CHAPTER XLIDISBANDING THE VOLUNTEERS

“If you [Craig] do not return with me, we shall go back as if our eyes were shut. I think my people will not go straight if Craig gets up from that place. But, my friend Craig, on account of the talking I have heard at this place, I am afraid for you.”

That afternoon Steptoe had a conference with the Indians, in which he declared: “My mission is pacific. I have come not to fight you, but to live among you. Come into my camp when you please. I trust we shall live together as friends,” and he appointed the next day for a fuller conference with the chiefs. By this action Steptoe intentionally repelled the governor’s wise recommendation and endeavor to “show the Indians the strength of our people and the unity of our councils.” Reports the governor:—

“Indeed, the Indians looked upon the Indian superintendent and the military officer as not representing a common cause. The former in the morning parts from them, having signally failed in making any arrangement to end the war; the latter speaks to the Indians as though there was no war, and therefore no necessity of making any arrangement at all.“The Indians, sharp-sighted and constantly on the alert from the merest trifles to draw conclusions as to character and policy, saw there did not exist between the Indian Department and the military the proper coöperation.”

“The Indians, sharp-sighted and constantly on the alert from the merest trifles to draw conclusions as to character and policy, saw there did not exist between the Indian Department and the military the proper coöperation.”

What next occurred is graphically related by the governor, in his report to Secretary of War Davis, as follows:—

I was occupied the remainder of the day and the next morning in establishing Craig’s agency in the neighborhood of Steptoe’s camp, and a little before noon, with some fifty friendly Nez Perces in charge of sub-agent Craig, I started with the train and Goff’s company for the Dalles.The Indians did not, however, come to see Steptoe at the time appointed. They previously set fire to his grass, and, following me as I set out about eleven o’clock on my way to the Dalles, they attacked me within three miles of Steptoe’s camp at about one o’clock in the afternoon.So satisfied was I that the Indians would carry into effect the determination avowed in their councils in their own camps for several nights previously to attack me, that in starting I formed my whole party, and moved in order of battle.I moved on under fire one mile to water, when, forming a corral of the wagons, and holding the adjacent hills and the brush on the stream by pickets, I made my arrangements to defend my position and fight the Indians. Our position in a low, open basin some five hundred or six hundred yards across was good, and with the aid of our corral we could defend ourselves against a vastly superior force of the enemy.The fight continued till late in the night. Two charges were made to disperse the Indians, the last led by Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw in person with twenty-four men, but whilst driving before him some one hundred and fifty Indians, an equal number pushed into his rear, and he was compelled to cut his way through them towards camp, when, drawing up his men, and aided by the teamsters and pickets, who gallantly sprang forward, he drove the Indians back when in full charge upon the corral.Just before the charge the friendly Nez Perces, fifty in number, who had been assigned to holding the ridge on the south side of the corral, were told by the enemy, “We came not to fight the Nez Perces, but the whites; go to your camp, or we wipe it out.” Their camp, with their women and children, was on a stream about a mile distant, upon which I directed the Nez Perces to retire, as I did not require their assistance, and I was fearful that my men might not be able to distinguish them from the hostiles, and thus friendly Indians might be killed.Towards night I notified Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe that I was fighting the Indians, that I should move the next morning, and expressed the opinion that a company of his troops would be of service. In his reply he stated that the Indians had burnt up his grass, and suggested that I should return to his camp, and place at his disposal my wagons, in order that he might move his whole command and his supplies to the Umatilla, or some other point, where sustenance could be found for his animals. To this arrangement I assented, and Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe sent to my camp Lieutenant Davidson with detachments from the companies of dragoons and artillery with a mountain howitzer. They reached my camp about two o’clock in the morning, where everything was in good order, and most of the men at the corral asleep. A picket had been driven in an hour and a half before by the enemy,—that on the hill south of the corral, but the enemy was immediately dislodged, and all the points were held, and ground-pits being dug.The howitzer having been fired on the way out, it was believed nothing would be gained by waiting till morning, and the whole force immediately returned to Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe’s camp.Soon after sunrise the enemy attacked his camp, but were soon dislodged by the howitzer, and a charge by a detachment from Steptoe’s command.On my arrival at the camp I urged Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe to build a blockhouse immediately, to leave one company to defend it with all his supplies,thento march below and return with an additional force and additional supplies, and by a vigorous winter campaign to whip the Indians into submission. I placed at his disposal for the building my teams and Indian employees.The blockhouse and stockade were built in a little more than two days. My Indian store-room was rebuilt at one corner of the stockade.In the action my whole force consisted of Goff’s company of sixty-nine men, the teamsters, herders, and Indian employees, numbering about fifty men, and the fifty Nez Perces. Our train consisted of about five hundred animals, not one of which was captured by the enemy. We fought four hundred and fiftyIndians, and had one man mortally, one dangerously, and two slightly wounded. We killed and wounded thirteen Indians.One half the Nez Perces, one hundred and twenty warriors, all of the Yakimas and Palouses, two hundred warriors, the great bulk of the Yakimas, Walla Wallas, and Umatillas were in the fight. The principal war chiefs were the son of Ow-hi and the Isle de Père chief, Quil-to-mee, the latter of whom had two horses shot under him, and who at the council showed me a letter from Colonel Wright acknowledging his valuable services in bringing about the peace of the Yakima.

The Indians did not, however, come to see Steptoe at the time appointed. They previously set fire to his grass, and, following me as I set out about eleven o’clock on my way to the Dalles, they attacked me within three miles of Steptoe’s camp at about one o’clock in the afternoon.

So satisfied was I that the Indians would carry into effect the determination avowed in their councils in their own camps for several nights previously to attack me, that in starting I formed my whole party, and moved in order of battle.

I moved on under fire one mile to water, when, forming a corral of the wagons, and holding the adjacent hills and the brush on the stream by pickets, I made my arrangements to defend my position and fight the Indians. Our position in a low, open basin some five hundred or six hundred yards across was good, and with the aid of our corral we could defend ourselves against a vastly superior force of the enemy.

The fight continued till late in the night. Two charges were made to disperse the Indians, the last led by Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw in person with twenty-four men, but whilst driving before him some one hundred and fifty Indians, an equal number pushed into his rear, and he was compelled to cut his way through them towards camp, when, drawing up his men, and aided by the teamsters and pickets, who gallantly sprang forward, he drove the Indians back when in full charge upon the corral.

