FOOTNOTES:

Conditions did not improve in the following year, for we find Washington again writing to his brother of "militia, who are here today and gone tomorrow—whose way, like the ways of [Pr]ovidence, are almost inscrutable."[265]Baron von Steuben testifies thus: "The eternal ebb and flow of men ... who went and came every day, rendered it impossible to have either a regiment or company complete.... I have seen a regiment consisting ofthirty menand a company ofone corporal."[266]Even Thomas Paine, the arch-enemy of anything resembling a regular or "standing" army, finally declared that militia "will not do for a long campaign."[267]Marshall thus describes the predicament in which Washington was placed by the inconstancy of this will-o'-the-wisp soldiery: "He was often abandoned by bodies of militia, before their places were filled by others.... The soldiers carried off arms and blankets."[268]

Bad as the militia were,[269]the States did not keep up even this happy-go-lucky branch of the army. "It is a matter of astonishment," savagely wrote Washington to the President of Pennsylvania, two months before Valley Forge, "to every part of the continent, to hear that Pennsylvania, the most opulent and populous of all the States, has but twelve hundred militia in the field, at a time when the enemy are endeavoring to make themselves completely masters of, and to fix their winter quarters in, her capital."[270]Even in the Continental line, it appears, Pennsylvania's quota had "never been above one third full; and now many of them are far below even that."[271]

Washington's wrath at Pennsylvania fairly blazed at this time, and the next day he wrote to Augustine Washington that "this State acts most infamously, the People of it, I mean, as we derive little or no assistance from them.... They are in a manner, totally disaffected or in a kind of Lethargy."[272]

The head of the American forces was not the only patriot officer to complain. "The Pennsylvania Associators [militia] ... are deserting ... notwithstanding the most spirited exertions of their officers," reported General Livingston in the midsummer of 1776.[273]General Lincoln and the Massachusetts Committee tried hard to keep the militia of the Bay State from going home; but, moaned Lee, "whether they will succeed, Heaven only knows."[274]

General Sullivan determined to quit the service because of abuse and ill-treatment.[275]For the same reason Schuyler proposed to resign.[276]These were not examples of pique; they denoted a general sentiment among officers who, in addition to their sufferings, beheld their future through none too darkened glasses. They "not only have the Mortification to See every thing live except themselves," wrote one minor officer in 1778, "but they see their private fortune wasting away to make fat those very Miscreants [speculators] ... they See their Country ... refuse to make any future provision for them, or even to give them the Necessary Supplies."[277]

Thousands of the Continentals were often practically naked; Chastellux found several hundred in an invalid camp, not because they were ill, but because "they were not covered even with rags."[278]"Our sick naked, and well naked, our unfortunate men in captivity naked"! wailed Washington in1777.[279]Two days before Christmas of that year he informed Congress that, of the force then under his immediate command, nearly three thousand were "barefoot and otherwise naked."[280]Sickness was general and appalling. Smallpox raged throughout the army even from the first.[281]"The Regimental Surgeons are immediately to make returns ... of all the men in their Regiments, who have not had the small Pox,"[282]read the orders of the day just after New Year's Day, in 1778.

Six years after Concord and Lexington, three hundred American soldiers, in a body, wished to join the British.[283]Stern measures were taken to prevent desertion and dishonesty and even to enforce the most ordinary duties of soldiers. "In the afternoon three of our regṭwere flogged;—2 of them received one hundred lashes apiece for attempting to desert; the other received 80 for enlisting twice and taking two bounties,"[284]Wild coolly enters in his diary. And again: "This afternoon one of our men was hanged on the grand parade for attempting to desert to the enemy";[285]and "at 6 ockP.M.a soldier of Col. Gimatts Battalion was hanged."

Sleeping on duty meant "Twenty Lashes on ...[the] bare back" of the careless sentry.[286]A soldier convicted of "getting drunk & losing his Arms" was "Sentenc'd to receive 100 Lashes on his bare back, & pay for his Arms lost."[287]A man who, in action, "turns his back on the Enemy" was ordered to be "instantly put ... to Death" by the officers.[288]At Yorktown in May, 1781, Wayne ordered a platoon to fire on twelve soldiers who were persuading their comrades not to march; six were killed and one wounded, who was, by Wayne's command, enforced by a cocked pistol, then finished with the bayonet thrust into the prostrate soldier by a comrade.[289]

Such was the rough handling practiced in the scanty and ill-treated army of individualists which Washington made shift to rally to the patriot colors.[290]It was not an encouraging omen. But blacker still was the disorganizing effect of local control of the various "State Lines" which the pompous authority of the newborn "sovereign and independent" Commonwealths asserted.[291]

Into this desperate confusion came the young Virginia lieutenant. Was this the manner of liberty? Was this the way a people fighting for their freedom confronted their enemy? The dreams he had dreamed, the visions he had seen back in his Virginia mountains were clad in glories as enchanting as the splendors of their tree-clad summits at break of day—dreams and visions for which strong men should be glad of the privilege of dying if thereby they might be won as realities for all the people. And indeed at this time, and in the even deadlier days that followed, young John Marshall found strong men by his side willing to die and to go through worse than death to make their great dream come true.

But why thus decrepit, the organization called the American army? Why this want of food even for such of the soldiers as were willing and eager to fight for their country? Why this scanty supply of arms? Why this avoidable sickness, this needless suffering, this frightful waste? What was the matter? Something surely was at fault. It must be in the power that assumed to direct the patriot army. But whence came that power? From Congress? No. Congress had no power; after a while, it did not even have influence. From the States? Yes; that was its source—there was plenty of power in the States.

But what kind of power, and how displayed? One State did one thing; another State did another thing.[292]One State clothed its troops well; anothersent no supplies at all.[293]One regiment of Maryland militia had no shirts and the men wrapped blankets about their bare bodies.[294]One day State troops would come into camp, and the next day leave. How could war be conducted, how could battles be fought and won, through such freakish, uncertain power as that?

