FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[122]Cong. Globe, 1871, p. 51.[123]See House report No. 50, 37th Congress, 3d session, page 38.[124]Rhodes,History of the United States,vii, 182-89.[125]This interview was reprinted in the New YorkTimesof December 6. It is corroborated in sentiment by the Trumbull manuscripts of that date, but it was probably not intended for publication. It purports to be a conversation between Trumbull and an ex-Senator.

[122]Cong. Globe, 1871, p. 51.

[123]See House report No. 50, 37th Congress, 3d session, page 38.

[124]Rhodes,History of the United States,vii, 182-89.

[125]This interview was reprinted in the New YorkTimesof December 6. It is corroborated in sentiment by the Trumbull manuscripts of that date, but it was probably not intended for publication. It purports to be a conversation between Trumbull and an ex-Senator.

THE CINCINNATI CONVENTION

The Liberal Republicans of Missouri held a state convention at Jefferson City, January 24, 1872. They adopted a platform which affirmed the sovereignty of the Union, emancipation, equality of rights, enfranchisement, complete amnesty, tariff reform, civil service reform, local self-government, and impartial suffrage. They also called a national mass convention to meet at Cincinnati on the first Monday in May.

This call was at once endorsed by General J. D. Cox, George Hoadley, Stanley Matthews, and J. B. Stallo, four of the most eminent citizens of Ohio, the first of whom had been a member of President Grant's Cabinet. Mr. Matthews, in an interview, expressed the hope that the Democrats would join in nominating a candidate for the presidency of the type of Charles Francis Adams, William S. Groesbeck, Lyman Trumbull, or Salmon P. Chase.

The movement spread like wildfire. Groups of Republicans, eminent in character and in public service in all the states, proclaimed their adhesion to it and declared their intention to participate in the convention. It had also the active support of the SpringfieldRepublican, the CincinnatiCommercial, and the ChicagoTribune, and the sympathy of the New YorkEvening Post, theNation, and the New YorkTribune. Democratic sympathy was manifested early and found expression in the columns of the LouisvilleCourier-Journal, whose editor, Henry Watterson, took a keen interest in the preliminaries of the Cincinnati meeting and whose coöperation was gladlywelcomed. The New YorkWorld, edited by Manton Marble, gave passive support to the movement by advising Democrats to conform to present facts and not seek to revive or sustain the dead issues of the war and Reconstruction.

Under date, New Orleans, April 23, Marble wrote to Schurz:

It is due to you that I should say, before you go to Cincinnati, that in my clear judgment the nomination of Charles Francis Adams would defeat the reëlection of Grant. It has always been obvious that Mr. Adams would be among the best of Presidents. He has been growing, during the last few months, to be the best of candidates. I could not name another so safe to win. Adams and Palmer would be a quite perfect ticket.—This is founded on careful consideration.

August Belmont, of New York, the most influential Democrat in that state not holding any public office, took an active part, both by correspondence and by personal solicitation, in the endeavor to secure the nomination by the Cincinnati Convention of a candidate whom the Democrats could support, and to induce the latter to abstain from making a separate nomination. From Vincennes, Indiana, April 23, he wrote to Schurz that, after having seen many prominent men of both parties, he had found the Cincinnati movement even stronger with them, and the people, than he had anticipated. He added:

Everybody looks for the action of your convention, and if you make a goodnationalplatform denouncing the abuses and corruption of the Executive, the military despotism of the South, the centralization of power and the subordination of the civil power to the military rule, and declare boldly for general amnesty and a revenue tariff, you will find every Democrat throughout the land ready to vote for your candidate, provided you name one whom our convention can endorse.... I found in the West and in New York an overwhelmingdesire for Charles F. Adams. Adams is the strongest and least vulnerable man; he will draw more votes from Grant than will any other candidate. The whole Democratic party will follow him.

There was a full delegation from Pennsylvania, composed of honorable men, who were not office-seekers. The meeting which appointed them was presided over by Colonel A. K. McClure, who announced, when taking the chair, that inasmuch as the Cincinnati Convention was a mass meeting, the persons attending it would not be entangled in the usual political machinery. The movement was on the lines of the Republican party; it was a movement of Republicans by necessity, who did not mean to be bound by the Government party as it then stood. General William B. Thomas said that he and other gentlemen had issued the call for this meeting to send a delegation to Cincinnati. He was engaged in work looking to the annihilation of the Republican party. He had helped to build up that party, but now he was free to say that it was the most corrupt party on the face of the earth. He was opposed to any candidate to be nominated by the coming Philadelphia Convention; Grant, or any other man. Colonel McClure said that the plain English of the whole thing was rebellion against the party and the bringing of it to the dignity of a revolution. Five years ago there might have been a necessity for the exercise of military power in the South, but not now. The South, to his mind, had been more desolated since the close of the war than before.

The Pennsylvanians had fifty-six votes in the convention. On the first roll-call they cast all of them for Governor A. G. Curtin. On all subsequent ones they gave a plurality for Adams.[126]

Numerous letters reached Trumbull before the call for the Cincinnati Convention was issued suggesting that he be a candidate for the presidency in opposition to Grant. One of these, dated Roslyn, Long Island, November 30, 1871, was from John H. Bryant, brother of William Cullen Bryant, who said that both himself and his brother desired to see him elected President and that if he should be a candidate he could count on the support of theEvening Post.

Silas L. Bryan, of Salem, Illinois, the father of William Jennings Bryan, wrote under date, December 19, 1871, that he considered Trumbull the Providential man for the present crisis and that if he would consent to be a candidate for the highest office he (Bryan) would take steps to promote that desirable end. To this letter Trumbull replied that to be talked about for the presidency impaired the influence he might otherwise have to promote the reforms which he labored to bring about. He did not, however, refuse Judge Bryan's offer of assistance.

Joseph Brown, Mayor of St. Louis, wrote that he would rather see Trumbull nominated for the presidency than any other man of either party. To this letter Trumbull made a reply similar to that given to Judge Bryan.

Walter B. Scates, ex-judge of the supreme court of Illinois, wrote: "You saved the Republican party in the impeachment trial and I now hope you may save the country from corruption, pillage, high tax, class legislation, and central despotism."

Jesse K. Dubois, auditor of Illinois, perhaps the most sagacious and experienced politician in the state, wrote, after signing the call for the Cincinnati Convention: "With you as our candidate I would wager we carry this state anywhere from 30,000 to 50,000 majority as against Grant."

On February 23, Trumbull made a speech in the Senate defending the Missouri Convention's platform against the objections of Senator Morton, who had stigmatized it as a Democratic movement, because that party in Connecticut had endorsed it in their state convention. In this speech Trumbull took up each resolution in the platform and showed that it was either in accord with Republican doctrine as affirmed in the national platforms of the party, or had been commended by President Grant in official messages to Congress. On the subject of civil service reform, to promote which Grant had appointed the George William Curtis Commission, he said:

The great evil of our civil service system grows out of the manner of making appointments and renewals and the use which is made of the patronage, treating it as mere party spoils. Often the patronage is used for purposes not rising to the dignity of even party purposes, but by certain individuals for individual and personal ends. It would be bad enough if the patronage were used as mere spoils for party, but it is infinitely worse than that under our present system.The Senator from Indiana, in his speech the other day, undertook to create the impression that I was opposed to civil service reform. Why, sir, I offered the very bill in this body which became a law under which the Civil Service Commission was organized. I introduced bills here years ago in favor of a reform in the civil service and especially to break up the running of members of Congress to the departments begging for offices. In my judgment there is nothing more disreputable, or which interferes more with the proper discharge of public duty, than this hanging around the skirts of power begging for offices for friends.

