FOOTNOTES:

TALLEYRANDTALLEYRAND

A month after Talleyrand became the head of French Foreign Affairs, Rufus King, then our Ministerat London, as soon as he had heard of the appointment of the American envoys, wrote Talleyrand a conciliatory letter congratulating the French diplomat upon his appointment. King and Talleyrand had often met both in England and America.

"We have been accustomed," writes King, "to converse on every subject with the greatest freedom"; then, assuming the frankness of friendship, King tries to pave the way for Marshall, Pinckney, and Gerry, without mentioning the latter, however. "From the moment I heard that you had been named to the Department of Foreign Affairs," King assures Talleyrand, "I have felt a satisfactory Confidence that the Cause of the increasing Misunderstanding between us would cease, and that the overtures mediated by our Government would not fail to restore Harmony and Friendship between the two Countries."[606]

King might have saved his ink. Talleyrand did not answer the letter; it is doubtful whether he even read it. At any rate, King's somewhat amateurish effort to beguile the French Foreign Minister by empty words utterly failed of its purpose.

The Americans received cold comfort from Talleyrand; he was busy, he said, on a report on Franco-American affairs asked for by the Directory; when he had presented it to his superiors he would, he said, let the Americans know "what steps were to follow." Talleyrand saw to it, however, that the envoys received "cards of hospitality" which had beendenied to Pinckney. These saved the Americans at least from offensive attentions from the police.[607]

Three days later, a Mr. Church, an American-born French citizen, accompanied by his son, called on Gerry, but found Marshall, who was alone. From Thomas Paine, Church had learned of plans of the Directory concerning neutrals which, he assured Marshall, "would be extremely advantageous to the United States." "Do not urge your mission now," suggested Church—the present was "a most unfavorable moment." Haste meant that "all would probably be lost." What were these measures of the Directory? asked Marshall. Church was not at liberty to disclose them, he said; but the envoys' "true policy was to wait for events."

That night came a letter from the author of "Common Sense." "This letter," Marshall records, "made very different impressions on us. I thought it an insult which ought to be received with that coldness which would forbid the repetition of it. Mr. Gerry was of a contrary opinion." Marshall insisted that the Directory knew of Paine's letter and would learn of the envoys' answer, and that Pinckney, Gerry, and himself must act only as they knew the American Government would approve. It was wrong, said he, and imprudent to lead the Directory to expect anything else from the envoys; and Paine's "aspersions on our government"should be resented.[608]So began the break between Marshall and Gerry, which, considering the characters of the two men, was inevitable.

Next, Talleyrand's confidential secretary confided to Major Mountflorence, of the American Consulate, that the Directory would require explanations of President Adams's speech to Congress, by which they were exasperated. The Directory would not receive the envoys, he said, until the negotiations were over; but that persons would be appointed "to treat with" the Americans, and that these agents would report to Talleyrand, who would have "charge of the negotiations."[609]Mountflorence, of course, so advised the envoys.

Thus the curtain rose upon the melodrama now to be enacted—an episode without a parallel in the history of American diplomacy. To understand what follows, we must remember that the envoys were governed by careful, lengthy, and detailed instructions to the effect that "no blame or censure be directly, or indirectly, imputed to the United States"; that in order not to "wound her [France] feelings or to excite her resentment" the negotiations were to be on the principles of the British Treaty; "that no engagement be made inconsistent with ... any prior treaty"; that "no restraint on our lawful commerce with any other nation be admitted"; that nothing be done "incompatible with the complete sovereignty and independence of the United States in matters of policy, commerce, and government";and "that no aid be stipulated in favor of France during the present war."[610]

We are now to witness the acts in that strange play, known to American history as the X. Y. Z. Mission, as theatrical a spectacle as any ever prepared for the stage. Indeed, the episode differs from a performance behind the footlights chiefly in that in this curious arrangement the explanation comes after the acting is over. When the dispatches to the American Government, which Marshall now is to write, were transmitted to Congress, diplomatic prudence caused the names of leading characters to be indicated only by certain letters of the alphabet. Thus, this determining phase of our diplomatic history is known to the present day as "The X. Y. Z. Affair."

