“Close cabins being now prepared,With bred, bief, beire, and fish,The passengers prepare themselves,That they might have their wish.”
Her magazine, carpenter’s and sailmaker’s lockers, etc., were doubtless well forward under her forecastle, easily accessible from the spar-deck, as was common to merchant vessels of her class and size. Dr. Young, in his “Chronicles of the Pilgrim Fathers” (p. 86, note), says: “This vessel was less than the average size of the fishing-smacks that go to the Grand Banks. This seems a frail bark in which to cross a stormy ocean of three thousand miles in extent. Yet it should be remembered that two of the ships of Columbus on his first daring and perilous voyage of discovery, were light vessels, without decks, little superior to the small craft that ply on our rivers and along our coasts . . . . Frobisher’s fleet consisted of two barks of twenty-five tons each and a pinnace of ten tons, when he sailed in 1576 to discover a north-west passage to the Indies. Sir Francis Drake, too, embarked on his voyage for circumnavigating the globe, in 1577, with five vessels, of which the largest was of one hundred, and the smallest fifteen tons. The bark in which Sir Humphrey Gilbert perished was of ten tons only.” The LITTLE JAMES, which the Company sent to Plymouth in July, 1623, was “a pinnace of only forty-four tons,” and in a vessel of fifty tons (the SPEEDWELL), Martin Pring, in 1603, coasted along the shores of New England. Goodwin says: “In 1587 there were not in all England’s fleet more than five merchant vessels exceeding two hundred tons.” The SPARROW-HAWK wrecked on Cape Cod in 1626 was only 40 feet “over all.” The Dutch seem to have built larger vessels. Winthrop records that as they came down the Channel, on their way to New England (1630), they passed the wreck of “a great Dutch merchantman of a thousand tons.”
The MAY-FLOWER’S galley, with its primitive conditions for cooking, existed rather as a place for the preparation of food and the keeping of utensils, than for the use of fire. The arrangements for the latter were exceedingly crude, and were limited to the open “hearth-box” filled with sand, the chief cooking appliance being the tripod-kettle of the early navigators: This might indeed be set up in any part of the ship where the “sand-hearth” could also go, and the smoke be cared for. It not infrequently found space in the fore castle, between decks, and, when fine weather prevailed, upon the open deck, as in the open caravels of Columbus, a hundred years before. The bake-kettle and the frying-pan held only less important places than the kettle for boiling. It must have been rather a burst of the imagination that led Mrs. Austin, in “Standish of Standish,” to make Peter Browne remind poor half-frozen Goodman—whom he is urging to make an effort to reach home, when they had been lost, but had got in sight of the MAY-FLOWER In the harbor—of “the good fires aboard of her.” Moreover, on January 22, when Goodman was lost, the company had occupied their “common-house” on shore. Her ordnance doubtless comprised several heavy guns (as such were then reckoned), mounted on the spar-deck amid ships, with lighter guns astern and on. the rail, and a piece of longer range and larger calibre upon the forecastle. Such was the general disposal of ordnance upon merchant vessels of her size in that day, when an armament was a ‘sine qua non’. Governor Winslow in his “Hypocrisie Unmasked,” 1646 (p. 91), says, in writing of the departure of the Pilgrims from Delfshaven, upon the SPEEDWELL: “The wind being fair we gave them a volley of small shot and three pieces of ordnance,” by which it seems that the SPEEDWELL, of only sixty tons, mounted at least “three pieces of ordnance” as, from the form of expression, there seem to have been “three pieces,” rather than three discharges of the same piece.
The inference is warranted that the MAY-FLOWER, being three times as large, would carry a considerably heavier and proportionate armament. The LADY ARBELLA, Winthrop’s ship, a vessel of 350 tons, carried “twenty-eight pieces of ordnance;” but as “Admiral” of the fleet, at a time when there was a state of war with others, and much piracy, she would presumably mount more than a proportionate weight of metal, especially as she convoyed smaller and lightly armed vessels, and carried much value. There is no reason to suppose that the MAY-FLOWER, in her excessively crowded condition, mounted more than eight or ten guns, and these chiefly of small calibre. Her boats included her “long-boat,” with which the experience of her company in “Cape Cod harbor” have made us familiar, and perhaps other smaller boats,—besides the Master’s “skiff” or “gig,” of whose existence and necessity there are numerous proofs. “Monday the 27,” Bradford and Winslow state, “it proved rough weather and cross winds, so as we were constrained, some in the shallop and others in the long-boat,” etc. Bradford states, in regard to the repeated springings-a-leak of the SPEEDWELL: “So the Master of the bigger ship, called Master Jones, being consulted with;” and again, “The Master of the small ship complained his ship was so leaky . . . so they [Masters Jones and Reynolds] came to consultation, again,” etc. It is evident that Jones was obliged to visit the SPEEDWELL to inspect her and to consult with the leaders, who were aboard her. For this purpose, as for others, a smaller boat than the “long-boat” would often serve, while the number of passengers and crew aboard would seem to demand still other boats. Winthrop notices that their Captain (Melborne) frequently “had his skiff heaved out,” in the course of their voyage. The Master’s small boat, called the “skiff” or “gig,” was, no doubt, stowed (lashed) in the waist of the ship, while the “long-boat” was probably lashed on deck forward, being hoisted out and in, as the practice of those days was, by “whips,” from the yardarms. It was early the habit to keep certain of the live-stock, poultry, rabbits, etc., in the unused boats upon deck, and it is possible that in the crowded state of the MAY-FLOWER this custom was followed. Bradford remarks that their “goods or common store . . . were long in unlading [at New Plimoth] for want of boats.” It seems hardly possible that the Admiralty authorities,—though navigation laws were then few, crude, and poorly enforced,—or that the Adventurers and Pilgrim chiefs themselves, would permit a ship carrying some 130 souls to cross the Atlantic in the stormy season, without a reasonable boat provision. The capacity of the “long-boat” we know to have been about twenty persons, as nearly that number is shown by Bradford and Winslow to have gone in her on the early expeditions from the ship, at Cape Cod. She would therefore accommodate only about one sixth of the ship’s company. As the “gig” would carry only five or six persons,—while the shallop was stowed between decks and could be of no service in case of need upon the voyage,—the inference is warranted that other boats were carried, which fail of specific mention, or that she was wofully lacking. The want of boats for unlading, mentioned by Bradford, suggests the possibility that some of the ship’s quota may have been lost or destroyed on her boisterous voyage, though no such event appears of record, or is suggested by any one. In the event of wreck, the Pilgrims must have trusted, like the Apostle Paul and his associates when cast away on the island of Melita, to get to shore, “some on boards and some on broken pieces of the ship.” Her steering-gear, rigging, and the mechanism for “getting her anchors,” “slinging,” “squaring,” and “cockbilling” her yards; for “making” and “shortening” sail; “heaving out” her boats and “handling” her cargo, were of course all of the crude and simple patterns and construction of the time, usually so well illustrating the ancient axiom in physics, that “what is lost [spent] in power is gained in time.”
The compass-box and hanging-compass, invented by the English cleric, William Barlow, but twelve years before the Pilgrim voyage, was almost the only nautical appliance possessed by Captain Jones, of the MAY-FLOWER, in which no radical improvement has since been made. Few charts of much value—especially of western waters—had yet been drafted, but the rough maps and diagrams of Cabot, Smith, Gosnold, Pring, Champlain and Dermer, Jones was too good a navigator not to have had. In speaking of the landing at Cape Cod, the expression is used by Bradford in “Mourt’s Relation,” “We went round all points of the compass,” proving that already the mariner’s compass had become familiar to the speech even of those not using it professionally.