The Senator from Indiana, in his speech the other day, undertook to create the impression that I was opposed to civil service reform. Why, sir, I offered the very bill in this body which became a law under which the Civil Service Commission was organized. I introduced bills here years ago in favor of a reform in the civil service and especially to break up the running of members of Congress to the departments begging for offices. In my judgment there is nothing more disreputable, or which interferes more with the proper discharge of public duty, than this hanging around the skirts of power begging for offices for friends.

The growth of the Cincinnati movement was signalized by a meeting at the Cooper Union in New York City on the evening of April 12, of which theNationsaid: "We believe that it was the most densely packed meeting which ever met there. All approach within fifty yards ofthe entrance was next to impossible in the early part of the evening, so great was the crowd in the street." Both Trumbull and Schurz spoke here to enthusiastic hearers.

Among the letters received by Trumbull prior to the convention the most thoughtful and weighty was the following written by Governor John M. Palmer, of Illinois:

Springfield, April 13, 1872.I have felt considerable apprehension in regard to the Cincinnati movement for the reason that I have doubted the ability of men of the right stamp to control the action of the proposed convention, and I have believed that it would be better to endure the abuses and weaknesses and follies of Grant's Administration for another four years than to crystallize them by the mistake of making a bad nomination of his successor. Grant is an evil that we can endure if we retain the right to point out his faults in principle and practice, but if some ancient Federalist should be elected to succeed him what is now usurpation would be accepted by the people as the proper theory of the government. But if the Cincinnati Convention nominates a statesman I will support him, and you if you are selected as the candidate.John M. Palmer.

Springfield, April 13, 1872.

I have felt considerable apprehension in regard to the Cincinnati movement for the reason that I have doubted the ability of men of the right stamp to control the action of the proposed convention, and I have believed that it would be better to endure the abuses and weaknesses and follies of Grant's Administration for another four years than to crystallize them by the mistake of making a bad nomination of his successor. Grant is an evil that we can endure if we retain the right to point out his faults in principle and practice, but if some ancient Federalist should be elected to succeed him what is now usurpation would be accepted by the people as the proper theory of the government. But if the Cincinnati Convention nominates a statesman I will support him, and you if you are selected as the candidate.

John M. Palmer.

Among the names mentioned as desirable candidates that of Charles Francis Adams was the most prominent. After him came Lyman Trumbull, Horace Greeley, David Davis, B. Gratz Brown, and Andrew G. Curtin. Adams had been Minister to Great Britain during the war, and was now one of the arbitrators of the Geneva Tribunal under the Alabama Claims Treaty. He had written a letter to David A. Wells which showed that he did not desire the nomination, was perfectly indifferent to it, but that if it were given to him without pledges of any kind he would not refuse. He said among other things:

If the call upon me were an unequivocal one based upon confidence in my character earned in public life, and a belief that I would carry out in practice the principles I professed,then indeed would come a test of my courage in an emergency; but if I am to be negotiated for, and have assurances given that I am honest, you will be so kind as to draw me out of that crowd.

This phrase was interpreted erroneously by some as an expression of contempt for "that crowd," but, of course, it was not so intended. The letter was not written for publication. Not only did Mr. Adams not seek the nomination, but his son, Charles Francis, Jr., refused to go to the convention, or to invite any of his Boston friends to go.

Greeley was an anti-slavery leader, founder of the New YorkTribune, book-writer, lecturer, foremost journalist in the country, distinguished both for intellectual power and personal eccentricity. Davis was a member of the Supreme Court of the United States, by Lincoln's appointment. Brown was governor of Missouri, and next to Schurz the most prominent leader of the Liberal movement. Curtin had been the war governor of Pennsylvania and was a man of high ability and unblemished character. The name of Sumner had been frequently mentioned as one suitable for the presidency, but he had not yet given his adhesion to the Liberal movement.

The New YorkHeraldof May 1 tells what I thought of the outlook when I first arrived in Cincinnati, thus:

Cincinnati, April 27, 1872.—Mr. Horace White, who arrived this morning, says that the Liberal movement has as yet only penetrated the crust of public sentiment and that the masses of the people are waiting in a half-curious way to see what will be done here before they will make up their minds.

Trumbull did not authorize the presentation of his name to the convention until one week before its meeting. Then a qualified acquiescence came in a letter to myself, dated Washington, April 24, saying:

I do not think I ought to be nominated unless there is adecidedfeeling among those who assemble, and are outside of rings and bargains, that I would be stronger than any one else. Unless this is the feeling, I think it would not be wise to present my name at all.... D. A. Wells has enclosed me a letter written on the 20th by John Van Buren, Governor Hoffman's secretary, which he thinks undoubtedly represents the feelings of the Hoffman wing of the New York Democracy. In this letter Van Buren says the convention must not touch the question of free trade, that the persons pushing this question are not unanimous on the question, and that a non-committal resolution would do harm in both directions. Grosvenor is very strenuous about having such a resolution as will commit the convention distinctly to revenue reform, and I fear will be a little unreasonable about it. I had thought that a resolution might be adopted which would assert the principle without being offensive to anybody; perhaps something like the resolution adopted by the last Illinois State Convention. Free-traders and protectionists differ more about the application of principles than the principles themselves in their efforts. Wells and other reformers of the East will be reasonable on this question. Van Buren further says in his letter: "One thing rely upon—you need do nothing at Cincinnati except with reference to drawing Republicans into the movement. Disregard the Democrats. The movement of that side will take care of itself. There will be no cheating nor holding back on their side. They will go over in bulk and with a will."

My reply to this letter, written immediately after the adjournment of the convention, was the following:

My judgment was from the beginning of our arrival here that you could not be nominated, but I did not tell anybody so. Dr. Jayne and Governor Koerner thought you could be; and their judgment, I thought, should be set before mine. So I held my tongue and did what I could. If I had taken the responsibility of withdrawing your name as suggested by your letter, I should never have had any standing in Illinois again—certainly not among your friends.

As this convention did not consist of delegates chosenby primary meetings, any person of Republican antecedents or attachments was permitted to attend and take part in it. To bring order out of chaos it was necessary for the men of each state to come together and choose a number corresponding to its population to cast its votes on all questions arising, including the nomination of candidates. In states which presented more than one candidate, as in Illinois, there was some difficulty in making the proper division as between Davis and Trumbull; but all such troubles were adjusted before the hour for assembling arrived. The streets of Cincinnati had never beheld a more orderly, single-minded, public-spirited crowd. At least four fifths had come together at their own expense for no other purpose than the general good. There was, however, a small minority of office-seekers among them. The movement in its inception was altogether free from that class, but when it began to assume formidable proportions and seemed not unlikely to sweep the country, it attracted a certain number of professional politicians, including a few estrays from the South.

The office-seeking fraternity were mostly supporters of Davis, whose appearance as a candidate for the presidency was extremely offensive to the original promoters of the movement. As a judge of the Supreme Court his incursion into the field of politics, unheralded, but not unprecedented, was an indecorum. Moreover, his supporters had not been early movers in the ranks of reform, and their sincerity was doubted. They were extremely active, however, after the movement had gained headway, and they were able to divide the vote of Illinois into two equal parts (21 to 21), so that Trumbull's strength in the convention was seriously impaired. Davis's chances were early demolished by the editorial fraternity, who, at a dinner at Murat Halstead's house, resolved that theywould not support him if nominated, and caused that fact to be made known.

Greeley's candidacy had not been taken seriously by the editors at Halstead's dinner-party. As an individual he was generally liked by them and his ability and honesty were held in the highest esteem; but he was looked upon as too eccentric and picturesque to find much support in such a sober-minded convention as ours. Adams and Trumbull were the only men supposed by us to be within the sphere of nomination, and the chances of Adams were deemed the better of the two. We had yet to learn that there are occasions and crowds where personal oddity and a flash of genius under an old white hat are more potent than high ancestry or approved statesmanship, or both those qualifications joined together.

