FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[51]Diary of Gideon Welles,i, 32.[52]Letters and Diaries of John Hay, 1, 47.[53]Nicolay and Hay,iii, 428. Probably the entry in Hay's Diary had been forgotten when the History was written, twenty-five years later.

[51]Diary of Gideon Welles,i, 32.

[52]Letters and Diaries of John Hay, 1, 47.

[53]Nicolay and Hay,iii, 428. Probably the entry in Hay's Diary had been forgotten when the History was written, twenty-five years later.

BULL RUN—THE CONFISCATION ACT

In company with other Senators, Trumbull went to the battle of Bull Run, July 21, 1861. His experience there he communicated to his wife, first by a brief telegram, and afterwards by letter. The telegram was suppressed by the authorities in charge of the telegraph office, who substituted one of their own in place of it and appended his name to it. The letter follows:

Washington, July 22nd, 1861.We started over into Virginia about 9 o'clock A.M., and drove to Centreville, which is a high commanding position and a village of perhaps fifty houses. Bull Run, where the battle occurred, is South about 3 miles and the creek on the main road, looking West, is about 4-1/2 miles distant. The country is timbered for perhaps a mile West of the creek, between which and Centreville there are a good many cleared fields. At Centreville, Grimes and I got saddles and rode horseback down the main road towards the creek about three miles toward a hospital where were some few wounded soldiers and a few prisoners who had been sent back. This was about half-past three o'clock P.M. Here we met with Col. Vandever of Iowa, who gave us a very clear account of the battle. He had been with Gen. McDowell and Gen. Hunter, who with the strongest part of the army, had gone early in the morning a few miles north of the main road and crossed the creek to take the enemy in the flank. His division had very serious fighting, but had driven the enemy back and taken three of his batteries. At the hospital we were about one and a half miles from Generals Tyler and Schenck, Col. Sherman, etc., who were down the road in the woods and out of sight, with several regiments and a number of guns. Their troops, Vandever told us, were a good deal demoralized, and he feared an attack from the South towards BullRun where the battle of a few days ago was fought. About this time a battery, apparently not more than a mile and a half distant and from the South, fired on the battery where Sherman and Schenck were. The firing was not rapid. On the hill at Centreville we could see quite beyond the timber of the creek off towards Manassas and see the smoke and hear the report of the artillery, but not very rapid as I thought. This we observed before leaving Centreville, and were told it was our main army driving the enemy back, but slowly and with great difficulty.While at the hospital McDougall of California came up from the neighborhood of Gen. Schenck and said he was going back towards Centreville to a convenient place where he could get water and take lunch. As Grimes and myself had got separated from Messrs. Wade and Chandler and Brown, who had with them our supplies, we concluded to go back with McD. and partake with him. We returned on the road towards Centreville and turned up towards a house fifty or a hundred yards from the road, where we quietly took our lunch, the firing continuing about as before. Just as we were putting away the things we heard a great noise, and looking up towards the road saw it filled with wagons, horsemen and footmen in full run towards Centreville. We immediately mounted our horses and galloped to the road, by which time it was crowded, hundreds being in advance on the way to Centreville and two guns of the Sherman battery having already passed in full retreat. We kept on with the crowd, not knowing what else to do. On the way to Centreville many soldiers threw away their guns, knapsacks, etc. Gov. Grimes and I each picked up a gun. I soon came up to Senator Lane of Indiana, and the gun being heavy to carry and he better able to manage it, I gave it to him. Efforts were made to rally the men by civilians and others on their way to Centreville, but all to no purpose. Literally, three could have chased ten thousand. All this stampede was occasioned, as I understand, by a charge of not exceeding two hundred cavalry upon Schenck's column down in the woods, which, instead of repulsing as they could easily have done (having before become disordered and having lost some of their officers), broke and ran, communicating the panic to everybody they met. The rebel cavalry, or about one hundred of them, charged up past the hospital where we had been and took there some prisoners,as I am told, and released those we had. It was the most shameful rout you can conceive of. I suppose two thousand soldiers came rushing into Centreville in this disorganized condition. The cavalry which made the charge I did not see, but suppose they disappeared in double-quick time, not dreaming that they had put a whole division to flight. Several guns were left down in the woods, though I believe two were brought off. What became of Schenck I do not know. Tyler, I understand, was at Centreville when I got back there. Whether other portions of our army were shamefully routed just at the close of the day, after we had really won the battle, it seems impossible for me to learn, though I was told that McDowell was at Centreville when we were there and that his column had also been driven back. If this be so it is a terrible defeat. At Centreville there was a reserve of 8000 or 10,000 men under Col. Miles who had not been in the action and they were formed in line of battle when we left there, but the enemy did not, I presume, advance to that point last night, as we heard no firing. We fed our horses at Centreville and left there at six o'clock last evening. Came on to Fairfax Court House, where we got supper, and leaving there at ten o'clock reached home at half-past two this morning, having had a sad day and witnessed scenes I hope never to see again. Not very many baggage wagons, perhaps not more than fifty, were advanced beyond Centreville. From them the horses were mostly unhitched and the wagons left standing in the road when the stampede took place. This side of Centreville there were a great many wagons, and the alarm if possible was greater than on the other. Thousands of shovels were thrown out upon the road, also axes, boxes of provisions, etc. In some instances wagons were upset to get them out of the road, and the road was full of four-horse wagons retreating as fast as possible, and also of flying soldiers who could not be made to stop at Centreville. The officers stopped the wagons and a good many of the retreating soldiers by putting a file of men across the road and not allowing them to pass. In this way all the teams were stopped, but a good many stragglers climbed the fences and got by. I fear that a great, and, of course, a terrible slaughter has overtaken the Union forces—God's ways are inscrutable. I am dreadfully disappointed and mortified.

Washington, July 22nd, 1861.