But how could this vaunted liberty, which orators had proclaimed and which Lieutenant Marshall himself had lauded to his frontier companions in arms, be achieved except by a well-organized army, equipped, supplied, and directed by a competent central Government? This was the talk common among the soldiers of the Continental establishment in which John Marshall was a lieutenant. In less than two years after he entered the regular service, even officers, driven to madness and despair by the pusillanimous weakness of Congress, openly denounced that body; and the soldiers themselves, who saw their wounds and sufferings coming to naught, cursed that sham and mockery which the jealousy and shallowness of State provincialism had set up in place of a National Government.[295]

All through the latter half of 1776, LieutenantMarshall of the Third Virginia Regiment marched, suffered, retreated and advanced, and performed his duties without complaint. He did more. At this time, when, to keep up the sinking spirits of the men was almost as important as was ammunition, young Marshall was the soul of good humor and of cheer; and we shall find him in a few months heartening his starving and freezing comrades at Valley Forge with quip and jest, a center from which radiated good temper and a hopeful and happy warmth. When in camp Marshall was always for some game or sport, which he played with infinite zest. He was the best quoit-thrower in the regiment. His long legs left the others behind in foot-races or jumping contests.

So well did he perform his work, so highly did he impress his superior officers, that, early in December, 1776, he was promoted to be captain-lieutenant, to rank from July 31, and transferred to the Fifteenth Virginia Line.[296]Thus he missed the glory of being one of that immortal company which on Christmas night, 1776, crossed the Delaware with Washington and fell upon the British at Trenton. His father, Major Thomas Marshall, shared in that renown;[297]but the days ahead held for John Marshall his share of fighting in actual battle.

Sick, ill-fed, dirty, and ragged, but with a steady nucleus of regular troops as devoted to their great commander as they were disgusted with the hybrid arrangement between the States and Congress, Washington's army worried along. Two months before the battle of the Brandywine, the AmericanGeneral informed the Committee of Congress that "no army was ever worse supplied than ours ... our Soldiers, the greatest part of last Campaign, and the whole of this, have scarcely tasted any kind of Vegetables; had but little salt and Vinegar." He told of the "many putrid diseases incident to the Army, and the lamentable mortality," which this neglect of soldiers in the field had caused. "Soap," says he, "is another article in great demand," but not to be had. He adds, sarcastically: "A soldier's pay will not enable him to purchase [soap] by which his ... consequent dirtiness adds not a little to the disease of the Army."[298]

Such was the army of which John Marshall was a part when it prepared to meet the well-fed, properly clad, adequately equipped British veterans under Howe who had invaded Pennsylvania. Even with such a force Washington felt it necessary to make an impression on disaffected[299]Philadelphia, and, for that purpose, marched through the city on his way to confront the enemy. For it was generally believed that the American army was as small in numbers[300]as it was wretched in equipment. A parade of eleven thousand men[301]through the Tory-infested metropolis would, Washington hoped, hearten patriot sympathizers and encourage Congress. He took pains that his troops should make the best appearance possible. Arms were scoured and the men woresprigs of green in their headgear. Among the orders for the march through the seat of government it was directed: "If any Soldr. shall dare to quit his ranks He shall receive 39 Lashes at the first halting place afterwards.... Not a Woman[302]belonging to the Army is to be seen with the troops on their March through the City."[303]

The Americans soon came in contact with the enemy and harassed him as much as possible. Many of Washington's men had no guns. Although fewer militia came to his aid than Congress had called for, testifies Marshall, yet "more appeared than could be armed. Those nearest danger were, as usual, most slow in assembling."[304]

Upon Wayne's suggestion, Washington formed "a corps of light infantry consisting of nine officers, eight sergeants, and a hundred rank and file, from each brigade" and placed them under the command of General Maxwell who had acquired a reputation as a hard fighter.[305]Among these picked officers was Captain-Lieutenant John Marshall. Maxwell's command was thrown forward to Iron Hill. "A choice body of men" was detailed from this select light infantry and, during the night, was posted on the road along which it was believed one column of the British army would advance. The small body of Americans had no artillery and its only purpose was to annoy the enemy and retard his progress. The British under Cornwallis attacked as soon as they discoveredMaxwell's troops. The Americans quickly were forced to retreat, having lost forty killed and wounded. Only three of the British were killed and but nineteen were wounded.[306]

This action was the first engagement in which Marshall took part after the battle of Great Bridge. It is important only as fixing the command to which he was assigned. Marshall told Justice Story that he was in the Iron Hill fight;[307]and it is certain, therefore, that he was in Maxwell's light infantry and one of the little band picked from that body of choice troops, for the perilous and discouraging task of checking the oncoming British thousands.

The American army retreated to the Brandywine, where on the 9th of September Washington stationed all his forces except the light infantry on the left of the river. The position was skillfully chosen, but vague and conflicting reports[308]of the movement of the British finally resulted in American disaster.

The light infantry was posted among the hills on the right of the stream along the road leading to Chadd's Ford, in order to skirmish with the British when they approached, and, if possible, prevent them from crossing the river. But the enemy, without much effort, drove the Americans across the Brandywine, neither side suffering much loss.[309]

Washington now made his final dispositions for battle. The command to which Marshall belonged, together with other detachments under the general direction of Anthony Wayne, were placed opposite the British at Chadd's Ford. Small parties of selected men crossed over and attacked the British on the other side of the stream. In one of these skirmishes the Americans "killed a British captain with ten or fifteen privates, drove them out of the wood and were on the point of taking a field piece." But large numbers of the enemy hurried forward and again the Americans were thrown across the river. Marshall was in this party.[310]

Thomas Marshall, now colonel,[311]held the advanced position under Sullivan at the right; and his regiment did the hardest fighting and suffered the heaviest losses on that unhappy day. When Cornwallis, in greatly superior numbers, suddenly poured down upon Sullivan's division, he all but surprised the Continentals and drove most of them flying before him;[312]but Colonel Marshall and his Virginians refused to be stampeded. That regiment "maintained its position without losing an inch of ground until both its flanks were turned, its ammunition nearly expended, and more than half the officers and one third of the soldiers were killed and wounded."[313]Colonel Marshall had two horses shot under him. But, cut to pieces as they were, no panic appeared in this superb Virginia command and they "retired in good order."[314]

While Thomas Marshall and his Third Virginia Line were thus checking Cornwallis's assault on the right, the British charged, in dense masses, across the Brandywine, at Chadd's Ford, upon Wayne's division, to which Captain-Lieutenant John Marshall had been assigned. The Americans made a show of resistance, but, learning of the rout of their right wing, quickly gave way.[315]

"Nearly six hundred British ... were killed or wounded; and the Americans lost eleven pieces of artillery and above a thousand men, of whom the third part were prisoners," according to the Britishstatement.[316]And by their own account the Americans lost three hundred killed, six hundred wounded, and between three and four hundred prisoners.[317]