Just before the charge the friendly Nez Perces, fifty in number, who had been assigned to holding the ridge on the south side of the corral, were told by the enemy, “We came not to fight the Nez Perces, but the whites; go to your camp, or we wipe it out.” Their camp, with their women and children, was on a stream about a mile distant, upon which I directed the Nez Perces to retire, as I did not require their assistance, and I was fearful that my men might not be able to distinguish them from the hostiles, and thus friendly Indians might be killed.

Towards night I notified Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe that I was fighting the Indians, that I should move the next morning, and expressed the opinion that a company of his troops would be of service. In his reply he stated that the Indians had burnt up his grass, and suggested that I should return to his camp, and place at his disposal my wagons, in order that he might move his whole command and his supplies to the Umatilla, or some other point, where sustenance could be found for his animals. To this arrangement I assented, and Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe sent to my camp Lieutenant Davidson with detachments from the companies of dragoons and artillery with a mountain howitzer. They reached my camp about two o’clock in the morning, where everything was in good order, and most of the men at the corral asleep. A picket had been driven in an hour and a half before by the enemy,—that on the hill south of the corral, but the enemy was immediately dislodged, and all the points were held, and ground-pits being dug.

The howitzer having been fired on the way out, it was believed nothing would be gained by waiting till morning, and the whole force immediately returned to Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe’s camp.

Soon after sunrise the enemy attacked his camp, but were soon dislodged by the howitzer, and a charge by a detachment from Steptoe’s command.

On my arrival at the camp I urged Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe to build a blockhouse immediately, to leave one company to defend it with all his supplies,thento march below and return with an additional force and additional supplies, and by a vigorous winter campaign to whip the Indians into submission. I placed at his disposal for the building my teams and Indian employees.

The blockhouse and stockade were built in a little more than two days. My Indian store-room was rebuilt at one corner of the stockade.

In the action my whole force consisted of Goff’s company of sixty-nine men, the teamsters, herders, and Indian employees, numbering about fifty men, and the fifty Nez Perces. Our train consisted of about five hundred animals, not one of which was captured by the enemy. We fought four hundred and fiftyIndians, and had one man mortally, one dangerously, and two slightly wounded. We killed and wounded thirteen Indians.

One half the Nez Perces, one hundred and twenty warriors, all of the Yakimas and Palouses, two hundred warriors, the great bulk of the Yakimas, Walla Wallas, and Umatillas were in the fight. The principal war chiefs were the son of Ow-hi and the Isle de Père chief, Quil-to-mee, the latter of whom had two horses shot under him, and who at the council showed me a letter from Colonel Wright acknowledging his valuable services in bringing about the peace of the Yakima.

In his report to the Indian Bureau the governor adds:

“The Indians were greatly surprised at Steptoe’s sending a force to my assistance, and Kam-i-ah-kan said on learning it, ‘I will let these men [referring to the regular troops] know who Kam-i-ah-kan is.’”

On the 23d the combined force, accompanied by Craig and the fifty Nez Perce auxiliaries, started for the Dalles, where they arrived on October 2 without incident of moment. Thus, as the governor remarks:—

“Circumstances had brought about the coöperation between the military and the Indian service which had not previously existed, and the words of Steptoe to the hostiles and mine to the friendly Indians corresponded. I had sent messengers to the Nez Perce country directing the friendly Nez Perces to separate from the hostile Nez Perces, and to keep the latter out of their portion of the country. Steptoe sent word that good Indians he would protect, and bad Indians he would punish.”

In truth, a great change had come over Steptoe’s views. The burning of his grass and the attack on his camp were too strong even for the orders of Wool and his own prejudices. He writes to Colonel Wright from his camp on the Umatilla, September 27:—

“In general terms I may say that in my judgment we are reduced to the necessity of waging a vigorous war, striking the Cuyuses at the Grande Ronde, and Kam-i-ah-kan wherever he may be found.”

The day before the attack on the governor, he wrote the same officer:—

“As it is, he [Governor Stevens] complains that I have, by not aiding him, or by not coöperating heartily with him, actually opposed him. This may be so, but I certainly have done for him all, and more than, my instructions warranted.”

The governor warmly commends—

“the admirable conduct of the volunteers and the Indian employees not only during the council, but in all the operations east of the Cascade Mountains.... There was not a single case of injury either to the person or the property of a friendly Indian, or of injury to the persons or property of the hostiles, during the council. The kindness and forbearance of officers and men, agents and employees, even when treated with rudeness by the hostiles, was extraordinary. The strayed cattle and horses of the Indians were restored to them. The volunteers were well supplied, and were not tempted to plunder for subsistence. I have the permission of Colonel Steptoe to refer to him and his officers as witnesses of what I have stated, and have the assurance from Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe that he has reported it to Colonel Wright, and of Colonel Wright that he has forwarded the report to General Wool.”

But Wool’s malignant animosity was not to be abated by the testimony of his own officers. He augmented his charges by declaring that Governor Stevens had called the council on purpose to force war upon the friendly Indians.

Immediately on reaching the Dalles, Governor Stevens renewed his demand upon Colonel Wright for the delivery of the Sound murderers for trial. Writes Wright in reply:—

“You know the circumstances under which the Indians referred to were permitted to come in and remain with the friendly Yakimas. Although I have made no promises that they should not be held to account for their former acts, yet in the present unsettled state of our Indian relations I think it would be unwise to seize them and transport them for trial. I would therefore respectfully suggest that the delivery of the Indians be suspended for the present.”

But the governor firmly reiterated his demand, declaring:—

“If the condition of things is so unsettled in the Yakima that the seizing of these men will lead to war, the sooner the war commences the better. Nothing in my judgment will be gained by a temporizing policy.”

The result was that Colonel Wright gave an order on Major Garnett, who commanded the post in the Yakima, to deliver up to the governor, for trial before the courts, Leschi, Nelson, Qui-e-muth, and Stahi.

But any embarrassment that might be caused to the peace on the Yakima by the execution of this order was very cleverly obviated by sending these Indians, or permitting them to go, back to the Sound country, and placing them under the protection of Colonel Casey, as will more fully appear hereafter.

