A hoard of treasures filled a little book-room above—his mother's sketches, drawings of his first wife driving her ponies in Sloane Street, photographs and trinkets of hers, old family caricatures, and also some original sketches by Leech. In the room next to it, occupied by his grandmother till her death in 1882, was a John Collier of the first Lady Dilke.
When the grandmother's sitting-room was used later by Sir Charles's second wife, its main features were a small reference library of French art and a collection of books on Labour. Before the fireplace, on the writing-table as it was in 1885, were bowls of French porcelain filled once a week with fresh flowers from the Toulon garden—paper white narcissus and purple anemones or big violets of Provençal growth.
Sir Charles's bedroom above was the old nursery, connected with his mother's room, in which he was born, and out of which opened a little room where as a child he slept. His memories of that room were the terrors of a nervous boy, lying alone in the dark, creeping downstairs to sit—a tiny white-robed figure—as near as possible to the drawing-room door, to get comfort from the hum of talk or thunder of the four-handed piano pieces of the period.
His own room for many years was full of drawings by his second wife—her studies under Mulready, her drawings for herRenaissance, and other pen-and-ink sketches by her hand, as well as two miniatures of her by Pollet. Some of Frank Dicey's Thames water-colours, one showing Sir Charles's river house at Dockett Eddy, and sketches from his own pen or brush made in his Russian, American, and world-wide wanderings, were here also. In a tiny glazed bookcase by the fire were some 'favourite books,' a volume or two of Kipling, two volumes of Anatole France, next to a cookery book of 1600, Renan'sSouvenirs d'Enfance et de Jeunesse, and a volume of Aubanel. The place of honour was given to a deeply scored copy of Jeremy Taylor'sGolden Grove.
Beside his great-uncle's Peninsular medal and clasps hung one of Roty's medals, a present from the artist. There were several of Roty's beautiful medallions in the house, the finest one of Sir Charles himself, explained by the legend on the back as 'done for his wife.' She had it made, and it was always with her.
There were a good many of W. E. F. Britten's pictures, painted for Sir Charles; the finest was that of 'St. Francis preaching to the Birds,' a thing of delicate colour and taste, which fitted with his love of the Umbrian Holy Land and went later to the country cottage at Pyrford. There was more force in a large crayon drawing of the Earl of Southampton in the Tower: 'his cat had just arrived down the chimney, probably saving his master's reason by relief of the intolerable tension of lonely confinement.'
The painted cats, or Miss Chaplin's modelled pussies, of which there were many, were seldom without some magnificent living representative at 76, Sloane Street. Zulu, an enormous dark long-haired cat, was very popular; but the last of the 'Head Cats,' Calino, was so engaging that, at his death about 1908, Sir Charles decided that he should never be replaced. The sway of these cats was despotic, but there were occasions on which their own territory was too limited for them, and messages would come from far down the street demanding the removal of the reigning favourite from some article of furniture where it had ensconced itself with such majesty that a show of violence was out of the question. Among his precious books was a cat story—privately printed and bound—which his second wife had gradually evolved among the wonderful essays in story-telling with which, when he was jaded, she diverted him. This held so large a share in his affection that it nearly displaced his little French copy of theContes de Perrault, containing the adventures of the Marquis of Carabas and Puss in Boots. At the winter cottage at Pyrford, among the pines, was a cattery, where Persian tailless cats, some ginger and some white, were bred. A list of names was kept ready for them, and Babettes, Papillons, Pierrots and Pierrettes, Mistigrises and Beelzebubs, were distributed to friends and acquaintances. Among the treasured pathetic scraps kept in his father's desk, his executors found a pencil drawing by his wife, the closed window of a silent house, into which the perfectly sketched figure of a little kitten was trying to enter.
In the gracious setting of this house the pervading atmosphere was that of work. The three generations of Dilkes whom it had sheltered had each found the sphere for which he was best fitted, and pursued it tirelessly. The grandfather, beloved old scholar and critic; the father, indefatigable organizer of international exhibitions, horticulturist, newspaper proprietor, member of Parliament—both passed on the traditions of strenuous labour to the great Parliamentarian who was now the occupant of the house. He had absorbed those traditions and far outvied his predecessors, working day and night, bringing down from his bedroom almost illegible memoranda to be deciphered by his secretary in the morning.
From 1880 to 1885 his accession to public office had intensified the work. Messengers with official boxes waited in the hall; callers on political or electoral business, to be interviewed by him or his secretaries, filled the Blue and Red Rooms. After the morning's fencing he passed rapidly from letters to interviews till the Office or the House of Commons claimed him, and his faithful coachman, Charles Grant, who when he died in 1901 had served his master for thirty years, waited for him at the door. Yet with all this the house continued, as in his father's day, to be noted for its hospitality, and the lists of guests in the tattered diaries bear witness to the enormous and varied circle of Sir Charles's friends. Here met foreign diplomatists and artists, English statesmen, and men of letters. Even Cardinal Manning broke his rule against dining out, as 'yours is a Cabinet dinner,' to come to 76, Sloane Street; but as he met M. de Franqueville, Baron Ferdinand de Rothschild, and the friend whom the Cardinal designated to be his biographer, the future author ofFrance, J. E. C. Bodley, there must have been talk of other subjects than 'Housing of the Poor.' Indeed, absence of 'shop' seems to have been one of the charms of these dinners, and Mr. G. W. Osborn, the Chairman of the Chelsea Liberal Association, records that, even when the local leaders met there, some outside element was always introduced which made the talk general.
On another occasion Sir Charles notes: 'July 9th, 1884. On this day Cardinal Manning dined with me, and gave me, in return for a Spanish crucifix with which I had presented him, a miniature of "our patron, St. Charles,"' which now, he adds, '(1891 and 1903) hangs in my bedroom. Manning and H. von Bismarck met at my table—I think for the first time.'
His first invitation to Mr. Gladstone, of October 26th, 1882, was to meet the Duc de Broglie: 'the leader of the Conservative party in France is at this moment a sufficiently interesting figure for me to think you may like to come to meet him, if you are not engaged.'
Such social life, like the morning's rapid turn with the foils or the Sunday afternoon on the river, helped to save him from breakdown under a strain of work persistently intense. Another quality which saved him was his power of turning at once and completely from one occupation to another.
A friend thus describes him as he appeared in 1885: 'There was in him a quality of boyishness I have never seen in any other man, coupled with deep gravity and seriousness, and the transition from one mood to the other came with lightning rapidity. Appeal to him on some question of high politics, even at a moment of the most joyous relaxation, and his face gravened, his bearing changed; he pulled himself together with a trick of manner habitual to the end, and the 'boy' became the statesman before it seemed the last echoes of his laughter had died away. We all prophesied for him accession to the highest offices of the State; for though so far the offices which he had held had been of but minor rank, yet he had magnified these offices till they became of the first importance, and his knowledge and authority were as great as were his charm and his power of gathering round him supporters and friends. He spoke with the authority of one who knows his value to the nation which he serves.'
So with Sir Charles's second marriage the house entered on its last phase, and the dark days which followed were lightened for its two occupants by mutual confidence and the support of an abiding love.
After a brief stay at Royat, whither doctor's orders had sent Lady Dilke, Sir Charles returned with her, in September, 1886, to the little riverside cottage at Dockett. Thence, as autumn drew on, they moved to the other cottage that had been built among the pines on the sandy ridge near Woking.