FOOTNOTES:[549]Marshall to his wife, July 2, 1797; MS.[550]Sedgwick to King, June 24, 1797; King, ii, 192.[551]Marshall to his wife, July 5, 1797; MS.[552]Marshall to Washington, July 7, 1797; MS., Lib. Cong.[553]Marshall to his wife, July 11, 1797; MS.[554]This, of course, was untrue, at that time. Marshall probably listened with polite interest to Adams, who was a master of the subject, and agreed with him. Thus Adams was impressed, as is the way of human nature.[555]Adams to Gerry, July 17, 1797;Works: Adams, viii, 549.[556]Aurora, July 17, 1797.[557]Aurora, July 19, 1797. For documents given envoys by the Government, seeAm. St. Prs., For. Rel., Class I, ii, 153.[558]Marshall to Secretary of State, July 10, 1797; Memorandum by Pickering; Pickering MSS., inProc., Mass. Hist. Soc., xxi, 177.[559]Marshall to his wife, "The Bay of Delaware," July 20, 1797; MS.[560]Washington's remarks on Monroe's "View";Writings: Ford, xiii, 452.[561]See McMaster, ii, 257-59, 319, 370. But Monroe, although shallow, was well meaning; and he had good excuse for over-enthusiasm; for his instructions were: "Let it be seen that in case of a war with any nation on earth, we shall consider France as our first and natural ally." (Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., Class I, ii, 669.)[562]"View of the Conduct of the Executive of the United States, etc.," by James Monroe (Philadelphia, Bache, Publisher, 1797). This pamphlet is printed in full in Monroe'sWritings: Hamilton, iii, as an Appendix.Washington did not deign to notice Monroe's attack publicly; but on the margin of Monroe's book answered every point. Extracts from Monroe's "View" and Washington's comments thereon are given in Washington'sWritings: Ford, xiii, 452-90.Jefferson not only approved but commended Monroe's attack on Washington. (See Jefferson to Monroe, Oct. 25, 1797;Works: Ford, viii, 344-46.) It is more than probable that he helped circulate it. (Jefferson to Eppes, Dec. 21, 1797;ib., 347; and to Madison, Feb. 8, 1798;ib., 362; see also Jefferson to Monroe, Dec. 27;ib., 350. "Your book was later coming than was to have been wished: however it works irresistibly. It would have been very gratifying to you to hear the unqualified eulogies ... by all who are not hostile to it from principle.")[563]Ticknor, ii, 113.[564]For a condensed but accurate and impartial statement of Monroe's conduct while Minister, see Gilman:James Monroe(American Statesmen Series), 36-73.[565]Paine to editors of theBien-Informé, Sept. 27, 1797;Writings: Conway, iii, 368-69.[566]Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., ii, 55-63.[567]See condensed summary of the American case in instructions to Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry;ib., 153-57.[568]Ib., 64; and for numerous other examples seeib., 28-64.[569]Ticknor, ii, 113.[570]Pinckney to Secretary of State, Amsterdam, Feb. 18, 1797;Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., vii, 10.[571]See Barras's speech inAm. St. Prs., For. Rel., ii, 12.[572]See Allen:Naval War with France, 31-33.[573]Adams, Message to Congress, May 16, 1797; Richardson, i, 235-36; also,Works: Adams, ix, 111-18.[574]Gibbs, ii, 171-72.[575]Hamilton proposed Jefferson or Madison. (Hamilton to Pickering, March 22, 1797; Lodge:Cabot, 101.)[576]Works: Adams, ix, 111-18.[577]Ib.[578]Gibbs, i, 467, 469, and footnote to 530-31.[579]Austin:Gerry, ii, 134-35.[580]Jefferson to Gerry, June 21, 1797;Works: Ford, viii, 314. This letter flattered Gerry's vanity and nullified Adams's prudent advice to him given a few days later. (Seeinfra.)[581]Sedgwick to King, June 24, 1797; King, ii, 193.[582]McHenry to Adams, in Cabinet meeting, 1797; Steiner, 224.[583]Adams to Gerry, July 8, 1797;Works: Adams, viii, 547-48. Nine days later the President again admonishes Gerry. While expressing confidence in him, the President tells Gerry that "Some have expressed ... fears of an unaccommodating disposition [in Gerry] and others of an obstinacy that will risk great things to secure small ones."Some have observed that there is, at present, a happy and perfect harmony among all our ministers abroad, and have expressed apprehension that your appointment might occasion an interruption of it." (Adams to Gerry, July 17, 1797;ib., 549.)[584]Marshall took the commission and instructions of John Quincy Adams as the American Minister to Prussia (Writings, J.Q.A.: Ford, ii, footnote to 216), to which post the younger Adams had been appointed by Washington because of his brilliant "Publicola" essays.[585]Marshall, to Washington, The Hague, Sept. 15, 1797; Washington MSS., Lib. Cong. See citationsib.,infra. (Sparks MSS.,Proc.Mass. Hist. Soc., lxvi; alsoAmer. Hist. Rev., ii, no. 2, Jan., 1897.)[586]Pinckney and his family had been living in Holland for almost seven months. (Pinckney to Pickering, Feb. 8, 1797;Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., ii, 10.)[587]Marshall to his wife, The Hague, Sept. 9, 1797, MS. Marshall's brother had been in The Hague July 30, but had gone to Berlin. Vans Murray to J. Q. Adams, July 30, 1797;Letters: Ford, 358. Apparently the brothers did not meet, notwithstanding the critical state of the Fairfax contract.[588]Marshall to Washington, The Hague, Sept. 15, 1797;Amer. Hist. Rev., ii, no. 2, Jan., 1897; and MS., Lib. Cong.[589]Seeinfra, next chapter.[590]Washington to Marshall, Dec. 4, 1797;Writings: Ford, xiii, 432-34.[591]To justify the violence of the 18th Fructidor, the Directory asserted that the French elections, in which a majority of conservatives and anti-revolutionists were returned and General Pichegru chosen President of the French Legislature, were parts of a royal conspiracy to destroy liberty and again place a king upon the throne of France. In these elections the French liberals, who were not in the army, did not vote; while all conservatives, who wished above all things for a stable and orderly government of law and for peace with other countries, flocked to the polls.Among the latter, of course, were the few Royalists who still remained in France. Such, at least, was the view Marshall took of this episode. To understand Marshall's subsequent career, too much weight cannot be given this fact and, indeed, all the startling events in France during the six historic months of Marshall's stay in Paris.But Marshall did not take into account the vital fact that the French soldiers had no chance to vote at this election. They were scattered far and wide—in Italy, Germany, and elsewhere. Yet these very men were the soul of the Revolutionary cause. And the private soldiers were more enraged by the result of the French elections than their generals—even than General Augereau, who was tigerish in his wrath.They felt that, while they were fighting on the battlefield, they had been betrayed at the ballot box. To the soldiers of France the revolution of the 18th Fructidor was the overthrow of their enemies in their own country. The army felt that it had answered with loyal bayonets a conspiracy of treasonable ballots. It now seems probable that the soldiers and officers of the French armies were right in this view.Pinckney was absurdly accused of interfering in the elections in behalf of the "Royalist Conspiracy." (Vans Murray to J. Q. Adams, April 3, 1798;Letters: Ford, 391.) Such a thing, of course, was perfectly impossible.[592]Marshall to Lee, Antwerp, Sept. 22, 1797; MS., New York Pub. Lib.[593]Gouverneur Morris to Washington, Feb., 1793; Morris, ii, 37. While Morris was an aristocrat, thoroughly hostile to democracy and without sympathy with or understanding of the French Revolution, his statements of facts have proved to be generally accurate. (See Lyman:Diplomacy of the United States, i, 352, on corruption of the Directory.)[594]Morris to Pinckney, Aug. 13, 1797; Morris, ii, 51.[595]Loliée:Talleyrand and His Times, 170-71.[596]King to Secretary of State, Dispatch no. 54, Nov. 18, 1797; King, ii, 243.[597]Marshall's Journal, official copy, Pickering Papers, Mass. Hist. Soc., 1.[598]Loliée:Talleyrand and His Times, 147; and Blennerhassett:Talleyrand, ii, 256-57.[599]Talleyrand to Mme. de Staël, quoted in McCabe:Talleyrand, 137.[600]Memoirs of Talleyrand: Broglie's ed., i, 179-82; also see McCabe's summary in hisTalleyrand, 136-38. Talleyrand was greatly impressed by the statement of a New Jersey farmer, who wished to see Bingham rather than President Washington because he had heard that Bingham was "so wealthy.... Throughout America I met with a similar love of money," says Talleyrand. (Memoirs of Talleyrand: Broglie's ed., i, 180.) In this estimate of American character during that period, Talleyrand did not differ from other travelers, nor, indeed, from the opinion of most Americans who expressed themselves upon this subject. (See vol.i, chaps.vii, andviii, of this work.)[601]Talleyrand as quoted in Pickering to King, Nov. 7, 1798;Pickering: Pickering, ii, 429.[602]Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., ii, 158.[603]Memoirs of Talleyrand: Stewarton, ii, 10.[604]Pinckney was the only one of the envoys who could speak French. He had received a finished education in England at Westminster and Oxford and afterward had studied in France at the Royal Military College at Caen.[605]Marshall and Talleyrand were forty-two years of age, Pinckney fifty-one, and Gerry fifty-three.[606]King to Talleyrand, London, Aug. 3, 1797; King, ii, 206-08.[607]Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., ii, 158; Marshall's Journal, Official Copy; MS., Mass. Hist. Soc., 2. The envoys' dispatches to the Secretary of State were prepared by Marshall, largely, from his Journal. Citations will be from the dispatches except when not including matter set out exclusively in Marshall's Journal.[608]Marshall's Journal, Oct. 11, 2-4.[609]Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., ii, 8-11, and 158. Fulwar Skipwith was consul; but Mountflorence was connected with the office.[610]Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., ii, 157. Italics are mine.