That the ship was “well-found” in anchors (with solid stocks), hemp cables, “spare” spars, “boat-tackling” and the heavy “hoisting-gear” of those days, we have the evidence of recorded use. “The MAY-FLOWER,” writes Captain Collins, would have had a hemp cable about 9 inches in circumference. Her anchors would probably weigh as follows: sheet anchor (or best bower) 500 to 600 lbs.; stream anchor 350 to 400 lbs.; the spare anchors same as the stream anchor.
“Charnock’s Illustrations” show that the anchors used in the MAY-FLOWER period were shaped very much like the so called Cape Ann anchor now made for our deep-sea fishing vessels. They had the conventional shaped flukes, with broad pointed palms, and a long shank, the upper end passing through a wooden stock. [Tory shows in his diagrams some of the anchors of that period with the space between the shank and flukes nearly filled up in the lower part with metal.] Such an anchor has the maximum of holding powers, and bearing in mind the elasticity of the hemp cables then used, would enable a vessel to ride safely even when exposed to heavy winds and a racing sea: There is no doubt, according to the British Admiralty Office,—which should be authority upon the matter, —that the flag under which the MAY-FLOWER, and all other vessels of the merchant marine of Great Britain, sailed, at the time she left England (as noted concerning the SPEEDWELL), was what became known as the “Union Jack,” as decreed by James the First, in 1606, supplanting the English ensign, which had been the red cross of St. George upon a white field. The new flag resulted from the “union” of the crowns and kingdoms of England and Scotland, upon the accession of James VI. of Scotland to the English throne, as James I. of England, upon the death of queen Elizabeth. Its design was formed by superimposing the red cross of St. George upon the white cross of St. Andrew, on a dark blue field; in other words, by imposing the cross of St. George, taken from the English ensign, upon the Scotch flag, and creating there by the new flag of Great Britain.
In a little monograph on “The British Flag—Its Origin and History,” a paper read by its author, Jona. F. Morris, Esq., before the Connecticut Historical Society, June 7, 1881, and reprinted at Hartford (1889), Mr. Morris, who has made much study of the matter, states (p. 4): “In 1603, James VI. of Scotland was crowned James I. of England. The Scots, in their pride that they had given a king to England, soon began to contend that the cross of St. Andrew should take precedence of the cross of St. George, that ships bearing the flag of the latter should salute that of St. Andrew. To allay the contention, the King, on the 12th of April, 1606, ordered that all subjects of Great Britain travelling by sea shall bear at the maintop the red cross of St. George and the white cross, commonly called the cross of St. Andrew, joined together according to a form made by his heralds besides this all vessels belonging to South Britain or England might wear the cross of St. George at the peak or fore, as they were wont, and all vessels belonging to North Britain or Scotland might wear the cross of St. Andrew at the fore top, as they had been accustomed; and all vessels were for bidden to wear any other flag at their peril. The new flag thus designed by the heralds and proclaimed by this order was called the ‘King’s Colors.’ For a long period the red cross had been the colors of English navigators, as well as the badge of English soldiery . . . . No permanent English settlement in America was made until after the adoption of the ‘King’s Colors.’ Jamestown, Plymouth, Salem, and Boston were settled under the new flag, though the ships bringing over settlers, being English vessels, also carried the red cross as permitted.” Mr. Barlow Cumberland, of Toronto, Canada, has also given, in a little monograph entitled “The Union Jack” (published by William Briggs of that city, 1898), an admirable account of the history of the British jack, which confirms the foregoing conclusions. The early English jack was later restored. Such, roughly sketched, was the Pilgrim ship, the renowned MAY-FLOWER, as, drafted from the meagre but fairly trustworthy and suggestive data available, she appears to us of to-day.
HER HISTORY:
In even the little we know of the later history of the ship, one cannot always be quite sure of her identity in the records of vessels of her name, of which there have been many. Dr. Nathaniel B. Shurtleff, of Boston, says that “a vessel bearing this name was owned in England about fifteen years or more before the voyage of our forefathers, but it would be impossible to prove or disprove its identity with the renowned MAY-FLOWER, however great such a probability might be. It is known, nevertheless, that—the identical famous vessel afterwards hailed from various English ports, such as London, Yarmouth, and Southampton, and that it was much used in transporting immigrants to this country. What eventually became of it and what was the end of its career, are equally unknown to history.” Goodwin says: “It does not appear that the MAY-FLOWER ever revisited Plymouth, but in 1629 she came to Salem,” with a company of the Leyden people for Plymouth, under command of Captain William Peirce, the warm friend of the Pilgrims, and in 1630 was one of the large fleet that attended John Winthrop, under a different master, discharging her passengers at Charlestown. Nothing is certainly known of her after that time. In 1648 a ship [hereinafter mentioned by Hunter] named the MAY-FLOWER was engaged in the slave trade, and the ill-informed as well as the ill-disposed have sometimes sneeringly alleged that this was our historic ship; but it is ascertained that the slaver was a vessel of three hundred and fifty tons,—nearly twice the size of our ship of happy memory. In 1588 the officials of Lynn (England) offered the “MAY-FLOWER” (150 tons) to join the fleet against the dreaded Spanish Armada. In 1657, Samuel Vassall, of London, complained that the government had twice impressed his ship, MAY-FLOWER, which he had “fitted out with sixty men, for the Straits.” Rev. Joseph Hunter, author of “The Founders of New Plymouth,” one of the most eminent antiquarians in England, and an indefatigable student of Pilgrim history among British archives, says: “I have not observed the name of MAY FLOWER [in which style he always writes it] before the year 1583 . . . But the name soon became exceedingly popular among those to whom belonged the giving of the names to vessels in the merchant-service. Before the close of that century [the sixteenth] we have a MAY-FLOWER of Hastings; a MAY-FLOWER of Rie; a MAY-FLOWER of Newcastle: a MAY FLOWER of Lynn; and a MAY-FLOWER Of Yarmouth: both in 1589. Also a MAY-FLOWER of Hull, 1599; a MAY FLOWER of London of eighty tons burden, 1587, and 1594, Of which Richard Ireland was the master, and another MAY-FLOWER of the same port, of ninety tons burthen, of which Robert White was the master in 1594, and a third MAY-FLOWER of London, unless it is the same vessel with one of the two just spoken of, only with a different master, William Morecock. In 1587 there was a MAY-FLOWER Of Dover, of which John Tooke was the master. In 1593 there was a MAY-FLOWER of Yarmouth of 120 tons, of which William Musgrove was the master. In 1608 there was a MAY-FLOWER of Dartmouth, of which Nicholas Waterdonne was the master; and in 1609 a MAY-FLOWER of Middleburgh entered an English port.”
