How we discover, on our return to Tezcuco, that a conspiracy had been set on foot by the men of Narvaez's troops to murder Cortes, and all who were of his party; of the author of this conspiracy, his punishment; and of other matters.
How we discover, on our return to Tezcuco, that a conspiracy had been set on foot by the men of Narvaez's troops to murder Cortes, and all who were of his party; of the author of this conspiracy, his punishment; and of other matters.
During our absence a conspiracy had been set on foot by a most intimate friend of the governor of Cuba, named Antonio de Villafaña, a native either of Zamora or Toro, in conjunction with others of Narvaez's troops, whose names, for honour's sake, I will refrain from mentioning here. The object of this conspiracy was to murder Cortes on his return, which was to be done in the following manner.
The conspirators designed handing over a letter to Cortes while he sat at dinner with his officers and other soldiers, which was to be securely fastened and sealed, purporting to come from his father, with a vessel that had just arrived from Spain. While he was occupied in the perusal of this letter, he and the whole of the officers and soldierswho sat at table with him, and offered any resistance, were to be poignarded to death.
All this being settled, it pleased the Almighty that the conspirators should also let two other distinguished officers into the secret, whose names, however, I must likewise repress. Both these officers had accompanied us on our recent expedition around the lake, and one of these officers, after Cortes should have been killed, was to be appointed one of the new captain-generals. In the same manner the other chief appointments, besides all our property and horses, had already been disposed of by the conspirators. The Almighty, however, in his mercy, prevented this horrible deed from being carried into effect, the consequences of which would have been continual divisions, the inevitable loss of New Spain, and the total destruction of our troops. The whole of this conspiracy was discovered to Cortes by one of our soldiers a couple of days after his return to Tezcuco, and he had thus sufficient time to adopt active measures for suppressing it before it spread further. The honest man who made the discovery to him assured him also that there were several men of rank among the conspirators.
Cortes, after he had handsomely rewarded this man, communicated the whole affair, under the seal of secrecy, to the officers Alvarado, Oli, Lugo, Sandoval, Tapia, and myself; also to the two alcaldes for the year, and to all those in whom he could place confidence. He then ordered us to arm ourselves without any further delay, and he then proceeded with us to the quarters of Antonio de Villafaña.
On entering his apartment we found him in conversation with several of the conspirators, and the four alguacils who accompanied us immediately arrested him. The rest instantly took to flight, but Cortes had many of them seized. Villafaña being thus in our power, Cortes thrust his hand into that officer's bosom, and drew forth a paper, containing the whole plan of the conspirators, to which all their names were attached. Cortes, on perusing this paper, found the names of several men of importance among the list of conspirators; and being desirous of saving them from dishonour, he afterwards gave out that Villafaña had swallowed the paper, and that he had not read it himself, nor even so much as seen it.
A criminal suit was now instituted against Villafaña, when he, with several others who were implicated in it, made a full confession of the whole matter. Cortes, the two alcaldes, and the quartermaster Oli, who formed the court-martial, then pronounced Villafaña guilty, and sentenced him to be hung; and, after he had confessed to father Juan Diaz, he was executed in front of his own quarters.
Here Cortes allowed the matter to rest, though several of the conspirators were kept in close confinement, and in order to frighten them appearances were made as if they likewise would have to share a similar fate with Villafaña. Our general, however, was desirous of saving their names from dishonour; to which may be added, that this was not exactly the time to go to the utmost severity of the law.
From that moment our general had a body guard, consisting of the captain Antonio de Quiñones, a native of Zamora, and twelve trustworthy men, who were to be near his person both night and day. In the same way he likewise requested the rest of us in whom he could place confidence to watch over the safety of his person. He never, however, evinced any animosity in his subsequent behaviour towards the other conspirators, though he took care to be particularly upon his guard against them.[19]
After this miserable affair was ended, notice was given that the prisoners we had made in our expedition round the lake were to be brought in to be marked within the space of two days. In order not to waste many words on the subject, for the third time I will merely state that our men were even more shamefully cheated on this occasion than on the former. First the emperor's fifths were deducted, then those of Cortes, and after him our chief officers committed their piracies. If, therefore, any of us had an Indian female who was handsome or strong of limb, we certainly took her to be marked with the iron, but stole her away the night following, and took care not to show her again until some considerable time had elapsed; so that numbers of our slaves were never marked at all, and yet we employed them as our naborias.