Before nominations were made, a platform was to be framed and adopted. There were three main issues to be considered: Universal amnesty, civil service reform, and tariff reform. On the first and second there was no difference of opinion. Without them the Cincinnati movement would never have taken place; the convention would never have been called. As to the third, there was a difference of opinion which divided the convention and the Committee on Resolutions in the middle, and it soon became known that "there was no common ground on which the protectionists and revenue reformers could stand." So wrote E. L. Godkin from the convention hall to theNation. He continued:

The Committee on Resolutions, after sitting up a whole night, were compelled to accept the compromise which he [Greeley] proposed—the reference of the whole matter to the people in the congressional districts. It is right to add that the sentiment of the convention was overwhelmingly in favor of this course. There is a touch of absurdity about it, it is true, but it is at least frank and honest, and at all events nothingelse was possible. Even such outspoken free-traders as Judge Hoadley, of this city, were compelled to concur in this disposition of the question.

As chairman of the Committee on Resolutions, and a free-trader, I can confirm all that Godkin wrote, and add that the committee considered the expediency of reporting to the convention their inability to agree and asking to be discharged. This plan was rejected lest it should cause a bolting movement, on an issue which was rated only third in importance among those which had brought us together. It was decided that tariff reform could wait, while the pacification of the South and the reform of the civil service could not.

Thursday night, May 2, I had gone to bed at the Burnet House when I was aroused by a loud knock on my door and a voice outside which I recognized as that of Grosvenor exclaiming: "Get up! Blair and Brown are here from St. Louis." Without waiting for an answer he went on knocking at other doors in the corridor and giving the same warning, but no other explanation. I arose, dressed myself, and went down to the rotunda of the hotel, where I found some of the supporters of Trumbull and of Adams who were trying to discover why the arrival of Frank Blair and Gratz Brown should produce a commotion in a convention of more than seven hundred, of which Blair and Brown were not members. Blair was then the Democratic Senator from Missouri. The two newcomers were not visible. They had obtained a room and had called into it some of the Missouri delegation and would not admit any uninvited persons. Presently Grosvenor returned and told us that Brown intended to withdraw as a candidate for the presidency and turn his forces over to Greeley, and himself take the Vice-Presidency. Grosvenor considered this a dangerouscombination and said that steps should be taken to checkmate it at once.

The Adams and Trumbull men here collected remained till about two o'clock trying to learn more about the expectedcoup, but as nothing further could be obtained they retired one by one to uneasy slumber. Grosvenor maintained to the last that great mischief was impending, but could not suggest any way to meet it.

On the following day voting began, and the first roll-call showed Adams in the lead with 205 votes; Greeley had 147, Trumbull 110, Brown 95, Davis 92-1/2, Curtin 62, Chase 2-1/2. Carl Schurz, who was permanent chairman of the convention and a supporter of Adams, then rose and with some signs of embarrassment said that a gentleman who had received a large number of votes desired to make a statement, whereupon he invited the Hon. B. Gratz Brown to come to the platform. Brown advanced to the front, and after thanking his friends for their support said that he had decided to withdraw his name and that he desired the nomination of Horace Greeley as the man most likely to win in the coming election. There was great applause among the supporters of Greeley, but the immediate result did not answer their expectations. Brown could not control even the Missouri delegation. The first vote of the Missouri men had been 30 for Brown. The second was, Trumbull 16, Greeley 10, Adams 4.

All the votes are shown in the following table:

Roll-CallAdamsGreeleyTrumbullDavisChaseBrownCurtinFirst20514711092-1/22-1/29562Second243245148812Third26425815644Fourth27925114151Fifth309258913025Sixth32433219632

Although Greeley's plurality on the sixth roll-call was small, his gain over the fifth was large, being 74 votes, that of Adams being only 15. This was a signal to all who wished to be on the winning side to take shelter under the old white hat. Changes were made before the result was announced which gave Greeley 482 to 187 for Adams. Then Greeley was declared nominated. The nomination of Gratz Brown for Vice-President followed without much opposition.

The supporters of Adams and of Trumbull were stunned. The first impulse of their leaders, and especially of Schurz, was to put on sackcloth, and go into retirement. Prompt decision, however, was necessary to the editors of daily newspapers. Other persons could go home and take days or weeks to think the matter over, but those who, at Halstead's table, had decided against David Davis, must needs make another prompt decision before the next paper went to press. They decided to support Greeley, because they had honestly led their readers to an honest belief that the Cincinnati movement was for the best interests of the Republic; and they deemed it unfair to turn against it on account of personal vexation against a man whose candidacy had been tolerated through the whole proceedings. That Greeley was an unbalanced man we all knew. That he was liable to go off at a tangent and that his self-esteem and self-confidence might put him beyond the reach of good counsel in affairs of great pith and moment, was the unexpressed thought of most of us. But we knew that his aims were patriotic, and we reflected that some risks are taken at every presidential election. Greeley had not yet been proved an unsafe President, and that was more than could be said for Grant. In fact, Grant's second term proved to be worse than his first.

Schurz was more distressed by the "Gratz Brown trick," as it was commonly called, than by anything else. This had the appearance of a brazen political swap executed in the light of day, by which the presidency and the vice-presidency were disposed of as so much merchandise. He did not, however, in his thoughts connect Greeley with the trade. It was physically impossible that the latter could have been a party to it, if there was a trade. Nevertheless he considered the German vote lost beyond recall by the bad look of it.[127]My own belief is that Blair and Brown were jealous of Schurz's power in Missouri; that they feared he would become omnipotent there, dominating both parties, if Adams should be elected President; and that the only way to head him off was to beat Adams. They chose Greeley for this purpose, not because they had any bargain with, or fondness for, him, but because he was the next strongest man in the convention.

The engineers of the Liberal Republican movement went their several ways. Those who held tariff reform of more importance than all other issues abjured Greeley at once. E. L. Godkin and William Cullen Bryant declared war against him because they considered him dangerous and unfit. The following correspondence which took place between Bryant and Trumbull was illustrative of the feelings of many others:

The Evening Post,41Nassau Street, Cor. Liberty,New York, May 8th, 1872.My dear Sir,It has been said that you will support the nomination of Mr. Greeley for President. I have no right to speak of any course which you may take in politics in any but respectful terms, but I may perhaps take the liberty of saying that if you give that man your countenance, some of your best friends here will deeply regret it. We who know Mr. Greeley know that his administration, should he be elected, cannot be otherwise than shamefully corrupt. His associates are of the worst sort and the worst abuses of the present Administration are likely to be even caricatured under his. His election would be a severe blow to the cause of revenue reform. The cause of civil service reform would be hopeless with him for President, for Reuben E. Fenton, his guide and counselor, and the other wretches by whom Greeley is surrounded, will never give up the patronage by which they expect to hold their power. As to other public measures there is no abuse or extravagance into which that man, through the infirmity of his judgment, may not be betrayed. It is wonderful how little, in some of his vagaries, the scruples which would influence other men of no exemplary integrity, restrain him. But I need not dwell upon these matters—they are all set forth in theEvening Postwhich you sometimes see. What I have written, is written in the most profound respect for your public character, and because of that respect. If you conclude to support Mr. Greeley, I shall, of course, infer that you do so because you do not know him.Yours truly,Hon. L. Trumbull.W. C. Bryant.United States Senate Chamber,Washington, May 10, 1872.Wm. C. Bryant, Esq.,My dear Sir,—Your kind and frank letter is before me. I wish I could see something better than to support Mr. Greeley, but I do not. Personally, I know but little of him, but in common with most people supposed he was an honest but confiding man, who was often imposed upon by those about him. This would be a great fault in a President, I admit, but with propersurroundings could be guarded against, and almost anything would be an improvement on what we have. One of the greatest evils of our time is party despotism and intolerance. Greeley's nomination is a bomb-shell which seems likely to blow up both parties. This will be an immense gain. Most of the corruptions in government are made possible through party tyranny. Members of the Senate are daily coerced into voting contrary to their convictions through party pressure. A notable instance of this was the vote on the impeachment of Johnson, and matters in this respect have not improved since. If by Greeley's election we could break up the present corrupt organizations, it would enable the people at the end of four years to elect a President with a view to his fitness instead of having one put upon them by a vote of political bummers acting in the name of party.Having favored the Cincinnati movement and Greeley having received the nomination, I see no course left but to try to elect him, and endeavor to surround him, as far as possible, with honest men. Greeley had a good deal of strength among the people and was strong in the convention outside of bargain or arrangement. Many voted for him as their first choice, and in Illinois I feel confident he is a stronger candidate than Adams would have been.Lyman Trumbull.