No longer having a seat in the House of Commons, Sir Charles again resumed the pen, by which he had first gained distinction.
In the English home politics of 1887, the Irish Question predominated as it had never done before: Home Rule was being thrashed out on every platform. This was a matter on which Sir Charles, to use his own words, 'never clearly saw his way'; it was one that he naturally avoided, for it had separated him from his most intimate political associate, and he turned to the field of foreign affairs which had continuously occupied him during his tenure of office, and which, save during the episode of the franchise negotiations, had been his central concern.
For a moment he had the notion of entering into the business of newspaper management. His object was not to secure literary reputation, but to direct and influence public opinion. Early in 1887 he wrote to his friend Mr. Thursfield of theTimes:
'What I want is work on foreign affairs, or rather external affairs, or foreign and colonial. I would prefer not to write, but to suggest and supervise foreign news, and to work up the subjects of the leaders which others would write. If I wrote, I think I should write less well than other people, because I always write as I speak, and not as people are taught to write.'
Nothing came of this idea; but it was a proposal remarkable in its self-depreciation, because it was made when work from his pen was already having a conspicuous success. Beginning in January, 1887, a series of six articles dealing with the existing position of the six Great Powers appeared in theFortnightly Review, anonymously, but the author was at once identified. They sent theReviewinto repeated editions. They appeared translated into French in theNouvelle Revue, and were discussed all over Europe. Later in the summer they were published in book form, and called in EnglishThe Present Position of European Politicsand in FrenchL'Europe en 1887.
In the author's own words, the articles dealt with 'facts and tendencies'; and though he would have been the last to hold himself a prophet, saying that in the nature of things 'two years meant for ever in politics,' much that he wrote is still of interest, and the suggestion of Mr. Erskine Childers' hero that we should 'Read Dilke' is not yet out of date. [Footnote:Riddle of the Sands, by Erskine Childers, popular edition, p. 127. First published March, 1903.]
The keynote of the book is contained in the opening words, 'The present position of the European world is one in which sheer force holds a larger place than it has held in modern times since the fall of Napoleon.' This reign of force the author traced back to 1878, the date of the Treaty of Berlin, but it was originally due, as he pointed out, to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871, which had left a permanent source of irritation in the European States system. Nevertheless, he recognized that for the time the continuance of Prince Bismarck's policy, based as it was on the maintenance of the Treaty, meant peace, because Prince Bismarck believed peace to be necessary for the maintenance in undiminished strength of the German Empire, wedged in between France and Russia, the former always hostile, the latter an uncertain quantity. An alliance with Austria-Hungary was necessary to this policy: an alliance dictated by the fact that no other was likely to be permanent. Italy, it was true, had recently joined the alliance; but Italy, like Russia, was an uncertain factor, and Sir Charles Dilke believed that, if a critical moment were to come, the desire to get the Trentino would be stronger than the ties of any alliance. The policy of Prince Bismarck was accordingly to prevent a Russo-French alliance, and to help Russia to push into the Far East; to help her also in the Balkans, but not beyond the point at which Austria might remonstrate; and to prevent Austria from seeking anything calculated to precipitate a war between herself and Russia, such as an attempt to add to the position which she had obtained in the Balkan Peninsula under the Treaty of Berlin. This policy also involved keeping Turkey quiet and preventing a league of the Balkan States, lest such a league should irritate Russia and Austria and produce a European conflagration.
General Fadejew, in a celebrated pamphlet [Footnote: General Fadejew,Über Russland's Kriegsmacht und Kriegspolitik, Leipzig, 1870, translated from the Russian.] which fluttered all the Chancelleries of Europe in the early seventies, had said that the road from Russia to Constantinople lay through Vienna; and Vienna, Sir Charles agreed with the Russian general, was the centre to be watched, for it was there that the key of European policy was to be found. 'Austria interests me,' he wrote, when preparing his book, to Sir William White, the Ambassador at Constantinople. 'I can't leave London, but I'm thinking of sending a man to Vienna to tell me certain things. If so, to whom should he go?' And he watched the strange development of events in Bulgaria. Early in January he notes an interview with 'Dr. Stoiloff, the ablest man except the brutal Stambuloff, and the leader of the Conservative party' in Bulgaria, where the perpetual intrigues of Russian agents, official and unofficial, had recently culminated, in August, 1886, in the kidnapping of the reigning chief of the State, Prince Alexander of Battenberg, and had thereby created an Austrian party: events which were to have many long-drawn-out consequences, as the following century to its own cost was to find out. Bulgaria from this time began to move in an orbit of her own, distinct from, and often unfriendly to, the other Balkan States.
In 1887 it was still a current belief—especially on the part of many of Sir Charles's own political friends—that Germany was eagerly watching for an opportunity to seize the German provinces of Austria, and that Austria was eagerly watching for an opportunity 'to go to Salonica,' as the current phrase had it. The two propositions were almost mutually destructive, but, without insisting on this rather obvious consideration, Sir Charles was well aware that (even apart from reasons of international policy) Germany could not desire the disruption of Austria, because the German provinces of Upper and Lower Austria and Styria did not lie next to North Germany, but were cut off from it by countries in which the most enterprising of all Slavonic peoples—the Czechs of Bohemia—'hated the Germans with a deadly hatred,' and already, even in 1887, had got the upper hand. Count Bismarck himself had resisted—and successfully—the desire of the military party to annex Bohemia in 1866 after Sadowa. The permanent exclusion of Austria and the House of Hapsburg from Germany was also no sudden or ephemeral policy. In the middle of the seventeenth century, as the author of theHoly Roman Empirehad reminded his readers, it had been proposed by the famous publicist Philippe Chemnitz, who wrote under the name of 'Hippolytus à Lapide,' as the surest means of securing a permanent unity of some kind in Germany. [Footnote: See Bryce,Holy Roman Empire, chap. xx., p. 386; Louis Léger,Histoire de l'Autriche-Hongrie, chap. xv., p. 258.] It had been adopted by the leaders in the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848-49, and Count Bismarck was the inheritor of these traditions when he finally expelled the House of Hapsburg in 1866, and thus translated ancient theories into modern facts. It was therefore highly improbable, to say the least, that only a few years after the Treaty of Berlin he should be engaged in an attempt to nullify his own work. [Footnote: On January 14th, 1849, the Frankfurt Parliament voted the exclusion of Austria from Germany.]