We started over into Virginia about 9 o'clock A.M., and drove to Centreville, which is a high commanding position and a village of perhaps fifty houses. Bull Run, where the battle occurred, is South about 3 miles and the creek on the main road, looking West, is about 4-1/2 miles distant. The country is timbered for perhaps a mile West of the creek, between which and Centreville there are a good many cleared fields. At Centreville, Grimes and I got saddles and rode horseback down the main road towards the creek about three miles toward a hospital where were some few wounded soldiers and a few prisoners who had been sent back. This was about half-past three o'clock P.M. Here we met with Col. Vandever of Iowa, who gave us a very clear account of the battle. He had been with Gen. McDowell and Gen. Hunter, who with the strongest part of the army, had gone early in the morning a few miles north of the main road and crossed the creek to take the enemy in the flank. His division had very serious fighting, but had driven the enemy back and taken three of his batteries. At the hospital we were about one and a half miles from Generals Tyler and Schenck, Col. Sherman, etc., who were down the road in the woods and out of sight, with several regiments and a number of guns. Their troops, Vandever told us, were a good deal demoralized, and he feared an attack from the South towards BullRun where the battle of a few days ago was fought. About this time a battery, apparently not more than a mile and a half distant and from the South, fired on the battery where Sherman and Schenck were. The firing was not rapid. On the hill at Centreville we could see quite beyond the timber of the creek off towards Manassas and see the smoke and hear the report of the artillery, but not very rapid as I thought. This we observed before leaving Centreville, and were told it was our main army driving the enemy back, but slowly and with great difficulty.

While at the hospital McDougall of California came up from the neighborhood of Gen. Schenck and said he was going back towards Centreville to a convenient place where he could get water and take lunch. As Grimes and myself had got separated from Messrs. Wade and Chandler and Brown, who had with them our supplies, we concluded to go back with McD. and partake with him. We returned on the road towards Centreville and turned up towards a house fifty or a hundred yards from the road, where we quietly took our lunch, the firing continuing about as before. Just as we were putting away the things we heard a great noise, and looking up towards the road saw it filled with wagons, horsemen and footmen in full run towards Centreville. We immediately mounted our horses and galloped to the road, by which time it was crowded, hundreds being in advance on the way to Centreville and two guns of the Sherman battery having already passed in full retreat. We kept on with the crowd, not knowing what else to do. On the way to Centreville many soldiers threw away their guns, knapsacks, etc. Gov. Grimes and I each picked up a gun. I soon came up to Senator Lane of Indiana, and the gun being heavy to carry and he better able to manage it, I gave it to him. Efforts were made to rally the men by civilians and others on their way to Centreville, but all to no purpose. Literally, three could have chased ten thousand. All this stampede was occasioned, as I understand, by a charge of not exceeding two hundred cavalry upon Schenck's column down in the woods, which, instead of repulsing as they could easily have done (having before become disordered and having lost some of their officers), broke and ran, communicating the panic to everybody they met. The rebel cavalry, or about one hundred of them, charged up past the hospital where we had been and took there some prisoners,as I am told, and released those we had. It was the most shameful rout you can conceive of. I suppose two thousand soldiers came rushing into Centreville in this disorganized condition. The cavalry which made the charge I did not see, but suppose they disappeared in double-quick time, not dreaming that they had put a whole division to flight. Several guns were left down in the woods, though I believe two were brought off. What became of Schenck I do not know. Tyler, I understand, was at Centreville when I got back there. Whether other portions of our army were shamefully routed just at the close of the day, after we had really won the battle, it seems impossible for me to learn, though I was told that McDowell was at Centreville when we were there and that his column had also been driven back. If this be so it is a terrible defeat. At Centreville there was a reserve of 8000 or 10,000 men under Col. Miles who had not been in the action and they were formed in line of battle when we left there, but the enemy did not, I presume, advance to that point last night, as we heard no firing. We fed our horses at Centreville and left there at six o'clock last evening. Came on to Fairfax Court House, where we got supper, and leaving there at ten o'clock reached home at half-past two this morning, having had a sad day and witnessed scenes I hope never to see again. Not very many baggage wagons, perhaps not more than fifty, were advanced beyond Centreville. From them the horses were mostly unhitched and the wagons left standing in the road when the stampede took place. This side of Centreville there were a great many wagons, and the alarm if possible was greater than on the other. Thousands of shovels were thrown out upon the road, also axes, boxes of provisions, etc. In some instances wagons were upset to get them out of the road, and the road was full of four-horse wagons retreating as fast as possible, and also of flying soldiers who could not be made to stop at Centreville. The officers stopped the wagons and a good many of the retreating soldiers by putting a file of men across the road and not allowing them to pass. In this way all the teams were stopped, but a good many stragglers climbed the fences and got by. I fear that a great, and, of course, a terrible slaughter has overtaken the Union forces—God's ways are inscrutable. I am dreadfully disappointed and mortified.

Copy of telegram sent to Mrs. Lyman Trumbull, July 22, 1861:

The battle resulted unfavorably to our cause.Lyman T.

The battle resulted unfavorably to our cause.

Lyman T.

When received by Mrs. Trumbull, it read:

I came from near the battlefield last night. It was a desperately bloody fight.

The only bill of importance passed at the July session of Congress at Trumbull's instance was one to declare free all slaves who might be employed by their owners, or with their owners' consent, on any military or naval work against the Government, and who might fall into our hands. It was called a Confiscation Act, but it did not confiscate any other than slave property. It was an entering wedge, however, for complete emancipation which came by successive steps later.

At the beginning of the regular session (December, 1861), I was sent to Washington City as correspondent of the ChicagoTribune, and was, for the first time, brought into close relations with Trumbull. He had rented a house on G Street, near the Post-Office Department.