Both British and American narratives agree that the conduct of the Continental troops at Brandywine was most unequal in stanchness, discipline, and, courage. John Marshall himself wrote: "As must ever be the case in new-raised armies, unused to danger and from which undeserving officers have not been expelled, their conduct was not uniform. Some regiments, especially those which had served the preceding campaign, maintained their ground with the firmness and intrepidity of veterans, while others gave way as soon as they were pressed."[318]

But the inefficiency of the American equipment gave some excuse for the fright that seized upon so many of them. For, testifies Marshall, "many of their muskets were scarcely fit for service; and being of unequal caliber, their cartridges could not be so well fitted, and consequently, their fire could not do as much execution as that of the enemy. This radical defect was felt in all the operations of the army."[319]

So ended the battle of the Brandywine, the third formal armed conflict in which John Marshall took part. He had been in skirmish after skirmish, and in all of them had shown the characteristic Marshall coolness and courage, which both father and son exhibited in such striking fashion on this September day on the field where Lafayette fellwounded, and where the patriot forces reeled back under the all but fatal blows of the well-directed British regiments.[320]

It is small wonder that the Americans were beaten in the battle of the Brandywine; indeed, the wonder is that the British did not follow up their victory and entirely wipe out the opposing patriots. But it is astonishing that the American army kept up heart. They were even "in good spirits" as Washington got them in hand and directed their retreat.[321]

They were pretty well scattered, however, and many small parties and numerous stragglers were left behind. Maxwell's men, among whom was John Marshall, were stationed at Chester as "a rallying point" for the fragments which otherwise would disperse or be captured. Much maneuvering followed by both British and Americans. At sight of a detachment of the enemy approaching Wilmington, the Delaware militia "dispersed themselves," says Marshall.[322]Soon the two armies again faced one another. Marshall thus describes the situation: "The advanced parties had met, and were beginning to skirmish, when they were separated by a heavy rain, which, becoming more and more violent, rendered the retreat of the Americans a measure of absolute necessity."[323]

Through a cold and blinding downpour, overroads deep with mud, Captain-Lieutenant Marshall marched with his retreating comrades. All day they struggled forward, and nearly all night. They had no time to eat and little or no food, even if they had had the time. Before the break of a gray, cold, rainy September dawn, a halt was called, and an examination made of arms and ammunition. "Scarcely a musket in a regiment could be discharged," Marshall records, "and scarcely one cartridge in a box was fit for use," although "forty rounds per man had just been drawn"—this because the cartridge boxes had been ill-made and of improper material.

Gun locks were loose, declares Marshall, because flimsily put on; the muskets were scarcely better than clubs. Hardly any of the soldiers had bayonets.[324]"Never" had the patriot army been "in such imminent peril," he asserts—and all because of the inefficiency or worse of the method of supplies. Well might Washington's dilapidated troops thank Providence for the bitter weather that drenched through and through both officers and men and soaked their ammunition, for "the extreme severity of the weather had entirely stopped the British army."[325]

Yet Washington was determined to block the British march on Philadelphia. He made shift to secure some fresh ammunition[326]and twice moved his army to get in front of the enemy or, failing in that,"to keep pace with them."[327]To check their too rapid advance Washington detached the troops under Wayne, among whom was John Marshall.[328]They found the "country was so extensively disaffected that Sir William Howe received accurate accounts of his [Wayne's] position and of his force. Major-General Grey was detached to surprise him [Wayne] and effectually accomplished his purpose." At eleven o'clock at night Grey drove in Wayne's pickets with charged bayonets, and in a desperate midnight encounter killed and wounded one hundred and fifty of his men.[329]General Smallwood, who was to have supported Wayne, was less than a mile away, but his militia, who, writes Marshall, "thought only of their own safety, having fallen in with a party returning from the pursuit of Wayne, fled in confusion with the loss of only one man."[330]

Another example, this, before John Marshall's eyes, of the unreliability of State-controlled troops;[331]one more paragraph in the chapter of fatal inefficiency of the so-called Government of the so-called United States. Day by day, week by week, month by month, year by year, these object lessons were witnessed by the young Virginia officer. They madea lifelong impression upon him and had an immediate effect. More and more he came to depend on Washington, as indeed the whole army did also, for all things which should have come from the Government itself.

Once again the American commander sought to intercept the British, but they escaped "by a variety of perplexing maneuvers," writes Washington, "thro' a Country from which I could not derive the least intelligence (being to a man disaffected)" and "marched immediately toward Philadelphia."[332]For the moment Washington could not follow, although, declares Marshall, "public opinion" was demanding and Congress insisting that one more blow be struck to save Philadelphia.[333]His forces were not yet united; his troops utterly exhausted.

Marching through heavy mud, wading streams, drenched by torrential rains, sleeping on the sodden ground "without tents ... without shoes or ... clothes ... without fire ... without food,"[334]to use Marshall's striking language, the Americans were in no condition to fight the superior forces of the well-found British. "At least one thousand men are bare-footed and have performed the marches in that condition," Washington informed the impatient Congress.[335]He did his utmost; that brilliant officer, Alexander Hamilton, was never so efficient; but nearly all that could be accomplished was toremove the military stores at Philadelphia up the Delaware farther from the approaching British, but also farther from the American army. Philadelphia itself "seemed asleep, or dead, and the whole State scarce alive. Maryland and Delaware the same," wrote John Adams in his diary.[336]

So the British occupied the Capital, placing most of their forces about Germantown. Congress, frightened and complaining, fled to York. The members of that august body, even before the British drove them from their cozy quarters, felt that "the prospect is chilling on every side; gloomy, dark, melancholy and dispiriting."[337]Would Washington never strike? Their impatience was to be relieved. The American commander had, by some miracle, procured munitions and put the muskets of his troops in a sort of serviceable order; and he felt that a surprise upon Germantown might succeed. He planned his attack admirably, as the British afterwards conceded.[338]In the twilight of a chilling October day, Washington gave orders to begin the advance.

