Nay, this is to my understanding three Gods, and Sherlock seems to have brought in the material phantom of a thing or substance.
Ib.p. 97.
But if these three distinct Persons are not separated, but essentially united unto one, each of them may be God, and all three but one God: for if these three Persons,—each of whomGreek: monadikôs, as it is in the Creed, singly by himself, not separately from the other divine Persons, is God and Lord, are essentially united into one, there can be but one God and one Lord; and how each of these persons is God, and all of them but one God, by their mutual consciousness, I have already explained.
—"That is,—if the three Persons are not three;"—so might the Arian answer, unless Sherlock had shown the difference of separate and distinct relatively to mind. "For what other separation can be conceived in mind but distinction? Distinction may be joined with imperfection, as ignorance, or forgetfulness; and so it is in men:—and if this be called separation by a metaphor from bodies, then the conclusion would be that in the Supreme Mind there is distinction without imperfection; and then the question is, whence comes plurality of Persons? Can it be conceived other than as the result of imperfection, that is, finiteness?
Ib.p. 98.
Thus each Divine Person is God, and all of them but the same one God; as I explained it before.
O no! asserted it.
Ib.p. 98-9.
This one supreme God is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, a Trinity in Unity, three Persons and one God. Now Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, with all their divine attributes and perfections (excepting their personal properties, which the Schools call themodi subsistendi, that one is the Father, the other the Son, and the other the Holy Ghost, which cannot be communicated to each other) are whole and entire in each Person by a mutual consciousness; each feels the other Persons in himself, all their essential wisdom, power, goodness, justice, as he feels himself, and this makes them essentially one, as I have proved at large.
Will not the Arian object, "You admit the
modus subsistendi
to be a divine perfection, and you affirm that it is incommunicable. Does it not follow therefore, that there are perfections which the All-perfect does not possess?" This would not apply to Bishop Bull or Waterland.
Sect. V. p. 102.
St. Austin in his sixth book of the Trinity takes notice of a common argument used by the orthodox fathers against the Arians, to prove the co-eternity of the Son with the Father, that if the Son be the Wisdom and Power of God, as St. Paul teaches (1Cor. i.) and God was never without his Wisdom and Power, the Son must he co-eternal with the Father. * * * But this acute Father discovers a great inconvenience in this argument, for it forces us to say that the Father is not wise, but by that Wisdom which he begot, not being himself Wisdom as the Father: and then we must consider whether the Son himself, as he is God of God, and Light of Light, may be said to be Wisdom of Wisdom, if God the Father be not Wisdom, but only begets Wisdom.
The proper answer to Augustine is, that the Son and Holy Ghost are necessary and essential, not contingent: and that
his
argument has a still greater inconvenience, as shewn in note p. 98.
Ib.pp. 110-113.
But what makes St. Gregory dispute thus nicely, and oppose the common and ordinary forms of speech? Did he in good earnest believe that there is but one man in the world? No, no! he acknowledged as many men as we do; a great multitude who had the same human nature, and that every one who had a human nature was an individual man, distinguished and divided from all other individuals of the same nature. What makes him so zealous then against saying, that Peter, James and John are three men? Only this; that he says man is the name of nature, and therefore to say there are three men is the same as to say, there are three human natures of a different kind; for if there are three human natures, they must differ from each other, or they cannot be three; and so you deny Peter, James, and John to beGreek: homooúsioior of the same nature; and for the same reason we must say that though the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, yet there are not three Gods, butGreek: mía theótaesone Godhead and Divinity.
Sherlock struggles in vain, in my opinion at least, to clear these Fathers of egregious logomachy, whatever may have been the soundness of their faith, spite of the quibbles by which they endeavoured to evince its rationality. The very change of the terms is suspicious. "Yes! we might say three Gods" (it would be answered,) "as we say and ought to say three men: for man and humanity,
Greek: ánthropôs
see previous image
and
Greek: ánthrôpótaes
are not the same terms;— so if the Father be God, the Son God, and the Holy Ghost God, there would be three Gods, though not
Greek: treis theótaetes
—that is, three Godheads."