The Evening Post,41Nassau Street, Cor. Liberty,New York, May 8th, 1872.My dear Sir,

It has been said that you will support the nomination of Mr. Greeley for President. I have no right to speak of any course which you may take in politics in any but respectful terms, but I may perhaps take the liberty of saying that if you give that man your countenance, some of your best friends here will deeply regret it. We who know Mr. Greeley know that his administration, should he be elected, cannot be otherwise than shamefully corrupt. His associates are of the worst sort and the worst abuses of the present Administration are likely to be even caricatured under his. His election would be a severe blow to the cause of revenue reform. The cause of civil service reform would be hopeless with him for President, for Reuben E. Fenton, his guide and counselor, and the other wretches by whom Greeley is surrounded, will never give up the patronage by which they expect to hold their power. As to other public measures there is no abuse or extravagance into which that man, through the infirmity of his judgment, may not be betrayed. It is wonderful how little, in some of his vagaries, the scruples which would influence other men of no exemplary integrity, restrain him. But I need not dwell upon these matters—they are all set forth in theEvening Postwhich you sometimes see. What I have written, is written in the most profound respect for your public character, and because of that respect. If you conclude to support Mr. Greeley, I shall, of course, infer that you do so because you do not know him.

Yours truly,Hon. L. Trumbull.W. C. Bryant.

United States Senate Chamber,Washington, May 10, 1872.Wm. C. Bryant, Esq.,

My dear Sir,—Your kind and frank letter is before me. I wish I could see something better than to support Mr. Greeley, but I do not. Personally, I know but little of him, but in common with most people supposed he was an honest but confiding man, who was often imposed upon by those about him. This would be a great fault in a President, I admit, but with propersurroundings could be guarded against, and almost anything would be an improvement on what we have. One of the greatest evils of our time is party despotism and intolerance. Greeley's nomination is a bomb-shell which seems likely to blow up both parties. This will be an immense gain. Most of the corruptions in government are made possible through party tyranny. Members of the Senate are daily coerced into voting contrary to their convictions through party pressure. A notable instance of this was the vote on the impeachment of Johnson, and matters in this respect have not improved since. If by Greeley's election we could break up the present corrupt organizations, it would enable the people at the end of four years to elect a President with a view to his fitness instead of having one put upon them by a vote of political bummers acting in the name of party.

Having favored the Cincinnati movement and Greeley having received the nomination, I see no course left but to try to elect him, and endeavor to surround him, as far as possible, with honest men. Greeley had a good deal of strength among the people and was strong in the convention outside of bargain or arrangement. Many voted for him as their first choice, and in Illinois I feel confident he is a stronger candidate than Adams would have been.

Lyman Trumbull.

Sumner, although urged by many of his warmest friends both before and after the convention, including Frank Bird, Samuel Bowles, and Greeley himself (through Whitelaw Reid), to declare his position, did not break silence until May 31, when he made his great speech against Grant. The speech remains a true catalogue of the shortcomings of Grant as a civil administrator up to that time. All his sins of omission and of commission were there set forth in orderly array, together with the proofs. Sumner thus spared future historians a deal of trouble in searching the records, but the speech was not very effective in the way of changing votes. Sumner sometimes mistook himself for a modern Ciceroimpeaching Verres. He piled up the agony in the fashion customary in the pleadings of the ancient forum. He overlooked the signal services rendered by Grant before he held any civil office. He did not make allowance for the transition of a tanner's clerk, earning fifty dollars a month and having a family to support, first to the command of half a million soldiers in war time, and then to the presidency of the United States in time of peace, all within the period of eight years. The mistakes naturally arising from such crude beginnings, when meeting gigantic responsibilities in quick succession, ought to have excited pathos as well as censure. By giving due consideration to Grant's whole career, he would have secured a better hearing for the part of it which he wished to impress upon the public mind.

Even now Sumner did not advise anybody to vote for Greeley. His omission to do so was at once construed as an argument favorable to Grant. It was said that the dangers involved in Greeley's eccentricities were so much greater than anything that Grant had done, or could do, that Grant's worst enemy (Sumner) would not advise people to vote for him. Not until the 29th of July did the Massachusetts Senator publicly speak for Greeley, and then only in a letter to some colored voters who had asked his advice. It was then too late to exert much influence. It is doubtful if even the colored men who had sought his advice gave any heed to it. Probably the reason why Sumner did not speak earlier was that he hesitated to break from his abolitionist friends, Garrison, Phillips, and others, who had besought him not to join the Democrats. When he did finally join the forces supporting Greeley, his old friend Garrison turned upon him and chastised him severely in a series of open letters, which Sumner declined to read.

FOOTNOTES:[126]ChicagoTimes, April 22.[127]Frank W. Bird, of Boston, who went to Cincinnati as an anti-Adams delegate, wrote to Charles Sumner on May 7: "Don't believe a word about the trade, in any discreditable sense, between Blair and Brown on the one part and the Greeley men on the other. Undoubtedly Blair wanted to head off Schurz, and equally truly an arrangement was made, or an understanding reached, on Thursday night, in a certain contingency to unite a portion of the Brown and Greeley forces: but, except perhaps in the motives of the leading negotiators on one side, there was nothing unusual in the affair, nothing that is not usually—indeed, almost necessarily—done in such conventions; nothing that was not contemplated and even proposed by the Adams men." (Sumner papers in Harvard University Library.)

[126]ChicagoTimes, April 22.

[127]Frank W. Bird, of Boston, who went to Cincinnati as an anti-Adams delegate, wrote to Charles Sumner on May 7: "Don't believe a word about the trade, in any discreditable sense, between Blair and Brown on the one part and the Greeley men on the other. Undoubtedly Blair wanted to head off Schurz, and equally truly an arrangement was made, or an understanding reached, on Thursday night, in a certain contingency to unite a portion of the Brown and Greeley forces: but, except perhaps in the motives of the leading negotiators on one side, there was nothing unusual in the affair, nothing that is not usually—indeed, almost necessarily—done in such conventions; nothing that was not contemplated and even proposed by the Adams men." (Sumner papers in Harvard University Library.)