[549]Marshall to his wife, July 2, 1797; MS.

[550]Sedgwick to King, June 24, 1797; King, ii, 192.

[551]Marshall to his wife, July 5, 1797; MS.

[552]Marshall to Washington, July 7, 1797; MS., Lib. Cong.

[553]Marshall to his wife, July 11, 1797; MS.

[554]This, of course, was untrue, at that time. Marshall probably listened with polite interest to Adams, who was a master of the subject, and agreed with him. Thus Adams was impressed, as is the way of human nature.

[555]Adams to Gerry, July 17, 1797;Works: Adams, viii, 549.

[556]Aurora, July 17, 1797.

[557]Aurora, July 19, 1797. For documents given envoys by the Government, seeAm. St. Prs., For. Rel., Class I, ii, 153.

[558]Marshall to Secretary of State, July 10, 1797; Memorandum by Pickering; Pickering MSS., inProc., Mass. Hist. Soc., xxi, 177.

[559]Marshall to his wife, "The Bay of Delaware," July 20, 1797; MS.

[560]Washington's remarks on Monroe's "View";Writings: Ford, xiii, 452.

[561]See McMaster, ii, 257-59, 319, 370. But Monroe, although shallow, was well meaning; and he had good excuse for over-enthusiasm; for his instructions were: "Let it be seen that in case of a war with any nation on earth, we shall consider France as our first and natural ally." (Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., Class I, ii, 669.)

[562]"View of the Conduct of the Executive of the United States, etc.," by James Monroe (Philadelphia, Bache, Publisher, 1797). This pamphlet is printed in full in Monroe'sWritings: Hamilton, iii, as an Appendix.Washington did not deign to notice Monroe's attack publicly; but on the margin of Monroe's book answered every point. Extracts from Monroe's "View" and Washington's comments thereon are given in Washington'sWritings: Ford, xiii, 452-90.Jefferson not only approved but commended Monroe's attack on Washington. (See Jefferson to Monroe, Oct. 25, 1797;Works: Ford, viii, 344-46.) It is more than probable that he helped circulate it. (Jefferson to Eppes, Dec. 21, 1797;ib., 347; and to Madison, Feb. 8, 1798;ib., 362; see also Jefferson to Monroe, Dec. 27;ib., 350. "Your book was later coming than was to have been wished: however it works irresistibly. It would have been very gratifying to you to hear the unqualified eulogies ... by all who are not hostile to it from principle.")

Washington did not deign to notice Monroe's attack publicly; but on the margin of Monroe's book answered every point. Extracts from Monroe's "View" and Washington's comments thereon are given in Washington'sWritings: Ford, xiii, 452-90.

Jefferson not only approved but commended Monroe's attack on Washington. (See Jefferson to Monroe, Oct. 25, 1797;Works: Ford, viii, 344-46.) It is more than probable that he helped circulate it. (Jefferson to Eppes, Dec. 21, 1797;ib., 347; and to Madison, Feb. 8, 1798;ib., 362; see also Jefferson to Monroe, Dec. 27;ib., 350. "Your book was later coming than was to have been wished: however it works irresistibly. It would have been very gratifying to you to hear the unqualified eulogies ... by all who are not hostile to it from principle.")