On the 5th Wright and Steptoe started for the Walla Walla, their force being increased one company. One of Colonel Wright’s first acts on arriving there was to hold councils with the disaffected and hostile chiefs, the same who had so recently attacked the governor and the camp of his own officer, Steptoe, at which he assured them that “the bloody cloth should be washed, past differences thrown behind us, and perpetual friendship must exist between us.” He gave ready ear to their complaints and demands, adopted their views in regard to the Walla Walla treaties, and actually recommended that they never be confirmed. Lieutenant-Colonel Steptoe put forth a proclamation, by order of General Wool, forbidding all white settlers to return to the country except the missionaries and Hudson Bay Company people. Wool instructs Wright under date of October 19: “Warned by what hasoccurred, the general trusts you will be on your guard against the whites, ... and prevent further trouble by keeping the whites out of the Indian country.”

A month later Steptoe, who seems to have had doubts of the good faith of the Indians, and to apprehend that they might resume active hostilities in the spring, ventured to recommend that “a good industrious colony” be permitted to settle the Walla Walla valley, but Wool promptly negatived this suggestion, declaring that “the Cascade Range formed, if not an impassable barrier, an excellent line of defense, a most valuable wall of separation between two races always at war when in contact. To permit settlers to pass the Dalles and occupy the natural reserve is to give up this advantage, throw down this wall, and advance the frontier hundreds of miles to the east, and add to the protective labors of the army.” He charged Steptoe to carry out his orders strictly. Thus he joined hands with the Indian enemy to keep out American settlers from the region to which they had been especially invited by Congress by the Donation Acts, and strove to frustrate the policy of his own government of extinguishing the Indian title and settling up the country. Seldom has our history shown a more shameful betrayal of duty than this veteran officer and his subordinates making a quasi-peace by surrendering to the demands of the hostile Indians for the abrogation of the treaties they had accepted, and the exclusion of white settlers from their country, and seeking to lighten “the protective duties of the army” by abandoning the defense and protection of their own race.

Governor Stevens remained at the Dalles until the 6th, settling up the business of the expedition and the Indian service, when he proceeded down the river, and, after spending some days at Vancouver and Portland in discharge of his multifarious duties, reached Olympia on the 15th.

In his reports, both to the Indian Bureau and to Secretary of War Davis, Governor Stevens condemned with just severity this craven policy.

On learning of Colonel Wright’s pacific and sympathetic talks with the disaffected and hostile chiefs in the valley, he again protested to Secretary Davis in the following indignant strain:—

“It would seem that, to get the consent of Colonel Wright to take the ground that a treaty should not be insisted upon, it was simply necessary for the malcontents to attack the Superintendent of Indian Affairs and his party. Now, one half of the Nez Perce nation, including the head chief, Lawyer, wish the treaty to be carried out. They have suffered much from their steadfast adherence to it. Are their wishes to be disregarded?“It seems to me that we have in this Territory fallen upon evil times. I hope and trust some energetic action may be taken to stop this trifling with great public interests, and to make our flag respected by the Indians of the interior.”

“It seems to me that we have in this Territory fallen upon evil times. I hope and trust some energetic action may be taken to stop this trifling with great public interests, and to make our flag respected by the Indians of the interior.”

The following, from his report of October 22 to the Indian Department, sums up the mistaken policy of the regular officers and its deplorable results, and gives his opinion of those neutrals in the war, the Hudson Bay Company and the missionaries:—

The department is aware that for many months I have been of opinion that a large portion of the Nez Perces were on the verge of hostilities, and that I deplored the mistaken course of Colonel Wright in the Yakima as tending directly to inflame the whole interior and prepare it for war. The war commenced, on our part, in the Yakima, in consequence of the attempt to arrest the murderers of Bolon, Mattice, and others, killed without provocation and under circumstances of unsurpassed atrocity. Two expeditions were made to effect this object and to punish the tribe. After the massacre of the Cascades, the third expedition, under Colonel Wright, went to the Yakima with the avowed object of pacifying the Indians, and a quasi-peaceis made, and murderers are allowed to come into camp with impunity.No effort is made to strike the Indians when within reach, and they breathe nothing but war, and the result of the campaign is that, after the chiefs had refused to come into council as they had promised, and weeks are fruitlessly expended in the attempt to negotiate, certain Indians with their families come in, and the master spirits of these tribes, with the flower of the young men, go east of the Columbia to prepare for continuing the war.I state boldly and plainly to the authorities that this mode of managing affairs is disgraceful to the government, and will bring with it in the future the most bitter consequences to the character and prosperity of the people of this most remote portion of our country.The demand for the murderers should have been inflexibly insisted upon; the Indians should have been struck in battle and severely chastised. Then there would have been peace in the Yakima. There would not have been war in the interior.But feeble and procrastinating measures having been pursued, even to the extent of impressing the Indians with the belief that the regular troops were a distinct people from the Americans, and were even allies of the Indians, Kam-i-ah-kan and Looking Glass have effected that combination in the interior which I apprehended and predicted. The brilliant victory of the Grande Ronde, which caused for a time the lower Nez Perces to break from the war party, has proved unavailing.I have therefore determined to have no agent on the Spokane, believing, in view of certain influences there, to which I will briefly allude, his presence would not be beneficial.In times of peace the influence of the Catholic missionaries is good in that quarter, and their good offices are desirable till some outrage is committed, or war breaks out. But since the war has broken out, whilst they have made every exertion to protect individuals, and to prevent other tribes joining in the war, they have occupied a position which cannot be filled on earth,—a position between the hostiles and the Americans. So great has been their desire for peace that they have overlooked all right, propriety, justice, necessity, siding with the Indians,siding with the Americans, but advising the latter particularly to agree to all the demands of the former,—murderers to go free, treaties to be abrogated, whites to retire to the settlements. And the Indians, seeing that the missionaries are on their side, are fortified in the belief that they are fighting in a holy cause. I state on my official responsibility that the influence of the Catholic missionaries in the upper country has latterly been most baneful and pernicious.Again, what is the interest of the Hudson Bay Company? There are unquestionably large deposits of gold, both north and south of the 49th parallel, east of the Cascade Mountains. A road has been made connecting Fraser River with the British interior, and the Hudson Bay Company have established a post in connection therewith on the main Columbia, north of the 49th parallel. This post and Fort Colville were supplied over this road the present year.I ask again, what is the interest of the Hudson Bay Company? Most unquestionably to develop the British interior and its mines of gold, and to keep the Americans out, which will be most effectually accomplished by yielding to the demands of the Indians east of the Cascades, and making peace by an abandonment of the country.I charge no man of that company with collusion with the Indians, but I know what human nature is; it will look out sharply for its own interests, and the interest of the Hudson Bay Company is the same as the Indian conceives to be his interest in that quarter.It will be impossible for Dr. Lansdale to return to the Flathead agency this year; both the hostility of the Indians through whose country he would have to pass and the lateness of the season forbid it. I regret this, as the Flathead nation have stood firmly by the Blackfoot treaty, and take a proper view of the acts of the hostiles between the Cascades and the Bitter Root.Thus, sir, east of the main Columbia the result of the operations of the regular troops has been that I am compelled to withdraw all my agents, except that it is barely possible that Craig, when he reaches the Walla Walla valley on his return, may be able to go to the Nez Perce country.What is the remedy for this state of things? I answer, vigorous military operations,—the whipping of hostile Indians into absolute submission, the hanging of murderers on conviction, and the planting of these Indians on reserves established by Congress.