THE GREELEY CAMPAIGN

My own feelings immediately after the nomination were set forth in a telegram to the ChicagoTribunepublished in its issue of May 4. The chief part was in these words:

Cincinnati, May 3.—The nomination of Mr. Greeley was accomplished by the people against the judgment and strenuous efforts of politicians, using the latter word in its larger and higher sense. The Gratz Brown performance has given the whole affair the appearance of a put-up job, but it was merely a lucky guess. The Blairs and Browns do not like Schurz. To defeat a candidate who was likely to be on confidential terms with Schurz, as either Adams or Trumbull would have been, was the thing nearest to their hearts, and for this purpose Brown made his appearance here. His speech in the Convention fell like dish-water on the whole assemblage, and, being followed by the transfer of the Missouri votes to Trumbull, instead of Greeley, showed that he had no influence in his own delegation. The changes from Brown to Greeley were few and far between, and in a short time the convention only remembered that Brown had been a candidate once and was so no longer. But the personal popularity of Greeley was more than a match for the intellectual strength of Trumbull and the moral gravity of Adams. He was stealing votes from both of them all the time. When the Illinois delegation at last perceived that the heart of the convention was carrying away the head, and retired for consultation, the surprising fact was developed that fifteen of their own number preferred Greeley to any candidate not from their own state. The supporters of Adams, while entertaining the most cordial feeling for the friends of Trumbull, think that if the latter had come over to Adams's corner the result would have been different. I do not think so. If the Illinois vote could have been cast solid for Adams at an earlierstage, the result might have been different: but there was no time when Adams could have got more than the twenty-seven votes which were finally cast for him. The contingency of having to divide between Adams and Greeley had never been considered, and, therefore, no time had been allowed to compare views. The vote of the state being thus divided, its weight was lost for any purpose of influencing other votes. Then gush and hurrah swept everything down, and, almost before a vote of Illinois had been recorded by the secretary, the dispatches came rushing to the telegraph instruments that Greeley was nominated. For a moment, the wiser heads in the convention were stunned, though everybody tried to look perfectly contented. Of all the things that could possibly happen, this was the one thing which everybody supposed could not happen. Not even the Greeley men themselves thought it could happen. The only able politician who seemed to be really for Greeley was Waldo Hutchins, of New York, and even his sincerity was questioned by Greeley's backbone friends as long as the Davis movement was regarded as still alive.

How the news was received by Trumbull was told by the New YorkHerald'sWashington dispatch of May 3:

... The scene in the Senate, when the news was received, was one of complacent dignity, such as only the members of that body could arrange, even if they had studied to prepare themselves for an art tableau. Mr. Fenton was the recipient of the dispatches, and his chair was consequently surrounded by a crowd of the less dignified Senators, who could not wait to have the telegrams passed around. Trumbull was the most undisturbed of all those on the floor. His equanimity astonished his friends as well as the numerous strangers in the galleries, who watched closely for indications of excitement in his parchment-like face. In truth, he seemed to get the news rather by some occult process of induction, if he got it at all, than by the course usual to ordinary men. Other members smiled, made comments, exchanged opinions and preserved their dignity with customary success; but he alone asserted an immobility of demeanor that will last for all time, in the memory of its witnesses, as a remarkable instance of self-possession. At last, when every one else had delivered himself of somecriticism he remarked to those in his immediate vicinity: "If the country can stand the first outburst of mirth the nomination will call forth, it may prove a strong ticket."

Carl Schurz was slow in reaching a decision to support the ticket. His first endeavor was to induce Greeley, in a friendly way, to decline the nomination, by showing him the sombre aspects of the campaign ahead. In a letter dated May 18, he told Greeley that the dissatisfaction of an influential part of the Liberal Republican forces was such that a meeting had been called to consider the question of putting another ticket in the field before the Democrats should hold their convention. Other discouraging features were presented and the letter concluded with these words:

I have, from the beginning, made it a point to tell you with entire candor how I feel and what I think about this business, and now if the developments of the campaign should be such as to disappoint your hopes, it shall not be my fault if you are deceived about the real state of things.

To this Greeley replied on the 20th, saying that his advices warranted him in predicting that New York would give 50,000 majority for the Cincinnati ticket, and that New England and the South would be nearly solid for it, while in Pennsylvania and the Northwest the chances were at least even. He ended by saying: "I shall accept unconditionally."

The meeting foreshadowed in Schurz's letter to Greeley took place at the Fifth Avenue Hotel on the 20th of June. It was composed mainly of persons who had participated in the Cincinnati Convention and had been greatly disappointed by Mr. Greeley's nomination. William Cullen Bryant presided, but fell asleep in the chair soon after the proceedings began. The first speech was made by Trumbull, who said that his mind was made up to support theCincinnati ticket. He thought that Greeley had gained strength during the first month of the campaign and that the chances of his election were good. He could see no reason for nominating another ticket. That would simply be playing into the hands of the supporters of Grant.

Schurz's position, as reported by theNation, was this:

That he, more than any other man, was chagrined by the result of Cincinnati; that he does not consider Mr. Greeley a reformer, and has no expectations of any reforms at his hands, and will say so on the stump; that he believes him "to be surrounded by bad men"; that he (Mr. Schurz), however, is so satisfied of the necessity of defeating Grant and dissolving existing party organizations, that he is ready to use any instrument for the purpose, and will, therefore, support Greeley in the modified and guarded manner indicated above. He looks forward, with a hopefulness bordering on enthusiasm, to the good things which will grow out of the confusion following on Greeley's election, and is deeply touched by the Southern eagerness for Greeley.

A private letter from E. L. Godkin to Schurz, dated Lenox, Massachusetts, June 28, gives reasons for deprecating the course that the latter had decided to take in the campaign.

He has considered Schurz's words about Greeley; would be most glad could he see any way to join in supporting Greeley, Schurz being the one man in American politics who inspires Godkin with some hope concerning them. He maturely considered what he could and would do when Greeley was first nominated. In view of his own share in bringing public feeling to the point of creating the convention, he would have stood by Greeley if possible; saw no chance to do so and sees none now; is satisfied he can have nothing to do with Greeley. If Greeley gave pledges, and broke them, "as I believe he would," it would be no consolation to Godkin that an opposition would thereby be raised up. He went through all this with Grant, who gavefar better guarantees than Greeley offers, "and he made fine promises and broke them, and good appointments and reversed them, and I have in consequence been three years in opposition." Cannot afford to repeat this. "Greeley would have to change his whole nature, at the age of 62, in order not to deceive and betray you," and when he has done so it will be too late to atone for having backed him by turning against him, which would then merely discredit one's judgment, and invite suspicion of some personal disappointment. Moreover, the small band of political reformers will have fallen into disrepute and become ridiculous and the country will be worse off than before. Feels that Schurz is sacrificing the future in taking Greeley on any terms....

Parke Godwin was even more bitter against Greeley. He wrote to Schurz under date May 28:

"... I have so strong a sense of Greeley's utter unfitness for the presidency that I cannot well express it. The man is a charlatan from top to bottom, and the smallest kind of a charlatan,—for no other motive than a weak and puerile vanity. His success in politics would be the success of whoever is most wrong in theory and most corrupt in practice." All the most corrupt spoilsmen of either side are either with him now or preparing to go to him. It is the first of duties to expose him and his factitious reputation. Grant and his crew are bad,—but hardly so bad as Greeley and his would be. Besides, Grant, though in very bad hands, has his clutches full: Greeley's set would be newcomers.

The regular Republican Convention met at Philadelphia, June 5, and nominated General Grant for President by unanimous vote. The names of Henry Wilson, Schuyler Colfax, and several others were presented for Vice-President. On the first roll-call Wilson had 361 votes and Colfax 306, and there were 66 for other candidates. Before the result was announced, 38 votes from Southern States were changed to Wilson, giving him 399, a majority of the whole number cast. This decision was brought about by the wish of Grant himself, communicated toGeneral Grenville M. Dodge before the convention met. Grant had no liking for Colfax.[128]

The platform of the convention laid stress on the imperative duty of "suppression of violent and treasonable organizations in certain lately rebellious regions and for the protection of the ballot-box." This meant the stern execution of the Ku-Klux Law, under suspension of the writ ofhabeas corpus, which was already in progress. The remainder of the platform was either "pointing with pride" at past achievements, or clap-trap of various kinds, including a promise to take good care of capital and labor, so as to secure "the largest opportunities and a just share of the mutual profits of these two great servants of civilization."