[563]Ticknor, ii, 113.

[564]For a condensed but accurate and impartial statement of Monroe's conduct while Minister, see Gilman:James Monroe(American Statesmen Series), 36-73.

[565]Paine to editors of theBien-Informé, Sept. 27, 1797;Writings: Conway, iii, 368-69.

[566]Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., ii, 55-63.

[567]See condensed summary of the American case in instructions to Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry;ib., 153-57.

[568]Ib., 64; and for numerous other examples seeib., 28-64.

[569]Ticknor, ii, 113.

[570]Pinckney to Secretary of State, Amsterdam, Feb. 18, 1797;Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., vii, 10.

[571]See Barras's speech inAm. St. Prs., For. Rel., ii, 12.

[572]See Allen:Naval War with France, 31-33.

[573]Adams, Message to Congress, May 16, 1797; Richardson, i, 235-36; also,Works: Adams, ix, 111-18.

[574]Gibbs, ii, 171-72.

[575]Hamilton proposed Jefferson or Madison. (Hamilton to Pickering, March 22, 1797; Lodge:Cabot, 101.)

[576]Works: Adams, ix, 111-18.

[577]Ib.

[578]Gibbs, i, 467, 469, and footnote to 530-31.

[579]Austin:Gerry, ii, 134-35.

[580]Jefferson to Gerry, June 21, 1797;Works: Ford, viii, 314. This letter flattered Gerry's vanity and nullified Adams's prudent advice to him given a few days later. (Seeinfra.)

[581]Sedgwick to King, June 24, 1797; King, ii, 193.

[582]McHenry to Adams, in Cabinet meeting, 1797; Steiner, 224.

[583]Adams to Gerry, July 8, 1797;Works: Adams, viii, 547-48. Nine days later the President again admonishes Gerry. While expressing confidence in him, the President tells Gerry that "Some have expressed ... fears of an unaccommodating disposition [in Gerry] and others of an obstinacy that will risk great things to secure small ones."Some have observed that there is, at present, a happy and perfect harmony among all our ministers abroad, and have expressed apprehension that your appointment might occasion an interruption of it." (Adams to Gerry, July 17, 1797;ib., 549.)

"Some have observed that there is, at present, a happy and perfect harmony among all our ministers abroad, and have expressed apprehension that your appointment might occasion an interruption of it." (Adams to Gerry, July 17, 1797;ib., 549.)

[584]Marshall took the commission and instructions of John Quincy Adams as the American Minister to Prussia (Writings, J.Q.A.: Ford, ii, footnote to 216), to which post the younger Adams had been appointed by Washington because of his brilliant "Publicola" essays.

[585]Marshall, to Washington, The Hague, Sept. 15, 1797; Washington MSS., Lib. Cong. See citationsib.,infra. (Sparks MSS.,Proc.Mass. Hist. Soc., lxvi; alsoAmer. Hist. Rev., ii, no. 2, Jan., 1897.)

[586]Pinckney and his family had been living in Holland for almost seven months. (Pinckney to Pickering, Feb. 8, 1797;Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., ii, 10.)

[587]Marshall to his wife, The Hague, Sept. 9, 1797, MS. Marshall's brother had been in The Hague July 30, but had gone to Berlin. Vans Murray to J. Q. Adams, July 30, 1797;Letters: Ford, 358. Apparently the brothers did not meet, notwithstanding the critical state of the Fairfax contract.

[588]Marshall to Washington, The Hague, Sept. 15, 1797;Amer. Hist. Rev., ii, no. 2, Jan., 1897; and MS., Lib. Cong.

[589]Seeinfra, next chapter.

[590]Washington to Marshall, Dec. 4, 1797;Writings: Ford, xiii, 432-34.

[591]To justify the violence of the 18th Fructidor, the Directory asserted that the French elections, in which a majority of conservatives and anti-revolutionists were returned and General Pichegru chosen President of the French Legislature, were parts of a royal conspiracy to destroy liberty and again place a king upon the throne of France. In these elections the French liberals, who were not in the army, did not vote; while all conservatives, who wished above all things for a stable and orderly government of law and for peace with other countries, flocked to the polls.Among the latter, of course, were the few Royalists who still remained in France. Such, at least, was the view Marshall took of this episode. To understand Marshall's subsequent career, too much weight cannot be given this fact and, indeed, all the startling events in France during the six historic months of Marshall's stay in Paris.But Marshall did not take into account the vital fact that the French soldiers had no chance to vote at this election. They were scattered far and wide—in Italy, Germany, and elsewhere. Yet these very men were the soul of the Revolutionary cause. And the private soldiers were more enraged by the result of the French elections than their generals—even than General Augereau, who was tigerish in his wrath.They felt that, while they were fighting on the battlefield, they had been betrayed at the ballot box. To the soldiers of France the revolution of the 18th Fructidor was the overthrow of their enemies in their own country. The army felt that it had answered with loyal bayonets a conspiracy of treasonable ballots. It now seems probable that the soldiers and officers of the French armies were right in this view.Pinckney was absurdly accused of interfering in the elections in behalf of the "Royalist Conspiracy." (Vans Murray to J. Q. Adams, April 3, 1798;Letters: Ford, 391.) Such a thing, of course, was perfectly impossible.

Among the latter, of course, were the few Royalists who still remained in France. Such, at least, was the view Marshall took of this episode. To understand Marshall's subsequent career, too much weight cannot be given this fact and, indeed, all the startling events in France during the six historic months of Marshall's stay in Paris.

But Marshall did not take into account the vital fact that the French soldiers had no chance to vote at this election. They were scattered far and wide—in Italy, Germany, and elsewhere. Yet these very men were the soul of the Revolutionary cause. And the private soldiers were more enraged by the result of the French elections than their generals—even than General Augereau, who was tigerish in his wrath.