Later in the century we find a MAY-FLOWER of Ipswich, and another of Newcastle in 1618; a MAY-FLOWER of York in 1621; a MAY-FLOWER of Scarborough in 1630, Robert Hadock the master; a MAY-FLOWER of Sandwich the same year, John Oliver the master; a MAY-FLOWER of Dover, 1633, Walter Finnis, master, in which two sons of the Earl of Berkshire crossed to Calais. “Which of these was the vessell which carried over the precious [Pilgrim] freight cannot perhaps be told [apparently neither, unless perhaps the MAY-FLOWER of Yarmouth of 1593, in which case her tonnage is incorrectly given], but we learn from Mr. Sherley’s letter to Governor Bradford’ that the same vessel was employed in 1629 in passing between the two countries, a company of the church at Leyden, who had joined in the first emigration, intending to pass in it to America; and in the same author we find that the vessel arrived in the harbour of Charlestown [N. E.] on July 1, 1630. There was a MAY-FLOWER which, in 1648, gained an unenviable notoriety as a slaver. But this was not the MAY-FLOWER which had carried over the first settlers, it being a vessel Of 350 tons, while the genuine MAY-FLOWER was of only 180 tons.” Of the first of her two known visits, after her voyage with the Pilgrim company from Leyden, Goodwin says: “In August, 1629, the renowned MAY-FLOWER came from England to Salem under Plymouth’s old friend [William] Peirce, and in her came thirty-five Leyden people, on their way to Plymouth.” The number has been in dispute, but the large cost of bringing them, over L500, would suggest that their families must have also come, as has been alleged, but for the following from Governor Bradford’s Letter Book: “These persons,” he says, “were in all thirty-five, which came at this time unto us from Leyden, whose charge out of Holland into England, and in England till the ship was ready, and then their transportation hither, came to a great deal of money, for besides victuals and other expenses, they were all newly apparelled.” Shirley, one of the Adventurers, writing to Governor Bradford in 1629, says: “Here are now many of your friends from Leyden coming over. With them also we have sent some servants, or in the ship that went lately (I think called the TALBOT), and this that these come in is the MAY-FLOWER.” All that Higginson’s journal tells of her, as noted, is, that “she was of Yarmouth;” was commanded by William Peirce, and carried provisions and passengers, but the fact that she was under command of Captain Peirce of itself tells much. On her next trip the MAY-FLOWER sailed from Southampton, in May, 1630, as part of Winthrop’s fleet, and arrived at Charlestown July 1. She was, on this voyage, under command of a new master (perhaps a Captain Weatherby), Captain Peirce having, at this time, command of the ship LYON, apparently in the service of Plymouth Colony. A vessel of this name [MAY-FLOWER] was sailing between England and Boston in 1656. Young says: “The MAY-FLOWER is a ship of renown in the history of the colonization of New England. She was one of the five vessels which, in 1629, conveyed Higginson’s company to Salem, and also one of the fleet which, in 1630, brought over his colony to Massachusetts Bay.”
October 6, 1652, “Thomas Webber, Mr. of the good shipp called the MAYFLOWER of the burden of Two hundred Tuns or there abouts . . . . Rideing at Ancor in the Harber of Boston,” sold one-sixteenth of the ship “for good & valluable Consideracons to Mr. John Pinchon of Springfield Mrchant.” The next day, October 7, 1652, the same “Thomas Webber, Mr, of the good Shipp called the MAY FLOWER of Boston in New England now bound for the barbadoes and thence to London,” acknowledges an indebtedness to Theodore Atkinson, a wealthy “hatter, felt-maker,” and merchant of Boston, and the same day (October 7, 1652), the said “Thomas Webber, Mr. of the good shipp called the MAY FLOWER of the burthen of Two hundred tuns or thereabouts,” sold “unto Theodore Atkinson felt-maker one-sixteenth part as well of said Shipp as of all & singular her masts Sails Sail-yards Ancors Cables Ropes Cords Gunns Gunpowder Shott Artillery Tackle Munition apparrell boate skiffe and furniture to the same belonging.” It is of course possible that this was the historic ship, though, if so, reappearing twenty two years after her last known voyage to New England. If the same, she was apparently under both new master and owner. From the facts that she is called “of Boston in New England” and was trading between that port, “the Barbadoes” and London, it is not impossible that she may have been built at Boston—a sort of namesake descendant of the historic ship—and was that MAY-FLOWER mentioned as belonging, in 1657, to Mr. Samuel Vassall; as he had large interests alike in Boston, Barbadoes, and London. Masters of vessels were often empowered to sell their ships or shares in them. Although we know not where her keel was laid, by what master she was built, or where she laid her timbers when her work was done, by virtue of her grand service to humanity, her fame is secure, and her name written among the few, the immortal names that were not born to die.
The officers and crew of the MAY-FLOWER were obviously important factors in the success of the Pilgrim undertaking, and it is of interest to know what we may concerning them. We have seen that the “pilot,” John Clarke, was employed by Weston and Cushman, even before the vessel upon which he was to serve had been found, and he had hence the distinction of being the first man “shipped” of the MAY-FLOWER’S complement. It is evident that he was promptly hired on its being known that he had recently returned from a voyage to Virginia in the cattle-ship FALCON, as certain to be of value in the colonists’ undertakings.
Knowing that the Adventurers’ agents were seeking both a ship and a master for her, it was the natural thing for the latter, that he should propose the Captain under whom he had last sailed, on much the same voyage as that now contemplated. It is an interesting fact that something of the uncertainty which for a time existed as to the names and features of the Pilgrim barks attaches the names and identity of their respective commanders. The “given” name of “Master” Reynolds, “pilott” and “Master” of the SPEED WELL, does not appear, but the assertion of Professor Arber, though positive enough, that “the Christian name of the Captain of the MAY-FLOWER is not known,” is not accepted by other authorities in Pilgrim history, though it is true that it does not find mention in the contemporaneous accounts of the Pilgrim ship and her voyage.
There is no room for doubt that the Captain of the FALCON—whose release from arrest while under charge of piracy the Earl of Warwick procured, that he might take command of the above-named cattle-ship on her voyage to Virginia, as hereinafter shown—was Thomas Jones. The identity of this man and “Master Jones” who assumed command of the MAY-FLOWER—with the former mate of the FALCON, John Clarke, as his first officer—is abundantly certified by circumstantial evidence of the strongest kind, as is also the fact that he commanded the ship DISCOVERY a little later.
With the powerful backing of such interested friends as the Earl of Warwick and Sir Ferdinando Gorges, undoubtedly already in league with Thomas Weston, who probably made the contract with Jones, as he had with Clarke, the suggestion of the latter as to the competency and availability of his late commander would be sure of prompt approval, and thus, in all probability, Captain Thomas Jones, who finds his chief place in history—and a most important one—as Master of the MAY-FLOWER, came to that service.
In 1619, as appears by Neill, the Virginia Company had one John Clarke in Ireland, “buying cattle for Virginia.” We know that Captain Jones soon sailed for Virginia with cattle, in the FALCON, of 150 tons, and as this was the only cattle ship in a long period, we can very certainly identify Clarke as the newly-hired mate of the MAY-FLOWER, who, Cush man says (letter of June 11/21, 1620), “went last year to Virginia with a ship of kine.” As 1620 did not begin until March 25, a ship sailing in February would have gone out in 1619, and Jones and Clarke could easily have made the voyage in time to engage for the MAY-FLOWER in the following June. “Six months after Jones’s trip in the latter” (i.e. after his return from the Pilgrim voyage), Neill says, “he took the DISCOVERY (60 tons) to Virginia, and then northward, trading along the coast. The Council for New England complained of him to the Virginia Company for robbing the natives on this voyage. He stopped at Plymouth (1622), and, taking advantage of the distress for food he found there, was extortionate in his prices. In July, 1625, he appeared at Jamestown, Virginia, in possession of a Spanish frigate, which he said had been captured by one Powell, under a Dutch commission, but it was thought a resumption of his old buccaneering practices. Before investigation he sickened and died.”