How Cortes issues orders to the inhabitants of all the townships in the neighbourhood of Tezcuco which were allied with us, to furnish us with arrows and copper points for the same, and what further took place at our head-quarters.
How Cortes issues orders to the inhabitants of all the townships in the neighbourhood of Tezcuco which were allied with us, to furnish us with arrows and copper points for the same, and what further took place at our head-quarters.
Our brigantines were now so far advanced towards completion, that they had merely to be rigged. For each brigantine a number of spare oars had been made in case of need. The canal in which these vessels were to be launched, and through which they were to be conveyed into the lake, was now also sufficiently deep and wide to swim these vessels.[20]Cortes now, therefore, began to make active preparations for the siege of Mexico. He issued orders to all the townships whichlay in the vicinity of Tezcuco, and were in alliance with us, for each of them to furnish him with 8000 copper points for our arrows, to be made after the model of our Spanish ones, of which some were sent them for that purpose. They were also to furnish an equal number of arrows, which were to be made from a wood particularly adapted for that use, and they received some of our Spanish arrows to work by. He allowed them eight days for the making and delivery of these; and indeed both the arrows and the copper points arrived at Tezcuco in the time specified. Our stock of these now consisted of 50,000 pieces, and the arrow points made by these people were even better than those we brought from Spain.
Cortes then ordered Pedro Barba, who commanded the crossbow-men to divide the arrows and copper points among his men, and see that every man fixed the points neatly to the arrows, and attached the feathers with strong glue. Every crossbow-man was also to furnish himself with two closely twisted cords for his bow; further to provide himself with a number of spare nuts for the bows, that if one should crack or fly off he might have another in readiness. The crossbow-men were also to exercise themselves in shooting at heaps of earth to ascertain the strength of their bows. Care was therefore taken that they should not want for Valencian strings to twist the cords of, for the vessel of Juan Burgos, which had recently arrived from Spain, had fortunately brought a good supply of these as well as of bows, powder, muskets and other arms, besides a quantity of horseshoes. In the same way our cavalry were ordered to equip themselves, have their horses fresh shod, and to exercise them daily in all manner of cavalry evolutions.
Cortes then sent word to the elder Xicotencatl, his two sons, and to Chichimeclatecl, informing them that we should leave Tezcuco after the feast of Corpus Christi, and begin the siege of Mexico. He therefore requested them to send him 20,000 warriors from their country, from Huexotzinco, and from Cholulla, who were now all in friendly alliance with each other. But it was unnecessary to inform the Tlascallans of our intentions, for they were always duly apprized beforehand by those of their countrymen who accompanied us in our expeditions and returned home with the booty they had made. The inhabitants of Tlalmanalco and Chalco were also requested to hold themselves in readiness to march out at a moment's notice. These and all our other allies were informed of the day when we proposed to commence operations against Mexico. From all sides we received the most friendly assurances of assistance, and that Cortes' orders would be punctually obeyed.
How Cortes reviews the whole of his troops at Tezcuco; and of his further dispositions for conducting the siege of Mexico.
How Cortes reviews the whole of his troops at Tezcuco; and of his further dispositions for conducting the siege of Mexico.
After Cortes had thus acquainted our allies with his designs against Mexico, he determined to review the whole of his troops, and selected for this purpose the second day of Easter. This review was held in the large square of Tezcuco, and our muster-roll gave the following numbers: Eighty-four horse; six hundred and fifty foot soldiers, of whom some were armed with swords and shields, and others with lances; one hundred and ninety-four crossbow-men and musketeers.
Out of these troops he selected the men who were to serve on the thirteen brigantines; each of which required twelve rowers and a captain, with twelve crossbow-men and musketeers. In this way the thirteen brigantines required two hundred and eighty men, who, with the additional number of artillerymen, amounted to three hundred and twenty-five. Next the cannon, with the necessary powder was distributed among them; and when all this was done, Cortes published the articles of war, which ran as follows:
First of all it was forbidden under a heavy penalty to blaspheme either against our Lord Jesus Christ, his blessed mother, the holy apostles, or against any of the saints in general.
Secondly, no one was to ill-use any of our allies, take anything from them, not even of the booty they might make, whether this consisted of gold, silver, jewels, or of anything else; for we were to bear in mind that they joined us in this war at our own particular request.
