Hegel—reading weizt for weist—takes the second line as
Too happy, if he can but know the outside of her rind.
Goethe's attack upon a vulgar misuse of the lines belongs to his dispute with the scientists. His verses appeared in 1820 asHeiteres Reimstückat the end of Heft 3zur Morphologie,—of which the closing section is entitledFreundlicher Zuruf(Werkexxvii. 161), as follows:—
"Ins Innre der Natur,"O du Philister!—"Dringt kein erschaffner Geist.". . . . . . ."Glückselig! wem sie nurDie äußre Schale weis't."Das hör' ich sechzig Jahre wiederholen,Ich fluche drauf, aber verstohlen:Sage mir taufend tausendmale:Alles giebt sie reichlich und gern;Natur hat weder SternNoch Schale,Alles ist sie mit einem Male.
[The last seven lines may be thus paraphrased in continuation:
I swear—of course but to myself—as rings within my earsThat same old warning o'er and o'er again for sixty years,And thus a thousand thousand times I answer in my mind:—With gladsome and ungrudging hand metes nature from her store:She keeps not back the core,Nor separates the rind,But all in each both rind and core has evermore combined.]
P.254, § 140. Plato and Aristotle: cf. Plato,Phaedrus,247 A (φθόνoς γὰρ ξω θείον χόρoυ ἴσταται);Timaeus,29 E; and Aristotle,Metaph.i. 2. 22.
P.256, § 140. Goethe:Sämmtl. Werke,iii. 203 (Maxime und Reflexionen). Gegen große Vorzüge eines Andern giebt es kein Rettungsmittel als die Liebe. Cf. Schiller to Goethe, 2 July, 1796. 'How vividly I have felt on this occasion ... that against surpassing merit nothing but Love gives liberty' (daß es dem Vortrefflichen gegenüber seine Freiheit giebt als die Liebe).
'Pragmatic.' This word, denoting a meddlesome busybody in older English and sometimes made a vague term of abuse, has been in the present century used in English as it is here employed in German.
According to Polybius, ix. I. 2, the πραγματικὸς τρόπος τῆς ἱστορίας is that which has a directly utilitarian aim. So Kant,Foundation of Metaph. of Ethic (Werke,viii. 41, note): 'A history is pragmatically composed when it renders prudent,i.e.instructs the world how it may secure its advantage better or at least as well as the ages preceding.' Schelling (v. 308) quotes in illustration of pragmatic history-writing the words of Faust to Wagner (Goethe, xi. 26):
Was ihr den Geist der Zeiten heisst,Das ist im Grund der herren eigner Geist,,In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln.
Cf. also Hegel,Werke,ix. 8. 'A second kind of reflectional history is the pragmatic. When we have to do with the past and are engaged with a distant world, the mind sees rising before it a present, which it has from its own action as a reward for its trouble. The events are different; but their central anduniversal fact, their structural plan is identical. This abolishes the past and makes the event present. Pragmatic reflections, however abstract they be, are thus in reality the present, and vivify the tales of the past with the life of to-day.—Here too a word should specially be given to the moralising and the moral instructions to be gained through history,—for which it was often studied.... Rulers, statesmen, nations, are especially bidden learn from the experience of history. But what experience and history teach is that nations and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted upon teaching which could have been drawn from it.'
Cf. Froude:Divorce of Catherine,p. 2. 'The student (of history) looks for an explanation (of political conduct) in elements which he thinks he understands—in pride, ambition, fear, avarice, jealousy, or sensuality.'
P.257, § 141. Cf. Goethe, xxiii, 298. 'What is the outside of an organic nature but the ever-varied phenomenon of the inside? This outside, this surface is so exactly adapted to a varied, complex, delicate, inward structure that it thus itself becomes an inside: both aspects, the outside and the inside, standing in most direct correlation alike in the quietest existence and in the most violent movement.'
P.260, § 143. Kant,Kritik der reinen Vernunft,2nd ed. p. 266.
P. 269, § 147. Cf. Schelling,Werke,v. 290 (cf. iii. 603). 'There are three periods of history, that of nature, of destiny, and of providence. These three ideas express the same identity, but in a different way. Destiny too is providence, but recognised in the real, as providence, is also destiny, but beheld (angeschaut) in the ideal.'
P.275, § 151. On the relation between Spinoza and Leibniz cf. Hegel,Werke,iv. 187-193. It would be a mistake, however, to represent Leibniz as mainly engaged in a work of conscious antagonism to Spinoza.