They felt that, while they were fighting on the battlefield, they had been betrayed at the ballot box. To the soldiers of France the revolution of the 18th Fructidor was the overthrow of their enemies in their own country. The army felt that it had answered with loyal bayonets a conspiracy of treasonable ballots. It now seems probable that the soldiers and officers of the French armies were right in this view.

Pinckney was absurdly accused of interfering in the elections in behalf of the "Royalist Conspiracy." (Vans Murray to J. Q. Adams, April 3, 1798;Letters: Ford, 391.) Such a thing, of course, was perfectly impossible.

[592]Marshall to Lee, Antwerp, Sept. 22, 1797; MS., New York Pub. Lib.

[593]Gouverneur Morris to Washington, Feb., 1793; Morris, ii, 37. While Morris was an aristocrat, thoroughly hostile to democracy and without sympathy with or understanding of the French Revolution, his statements of facts have proved to be generally accurate. (See Lyman:Diplomacy of the United States, i, 352, on corruption of the Directory.)

[594]Morris to Pinckney, Aug. 13, 1797; Morris, ii, 51.

[595]Loliée:Talleyrand and His Times, 170-71.

[596]King to Secretary of State, Dispatch no. 54, Nov. 18, 1797; King, ii, 243.

[597]Marshall's Journal, official copy, Pickering Papers, Mass. Hist. Soc., 1.

[598]Loliée:Talleyrand and His Times, 147; and Blennerhassett:Talleyrand, ii, 256-57.

[599]Talleyrand to Mme. de Staël, quoted in McCabe:Talleyrand, 137.

[600]Memoirs of Talleyrand: Broglie's ed., i, 179-82; also see McCabe's summary in hisTalleyrand, 136-38. Talleyrand was greatly impressed by the statement of a New Jersey farmer, who wished to see Bingham rather than President Washington because he had heard that Bingham was "so wealthy.... Throughout America I met with a similar love of money," says Talleyrand. (Memoirs of Talleyrand: Broglie's ed., i, 180.) In this estimate of American character during that period, Talleyrand did not differ from other travelers, nor, indeed, from the opinion of most Americans who expressed themselves upon this subject. (See vol.i, chaps.vii, andviii, of this work.)

[601]Talleyrand as quoted in Pickering to King, Nov. 7, 1798;Pickering: Pickering, ii, 429.

[602]Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., ii, 158.

[603]Memoirs of Talleyrand: Stewarton, ii, 10.

[604]Pinckney was the only one of the envoys who could speak French. He had received a finished education in England at Westminster and Oxford and afterward had studied in France at the Royal Military College at Caen.

[605]Marshall and Talleyrand were forty-two years of age, Pinckney fifty-one, and Gerry fifty-three.

[606]King to Talleyrand, London, Aug. 3, 1797; King, ii, 206-08.

[607]Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., ii, 158; Marshall's Journal, Official Copy; MS., Mass. Hist. Soc., 2. The envoys' dispatches to the Secretary of State were prepared by Marshall, largely, from his Journal. Citations will be from the dispatches except when not including matter set out exclusively in Marshall's Journal.

[608]Marshall's Journal, Oct. 11, 2-4.

[609]Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., ii, 8-11, and 158. Fulwar Skipwith was consul; but Mountflorence was connected with the office.

[610]Am. St. Prs., For. Rel., ii, 157. Italics are mine.

Society is divided into two classes; the shearers and the shorn. We should always be with the former against the latter. (Talleyrand.)To lend money to a belligerent power is to relinquish our neutrality. (Marshall.)

Society is divided into two classes; the shearers and the shorn. We should always be with the former against the latter. (Talleyrand.)

To lend money to a belligerent power is to relinquish our neutrality. (Marshall.)

Diplomatically Marshall and his associates found themselves marooned. Many and long were their discussions of the situation. "We have had several conversations on the extraordinary silence of the Government concerning our reception," writes Marshall in his Journal. "The plunder of our commerce sustains no abatements, the condemnations of our vessels are press'd with ardor ... our reception is postponed in a manner most unusual & contemptuous.

"I urge repeatedly that we ought, in a respectful communication to the Minister [Talleyrand] ... to pray for a suspension of all further proceedings against American vessels until the further order of the Directory....

"We have already permitted much time to pass away, we could not be charged with precipitation, & I am willing to wait two or three days longer but not more.... The existing state of things is to France the most beneficial & the most desirable, but to America it is ruinous. I therefore urge that in a few days we shall lay this interesting subject before the Minister."[611]

Marshall tells us that Gerry again opposed action, holding that for the envoys to act would "irritate the [French] Government." The Directory "might take umbrage."[612]Besides, declared Gerry, France was in a quandary what to do and "any movement on our part" would relieve her and put the blame on the envoys. "But," records Marshall, "in the address I propose I would say nothing which could give umbrage, & if, as is to be feared, France is determined to be offended, she may quarrel with our answer to any proposition she may make or even with our silence." Pinckney agreed with Marshall; but they yielded to Gerry in order to "preserve unanimity."[613]

Tidings soon arrived of the crushing defeat of the Dutch fleet by the British; and on the heels of this came reports that the Directory were ready to negotiate with the Americans.[614]Next morning, and four days after the mysterious intimations to the American envoys from Talleyrand through his confidential secretary, a Parisian business man called on Pinckney and told him that a Mr. Hottenguer,[615]"a native of Switzerland who had been in America,"[616]and "a gentleman of considerable credit and reputation," would call on Pinckney. Pinckney had met Hottenguer on a former occasion, probably at The Hague. That evening this cosmopolitan agent of financiers and foreign offices paid the expected visit. After a while Hottenguer "whispered ... that he had a message from Talleyrand." Into the next room went Pinckney and his caller. There Hottenguer told Pinckney that the Directory were "exceedingly irritated" at President Adams's speech and that "they should be softened."