Thirdly, none of the men, either during day or night time, were to leave our head-quarters, whether to fetch provisions from any of the townships allied to us, or for any other purpose whatever. Any one found guilty of this would be severely punished.
Fourthly, every soldier was to supply himself with a sufficient number of arms and keep them in proper order; for we were to remember how well the Mexicans were provided with everything in the shape of weapons.
Fifthly, all gambling for horses or weapons was strictly forbidden.
Lastly, none of the men, whatever company they belonged to, were to lay themselves down to rest without being completely armed and were to keep their shoes on, to which an exception was merely granted in cases of urgent necessity when a person was severely wounded, or unable to doduty; for we should be prepared to receive the enemy at a moment's notice.
Besides these the usual articles of war were again read over, which, among other things, threatened punishment of death to the sentinel who deserted his post or fell asleep while on duty. The same punishment would be inflicted on any soldier who left his quarters without his captain's permission, or who left his commanding officer in a moment of danger and took to flight.
The manner in which Cortes selects the men who were to row the brigantines; of the commanders who were appointed to each, and of other matters.
The manner in which Cortes selects the men who were to row the brigantines; of the commanders who were appointed to each, and of other matters.
Cortes on selecting the men who were to serve on board the brigantines could not find a sufficient number of sailors to row them. All the sailors who had come with us, with Narvaez, and with the vessels which had recently arrived from Jamaica, had been duly noted down, but even then there was not a sufficient number. Besides which many would not condescend to this work, saying, it was unreasonable to think of making rowers of them.
Cortes then turned his attention to those who daily went out a fishing, and found they were mostly natives of Palos, Moguer, Triana, or other coast towns, which were celebrated for producing capital sailors. All these persons were commanded under threats of severe punishment, to enter without delay upon the service of the brigantines. Many, indeed, who were men of noble birth, remonstrated with our general, and told him, it was insulting to think of setting them to such work; but Cortes paid no respect to persons, and by these means he mustered one hundred and fifty capital oars, who indeed had better days of it than we who had to fight on the causeways, and obtained a much greater share of booty than we did, as will be sufficiently seen hereafter.
As soon as each brigantine was fully equipped for war, Cortes ordered a flag, bearing the royal arms, to be hoisted; and a second one, bearing the number of the vessel. The following were the commanders appointed: viz. Pedro Barba, Garcia Holguin, Juan de Limpias, the deaf Carvajal, Juan Xaramillo, Geronimo de la Mota, the other Carvajal, who now lives at an advanced age in the street San Francisco;a certain Portillo, an excellent soldier, who had just arrived from Spain and had brought a beautiful wife with him. The naval captain Zamora, who lives at present in Guaxaca. A certain Colmero, who was both a good sailor and a good soldier. Further, Lerma, Gines, Nortes, Briones of Salamanca, Miguel Diaz de Auz, and one other officer, whose name has slipped my memory.
The whole of the crews were strictly enjoined to pay implicit obedience to their commanders; and any one who left his vessel was liable to severe punishment. The several commanders then received their particular instructions as to the manner in which they were to cooperate with the land forces.
All these matters had just been arranged when Cortes received intelligence that the Tlascallan chiefs were marching with a large body of troops, consisting of Tlascallans and Huexotzincans. The chief command of these had been intrusted to the younger Xicotencatl, the same who commanded against us in our battles with Tlascalla. He was likewise accompanied by his two brothers, the two younger sons of the excellent Don Lorenzo de Vargas. One of the chiefs of Cholulla likewise made his appearance, but with a very small body of men; for, though the Cholullans had broken off their alliance with Mexico from the time we had punished them so severely, yet they never stood upon the best of terms with us; on the contrary, they appeared as if waiting to see how matters would terminate, and then to side with the triumphant party. After our direful retreat from Mexico, they were almost upon the point of declaring against us.
When Cortes was informed of Xicotencatl's approach, who had come a day before the time appointed, he went out with Alvarado and several other officers to a distance of about a mile from Tezcuco, and welcomed him and his brothers with every demonstration of joy. Xicotencatl, with his men, marched forward in the best order, and all were accoutred in their best garments. Every company had a standard, on which was embroidered a white bird with expanded wings, being the arms of Tlascalla, and resembled an eagle. Every one of the men had a bunch of plumes stuck on his head; they struck up their war music, waved their flags, and continually cried out, "Long live the emperor, our master! Spain for ever! Tlascalla for ever!"