P.277, § 153. Jacobi.—Jacobi (like Schopenhauer) insists specially on the distinction between grounds (Gründe)—which are formal, logical, and verbal, and causes (Ursachen)—which carry us into reality and life and nature. To transform the mereBecauseinto thecausewe must (he says) pass from logic and the analytical understanding to experience and the inner life. Instead of the timelessness of simultaneity whichcharacterises the logical relation cf ground and consequent, the nexus of cause and effect introduces the element of time,—thereby acquiring reality (Jacobi,Werke,iii. 452). The conception of Cause—meaningless as a mere category of abstract thought—gets reality as a factor in experience, ein Erfahrungsbegriff, and is immediately given to us in the consciousness of our own causality (Jacobi,Werke,iv. 145-158). Cf. Kant,Kritik der reinen Vern.p. 116.
P.283, § 158. TheAmor intellectualis Dei(Spinoza,Eth.v. 32) is described as a consequence of the third grade of cognition, viz. thescientia intuitivawhich 'proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate cognition of the essence of things (ii. 40, Schol. 2). From it arises (v. 27), the highest possibleacquiescentia mentis,in which the mind contemplates all thingssub specie aeternitatis(v. 29), knows itself to be in God and sees itself and all things in their divine essence. But this intellectual love of mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself (v. 36) 'From these things we clearly understand in what our salvation or blessedness or liberty consists: to wit, in the constant and eternal love towards God, or in the love of God towards men' (Schol. to v. 36).
Page289, § 161. Evolution and development in the stricter sense in which these terms were originally used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries imply a theory of preformation, according to which the growth of an organic being is simply a process of enlarging and filling out a miniature organism, actual but invisible, because too inconspicuous. Such was the doctrine adopted by Leibniz (Considérations sur le principe de vie; Système nouveau de la Nature, &c.). According to it development is no real generation of new parts, but only an augmentation into bulk and visibility of parts already outlined. This doctrine of preformation (as opposed to epigenesis) is carried out by Charles Bonnet, who in hisConsidérations sur les corps organisés(1762) propounds the further hypothesis that the 'germs' from which living beings proceed contain, enclosed one within another, the germs of all creatures yet to be. This is the hypothesis of 'Emboîtement.' 'The systemwhich regards generations as mere educts' says Kant (Kritik der Urteilskraft,§ 80;Werke,iv. 318) 'is called that ofindividualpreformation or the evolution theory: the system which regards them as products is called Epigenesis.—which might also be called the theory ofgenericpreformation, considering that the productive powers of the générants follow the inherent tendencies belonging to the family characteristics, and that the specific form is therefore a 'virtual' preformation, in this way the opposing theory of individual preformation might be better called the involution theory, or theory of Einschachtelung (Emboîtement.) Cf. Leibniz (Werke,Erdmann, 715). 'As animals generally are not entirely born at conception orgeneration,no more do they entirely perish at what we calldeath; for it is reasonable that what does not commence naturally, does not finish either in the order of nature. Thus quitting their mask or their rags, they only return to a subtler theatre, where however they can be as sensible and well regulated as in the greater.... Thus not only the souls, but even the animals are neither generable nor perishable: they are only developed, enveloped, re-clothed, unclothed,—transformed. The souls never altogether quit their body, and do not pass from one body into another body which is entirely new to them. There is therefore no metempsychosis, but there is metamorphosis. The animals change, take and quit only parts: which takes place little by little and by small imperceptible parcels, but continually, in nutrition: and takes place suddenly notably but rarely, at conception, or at death, which make them gain or lose much all at once.'
The theory ofEmboîtementorEnvelopment,according to Bonnet (Considérations,&c. ch. I) is that 'the germs of all the organised bodies of one species were inclosed (renfermés) one in another, and have been developed successively.' So according to Haller (Physiology,Tome vii. § 2) 'it is evident that in plants the mother-plant contains the germs of several generations; and there is therefore no inherent improbability in the view thattous les enfans, excepté un, fussent renfermés dans l'ovaire de la première Fille d'Eve.'Cf. Weismann'sContinuity of the Germ-plasma.Yet Bonnet (Contemplation de la Nature,part vii. ch. 9, note 2), says, 'The germs are not enclosed like boxes or cases one in another, but a germ forms part of another germ, as a grain forms part of the plant in which it is developed.'
P.293, § 163. Rousseau,Contrat Social,liv. ii. ch. 3.