No effort is made to strike the Indians when within reach, and they breathe nothing but war, and the result of the campaign is that, after the chiefs had refused to come into council as they had promised, and weeks are fruitlessly expended in the attempt to negotiate, certain Indians with their families come in, and the master spirits of these tribes, with the flower of the young men, go east of the Columbia to prepare for continuing the war.

I state boldly and plainly to the authorities that this mode of managing affairs is disgraceful to the government, and will bring with it in the future the most bitter consequences to the character and prosperity of the people of this most remote portion of our country.

The demand for the murderers should have been inflexibly insisted upon; the Indians should have been struck in battle and severely chastised. Then there would have been peace in the Yakima. There would not have been war in the interior.

But feeble and procrastinating measures having been pursued, even to the extent of impressing the Indians with the belief that the regular troops were a distinct people from the Americans, and were even allies of the Indians, Kam-i-ah-kan and Looking Glass have effected that combination in the interior which I apprehended and predicted. The brilliant victory of the Grande Ronde, which caused for a time the lower Nez Perces to break from the war party, has proved unavailing.

I have therefore determined to have no agent on the Spokane, believing, in view of certain influences there, to which I will briefly allude, his presence would not be beneficial.

In times of peace the influence of the Catholic missionaries is good in that quarter, and their good offices are desirable till some outrage is committed, or war breaks out. But since the war has broken out, whilst they have made every exertion to protect individuals, and to prevent other tribes joining in the war, they have occupied a position which cannot be filled on earth,—a position between the hostiles and the Americans. So great has been their desire for peace that they have overlooked all right, propriety, justice, necessity, siding with the Indians,siding with the Americans, but advising the latter particularly to agree to all the demands of the former,—murderers to go free, treaties to be abrogated, whites to retire to the settlements. And the Indians, seeing that the missionaries are on their side, are fortified in the belief that they are fighting in a holy cause. I state on my official responsibility that the influence of the Catholic missionaries in the upper country has latterly been most baneful and pernicious.

Again, what is the interest of the Hudson Bay Company? There are unquestionably large deposits of gold, both north and south of the 49th parallel, east of the Cascade Mountains. A road has been made connecting Fraser River with the British interior, and the Hudson Bay Company have established a post in connection therewith on the main Columbia, north of the 49th parallel. This post and Fort Colville were supplied over this road the present year.

I ask again, what is the interest of the Hudson Bay Company? Most unquestionably to develop the British interior and its mines of gold, and to keep the Americans out, which will be most effectually accomplished by yielding to the demands of the Indians east of the Cascades, and making peace by an abandonment of the country.

I charge no man of that company with collusion with the Indians, but I know what human nature is; it will look out sharply for its own interests, and the interest of the Hudson Bay Company is the same as the Indian conceives to be his interest in that quarter.

It will be impossible for Dr. Lansdale to return to the Flathead agency this year; both the hostility of the Indians through whose country he would have to pass and the lateness of the season forbid it. I regret this, as the Flathead nation have stood firmly by the Blackfoot treaty, and take a proper view of the acts of the hostiles between the Cascades and the Bitter Root.

Thus, sir, east of the main Columbia the result of the operations of the regular troops has been that I am compelled to withdraw all my agents, except that it is barely possible that Craig, when he reaches the Walla Walla valley on his return, may be able to go to the Nez Perce country.

What is the remedy for this state of things? I answer, vigorous military operations,—the whipping of hostile Indians into absolute submission, the hanging of murderers on conviction, and the planting of these Indians on reserves established by Congress.

Agent Craig did return to Lapwai at the request of the Lawyer.

The soundness of Governor Stevens’s views and the accuracy of his foresight were abundantly vindicated within two years. During the following year, 1857, the settlers were excluded, the regulars lay inactive in their posts, and the quasi-peace continued. But in 1858 the Yakimas waxed too insolent and predatory for even Wright’s patience. He sent Major Garnett through their country with a large force, who summarily seized and hanged a number of the chiefs and warriors, shot seven hundred of their ponies, and these severe acts humbled the haughty savages and reduced them to good behavior at last.

Colonel Wright also ordered Steptoe, with two hundred dragoons, to advance from Walla Walla across Snake River towards Spokane. The Spokanes had warned the troops not to invade their country, alleging that they were neutral, and would permit neither the Yakima braves nor the white soldiers to enter their limits. Disregarding this warning, Steptoe marched some eighty miles north of the Snake, when he was assailed by the whole force of the Spokanes and Cœur d’Alenes, badly defeated, and driven in precipitate retreat the whole distance back to Snake River, hotly pursued by the victorious Indians, and his force was only saved from massacre by the friendly Nez Perces, who ferried the fugitive troops over the river in their canoes, and boldly interposed between them and the pursuing savages.