That Jones was a man of large experience, and fully competent in his profession, is beyond dispute. His disposition, character, and deeds have been the subject of much discussion. By most writers he is held to have been a man of coarse, “unsympathetic” nature, “a rough sea-dog,” capable of good feeling and kindly impulses at times, but neither governed by them nor by principle. That he was a “highwayman of the seas,” a buccaneer and pirate, guilty of blood for gold, there can be no doubt. Certainly nothing could justify the estimate of him given by Professor Arber, that “he was both fair-minded and friendly toward the Pilgrim Fathers,” and he certainly stands alone among writers of reputation in that opinion. Jones’s selfishness,
[Bradford himself—whose authority in the matter will not bedoubted—says (Historie, Mass. ed. p. 112): “As this calamitie,the general sickness, fell among ye passengers that were to be lefthere to plant, and were basted ashore and made to drinke water, thatthe sea-men might have ye more bear [beer] and one in his sicknessdesiring but a small can of beare it was answered that if he weretheir own father he should have none.” Bradford also shows (op.cit. p. 153) the rapacity of Jones, when in command of theDISCOVERY, in his extortionate demands upon the Plymouth planters,notwithstanding their necessities.]
threats, boorishness, and extortion, to say nothing of his exceedingly bad record as a pirate, both in East and West Indian waters, compel a far different estimate of him as a man, from that of Arber, however excellent he was as a mariner. Professor Arber dissents from Goodwin’s conclusion that Captain Jones of the DISCOVERY was the former Master of the MAY-FLOWER, but the reasons of his dissent are by no means convincing. He argues that Jones would not have accepted the command of a vessel so much smaller than his last, the DISCOVERY being only one third the size of the MAY-FLOWER. Master-mariners, particularly when just returned from long and unsuccessful voyages, especially if in bad repute,—as was Jones, —are obliged to take such employment as offers, and are often glad to get a ship much smaller than their last, rather than remain idle. Moreover, in Jones’s case, if, as appears, he was inclined to buccaneering, the smaller ship would serve his purpose—as it seems it did satisfactorily. Nor is the fact that Bradford speaks of him—although previously so well acquainted—as “one Captain Jones,” to be taken as evidence, as Arber thinks, that the Master of the DISCOVERY was some other of the name. Bradford was writing history, and his thought just then was the especial Providence of God in the timely relief afforded their necessities by the arrival of the ships with food, without regard to the individuals who brought it, or the fact that one was an acquaintance of former years. On the other hand, Winslow—in his “Good Newes from New England” —records the arrival of the two ships in August, 1622, and says, “the one as I take [recollect] it, was called the DISCOVERY, Captain Jones having command thereof,” which on the same line of argument as Arber’s might be read, “our old acquaintance Captain Jones, you know”! If the expression of Bradford makes against its being Captain Jones, formerly of the MAY-FLOWER, Winslow’s certainly makes quite as much for it, while the fact which Winslow recites, viz. that the DISCOVERY, under Jones, was sailing as consort to the SPARROW, a ship of Thomas Weston,—who employed him for the MAY-FLOWER, was linked with him in the Gorges conspiracy, and had become nearly as degenerate as he,—is certainly significant. There are still better grounds, as will appear in the closely connected relations of Jones, for holding with Goodwin rather than with Arber in the matter. The standard authority in the case is the late Rev. E. D. Neill, D. D., for some years United States consul at Dublin, who made very considerable research into all matters pertaining to the Virginia Companies, consulting their original records and “transactions,” the Dutch related documents, the “Calendars of the East India Company,” etc. Upon him and his exhaustive work all others have largely drawn,—notably Professor Arber himself,—and his conclusions seem entitled to the same weight here which Arber gives them in other relations. Dr. Neill is clearly of opinion that the Captains of the MAY-FLOWER and the DISCOVERY were identical, and this belief is shared by such authorities in Pilgrim literature as Young, Prince, Goodwin, and Davis, and against this formidable consensus of opinion, Arber, unless better supported, can hardly hope to prevail.
The question of Jones’s duplicity and fraud, in bringing the Pilgrims to land at Cape Cod instead of the “neighbor-hood of Hudson’s River,” has been much mooted and with much diversity of opinion, but in the light of the subjoined evidence and considerations it seems well-nigh impossible to acquit him of the crime—for such it was, in inception, nature, and results, however overruled for good.
The specific statements of Bradford and others leave no room for doubt that the MAY-FLOWER Pilgrims fully intended to make their settlement somewhere in the region of the mouth of “Hudson’s River.” Morton states in terms that Captain Jones’s “engagement was to Hudson’s River.” Presumably, as heretofore noted, the stipulation of his charter party required that he should complete his outward voyage in that general locality. The northern limits of the patents granted in the Pilgrim interest, whether that of John Wincob (or Wincop) sealed June 9/ 19, 1619, but never used, or the first one to John Pierce, of February 2/12, 1620, were, of course, brought within the limits of the First (London) Virginia Company’s charter, which embraced, as is well-known, the territory between the parallels of 34 deg. and 41 deg. N. latitude. The most northerly of these parallels runs but about twenty miles to the north of the mouth of “Hudson’s River.” It is certain that the Pilgrims, after the great expense, labor, and pains of three years, to secure the protection of these Patents, would not willingly or deliberately, have planted themselves outside that protection, upon territory where they had none, and where, as interlopers, they might reasonably expect trouble with the lawful proprietors. Nor was there any reason why, if they so desired, they should not have gone to “Hudson’s River” or its vicinity, unless it was that they had once seemed to recognize the States General of Holland as the rightful owners of that territory, by making petition to them, through the New Netherland Company, for their authority and protection in settling there. But even this fact constituted no moral or legal bar to such action, if desirable First, because it appears certain that, whatever the cause, they “broke off” themselves their negotiations with the Dutch,—whether on account of the inducements offered by Thomas Weston, or a doubt of the ability of the Dutch to maintain their claim to that region, and to protect there, or both, neither appears nor matters. Second, because the States General—whether with knowledge that they of Leyden had so “broken off” or from their own doubts of their ability to maintain their claim on the Hudson region, does not appear—rejected the petition made to them in the Pilgrims’ behalf. It is probable that the latter was the real reason, from the fact that the petition was twice rejected.
In view of the high opinion of the Leyden brethren, entertained, as we know, by the Dutch, it is clear that the latter would have been pleased to secure them as colonists; while if at all confident of their rights to the territory, they must have been anxious to colonize it and thus confirm their hold, increase their revenues as speedily as possible, and
Third, because it appears upon the showing of the petition itself, made by the New Netherland Company (to which the Leyden leaders had looked, doubtless on account of its pretensions, for the authority and protection of the States General, as they afterward did to the English Virginia Company for British protection), that this Company had lost its own charter by expiration, and hence had absolutely nothing to offer the Leyden people beyond the personal and associate influence of its members, and the prestige of a name that had once been potential. In fact, the New Netherland Company was using the Leyden congregation as a leverage to pry for itself from the States General new advantages, larger than it had previously enjoyed.
Moreover it appears by the evidence of both the petition of the Directors of the New Netherland Company to the Prince of Orange (February 2/12, 1619/20), and the letters of Sir Dudley Carleton, the British ambassador at the Hague, to the English Privy Council, dated February 5/15, 1621/22, that, up to this latter date the Dutch had established no colony
[British State Papers, Holland, Bundle 165. Sir Dudley Carleton’sLetters. “They have certain Factors there, continually resident,trading with savages . . . but I cannot learn of any colony,either I already planted there by these people, or so much asintended.” Sir Dudley Carleton’s Letters.]
on the territory claimed by them at the Hudson, and had no other representation there than the trading-post of a commercial company whose charter had expired. There can be no doubt that the Leyden leaders knew, from their dealings with the New Netherland Company, and the study of the whole problem which they evidently made, that this region was open to them or any other parties for habitation and trade, so far as any prior grants or charters under the Dutch were concerned, but they required more than this.