Ib.p. 115-16.
Gregory Nyssen tells us thatGreek: theòsisGreek: theatàesandGreek: éphoros, the inspector and governor of the world, that is, it is a name of energy, operation and power; and if this virtue, energy, and operation be the very same in all the Persons of the Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, then they are but one God, but one power and energy. * * * The Father does nothing by himself, nor the Son by himself, nor the Holy Ghost by himself; but the whole energy and operation of the Deity relating to creatures begins with the Father, passes to the Son, and from Father and Son to the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit does not act anything separately; there are not three distinct operations, as there are three Persons,Greek: allà mìa tìs gínetai agathou Bouláematos kínaesis kaì diakósmaesissee previous image—but one motion and disposition of the good will, which passes through the whole Trinity from Father to Son, and to the Holy Ghost, and this is doneGreek: achrónos kaì adiarétôswithout any distance of time, or propagating the motion from one to the other, but by one thought, as it is in one numerical mind and spirit, and therefore, though they are three Persons, they are but one numerical power and energy.
But this is either Tritheism or Sabellianism; it is hard to say which. Either the
Greek: Boúlaema
subsists in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost, and not merely passes through them, and then there would be three numerical
Greek: Boúlaema
, as well as three numerical Persons:
ergo
,
Greek: treis theoì àe theataí
see previous image
(according to Gregory Nyssen's shallow and disprovable etymology), which would be Tritheism: or
Greek: hén ti gínetai Boúlaema
, and then the Son and Holy Ghost are but terms of relation, which is Sabellianism. But in fact this Gregory and the others were Tritheists in the mode of their conception, though they did not wish to be so, and refused even to believe themselves such.
Gregory Nyssen, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus and Damascen were charged with "a kind of Tritheism" by Petavius and Dr. Cudworth, who, according to Sherlock, have "mistaken their meaning." See pp. 106-9, of this "Vindication."
Ib.p. 117.
For I leave any man to judge, whether thisGreek: mía kínaesis Bouláematossee previous image, this one single motion of will, which is in the same instant in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, can signify anything else but a mutual consciousness, which makes them numerically one, and as intimate to each other, as every man is to himself, as I have already explained it.
Is not God conscious to all my thoughts, though I am not conscious of God's? Would Sherlock endure that I should infer:
ergo
, God is numerically one with me, though I am not numerically one with God? I have never seen, but greatly wish to see, Waterland's controversial tracts against Sherlock. Again: according to Sherlock's conception, it would seem to follow that we ought to make a triad of triads, or an ennead.
Else there is an
x
in the Father which is not in the Son, a
y
in the Son which is not in the Father, and a
z
in the Holy Ghost which is in neither: that is, each by himself is not total God.
Ib.p. 120.
But however he might be mistaken in his philosophy, he was not in his divinity; for he asserts a numerical unity of the divine nature, not a mere specific unity, which is nothing but a logical notion, nor a collective unity, which is nothing but a company who are naturally many: but a true subsisting numerical unity of nature; and if the difficulty of explaining this, and his zeal to defend it, forced him upon some unintelligible niceties, to prove that the same numerical human nature too is but one in all men, it is hard to charge him with teaching, that there are three independent and co-ordinate Gods, because we think he has not proved that Peter, James, and John, are but one man. This will make very foul work with the Fathers, if we charge them with all those erroneous conceits about the Trinity, which we can fancy in their inconvenient ways of explaining that venerable mystery, especially when they compare that mysterious unity with any natural unions.
So that after all this obscuration of the obscure, Sherlock ends by fairly throwing up his briefs, and yet calls out, "Not guilty!
Victoria
!" And what is this but to say: These Fathers did indeed involve Tritheism in their mode of defending the Tri-personality; but they were not Tritheists:—though it would be far more accurate to say, that they were Tritheists, but not so as to make any practical breach of the Unity;—as if, for instance, Peter, James, and John had three silver tickets, by shewing one of which either or all three would have the same thing as if they had shewn all three tickets, and
vice versa
, all three tickets could produce no more than each one; each corresponding to the whole.