As soon as he could organize a powerful force, ColonelWright in September, two months later, marched to the Spokane in person, encountered and defeated the Indians near the scene of Steptoe’s defeat, and reduced them to submission, hanging a number of them offhand without trial, and killing many of their horses. On his return to Walla Walla he seized and executed in like manner several of the more turbulent Cuyuse and Walla Walla warriors. And this was the end of Wool’s theory of peaceable and injured Indians, and the prejudiced officers, who clung to it so long and so obstinately, were at length obliged to adopt the very policy that Governor Stevens urged upon them in the beginning.

The Yakima chief, Ow-hi, most active next to Kam-i-ah-kan in bringing on the war and inciting the other tribes to hostility, and cunning and treacherous in his diplomacy, boldly entered Wright’s camp on the Spokane soon after the fight, and was forthwith arrested and held a prisoner by that commander. The next day Ow-hi’s son, Qualchen,—the murderer of agent Bolon,—rode into camp, putting on a bold face and fully expecting to be treated with the consideration formerly shown the Yakima chiefs. Far different was his fate. Wright sternly ordered him to immediate execution, and the wretched brave was forthwith hanged by the guard, despite his frantic pleadings and protestations. His father, the chief Ow-hi, was killed a few days later while attempting to escape. But Wool and his parasites, so vociferous in denouncing the slaying of Pu-pu-mox-mox under like circumstances, raised no voice in rebuke of the merciless severity of Wright.

On returning to Olympia the governor issued the order disbanding the entire volunteer organization, and took the necessary steps for disposing at public auction of the animals, equipments, and supplies on hand, and settling the accounts. The animals captured by Shaw in the Grande Ronde were sold at Vancouver, and brought enough to defray the entire cost of the expedition. In fact, owing to the large number taken, there were more animals actually sold at the several auctions than the whole number purchased for the volunteer service, notwithstanding the many worn out during the months of hard service. The sales of property realized some $150,000, and the articles sold generally brought more than the original cost. “I trust,” remarked the governor, “that in view of the fact that our transportation has cost us nothing, that our people have let their animals go into the service from three to nine months, and have taken them back at a premium, the enemies of the Territory will be more guarded in their speech.” As all the expenses of the volunteer organization had been defrayed by scrip, the sales were made for scrip, and many of the settler-volunteers were glad to purchase stock, wagons, or supplies to take home with them, instead of paper promises to pay, yet at that time the scrip was but little depreciated.

An incident showing the scrupulous regard for orders and public property maintained among the volunteers isrelated of Captain Henness. He captured a mule at the battle of the Grande Ronde and rode it home to Olympia, a distance of some five hundred miles. Desirous of owning the animal, he bid for it when put up at the public auction, but it was struck off to another for $475; and this brave officer, who had served in the field as captain of a company for ten months, was unable to secure his own riding mule, and one, too, captured by himself.

When the accounts were finally adjusted, the scrip issued amounted to—

The aggregate number of volunteers was 1896. About one thousand were in service at one time. They were about equally divided between mounted and infantry troops. Oregon furnished 215,—the companies of Miller, Goff, and Richards (afterwards Williams). As the whites capable of bearing arms in the entire Territory did not exceed 1700, it is evident that this aid from Oregon was of great value.

Thirty-five stockades, forts, and blockhouses were built by the volunteers, some of them being quite large works, twenty-three by the settlers, and seven by the regular troops. Besides which, the roads and trails cut by the volunteers involved an immense amount of labor.

The strict discipline, highmoraleand good conduct of the volunteers were remarkable, and very creditable to them, and to the firm and sagacious mind that organized and commanded them. All captured property was turned over to the quartermasters, and properly accounted for. There was no case of murder, or unauthorized killing of Indians, by the volunteers. There was no plundering or serious offenses of any kind charged upon them. Theyobeyed their orders with alacrity and zeal, no matter how arduous or how dangerous the duty required of them. They were the best type of American settlers, brave, intelligent, patriotic, self-respecting. They went into the war in self-defense, and were determined to put it through as soon as possible.

Study the maps of their marches and scouts; count the blockhouses they built, the roads and trails they opened; consider the unknown and almost impenetrable forest region the theatre of war; the rains; the hardships, the labors they underwent; and reflect how uniformly successful they were, not only in engagements, but in throwing the savage enemy wholly on the defensive, in completely putting an end to his attacks and depredations, and hunting him down so vigorously that only flight or submission could save him from death,—and one cannot but realize how necessary were their patriotic services and achievements, and how well they justified the wisdom and ability of Governor Stevens in calling them to the defense of the country, and carrying on an aggressive war.

FORTS AND BLOCKHOUSES BUILT BY VOLUNTEERS.

BY SETTLERS FOR MUTUAL PROTECTION.

BY REGULAR TROOPS.

A few days after his return Governor Stevens was requested by Colonel Casey to take charge of a band of about a hundred lately hostile Sound Indians who had recently returned, or been sent back, from the Yakima. The colonel complained that he had already sent them to the reservation, but the agent had refused to receive them, and, in order to prevent any disturbance that might arise from the “strange conduct of your agent,” he had again received and was feeding them. The governor, having learned that Stahi and other known murderers were with this band, and that Leschi had been recently seen near Fort Nisqually, the Hudson Bay Company post, at once replied, positively refusing to receive them until the murderers among them were arrested for trial, and formally demanded Colonel Casey’s aid to that end:—

“I have therefore to request your aid in apprehending Leschi, Qui-e-muth, Kitsap, Stahi, and Nelson, and other murderers, and to keep them in custody awaiting a warrant from the nearest magistrate, which being accomplished, I will receive the remainder.“In conclusion, I have to state that I do not believe any country or any age has afforded an example of the kindness and justice which has been shown towards the Indians by the suffering inhabitants of the Sound during the recent troubles. They have, in spite of the few cases of murder which have occurred, shown themselves eminently a law-abiding, a just, and a forbearing people. They desire the murderers of Indians to be punished, but they complain, and they have a right to complain, if Indians, whose hands are steeped in the blood of the innocent, go unwhipped of justice.”

“In conclusion, I have to state that I do not believe any country or any age has afforded an example of the kindness and justice which has been shown towards the Indians by the suffering inhabitants of the Sound during the recent troubles. They have, in spite of the few cases of murder which have occurred, shown themselves eminently a law-abiding, a just, and a forbearing people. They desire the murderers of Indians to be punished, but they complain, and they have a right to complain, if Indians, whose hands are steeped in the blood of the innocent, go unwhipped of justice.”