Throughout the night the army marched, and in the early morning[339]the three divisions into which the American force was divided threw themselves upon the British within brief intervals of time. All went well at first. Within about half an hour after Sullivan and Wayne had engaged the British left wing, the American left wing, to which John Marshall was now attached,[340]attacked the front of the British right wing, driving that part of the enemy from the ground. With battle shouts Marshall and his comrades under General Woodford charged the retreating British. Then it was that a small force of the enemy took possession of the Chew House and poured a murderous hail of lead into the huzzaing American ranks. This saved the day for the Royal force and turned an American victory into defeat.[341]

It was a dramatic struggle in which John Marshall that day took part. Fighting desperately beside them, he saw his comrades fall in heaps around him as they strove to take the fiercely defended stone house of the Tory Judge. A fog came up so thick that the various divisions could see but a little way before them. The dun smoke from burning hay and fields of stubble, to which the British had set fire, made thicker the murk until the Americans fighting from three different points could not tell friend from foe.[342]For a while their fire was directed only by the flash from what they thought must be the guns of the enemy.[343]

The rattle of musketry and roar of cannon was like "the crackling of thorns under a pot, and incessant peals of thunder," wrote an American officer in an attempt to describe the battle in a letter to his relatives at home.[344]Through it all, the Americans kept up their cheering until, as they fought, thedefeat was plain to the most audacious of them; and retreat, with which they had grown so familiar, once more began. For nine miles the British pursued them, the road stained with blood from the beaten patriots.[345]Nearly a thousand of Washington's soldiers were killed or wounded, and over four hundred were made prisoners on that ill-fated day, while the British loss was less than half these numbers.[346]

Two months of service followed, as hard as the many gone before with which Fate had blackened the calendar of the patriot cause. Washington was frantically urged to "storm" Philadelphia: Congress wished it; a "torrent of public opinion" demanded it; even some of Washington's officers were carried off their feet and advised "the mad enterprise," to use Marshall's warm description of the pressure upon his commander.[347]The depreciation of the Continental paper money, the increasing disaffection of the people, the desperate plight of American fortunes, were advanced as reasons for a "grand effort" to remedy the ruinous situation. Washington was immovable, and his best officers sustained him. Risking his army's destruction was not the way to stop depreciation of the currency, said Washington; its value had fallen for want of taxes to sustain it and could be raised only by their levy.[348]And "the corruption and defection of the people, and their unwillingness to serve in the army of the United States,were evils which would be very greatly increased by an unsuccessful attempt on Philadelphia."[349]

So black grew American prospects that secret sympathizers with the British became open in their advocacy of the abandonment of the Revolution. A Philadelphia Episcopal rector, who had been chaplain of Congress, wrote Washington that the patriot cause was lost and besought him to give up the struggle. "The most respectable characters" had abandoned the cause of independence, said Duché. Look at Congress. Its members were "obscure" and "distinguished for the weakness of their understandings and the violence of their tempers ... chosen by a little, low, faction.... Tis you ... only that support them." And the army! "The whole world knows that its only existence depends on you." Consider the situation: "Your harbors are blocked up, your cities fall one after the other; fortress after fortress, battle after battle is lost.... How fruitless the expense of blood!" Washington alone can end it. Humanity calls upon him to do so; and if he heeds that call his character "will appear with lustre in the annals of history."[350]Deeply offended, Washington sent the letter to Congress, which, however, continued to find fault with him and to urge an attack upon the British in the Capital.

Although Washington refused to throw his worn and hungry troops upon the perfectly prepared and victorious enemy entrenched in Philadelphia, he waseager to meet the British in the open field. But he must choose the place. So when, early in December, Howe's army marched out of Philadelphia the Americans were ready. Washington had taken a strong position on some hills toward the Schuylkill not far from White Marsh. After much maneuvering by the British and effective skirmishing by detachments of the patriots,[351]the two armies came into close contact. Not more than a mile away shone the scarlet uniforms of the Royal troops. Washington refused to be lured from his advantageous ground.[352]Apparently the British were about to attack and a decisive battle to be fought. After Brandywine and Germantown, another defeat would have been ruinous.

Washington personally animated his men. Marshall, who witnessed it, thus describes the scene: "The American chief rode through every brigade of his army, delivering, in person, his orders respecting the manner of receiving the enemy, exhorting his troops to rely principally on the bayonet, and encouraging them by the steady firmness of his countenance, as well as by his words, to a vigorous performance of their duty."[353]

These words make one see, as one reads, the great Virginian in his noblest aspect—calm in the face of possible disaster, his spirit burning brightest on thevery fuel of danger itself, his clear mind unclouded by what was likely to befall.

Each division, each regiment, each company, was given plain and practical orders for the expected conflict. And we may be sure that each man, private as well as officer, took heart as he looked upon the giant figure and listened to the steady directions and undismayed encouragement of his chief. Certain it is that John Marshall so felt and thought. A rare picture, this, full of life and color, that permits us to behold the growth in the young soldier's soul of that faith in and devotion to George Washington, seeds of which had been planted in his childhood days in the Blue Ridge home.

Finally the British, seeing the resolute front of the Americans and already bleeding from the fierce thrusts of Morgan's Virginia riflemen, suddenly withdrew to Philadelphia,[354]and Washington's army went into winter quarters on the hills of Valley Forge.