Very few Senators at that period kept house in Washington. At Mrs. Shipman's boarding-house on Seventh Street, lived Senators Fessenden, Grimes, Foot, and Representatives Morrill, of Vermont, and Washburne, of Illinois; and there I also found quarters. As this was only a block distant from the Trumbulls', and as I had received a cordial welcome from them, I was soon on terms of intimacy with the family. Mr. Trumbull was then forty-eight-years of age, five feet ten and one half inches in height, straight as an arrow, weighing one hundred and sixty-seven pounds, of faultless physique, in perfect health, and in manners a cultivated gentleman.Mrs. Trumbull was thirty-seven years old, of winning features, gracious manners, and noble presence. Five children had been born to them, all sons. Walter, fifteen years of age, the eldest then living, had recently returned from an ocean voyage on the warship Vandalia, under Commander S. Phillips Lee. A more attractive family group, or one more charming in a social way or more kindly affectioned one to another, I have never known. Civilization could show no finer type.

The Thirty-seventh Congress met in a state of great depression. Disaster had befallen the armies of the Union, but the defeat at Bull Run was not so disheartening as the subsequent inaction both east and west. McClellan on the Potomac had done nothing but organize and parade. Frémont on the Mississippi had done worse than nothing. He had surrounded himself with a gang of thieves whose plundering threatened to bankrupt the treasury, and when he saw exposure threatening he issued a military order emancipating slaves, the revocation of which by the President very nearly upset the Government. The popular demand for a blow at slavery as the cause of the rebellion had increased in proportion as the military operations had been disappointing. Lincoln believed that the time had not yet come for using that weapon. He revoked Frémont's order. He thereby saved Kentucky to the Union, and he still held emancipation in reserve for a later day; but he incurred the risk of alienating the radical element of the Republican party—an honest, fiery, valiant, indispensable wing of the forces supporting the Union. The explosion which took place in this division of the party was almost but not quite fatal. Many letters received by Trumbull at this juncture were angry and some mournful in the extreme. The following written by Mr. M. Carey Lea, of Philadelphia,touches upon a danger threatening the national finances, in consequence of this episode:

Philadelphia, Nov. 1, 1861.Dear Sir:The ability of our Government to carry on this war depends upon its being able to continue to obtain the enormous amounts of money requisite. Of late, within a week or so, an alarming falling off in the bond subscriptions has taken place. Now it is upon these private subscriptions that the ability of the banks to continue to lend the Government money depends, and unless a change takes place they will be unable to take the fifty millions remaining of the one hundred and fifty millions loan. A member of the committee informed me lately that the banks had positively declined to pledge themselves before the 1st of December, notwithstanding Mr. Chase's desire that they should do so.This sudden diminution of subscriptions arises from the course taken by some of our friends in the West. Even suppose that Gen. Frémont is treated unfairly by the Government (and I think he is fairly termed incapable)—but suppose there should be injustice done him—you might disapprove it, but the moment there is any serious idea ofresistingthe act of the President,thiswar is ended. For the bare suggestion of such a thing has almost stopped subscriptions, and the serious discussion, much more the attempt, would instantly put an end to them.I beg to remind you that in what I say I have no prejudice against Frémont. I voted for him and have always concurred in opinions with the Republican party, but we have now reached a point where, if we look tomenand not toprinciples, we are shipwrecked. Frémont is not more anti-slavery in his views than Lincoln and Seward, and if he were in their place would adopt the same cautious policy. The state of affairs must be my excuse for intruding upon you these views. Weallhaveallat stake and such a crisis leads those to speak who are ordinarily silent. I remain, my dear Sir,Yours respectfully,M. Carey Lea.

Philadelphia, Nov. 1, 1861.

Dear Sir:The ability of our Government to carry on this war depends upon its being able to continue to obtain the enormous amounts of money requisite. Of late, within a week or so, an alarming falling off in the bond subscriptions has taken place. Now it is upon these private subscriptions that the ability of the banks to continue to lend the Government money depends, and unless a change takes place they will be unable to take the fifty millions remaining of the one hundred and fifty millions loan. A member of the committee informed me lately that the banks had positively declined to pledge themselves before the 1st of December, notwithstanding Mr. Chase's desire that they should do so.

This sudden diminution of subscriptions arises from the course taken by some of our friends in the West. Even suppose that Gen. Frémont is treated unfairly by the Government (and I think he is fairly termed incapable)—but suppose there should be injustice done him—you might disapprove it, but the moment there is any serious idea ofresistingthe act of the President,thiswar is ended. For the bare suggestion of such a thing has almost stopped subscriptions, and the serious discussion, much more the attempt, would instantly put an end to them.

I beg to remind you that in what I say I have no prejudice against Frémont. I voted for him and have always concurred in opinions with the Republican party, but we have now reached a point where, if we look tomenand not toprinciples, we are shipwrecked. Frémont is not more anti-slavery in his views than Lincoln and Seward, and if he were in their place would adopt the same cautious policy. The state of affairs must be my excuse for intruding upon you these views. Weallhaveallat stake and such a crisis leads those to speak who are ordinarily silent. I remain, my dear Sir,

Yours respectfully,M. Carey Lea.