In response to this Colonel Casey declared that these Indians “delivered themselves up to Colonel Wright when in the Yakima country, made their peace with him, and were promised protection. Colonel Wright informed me of these facts.” He declined, therefore, to assist in arresting the murderers, on the ground that it would be bad policy, if not bad faith, to do so, and added that he would refer the matter to General Wool. He also remarked: “The Indians on the Sound, there is no doubt, can, by neglect and ill-usage, be driven to desperation.”

The governor controverted the position assumed by Colonel Casey that protection had been promised these Indians by Colonel Wright, and renewed his demand:—

“I have the statement to me by Colonel Wright that he had made no terms with them, and had guaranteed to them no immunity from trial and punishment. This statement was made to me repeatedly by Colonel Wright, and in the presence of witnesses, one of whom is Mr. Secretary Mason. On the contrary, I have twice in writing made requisition on Colonel Wright for the delivery to me, in order that they might be brought within reach of the civil authorities, of Leschi, Qui-e-muth, Kitsap, Stahi, and Nelson,—a requisition which he hasnot pretended to disregard, but which he simply asked my consent to have suspended for the present in view of the circumstances under which they came in. I renew my requisition upon you, as I did upon Colonel Wright, and I inclose for your information the correspondence with Colonel Wright in relation to the subject.“Granted that it was a case of legitimate warfare, the men for whom I make requisition committed the murders in a time of profound peace, wider circumstances of unsurpassed treachery and barbarity, when their victims were entirely unsuspicious of danger, and this, too, in violation of the faith of treaties, which expressly stipulated for the giving up of men guilty of such offenses.“Nor is there any analogy between the cases of known Indians who have murdered white men and certain unknown white men who have murdered Indians. Your soldiers killed an Indian. Where are they? The citizens have killed Indians. Where are they? Two are in your own garrison in confinement awaiting trial; and the others,—proof has not yet been found, after every exertion has been made to insure a bill from a grand jury in regard to the persons suspected.“I do not understand, in view of the known humanity and energy of the Indian service on the Sound, aided as it has been by the body of the citizens, the necessity, in communications to me, of this constant reference to the ill-treatment of the Indians, for it must be borne in mind that we have managed some four thousand five hundred Indians on temporary reservations on the Sound during the war. Indians taken from the war ground, by unwearied vigilance and care, have been seen to pass from a state of uncertainty as to whether they would join the war party, to one of contentment and satisfaction, with no assistance from the military whatever.”

“Granted that it was a case of legitimate warfare, the men for whom I make requisition committed the murders in a time of profound peace, wider circumstances of unsurpassed treachery and barbarity, when their victims were entirely unsuspicious of danger, and this, too, in violation of the faith of treaties, which expressly stipulated for the giving up of men guilty of such offenses.

“Nor is there any analogy between the cases of known Indians who have murdered white men and certain unknown white men who have murdered Indians. Your soldiers killed an Indian. Where are they? The citizens have killed Indians. Where are they? Two are in your own garrison in confinement awaiting trial; and the others,—proof has not yet been found, after every exertion has been made to insure a bill from a grand jury in regard to the persons suspected.

“I do not understand, in view of the known humanity and energy of the Indian service on the Sound, aided as it has been by the body of the citizens, the necessity, in communications to me, of this constant reference to the ill-treatment of the Indians, for it must be borne in mind that we have managed some four thousand five hundred Indians on temporary reservations on the Sound during the war. Indians taken from the war ground, by unwearied vigilance and care, have been seen to pass from a state of uncertainty as to whether they would join the war party, to one of contentment and satisfaction, with no assistance from the military whatever.”

The governor also sent Colonel Casey a copy of Colonel Wright’s order on Major Garnett to deliver up the murderers.

This correspondence seems to raise an ugly question of veracity between the two regular officers in regard to whether protection had or had not been promised theSound murderers, but the strenuous efforts to shield them from punishment for their crimes made by these officers is passing strange.

Colonel Casey persisted in his refusal, saying: “This is a case in which the rights and usages of war are somewhat involved, and in consequence I consider myself and military superiors the proper persons to judge in the matter,” and he referred it to General Wool. That officer, of course, swiftly directed him to protect Leschi, and all other Indians professing friendship, against the whites.

A few days later Colonel Casey again referred to the case of the Indians, suggested that the reports which his agents and others carried to the governor should be received with great caution, and remarked:—

“The one which I had the honor to receive from you a few days since, that more than one hundred Indians had left the reservation for the purpose of joining Leschi, proves to have been, what I believed at the time, a baseless fabrication. With a sincere desire to do justice to all, I will say that it is my firm belief, after weighing I trust with due consideration all the circumstances connected with the matter, that if, in dealing with the Indians on the Sound, a spirit of justice is exercised, and those who have charge of them are actuated by an eye single to their duties and the peace of the country, there need be no further difficulty.”

This unwarrantable slur called forth the following pungent reply from the governor. He had made no such report as Casey attributed to him:—

Lieutenant-Colonel Silas Casey.Sir,—My reasons for declining to receive the Indians at your post have been already stated, and remain in full force. When the murderers, and those accused of murder, are, in compliance with my requisition, placed by you in the hands of the civil authority, the Indians will be received. The agents have positive orders to receive none of these Indians except by mywritten instructions. The Indians have been or will be indicted by the grand jury of the several counties. As you have proclaimed that hostilities have ceased, they are in your military possession.In regard to your observations about the reports which my “agents and others carry to me,” as well as the reiterations of former observations in reference to the exercise of a spirit of justice, and the efforts of persons in charge of Indians being “actuated by an eye single to those duties and the peace of the country,” I have simply to state that the tone of them is offensive, and comes with an ill grace from the authority which has done little to that which has done much. It is not my disposition to retaliate, but the occasion makes it proper for me to state that the greatest difficulty I have had to encounter in stopping the whiskey traffic with the Indians at Steilacoom and Bellingham Bay has been the conduct of your own command. It would seem to be more appropriate that you should first control and reform the conduct of your own people, before going out of your way to instruct and rebuke another branch of the public service,—a service, too, which, both from its experience and the success which has attended its labors, is entitled to the presumption that it is as much interested in, and as much devoted to, the peace of the country as yourself, and as well qualified, to say the least, to consider dispassionately and to judge wisely of affairs at the present juncture.I have also been informed of your thanking God, in the presence of Mr. Wells, who informed you how the Muckleshoot reservation was laid off, that the iniquity of it was not upon your hands,—a remark highly presumptuous and insulting, as well from the fact that the business did not concern you, as from the fact that the reservation was laid off both in the way I arranged with the Indians at the council on Fox Island and to their entire satisfaction on the ground.Very respectfully your obedient servant,Isaac I. Stevens,Governor and Supt. Indian Affairs.N.B. I will respectfully ask you to send me a copy of my letter notifying you that one hundred Indians had left to join Leschi.