Ib.
I am sure St. Gregory was so far from suspecting that he should be charged with Tritheism upon this account, that he fences against another charge of mixing and confounding theHypostasesor Persons, by denying any difference or diversity of nature,Greek: hôs ek tou màe déchesthai tàen katà physin diaphoràn, míxin tina tôn hypostáseôn kaì anakúklaesin kataskeúzontawhich argues that he thought he had so fully asserted the unity of the divine essence, that some might suspect he had left but one Person, as well as one nature in God.
This is just what I have said, p. 116. Whether Sabellianism or Tritheism, I observed is hard to determine. Extremes meet.
Ib.p. 121.
Secondly, to thishomo-ousiotesthe Fathers added a numerical unity of the divine essence. This Petavius has proved at large by numerous testimonies, even from those very Fathers, whom he before accused for making God only collectively one, as three men are one man; such as Gregory Nyssen, St. Cyril, Maximus, Damascen; which is a demonstration, that howeverhe might mistaketheir explication of it, from the unity of human nature, they were far enough from Tritheism, or one collective God.
This is most uncandid. Sherlock, even to be consistent with his own confession, § 1. p. 120, ought to have said, "However he might mistake their
intention
, in consequence of their inconvenient and unphilosophical explication;" which mistake, in fact, consisted in taking them at their word.
Ib.
Petavius greatly commends Boethius's explication of this mystery, which is the very same he had before condemned in Gregory Nyssen, and those other Fathers.—That Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one God, not three Gods:hujus conjunctionis ratio est indifferentia: that is, such a sameness of nature as admits of no difference or variety, or an exacthomo-ousiotes, as he explains it. * * Those make a difference, who augment and diminish, as the Arians do; who distinguish the Trinity into different natures, as well as Persons, of different worth and excellency, and thus divide and multiply the Trinity into a plurality of Gods.Principium enim pluralitatis alteritas est. Præter alteritatem enim nec pluralitas quid sit intelligi potest.
Then if so, what becomes of the Persons? Have the Persons attributes distinct from their nature;—or does not their common nature constitute their common attributes?
Principium enim, &c.
Ib.p. 124.
That the Fathers universally acknowledged that the operation of the whole Trinity,ad extra, is but one, Petavius has proved beyond all contradiction; and hence they conclude the unity of the divine nature and essence; for every nature has a virtue and energy of its own; for nature is a principle of action, and if the energy and operation be but one, there can be but one nature; and if there be two distinct and divided operations, if either of them can act alone without the other, there must be two divided natures.
Then it was not the Son but the whole Trinity that was crucified: for surely this was an operation
ad extra
.
Ib.p. 126.
But to do St. Austin right, though he do not name this consciousness, yet he explains this Trinity in Unity by examples of mutual consciousness. I named one of his similitudes before, of the unity of our understanding, memory, and will,whichare all conscious to each other; that we remember what we understand and will; we understand what we remember and will; and what we will we remember and understand; and therefore all these three faculties do penetrate and comprehend each other.
Which
! The
man
is self-conscious alike when he remembers, wills, and understands; but in what sense is the generic term "memory" conscious to the generic word "will?" This is mere nonsense. Are memory, understanding, and volition persons,—self-subsistents? If not, what are they to the purpose? Who doubts that Jehovah is consciously powerful, consciously wise, consciously good; and that it is the same Jehovah, who in being omnipotent, is good and wise; in being wise, omnipotent and good; in being good, is wise and omnipotent? But what has all this to do with a distinction of Persons? Instead of one Tri-unity we might have a mille-unity. The fact is, that Sherlock, and (for aught I know) Gregory Nyssen, had not the clear idea of the Trinity, positively; but only a negative Arianism.
Ib.p. 127.
He proceeds to shew that this unity is without all manner of confusion and mixture, * * for the mind that loves, is in the love. * * * And the knowledge of the mind which knows and loves itself, is in the mind, and in its love, because it loves itself, knowing, and knows itself loving: and thus also two are in each, for the mind which knows and loves itself, with its knowledge is in love, and with its love is in knowledge.