To Englishmen, the English claim to the territory at “Hudson’s River” was valid, by virtue of the discovery of the Cabots, under the law of nations as then recognized, not withstanding Hudson’s more particular explorations of those parts in 1609, in the service of Holland, especially as no colony or permanent occupancy of the region by the Dutch had been made.
Professor John Fiske shows that “it was not until the Protestant England of Elizabeth had come to a life-and-death grapple with Spain, and not until the discovery of America had advanced much nearer completion, so that its value began to be more correctly understood, that political and commercial motives combined in determining England to attack Spain through America, and to deprive her of supremacy in the colonial and maritime world. Then the voyages of the Cabots assumed an importance entirely new, and could be quoted as the basis of a prior claim on the part of the English Crown, to lands which it [through the Cabots] had discovered.”
Having in mind the terrible history of slaughter and reprisal between the Spanish and French (Huguenot) settlers in Florida in 1565-67,
[Bancroft, History of the United States, vol. i. p. 68; Fiske,Discovery of America, vol. ii. p. 511 et seq. With the terribleexperience of the Florida plantations in memory, the far-sightedleaders of the Leyden church proposed to plant under the shelter ofan arm strong enough to protect them, and we find the Directors ofthe New Netherland Company stating that the Leyden party (thePilgrims) can be induced to settle under Dutch auspices, “provided,they would be guarded and preserved from all violence on the part ofother potentates, by the authority, and under the protection of yourPrincely Excellency and the High and Mighty States General.”Petition of the Directors of the New Netherland Company to thePrince of Orange.]
the Pilgrims recognized the need of a strong power behind them, under whose aegis they might safely plant, and by virtue of whose might and right they could hope to keep their lives and possessions. The King of England had, in 1606, granted charters to the two Virginia Companies, covering all the territory in dispute, and, there could be no doubt, would protect these grants and British proprietorship therein, against all comers. Indeed, the King (James I.) by letter to Sir Dudley Carleton, his ambassador at the Hague, under date of December 15, 1621, expressly claimed his rights in the New Netherland territory and instructed him to impress upon the government of the States General his Majesty’s claim,—“who, ‘jure prime occupation’ hath good and sufficient title to these parts.” There can be no question that the overtures of Sandys, Weston, and others to make interest for them with one of these English Companies, agreed as well with both the preferences and convictions of the Leyden Pilgrims, as they did with the hopes and designs of Sir Ferdinando Gorges. In the light of these facts, there appears to have been neither legal nor moral bar to the evident intention of the Pilgrims to settle in the vicinity of “Hudson’s River,” if they so elected. In their light, also, despite the positive allegations of the truthful but not always reliable Morton, his charges of intrigue between the Dutch and Master Jones of the MAY-FLOWER, to prevent the settlement of his ship’s company at “Hudson’s River,” may well be doubted. Writing in “New England’s Memorial” in 1669, Morton says: “But some of the Dutch, having notice of their intentions, and having thoughts about the same time of erecting a plantation there likewise, they fraudulently hired the said Jones, by delays while they were in England, and now under pretence of the shoals the dangers of the Monomoy Shoals off Cape Cod to disappoint them in going thither.” He adds: “Of this plot between the Dutch and Mr. Jones, I have had late and certain intelligence.” If this intelligence was more reliable than his assertion concerning the responsibility of Jones for the “delays while they were in England,” it may well be discredited, as not the faintest evidence appears to make him responsible for those delays, and they are amply accounted for without him. Without questioning the veracity of Morton (while suggesting his many known errors, and that the lapse of time made it easy to misinterpret even apparently certain facts), it must be remembered that he is the original sponsor for the charge of Dutch intrigue with Jones, and was its sole support for many years. All other writers who have accepted and indorsed his views are of later date, and but follow him, while Bradford and Winslow, who were victims of this Dutch conspiracy against them, if it ever existed, were entirely silent in their writings upon the matter, which we may be sure they would not have been, had they suspected the Dutch as prime movers in the treachery. That there was a conspiracy to accomplish the landing of the MAY-FLOWER planters at a point north of “the Hudson” (in fact, north of the bounds defined by the (first) Pierce patent, upon which they relied), i.e. north of 41 deg. N. latitude,—is very certain; but that it was of Dutch origin, or based upon motives which are attributed to the Dutch, is clearly erroneous. While the historical facts indicate an utter lack of motive for such an intrigue on the part of the Dutch, either as a government or as individuals, there was no lack of motive on the part of certain others, who, we can but believe, were responsible for the conspiracy. Moreover, the chief conspirators were such, that, even if the plot was ultimately suspected by the Pilgrims, a wise policy—indeed, self-preservation —would have dictated their silence. That the Dutch were without sufficient motive or interest has been declared. That the States General could have had no wish to reject so exceptionally excellent a body of colonists as subjects, and as tenants to hold and develop their disputed territory—if in position to receive them and guarantee them protection —is clear. The sole objection that could be urged against them was their English birth, and with English regiments garrisoning the Dutch home cities, and foreigners of every nation in the States General’s employ, by land and by sea, such an objection could have had no weight. Indeed, the Leyden party proposed, if they effected satisfactory arrangements with the States General (as stated by the Directors of the New Netherland Company), “to plant there [at “Hudson’s River”] a new commonwealth, all under the order and command of your Princely Excellency and their High Mightinesses the States General:” The Leyden Pilgrims were men who kept their agreements.
The Dutch trading-companies, who were the only parties in the Low Countries who could possibly have had any motive for such a conspiracy, were at this time themselves without charters, and the overtures of the principal company, made to the government in behalf of themselves and the Leyden brethren, had recently, as we have seen, been twice rejected. They had apparently, therefore, little to hope for in the near future; certainly not enough to warrant expenditure and the risk of disgraceful exposure, in negotiations with a stranger—an obscure ship-master—to change his course and land his passengers in violation of the terms of his charter-party;—negotiations, moreover, in which neither of the parties could well have had any guaranty of the other’s good faith.
But, as previously asserted, there was a party—to whom such knavery was an ordinary affair—who had ample motive, and of whom Master Thomas Jones was already the very willing and subservient ally and tool, and had been such for years. Singularly enough, the motive governing this party was exactly the reverse of that attributed—though illogically and without reason—to the Dutch. In the case of the latter, the alleged animus was a desire to keep the Pilgrim planters away from their “Hudson’s River” domain. In the case of the real conspirators, the purpose was to secure these planters as colonists for, and bring them to, the more northern territory owned by them. It is well known that Sir Ferdinando Gorges was the leading spirit of the “Second Virginia Company,” as he also became (with the Earl of Warwick a close second) of “The Council for the Affairs of New England,” of which both men were made “Governors,” in November of 1620, when the Council practically superseded the “Second Virginia Company.” The Great Charter for “The Council of Affairs of New England,” commonly known as “The Council for New England,” issued Tuesday, November 3/13, 1620, and it held in force till Sunday, June 7/17, 1635.
Although not its official head, and ranked at its board by dukes and earls, Sir Ferdinando Gorges was—as he had been in the old Plymouth (or Second) Virginia Company—the leading man. This was largely from his superior acquaintance with, and long and varied experience in, New England affairs. The “Council” was composed of forty patentees, and Baxter truly states, that “Sir Ferdinando Gorges, at this time [1621] stood at the head of the Council for New England, so far as influence went; in fact, his hand shaped its affairs.” This company, holding—by the division of territory made under the original charter-grants—a strip of territory one hundred miles wide, on the North American coast, between the parallels of 41 deg. and 45 deg. N. latitude, had not prospered, and its efforts at colonization (on what is now the Maine coast), in 1607 and later, had proved abortive, largely through the character of its “settlers,” who had been, in good degree, a somewhat notable mixture of two of the worst elements of society,—convicts and broken-down “gentlemen.”