Lieutenant-Colonel Silas Casey.

Sir,—My reasons for declining to receive the Indians at your post have been already stated, and remain in full force. When the murderers, and those accused of murder, are, in compliance with my requisition, placed by you in the hands of the civil authority, the Indians will be received. The agents have positive orders to receive none of these Indians except by mywritten instructions. The Indians have been or will be indicted by the grand jury of the several counties. As you have proclaimed that hostilities have ceased, they are in your military possession.

In regard to your observations about the reports which my “agents and others carry to me,” as well as the reiterations of former observations in reference to the exercise of a spirit of justice, and the efforts of persons in charge of Indians being “actuated by an eye single to those duties and the peace of the country,” I have simply to state that the tone of them is offensive, and comes with an ill grace from the authority which has done little to that which has done much. It is not my disposition to retaliate, but the occasion makes it proper for me to state that the greatest difficulty I have had to encounter in stopping the whiskey traffic with the Indians at Steilacoom and Bellingham Bay has been the conduct of your own command. It would seem to be more appropriate that you should first control and reform the conduct of your own people, before going out of your way to instruct and rebuke another branch of the public service,—a service, too, which, both from its experience and the success which has attended its labors, is entitled to the presumption that it is as much interested in, and as much devoted to, the peace of the country as yourself, and as well qualified, to say the least, to consider dispassionately and to judge wisely of affairs at the present juncture.

I have also been informed of your thanking God, in the presence of Mr. Wells, who informed you how the Muckleshoot reservation was laid off, that the iniquity of it was not upon your hands,—a remark highly presumptuous and insulting, as well from the fact that the business did not concern you, as from the fact that the reservation was laid off both in the way I arranged with the Indians at the council on Fox Island and to their entire satisfaction on the ground.

Very respectfully your obedient servant,

Isaac I. Stevens,Governor and Supt. Indian Affairs.

N.B. I will respectfully ask you to send me a copy of my letter notifying you that one hundred Indians had left to join Leschi.

It is perhaps creditable to Colonel Casey’s discretion that he attempted no reply to this letter, but simply acknowledged its receipt, and admitted that, in attributing the report about Leschi to the governor, “it was an error on my part, and I cheerfully correct it.” A thoroughly well-meaning man, he was evidently affected by Wool’s orders and influence; and, moreover, he suffered himself to give ear to, and was consequently misled by, the clique of lawyers and politicians who had instigated the martial law trouble in order to embarrass the governor, and were now hounding him with unabated rancor.

Notwithstanding Casey’s scruples and Wool’s orders, Leschi and other accused murderers were duly indicted, arrested, and delivered to and received by Colonel Casey for custody at Fort Steilacoom, and thereupon the governor relieved him of his unwelcome protégés by sending them to the reservation. Leschi was tried in due time, but the jury disagreed. He was convicted at a subsequent trial, and expiated his crimes on the gallows. The regular officers at Fort Steilacoom, with certain lawyers and Indian sympathizers, made desperate efforts to save him from punishment, but in vain. The well-meaning Casey was even hanged in effigy by the people, indignant at his course.

Leschi’s brother, Qui-e-muth, was captured near Yelm prairie, November 18, and brought to the governor’s office in Olympia at midnight. The governor gave strict orders for guarding and protecting him there until morning, when he was to be taken to Steilacoom. Just before daylight, as he was sleeping on the floor, surrounded by his guards, who were also asleep, a man rushed into the room, the door being unlocked, shot Qui-e-muth in the arm with a pistol, and, as he rose to his feet, drove a bowie knife into his heart, and rushed out as suddenly as he had entered. The deed was done, the assassin vanished, the victim sank lifeless to the floor, all in an instant, ere the startled and astonished guards could raise a hand to protect their charge. The governor, who had retired to rest in his quarters in the next building, aroused by the shot and the trampling of feet, came immediately to the scene, and was horror-struck and filled with indignation at the crime, and denounced it in unmeasured terms as a disgrace to the good name of the people and of the Territory. He made every effort to identify and punish the murderer, but without avail. None of the guards could identify him, and no testimony could be found against any one. Yet it was currently whispered that vengeance for the murder of McAlister, a settler on the Nisqually and one of the earliest victims of savage treachery, had nerved the arm of his son-in-law, Joseph Bunting, to strike the blow.

Nothing that occurred during the whole war excited greater indignation in the mind of the governor than this act, or caused him more regret and chagrin. He had been unremitting in his efforts to protect the Indians from lawless violence, and with such remarkable success that the volunteers were wholly free from reproach; only six cases had occurred among the exasperated settlers, and several of these he had brought to trial. And now this dastardly deed brought reproach to his very door.

During all the Indian outbreak and hostilities a number of Hudson Bay Company ex-employees, Scotchmen and Canadians, were living in the Indian country back of Steilacoom in safety, when every American settler was murdered, or had fled to the towns. They had Indian wives and half-breed children, and claimed to be neutral. They were in frequent communication with the hostile Indians, and were not molested by them. Captain Maxon and other officers reported that they were undoubtedly giving information, aid, and comfort to the enemy, and that their scouting expeditions were fruitless in consequence. The Indians who killed White and Northcraft in March so near Olympia were tracked straight to the houses of two of these neutrals, who acknowledged having been visited by the savages, but disclaimed any knowledge of their deeds. The volunteer officers, however, believed that they were not only sympathizers with, but active allies of, the hostiles, and were ready at the least intimation from the governor to treat them as hostiles. Colonel Casey declared that they ought not to be suffered to remain on their farms, where they could aid the enemy, if so disposed. The governor therefore ordered them to leave the Indian country and remove to Olympia, Fort Nisqually, or Steilacoom, and there remain until further orders, in order to place them where they would be unable to give information or aid to the enemy, and also for their own safety, for the indignation of the volunteers was at white heat against them. Accordingly they moved in as ordered, twelve of them.