To this weighty communication Trumbull made the following reply:

Washington, Nov. 5th, 1861.My dear Sir:Thanks for your kind letter just received. I was not aware of a disposition in the West to resist the act of the President in regard to Gen. Frémont; though I was aware that there was very great dissatisfaction in that part of the country at the want of enterprise and energy on that part of our Grand Army of the Potomac. We are fighting to sustain constitutional government and regulated liberty, and, of course, to set up any military leader in opposition to the constituted authorities would be utterly destructive of the very purpose for which the people of the loyal states are now so liberally contributing their blood and treasure, and could only be justified in case those charged with the administration of affairs were betraying their trusts or had shown themselves utterly incompetent and unable to maintain the Government. In my opinion this rebellion ought to and might have been crushed before this.I have entire confidence in the integrity and patriotism of the President. He means well and in ordinary times would have made one of the best of Presidents, but he lacks confidence in himself and thewillnecessary in this great emergency, and he is most miserably surrounded. Now that Gen. Scott has retired, I hope for more activity and should confidently expect it did I not know that there is still remaining an influence almost if not quite controlling, which I fear is looking more to some grand diplomatic move for the settlement of our troubles than to the strengthening of our arms. It is only by making this war terrible to traitors that our difficulties can be permanently settled. War means desolation, and they who have brought it on must be made to feel all its horrors, and our armies must go forth using all the means which God and nature have put in their hands to put down this wicked rebellion. This in the end will be done, and if our armies are vigorously and actively led will soon give us peace. I trust that Gen. McClellan will now drive the enemy from the vicinity of the Capital—that he has the means to do it, I have no doubt. If the case were reversed and the South had our means and our arms and men, and we theirs, they would before this have driven us to the St. Lawrence. If our army should go into winter quarters with the Capital besieged, I very much fear the result would be a recognition of the Confederates by foreign Governments, the demoralization ofour own people, and of course an inability to raise either men or money another season. Such must not be. Action, action is what we want and must have. God grant that McClellan may prove equal to the emergency.Yours very truly,Lyman Trumbull.

Washington, Nov. 5th, 1861.

My dear Sir:Thanks for your kind letter just received. I was not aware of a disposition in the West to resist the act of the President in regard to Gen. Frémont; though I was aware that there was very great dissatisfaction in that part of the country at the want of enterprise and energy on that part of our Grand Army of the Potomac. We are fighting to sustain constitutional government and regulated liberty, and, of course, to set up any military leader in opposition to the constituted authorities would be utterly destructive of the very purpose for which the people of the loyal states are now so liberally contributing their blood and treasure, and could only be justified in case those charged with the administration of affairs were betraying their trusts or had shown themselves utterly incompetent and unable to maintain the Government. In my opinion this rebellion ought to and might have been crushed before this.

I have entire confidence in the integrity and patriotism of the President. He means well and in ordinary times would have made one of the best of Presidents, but he lacks confidence in himself and thewillnecessary in this great emergency, and he is most miserably surrounded. Now that Gen. Scott has retired, I hope for more activity and should confidently expect it did I not know that there is still remaining an influence almost if not quite controlling, which I fear is looking more to some grand diplomatic move for the settlement of our troubles than to the strengthening of our arms. It is only by making this war terrible to traitors that our difficulties can be permanently settled. War means desolation, and they who have brought it on must be made to feel all its horrors, and our armies must go forth using all the means which God and nature have put in their hands to put down this wicked rebellion. This in the end will be done, and if our armies are vigorously and actively led will soon give us peace. I trust that Gen. McClellan will now drive the enemy from the vicinity of the Capital—that he has the means to do it, I have no doubt. If the case were reversed and the South had our means and our arms and men, and we theirs, they would before this have driven us to the St. Lawrence. If our army should go into winter quarters with the Capital besieged, I very much fear the result would be a recognition of the Confederates by foreign Governments, the demoralization ofour own people, and of course an inability to raise either men or money another season. Such must not be. Action, action is what we want and must have. God grant that McClellan may prove equal to the emergency.

Yours very truly,Lyman Trumbull.

The "influence almost if not quite controlling" meant Seward. Secretary Cameron went to St. Louis to investigate Frémont and found him guilty. Two months later he followed Frémont's example.[54]In his report as Secretary of War he inserted an argument in favor of the emancipation and arming of slaves. This he sent to the newspapers in advance of its delivery to the President and without his knowledge. The latter discovered it in time to expunge the objectionable part and to prevent its delivery to Congress, but not soon enough to recall it from the press. The expunged part was published by some of the newspapers that had received it and was reproduced in theCongressional Globe(December 12), by Representative Eliot, of Massachusetts.

The next man to take upon himself the responsibility of declaring the nation's policy on this momentous question was General David Hunter, who then held sway over a small strip of ground on the coast of South Carolina. In the month of May, 1862, he issued an order granting freedom to all slaves in South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. Hunter's order was promptly revoked by the President.

Trumbull had been the pioneer, at the July session, in the way of legislation for freeing the slaves. On the first day of the regular session he took another step forward, by introducing a bill for the confiscation of the property of the rebels and for giving freedom to persons held as slaves by them. This came to be known as the Confiscation Act.

On the 5th of December, 1861, he reported the bill from the Committee on the Judiciary and made a brief speech on it. It provided that all the property, real and personal, situated within the limits of the United States, belonging to persons who should bear arms against the Government, or give aid and comfort to those in rebellion, which persons should not be reachable by the ordinary process of law, should be forfeited and confiscated to the United States and that the forfeiture should take immediate effect; and that the slaves of all such persons should be free. Also that no slaves escaping from servitude should be delivered up unless the person claiming them should prove that he had been at all times loyal to the Government. Also that no officer in the military or naval service should assume to decide whether a claim made by a master to an escaping slave was valid or not.

This bill was thepièce de résistanceof senatorial debate for the whole session. Its confiscatory features were attacked on the 4th of March by Senator Cowan, in a speech of great force. Cowan was a new Senator from Pennsylvania, a Republican of conservative leanings, and a great debater. He opposed the bill on grounds of both constitutionality and expediency. On the 24th of April, Collamer, of Vermont, expressed the sound opinions that private property could not be confiscated except by judicial process, and that even if it could be done it would be bad policy, since it would tend to prolongthe war and would constitute a barrier against future peace.