It took these troops about three hours before they had all entered the town, and our general ordered them to be provided with good quarters, and the best food we could get. When they had all entered the town, he once more bid them heartily welcome, assuring them he would enrich them all, and then desired them to rest from their fatigues,adding, that he would let them know the next day the duty they would have to perform.
Almost at the very moment these Tlascallans were marching into Tezcuco, a letter was put into Cortes' hands from Hernando de Barrientos, who was at Chinantla, about 360 miles from Mexico. Barrientos related that, while he was exploring the mines, being left behind for that purpose by Pizarro, the Mexicans had attacked him, and killed three of his companions, and that he alone had been fortunate enough to escape to the inhabitants of Chinantla, who were at enmity with the Mexicans. This was the same people who had furnished us with those long lances in our battle against Narvaez.
Without wishing to repeat the whole contents of this letter, I will only state that Cortes, in answer to it, told him he was about to besiege Mexico, and cautioned him to keep on good terms with the caziques of the country, and not to leave that place until he should receive further intelligence from head-quarters; for he would run great danger of being murdered on the road by the Mexicans.
Of Cortes' further dispositions for the siege.
Of Cortes' further dispositions for the siege.
Cortes now divided the whole of our troops into three divisions. The first division, consisting of one hundred and fifty foot, all well armed with swords and shields, thirty horse, and eighteen musketeers and crossbow-men, was commanded by Alvarado, under whom Guiterrez de Badajoz, Andreas de Monjaraz, and Jorge de Alvarado had each the command of fifty men and a third part of the musketeers and crossbow-men; the cavalry being under the immediate command of Alvarado himself. To this division 8000 Tlascallans were added, and Alvarado, in whose division I also was, received orders to take up his position in the town of Tlacupa. Cortes particularly recommended us to furnish ourselves with good weapons, helmets, gorgets, and steel coverings for the legs, to protect our bodies from the destructive weapons of the Mexicans. These precautions were, indeed, very necessary; but, notwithstanding all our defensive armour, scarcely a day past by in which the enemy did not kill or wound some of our men.
The second division was placed under the command of Oli, and consisted of thirty horse, one hundred and sixty-five foot, and twenty crossbow-men and musketeers. Andreas de Tapia, Verdugo, and Lugocommanded under him, he himself having the immediate command of the cavalry. To this division, likewise, 8000 Tlascallans were added, and they were to take up their position in the town of Cojohuacan, about eight miles from Tlacupa.
Sandoval was appointed to the command of the third division, consisting of twenty-four horse, fourteen crossbow-men and musketeers, and one hundred and fifty foot armed with shields and swords. To this division were added 8000 Indians from the townships of Chalco, Huexotzinco, and other places in alliance with us. Cortes appointed Luis Marin and Pedro de Ircio, two intimate friends of Sandoval, to command under him, the latter himself having the immediate command of the cavalry. This division was to take up a position near Iztapalapan, and Sandoval's instructions were to attack that town, and do as much damage there as he could, until he received further orders. Sandoval did not leave Tezcuco before Cortes was about to step on board, who himself took the chief command of the brigantines. On this flotilla there were altogether 325 men. Thus Sandoval, Oli, and Alvarado were each ordered off to different points: one marched to the left, the other to the right; and those who are not acquainted with the situation of this town or of the lake in general, would imagine that these divisions were removing from one common centre rather than approaching it. Each of these three captains received particular instructions for his plan of operation, and the next morning was fixed for our departure.
In order to be detained as little as possible, we sent off the whole body of Tlascallans in advance to the Mexican frontiers. These troops marched out in the best possible humour, under their commander Chichimeclatecl and other officers, but discovered that their commander-in-chief, the younger Xicotencatl, had remained behind. After considerable inquiries, it was found that he had secretly returned to Tlascalla on the previous night to take forcible possession of the caziquedom and territory of Chichimeclatecl. It appears, according to the accounts of the Tlascallans, that he wished to avail himself of this favorable opportunity of raising himself to supreme power in his own country, which the absence of Chichimeclatecl offered to him, who, in his opinion, was the only person that stood in his way since the death of Maxixcatzin, as he did not fear any opposition from his old blind father. This Xicotencatl, the Tlascallans further added, had never felt any real inclination to join us in the war against Mexico, but had frequently assured them it would terminate in the destruction of us all.[21]
When Chichimeclatecl received information of this, he instantly returned to Tezcuco in order to apprize Cortes of it. Our general, onhearing this, despatched five distinguished personages of Tezcuco, and two Tlascallans, who were his particular friends, after Xicotencatl, to request his immediate return to his troops, in Cortes' name. They were to remind him that his father Lorenzo de Vargas would certainly have marched out against Mexico in person, if blindness and old age had not prevented him; that the whole population of Tlascalla continued loyal to his majesty, and that the revolt he wished to excite would throw dishonour on his own country. These representations Cortes desired should be accompanied by large promises, to induce him to return to obedience. Xicotencatl, however, haughtily replied, that he was determined to abide by his resolve, and our dominion in this country would not have continued thus long if his father and Maxixcatzin had followed his advice.