The Democratic National Convention met at Baltimore, July 9, and adopted both the platform and the candidates of the Cincinnati Convention. This involved a complete reversal of the party's principles as declared in its last previous platform, but it was not inconsistent with inexorable facts. There was nothing else to be done unless the party was determined still to battle against the result of the Civil War. It was inevitable, however, that there should be a remnant of the party that would never vote for Greeley—the man who above all others had gored them most savagely in the fights of a quarter of a century. The dissentients called and held a convention at Louisville, September 3, where they nominated Charles O'Conor of New York for President and John Quincy Adams for Vice-President, both of whom declined. Other attempts to put a third ticket in the field came to nothing. The recalcitrants either voted for Grant or abstained from voting altogether.

Trumbull took an active part in the campaign, speaking to large crowds and almost incessantly in Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois. His first speech was made at Springfield, Illinois, June 26, a synopsis of which will serve to indicate the views which he advocated.

He said that he was glad to explain to Illinoisans the position he had felt it his duty to take on many points. It was now more than seventeen years that he had represented the state in Washington. In that time the principles on which the Republican party was formed had all been settled. Nothing remained but the machinery, which had fallen into the hands of those who sought to use it for merely selfish ends. During his service he had sometimes not acted according to the views of all his constituents, but he had not failed to follow his own sense of duty and right. Within the last ten years many abuses had crept into the Government and numerous defalcations had occurred, perhaps the most noted being that of Hodge, paymaster, in the office of the Paymaster-General, "whose defalcations, occurring right under the eye of the Government, amounted to more than $400,000." An investigating committee had reported to a previous Congress great abuses in the New York Custom-House—bribery and demoralization. At the beginning of the recent session he [Trumbull] had introduced a resolution for a joint committee of investigation, with power to send for persons and papers; introduced it in good faith to unearth frauds, if existent, and to correct them, without design of injuring the party. "I was simple-minded enough to believe that the Republican party, ... with which I had been identified for so many years, would be lifted in public estimation ... if it had the virtue and the honesty to expose, even among its own members, wrong, corruptions, and fraud if fraud existed, and to apply the proper corrective. And I was very much astonished when that proposition was met by gentlemen in the Senate who constitute what, for brevity's sake, I may denominate a Senatorial Ring, denouncing me as unfaithful to the Republican party and as throwing dirt upon it by offering a resolution to inquire into the conduct of public officers."The public indignation aroused by this forced the SenatorialRing to action. "A party caucus of Republican Senators was called, and a scheme devised to change the character of the resolution, and to organize and pack the committee, which, instead of going forth to uncover and expose corruption, should go forth to conceal and cover it up. The proposition for the joint committee of the two houses, with power to send for persons and papers, was voted down, and in its place a resolution was passed creating a committee of the Senate alone. The members of the committee were selected in a party caucus, and not a single Republican Senator who had originally favored the investigation was placed upon the committee. This was contrary to parliamentary law, and contrary to the plainest principles of common sense, if the object was to discover abuses, and contrary to that ordinary rule which says that a child must not be put to a nurse who cares not for it. This investigation was placed in the hands of the parties to be investigated...." Even this committee, going to New York, could not, however, shut their eyes to the enormous abuses there. But they did give public notice that any merchants who had paid bribe money to customs officials would be prosecuted to the extent of the law, thereby securing the non-appearance of any such merchant as a witness. They acted as if sent to investigate merchants, not officials.... And the Senate Ring would allow no measure to be considered tending to rectify these abuses, wanting to keep the spoils to carry next fall's elections. A bill from the House was referred to the Judiciary committee, which had a majority of Ring members,—a bill to inaugurate reforms and to protect merchants from plunder. Although it was before the committee two months it was never reported to the Senate. "I made two motions in the Senate to have the committee discharged and to bring the bill before the Senate, that it might receive its attention, but they were voted down under party drill.""Let me tell you of another committee of investigation, raised in the House of Representatives, and packed also by an obsequious and partisan Speaker,—a committee, a majority of which consisted of the friends of the Secretary of the Navy whose conduct was about to be investigated. I want to tell you what that committee did, and I think you will be astonished when I state the fact that a committee of members of the Houseof Representatives could have been found, who were so blinded by party zeal, so full of bigotry or cowardice that they could not see, or were afraid to expose, violations of the law on the part of political associates. This committee was raised on the motion of Governor Blair, of Michigan, a high-minded, independent, and able Republican.... At his [Blair's] instance, a committee was raised to inquire into certain transactions in the Navy Department, presided over by Secretary Robeson.... Among many of the things that the committee was instructed to inquire into ... was a claim for building certain vessels for the Government of the United States during the war. I have the precise figures here, giving the exact amounts which the Government contracted to pay for the construction of the three vessels, Tecumseh, Mahopac, and Manhattan. The contract was made in 1862, and the Government agreed to pay a contractor of the name of Secor $1,380,000 for the construction of these three vessels. After the contract was made, the Government desired some changes in the plans of the vessels, and a board of naval officers was appointed to superintend them and to certify bills for extra work, which they did to the amount of more than $500,000. The vessels were furnished, the contract price paid—the sum due for the extra work was paid, and it was all settled and closed in the Navy Department in 1865. But these contractors, who had received more than $1,900,000 for building the vessels and the extra work, came to Congress by petition, and complained that they still had not received as much as they ought, because they said that they were delayed in their contracts by the action of the Government; that while thus delayed the price of labor and of materials advanced, and they had met with great loss, and they, therefore, asked Congress to allow them something more. Congress, in 1867, passed a law directing the Secretary of the Navy to look into this matter and report to the next session. The Secretary appointed a board of Naval officers, who made the investigation, and reported to Congress that these Secors ought to be allowed $115,000 more (I use round numbers)—$115,000 in addition to what they had already received, and put into the law these words, 'which shall be in full discharge of all claims against the United States on account of the vessels upon which the Board made the allowance as per this report.' Now, doany of you, does any lawyer, ... know how to write a stronger clause than that to end this claim? If you do, I do not.... The Secors, in 1868, received the $115,000 and gave their receipt.... Would you believe it possible that the Secretary of the Navy would, after that, pay anything more?... Mr. Robeson, in 1870, ... on his own motion, without any act of Congress authorizing it, proceeds to reinvestigate this claim, and without coming to Congress at all pays over to these gentlemen $93,000 more. Well, that is not the worst of it. He might just as well have paid them $93,000,000. The Congress of the United States never appropriated any money to pay this $93,000, but the Secretary of the Navy took the money appropriated for other purposes and other years and paid it out of that. This is bad enough.... But when this packed committee came to examine this transaction, a majority of its members reported that the transactions only involved a mere difference of opinion as to the construction of the law, and, in their opinion, the Secretary had construed it rightly. And Mr. Robeson, instead of being rebuked, is commended by the committee, and is continued in office. It is due to the chairman of the committee—Governor Blair, of Michigan, and one of his associates—the committee consisted of five members—to say that they dissented from the majority report, and held that the transaction was not only without authority of law, but in direct violation of it...."I was never a party man to the extent of being willing to serve the party against my country and if, to-day, I am acting with the Liberal Republican party, if I have denounced these transactions at the hazard of being myself denounced, it was done in good faith on my part, for the purpose of correcting abuses, and appealing from a party tyranny established by a Senatorial Ring to the honest, intelligent, upright citizens of the country, who are bound by no such shackles as will compel them to cover up fraud and iniquity in any party...."He mentioned the encroachments of the Federal Government, as in the attempt to destroy the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpusin the last session of Congress, as a bill virtually placing the elections of the Southern States under the direction of the President. If the people have become so far indifferent to their rights as to permit the President to suspend the writofhabeas corpusat will, and to control and supervise their elections, their liberties are gone, and "they have only to wait until a man sufficiently ambitious reaches the Presidency, for him to grasp and maintain absolute powers."