The Confederate Government had led the way by passing a law (May 21, 1861) sequestrating all debts due to Northern individuals or corporations and authorizing the payment of the same to the Confederate Treasury. The whole subject was extremely complex. "There was commonly," says a recent writer in theAmerican Historical Review, "a failure in the debates to discriminate between a general confiscation of property within the jurisdiction of the confiscating government and the treatment accorded by victorious armies to private property found within the limits of military occupation. Thus the general rule exempting private property on land from the sort of capture property must suffer at sea, was erroneously appealed to as an inhibition upon the right of judicial confiscation. That a military capture on land analogous to prize at sea was not regarded as a legitimate war measure was so obvious and well recognized a principle that it would hardly require a continual reaffirmation. It was a very different matter, however, so far as the law and practice of nations was concerned, for a belligerent to attack through its courts whatever enemy's property might be available within its limits."[55]

Collamer offered an amendment to strike out the first section of the bill and insert a clause providing that every person adjudged guilty of the crime of treason should suffer death, or, at the discretion of the court, be imprisoned not less than five years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars, which fine should be levied on any property, real or personal, of which he might be possessed. The fine was to be in lieu of confiscation. The aim of the amendment was to substitute due process of law in place of legislative forfeiture. Various other amendments were offered. On the 6th of May, the Senate voted by 24 to 14 to refer the bill and amendments to a select committee of nine. The House, which had been waiting for the Senate bill, decided on the 14th of May to take up a measure of its own, which it passed on the 26th. The select committee of the Senate framed a measure regarding the emancipation of escaping slaves. This and the House bill were sent to a conference committee, which reported the bill which became a law July 17, 1862.

This was not the end of it, however. Provision had been made in the bill for the forfeiture, by judicial process, of the property, both real and personal, of rebels, regardless of the clause of the Constitution which declares that "no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted." No such exception was made in the bill. The President considered it unconstitutional in this particular, and he wrote a short message giving his reasons for withholding his approval of the measure. A rumor of his intention reached Senator Fessenden, who called at the White House to inquire whether it was true. He had a frank conversation with the President, the result of which was that both houses passed a joint resolution providing that no punishment or proceedings under the Confiscation Act should be so construed as to work a forfeiture of the real estate of the offender beyond his natural life. Lincoln's intended veto of the Confiscation Bill is printed on page 3406 of theCongressional Globe. Touching confiscation in general he expressed the golden opinion that "the severest justice may not always be the best policy." But he would not have vetoed the bill on grounds of expediency merely. The forfeiture of real estate in perpetuity wasthe insuperable objection in his mind. And he here seems to me to have been entirely right. Yet Trumbull had the support of Judge Harris, Seward's successor in the Senate, than whom nobody stood higher as a lawyer at that day.

The President then signed both the bill and the joint resolution. The Confiscation Act remained, however, practically a dead letter, except as to the freeing of the slaves. In the latter particular it was the first great step toward complete emancipation, since it took effect upon slaves within our lines, who could be reached and made freede facto. It provided that all slaves of persons who should be thereafter engaged in rebellion, escaping and taking refuge in the lines of the Union forces, and all such slaves found in places captured by such forces, should be declared free; that no slaves escaping should be delivered up unless the owner should swear that he had not aided the rebellion; that no officer of the United States should assume to decide on the validity of the claim of any person to an escaping slave; that the President should be authorized to employ negroes for the suppression of the rebellion in any capacity he saw fit; and that he might colonize negroes with their own consent and the consent of the foreign Government receiving them.

According to a report of the Solicitor of the Treasury dated Dec. 27, 1867, the total proceeds of confiscation actually paid into the Treasury up to that time amounted to the insignificant sum of $129,680.

The enforcement of the confiscation act was placed under the charge of the Attorney-General. Practically, however, it was performed by officers of the army, so far as it was enforced at all. General Lew Wallace, while in command of the Middle Department at Baltimore, in 1864, issued two orders declaring his intention to confiscatethe property of certain persons who were either serving in the rebel army or giving aid to the Confederate cause. These orders, which were published in the newspapers, came to the notice of Attorney-General Bates, who at once wrote to Wallace to remind him that the execution of the confiscation act devolved upon the Attorney-General, and that he (Bates) had not given any orders which would warrant the Commander of the Middle Department in seizing private property, and requesting him to withdraw the orders. Wallace replied that his construction of the law differed from that of the Attorney-General and that he should execute it according to his own understanding of it. Thereupon Bates took the orders, and the correspondence, to the President and declared his intention to resign his office if his functions were usurped by military men in the field, or by the War Department. Lincoln took the papers, and directed Secretary Stanton to require Wallace to withdraw the two orders and to desist from confiscation altogether. This was done by Stanton, but the orders were never publicly withdrawn although action under them was discontinued.

FOOTNOTES:[54]Gideon Welles quotes Montgomery Blair as saying in conversation (September 12, 1862): "Bedeviled with the belief that he might be a candidate for the Presidency, Cameron was beguiled and led to mount the nigger hobby, alarmed the President with his notions, and at the right moment (B. says) he plainly and promptly told the President he ought to get rid of C. at once, that he was not fit to remain in the Cabinet, and was incompetent to manage the War Department, which he had undertaken to run by the aid of Tom A. Scott, a corrupt lobby jobber from Philadelphia." (Diary,i, 127.)[55]Article on "Some Legal Aspects of the Confiscation Acts of the Civil War," by J. G. Randall.Am. Hist. Review, October, 1912.

[54]Gideon Welles quotes Montgomery Blair as saying in conversation (September 12, 1862): "Bedeviled with the belief that he might be a candidate for the Presidency, Cameron was beguiled and led to mount the nigger hobby, alarmed the President with his notions, and at the right moment (B. says) he plainly and promptly told the President he ought to get rid of C. at once, that he was not fit to remain in the Cabinet, and was incompetent to manage the War Department, which he had undertaken to run by the aid of Tom A. Scott, a corrupt lobby jobber from Philadelphia." (Diary,i, 127.)