FOOTNOTES:[217]Slaughter, 107-08. This was "the first minute battalion raised within this Commonwealth." (Memorial of Thomas Marshall to the Virginia Legislature for military "emoluments";MS.Archives, Va. St. Lib.) Appendix IV.[218]Washington to Mason, April 5, 1769;Writings: Ford, ii, 263.[219]Meade, ii, 219.[220]Binney, in Dillon, iii, 286.[221]Ib.[222]Statement of eye-witness. (Binney, in Dillon, iii, 287.)[223]Ib., 288.[224]In all descriptions of Marshall, it is stated that his eyes were black and brilliant. His portraits, however, show them as dark brown, but keen and piercing.[225]Binney, in Dillon, iii, 287-88.[226]Ib.[227]Binney, in Dillon, iii, 288.[228]Not only do we find Marshalls, father and sons, taking gallant part in the Revolutionary War, but, thereafter, advocates of war with any country when the honor or interest of America was at stake.[229]Binney, in Dillon, iii, 288.[230]Infra, chap.IV.[231]Slaughter, 107-08. But Binney's informant says that it was twenty miles from the court-house. (Binney, in Dillon, iii, 286.)[232]Slaughter, 107-08; and certificate of J. Marshall in pension claim of William Payne;MSS.Rev. War, S. F. no. 8938½, Pension Bureau.[233]Slaughter, 107-08.[234]Ib.[235]Campbell, 607-14.[236]Slaughter, 107-08; certificate of J. Marshall in pension claim of David Jameson; MSS. Rev. War, S. F. no. 5607, Pension Bureau.[237]Only the Tories and the disaffected were frightened by these back-countrymen. Apparently Slaughter took this for granted and failed to make the distinction.[238]"The people hearing that we came from the backwoods, and seeing our savage-looking equipments, seemed as much afraid of us as if we had been Indians," writes the chronicler of that march. But the people, it appears, soon got over their fright; for this frontier soldiery, as one of them relates, "took pride in demeaning ourselves as patriots and gentlemen, and the people soon treated us with respect and great kindness." (Slaughter, 107-08.)[239]Slaughter, 107-08.[240]Ib.[241]Campbell, 633-34; Eckenrode:R. V., 81, 82.[242]Burk, iv, 85; and Lossing, ii, 535-36.[243]Marshall, i, 69; and Campbell, 635.[244]Marshall to Samuel Templeman, Richmond, Sept. 26, 1832, supporting latter's claim for pension; MSS. Rev. War, S. F. no. 6204, Pension Bureau.[245]For the conduct of the men then in supreme authority in Virginia see Wirt, 166-81; and Henry, i, 333-36; also, Campbell, 636et seq.; and see Eckenrode:R. V., 75.[246]Marshall, i, 69; and see Eckenrode:R. V., chap. iii, for the best account that has been given of this important episode. Dr. Eckenrode's narrative is a complete statement, from original sources, of every phase of this initial armed conflict between the patriots and Royalists in Virginia. Also see affidavit of Marshall in pension claim of William Payne, April 26, 1832; MSS. Rev. War, S. F. no. 8938½, Pension Bureau.[247]Affidavit of Marshall in pension claim of William Payne, April 26, 1832: MSS. Rev. War, S. F. no. 8938½, Pension Bureau.[248]Memorial of Thomas Marshall. (Supra, and Appendix IV.)[249]This uniform was rare; it is probable, however, that Thomas Marshall procured it for himself and son. He could afford it at that time, and he was a very proud man.[250]Chastellux found the army nearly disbanded from necessity in 1782. (Chastellux, translator's note to 60.)[251]Washington to President of Congress, Jan. 24, 1776;Writings: Ford, iii, 372-73.[252]Washington to Reed, Feb. 10, 1776;ib., 413.[253]Washington to Committee of Safety of New York, April 27, 1776;Writings: Ford, iv, 51-52.[254]Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 20, 1776;ib., 422.[255]Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 24, 1776;ib., 439.[256]Washington to Major-General Lee, Dec. 1, 1776;ib.,v, 62.[257]General Greene to Governor Cooke, Dec. 4, 1776;ib., footnote to 62.[258]Washington to President of Congress, Dec. 12, 1776;Writings: Ford, v, 84.[259]Washington to President of Congress, Dec. 24, 1776;ib., 129-30. While Washington was desperately badly off, he exaggerates somewhat in this despondent report, as Mr. Ford's footnote (ib., 130) shows.[260]Washington to President of Congress, Nov. 11, 1776;ib., 19.[261]Washington to John Augustine Washington, Nov. 19, 1776;Writings: Ford, v, 38-39.[262]Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 8, 1776;ib., iv, 397.[263]Washington to John Augustine Washington, Sept. 22, 1776;ib., 429.[264]Washington to Lund Washington, Sept. 30, 1776;Writings: Ford, iv, 457-59.[265]Washington to John Augustine Washington, Feb. 24, 1777;ib., v, 252. The militia officers were elected "without respect either to service or experience." (Chastellux, 235.)[266]Kapp, 115.[267]The Crisis: Paine;Writings: Conway, i, 175.[268]Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 66.[269]The militia were worse than wasteful and unmanageable; they deserted by companies. (Hatch, 72-73.)[270]Washington to Wharton, Oct. 17, 1777:Writings: Ford, vi, 118-19.[271]Ib.[272]Washington to John Augustine Washington, Oct. 18, 1777;ib., 126-29.[273]Livingston to Washington, Aug. 12, 1776;Cor. Rev.: Sparks, i, 275.[274]Lee to Washington, Nov. 12, 1776;ib., 305.[275]Sullivan to Washington, March 7, 1777;ib., 353-54.[276]Schuyler to Washington, Sept. 9. 1776;ib., 287.[277]Smith to McHenry, Dec. 10, 1778; Steiner, 21.[278]Chastellux, 44; and see Moore'sDiary, i, 399-400; andinfra, chap.IV.[279]Washington to Livingston, Dec. 31, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 272.[280]Washington to President of Congress, Dec. 23, 1777;ib., 260; and seeib., 267.[281]Pa. Mag. Hist. and Biog., 1890-91 (2d Series), vi, 79. Most faces among the patriot troops were pitted with this plague. Washington was deeply pockmarked. He had the smallpox in the Barbadoes when he was nineteen years old. (Sparks, 15.)[282]Weedon, Jan. 6, 1778, 183.[283]Hatch, 135; and Kapp, 109.[284]Proc., Mass. Hist. Soc. (2d Series), vi, 93.[285]Ib.Entries of desertions and savage punishment are frequent in Wild'sDiary; see p. 135 as an example. Also see Moore'sDiary, i, 405.[286]Weedon, 14.[287]Ib., Sept. 3, 1777, 30.[288]Ib., Sept. 15, 1777, 52. And see Sept. 6, p. 36, where officers as well as privates are ordered "instantly Shot" if they are "so far lost to all Shame as basely to quit their posts without orders, or shall skulk from Danger or offer to retreat before orders."[289]Livingston to Webb, May 28, 1781;Writings: Ford, ix, footnote to 267.[290]One reason for the chaotic state of the army was the lack of trained officers and the ignorance of the majority of common soldiers in regard to the simplest elements of drill or discipline. Many of the bearers of commissions knew little more than the men; and of such untrained officers there was an overabundance. (Hatch, 13-15.) To Baron von Steuben's training of privates as well as officers is due the chief credit for remedying this all but fatal defect. (Kapp, 126-35; alsoinfra, chap.IV.)