Indeed, the envoys would not be received, said Hottenguer, unless the mellowing process were applied to the wounded and angry Directory. He was perfectly plain as to the method of soothing that sore and sensitive body—"money" for the pockets of its members and the Foreign Minister which would be "at the disposal of M. Talleyrand." Also a loan must be made to France. Becoming still more explicit, Hottenguer stated the exact amount of financial salve which must be applied in the first step of the healing treatment required from our envoys—a small bribe of one million two hundred thousand livres [about fifty thousand pounds sterling, or two hundred and fifty thousand dollars].

"It was absolutely required," reports Marshall, "that we should ... pay the debts due by contract from France to our citizens ... pay for the spoliations committed on our commerce ... & make a considerable loan.... Besides this, added Mr. Hottenguer, there must be something for the pocket ... for the private use of the Directoire & Minister under the form of satisfying claims which," says Marshall, "did not in fact exist."[617]

Pinckney reported to his colleagues. Again the envoys divided as to the course to pursue. "I was decidedly of opinion," runs Marshall's chronicle, "& so expressed myself, that such a proposition could not be made by a nation from whom any treaty, short of the absolute surrender of the independence of the United States was to be expected, but that if there was a possibility of accommodation, to give any countenance whatever to such a proposition would be certainly to destroy that possibility because it would induce France to demand from us terms to which it was impossible for us to accede. I therefore," continues Marshall, "thought we ought, so soon as we could obtain the whole information, to treat the terms as inadmissible and without taking any notice of them to make some remonstrance to the minister on our situation & on that of our countrymen." Pinckney agreed with Marshall; Gerry dissented and declared that "the whole negotiation ... would be entirely broken off if such an answer was given as I [Marshall] had hinted & there would be a war between the twonations." At last it was decided to get Hottenguer's proposition in writing.[618]

When Pinckney so informed Hottenguer, the latter announced that he had not dealt "immediately with Talleyrand but through another gentleman in whom Talleyrand had great confidence." Hottenguer had no objection, however, to writing out his "suggestions," which he did the next evening.[619]The following morning he advised the envoys that a Mr. Bellamy, "the confidential friend of M. Talleyrand," would call and explain matters in person. Decidedly, the fog was thickening. The envoys debated among themselves as to what should be done.

"I again urg'd the necessity of breaking off this indirect mode of procedure," testifies Marshall; but "Mr. Gerry reprobated precipitation, insisted on further explanations as we could not completely understand the scope & object of the propositions & conceiv'd that we ought not abruptly object to them." Marshall and Pinckney thought "that they [Talleyrand's demands] were beyond our powers & ... amounted to a surrender of the independence of our country."[620]But Gerry had his way and the weaving of the spider's web went on.

Two hours after candlelight that evening Hottenguer and Bellamy entered Marshall's room where the three Americans were waiting for them; and Bellamy was introduced as "the confidential friend of M. Talleyrand," of whom Hottenguer had toldthe envoys. Bellamy was, says Marshall, "a genevan now residing in Hamburg but in Paris on a visit."[621]He went straight to the point. Talleyrand, he confided to the envoys, was "a friend of America ... the kindness and civilities he had personally received in America" had touched his heart; and he was burning to "repay these kindnesses." But what could this anxious friend of America do when the cruel Directory were so outraged at the American President's address to Congress that they would neither receive the envoys nor authorize "Talleyrand to have any communications with" them.

Bellamy pointed out that under these circumstances Talleyrand could not, of course, communicate directly with the envoys; but "had authorized" him to deal with them "and to promise" that the French Foreign Minister would do his best to get the Directory to receive the Americans if the latter agreed to Talleyrand's terms. Nevertheless, Bellamy "stated explicitly and repeatedly that he was clothed with no authority"—he was not a diplomat, he said, but only the trusted friend of Talleyrand. He then pointed out the passages from Adams's address[622]which had so exasperated the French rulers and stated what the envoys must do to make headway.

The American envoys, asserted Bellamy, must make "a formal disavowal in writing ... that ... the speech of the Citizen President," Barras, was "not offensive" to America; must offer "reparation" for President Adams's address; must affirmthat the decree of the Directory,[623]which Adams had denounced, was not "contrary to the treaty of 1778"; must state "in writing" the depredations on American trade "by the English and French privateers," and must make "a formal declaration" that Adams in his speech to Congress had not referred to the French Government or its agents: if all this were done "the French Republic is disposed to renew their old-time relations with America" by a new treaty which should place France "with respect to the United States exactly on the same footing as they [the United States] should be with England." But, said Bellamy, there must be a secret article of this new treaty providing for a loan from America to France.[624]

Impossible as these terms were, the whole business must be preceded by a bribe. "I will not disguise from you," said Bellamy, "that this situation being met, the essential part of the treaty remains to be adjusted....You must pay money—you must pay a great deal of money." Little was said about the two hundred and fifty thousand dollars bribe; "that," declare the envoys' dispatches to the American Secretary of State, "being completely understood on all sides to be required for the officers of the government, and, therefore, needing no further explanation." When all these conditions were complied with, said Bellamy, "M. Talleyrand trusted that, by his influence with the Directory, he could prevailon the government to receive" the Americans. For two hours the talk ran on. Before Talleyrand's agents left, the anxiously hospitable Gerry invited them to breakfast the next morning.