[55]Article on "Some Legal Aspects of the Confiscation Acts of the Civil War," by J. G. Randall.Am. Hist. Review, October, 1912.

THE EXPULSION OF CAMERON

Early in the year 1862, it was found that the national credit was sinking in consequence of frauds in the War Department. A Committee on Government Contracts was appointed by the House, and the first man to fall under its censure was Alexander Cummings, one of the two Pennsylvania politicians with whom David Davis had made his bargain for votes at the Chicago convention.

The War Department was represented at New York by General Wool with a suitable staff, Major Eaton being the commissary. There was also a Union Defense Committee consisting of eminent citizens who had volunteered to serve the Government in whatever capacity they might be needed. Nevertheless, Secretary Cameron placed a fund of two million dollars in the hands of General Dix, Mr. Opdycke, and Mr. Blatchford, to be disbursed by E. D. Morgan and Alexander Cummings, or either of them, for the purpose of forwarding troops and supplies to Washington. As E. D. Morgan was Governor of the State and was busy at Albany, this arrangement would be likely to devolve most of the purchases on Cummings alone. Cameron wrote on April 2, to Cummings:

The Department needs at this moment an intelligent, experienced, and energetic man on whom it can rely, to assist in pushing forward troops, munitions, and supplies. I am aware that your private affairs may demand your time. I am sure your patriotism will induce you to aid me even at some loss to yourself.

Major Eaton, the army commissary, distinctly informedCummings that his services were not needed in the purchase of supplies. Nevertheless, Cummings drew $160,000 out of the two-million fund and proceeded to disburse the same. He first appointed a certain Captain Comstock to charter or purchase vessels. Captain Comstock went to Brooklyn, accompanied by a friend, and inspected a steamer appropriately named the Catiline, which he found could be bought for $18,000. Before he made his report to Cummings, the friend who accompanied him suggested to another friend named John E. Develin that there was a chance to make some money "by good management." Comstock at the same time assured Colonel D. D. Tompkins, of the Quartermaster's Department, that the ship was worth $50,000. Comstock testified that he was sent for by Thurlow Weed to come to the Astor House at the outbreak of the troubles, and that Weed stated to him that he (Weed) was an agent of the Government to send troops and munitions of war to Washington by way of the Chesapeake, and that he wished to charter vessels for that purpose. Afterwards Cummings called upon Comstock and showed him the same authority that Weed had shown.

The Catiline was bought by Develin for $18,000. The seller of the ship testified that he received, as security for the purchase money, four notes of $4500 each executed by Thurlow Weed, John E. Develin, G. C. Davidson, and O. B. Matteson. Matteson had been a member of a previous Congress from Utica, New York, but had been expelled from the House. The Catiline was chartered for the Government at the rate of $10,000 per month for three months, with an agreement that if she were lost in the service the owners should be paid $50,000. The title to the Catiline was, for convenience, placed in the name of a Mr. Stetson.

Cummings was examined by the Committee on Government Contracts. He testified that he had formerly been the publisher of the PhiladelphiaEvening Bulletin, and later publisher of the New YorkWorld, and that he had resided in the latter city about eighteen months; his family still residing in Philadelphia. The purchases made by him to be shipped on the Catiline consisted mainly of groceries and provisions, including twenty-five casks of Scotch ale, and twenty-five casks of London porter; but he testified that he did not see any of the articles bought, nor did he have any knowledge of their quality, nor did he see any of them put on board the ship. The purchases, he said, were made from the firm of E. Corning & Co., of Albany, through a member of the firm named Davidson, whom Cummings met at the Astor House. Cummings assumed that Davidson was a member of the firm because Davidson told him so; he had no other evidence of the fact. He assumed also that Corning & Co. were dealers in provisions, but had no absolute knowledge on that point.[56]He supposed that the goods were shipped from Albany to be loaded on the Catiline, but did not know that such was the fact. All these details he left to his clerk, James Humphrey, who had been recommended as clerk by Thurlow Weed. Cummings testified that he did not know Humphrey before; did not know whether he had ever been in business in Albany or in New York; took him on Weed's recommendation; made no bargain with him as to salary; did not know where he could be found now. Bought a lot of hard bread from a house in Boston. Questioned to whom he made payment for this bread, he answered: "Directly to the party selling it, I suppose." "By you?" "By my clerk, I suppose." Did not recollect who first suggested the purchase of bread. Had nodirections from the Government to purchase any particular articles. Bought a quantity of straw hats and linen pantaloons, thinking they would be needed by the troops in warm weather. Did not personally know that any of the goods had been loaded on the steamer or by whom they should have been so loaded. The cargo was certified by Cummings to Cameron as shipped for the Government. Mr. Barney, Collector of the Port, refused to give a clearance to the Catiline to sail. Mr. Stetson, the owner, produced a letter from Thurlow Weed requesting a clearance, but Barney still refused. Finally General Wool gave a "pass" on which the Catiline sailed without a clearance. General Wool revoked the pass on the following day, but the ship had already departed.[57]

The report says: "The Committee have no occasion to call in question the integrity of Mr. Cummings." We must infer, therefore, that he was chosen by Cameron to disburse Government money in this emergency because he was an extraordinary simpleton, and likely to be guided by Thurlow Weed in buying army supplies from a hardware firm in Albany, and an unknown Boston house that furnished hard bread.

Congressman Van Wyck of New York, a member of the Committee, said that Mr. Weed's absence from home had prevented an examination into the nature and extent of his agency in the matter of the Catiline.[58]At the time when Weed's testimony was wanted he was in Europe acting as a volunteer diplomat "assisting to counteract the machinations of the agents of treason against the United States in that quarter," as appears by a letter of Secretary Seward to Minister Adams, dated November 7, 1861.