Upon this our general ordered an alguacil to repair in all haste with four of our horse and five distinguished men of Tezcuco to Xicotencatl's abode, to take him prisoner, and hang him without any further ceremony. "All kindness," added Cortes, "is thrown away upon this cazique. His whole time is spent in devising plots and creating mischief. I cannot suffer this to continue any longer; the matter has now come to a crisis."
As soon as Alvarado received information of these commands, he urgently begged of Cortes to pardon Xicotencatl. Our general replied that he would consider about it, though he secretly gave the alguacil peremptory orders to put him to death, which was accordingly done. Xicotencatl was hung in a town subject to Tezcuco, and thus an end was put to all his plottings. Many Tlascallans assured us that the elder Xicotencatl himself had cautioned Cortes against his son,[22]and had advised him to put him to death.
This affair delayed our departure from Tezcuco for one day; and thus it was not till the 13th of May, 1521, that we commenced our march. As our road lay for a considerable distance in the same direction, our division under Alvarado and that under Oli marched out at the same time. The first night we encamped in the township of Alcuman, to which place Oli had despatched some men in advance to prepare quarters for his troops, and had ordered that the houses which they took possession of should, by way of distinction, be decorated with green boughs. When we arrived with Alvarado, we found, to our surprise, that every house had been taken, and the two divisions were just about to settle the matter, sword in hand, when the officers stepped in between, and thereby put a stop to the dispute. But the insult which had thus been offered to us was not so easily to be forgotten;when, therefore, this circumstance became known to Cortes, he sent off father Melgarejo and Luis Marin to us, with letters to every officer and soldier, in which he reproached us for quarrelling, and admonished us to keep peace with each other. From this moment Alvarado and Oli were never upon such friendly terms as formerly.
The following morning the two divisions continued their march, and we encamped for the night in a town subject to Mexico, but which was quite deserted by its inhabitants. This was likewise the case in Quauhtitlan, where we took up our quarters the next night.
Tenayucan and Escapuzalco, through which we marched the day following, were also quite deserted. Our Tlascallan friends spread themselves all through these townships, and entered into every house during the fore part of the evening, from which they brought in quantities of provisions. We adopted every military precaution for the night, as we were not far distant from Mexico, and could plainly hear the Mexicans, who were lying in crowds in their canoes on the lake and along the causeways, hooting and yelling fearfully throughout the whole of the night, and challenging us to the combat. Their object, was to induce us to fall upon them in the dark, when they would have had a great advantage over us. We had, however, received a sufficient warning by our former misfortune, and very wisely kept ourselves as quietly as possible until next morning, which was a Sunday.
After father Juan Diaz had said mass, we commended ourselves to the protection of the Almighty, and both divisions marched forward to cut off the aqueduct of Chapultepec, which lies about two miles from Tlacupa, and supplies Mexico with water. On our way thither, we fell in with several bodies of Mexicans, who had received intelligence that this was to be the commencement of our operations against Mexico. The enemy had in every way the advantage ground over us, and attacked us vigorously with lances, arrows, and stones, by which three of our men were wounded; but we soon put them to flight, and they were so closely pursued by the Tlascallans that they lost twenty killed, and seven or eight were taken prisoners. We were now able to destroy the aqueduct without any further opposition, and the city of Mexico was deprived of this source of obtaining water during the whole of the siege.