The public indignation aroused by this forced the SenatorialRing to action. "A party caucus of Republican Senators was called, and a scheme devised to change the character of the resolution, and to organize and pack the committee, which, instead of going forth to uncover and expose corruption, should go forth to conceal and cover it up. The proposition for the joint committee of the two houses, with power to send for persons and papers, was voted down, and in its place a resolution was passed creating a committee of the Senate alone. The members of the committee were selected in a party caucus, and not a single Republican Senator who had originally favored the investigation was placed upon the committee. This was contrary to parliamentary law, and contrary to the plainest principles of common sense, if the object was to discover abuses, and contrary to that ordinary rule which says that a child must not be put to a nurse who cares not for it. This investigation was placed in the hands of the parties to be investigated...." Even this committee, going to New York, could not, however, shut their eyes to the enormous abuses there. But they did give public notice that any merchants who had paid bribe money to customs officials would be prosecuted to the extent of the law, thereby securing the non-appearance of any such merchant as a witness. They acted as if sent to investigate merchants, not officials.... And the Senate Ring would allow no measure to be considered tending to rectify these abuses, wanting to keep the spoils to carry next fall's elections. A bill from the House was referred to the Judiciary committee, which had a majority of Ring members,—a bill to inaugurate reforms and to protect merchants from plunder. Although it was before the committee two months it was never reported to the Senate. "I made two motions in the Senate to have the committee discharged and to bring the bill before the Senate, that it might receive its attention, but they were voted down under party drill."

"Let me tell you of another committee of investigation, raised in the House of Representatives, and packed also by an obsequious and partisan Speaker,—a committee, a majority of which consisted of the friends of the Secretary of the Navy whose conduct was about to be investigated. I want to tell you what that committee did, and I think you will be astonished when I state the fact that a committee of members of the Houseof Representatives could have been found, who were so blinded by party zeal, so full of bigotry or cowardice that they could not see, or were afraid to expose, violations of the law on the part of political associates. This committee was raised on the motion of Governor Blair, of Michigan, a high-minded, independent, and able Republican.... At his [Blair's] instance, a committee was raised to inquire into certain transactions in the Navy Department, presided over by Secretary Robeson.... Among many of the things that the committee was instructed to inquire into ... was a claim for building certain vessels for the Government of the United States during the war. I have the precise figures here, giving the exact amounts which the Government contracted to pay for the construction of the three vessels, Tecumseh, Mahopac, and Manhattan. The contract was made in 1862, and the Government agreed to pay a contractor of the name of Secor $1,380,000 for the construction of these three vessels. After the contract was made, the Government desired some changes in the plans of the vessels, and a board of naval officers was appointed to superintend them and to certify bills for extra work, which they did to the amount of more than $500,000. The vessels were furnished, the contract price paid—the sum due for the extra work was paid, and it was all settled and closed in the Navy Department in 1865. But these contractors, who had received more than $1,900,000 for building the vessels and the extra work, came to Congress by petition, and complained that they still had not received as much as they ought, because they said that they were delayed in their contracts by the action of the Government; that while thus delayed the price of labor and of materials advanced, and they had met with great loss, and they, therefore, asked Congress to allow them something more. Congress, in 1867, passed a law directing the Secretary of the Navy to look into this matter and report to the next session. The Secretary appointed a board of Naval officers, who made the investigation, and reported to Congress that these Secors ought to be allowed $115,000 more (I use round numbers)—$115,000 in addition to what they had already received, and put into the law these words, 'which shall be in full discharge of all claims against the United States on account of the vessels upon which the Board made the allowance as per this report.' Now, doany of you, does any lawyer, ... know how to write a stronger clause than that to end this claim? If you do, I do not.... The Secors, in 1868, received the $115,000 and gave their receipt.... Would you believe it possible that the Secretary of the Navy would, after that, pay anything more?... Mr. Robeson, in 1870, ... on his own motion, without any act of Congress authorizing it, proceeds to reinvestigate this claim, and without coming to Congress at all pays over to these gentlemen $93,000 more. Well, that is not the worst of it. He might just as well have paid them $93,000,000. The Congress of the United States never appropriated any money to pay this $93,000, but the Secretary of the Navy took the money appropriated for other purposes and other years and paid it out of that. This is bad enough.... But when this packed committee came to examine this transaction, a majority of its members reported that the transactions only involved a mere difference of opinion as to the construction of the law, and, in their opinion, the Secretary had construed it rightly. And Mr. Robeson, instead of being rebuked, is commended by the committee, and is continued in office. It is due to the chairman of the committee—Governor Blair, of Michigan, and one of his associates—the committee consisted of five members—to say that they dissented from the majority report, and held that the transaction was not only without authority of law, but in direct violation of it....

"I was never a party man to the extent of being willing to serve the party against my country and if, to-day, I am acting with the Liberal Republican party, if I have denounced these transactions at the hazard of being myself denounced, it was done in good faith on my part, for the purpose of correcting abuses, and appealing from a party tyranny established by a Senatorial Ring to the honest, intelligent, upright citizens of the country, who are bound by no such shackles as will compel them to cover up fraud and iniquity in any party...."

He mentioned the encroachments of the Federal Government, as in the attempt to destroy the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpusin the last session of Congress, as a bill virtually placing the elections of the Southern States under the direction of the President. If the people have become so far indifferent to their rights as to permit the President to suspend the writofhabeas corpusat will, and to control and supervise their elections, their liberties are gone, and "they have only to wait until a man sufficiently ambitious reaches the Presidency, for him to grasp and maintain absolute powers."

The speech was two hours long, and concluded with this tribute to Greeley:

... Mr. Greeley [he said] is a man of the highest character and intelligence. No man in the land is better acquainted with the public men of the country than he. He is a man of purity of character, of strict honesty, who would not look upon corruption and official delinquency with the least degree of allowance. You may rely upon that and upon his bringing about him the ablest men of the land to form a strong and able Administration, because he knows who the able men are, and could have no other motive than to make his Administration a success, as he will not seek a reëlection. I am not in the habit of saying much about individuals, but I think I may say to you that you may trust Horace Greeley for an honest administration of the Government, and that is what the people of the country want. You may trust him above almost all other men in this land for bringing about that state of good feeling between the North and the South, so essential to the peace and prosperity of the nation.

The campaign started with considerable éclat among the ranks of Greeley's supporters and corresponding depression on the other side. Carl Schurz, who took the laboring oar, at first with reluctance bordering on gloom, gathered confidence as he progressed in his stumping tour. Enthusiasm for the old white hat seemed to be no figment of imagination, but a living reality. All eyes were fixed upon North Carolina which had an election for state officers on the 1st of August, and which the Liberals expected to win. The early returns seemed to justify their confidence, but there was a change when the western mountain districts were heard from. The supporters ofGrant carried the state by about 2000 majority. This wound was not so deep as a well nor so wide as a church door, but it answered one purpose. It ended the "old white hat" enthusiasm and turned attention to the more sober and solid aspects of the campaign. That Greeley was an unbalanced character, that he was lacking in steadiness, in mental equipoise and ability to look at both sides of any question where his feelings were strongly enlisted, it was easy to show by many examples in his brilliant career. His occasional controversies with Lincoln during the war, in which he was invariably worsted, were now reproduced with effect by the orators on the Grant side, and the old white hat and coat and the Flintwinch neck-tie were savagely pictured by Tom Nast inHarper's Weekly. There were satirical persons who said that Greeley took as much pains to make himself a harlequin as another might take to make himself a dandy.