The Committee on Government Contracts were unable to determine whether the cargo of the Catiline was a private speculation or abona-fidepurchase for the Government. The character of the goods purchased and the mode of purchase pointed to the former conclusion. Scotch ale and London porter were not embraced in any list of authorized rations, nor were straw hats and linen pantaloons included in quartermaster's stores. Congressman Van Wyck conjectured that it was a private speculation until Collector Barney refused to grant a clearance, and that then it was turned over to the Government. Mr. Stetson, who applied for the clearance, first told the Collector that the ship was loaded with flour and provisions belonging to several of his friends. When he called the second time he testified that the cargo consisted of supplies for the troops. The ship was destroyed by fire before the three months' charter expired.

On the 13th of January, Henry L. Dawes, of Massachusetts, another member of the committee, alluded to certain purchases of cavalry horses, saying:

A regiment of cavalry has just reached Louisville one thousand strong, and a board of army officers has condemned four hundred and eighty-five of the one thousand horses as utterly worthless. The man who examined those horses declared, upon his oath, that there is not one of them worth twenty dollars. They are blind, spavined, ring-boned, with the heaves, with the glanders, and with every disease that horseflesh is heir to. Those four hundred and eighty-five horses cost the Government, before they were mustered into the service, $58,200, andit cost the Government to transport them from Pennsylvania to Louisville, $10,000 more before they were condemned and cast off.There are, sir, eighty-three regiments of cavalry one thousand strong now in or roundabout the army. It costs $250,000 to put one of those regiments upon its feet before it marches a step. Twenty millions of dollars have thus far been expended upon these cavalry regiments before they left the encampments in which they were gathered and mustered into the service. They have come here and then some of them have been sent back to Elmira; they have been sent back to Annapolis; they have been sent here and they have been sent there to spend the winter; and many of the horses that were sent back have been tied to posts and to trees within the District of Columbia and there left to starve to death. A guide can take you around the District of Columbia to-day to hundreds of carcasses of horses chained to trees where they have pined away, living on bark and limbs till they starve and die; and the Committee for the District of Columbia have been compelled to call for legislation here to prevent the city wherein we are assembled from becoming an equine Golgotha.[59]

There are, sir, eighty-three regiments of cavalry one thousand strong now in or roundabout the army. It costs $250,000 to put one of those regiments upon its feet before it marches a step. Twenty millions of dollars have thus far been expended upon these cavalry regiments before they left the encampments in which they were gathered and mustered into the service. They have come here and then some of them have been sent back to Elmira; they have been sent back to Annapolis; they have been sent here and they have been sent there to spend the winter; and many of the horses that were sent back have been tied to posts and to trees within the District of Columbia and there left to starve to death. A guide can take you around the District of Columbia to-day to hundreds of carcasses of horses chained to trees where they have pined away, living on bark and limbs till they starve and die; and the Committee for the District of Columbia have been compelled to call for legislation here to prevent the city wherein we are assembled from becoming an equine Golgotha.[59]

Horse contracts of this sort had been so plentiful that Government officials had gone about the streets of Washington with their pockets full of them. Some of these contracts had been used to pay Cameron's political debts and to cure old political feuds, and banquets had been given with the proceeds, "where the hatchet of political animosity," said Dawes, "was buried in the grave of public confidence and the national credit was crucified between malefactors."

Dawes said also that there was "indubitable evidence that somebody has plundered the public treasury well-nigh in a single year as much as the entire current yearly expenses of the Government which the people hurled from power because of its corruption"—meaning Buchanan's Administration.[60]

In the Senate on the 14th, Trumbull, quoting from the testimony of the House Committee, said that Hall's carbines, originally owned by the Government, but condemned and sold as useless at about $2 each, were purchased back for the Government, in April or May, at $15 each. In June, the Government sold them again at $3.50 each. Afterwards in August, they were purchased by an agent of the Government at $12.50 each and turned over to the Government at $22 each, and the Committee of the House was then trying to prevent this last payment from being made, and eventually succeeded in doing so. The beneficiary in this case was one Simon Stevens, not a relative of Thaddeus Stevens, but a protégé of his, and an occupant of his law office. He operated through General Frémont, not through Cameron.

"Sir," said Dawes, "amid all these things is it strange that the public treasury trembles and staggers like a strong man with a great burden upon him? Sir, the man beneath an exhausted receiver gasping for breath is not more helpless to-day than is the treasury of this Government beneath the exhausting process to which it is subjected."

Somewhat later Congressman Van Wyck showed, among other things, that Thurlow Weed, by the favor of Cameron, had established himself between the Government and the powder manufacturers in such a way as to pocket a commission of five per cent on purchases of ammunition.[61]

The committee visited severe censure on Thomas A. Scott, for acting as Assistant Secretary of War, while holding the office of vice-president of the Pennsylvania Central Railroad. Scott said that he ceased to draw salary from the railroad when he became AssistantSecretary, but that he had retained his railroad connection because he considered it of more value to himself than the other position. The committee considered it highly improper for him to hold the power to award large Government contracts for transportation and to fix prices therefor while he had personal railroad interests, and while Secretary Cameron, to whom he owed his appointment, was interested in the Northern Central Railroad. The latter was commonly called "Cameron's road." An order had been issued by Scott, without consultation with the Quartermaster-General of the army, fixing the rates to be paid for the transportation of troops, baggage, and supplies. The Quartermaster-General testified that Scott's order as to prices was addressed to one of his own subordinates and that he first saw it in the hands of that subordinate. He construed it, however, as an order from his superior officer and therefore as governing himself. Officers of other railroads testified that the rates fixed by Scott were much too high considering the magnitude and kind of work to be done. Thus, the rate for transporting troops was fixed at two cents per mile per man, whether carried in passenger cars or in box cars, and whether taken as single passengers or by regiments.