Austria, Sir Charles Dilke pointed out, some day by mere competition with Russia, if that Power made further advances, might perhaps be forced forward unwillingly to Salonica; but by thus seizing Macedonia—a far larger proposition than that of the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, and in many respects a different one—it was clear she would 'increase her military weakness, would deeply offend the Servians, the Greeks, and the Bulgarians, and by increasing the number of her Slavonic subjects would only hasten her own break-up.' Here, in fact, lay the real danger to the 'Eastern Empire.' Prince Bismarck, as a matter of fact, was of all men in Europe the man who most desired to keep Austria alive. 'It is a necessity to him that she should continue to exist. Once destroy Austria, and Germany is left to fight it out with France and Russia without assistance, for in this case Italy would not move,' notwithstanding the recently renewed Triple Alliance. That a military party existed in Austria which might desire to go to Salonica, and would also rejoice in a war with Italy, Sir Charles was well aware; but he saw no reason to believe that it would succeed in forcing these adventures on the Ballplatz, or on the statesmen of Hungary, who above all things dreaded an increase of the Slavonic elements in the Empire. The Austria-Hungary of 1887 was the Austria-Hungary of the long rule of Count Taafe at Vienna, of M. Koloman Tisza at Buda-Pesth, and of Count Kalnoky at the Ballplatz; and it was not unreasonable at that time to consider it possible that, 'after the division of the respective spheres of influence of Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia, in Macedonia, Austria might gradually increase her influence in the Balkan States; and if she would take the bold step of making up an arrangement for evacuating part of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, so as to show she had no intention of going southwards to Salonica, she might bring together in a general understanding with herself the small States and the Turks.' This, however, Sir Charles admitted, was probably impracticable, 'as Austro- Hungarian pride would effectually prevent the abandonment of any portion of Bosnia.' But so late as 1909 Dilke told Lord Fitzmaurice, when, at the time of her final annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary had retired from the Sandjak of Novi Bazar, that he thought the British Foreign Office 'had made too great a fuss' over the annexation, which had been certain to come, sooner or later. [Footnote: Lord Fitzmaurice was then Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and represented the Foreign Office in the House of Lords. See further as to Sir Charles Dilke's' views on the events of 1908, Chapter LVIII.]
Mr. Robert Lowe is credited with having said that a metaphysician resembled a blind man groping in a dark room for a black hat that was not there. The comparison might almost have been applied to the Foreign Minister of the Dual Empire, vainly seeking for a coherent policy among the mists and cross-currents of rival nationalities. The charge to be made against the foreign policy of Austria-Hungary was, in fact, not that she had got a policy—good or bad, ambitious or the reverse—but that it was almost impossible as a rule to ascertain whether she had any policy at all: the explanation being that her internal problems paralyzed her action abroad. 'It was difficult to be a patriot in Austria, for nobody exactly knew to the representatives of what race, tongue, or language, his allegiance was due.' 'Austria was indeed of all countries in the world by far the most difficult to govern, and as a necessity of her condition she must before all things long for peace…. Under her many difficulties caused by racial divisions she had become constitutionally timid and naturally slow to move, and the outlook was far from promising … nor had Prince Bismarck'—notwithstanding the terms of the Triple Alliance—'bound Germany to espouse all the quarrels of Austria, no matter where and with whom.' It had been said, and by Prince Bismarck himself, that the bones of not a single Pomeranian grenadier should be allowed to whiten in a Balkan quarrel. [Footnote: Speech in the Reichstag, December 16th, 1876.] 'The only real question worth asking was: Will Austria resist Russian pretensions, and will she, if in danger of conquest, be supported by allies, or will she yield and take her share of the spoils?' [Footnote:The Present Position of European Politics, pp. 185, 193, 194, 205, 206, 219, 221-224.]
The long-standing jealousies, also, of Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Greece, in regard to the future of the Adriatic coast, Sir Charles Dilke felt were not sufficiently appreciated in England, where public opinion was too much inclined to see the Turk and the Slav only in every question concerned with the Balkan Peninsula. When Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1880-81, he had given a strong support to the proposals in regard to Albania of Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, which had the approval of Mr. Goschen, then Special Ambassador to the Porte—proposals which were framed with a view to the ultimate autonomy of the country, and were not accepted by the European Commission of Reforms, mainly owing to the opposition of Austria-Hungary. [Footnote: SeeLife of Lord Goschen, vol. i, p. 215. These proposals were revived in 1912, and, which is remarkable, by Count Berchtold, the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, in a despatch in favour of 'progressive decentralization.' See an article in theEdinburgh Review, April, 1913: 'Austria and Italy have been rivals for influence in Albania, as Austria and Russia were rivals in Macedonia. It was because of this rivalry that the Treaty of Berlin, so far as it applied to the European provinces of Turkey, was never properly carried into effect. For the same reason the Fitzmaurice proposal of 1880 was defeated by the opposition of Vienna. The suggestion was that a greater Albania should be created, which would have been autonomous under a European guarantee. It is among the ironies of history that this scheme, rejected by Austria when it came from a friendly and neutral source, should have been put forward by the Austrian Foreign Office itself thirty-two years later. Count Berchtold's Circular Note of August 14th, 1912, revived the Fitzmaurice programme. The proposition came too late.'] But inThe Present Position of European Politicsit is seen how the author's increasing confidence in the future of Greece led to a change of opinion on this, the most intricate, perhaps, of all diplomatic questions connected with the Near East. He now advocated as large an extension as possible of the existing northern boundary of Greece, and held that the rest of Albania should be joined to Greece by some form of personal union, which ultimately might grow into a closer tie, bearing in mind the friendly cooperation of Greeks and Albanians in the War of Independence against Turkey, and the fact that a strong Albanian element already existed in the Greek kingdom. [Footnote:The Present Position of European Politics, pp. 146, 148, 193, 206, 214-217, 232, 237, 238.] A European Congress seemed to him the only method to avoid the ultimate arbitrament of war in this mass of tangled questions, but experience had shown that a Congress was useless unless the Great Powers had settled the main questions beforehand in agreement among themselves. Experience had unfortunately also shown the extreme difficulty of obtaining any such agreement.
'Austria ought to have been the heir of Turkey; the protector of a Greece extended to include Albania, Macedonia, the Islands, and the coast to Constantinople and down to Asia Minor; the friend of Servia and Roumania, and what not.' But these things remained in the class of visions, even if occasionally some Austrian or Hungarian statesman, like Herr von Kallay, seemed disposed to grasp them, and to renew the tradition of the forward policy attributed to Prince Eugène of Savoy and the Archduke Charles. Hungary also had made Roumania her antagonist by her illiberal policy in regard to the navigation of the Danube. Any permanent confederation of the Balkan States as distinct from a temporary alliance for some special and defined object, such as a possible attack on Turkey, seemed therefore no longer possible, especially after the recent events in Bulgaria. Meanwhile there was to be peace, because Prince Bismarck so willed it. [Footnote: SeeDer Krimkrieg und die Österreichische Politik, von Heinrich Friedjung, chap, ii., p. 16 (Stuttgart und Berlin, 1907); Louis Léger,Études Slaves: L'Autriche-Hongrie et la Question d'Orient, p. 395.]
The overmastering sense of the importance of whatever happened at Vienna and Constantinople—of which every page ofThe Present Position of European Politicsis the evidence—will largely explain Sir Charles Dilke's views on another question. It has been seen that he was amongst the strongest advocates of an active policy in Egypt in 1882, agreeing in this with Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Hartington. But at an early period after the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir he pronounced himself, when the question arose, in favour of the earliest possible evacuation of the country, and contemplated it as a possibility of the immediate future. [Footnote: Sir Charles wrote in theSpeakerof January 23rd, 1892, in reply to Admiral Maxse: 'Admiral Maxse appears to think that my views in favour of evacuation have been recently formed….' 'There was a time,beforethe intervention of the condominium with France by Lord Derby, when I held a different view; but it was not only formed under circumstances very different from those which have now existed for fourteen years, but also at a time when I had not given special consideration to our probable naval and military position in the event of war.'] Egypt to him, considered from the point of view of British interests, was subsidiary to Constantinople. All that really signified was the right of passage through the Suez Canal, which could, he believed, be secured by international arrangement and the neutralization of the country, a plan for which, as already seen, was being actually discussed by Mr. Gladstone's Government when it fell. Egypt, in fact, he regarded as part of Asia rather than of Africa, and he believed that time would make this more clear than ever, in proportion as railways were developed in Syria, Arabia, and Asia Minor. In this connection Constantinople, not Alexandria or Cairo, seemed to him the decisive factor: an opinion which brought him into opposition with those who held the view that since the occupation of Egypt by British troops events at Constantinople had become comparatively unimportant to this country. He also feared that if some great European crisis were to arise, in which Great Britain was involved, the occupation of Egypt might be a hindrance rather than a source of strength, and might hamper our exertions in other lands.