“In 1607,” says Goodwin, “Gorges and the cruel Judge Popham planted a colony at Phillipsburg (or Sagadahoc, as is supposed), by the mouth of the Kennebec. Two ships came, ‘THE GIFT OF GOD’ and the ‘MARY AND JOHN,’ bringing a hundred persons. Through August they found all delightful, but when the ships went back in December, fifty five of the number returned to England, weary of their experience and fearful of the cold .... With spring the ships returned from England; “but by this time the remainder were ready to leave,” so every soul returned with Gilbert [the Admiral] . . . . For thirty years Gorges continued to push exploration and emigration to that region, but his ambition and liberality ever resulted in disappointment and loss.” The annals of the time show that not a few of the Sagadahoc colonists were convicts, released from the English jails to people this colony.
Hakluyt says: “In 1607 [this should read 1608], disheartened by the death of Popham, they all embarked in a ship from Exeter and in the new pynnace, the ‘VIRGINIA,’ built in the colony, and sett sail for England, and this was the end of that northern colony upon the river Sachadehoc [Kennebec].”
No one knew better than the shrewd Gorges the value of such a colony as that of the Leyden brethren would be, to plant, populate, and develop his Company’s great demesne. None were more facile than himself and the buccaneering Earl of Warwick, to plan and execute the bold, but—as it proved—easy coup, by which the Pilgrim colony was to be stolen bodily; for the benefit of the “Second Virginia Company” and its successor, “the Council for New England,” from the “First (or London) Company,” under whose patent (to John Pierce) and patronage they sailed. They apparently did not take their patent with them,—it would have been worthless if they had,—and they were destined to have no small trouble with Pierce, before they were established in their rights under the new patent granted him (in the interest of the Adventurers and themselves), by the “Council for New England.” Master John Wincob’s early and silent withdrawal from his apparently active connection with the Pilgrim movement, and the evident cancellation of the first patent issued to him in its interest, by the (London) Virginia Company, have never been satisfactorily explained. Wincob (or Wincop), we are told, “was a religious Gentleman, then belonging to the household of the Countess of Lincoln, who intended to go with them [the Pilgrims] but God so disposed as he never went, nor they ever made use of this Patent, which had cost them so much labor and charge.” Wincob, it appears by the minutes of the (London) Virginia Company of Wednesday, May 26/June 5, 1619, was commended to the Company, for the patent he sought, by the fourth Earl of Lincoln, and it was doubtless through his influence that it was granted and sealed, June 9/19, 1619. But while Wincob was a member of the household of the Dowager Countess of Lincoln, mother of the fourth Earl of Lincoln; John, the eldest son of Sir Ferdinando Gorges, had married the Earl’s daughter (sister ?), and hence Gorges stood in a much nearer relation to the Earl than did his mother’s friend and dependant (as Wincob evidently was), as well as on a much more equal social footing. By the minutes of the (London) Virginia Company of Wednesday, February 2/ 12, 1619/20, it appears that a patent was “allowed and sealed to John Pierce and his associates, heirs and assigns,” for practically the same territory for which the patent to Wincob had been given but eight months before. No explanation was offered, and none appears of record, but the logical conclusion is, that the first patent had been cancelled, that Master Wincob’s personal interest in the Pilgrim exodus had ceased, and that the Lincoln patronage had been withdrawn. It is a rational conjecture that Sir Ferdinando Gorges, through the relationship he sustained to the Earl, procured the withdrawal of Wincob and his patent, knowing that the success of his (Gorges’s) plot would render the Wincob patent worthless, and that the theft of the colony, in his own interest, would be likely to breed “unpleasantness” between himself and Wincob’s sponsors and friends among the Adventurers, many of whom were friends of the Earl of Lincoln.
The Earl of Warwick, the man of highest social and political rank in the First (or London) Virginia Company, was, at about the same time, induced by Gorges to abandon his (the London) Company and unite with himself in securing from the Crown the charter of the “Council of Affairs for New England.” The only inducements he could offer for the change must apparently have resided in the promised large results of plottings disclosed by him (Gorges), but he needed the influential and unscrupulous Earl for the promotion of his schemes, and won him, by some means, to an active partnership, which was doubtless congenial to both. The “fine Italian hand” of Sir Ferdinando hence appears at every stage, and in every phase, of the Leyden movement, from the mission of Weston to Holland, to the landing at Cape Cod, and every movement clearly indicates the crafty cunning, the skilful and brilliant manipulation, and the dogged determination of the man.
That Weston was a most pliant and efficient tool in the hands of Gorges, “from start to finish” of this undertaking, is certainly apparent. Whether he was, from the outset, made fully aware of the sinister designs of the chief conspirator, and a party to them, admits of some doubt, though the conviction strengthens with study, that he was, from the beginning, ‘particeps criminis’. If he was ever single-minded for the welfare of the Leyden brethren and the Adventurers, it must have been for a very brief time at the inception of the enterprise; and circumstances seem to forbid crediting him with honesty of purpose, even then. The weight of evidence indicates that he both knew, and was fully enlisted in, the entire plot of Gorges from the outset. In all its early stages he was its most efficient promoter, and seems to have given ample proof of his compliant zeal in its execution. His visit to the Leyden brethren in Holland was, apparently, wholly instigated by Gorges, as the latter complacently claims and collateral evidence proves. In his endeavor to induce the leaders to “break off with the Dutch,” their pending negotiations for settlement at “Hudson’s River,” he evidently made capital of, and traded upon, his former kindness to some of them when they were in straits,—a most contemptible thing in itself, yet characteristic of the man. He led the Pilgrims to “break off” their dealings with the Dutch by the largest and most positive promises of greater advantages through him, few of which he ever voluntarily kept (as we see by John Robinson’s sharp arraignment of him), his whole object being apparently to get the Leyden party into his control and that of his friends,—the most subtle and able of whom was Gorges. Bradford recites that Weston not only urged the Leyden leaders “not to meddle with ye Dutch,” but also,—“not too much to depend on ye Virginia [London] Company,” but to rely on himself and his friends. This strongly suggests active cooperation with Gorges, on Weston’s part, at the outset, with the intent (if he could win them by any means, from allegiance to the First (London) Virginia Company), to lead the Leyden party, if possible, into Gorges’s hands and under the control and patronage of the Second (or Plymouth) Virginia Company. Whatever the date may have been, at which (as Bradford states) the Leyden people “heard, both by Mr. Weston and others, yt sundrie Honble: Lords had obtained a large grante from ye king for ye more northerly parts of that countrie, derived out of ye Virginia patents, and wholly secluded from theire Governmente, and to be called by another name, viz. New England, unto which Mr. Weston and the chiefe of them begane to incline;” Bradford leaves us in no doubt as to Weston’s attitude toward the matter itself. It is certain that the governor, writing from memory, long afterward, fixed the time at which the Honble: Lords had obtained “their large grante” much earlier than it could possibly have occurred, as we know the exact date of the patent for the, “Council for New England,” and that the order for its issue was not given till just as the Pilgrims left Leyden; so that they could not have known of the actual “grante” till they reached Southampton. The essential fact, stated on this best of authority, is, that “Mr. Weston and the chiefe of them [their sponsors, i.e. Weston and Lord Warwick, both in league with Gorges] begane to incline to Gorges’s new Council for New England.” Such an attitude (evidently taken insidiously) meant, on Weston’s part, of necessity, no less than treachery to his associates of the Adventurers; to the (London) Virginia Company, and to the Leyden company and their allied English colonists, in the interest of Sir Ferdinando Gorges and his schemes and of the new “Council” that Gorges was organizing. Weston’s refusal to advance “a penny” to clear the departing Pilgrims from their port charges at Southampton; his almost immediate severance of connection with both the colonists and the Adventurers; and his early association with Gorges,—in open and disgraceful violation of all the formers’ rights in New England,—to say nothing of his exhibition of a malevolence rarely exercised except toward those one has deeply wronged, all point to a complete and positive surrender of himself and his energies to the plot of Gorges, as a full participant, from its inception. In his review of the Anniversary Address of Hon. Charles Francis Adams (of July 4, 1892, at Quincy), Daniel W. Baker, Esq., of Boston, says: “The Pilgrim Fathers were influenced in their decision to come to New England by Weston, who, if not the agent of Gorges in this particular matter, was such in other matters and held intimate relations with him.”