[291]For statement of conditions in the American army throughout the war see Hatch; also, Bolton.[292]The States were childishly jealous of one another. Their different laws on the subject of rank alone caused unbelievable confusion. (Hatch, 13-16. And see Watson, 64, for local feeling, and inefficiency caused by the organization of the army into State lines.)[293]Hatch says that Connecticut provided most bountifully for her men. (Hatch, 87.) But Chastellux found the Pennsylvania line the best equipped; each Pennsylvania regiment had even a band of music. (Chastellux, 65.)[294]"The only garment they possess is a blanket elegantly twined about them. You may judge, sir, how much this apparel graces their appearance in parade." (Inspector Fleury to Von Steuben, May 13, 1778; as quoted in Hatch, 87.)[295]Diary of Joseph Clark;Proceedings, N.J. Hist. Soc. (1st Series), vii, 104. The States would give no revenue to the general Government and the officers thought the country would go to pieces. (Hatch, 154.)[296]Heitman, 285.[297]Binney, in Dillon, iii, 284.[298]Washington to Committee of Congress, July 19, 1777;Writings: Ford, v, 495.[299]Washington to President of Congress, Aug. 23, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 50; also see Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 126.[300]Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 126.[301]Ib., 127.[302]On this subject see Waldo's poem,Hist. Mag., vii, 274; and Clark's Diary,Proc., N.J. Hist. Soc., vii, 102.[303]Weedon, Aug. 23, 1777, 19.[304]Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 127.[305]Ib., 128; and see Trevelyan, iv, 226.[306]Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 127-29;ib.(2d ed.), i, 154-56; Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 3, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 64-65.[307]Story, in Dillon, iii, 335.[308]Washington to President of Congress, Sept 11, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 69.[309]Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 131;ib.(2d ed.), i, 156. Colonel Harrison, Washington's Secretary, reported immediately to the President of Congress that Maxwell's men believed that they killed or wounded "at least three hundred" of the British. (Harrison to President of Congress, Sept. 11, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, footnote to 68.)[310]Marshall, i, 156. The fact that Marshall places himself in this detachment, which was a part of Maxwell's light infantry, together with his presence at Iron Hill, fixes his position in the battle of the Brandywine and in the movements that immediately followed. It is reasonably certain that he was under Maxwell until just before the battle of Germantown. Of this skirmish Washington's optimistic and excited Secretary wrote on the spot, that Maxwell's men killed thirty men and one captain "left dead on the spot." (Harrison to the President of Congress, Sept. 11, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, footnote to 68.)[311]Thomas Marshall was promoted to be lieutenant-colonel Aug. 13, 1776; and colonel Feb. 21, 1777. (Heitman, 285.)[312]Trevelyan, iv, 230.[313]Marshall, i, footnote to 158.[314]Ib.Colonel Thomas Marshall's cool-headed and heroic conduct at this battle, which brought out in high lights his fine record as an officer, caused the Virginia House of Delegates to elect him colonel of the State Regiment of Artillery raised by that Commonwealth three months later. The vote is significant; for, although there were three candidates, each a man of merit, and although Thomas Marshall himself was not an aspirant for the place, and, indeed, was at Valley Forge when the election occurred, twice as many votes were cast for him as for all the other candidates put together. Four men were balloted for, Thomas Marshall receiving seventy-five votes and the other three candidates all together but thirty-six votes. (Journal, H.B. (Nov. 5, 1777), 27.)[315]Marshall, i, 156; and Trevelyan, iv, 230-31. Washington reported that Wayne and Maxwell's men retreated only "after a severe conflict." (Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 11, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 69.)[316]Trevelyan, iv, 232.[317]Marshall, i, 157-58.[318]Ib.; and see Irving, iii, 200-09.[319]Marshall, i, 158-59.[320]Four years afterward Chastellux found that "most of the trees bear the mark of bullets or cannon shot." (Chastellux, 118.)[321]Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 11, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 70.[322]Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 141, and see Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 23, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 81.[323]Marshall, i, 160.[324]Marshall, i, 160. When their enlistments expired, the soldiers took the Government's muskets and bayonets home with them. Thus thousands of muskets and bayonets continually disappeared. (See Kapp, 117.)[325]Marshall, i, 160-61.[326]Ib.[327]Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 23, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 81-82.[328]This is an inference, but a fair one. Maxwell was under Wayne; and Marshall was one of Maxwell's light infantry of picked men. (Supra.)[329]Marshall, i, 161. "The British accounts represent the American loss to have been much larger. It probably amounted to at least three hundred men." (Ib., footnote.)[330]Ib., and seePa. Mag. Hist. and Biog., i, 305.[331]Marshall repeatedly expresses this thought in his entire account of the war.[332]Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 23, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 80.[333]Marshall, i, 162.[334]Ib.[335]Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 23, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 82.[336]Works: Adams, ii, 437.[337]Ib.[338]Pa. Mag. Hist. and Biog., xvi, 197et seq.[339]American officer's description of the battle. (Ib., xi, 330.)[340]Marshall, i, 168.[341]Ib., 168-69.[342]From an American officer's description, inPa. Mag. Hist. and Biog., xi, 330.[343]Ib., 331-32.[344]Ib.[345]"The rebels carried off a large number of their wounded as we could see by the blood on the roads, on which we followed them so far [nine miles]." (British officer's account of battle;Pa. Mag. Hist. and Biog., xvi, 197et seq.)[346]Marshall, i, 170-71.[347]Ib., 181.[348]Ib., 181-82.[349]Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 287. Marshall omits this sentence in his second edition. But his revised account is severe enough.[350]The Reverend Jacob Duché, to Washington, Oct. 8, 1777;Cor. Rev.: Sparks, i, 448-58.[351]Washington to President of Congress, Dec. 10, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 238-39.[352]Clark's Diary,Proc., N.J. Hist. Soc. (1st Series), vii, 102-03. "It seems that the enemy had waited all this time before our lines to decoy us from the heights we possessed." (Ib.)[353]Marshall, i, 184.[354]Marshall, i, 184.