P.296, § 165. The 'adequate' idea is a sub-species of the 'distinct.' When an idea does not merely distinguish a thing from others (when it isclear),or in addition represent the characteristic marks belonging to the object so distinguished (when it isdistinct),but also brings out the farther characteristics of these characteristics, the idea isadequate.Thus adequate is a sort of second power of distinct. (Cf. Baumeister'sInstit. Philos. Ration.1765, §§ 64-94.) Hegel's description rather agrees with the 'complete idea' 'by which I put before my mind singly marks sufficient to discern the thing represented from all other things in every case, state, and time' (Baumeister,ib.§ 88). But cf. Leibniz, ed. Erdm. p. 79:notitia adaequata.
P.298, § 166. Cf. Baumeister,Instit. Phil. Rat.§ 185:Judicium est idearum conjunctio vel separatio.
P.299, § 166.Punctum saliens:thepunctum sanguineum saliensof Harvey (de Generat. Animal, exercit.17), or first appearance of the heart: theστιγμὴ αἱματίνηin the egg, of which Aristotle (Hist. Anim.vi. 3) says τoῡτο τὸ σημεῖον πηδᾷ καὶ κινεῖται ὥσπερ ἓμψυχον.
P.301, § 169. Cf. Whately,Logic(Bk. ii. ch. I, § 2), 'Of these terms that which is spoken of is called thesubject;that which is said of it, thepredicate.'
P.303, § 171. Kant,Kritik der reinen Vernunft(p. 95, 2nd ed.) § 9.
P.304, § 172. Cf. Jevons,Principles of Science,ch. 3, 'on limited identities' and 'negative propositions.'
P.309. Ear-lobes. The remark is due to Blumenbach: cf. Hegel'sWerke,v. 285.
P.312. Colours,i.e.painters' colours; cf.Werke,vii. 1. 314 (lecture-note). 'Painters are not such fools as to be Newtonians: they have red, yellow, and blue, and out of these they make their other colours.'
P.315, § 181. For the genetic classification of judgments and syllogisms and the passage from the former to the latter compare especially Lotze'sLogic,Book i. And for the comprehensive exhibition of the systematic process of judgment and inference see B. Bosanquet'sLogic, or the Morphology of Knowledge.The passage from Hegel'sWerke,v. 139, quoted at the head of that work is parallel to the sentence in p. 318, 'The interest, therefore,' &c.
P.320, § 186. The letters I-P-U, of course, stand for Individual, Particular, and Universal.
P.321, § 187. Fourth figure. This so-called Galenian figure was differentiated from the first figure by the separation of the five moods, which (after Arist.An.pr. i. 7 and ii. I) Theophrastus and the later pupils, down at least to Boëthius, had subjoined to the four recognised types of perfect syllogism. But its Galenian origin is more than doubtful.
P.325, § 190. Cf. Mill'sLogic,Bk. ii. ch. 3. 'In every syllogism considered as an argument to prove the conclusion there is apetitio principii.'
Hegel's Induction is that strictly so called or complete induction, the argument from the sum of actual experiences—thatper enumerationem simplicem,andδιὰ πάντων.Of course except by accident or by artificial arrangement such completeness is impossiblein rerum natura.
P.326, § 190. The 'philosophy of Nature' referred to here is probably that of Oken and the Schellingians; but later critics (e.g.Riehl,Philosoph. Criticismus,iii. 120) have accused Hegel himself of even greater enormities in this department.
P.328, § 192.Elementarlehre:Theory of the Elements, called by Hamilton (Lectures on Logic,i. 65) Stoicheiology as opposed to methodology. Cf. the Port Royal Logic. Kant'sKritikobserves the same division of the subject.
P.332, § 193. Anselm,Proslogium,c. 2. In theMonologiumAnselm expounds the usual argument from conditioned to unconditioned (Est igitur unum aliquid, quod solum maxime et summe omnium est; per quod est quidquid est bonum vel magnum, el omnino quidquid aliquid est. Monol.c. 3). But in the Proslogium he seeks an argumentquod nullo ad se probandum quam se solo indigeret—i.e.from the conception of (God as) the highest and greatest that can be (aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari potest) he infers its being (sic ergo vereESTaliquid quo majus cogitari non potest, ut nec cogitari possit non esse.) The absolute would not be absolute if the idea of it did notipso factoimply existence.
Gaunilo of Marmoutier in theLiber pro insipientemade the objection that the fact of such argument being needed showed that idea and reality wereprima faciedifferent. And in fact the argument of Anselm deals with an Absolute which is object rather than subject, thought rather than thinker; in humanconsciousness realised, but not essentially self-affirming—implicit (an:sich) only, as said in pp. 331, 333. And Anselm admits c. 15Domine, non solum es, quo majus cogitari nequit, sed es quiddam majus quam cogitari potest(transcending our thought).