Nicolay and Hay tell us that Cameron's departure from the Cabinet was in consequence of his disagreement with the President as to that part of his report relating to the arming of slaves; that although nothing more was said by either himself or Lincoln on that subject, "each of them realized that the circumstance had created a situation of difficulty and embarrassment which could not be indefinitely prolonged." Cameron, they say, began to signify his weariness of the onerous labors of the War Department, and hinted to the President that he would prefer the less responsible duties of a foreign mission. Tooutsiders this affair seemed to have completely blown over when, on January 11, 1862, Lincoln wrote the following short note:

My dear Sir:As you have more than once expressed a desire for a change of position, I can now gratify you consistently with my view of the public interest. I, therefore, propose nominating you to the Senate next Monday as Minister to Russia.Very sincerely your friend,A. Lincoln.

Very sincerely your friend,A. Lincoln.

The real facts were given to the world by A. K. McClure somewhat later in his book on "Lincoln and Men of War-Time." He says that Cameron's dismissal was due to the severe strain put upon the national credit, which led to the severest criticisms of all manner of public profligacy, culminating in a formal appeal to the President from leading financial men of the country for an immediate change of the Secretary of War; that Lincoln's letter of dismissal was sent to Cameron by the hand of Secretary Chase, and that it was extremely curt, being almost, if not quite, literally as follows: "I have this day nominated Hon. Edwin M. Stanton to be Secretary of War and you to be Minister Plenipotentiary to Russia"; that Cameron in great agitation brought this missive to the room of Thomas A. Scott, Assistant Secretary of War, where Mr. McClure happened to be dining and showed it to them; that he wept bitterly, and said that it meant his personal degradation and political ruin. Scott and McClure volunteered to see Lincoln and ask him to withdraw the offensive letter and to permit Cameron to antedate a letter of resignation, to which Lincoln consented. "The letter conveyed by Chase was recalled; a new correspondence was prepared, and a month later given to the public."[62]

McClure palliates Cameron's conduct by saying that "contracts had to be made with such haste as to forbid the exercise of sound discretion in obtaining what the country needed; and Cameron, with his peculiar political surroundings and a horde of partisans clamoring for spoils, was compelled either to reject the confident expectation of his friends or to submit to imminent peril from the grossest abuse of his delegated authority." This is another way of saying that he was compelled either to pay his political debts out of his own pocket, or give his henchmen access to the public treasury, and that he chose the latter alternative.

The House of Representatives passed a resolution of censure upon Cameron for investing Alexander Cummings with the control of large sums of the public money and authorizing him to purchase military supplies without restriction when the services of competent public officers were available. A few days later the President sent to the House a special message, assuming for himself and the entire Cabinet the responsibility for adopting that irregular mode of procuring supplies in the then existing emergency, a message which, when read in the light of Cummings's testimony, adds nothing to Lincoln's fame.

There was a struggle in executive session of the Senate, lasting four days, over the confirmation of Cameron as Minister to Russia. Trumbull took the lead in opposition. He considered it an immoral act, like giving to an unfaithful servant a "character" and exposing society to new malfeasance at his hands. He believed and said that the new office conferred upon him would serve simply as whitewash to enable him to recover his seat in the Senate, and that that was the reason why he wanted the mission to Russia.

Sumner, the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, had been much impressed by Cameron's anti-slavery zeal. As soon as the nomination came in, he moved that it be confirmed unanimously and without reference to any committee, which was the usual custom in cases where ex-Senators of good repute were nominated to office. Objection being made, the nomination went over. This was the day on which Dawes made his speech in the House. Sumner saw the speech, called Cameron's attention to it, and asked what answer should be made to such accusations. Cameron replied that he had never made a contract for any kind of army supplies since he had been Secretary of War, but had left all such business to the heads of bureaus charged with such duties, and had never interfered with them. On the 15th he put this statement in writing and addressed it to Vice-President Hamlin:—

I take this occasion to state that I have myself not made a single contract for any purpose whatever, having always interpreted the laws of Congress as contemplating that the heads of bureaus, who are experienced and able officers of the regular army, shall make all contracts for supplies for the branches of the service under their care respectively.So far I have not found any occasion to interfere with them in the discharge of this portion of their responsible duties.I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,Simon Cameron.Hon. H. Hamlin,President of the Senate of the United States.

So far I have not found any occasion to interfere with them in the discharge of this portion of their responsible duties.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,

Simon Cameron.Hon. H. Hamlin,President of the Senate of the United States.

In reply Dawes produced documents to show that there were then outstanding contracts, made by Cameron himself, for 1,836,900 muskets and rifles, and for only 64,000 by the Chief of Ordnance, the officer charged with that duty, and that on the very day when the letter to Hamlin was written, Cameron made a contract, against the adviceof the Chief of Ordnance, for an unlimited number of swords and sabres—all that a certain Philadelphia firm could produce in a given time. This was done after he had resigned and before his successor, Stanton, had been sworn in.[63]

Cameron was confirmed as Minister to Russia on the 17th, by a vote of 28 to 14. The Republican Senators who voted against confirmation were Foster, Grimes, Hale, Harlan, Trumbull, and Wilkinson. Trumbull handed me this list of names for publication, saying that all of them desired to have it published.

Cameron remained abroad until time and more exciting events had cast a kindly shadow on his record. He then came home and a few years later was reëlected to the Senate. When the attack was made on his dear friend Sumner, which ended in displacing him from the chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign Relations, which he had held ten years, Cameron retreated to a Committee room, as to a cyclone cellar, where he remained until the deed was done, leaving Trumbull, Schurz, and Wilson to fight the battle for his dear friend. Then he returned and sat down in the chair thus made vacant. He subsequently explained that he did so because his name was the next one to Sumner's on the committee list.[64]

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