He had, however, no fear of allowing the Bosporus and the Dardanelles to be opened under suitable conditions to the passage of Russian ships of war, but only on the condition laid down by Sir William White, that the right accorded to Russia must be accorded to the ships of war of other nations; and this partly out of regard to the dignity of the British flag, and partly because any exclusive right accorded to Russia would be resisted by the States bordering on the Black Sea and by those interested in the trade and navigation of the Danube. But the opening of the Straits was one thing, the possession of Constantinople by Russia was another, and in his opinion would cause a European convulsion; for he saw in Constantinople what has since been termed 'the great strategic centre of the world': [Footnote: The expression was used by Mr. Winston Churchill in a speech on November 15th, 1915, in the House of Commons.] the meeting-place and clearing-house of the trade and politics of three continents.
'Russia at Constantinople,' he wrote, 'would mean the destruction of Austria and the Russification of a large portion of her Slavs. When Austria had disappeared or had been transformed out of all knowledge, Germany, placed between France and Russia, would be still weaker in her military position than she is at present. It is no doubt impossible that Germany can really contemplate that contingency with complete satisfaction. And if she cannot get other people to help Austria to keep Russia away from Constantinople, it is probable that she would be forced to interfere to help to do so, however stoutly her rulers may make the opposite declaration. One of my most valued correspondents, whose criticisms have been of the highest use to me, admits that to place Turkey at the head of a Balkan Confederation would be "adding a badger to your three unfriendly cats and altogether hostile dog"; but, nevertheless, he thinks that such a combination would be possible on account of the overwhelming dread of the danger of absorption by Russia; and I think it right to state his view, although I am unable to modify that which I have said as to the difficulties which the dispute for Macedonia causes.' [Footnote:The Present Position of European Politics, pp. 372, 373.]
In the autumn of 1891 this note occurs in the Memoir: 'John Morley having made a speech in favour of the cessation of the Egyptian occupation, I wrote to tell him how pleased I was, and in his reply he asked why we should go on mechanically applauding Lord Salisbury's foreign policy, which left this danger standing.'
Mr. Morley's satisfaction was, however, not shared by Mr. Chamberlain, who wrote in January, 1892, 'to implore me to have regard to the opinion of society about Egypt.'
'I do not mean fashionable society,' he added, 'but political society, and the great majority of cultivated politicians. I think you do go out of your way to offend them when you advocate evacuation of Egypt, and I ask you to consider if it is worth your while. It is not necessary for your constituents, and with regard to the others, there is no need to add to their causes of anger against you. My advice is, "Be as Radical as you like, be Home Ruler if you must, but be a little Jingo if you can."'
The correspondence had begun in the autumn of 1891, when Sir Charles wrote the following letter:
'Pyrford by Maybury, 'Near Woking, 'October19_th_, 1891.
'My Dear Chamberlain,
'I have never said that there are not conceivable circumstances in which it would be better for us to be in Egypt. I'm going to try and discuss them in the book I am at work on.Recommand of the sea against France. We have not quite a sufficient force to blockade Brest and Toulon. Lefevre and most of our sailors contemplate only "masking" Toulon by a fleet at Gibraltar, and using the Cape route. In this case we could not reinforce Egypt except from India, and not, of course, from India if we were at war with Russia too.
'I am in favour of a stronger navy, and attempting blockade, though it is notcertainthat it can be madefor certainsuccessful. Still Colomb is a better authority than Beresford, etc. I mean "Admiral Colomb," not Sir John. The difficulty, even if blockades are possible, is that France keeps building after us so as always to be without the limits which would make it possible. Lefevre will support Mr. G. in cutting down the navy on this ground—i.e., will prove by figures that every time we lay down nine ships the French lay down six or seven.
'I think that in the long-run France will beat Germany. She will fight her some day single-handed on a point in which Austria and Italy will not move, nor Russia either. Then, if Germany gets the best of it, the others will "mediate."
'Yours ever,
'Chs. W. D.'
'November, 1891, we spent in France…. While I was away I had a correspondence with Chamberlain about his speech on Egypt' (in reply to Morley), 'and pointed out to him,' says the Memoir,' that he had changed his mind so completely about evacuation that it was hardly prudent in him not frankly to admit the change of mind, as he had done in at least one speech previously.' He replied:
'"I have looked the matter up, and I think it is quite true that in 1884 we were all for evacuation as early as possible. But I did not then estimate properly the magnitude of the task we had undertaken, nor did I know how splendidly it would be performed by Baring and his colleagues. Baring himself began as a strong advocate for evacuation."
'In my answer, I said that Baring had only changed his mind in the way in which all people are apt to change their minds when they are employed as the agents of a policy, and I combated Chamberlain's military views, which were, in fact, for defending Egypt by the fleet—that fleet which is expected to do everything!'
Sir Charles set out in an article in theSpeakerall the pledges to evacuate which had been given by the Liberal Government and repeated by Lord Salisbury. Thereupon Mr. Morley, whose general views on foreign policy were not as a rule at all the same as those of Sir Charles, wrote from Biarritz, where he was in Mr. Gladstone's company, that he had read theSpeakerwith enormous satisfaction. It would have a stimulating effect in quarters where a little stimulus was much needed, and had given much satisfaction to other people in Biarritz besides himself.
'"Quarters" of course meant Rosebery,' is Sir Charles's comment, and he adds:
'In order to meet the Rosebery objection to evacuation, I wrote an article for the JanuaryFortnightly, of which the editor changed nothing but the title. I had called it "Lords Salisbury and Rosebery," and he changed it to "Conservative Foreign Policy."'
At a later date, in a letter [Footnote: This letter was apparently written on April 14th, 1893:
'Those of us who bitterly dislike the occupation of Egypt by a British force have been both to add to your work before and during a session in which, not to speak of the ordinary demand on the time of a Prime Minister, your unprecedented relation to the chief measure makes it the duty of your supporters to confine themselves to helping clear the road. Naught else could have excused us from having hitherto refrained from pressing the state of Egypt on the consideration of yourself, or of the House of Commons. It is only because since the publication of a recent despatch we feel that the time has nearly come for making up one's mind to be for ever silent upon the question, and because I cannot do so, given the strong feeling that I have with regard to it, without one last attempt to cause some change in a "temporary" situation now crystallizing into permanency, that I venture to address you. I ask for no reply. I shall have to bring the question before the House of Commons. I have no illusions as to what is likely to be the result of so doing. Sir E. Grey will tell us that the occupation is still "temporary," but must last, "for the sake of Egypt," till we can "with safety" leave: and so it will continue, with all its dangers to ourselves, till the next great war. Whoever else may again raise the Egyptian question in the future, I shall not. Vote I must, whenever it comes before the House, but I need not do more.