As soon as we had destroyed this aqueduct, our officers determined to make an attempt upon one of the bridges on the causeway leading from Tlacupa. We had scarcely begun to move along the causeway when numbers of canoes, filled with troops, advanced swiftly from both sides, while other large bodies of the enemy came marching up thecauseway against us, so that we were quite astounded at the very sight. In the first encounter thirty of our men were wounded and three killed. Notwithstanding all this, we fought our way up to the first bridge. According to what we afterwards heard, it was the wish of the Mexicans that we should pass over the bridge; for we had no sooner done so than we were assailed by such terrific crowds, as to be unable to move. What indeed could we do on a causeway which was no more than eight paces in breadth, where we were attacked on all sides at once? Our crossbow-men and musketeers certainly kept up a continued fire on the canoes, but the enemy received but a trifling loss this way, for they had raised boards alongside of their canoes, by which their troops were sheltered from our fire. Those of the enemy's troops which attacked us on the causeway itself we certainly drove back each time into the water, but fresh troops kept pouring in too fast for us to gain much advantage this way. Here our cavalry was of no manner of use to us, while the horses were greatly exposed to the attacks of the enemy on each side of the causeway, and many were consequently wounded. If our cavalry attempted to pursue the enemy into the water, the latter had provided against this by palisades, behind which they retired, and stretched out against them their long lances, to which they had fastened the swords we unfortunately lost on our retreat from Mexico.
In this way the battle continued for upwards of an hour, the enemy each time returning to the attack with such excessive fury that, at length, we could stand our ground no longer: nor was this all, for we now saw another large fleet of canoes approaching with a fresh body of men, who were ordered to fall upon our rear. We therefore determined to retreat back along the causeway, for which purpose we ordered the Tlascallans to move off first, that we might effect our retreat in perfect good order. Here the Tlascallans had greatly embarrassed us in our movements, who, it is well known, never can fight standing in the water.
The instant the Mexicans perceived we were turning back, and saw the Tlascallans moving off the causeway, they set up most distracting yells, and attacked us man to man with great fierceness. It is indeed out of my power to describe it. The whole of the causeway was instantly covered with lances, arrows, and stones, besides that vast quantities fell into the water. When we had again reached the mainland, we returned fervent thanks to the Almighty for having rescued us from this severe battle.
Eight of our men were killed and fifty wounded: added to all this,we were obliged to put up with the hootings and jeers of the enemy, who kept calling upon the Tlascallans to come with double their numbers next time, and they would very soon settle their impudence. Our first deeds of arms, therefore, merely consisted in destroying the aqueduct of Chapultepec, and in reconnoitring the lake along the causeway, in which we did not exactly reap much honour.
For the rest, we passed the following night very quietly in our quarters, posted our sentinels, and dressed our wounds. One of our horses was so severely wounded that it died soon after.
The following morning Oli determined upon taking up the position assigned to his division at Cojohuacan, about six miles further on; and however Alvarado and the other cavaliers might beg of him not to separate the two divisions, yet he would not alter his determination. Christobal de Oli was a man of uncommon bravery, whose pride was wounded at the unsuccessful attempt we had made upon the causeway, and he accused Alvarado of inconsiderateness for having ordered the attack. Nothing, therefore, could induce him to stay, and he marched off with his men to Cojohuacan.
The separation of the two divisions was very impolitic at this juncture; for if the Mexicans had been aware of the smallness of our numbers, and had attacked either of the divisions during the five following days, before the brigantines had arrived, we should with difficulty have escaped destruction. Both divisions, therefore, remained as quiet as the enemy would allow them, though not a day passed by that the Mexicans did not land troops to annoy us in our camp, and, if possible, to entice us into places where we should be unable to act, and they could attack us to greater advantage.
Sandoval, as we have seen, left Tezcuco with his division four days after the feast of Corpus Christi, and marched towards Iztapalapan. His route lay through townships which were either subject to, or in alliance with Tezcuco. As soon as he arrived at Iztapalapan, he commenced his military operations by burning down the greater portion of the houses which stood on the mainland.
It was not long before large bodies of Mexican troops arrived for the protection of Iztapalapan, with whom Sandoval had a severe skirmish, and drove them back again to their canoes; but still they continued to shower their arrows and darts upon him, and wounded several of his men.
During this conflict a thick smoke was seen to rise from several signal fires which had been lighted on the surrounding hills. This had been a signal to call in all the canoes of Mexico and of the other townssituated on the lake, as Cortes had just run out from Tezcuco with the thirteen brigantines.