Most of them had already taken out their first naturalization papers, and filed on their claims under the Donation Acts, and were entitled to all the rights of American citizens. A few lawyers at Steilacoom, political or personal opponents of the governor, most active of whom was Frank Clark, saw here a chance to embarrass him,—in their own vernacular, “to get him down.” They went to these ignorant men, exhorted them in regard to their rights as citizens, assured them that the governor had no authority to order them to abandon their claims, which Congress had bestowed upon them, and that they could return to their homes with safety, because the law and the courts would protect them in so doing. Thus persuaded, five of these misguided men, Charles Wren, Sandy Smith, John McLeod, Henry Smith, and John McField, went back to their farms. As soon as informed of their return, the governor caused them to be seized by a party of volunteers, taken to Fort Steilacoom, and turned over to Colonel Casey for safe custody, there being no jails in the Territory.

Clark and his coadjutors lost no time in suing out a writ of habeas corpus. They represented matters to Colonel Casey in such a light that he notified the governor to relieve him of the prisoners. But the governor was not the man to suffer a few political tricksters to frustrate his necessary military measures. He well knew that if he surrendered in this case, he would have to abandon the practice, indispensable for carrying on the war, of impressing teams and supplies, and that his hold upon and discipline of the volunteers would be seriously impaired. On April 3 he proclaimedmartial lawover the county of Pierce, and suspended the functions of all civil officers therein. He caused the prisoners to betaken from the custody of Colonel Casey, brought to Olympia, and incarcerated in a blockhouse.

As the regular May term of the United States Court for Pierce County drew near, the mischief-makers were urgent for Judge F.A. Chenoweth, of whose district that county formed part, to hold court and enforce the writ of habeas corpus; but he, being sick, or else, as was currently believed at the time, fearing trouble and feigning sickness, requested Chief Justice Edward Lander to hold the term in his stead. Judge Lander at the time was captain of Company A, and with his company was garrisoning the post on the Duwhamish, near Seattle; but without a word of notice to his military superiors he forsook his post, hastened to Steilacoom, and opened court on May 7. The governor previously urged him to adjourn his court for one month, by which time there was every prospect that the Indians would be subdued, and the exigency necessitating the restraint of the prisoners would have passed. But Lander refused this way of avoiding a conflict, and persisted in what he doubtless deemed his duty.

The governor resolutely met the issue thus raised. The court was duly opened on the appointed day, the lawyers were ready with their motions, when a detachment of volunteers under Lieutenant-Colonel Shaw marched into the court-room, arrested the chief justice on the bench and the clerk at his table, and carried them under guard to Olympia, where they were released.

As soon as the detachment had departed with the prisoner judge and clerk, the clique, which had so cunningly engineered this conflict between the federal governor and the federal judge, both commissioned by the same President, made haste to hold a meeting of the “bar,” vociferously to denounce the “flagrant usurpation and high-handed outrage” of the governor, and topass a long string of condemnatory resolutions, which were signed by all the members participating in the meeting, nine in number. Immediately afterwards the same parties held a “citizens’ meeting” with a few others in the same room, and gave vent to more vituperative oratory, and passed more denunciatory resolutions. The whole proceedings were then published in a circular and in the newspapers. Undoubtedly some who took part in these demonstrations were sincere in believing the governor’s action to be wrong and uncalled for, but the real motives and animus of the prime movers were abundantly shown by the false, bitter, and scandalous statements and affidavits they made against him, and dispatched to the President, committees of Congress, and the Eastern press. They vehemently accused him not only of high-handed tyranny and usurpation, but of getting up the war by his Indian treaties, which he had made in obedience to the instructions of the government; of vindictively oppressing and persecuting the Indians, when he was feeding five thousand of them on the reservations, and standing like a rock to protect them from abuse; and even of drunkenness and embezzlement of public funds. These charges, from their very excess and bitterness, largely defeated themselves with the government, and with all by whom Governor Stevens was personally known; but they excited a deep prejudice against him in the minds of many, as he afterwards found in his congressional career. Wool, too, welcomed with avidity these reinforcements to his crusade, and immediately forwarded copies of the resolutions, together with anonymous articles reflecting on the governor, to the War Department.

The signers of the resolutions were: W.H. Wallace, George Gibbs, Elwood Evans, C.C. Hewitt, Frank Clark, B.F. Kendall, William C. Peas, E.O. Murden, H.A. Goldsborough.Wallace and Gibbs were the principal speakers at the citizens’ meeting; Thomas M. Chambers, chairman; E. Schrotter and E.M. Meeker, secretaries; S. McCaw, R. S. Moore, Hugh Patteson, William M. Kincaid, William R. Downey, committee on resolutions.

Evans and Kendall came among the aides whom Governor Stevens brought to the country with the Northern exploration, and who settled in Olympia. The former became distinguished as an eloquent speaker and writer and historian of the Pacific Northwest, and, in after-years, paid the most warm, heartfelt, and appreciative eulogies to Governor Stevens’s character and public services. Gibbs and Goldsborough, whom it will be remembered the governor had employed in the Indian service and treated with great kindness and consideration, were unsuccessful and disappointed men. The former nursed a grievance, in that the governor had rejected an extensive and ambitious policy of Indian treaties and Indian management which Gibbs had elaborately set forth in his report on the Indians, and which, if accepted, would probably have furnished a good position for himself.

The circular contained many misstatements, and was highly colored to give a wrong impression of the actual condition of affairs. To correct this, the governor published his vindication for proclaiming and enforcing martial law in Pierce County. In this he clearly and forcibly states the facts and conditions rendering it necessary, for the success of military operations, that the suspected men be removed from the Indian country, and sums up:—

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