'Not one word of blame of anyone will fall from me when I raise the question on first going into Committee on Civil Estimates. It seems to me, I confess—but I shall try to keep the opinion to myself— that it would have been, on the whole, the safest course to have done in 1892 that which Lord Granville, under your guidance, did in 1880, and to have ourselves proposed, on the very day of the accession to office of the new Government, the policy which we thought best in the interest of the country and had supported in Opposition. Lord Granville congratulated himself, and with justice, on the promptitude with which, before the Russians could say a word to him as to the complete fulfilment of the Treaty of Berlin, he had told the Ambassador, in the first minute of their first interview, that the Government would insist on that fulfilment. Had the present Secretary of State, at his first interview with the French Ambassador, made a similar communication with regard to Egypt (at least so far as to propose to resume the negotiations of 1887), we should, perhaps, have avoided many evils. I share to the full the belief, which you expressed in such admirable terms a couple of years ago, that the long-lasting occupation of Egypt by our forces is the cause of all the difficulties by which our foreign policy, and even our position in Europe, are oppressed. Our hands are not free, and never will be free, so long as the occupation continues. But ills more direct are likely to fall upon us; and no one can look forward without the gravest dread to the prospect of our being drawn, step by step, into a situation in which we shall be driven to arrest the persons of the young Khedive and those of his advisers who possess the confidence of all that is intelligent among the Egyptian people; or (as seems hinted in Lord Bosebery's despatch) to insist upon a deposition.
'In the discussions as to the occupation of Egypt which occurred in the Cabinet, before I was a member of it, in 1882, even before the expedition (for the occupation was foreseen), I took a share, as Lord Granville was good enough to consult me on the papers circulated by his colleagues. As far as I am concerned, I have never budged from the principles of a memorandum which I wrote on July 4th, 1882; but those principles were far more excellently stated by you in a memorandum of the beginning of September, 1882—before Tel-el-Kebir—a memorandum which was approved by men now so hostile to your views as Sir Auckland Colvin and Sir Edward Malet. Sir E. Baring, now, as Lord Cromer, so bitterly opposed to us, in a paper of September or October, 1882, and Chamberlain in his paper of about October 21st, 1882, both pointed out how essential it was that our occupation should be really temporary, and that our condition—that we should leave behind us a "stable" state of things—depended on and meant what Chamberlain called "the extension of Egyptian liberties": the convoking, if not of a truly representative Assembly, at least of the Notables. Lord Dufferin, in December 1882, wrote to me that he would sooner run any risk than abandon the representative institutions proposed for Egypt in his famous scheme. Yet now the French are bidding the Khedive call together, against Lord Dufferin's virtual successor, this very Assembly of Notables, which Lord Cromer, such is his present policy, dare not call. The conception of this Assembly was the act of yourself, supported by Lord Granville and Sir William Harcourt and supported on paper by Lord Dufferin and Sir E. Baring, and opposed by Lord Hartington, by the then Chancellor, and by Lord Northbrook. This "extension of Egyptian liberties," which was our pride, which was our excuse for that "short prolongation" of the occupation, to which I was myself opposed—an extension of liberties which has not been carried into practical effect by us—is certain to result in a declaration by the Notables, when they meet, as within this year, through the French Agent's influence, they will, that they are rootedly opposed to our presence in their land.
'It may be said that neither the Turks nor the French have pressed us, directly, to come out. The Turks will never really press us. The Sultan is forced by Moslem public opinion to ask us to leave Egypt, but he is in fact personally anxious that we should stay there to keep Mahdism in the desert and representative institutions in the shade. The French have also their inner policy—their Rothschilds to keep in good humour—and two currents, one political and one financial, with which to deal. M. Waddington expressed to you at Hawarden a mere desire for exchange of views between the Cabinets. He was naturally anxious not to be refused in any direct request. But French public opinion is exasperated against us; only one man in France believes a word we say, and our diplomatists and admirals behave as though they represented German instead of neutral interests. We are responsible for tempting Italy to stay in the alliance of the Central Powers, to her own hurt.
'None of these things shall I be able to say when I bring the question before the House of Commons. To do so would involve statements based on private letters and statements as to Cabinet differences of 1882, which I cannot make. We shall be compelled to rely chiefly upon the declarations of Lord Salisbury, which were summed up in his words of May, 1887, to the effect that the occupation entails on us "heavy sacrifices, without adequate return either in peace or in war."
'Having given attention for some years past to our general position as a nation, feeling as I do, with you, how adversely it is affected by the prolongation of the "temporary" occupation, which, as matters stand, seems likely to endure till the next war, even should it be postponed till half a century hence, I cannot but feel miserable at the situation of this affair, and I once more ask your pardon for in this way liberating my mind, or, I fear, rather discharging upon you, regardless of your prodigious avocations, this last expression of a regret deeper than that which I have previously entertained on any public question.
'Through the mischiefs of the occupation there now seems to come no single ray of light. The present year will not pass over without a change in the local situation at Cairo, from which a conference is likely to result. A passage near the end of Lord Rosebery's despatch shows that he is prepared to have a conference forced upon him. Had we invited it, such a conference would be to us the blessing that it will be to others. Would it not at least be best that we should call that conference on the first opportunity rather than have it thrust down our throats?
'This letter has not been shown to anyone, and needs, as I said, no reply, but I should be glad if it were not handed to anyone outside of your own circle. It has not been mentioned to anyone except Mr. Herbert Gladstone.']
to Mr. Gladstone during his last Premiership, Dilke summed up his views when a debate was about to take place in the House of Commons, and four days later he notes: 'On April 18th I had a long interview with Mr. Gladstone, who sent for me, on my letter. The only thing he said worth remembering was, "Jingoism is stronger than ever. It is no longer war fever, but earth hunger."'
In 1887 the possibility of a German attempt to violate the neutrality of Belgian territory, notwithstanding the treaty of guarantee of 1839, which Prussia herself had signed, was again attracting attention owing to a sudden renewal of warlike apprehensions on the Continent. The position of Luxemburg was a kindred question, though the international guarantee was of a far more uncertain character than in the case of Belgium. Sir Charles, as already related, had returned from his work in France during the war of 1870 with a profound conviction that a spirit of reckless violence was abroad in Germany, which would stop at nothing if favourable circumstances offered a temptation to action; and in his opinion the absence of any fortifications at Liége and Namur afforded such a temptation. The point had been till then little discussed in England, though General Brialmont had written in theRevue de Belgiqueon the subject. Sir Charles's view having been questioned, that the danger to Belgium's neutrality for military and other reasons was from Germany alone, he drew attention to the enormous accumulation of supplies of every kind in the entrenched camp of Cologne as of itself sufficient in military eyes to prove the truth of what he said. He considered also that the reduction of our horse artillery greatly impaired the possibility of Great Britain affording really effectual military assistance to Belgium, and that the recent utterances of the principal organ of the Conservative party, theStandard, and of the writers in theNational Review, that intervention in support of Belgium 'would be not only insane but impossible,' showed that the public opinion of Great Britain was no longer unanimous as it had been in 1870-71. [Footnote: The questions connected with the Belgian and Luxemburg guarantees are very fully discussed in a recent work,England's Guarantee to Belgium and Luxemburg, by C. P. Sanger and H. T. J. Norton. See also chapter i. ofWar: Its Conduct and Legal Results, by Dr. Baty and Prof. J. H. Morgan;The Present Position of European Politics, pp. 42-48, 73, 321-323.] This dispassionate consideration of the chances of England's intervening single-handed and without allies, in the case of a European war, to protect the neutrality of an unfortified Belgium, led to statements that he was opposed to such a step, and he had to point out in reply that for years he had consistently expressed the contrary view, but that he was now dealing with facts and tendencies, not with his own wishes. [Footnote:British Army, chap. ii., p. 55.] Shortly after the appearance of this article, discussion in Belgium led to the introduction of a Government Bill for the fortification of the towns upon the Meuse, and it was afterwards decided to fortify Namur and Liége.