The known facts favor the belief that Gorges’s cogitations on colonial matters—especially as stimulated by his plottings in relation to the Leyden people—led to his project of the grant—and charter for the new “Council for New England,” designed and constituted to supplant, or override, all others. It is highly probable that this grand scheme —duly embellished by the crafty Gorges,—being unfolded to Weston, with suggestions of great opportunities for Weston himself therein, warmed and drew him, and brought him to full and zealous cooperation in all Gorges’s plans, and that from this time, as Bradford states, he “begane to incline” toward, and to suggest to the Pilgrims, association with Gorges and the new “Council.” Not daring openly to declare his change of allegiance and his perfidy, he undertook, apparently, at first, by suggestions, e.g. “not to place too much dependence on the London Company, but to rely on himself and friends;” that “the fishing of New England was good,” etc.; and making thus no headway, then, by a policy of delay, fault finding, etc., to breed dissatisfaction, on the Pilgrims’ part, with the Adventurers, the patent of Wincob, etc., with the hope of bringing about “a new deal” in the Gorges interest. The same “delays” in sailing, that have been adduced as proof of Jones’s complicity with the Dutch, would have been of equal advantage to these noble schemers, and if he had any hand in them-which does not appear—it would have been far more likely in the interest of his long-time patron, the Earl of Warwick, and of his friends, than of any Dutch conspirators.
Once the colonists were landed upon the American soil, especially if late in the season, they would not be likely, it doubtless was argued, to remove; while by a liberal policy on the part of the “Council for New England” toward them—when they discovered that they were upon its territory—they could probably be retained. That just such a policy was, at once and eagerly, adopted toward them, as soon as occasion permitted, is good proof that the scheme was thoroughly matured from the start. The record of the action of the “Council for New England”—which had become the successor of the Second Virginia Company before intelligence was received that the Pilgrims had landed on its domain—is not at hand, but it appears by the record of the London Company, under date of Monday, July 16/26, 1621, that the “Council for New England” had promptly made itself agreeable to the colonists. The record reads: “It was moved, seeing that Master John Pierce had taken a Patent of Sir Ferdinando Gorges, and thereupon seated his Company [the Pilgrims] within the limits of the Northern Plantations, as by some was supposed,”’ etc. From this it is plain that, on receipt by Pierce of the news that the colony was landed within the limits of the “Council for New England,” he had, as instructed, applied for, and been given (June 1, 1621), the (first) “Council” patent for the colony. For confirmation hereof one should see also the minutes of the “Council for New England” of March 25/April 4., 1623, and the fulsome letter of Robert Cushman returning thanks in behalf of the Planters (through John Pierce), to Gorges, for his prompt response to their request for a patent and for his general complacency toward them Hon. James Phinney Baxter, Gorges’s able and faithful biographer, says: “We can imagine with what alacrity he [Sir Ferdinando] hastened to give to Pierce a patent in their behalf.” The same biographer, clearly unconscious of the well-laid plot of Gorges and Warwick (as all other writers but Neill and Davis have been), bears testimony (all the stronger because the witness is unwitting of the intrigue), to the ardent interest Gorges had in its success. He says: “The warm desire of Sir Ferdinando Gorges to see a permanent colony founded within the domain of the Plymouth [or Second] Virginia Company was to be realized in a manner of which he had never dreamed [sic!] and by a people with whom he had but little sympathized, although we know that he favored their settlement within the territorial limits of the Plymouth [Second] Company.” He had indeed “favored their settlement,” by all the craft of which he was master, and greeted their expected and duly arranged advent with all the jubilant open-handedness with which the hunter treats the wild horse he has entrapped, and hopes to domesticate and turn to account. Everything favored the conspirators. The deflection north-ward from the normal course of the ship as she approached the coast, bound for the latitude of the Hudson, required only to be so trifling that the best sailor of the Pilgrim leaders would not be likely to note or criticise it, and it was by no means uncommon to make Cape Cod as the first landfall on Virginia voyages. The lateness of the arrival on the coast, and the difficulties ever attendant on doubling Cape Cod, properly turned to account, would increase the anxiety for almost any landing-place, and render it easy to retain the sea-worn colonists when once on shore. The grand advantage, however, over and above all else, was the entire ease and certainty with which the cooperation of the one man essential to the success of the undertaking could be secured, without need of the privity of any other, viz. the Master of the MAY-FLOWER, Captain Thomas Jones.
Let us see upon what the assumption of this ready and certain accord on the part of Captain Jones rests. Rev. Dr. Neill, whose thorough study of the records of the Virginia Companies, and of the East India Company Calendars and collateral data, entitles him to speak with authority, recites that, “In 1617, Capt. Thomas Jones (sometimes spelled Joanes) had been sent to the East Indies in command of the ship LION by the Earl of Warwick (then Sir Robt. Rich), under a letter of protection from the Duke of Savoy, a foreign prince, ostensibly ‘to take pirates,’ which [pretext] had grown, as Sir Thomas Roe (the English ambassador with the Great Mogul) states, ‘to be a common pretence for becoming pirate.’” Caught by the famous Captain Martin Pring, in full pursuit of the junk of the Queen Mother of the Great Mogul, Jones was attacked, his ship fired in the fight, and burned,—with some of his crew,—and he was sent a prisoner to England in the ship BULL, arriving in the Thames, January 1, 1618/19. No action seems to have been taken against him for his offences, and presumably his employer, Sir Robert, the coming Earl, obtained his liberty on one pretext or another. On January 19, however, complaint was made against Captain Jones, “late of the LION,” by the East India Company, “for hiring divers men to serve the King of Denmark in the East Indies.” A few days after his arrest for “hiring away the Company’s men, Lord Warwick got him off” on the claim that he had employed him “to go to Virginia with cattle.” From the “Transactions” of the Second Virginia Company, of which—as we have seen—Sir Ferdinando Gorges was the leading spirit, it appears that on “February 2, 1619/20, a commission was allowed Captain Thomas Jones of the FALCON, a ship of 150 tons” [he having been lately released from arrest by the Earl of Warwick’s intercession], and that “before the close of the month, he sailed with cattle for Virginia,” as previously noted. Dr. Neill, than whom there can be no better authority, was himself satisfied, and unequivocally states, that “Thomas Jones, Captain of the MAY-FLOWER, was without doubt the old servant of Lord Warwick in the East Indies.” Having done Sir Robert Rich’s (the Earl of Warwick’s) “dirty work” for years, and having on all occasions been saved from harm by his noble patron (even when piracy and similar practices had involved him in the meshes of the law), it would be but a trifling matter, at the request of such powerful friends as the Earl and Sir Ferdinando Gorges, to steal the Pilgrim Colony from the London Virginia Company, and hand it over bodily to the “Council for New England,”—the successor of the Second (Plymouth) Virginia Company,—in which their interests were vested, Warwick having, significantly, transferred his membership from the London Company to the new “Council for New England,” as it was commonly called. Neill states, and there is abundant proof, that “the Earl of Warwick and Gorges were in sympathy,” and were active coadjutors, while it is self-evident that both would be anxious to accomplish the permanent settlement of the “Northern Plantations” held by their Company. That they would hesitate to utilize so excellent an opportunity to secure so very desirable a colony, by any means available, our knowledge of the men and their records makes it impossible to believe,—while nothing could apparently have been easier of