The attacks were not without effect upon people who had never seen Greeley face to face. To his immediate friends in New York it seemed necessary that he should show himself to the public so that people might know he was a man of solid parts, of statesmanlike proportions and brain power. He was persuaded to make a series of speeches in Indiana, Ohio, and Pennsylvania in the month of September, as those states were likely to have a decisive influence on the country in their local elections, which took place in October. Accordingly he took the stump, beginning at Jeffersonville, Indiana, and moving eastward. His speeches surprised both friends and enemies by their high tone, argumentative force, good temper, and versatility and vigor of expression. The main point which he sought to enforce was the need of restored peace and brotherhood in all the land. No pleading could bemore persuasive or more touching. No doubt can exist of the sincerity with which it was uttered.

It was somewhat droll that in the last speech of the series he was confronted by a speaker on the Grant side at Easton, Pennsylvania, September 28, who predicted that if Greeley were elected all the furnace fires in the Lehigh Valley would be put out and their working-people thrown upon the almshouses. This to the stoutest champion of the protective tariff then living! He was not, however, struck dumb by the prospect of the early impoverishment of the iron workers. He said:

A recent speaker of the opposition has asserted that if I were made President all the furnace fires in the Lehigh Valley would presently be put out. This seems incredible. All men know I am a protectionist; but that I would not veto any bill fairly passed by the Congress of the United States modifying or changing the tariff is certainly true. I do not believe in government by selfish rings, but I believe just as little in government by the one-man power. I don't believe in government by vetoes. The veto power of the President is not given him to enable him to reject every bill for which he would have refused to vote if a member of Congress, but only to be employed in certain great emergencies where corruption or recklessness has passed a measure through Congress which would not stand the test of inquiry. I tell you, friends, I believe in legislation by Congress, not by Presidents, and I should myself approve and sign a bill which had a fair majority in Congress, although in my judgment it was not accordant with public policy—with the wisest policy.

Although Greeley's stumping tour raised him in the public estimation, it is doubtful if it gained him any votes. It was now too late. People's minds were made up and nothing could change them, not even the Crédit-Mobilier scandal. General Grant was not concerned in this scandal, but a number of his most distinguished supporters, the very pillars of the Republican party, beginning withVice-President Colfax, were named as guilty of taking bribes to influence their votes in Congress for the Union Pacific Railroad. This accusation was not made public until September, and then by accident. Most of the persons accused made denial, and since no investigation could be had until the next session of Congress (a month later than the election), nobody was bound to give credence to an unproved charge. The general answer of the supporters of Grant was that they would not withhold their votes from him even if the charge were true. Nor could they be blamed for so saying. If the persons accused were really guilty, they would be punished in due time, or at all events exposed, and exposure would itself be punishment. It is needless to go into the details of the Crédit-Mobilier scandal here. It was investigated by an able and impartial committee of the House, and all the guilty ones were visited with such punishment as Congress could legally inflict.

Of the three October states, Pennsylvania and Ohio gave large Republican majorities and Indiana a small majority for Hendricks (Democrat) for governor. This was decisive of the general result in November. Greeley and Brown were overwhelmingly defeated. The only states that gave them majorities were Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Tennessee, and Texas, having altogether 66 electoral votes. The others gave Grant and Wilson a total of 272 electoral votes. The state of New York, which Greeley, in his letter to Schurz, had claimed by 50,000, gave 53,000 majority against him.

I have always held the opinion that either Adams or Trumbull could have been elected if nominated at Cincinnati. I think also that Adams was the stronger of the two, because he had incurred no personal ill-will during the twelve years of war and Reconstruction and becausethe minds of the Democratic leaders who had encouraged the Liberal movement were eagerly expecting him. There would have been no bolting movement in that quarter. The Germans also were enthusiastic for Adams, and although they would have supported Trumbull willingly, there would have been perhaps a trifle less of cordiality for him. Neither of the two was gifted with personal "magnetism," but either of them had as much of that quality as Grant had, or as the public then desired. The voters were not then in search of the sympathetic virtues. There was a yearning for some cold-blooded, masterful man to go through the temple of freedom with a scourge of small cords driving out the grafters and money-changers. Adams was qualified for this rôle. He was also the man of whom the Republican leaders had the gravest fears as an opposing candidate.

The campaign and its result killed poor Greeley. The election took place on the 5th of November. On the 10th he wrote a letter of two lines marked "private forever" to Carl Schurz, saying:

I wish I could say with what an agony of emotion I subscribe myself, gratefully yours, Horace Greeley.

He then took to his bed and his friends became alarmed. Frequent bulletins were published in theTribuneshowing that he was a victim of insomnia, from which, the paper said, he had been a sufferer, more or less, at former periods of his life. He died on the 29th. His wife had died one month earlier, October 30. History says that he died of a broken heart.[129]

That Greeley had been eager for public office from an early period was shown by his famous letter withdrawing himself as junior partner from the firm of Seward, Weed, and Greeley. When the Cincinnati nomination came to him his fondest dreams seemed to be on the eve of fulfillment. Now all such dreams had vanished, a political party of noble aspirations had foundered on him as the hidden rock, his self-esteem had received an annihilating blow, and his belovedTribune, the labor of his lifetime, was supposed to be ruined pecuniarily. Whatever his faults may have been, he received his punishment for them in this world. He was only sixty-two years of age, of sound constitution and good habits, and had never used liquor or tobacco. He ought to, and probably would, have lived twenty years longer if he had put away ambition and contented himself with the repute and influence he had fairly earned. He was the most influential editor of his time and country, but as a political writer E. L. Godkin was his superior, and in fact Godkin, in the columns of theNation, contributed more than any other writer, perhaps more than any other person, to his overthrow.

The state election of Louisiana in 1872 had resulted in a disputed return for governor and legislature. One set of returns showed a majority for John McEnery, the conservative candidate. Another set showed a majority for William P. Kellogg, Republican. The sitting governor, Warmoth, controlled the returning board and he favored McEnery. A former returning board headed by one Lynch had been dissolved by an act of the legislature. To this defunct board the supporters of Kellogg appealed. The Lynch Board, without any actual returns before them, declared Kellogg elected. They then procured an orderfrom Judge Durell, of the United States Circuit Court at New Orleans, to the United States Marshal, Packard, who had a small military force at his command, to seize the State House. This was done and the act was approved by President Grant. An appeal to him from the better class of citizens of New Orleans was rejected. The excitement in Congress growing out of this usurpation was intense, even among Republicans. The Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections was ordered to make an investigation, which it did, and it reported, through Senator Carpenter on the 20th of February, that the action of Judge Durell was illegal and that all steps taken in pursuance of it were void. It recommended a new election and reported a bill for holding it; but Senator Morton, who made a minority report, prevented it from coming to a vote. Trumbull, who was also a member of the committee, made a report more drastic than that of Carpenter and supported his own view by a speech delivered on the 15th of February.

Here you have [he said] an order sent from the city of Washington on the 3d day of December, which was before Judge Durell issued his order to seize the State House and organize a legislature, and directing that nobody should take part in the organization except such persons as were returned as members by what was known as the Lynch Board, a board which the committee, in their report drawn by the Senator from Wisconsin, say had been abolished by an act of the legislature, and had not a single official return before it. It undertook to canvass returns without having any returns to canvass. On forged affidavits, hearsay, and newspaper reports and verbal statements, the Lynch Returning Board, consisting of four men, without legal existence as a returning board, got together and without one official return, or other legitimate evidence before them, undertook to say who should constitute the Legislature of Louisiana.[130]

This was Trumbull's last speech in the Senate and was one of his best, but other influences prevailed with Grant.[131]

Thus Kellogg and his crew became the masters of Louisiana, and four years later became the deciding factor in the Hayes-Tilden presidential contest.

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