Then why do we make tri-personality in unity peculiar to God?
The doctrine of the Trinity (the foundation of all rational theology, no less than the precondition and ground of the rational possibility of the Christian Faith, that is, the Incarnation and Redemption), rests securely on the position,—that in man
omni actioni præit sua propria passio; Deus autem est actus purissimus sine ulla potentialitate
. As the tune produced between the breeze and Eolian harp is not a self-subsistent, so neither memory, nor understanding, nor even love in man: for he is a passive as well as active being: he is a patible agent. But in God this is not so. Whatever is necessarily of him, (God of God, Light of Light), is necessarily all act; therefore necessarily self-subsistent, though not necessarily self-originated. This then is the true mystery, because the true unique; that the Son of God has origination without passion, that is, without ceasing to be a pure act: while a created entity is, as far as it is merely creaturely and distinguishable from the Creator, a mere
passio
or recipient. This unicity we strive, not to
express
, for that is impossible; but to designate, by the nearest, though inadequate, analogy,—
Begotten
.
Ib.p. 133.
As for the Holy Ghost, whose nature is represented to be love, I do not indeed find in Scripture that it is any where said, that the Holy Ghost is that mutual love, wherewith Father and Son love each other: but this we know, that there is a mutual love between Father and Son:the Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hands.—John iii. 35.And the Father loveth the Son, and sheweth him all things that himself doeth.-John v. 20; and our Saviour himself tells us,I love the Father.—John xiv. 31. And I shewed before, that love is a distinct act,and therefore in God must be a person: for there are no accidents nor faculties in God.
This most important, nay, fundamental truth, so familiar to the elder philosophy, and so strongly and distinctly enunciated by Philo Judæus, the senior and contemporary of the Evangelists, is to our modern divines darkness and a sound.
Sect. VI. pp. 147-8.
Yes; you'll say, that there should be three Persons, each of which is God, and yet but one God, is a contradiction: but what principle of natural reason does it contradict?
Surely never did argument vertiginate more! I had just acceded to Sherlock's exposition of the Trinity, as the Supreme Being, his reflex act of self-consciousness and his love, all forming one supreme mind; and now he tells me, that each is the whole Supreme Mind, and denies that three, each
per se
the whole God, are not the same as three Gods! I grant that division and separation are terms inapplicable, yet surely three distinct though undivided Gods, are three Gods. That the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are the one true God, I fully believe; but not Sherlock's exposition of the doctrine. Nay, I think it would have been far better to have worded the mystery thus:— The Father together with his Son and Spirit, is the one true God.
"Each
per se
God." This is the
Greek: prôton méga pseudos
see previous image
of Sherlock's scheme. Each of the three is whole God, because neither is, or can be
per se
; the Father himself being
a se
, but not
per se
.
Ib.p. 149.
For it is demonstrable that if there be three Persons and one God, each Person must be God, and yet there cannot be three distinct Gods, but one. For if each Person be not God, all three cannot be God, unless the Godhead have Persons in it which are not God.
Three persons having the same nature are three persons;—and if to possess without limitation the divine nature, as opposed to the human, is what we mean by God, why then three such persons are three Gods, and will bethought so, till Gregory Nyssen can persuade us that John, James, and Peter, each possessing the human nature, are not three men. John is a man, James is a man, and Peter is a man: but they are not three men, but one man!
Ib.p. 150.
I affirm, that natural reason is not the rule and measure of expounding Scripture, no more than it is of expounding any other writing. The true and only way to interpret any writing, even the Scriptures themselves, is to examine the use and propriety of words and phrases, the connexion, scope, and design of the text, its allusion to ancient customs and usages, or disputes. For there is no other good reason to be given for any exposition, but that the words signify so, and the circumstances of the place, and the apparent scope of the writer require it.
This and the following paragraph are excellent.
O si sic omnia
!
Ib.p. 153.