accomplishment. It will readily be understood that if the conspirators were these men,—upon whose grace the Pilgrims must depend for permission to remain upon the territory to which they had been inveigled, or even for permission to depart from it, without spoliation, —men whose influence with the King (no friend to the Pilgrims) was sufficient to make both of them, in the very month of the Pilgrims’ landing, “governors” of “The Council for New England,” under whose authority the Planters must remain,—the latter were not likely to voice their suspicions of the trick played upon them, if they discovered it, or openly to resent it, when known. Dr. Dexter, in commenting on the remark of Bradford, “We made Master Jones our leader, for we thought it best herein to gratifie his kindness & forwardness,” sensibly says, “This proves nothing either way, in regard to the charge which Secretary Morton makes of treachery against Jones, in landing the company so far north, because, if that were true, it was not known to any of the company for years afterward, and of course could not now [at that time] impair their feelings of confidence in, or kindness towards, him. Moreover, the phraseology, “we thought it best to gratifie,” suggests rather considerations of policy than cordial desire, and their acquaintance, too, with the man was still young. There is, however, no evidence that Jones’s duplicity was suspected till long afterward, though his character was fully recognized. Gorges himself furnishes, in his writings, the strongest confirmation we have of the already apparent fact, that he was himself the prime conspirator. He says, in his own “Narration,” “It was referred [evidently by himself] to their [the London Virginia Company’s] consideration, how necessary it was that means might be used to draw unto those their enterprises, some of those families that had retired themselves into Holland for scruple of conscience, giving them such freedom and liberty as might stand with their liking.” When have we ever found Sir Ferdinando Gorges thus solicitous for the success of the rival Virginia Company? Why, if he so esteemed the Leyden people as excellent colonists, did he not endeavor to secure them himself directly, for his own languishing company? Certainly the “scruple of conscience” of the Leyden brethren did not hinder him, for he found it no bar, though of the Established Church himself, to giving them instantly all and more than was asked in their behalf, as soon as he had them upon his territory and they had applied for a patent. He well knew that it would be matter of some expense and difficulty to bring the Leyden congregation into agreement to go to either of the Virginia grants, and he doubtless, and with good reason, feared that his repute and the character and reputation of his own Company, with its past history of failure, convict settlers, and loose living, would be repellent to these people of “conscience.” If they could be brought to the “going-point,” by men more of their ilk, like Sir Edwin Sandys, Weston, and others, it would then be time to see if he could not pluck the ripe fruit for himself,—as he seems to have done.
“This advice,” he says, “being hearkened unto, there were [those] that undertook the putting it in practice [Weston and others] and it was accordingly brought to effect,” etc. Then, reciting (erroneously) the difficulties with the SPEEDWELL, etc., he records the MAY-FLOWER’S arrival at Cape Cod, saying, “The . . . ship with great difficulty reached the coast of New England.” He then gives a glowing, though absurd, account of the attractions the planters found—in midwinter —especially naming the hospitable reception of the Indians, despite the fact of the savage attack made upon them by the Nausets at Cape Cod, and adds: “After they had well considered the state of their affairs and found that the authority they had from the London Company of Virginia, could not warrant their abode in that place,” which “they found so prosperous and pleasing [sic] they hastened away their ship, with orders to their Solicitor to deal with me to be a means they might have a grant from the Council of New England Affairs, to settle in the place, which was accordingly performed to their particular satisfaction and good content of them all.” One can readily imagine the crafty smile with which Sir Ferdinando thus guilelessly recorded the complete success of his plot. It is of interest to note how like a needle to the pole the grand conspirator’s mind flies to the fact which most appeals to him —that they find “that the authority they had . . . could not warrant their abode in that place.” It is of like interest to observe that in that place which he called “pleasant and prosperous” one half their own and of the ship’s company had died before they hastened the ship away, and they had endured trial, hardships, and sorrows untellable,—although from pluck and principle they would not abandon it. He tells us “they hastened away their ship,” and implies that it was for the chief purpose of obtaining through him a grant of the land they occupied. While we know that the ship did not return till the following April,—and then at her Captain’s rather than the Pilgrims’ pleasure,—it is evident that Gorges could think of events only as incident to his designs and from his point of view. His plot had succeeded. He had the “Holland families” upon his soil, and his willing imagination converted their sober and deliberate action into the eager haste with which he had planned that they should fly to him for the patent, which his cunning had—as he purposed—rendered necessary. Of course their request “was performed,” and so readily and delightedly that, recognizing John Pierce as their mouthpiece and the plantation as “Mr. Pierces Plantation,” Sir Ferdinando and his associates—the “Council for New England,” including his joint-conspirator, the Earl of Warwick—gave Pierce unhesitatingly whatever he asked. The Hon. William T. Davis, who alone among Pilgrim historians (except Dr. Neill, whom he follows) seems to have suspected the hand of Gorges in the treachery of Captain Jones, here demonstrated, has suggested that: “Whether Gorges might not have influenced Pierce, in whose name the patent of the Pilgrims had been issued—and whether both together might not have seduced Capt. Jones, are further considerations to be weighed, in solving the problem of a deviation from the intended voyage of the MAYFLOWER.” Although not aware of these suggestions, either of Mr. Davis or of Dr. Neill, till his own labors had satisfied him of Gorges’s guilt, and his conclusions were formed, the author cheerfully recognizes the priority to his own demonstration, of the suggestions of both these gentlemen. No thing appears of record, however, to indicate that John Pierce was in any way a party to Gorges’s plot. On the contrary, as his interest was wholly allied to his patent, which Gorges’s scheme would render of little value to his associate Adventurers and himself he would naturally have been, unless heavily bribed to duplicity beyond his expectations from their intended venture, the last man to whom to disclose such a conspiracy. Neither was he necessary in any way to the success of the scheme. He did not hire either the ship or her master; he does not appear to have had any Pilgrim relations to Captain Jones, and certainly could have had no such influence with him as Gorges could himself command, through Warwick and his own ability—from his position at the head of the “New England Council”—to reward the service he required. That Gorges was able himself to exert all the influence requisite to secure Jones’s cooperation, without the aid of Pierce, who probably could have given none, is evident. Mr. Davis’s suggestion, while pertinent and potential as to Gorges, is clearly wide of the mark as to Pierce. He represented the Adventurers in the matter of patents only, but Weston was in authority as to the pivotal matter of shipping. An evidently hasty footnote of Dr. Neill, appended to the “Memorial” offered by him to the Congress of the United States, in 1868, seems to have been the only authority of Mr. William T. Davis for the foregoing suggestion as to the complicity of Pierce in the treachery of Captain Jones, except the bare suspicion, already alluded to, in the records of the London Company. Neill says: “Captain Jones, the navigator of the MAY-FLOWER, and John Pierce, probably had arranged as to destination without the knowledge of the passengers.” While of course this is not impossible, there is, as stated, absolutely nothing to indicate any knowledge, participation, or need of Pierce in the matter, and of course the fewer there were in the secret the better.