Estimating the probabilities of a Continental war, he thought that Russia came next to England in staying power, because her enormous army formed a smaller proportion of her working class than in the case of any other great Continental Power. Notwithstanding his suspicions of her policy, he spoke of Russia with a deep and discriminating interest born of numerous visits to all parts of her dominions, and deprecated the attitude of those Englishmen whose dislike of Russia had done harm to the cause of sense and truth by exaggeration, and had led them to ignore 'her power and the marvellous patriotism of her people.' 'In the union of patriotism with religion I know no nation which can approach them.' There could be no doubt in any reasonable mind of her real and lasting strength. But her unlimited power of self-deception; the necessary instability of a policy resting upon the will of a single man; her misgovernment of Poland and her alienation of Bulgaria, constituted dangers which it was idle to ignore. He, however, set against these weaknesses her popularity with all the Slav nations; her influence in the Baltic provinces of Germany, and even with the Poles, 'who, like everyone else of Slavonic race, seem born with a hatred of the Teutons.'
'The only foreigner who is known to the Russian peasantry is the German, and the name for German and for foreigner with the peasantry is the same, and the hatred of the "dumb men," as they call their German neighbours, is intense. The peasantry know little of the English, and if you listen to their sentiments you discover that it is their belief that one day there will be betweenthemand Germany a war compared with which, their soldiers say, that of 1870 will be child's play, and that if Germany wins this will not be the end, but that war after war will follow until Germany is destroyed.'
'Because Russia is very violent in her language and her acts, we often fail to see how a peasantry, which an aristocratic government or a government of political economists could never win, is won over by her to her rule. The Moscow men failed in Bulgaria, but in Poland they succeeded, and in the Baltic provinces, too, their methods and their policy have not been wanting, and the problems that have so long perplexed this country in her relations with Ireland would have been solved in a week by Samarin, or Miliutin, or Prince Teherkasky.' [Footnote:Present Position of European Politics, pp. 125, 134.]
The popular phrases which dubbed Sir Charles Dilke as 'anti-German' or 'anti-Russian' were never more curiously misapplied. The flaw to be found even in the mental constitution of Gambetta's great personality, as shown by his antagonism to Russia, had no part in his friend's outlook; nor did Sir Charles's friendship for all things French make him an enemy to Germany, though the possibility of conjuring 'the German peril' was ever in his mind. But he doubted the wisdom of the wavering counsels which began with 'lying down to Germany,' and were to be marked by the cession of Heligoland. Strong men and strong Governments recognize and respect one another; and in dealing with Germany he believed that it was necessary never to forget this trite yet valuable warning.
If personal friendships and political sympathy made Sir Charles, as the previous chapters have shown, look constantly to France as the natural ally of Great Britain, and also her most desirable ally, neither friendships nor sympathies could blind him to the constant danger arising from the instability of French Administrations, and the consequent difficulty of relying on any certainty in arrangements projected for joint action. Of this the events connected with Egypt had been a most conspicuous illustration. Nor were these the only dangers: for the best friends of France were painfully aware of the immense influence exercised by powerful financial interests both in her domestic and in her foreign affairs, and by the growth of fierce antagonisms on home questions which seemed to tear the country asunder and paralyze her position abroad. Numerous questions, not only in Egypt, but elsewhere in Africa; the old quarrels about the Newfoundland fisheries, on which Sir Charles was constantly putting his finger as a possible cause of a serious quarrel; and increasing jealousies in the Pacific, contributed to produce a condition of permanent tension for many years in the relations of the two countries, until the Fashoda incident in 1898 brought a crisis which cleared the air. Two of the ablest men in France, M. Jules Ferry and M. Hanotaux, were, to say the least, not friendly to Great Britain, and a plan which Sir Julian Pauncefote [Footnote: Then Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and afterwards Lord Pauncefote and Ambassador at Washington.] had suggested in 1884, of attempting to bring all outstanding questions with France into one great settlement, fell still-born, to be vivified, but twenty years later, by Lord Lansdowne in more favourable circumstances.
In all possible complications Sir Charles relied much on Italy's close friendship for England—notwithstanding her entry into the Triple Alliance—a friendship due to permanent gratitude for the support which she had received from Lord Russell, Mr. Gladstone, and Lord Palmerston, at the crisis of her fate in 1859; and also to the offer to her of a joint occupation of Egypt in 1882—an offer rejected indeed, but fruitful of good feeling.
But more important even than any question of alliances was, he insisted, the necessity that Great Britain should know her own mind, and have a definite policy in regard to the future of Constantinople and of Egypt, and in regard to the Belgian guarantee. Army organization itself obviously depended on policy, and in this connection there was a danger at home greater, perhaps, than any originating abroad.
'It is too much the case with us in England,' he wrote, 'that when we are occupied with the consideration of the Irish problem, or dealing with the circumstances which most often lead to the rise and fall of Ministries, we allow the foreign affairs of the country to be transacted in the dark: with an absence of control which, owing to the efficiency of our Foreign Office, may produce no ill, but also with an absence of knowledge which cannot be advantageous. On the other hand, when some awkward circumstance arises, a disproportionate weight is attached to it by those who have wilfully remained in ignorance of the true position, and the diplomacy of the country is suddenly unduly hampered by criticism which rests on no foundation of fact.'
Speaking from experience, he uttered a warning as to the danger of uninstructed debates and foolish questions—then so frequent—on foreign affairs in the House of Commons, and the harm done by them abroad. He spoke of the tendency to take advantage of some rebuff in foreign affairs for party motives, and urged that, as secrecy was not to be hoped for, members should at least try to inform themselves and the electorate, and avoid 'periods of ignorant calm' or 'equally ignorant panic.' In this connection he never ceased to insist on the weakness of our position abroad, owing to the deficient strength and want of organization of our army; the small results shown for the immense amount spent; the insufficient stock of arms and ammunition, and the poor reserves of rifles; and he urged that, whatever our economies, none should fall upon equipment or reserves of material. Such economies he stigmatized as a 'horrible treachery to the interests of the country.' [Footnote: The military situation as a whole is discussed in chapter vi. ofThe Present Position of European Politics, 'The United Kingdom.']
1886-1894
Pathways of return to political life soon began to open to Sir CharlesDilke. In November, 1886, Mr. Labouchere wrote:
'It looks as though Chamberlain will be the scapegoat. At present his going over bag and baggage to the Whigs has utterly disgusted the Radicals. As long as Gladstone lives things will go on fairly with us, but after—the deluge. The Radical M.P.'s are regretting your not being in, as they would have accepted you as the leader.'