Reconcile men to the doctrine (of the Trinity), and the Scripture is plain without any farther comment. This I have now endeavoured; and I believe our adversaries will talk more sparingly of absurdities and contradictions for the future, and they will lose the best argument they have against the orthodox expositions of Scripture.
Good doctor! you sadly over-rated both your own powers, and the docility of your adversaries. If so clear a head and so zealous a Trinitarian as Dr. Waterland could not digest your exposition, or acquit it of Tritheism, little hope is there of finding the Unitarians more persuadable.
Ib.p. 154.
Though Christ be God himself, yet if there be three Persons in the Godhead, the equality and sameness of nature does not destroy the subordination of Persons: a Son is equal to his Father by nature, but inferior to him as his Son: if the Father, as I have explained it, be original mind and wisdom, the Son a personal, subsisting, but reflex image of his Father's wisdom, though their eternal wisdom be equal and the same, yet the original is superior to the image, the Father to the Son.
But why? We men deem it so, because the image is but a shadow, and not equal to the original; but if it were the same in all perfections, how could that, which is exactly the same, be less? Again, God is all Being:—consequently there can nothing be added to the idea, except what implies a negation or diminution of it. If one and the same Being is equal to the Father, as touching his Godhead, but inferior as man; then it is +
m-x
, which is not = +
m
. But of two men I may say, that they are equal to each other. A. = + courage-wisdom. B. = + wisdom-courage. Both wise and courageous; but A. inferior in wisdom, B. in courage. But God is all-perfect.
Ib.p. 156.
So born before all creatures, asGreek: prôtótokosalso signifies,that by him were all things created.All things were created by him, and for him, and he is before all things, (which is the explication ofGreek: pôrtótokos pásaes ktíseossee previous imagebegotten before the whole creation, and therefore no part of the creation himself.)
This is quite right. Our version should here be corrected.
Greek: Prôto
or
Greek: prótaton
is here an intense comparative,—
infinitely before
.
Ib.p. 159.
That hebeing in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, &c.—Phil. ii. 8, 9.
I should be inclined to adopt an interpretation of the unusual phrase
Greek: hárpagmon
somewhat different both from the Socinian and the Church version:—"who being in the form of God did not
think equality with God a thing to be seized with violence
, but made, &c."
Ib.p. 160.
Is a mere creature a fit lieutenant or representative of God in personal or prerogative acts of government and power? Must not every being be represented by one of his own kind, a man by a man, an angel by an angel, in such acts as are proper to their natures? and must not God then be represented by one who is God? Is any creature capable of the government of the world? Does not this require infinite wisdom and infinite power? And can God communicate infinite wisdom and infinite power to a creature or a finite nature? That is, can a creature be made a true and essential God?
This is sound reasoning. It is to be regretted that Sherlock had not confined himself to logical comments on the Scripture, instead of attempting metaphysical solutions.
Ib.pp. 161-3.
I find little or nothing to
object to
in this exposition, from pp. 161-163 inclusively, of
Phil
. ii. 8, 9. And yet I seem to feel, as if a something that should have been prefixed, and to which all these considerations would have been excellent seconds, were missing. To explain the Cross by the necessity of sacrificial blood, and the sacrificial blood as a type and
ante
-delegate or pre-substitute of the Cross, is too like an
argumentum in circulo
.
Ib.p. 164.
And though Christ be the eternal Son of God, and the natural Lord and heir of all things, yetGod hathin thishighly exalted himand givenhim a name which is above every name, that at(or inGreek: en)the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, &c.—Phil. ii. 9, 10, 11.
Never was a sublime passage more debased than by this rendering of
Greek: en
by
at
, instead of
in
;—
at
the
phenomenon
, instead of
in
the
noumenon
. For such is the force of
nomen
, name, in this and similar passages, namely,
in vera et substantiali potestate Jesu
: that is,
Greek: en lógô kaì dià lógou
see previous image
the true
noumenon
or
ens intelligibile
of Christ. To bow at hearing the
cognomen
may become a universal, but it is still only a non-essential, consequence of the former. But the debasement of the idea is not the worst evil of this false rendering;—it has afforded the pretext and authority for un-Christian intolerance.