Into consultation once more went the envoys. "I pressed strongly," writes Marshall in his Journal, "the necessity of declaring that the propositions were totally inadmissible" and that "it was derogatory from the honor and wounded the real interests of our country to permit ourselves, while unacknowledg'd, to carry on this clandestine negotiation with persons who produced no evidence of being authoriz'd by the Directoire or the Minister to treat with us. Mr. Gerry was quite of a contrary opinion & the old beaten ground about precipitation &c. was trodden once again. Gen'l Pinckney advocated decidedly the same opinions with myself & we determined that the next morning should positively put an end to these conferences."[625]

"On our retiring," continues Marshall's narrative, "Mr. Gerry began to propose further delays & that we shou'd inform them [Talleyrand's go-betweens] that we wou'd take their propositions into consideration—I improperly interrupted him & declared that I wou'd not consent to any proposition of the sort, that the subject was already considered & that so far as my voice wou'd go I wou'd not permit it to be supposed longer that we cou'd deliberate on such propositions as were made to us."

Pinckney agreed with Marshall; but, for harmony's sake, Marshall finally said that he wouldreturn to America to "consult our government" on this express condition only—"that France should previously and immediately suspend all depredations upon American commerce." For once, Gerry assented and a letter was written accordingly.[626]

Hottenguer was prompt in his engagement to breakfast with Gerry the next morning; but Bellamy did not come till ten o'clock, explaining that he had been closeted with Talleyrand. Bellamy was much depressed; the Directory, he declared, would not receive the envoys until the latter had disavowed President Adams's speech,unlessthey "could find the means to change their [the Directory's] determination in this particular." What were such "means?" asked the envoys. "I am not authorized to state them," said Bellamy. "You must search for them and propose them yourselves."

Still, Bellamy, merely as an individual, was willing to suggest such "means." It was money, he explained. The "Directory were jealous of their own honor and the honor of the nation"; they demanded the same treatment formerly accorded to the King; and their "honor must be maintained in the manner required" unless "the envoys substituted ... something perhaps more valuable, and that was money."[627]

It was all so simple, according to Bellamy. All that the envoys had to do was to buy thirty-two million florins of Dutch inscriptions at twenty shillings to the pound. "It was certain," he assuredthe Americans, "that after a time the Dutch Government would repay ... the money, so that America would ultimately lose nothing" and everybody would be happy. But even if the envoys made the loan in this way, the bribe of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars must be paid in addition. Thereupon the envoys handed him the letter which Marshall had prepared the night before, which stated that they had no power to make a loan, but could send one of their number to America for consultation and instruction.

Bellamy was "disappointed" and at once modified his language. Why did the envoys treat the money proposition as coming from the Directory? It was only his own personal suggestion. Then "what has led to our present conversation?" asked the envoys. Pinckney recalled Hottenguer's first visit and the latter confirmed Pinckney's account.

Upon the envoys stating the differences between France and America, to settle which was the purpose of their mission, and gently resenting the demands made upon them, Bellamy became excited. The envoys' conduct was not to be borne, he exclaimed; let them beware of the resentment of France. They "could not help it," answered the envoys—the Directory must look after France; the envoys must look after the United States.

Bellamy was "in despair." What a provincial view these Americans took of a diplomatic negotiation! They must broaden their horizon. They must acquire worldly wisdom. They must remember "the respect which the Directory required"; they mustrealize that that august body "would exact as much as was paid to the ancient kings." The envoys would not be received without it; that was flat, Bellamy informed them; and "he seemed to shudder at the consequences."

Marshall and Pinckney simply would not see the point. But Gerry was a man of the world who could understand European diplomacy. Marshall declared that the envoys were there to adjust international differences. If, however, France "would make war," then, said they: "We regret the unavoidable necessity of defending ourselves."[628]

For a little while Talleyrand's leeches dropped away from the perplexed Americans. Marshall reported to Washington French conditions as he had observed them up to that time. He confirms to the former President the American report that French agriculture had been improved "in the course of the present war":—

"In that part of the country through which I have passed the evidences of plenty abound. The whole earth appears to be in cultivation & the harvests of the present year appear to be as productive as the fields which yield them are extensive.

"I am informed that every part of the country exhibits the same aspect. If this be the fact, there will probably remain, notwithstanding the demands of the armies, a surplus of provisions."

Marshall briefly but clearly analyzes the economic and commercial outcome of the war:—

"Manufactures have declined in the same ratiothat the cultivation of the soil has increas'd. War has been made upon the great manufacturing towns & they are in a considerable degree destroy'd. With manufactures France does not supply herself fully from her internal resources.

"Those of Britain flow in upon her notwithstanding the most severe prohibitory laws. The port of Rotterdam is purposely left open by the English & their goods are imported by the Dutch under Prussian and other neutral colors. They are smuggled in great quantities into France.

"Peace, then, will find this [French] nation entirely competent to the full supply of her colonies with provisions and needing manufactures to be imported for her own consumption.... France can take from America tobacco & raw cotton she can supply us with wines, brandies & silks."

Marshall then makes a searching commentary on French politics.

"The existing political state of France is connected with certain internal & powerfully operating causes by which it has been & will continue to be greatly influenc'd. Not the least of these is the tenure by which property is held.

"In the course of the revolution it is believed that more than half the land of France has become national.[629]Of this a very considerable proportion has been sold at a low rate.

"It is true that much of it belonged to those who have fallen under the Guillotine or who have been termed emigrants. Among the emigrants are manywhose attachment to their country has never been shaken; & what is remarkable, among them are many who were never out of France. The law upon this subject is worthy of attention.

"Any two persons, no matter what their reputation, may, to some authority, I believe the municipality of the district, write & subscribe against any person whatever a charge, that such person is an emigrant, on receipt of which the person so charg'd is without further investigation inscribed on the list of emigrants.

"If the person so inscribed be afterwards apprehended while his name remains on the list, the trial, as I understand, is, not of the fact of emigration, but of the identity of the persons, & if this identity be established, he is instantly fusiller'd [shot]. The law is either rightly executed or permitted to be relax'd, as the occasion or the temper of the times may direct.