In the autumn of 1886 the Council of the Chelsea Liberal Association unanimously asked him to be their candidate (for Parliament), but he replied that he could not serve the borough to his own satisfaction while so large a section of the public still attached weight to the 'gross calumnies' with which he had been assailed. He was, however, from the autumn of 1887, increasingly active in local affairs, both on the Vestry and the Board of Guardians, [Footnote: In the winter of 1888, Sir Charles was unanimously elected Chairman of the Board of Guardians, as also of the Vestry ('as was the case in subsequent years'). He wrote to Mr. Chamberlain: 'I've taken the chairmanship of the Chelsea Board of Guardians, so am keeping my hand in on the prevention of obstruction. I am forced to begin gradually with them, and have only as yet ruled that I cannotlet two speak at once.'] and also on the newly formed Library Committee, on which he served for three years, till both the local libraries were established and opened.
To M. Joseph Reinach he wrote in April, 1887: 'I have a splendid position as a writer, and writing projects which will occupy me for three years at least; and if any great calamity should occur which would force me back into public life—such as war with Russia, for example—I do not know that I should like the change.' Nor was the political scene attractive at this moment. His friends were tearing each other asunder; and not only his political friends—both parties were rent with faction.
'On October 1st, 1886, Chamberlain called and gave me an interesting picture of the political state. He seemed to think that he could keep Mr. Gladstone out for life, and was persuaded that Randolph would give him all he wanted and leave Hartington and Salisbury in the lurch. Randolph had promised him to have an anti-Jingo foreign policy, leaving Turkey to her fate, and to pacify Ireland with the National Councils scheme, modified into two Councils, or into Provincial Councils, to suit Ulster; and Churchill had also promised him procedure reform—that is, a sharper closure—and a three-acres- and-a-cow policy for England.
'There was an article in theMorning Post, October 2nd, representing Churchill's democratic views, but in the later autumn (while Chamberlain was away abroad) Churchill was beaten in the Cabinet both on his Irish scheme and also on the amendments which he proposed to make in the Local Government (England) Bill in the three-acres-and-a-cow direction. On December 17th Chamberlain, who had returned from abroad, came to lunch with me, furious at the defeat of Randolph Churchill. He found no fault with the Irish policy' (which was strongly coercionist), 'or with the foreign policy of the Cabinet; but he was anxious to defeat them on their Local Government (England) Bill, if it was not altered back again to suit his policy. Ultimately a compromise on this matter was arranged.'
For a moment it seemed as if Chamberlain's anger with the Tory party was going to drive him back into his old associations. On December 31st,
'Chamberlain and John Morley came in together to lunch, Chamberlain having been asked and Morley not, and it was somewhat startling. "Chamberlain thinks that he can get Mr. Gladstone by the bait of 'Four times Prime Minister' to accept his terms. On the other hand, Mr. Gladstone thinks that he can detach Chamberlain from Hartington. Conferences are sitting: Harcourt, Herschell, and Morley, meeting Chamberlain and Trevelyan. Hartington is crusty at this. Chamberlain has threatened Hartington with the consequences if he, as he wants to, supports a reactionary Local Government Bill of Salisbury's. Chamberlain has written to Salisbury as to this Local Government Bill, and received a dilatory reply." He told me the whole long history of Randolph's troubles with the Cabinet which preceded his resignation; first on procedure, as to which he finally obtained his own way, secondly as to foreign affairs, thirdly as to allotments, fourthly as to Local Government, and fifthly as to finance. Churchill always stood absolutely alone, and, being in a minority of one, could only get his way at all by continually tendering his resignation. At last he resigned once too often, as it was of course on the wrong subject; Salisbury jumped at it, and accepted it in a cool letter when Churchill did not mean it in the least. It was only the classical annual resignation of a Chancellor of the Exchequer against his colleagues of the army and navy. The Budget always involves the resignation either of the Secretary of State for War and First Lord of the Admiralty, or else of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but hitherto they have always managed to make it up.'
Within a fortnight Sir Charles 'was hearing from all sides about the Round Table Conferences which were intended to reunite the Liberal party…. From Chamberlain I heard that his view was to bring about amodus vivendionly, under which the Conservative Government was to be turned out on some side-issue. Mr. Gladstone would become Prime Minister for the fourth time, if the Irish would consent to take Local Government and a Land Bill first, and to leave Home Rule over. He thought that Mr. Gladstone was not unwilling, but that there would be difficulty in getting the Irish to consent. Morley and Harcourt were, according to Chamberlain, friendly to his suggestions, and Hartington hostile, not trusting Mr. Gladstone.'
On January 15th, 1887, Sir Charles wrote to Mr. Chesson [Footnote: See note, p. 273.] that
'Chamberlain and Morley were both going to make conciliatory speeches, but that nothing had really been done at Harcourt's house, every difficulty having been "reserved." There could be no doubt that several of the five who were there meeting were anxious to keep things open, on the chance of Mr. Gladstone not remaining in sufficiently good health to continue to lead the party. The independent Liberals were vexed at the Conferences. Willy Bright called on me, and said that obviously the great difficulty of the moment was "to keep Mr. Gladstone in the Gladstonian party." Morley, who also called on me, casually observed, "Harcourt was never a Home Ruler. The only Home Rulers in the last Cabinet were Lord Granville and Spencer, in addition to myself and Mr. Gladstone." When we remember the views of Spencer in May, 1885, his violent Home Rule, which dates from July, 1885, is laughable.'
'On the 15th I had a long and curious conversation with Chamberlain about the matter. He said that the articles which had been appearing in theBirmingham Postabout his own position were inspired by him—that he and the other members of the Conference were telling the newspapers that everything was going on swimmingly, but that the whole thing was in reality a sham on both sides. Parnell was frightened at Mr. Gladstone's declining health, and Mr. Gladstone did not wish to end his life by having smashed his party, so that the Conference was willingly continued, although it was doing nothing. It was the wish of all concerned in it to be at the point of an apparent reconciliation whenever Mr. Gladstone might become incapacitated, but he, Chamberlain, was firmly decided not to take office under Mr. Gladstone.
'Chamberlain said that Randolph Churchill on the previous night had asked him, "Shall I come over?" but that he, Chamberlain, had replied that he advised him not to, being afraid that Randolph would play for the lead of the party, and not liking the notion of having him for leader. He had advised Randolph to simulate moderation towards Lord Salisbury, in spite of his anger at the Duke of Norfolk and the members of the Conservative party who, since his quarrel with the Government, had been "attacking his private character."'
'On February 4th, 1887, Chamberlain again came to see me, and I noted in my diary that he was "very sore against Labouchere and others."
'On February 13th, Morley called and said that the Round Table Conference was hopeless, although they were to meet at dinner on the 14th, and once again after that. He said, "Both sides are very cross, and each side asks, 'What is to become of the other?'"
'On the same day Chance, M.P., told me, he being the attorney of the Nationalist party, that O'Shea was going forward with his divorce case against Parnell, and that Parnell had no defence possible. I have never known what was the reason of the immense delays which afterwards occurred.'
Parties now began to settle into their new groupings.