P.333, line 2. This sentence has been transposed in the translation. In the original it occurs after the quotation from the Latin in p. 332.
P.334, § 194. Leibniz: for a brief account of the Monads see Caird'sCrit. Philosophy of J. Kant,i. 86-95.
A monad is the simple substance or indivisible unity corresponding to a body. It is as simple what the world is as a multiplicity: it 'represents,'i.e.concentrates into unity, the variety of phenomena: is the expression of the material in the immaterial, of the compound in the simple, of the extended outward in the inward. Its unity and its representative capacity go together (cf. Lotze,Mikrokosmus.) It is the 'present which is full of the future and laden with the past' (ed. Erdm. p. 197); the point which is all-embracing, the totality of the universe. And yet there are monads—in the plural.
P.334, § 194. Fichte,Werke,i. 430. 'Every thorough-going dogmatic philosopher is necessarily a fatalist.'
P. 338, § 195. Cf.Encyclop.§ 463. 'This supreme inwardising of ideation (Vorstellung) is the supreme self-divestment of intelligence, reducing itself to the mere being, the general space of mere names and meaningless words. The ego, which is this abstract being, is, because subjectivity, at the same time the power over the different names, the empty link which fixes in itself series of them and keeps them in fixed order.'
Contemporaneously with Hegel, Herbart turned psychology in the line of a 'statics and dynamics of the mind.' See (besides earlier suggestions) hisDe Attentionis mensura causisque primariis(1822) and hisUeber die Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit, Mathematik auf Psychologie anzuwenden(1822).
P.340, § 198.Civilsociety: distinguished as the social and economical organisation of thebourgeoisie,with their particularist-universal aims, from the true universal unity ofcitoyensin the state or ethico-political organism.
P.345, § 204. Inner design: see Kant'sKritik der Urtheilskraft,§ 62.
Aristotle,De Anima,ii. 4 (415. b. 7) φανερὸν δ' ὠς καὶ οὗἕνεκα ἡ ψυχὴ ατία: ii. 2 ζωὴν λέγομεν τὴν δι' αὑτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν.
P.347, § 206. Neutral first water, cf.Encyclop.§ 284, 'without independent individuality, without rigidity and intrinsic determination, a thorough-going equilibrium.' Cf.Werke,vii. 6. 168. 'Water is absolute neutrality, not like salt, an individualised neutrality; and hence it was at an early date called the mother of everything particular.' 'As the neutral it is the solvent of acids and alkalis.' Cf. Oken'sLehrbuch der Naturphilosophie,§§ 294 and 432.
P.348, § 206. Conclude = beschliessen: Resolve = entschliessen. Cf. Chr. Sigwart,Kleine Schriften,ii. 115,seqq.
P.359, § 216. Aristotle,De Anim. Generat.i. (726. b. 24) ἡ χεὶρ ἄνεν ψυχικῆς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἔστι χεὶρ ἀλλὰ μόνον ὁμώνυμον.
Arist.Metaph.viii. 6 (1045. b. 11) ο δὲ (λέγoυσi) σύνθεσιν ἥ σύνδεσμον ψυχῆς σώματι τὸ ζῆν.
P.360, § 218. Sensibility, &c. This triplicity (as partly distinguished by Haller after Glisson) of the functions of organic life is largely worked out in Schelling, ii. 491.
P.361, § 219. Cf. Schelling, ii. 540. As walking is a constantly prevented falling, so life is a constantly prevented extinction of the vital process.
P.367, § 229. Spinoza (Eth.i. def. I) definescausa suiasid cujus essentia involvit existentiam,and (in def. 3) definessubstantiaasid quod in se est et per se concipitur.
Schelling:e.g. Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie(1801), (Werke,iv. 114): 'I call reason the absolute reason, or reason, in so far as it is thought as total indifference of subjective and objective.'
P.367, § 230. 'Mammals distinguish themselves': unter; unter:scheiden, instead of scheiden: cf.Werke,ii. 181. 'The distinctive marks of animals,e.g.are taken from the claws and teeth: for in fact it is not merely cognition which by this means distinguishes one animal from another: but the animal thereby separates itself off: by these weapons it keeps itself to itself and separate from the universal.' Cf.Werke,vii. a. 651seqq.(Encycl.§ 370) where reference is made to Cuvier,Recherches sur les ossements fossiles des quadrupèdes(1812), &c.