[217]Slaughter, 107-08. This was "the first minute battalion raised within this Commonwealth." (Memorial of Thomas Marshall to the Virginia Legislature for military "emoluments";MS.Archives, Va. St. Lib.) Appendix IV.

[218]Washington to Mason, April 5, 1769;Writings: Ford, ii, 263.

[219]Meade, ii, 219.

[220]Binney, in Dillon, iii, 286.

[221]Ib.

[222]Statement of eye-witness. (Binney, in Dillon, iii, 287.)

[223]Ib., 288.

[224]In all descriptions of Marshall, it is stated that his eyes were black and brilliant. His portraits, however, show them as dark brown, but keen and piercing.

[225]Binney, in Dillon, iii, 287-88.

[226]Ib.

[227]Binney, in Dillon, iii, 288.

[228]Not only do we find Marshalls, father and sons, taking gallant part in the Revolutionary War, but, thereafter, advocates of war with any country when the honor or interest of America was at stake.

[229]Binney, in Dillon, iii, 288.

[230]Infra, chap.IV.

[231]Slaughter, 107-08. But Binney's informant says that it was twenty miles from the court-house. (Binney, in Dillon, iii, 286.)

[232]Slaughter, 107-08; and certificate of J. Marshall in pension claim of William Payne;MSS.Rev. War, S. F. no. 8938½, Pension Bureau.

[233]Slaughter, 107-08.

[234]Ib.

[235]Campbell, 607-14.

[236]Slaughter, 107-08; certificate of J. Marshall in pension claim of David Jameson; MSS. Rev. War, S. F. no. 5607, Pension Bureau.

[237]Only the Tories and the disaffected were frightened by these back-countrymen. Apparently Slaughter took this for granted and failed to make the distinction.

[238]"The people hearing that we came from the backwoods, and seeing our savage-looking equipments, seemed as much afraid of us as if we had been Indians," writes the chronicler of that march. But the people, it appears, soon got over their fright; for this frontier soldiery, as one of them relates, "took pride in demeaning ourselves as patriots and gentlemen, and the people soon treated us with respect and great kindness." (Slaughter, 107-08.)

[239]Slaughter, 107-08.

[240]Ib.

[241]Campbell, 633-34; Eckenrode:R. V., 81, 82.

[242]Burk, iv, 85; and Lossing, ii, 535-36.

[243]Marshall, i, 69; and Campbell, 635.

[244]Marshall to Samuel Templeman, Richmond, Sept. 26, 1832, supporting latter's claim for pension; MSS. Rev. War, S. F. no. 6204, Pension Bureau.

[245]For the conduct of the men then in supreme authority in Virginia see Wirt, 166-81; and Henry, i, 333-36; also, Campbell, 636et seq.; and see Eckenrode:R. V., 75.

[246]Marshall, i, 69; and see Eckenrode:R. V., chap. iii, for the best account that has been given of this important episode. Dr. Eckenrode's narrative is a complete statement, from original sources, of every phase of this initial armed conflict between the patriots and Royalists in Virginia. Also see affidavit of Marshall in pension claim of William Payne, April 26, 1832; MSS. Rev. War, S. F. no. 8938½, Pension Bureau.

[247]Affidavit of Marshall in pension claim of William Payne, April 26, 1832: MSS. Rev. War, S. F. no. 8938½, Pension Bureau.

[248]Memorial of Thomas Marshall. (Supra, and Appendix IV.)

[249]This uniform was rare; it is probable, however, that Thomas Marshall procured it for himself and son. He could afford it at that time, and he was a very proud man.

[250]Chastellux found the army nearly disbanded from necessity in 1782. (Chastellux, translator's note to 60.)

[251]Washington to President of Congress, Jan. 24, 1776;Writings: Ford, iii, 372-73.

[252]Washington to Reed, Feb. 10, 1776;ib., 413.

[253]Washington to Committee of Safety of New York, April 27, 1776;Writings: Ford, iv, 51-52.

[254]Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 20, 1776;ib., 422.

[255]Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 24, 1776;ib., 439.

[256]Washington to Major-General Lee, Dec. 1, 1776;ib.,v, 62.

[257]General Greene to Governor Cooke, Dec. 4, 1776;ib., footnote to 62.

[258]Washington to President of Congress, Dec. 12, 1776;Writings: Ford, v, 84.

[259]Washington to President of Congress, Dec. 24, 1776;ib., 129-30. While Washington was desperately badly off, he exaggerates somewhat in this despondent report, as Mr. Ford's footnote (ib., 130) shows.

[260]Washington to President of Congress, Nov. 11, 1776;ib., 19.

[261]Washington to John Augustine Washington, Nov. 19, 1776;Writings: Ford, v, 38-39.

[262]Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 8, 1776;ib., iv, 397.

[263]Washington to John Augustine Washington, Sept. 22, 1776;ib., 429.

[264]Washington to Lund Washington, Sept. 30, 1776;Writings: Ford, iv, 457-59.

[265]Washington to John Augustine Washington, Feb. 24, 1777;ib., v, 252. The militia officers were elected "without respect either to service or experience." (Chastellux, 235.)

[266]Kapp, 115.

[267]The Crisis: Paine;Writings: Conway, i, 175.

[268]Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 66.

[269]The militia were worse than wasteful and unmanageable; they deserted by companies. (Hatch, 72-73.)

[270]Washington to Wharton, Oct. 17, 1777:Writings: Ford, vi, 118-19.

[271]Ib.

[272]Washington to John Augustine Washington, Oct. 18, 1777;ib., 126-29.

[273]Livingston to Washington, Aug. 12, 1776;Cor. Rev.: Sparks, i, 275.

[274]Lee to Washington, Nov. 12, 1776;ib., 305.

[275]Sullivan to Washington, March 7, 1777;ib., 353-54.

[276]Schuyler to Washington, Sept. 9. 1776;ib., 287.

[277]Smith to McHenry, Dec. 10, 1778; Steiner, 21.

[278]Chastellux, 44; and see Moore'sDiary, i, 399-400; andinfra, chap.IV.

[279]Washington to Livingston, Dec. 31, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 272.

[280]Washington to President of Congress, Dec. 23, 1777;ib., 260; and seeib., 267.

[281]Pa. Mag. Hist. and Biog., 1890-91 (2d Series), vi, 79. Most faces among the patriot troops were pitted with this plague. Washington was deeply pockmarked. He had the smallpox in the Barbadoes when he was nineteen years old. (Sparks, 15.)

[282]Weedon, Jan. 6, 1778, 183.

[283]Hatch, 135; and Kapp, 109.

[284]Proc., Mass. Hist. Soc. (2d Series), vi, 93.

[285]Ib.Entries of desertions and savage punishment are frequent in Wild'sDiary; see p. 135 as an example. Also see Moore'sDiary, i, 405.

[286]Weedon, 14.

[287]Ib., Sept. 3, 1777, 30.

[288]Ib., Sept. 15, 1777, 52. And see Sept. 6, p. 36, where officers as well as privates are ordered "instantly Shot" if they are "so far lost to all Shame as basely to quit their posts without orders, or shall skulk from Danger or offer to retreat before orders."

[289]Livingston to Webb, May 28, 1781;Writings: Ford, ix, footnote to 267.

[290]One reason for the chaotic state of the army was the lack of trained officers and the ignorance of the majority of common soldiers in regard to the simplest elements of drill or discipline. Many of the bearers of commissions knew little more than the men; and of such untrained officers there was an overabundance. (Hatch, 13-15.) To Baron von Steuben's training of privates as well as officers is due the chief credit for remedying this all but fatal defect. (Kapp, 126-35; alsoinfra, chap.IV.)