The first attack our general made with this fleet was against a rocky height on an island near Mexico. This place had been strongly fortified, and was garrisoned by a great number of Mexicans and inhabitants of other townships. All the canoes of Mexico, Xochimilco, Cojohuacan, Huitzilopuzco, Iztapalapan, and Mexicalzinco, had united in a body to oppose Cortes, which was the reason why the attack was carried on with so little vigour against Sandoval, who, however, was not able to do the enemy much damage, as most of the houses stood in the water; though, in the commencement of the attack, our allies had made many prisoners. In Iztapalapan, Saudoval found himself on a peninsula in the lake, and the only way by which he could reach Cojohuacan was by a causeway which ran half way through the lake, on which he would have been assailed from both sides by the enemy, without his being able to defend himself with much advantage.
When Cortes observed the vast number of canoes which kept continually crowding around the brigantines, he began to feel alarmed, and this not without reason, for their number amounted to above 4000. He therefore abandoned his attack upon the rock, and selected a position with his brigantines, where he would be able to observe all the enemy's movements, and steer off in any direction he might choose. He likewise issued orders to the respective commanders of the brigantines not to commence an attack on the canoes before the wind, which had just commenced blowing from the land, should have increased. When the Mexicans found our fleet was moving off again, they not incorrectly ascribed it to fear, and they immediately advanced with their canoes to fall upon the brigantines. There now suddenly arose a stiffish breeze, our rowers pulled with all their might, and Cortes ordered the brigantines to run right in among the canoes. Numbers were bored into the ground, many of the enemy killed and wounded, and all the rest of the canoes turned round, and made off at a rapid rate, to seek refuge between the houses built in the lake, where they could not be followed by the brigantines. This was our first naval engagement, and Cortes gained the victory, thanks be to the Almighty.
After this encounter he steered for Cojohuacan, where Oli had taken up his position. Here again he fell in with large bodies of the enemy, who lay in wait for him at a point of considerable danger, and attempted to carry off two of the brigantines. They attacked him at the same time from their canoes, and from the tops of the temples.Cortes now fired in upon them with the cannon, and killed great numbers. The artillerymen fired away so incessantly upon this occasion, that all their powder was consumed, and some of them had their faces and hands burnt. Cortes then despatched the smallest brigantine to Iztapalapan, to bring away all the powder Sandoval had with him there, and wrote word to him not on any account to quit that place. He himself staid the two next days with Oli, on whose position the enemy continued their attacks without intermission.
I must now also relate what took place at this time in Tlacupa, where I was stationed with Alvarado.
When we received intelligence that Cortes had run out with the brigantines, we advanced along our causeway up to the bridge, but this time with greater precaution. Our cavalry was stationed in front of the causeway, while the remaining troops moved along in a close body up to the bridge, the crossbow-men and musketeers keeping up an incessant fire upon the enemy. In this way we renewed the attack each day, and repaired the gaps in the causeway, but three of our men had been killed.
In the meantime the enemy did Sandoval considerable damage from the tops of the houses which stood in the water, and he therefore resolved to attack those which he was best able to get at. Quauhtemoctzin then sent off a large body of troops to the assistance of the town, with commands to cut through the causeway in Sandoval's rear. Cortes observing a vast number of canoes going in the direction of Iztapalapan, instantly steered with the brigantines for the same place, and ordered Oli, with the whole of his division, to shape his course thither along the causeway. They found the Mexicans already hard at work in cutting through the causeway, and concluded from this that Sandoval was destroying the houses which stood in the water. They found him, as they had suspected, already in the heat of an engagement with the enemy, who, however, retired on the approach of the brigantines.
Cortes now ordered Sandoval to quit Iztapalapan with his troops, and to take up his position at Tepeaquilla, in front of the causeway, which leads from this place to Mexico. This Tepeaquilla is at present dedicated to our dear lady of Guadaloupe, where so many miracles have happened, and still daily take place.
How Cortes assigns particular stations to the twelve brigantines, the thirteenth being considered unfit for service.
How Cortes assigns particular stations to the twelve brigantines, the thirteenth being considered unfit for service.
Cortes, our officers, and the whole of the troops were now convinced that it was impossible to fight our way to the city along the causeways, unless we were covered on each side by a couple of the brigantines. Our general therefore joined four of these to Alvarado's division, he himself retaining six others near his head-quarters, which he had taken up where Oli was stationed; the remaining two he sent to Sandoval, for the smallest brigantine was not considered of sufficient bulk to make head against the large canoes, and was taken out of the service altogether, and the men distributed among the crews of the other twelve.