P.368, § 230. Kant,Kritik der Urtheilskraft:Einleitung, § 9 (note), (Werke,ed. Ros. iv. 39); see Caird'sCritical Philosophy of I. Kant,Book i. ch. 5; also Hegel'sWerke,ii. 3.
P.369, § 231. An example of Wolfs pedantry is given in Hegel,Werke,v. 307, from WolfsRudiments of Architecture,Theorem viii. 'A window must be broad enough for two persons to recline comfortably in it, side by side.Proof.It is customary to recline with another person on the window to look about. But as the architect ought to satisfy the main views of the owner (§ I) he must make the window broad enough for two persons to recline comfortably side by side.'
'Construction': cf.Werke,ii. 38. 'Instead of its own internal life and spontaneous movement, such a simple mode (as subject, object, cause, substance, &c.) has expression given to it by perception (here = sense-consciousness) on some superficial analogy: and this external and empty application of the formula is called "Construction." The procedure shares the qualities of all such formalism. How stupid-headed must be the man, who could not in a quarter of an hour master the theory of asthenic, sthenic and indirectly asthenic diseases' (this is pointed at Schelling'sWerke,iii. 236) 'and the three corresponding curative methods, and who, when, no long time since, such instruction was sufficient, could not in this short period be transformed from a mere practitioner into a "scientific" physician? The formalism ofNaturphilosophiemay teache.g.that understanding is electricity, or that the animal is nitrogen, or even that it islikethe South or the North, or that it represents it,—as baldly as is here expressed or with greater elaboration in terminology. At such teachings the inexperienced may fall into a rapture of admiration, may reverence the profound genius it implies,—may take delight in the sprightliness of language which instead of the abstractconceptgives the more pleasingperceptualimage, and may congratulate itself on feeling its soul akin to such splendid achievement. The trick of such a wisdom is as soon learnt as it is easy to practice; its repetition, when it grows familiar, becomes as intolerable as the repetition of juggling once detected. The instrument of this monotonous formalism is not harder to manipulate than a painter's palette with two colours on it, say red and green, the former to dye the surface if a historic piece, the latter if a landscape is asked for.'
Kant (Werke,iii. 36) in the 'Prolegomena to every future Metaphysic,' § 7, says: 'We find, however, it is the peculiarity of mathematical science that it must first exhibit its concept in apercept, and do soà priori,—hence in a pure percept. This observation with regard to the nature of mathematics gives a hint as to the first and supreme condition of its possibility: it must be based on some pure percept in which it can exhibit all its conceptsin concretoand yetà priori,or, as it is called,construethem.'
The phrase, and the emphasis on the doctrine, that perception must be taken as an auxiliary in mathematics,' belong specially to the second edition of theKritik, e.g.Pref. xii. To learn the properties of the isosceles triangle the mathematical student must 'produce (by 'construction') what he himself thought into it and exhibitedà prioriaccording to concepts.'
'Construction, in general,' says Schelling (Werke,v. 252: cf. iv. 407) 'is the exhibition of the universal and particular in unity':—'absolute unity of the ideal and the real.' v. 225. Darstellung in intellektueller Anschauung ist philosophische Konstruktion.
P.372. 'Recollection' = Erinnerung:i.e.the return from differentiation and externality to simplicity and inwardness: distinguished from Gedächtniss = memory (specially of words).
P.373, § 236. Cf. Schelling,Werke,iv. 405. 'Every particular object is in its absoluteness the Idea; and accordingly the Idea is also the absolute object (Gegenstand) itself,—as the absolutely ideal also the absolutely real.'
P.374, § 236. Aristotle,Metaphys.xi. 9 (1074. 6. 34) αὑτὸν ἅρα νοεῖ (ὁ νοῦς = θεος), εἵπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἐστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις. Cf. Arist.Metaph.xii. 7.
P.377, §239. 'Supposes a correlative' = ist für Eines. On Seyn: für Eines, cf.Werke,iii. 168. Das Ideëlle ist notwendig für:Eines, aber es ist nicht für ein Anderes: das Eine für welches es ist, ist nur es selbst. ... God is therefore for-self (to himself) in so far as he himself is that which is for him.
P.379, § 244. The percipient idea (anschauende Idee), of course both object and subject of intuition, is opposed to the Idea (as logical) in the element ofThought: but stillas Ideaand not—to use Kant's phrase (Kritik der r. Vern.§ 26)—asnatura materialiter spectata.