'On March 2nd, 1887, Chamberlain came to lunch, and told me a good deal about the failure of the Round Table Conference, but it was not till April 3rd that he told me the whole story. On this latter day Deakin, the Chief Secretary of Victoria, and most interesting of Colonists, was with me; and Chamberlain came in before Deakin had gone, and, talking with his customary frankness, discussed the whole matter before the astonished Victorian. There had been a sad split caused by a letter which he had written, and which he admitted was an indiscreet one, to theBaptist, as to Welsh Disestablishment. A hint was then let fall that the Gladstonians were going to negotiate with Hartington direct. On this Chamberlain went off to Hartington and got from him a letter to say that Hartington would not negotiate himself, but that Chamberlain was in possession of his views. Efforts were then made to get Chamberlain to meet Mr. Gladstone. Chamberlain agreed to do so, but not to ask for the meeting. At length a meeting was fixed at Mr. Gladstone's request for the morrow, Monday, April 4th. It was settled that at this Mr. Gladstone would ask what Chamberlain had to propose. Chamberlain was going to reply that Mr. Gladstone knew his views, and to then ask whether they were accepted, and he knew perfectly that nothing would come of it. He had on the same day, April 3rd, met Randolph at Mrs. Jeune's at lunch. They had walked away together, when Randolph had proposed a Chamberlain-Hartington-Randolph league against both parties. This had tempted Chamberlain, but was an idle suggestion, as Hartington and Randolph could never work together.'
In the autumn of 1887 Sir Charles and Lady Dilke went to Constantinople, and he writes:
'I had received at this time a letter from James, in which he said that Mr. Gladstone had sent for him to talk to him about me in the friendliest way, and, Mr. Gladstone having called, I wrote to him, and transmitted some messages from the Sultan, in the following letter:
"Athens, "October 14th.
'"I have never thanked you except verbally through James for a kind and pleasant message which I had from you by James and Chamberlain last session.
'"At Constantinople last Friday, and again to Lady Dilke last Monday, the Sultan said that he wished complimentary messages conveyed to you. The Greek Patriarch said the same thing to us on Tuesday and Wednesday. My wife told both that she hardly knew you, and I replied that I was unlikely to see you for some time, but would see that the messages reached you.
'"The Greeks on the one hand, and the Bulgarians on the other, are now very friendly with the Sultan, but I regret to find that the dislike between the Greeks and the Bulgarians is as strong as ever. The common preference of both for the Sultan over Russia has not sufficed to draw them together. The split between the Bulgarian Government and the Exarch of Bulgaria will, however, probably draw Bulgaria closer to the Phanar."'
Mr. Gladstone replied, on October 24th, that his message to Sir Charles expressed his real feeling, which he should have been glad to find other modes of expressing. He added that if the Sultan spoke sincerely in the message which Sir Charles transmitted,
'he must be acting as a good Christian: for Hobart Pasha when here, as a spy on Fehmi, told me the Sultan believed I was his greatest enemy. I have never been so great an enemy to him as he to himself. I have never had extreme views about Turkey. Had I the settling of the affair, I should be disposed to keep the Turks in Constantinople, and not to let Home Rule when freely and honestly given mean total severance. But the materials of convulsion are, I fear, slowly gathering in that quarter, and Russia, shut out from her just claim to the passage of the Straits, means to have the mastery of them. I always grieve over the feud of Hellene and Slav, out of which much mischief may come. The situation here is favourable to those who view the Irish Question as you do. The relations with Chamberlain have been rather painful. I think he has developed since the schism of March, 1886, even greater speaking and debating talents than he had shown before. I think also that the organization of dissentient Liberalism, in which he has borne so large a part, has been enormously favourable to his general creed as an advanced Radical, whereas Hartington with his weak-kneed men has been utterly hoodwinked, and hoodwinked by himself. On the other hand, I own myself amazed at Chamberlain's proceedings during the last month. Everyone took a favourable view of his accepting the American mission; [Footnote: Mr. Chamberlain was corresponding with Sir Charles in regard to his mission, for which he started on October 29th, 1887. It had for its object the negotiation of a treaty with America on several outstanding questions.] but a man of one-tenth of his talent ought to have seen the folly of widening breaches and exasperating all passions as a preliminary to charging himself with a business that eminently requires a serene atmosphere.
'We witnessed at Nottingham an enthusiasm literally the greatest I have ever seen.'
'On my return to England before the middle of November, 1887, I received a letter from the Cinderford Liberal Association, in the Forest of Dean, in which they referred to an attempt which had been made to induce me to stand for the Forest of Dean when Blake retired in July, 1887, and went on to press me to go there to speak…. After the completion of the army articles and of the book, I intended to set to work on a new version of myGreater Britain. This afterwards became the book published under the title ofProblems of Greater Britain.'
On October 28th, 1887, 'Chamberlain wrote … "Mr. Gladstone's last speech shows distinct signs of old age. I think matters cannot long remain in their present state, and the whole policy of England—both foreign and domestic—may be greatly altered."'
On reaching Washington, Chamberlain wrote: 'I do not find the "civilized world" so much pro-Irish as Mr. Gladstone would have us believe. On the contrary, I have as yet only met two Americans who have expressed themselves favourable to Mr. Gladstone's policy. They are, generally speaking, inclined to some concession in the direction of State rights, but they are entirely opposed to anything in the nature of a self- governing colony, and they have no personal liking for the Irish. Above all, they are horrified at Mr. Gladstone's recent utterances about law and order, and say openly that he must have lost his head.'
'On January 4th, 1888, I made a speech in which I laid down my position as regarded Parliamentary candidature. It was made in presiding at the first dinner of the Hammersmith Central Liberal Club. About the same time I received requests to stand as candidate for Merthyr and for the northern division of the borough of West Ham, which I declined, pointing to my Hammersmith speech without giving further reasons.'
'About this time, my son being now at Rugby, we went down to see him and lunched with the Percivals.'
In the new session of 1888 Mr. Ritchie introduced his Local Government Bill, which (as Sir Charles had predicted to the Chelsea electors in 1885) was much influenced by the Liberal scheme that lay accessible in an official pigeonhole. The outline given by the new President of the Local Government Board in introducing the measure showed, however, that it fell short of expectation, and Sir Charles immediately criticized the project in an evening paper without waiting for publication of the text. When the Bill was published, he issued notes upon it, in concert with Mr. Cobb, M.P. for the Rugby Division, condemning the absence of any attempt to 'reform and revivify the parish.'
'My main objection to Mr. Ritchie's scheme was that, whereas in my scheme the District Councils had been more highly organized than the County Councils, in his scheme the reverse was the case. [Footnote: The allusion is here, apparently, to the Bill which Mr. Chamberlain prepared in 1886, but with considerable help from Sir Charles.] There was no building up out of the smaller districts, giving the work as far as possible to the smallest, where the people were at their homes; but Mr. Ritchie's unit was the county, and the smaller bodies were neglected.
'The Liberal leaders took a short-sighted course in recommending their friends to allow the Bill to pass almost without discussion.' [Footnote: In 1892 he again notes his intervention on this question. 'On November 9th, 1892, I had a long interview at the Local Government Board with Henry Fowler, the President, at his request, before I went down to the Chelsea Board of Guardians for the last time. He consulted me as to all his Bills, especially as to that on Local Government.']