"During intervals of humanity some disposition has been manifested to permit the return of those who have never offended, who have been banished by a terror which the government itself has reprobated, & to permit in case of arrestation, an investigation of the fact of emigration as well as of the identity of the person accus'd.

"There is too a great deal of property which has been sold as national but which in truth was never so, & which may be reclaimed by the original proprietors.

"In this state the acquirers of national property are of course extremely suspicious. They form a vastproportion of the population of France. They are not only important in consequence of their numbers, but in consequence of their vigor, their activity & that unity of interest which produces a unity of effort among them.

"The armies too have been promised a milliard. This promise rests upon the national property for its performance. The effect of these circumstances cannot escape your observation. Classes of citizens are to be disfranchised against the next election."

Marshall and Pinckney, at this early stage of Talleyrand's financial-diplomatic intrigue, were so disgusted that they were on the point of "returning to America immediately." The continuance of French depredations on the high seas caused Marshall to write to Washington as follows:—

"The captures of our vessels seem to be only limited by the ability to capture. That ability is increasing, as the government has let out to hardy adventurers the national frigates. Among those who plunder us, who are most active in this infamous business, & most loud in vociferating criminations equally absurd and untrue, are some unprincipled apostates who were born in America.

"These sea rovers by a variety of means seem to have acquired great influence in the government.

"This influence will be exerted to prevent an accommodation between the United States & France and to prevent any regulations which may intercept the passage of the spoils they have made on our commerce, to their pockets. The government I believe is too well disposed to promote their views. At present it seems to me to be radically hostile to our country.

"I cou'd wish to form a contrary opinion, but to do so I must shut my eyes on every object which presents itself to them & fabricate in my own mind non-existing things, to be substituted for realities, & to form the basis of my creed.

"Might I be permitted to hazard an opinion it wou'd be the Atlantic only can save us, & that no consideration will be sufficiently powerful to check the extremities to which the temper of this government will carry it, but an apprehension that we may be thrown into the arms of Britain."

Although the Treaty of Campo Formio had been signed on the 17th of October, Paris had not yet heard of it. This treaty marked Bonaparte as the most constructive diplomat, as well as the foremost captain, of the age, for such he had already proved himself to be. A week later, when Marshall wrote the above letter to Washington (October 24, 1797), he reported that "The negotiations with the Emperor of Austria are said not to have been absolutely broken off. Yesterday it was said that peace with him was certain. Several couriers have arrived lately from Buonaparte & the national debt rose yesterday from seven to ten livres in the hundred. Whether this is founded on a real expectation of peace with Austria or is the mere work of stock jobbers is not for me to decide."

But three days afterward (October 27) the news reached Paris; and Marshall adds this postscript: "The definitive peace is made with the Emperor.You will have seen the conditions. Venice has experienced the fate of Poland. England is threatened with an invasion."[630]

The thunders of cannon announcing Bonaparte's success were still rolling through Paris when Talleyrand's plotters again descended upon the American envoys. Bellamy came and, Pinckney and Gerry being at the opera, saw Marshall alone. The triumph of Bonaparte was his theme. The victorious general was now ready to invade England, announced Bellamy; but "concerning America not a syllable was said."[631]

Already Talleyrand, sensitive as any hawk to coming changes in the political weather, had begun to insinuate himself into the confidence of the future conqueror of Europe, whose diplomatic right arm he so soon was to become. The next morning the thrifty Hottenguer again visits the envoys. Bonaparte's success in the negotiations of Campo Formio, which sealed the victories of the French arms, has alarmed Hottenguer, he declares, for the success of the American mission.

Why, he asks, have the Americans made no proposition to the Directory? That haughty body "were becoming impatient and would take a decided course in regard to America" if the envoys "could not soften them," exclaims Talleyrand's solicitous messenger. Surely the envoys can see that Bonaparte's treaty with Austria has changed everything,and that therefore the envoys themselves must change accordingly.

Exhibiting great emotion, Hottenguer asserts that the Directory have determined "that all nations should aid them [the French], or be considered and treated as enemies." Think, he cries, of the "power and violence of France." Think of the present danger the envoys are in. Think of the wisdom of "softening the Directory." But he hints that "the Directory might be made more friendly." Gain time! Gain time! Give the bribe, and gain time! the wily agent advises the Americans. Otherwise, France may declare war against America.

That would be most unfortunate, answer the envoys, but assert that the present American "situation was more ruinous than a declared war could be"; for now American "commerce was floundering unprotected." In case of war "America would protect herself."

"You do not speak to the point," Hottenguer passionately cries out; "it is money; it is expected that you will offer money."

"We have given an answer to that demand," the envoys reply.

"No," exclaims Hottenguer, "you have not! What is your answer?"

"It is no," shouts Pinckney; "no; not a sixpence!"

The persistent Hottenguer does not desist. He tells the envoys that they do not know the kind of men they are dealing with. The Directory, he insists, disregard the justice of American claims; care nothing even for the French colonies; "considerthemselves as perfectly invulnerable" from the United States. Money is the only thing that will interest such terrible men. The Americans, parrying, ask whether, even if they give money, Talleyrand will furnish proofs that it will produce results. Hottenguer evades the question. A long discussion ensues.

Pay the bribe, again and again urges the irritated but tenacious go-between. Does not your Government "know that nothing is to be obtained here without money?"

"Our Government had not even suspected such a state of things," declare the amazed Americans.

"Well," answers Hottenguer, "there is not an American in Paris who could not have given that information.... Hamburgh and other states of Europe were obliged to buy peace ... nothing could resist" the power of France; let the envoys think of "the danger of a breach with her."[632]

Thus far Pinckney mostly had spoken for the envoys. Marshall now took up the American case. Few utterances ever made by him more clearly reveal the mettle of the man; and none better show his conception of the American Nation's rights, dignity, and station among the Governments of the world.

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