[291]For statement of conditions in the American army throughout the war see Hatch; also, Bolton.

[292]The States were childishly jealous of one another. Their different laws on the subject of rank alone caused unbelievable confusion. (Hatch, 13-16. And see Watson, 64, for local feeling, and inefficiency caused by the organization of the army into State lines.)

[293]Hatch says that Connecticut provided most bountifully for her men. (Hatch, 87.) But Chastellux found the Pennsylvania line the best equipped; each Pennsylvania regiment had even a band of music. (Chastellux, 65.)

[294]"The only garment they possess is a blanket elegantly twined about them. You may judge, sir, how much this apparel graces their appearance in parade." (Inspector Fleury to Von Steuben, May 13, 1778; as quoted in Hatch, 87.)

[295]Diary of Joseph Clark;Proceedings, N.J. Hist. Soc. (1st Series), vii, 104. The States would give no revenue to the general Government and the officers thought the country would go to pieces. (Hatch, 154.)

[296]Heitman, 285.

[297]Binney, in Dillon, iii, 284.

[298]Washington to Committee of Congress, July 19, 1777;Writings: Ford, v, 495.

[299]Washington to President of Congress, Aug. 23, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 50; also see Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 126.

[300]Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 126.

[301]Ib., 127.

[302]On this subject see Waldo's poem,Hist. Mag., vii, 274; and Clark's Diary,Proc., N.J. Hist. Soc., vii, 102.

[303]Weedon, Aug. 23, 1777, 19.

[304]Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 127.

[305]Ib., 128; and see Trevelyan, iv, 226.

[306]Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 127-29;ib.(2d ed.), i, 154-56; Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 3, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 64-65.

[307]Story, in Dillon, iii, 335.

[308]Washington to President of Congress, Sept 11, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 69.

[309]Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 131;ib.(2d ed.), i, 156. Colonel Harrison, Washington's Secretary, reported immediately to the President of Congress that Maxwell's men believed that they killed or wounded "at least three hundred" of the British. (Harrison to President of Congress, Sept. 11, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, footnote to 68.)

[310]Marshall, i, 156. The fact that Marshall places himself in this detachment, which was a part of Maxwell's light infantry, together with his presence at Iron Hill, fixes his position in the battle of the Brandywine and in the movements that immediately followed. It is reasonably certain that he was under Maxwell until just before the battle of Germantown. Of this skirmish Washington's optimistic and excited Secretary wrote on the spot, that Maxwell's men killed thirty men and one captain "left dead on the spot." (Harrison to the President of Congress, Sept. 11, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, footnote to 68.)

[311]Thomas Marshall was promoted to be lieutenant-colonel Aug. 13, 1776; and colonel Feb. 21, 1777. (Heitman, 285.)

[312]Trevelyan, iv, 230.

[313]Marshall, i, footnote to 158.

[314]Ib.Colonel Thomas Marshall's cool-headed and heroic conduct at this battle, which brought out in high lights his fine record as an officer, caused the Virginia House of Delegates to elect him colonel of the State Regiment of Artillery raised by that Commonwealth three months later. The vote is significant; for, although there were three candidates, each a man of merit, and although Thomas Marshall himself was not an aspirant for the place, and, indeed, was at Valley Forge when the election occurred, twice as many votes were cast for him as for all the other candidates put together. Four men were balloted for, Thomas Marshall receiving seventy-five votes and the other three candidates all together but thirty-six votes. (Journal, H.B. (Nov. 5, 1777), 27.)

[315]Marshall, i, 156; and Trevelyan, iv, 230-31. Washington reported that Wayne and Maxwell's men retreated only "after a severe conflict." (Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 11, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 69.)

[316]Trevelyan, iv, 232.

[317]Marshall, i, 157-58.

[318]Ib.; and see Irving, iii, 200-09.

[319]Marshall, i, 158-59.

[320]Four years afterward Chastellux found that "most of the trees bear the mark of bullets or cannon shot." (Chastellux, 118.)

[321]Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 11, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 70.

[322]Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 141, and see Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 23, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 81.

[323]Marshall, i, 160.

[324]Marshall, i, 160. When their enlistments expired, the soldiers took the Government's muskets and bayonets home with them. Thus thousands of muskets and bayonets continually disappeared. (See Kapp, 117.)

[325]Marshall, i, 160-61.

[326]Ib.

[327]Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 23, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 81-82.

[328]This is an inference, but a fair one. Maxwell was under Wayne; and Marshall was one of Maxwell's light infantry of picked men. (Supra.)

[329]Marshall, i, 161. "The British accounts represent the American loss to have been much larger. It probably amounted to at least three hundred men." (Ib., footnote.)

[330]Ib., and seePa. Mag. Hist. and Biog., i, 305.

[331]Marshall repeatedly expresses this thought in his entire account of the war.

[332]Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 23, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 80.

[333]Marshall, i, 162.

[334]Ib.

[335]Washington to President of Congress, Sept. 23, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 82.

[336]Works: Adams, ii, 437.

[337]Ib.

[338]Pa. Mag. Hist. and Biog., xvi, 197et seq.

[339]American officer's description of the battle. (Ib., xi, 330.)

[340]Marshall, i, 168.

[341]Ib., 168-69.

[342]From an American officer's description, inPa. Mag. Hist. and Biog., xi, 330.

[343]Ib., 331-32.

[344]Ib.

[345]"The rebels carried off a large number of their wounded as we could see by the blood on the roads, on which we followed them so far [nine miles]." (British officer's account of battle;Pa. Mag. Hist. and Biog., xvi, 197et seq.)

[346]Marshall, i, 170-71.

[347]Ib., 181.

[348]Ib., 181-82.

[349]Marshall (1st ed.), iii, 287. Marshall omits this sentence in his second edition. But his revised account is severe enough.

[350]The Reverend Jacob Duché, to Washington, Oct. 8, 1777;Cor. Rev.: Sparks, i, 448-58.

[351]Washington to President of Congress, Dec. 10, 1777;Writings: Ford, vi, 238-39.

[352]Clark's Diary,Proc., N.J. Hist. Soc. (1st Series), vii, 102-03. "It seems that the enemy had waited all this time before our lines to decoy us from the heights we possessed." (Ib.)

[353]Marshall, i, 184.

[354]Marshall, i, 184.

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