As soon as the brigantines arrived at our station Alvarado placed two on each side of the causeway, which were to cover us as we advanced to the attack of the bridges. We now fought with better success than we had previously done for the brigantines kept off the canoes, and prevented them from attacking our flanks; so that we now succeeded in forcing some of the bridges, and in destroying several of the enemy's entrenchments. The conflict, however, was no less severe; on the contrary, the Mexicans made so good a use of their lances, arrows, and slings, that, although our jackets were thickly quilted with cotton, they wounded the greater part of our men; nor did they desist from the attack till night came on; but they had the great advantage over us, that they could relieve their troops from time to time, by pouring in fresh men, and could shower innumerable quantities of stones, arrows, and lances, upon our brigantines, from the tops of the houses. Indeed I cannot find a more appropriate expression than shower, although they alone can feel its full force who were present on the occasion. If we did at times succeed, with the utmost exertion, to force an entrenchment or a bridge, and we omitted to station a strong detachment to guard it, the enemy returned in the night, made another opening in the causeway, threw up larger entrenchments, and dug deep pits, which immediately filled with water, and these they covered slightly over, that we might sink down into them in the midst of the battle of the following day, when the canoes would hasten up to profit by the confusion, and carry off our men prisoners. For this purpose numbers of canoes were lying wait in places where they were out of the reach of our brigantines, though they were always ready at hand, if their assistance wasrequired. But the enemy had provided in another artful way to render our brigantines useless in certain spots of the lake, by driving numbers of stakes into the water, whose tops were just below the surface; so that it was often impossible for our vessels to avoid them, and they consequently stuck fast, and left our troops open to the attacks of the canoes.
I have before mentioned of what little use the cavalry was to us in our operations on the causeway; for whenever they did drive the Mexicans before them up to the bridges, the latter leaped into the water, and retreated behind the entrenchments which they had thrown up on the causeway itself, where other bodies of the enemy stood ready to receive them armed with extremely long lances, with which, and various kinds of projectiles, they severely wounded our horses; so that the owners of the horses were very unwilling to risk them in such unequal conflict; for at that time the ordinary price of a horse was from 800 to 1000 pesos.
When night came on, and released us from the attacks of the enemy, we returned to our encampment, and attended to our wounds, which we dressed with bandages steeped in oil. There was likewise a soldier among our troops, named Juan Catalan, who charmed the wounds, and the Lord Jesus blessed this man's exertions in a manner that he invariably succeeded in his cures. Indeed, if all our wounded, each day we renewed the attack, had remained behind in our camp, none of the companies could ever have sallied out with more than twenty men at a time. When our friends of Tlascalla observed how this man charmed the wounds, and how every one who was wounded applied to him for assistance, they likewise brought him all their wounded, and these were so very numerous, that his only occupation throughout the day consisted in charming wounds.
Our officers and ensigns were most exposed to the enemy's weapons, and were oftener wounded in consequence; for which reason a fresh set of men were each day appointed to carry our tattered colours. With all these hardships we had to suffer, it will at least be thought that we had plenty of food. But of this we were likewise deprived, and we should have thought ourselves fortunate if we had only had some refreshing food for our wounded; we had not even a cake of maise! Miserable indeed was our distress! The only means we had of keeping soul and body together was by eating herbs and cherries, and at last we had nothing to subsist on but wild figs; Cortes and Sandoval's divisions fared no better than ours, and the Mexicans likewise continued the attack upon them from morning to night. Every blessed day thatcame they were obliged to advance fighting their way up to the bridges along the causeway; for the Mexicans, and the troops which lay in the other towns of the lake, merely awaited the morning dawn, when the signals were given from the summit of the great temple of Huitzilopochtli to rush out upon us both by land and water.
The operations of the besieged were carried on with perfect order, and it was previously settled where the different bodies of their troops were to direct the attack.
As we began to experience that our daily advancing along the causeway each time cost us a loss of men, besides that we gained little advantage by it, for the Mexicans returned in the night, and again took possession of the points we had forced, we determined to alter our plan of operations, and took up a position on a more spacious part of the causeway, where several towers rose up together, and where we should be able to quarter ourselves for the night. Though we were miserably off here, and had nothing to protect us from the rain, nor to cover us from the piercing rays of the sun, we were not to be deterred from our purpose. The Indian females who baked our bread were obliged to remain behind in Tlacupa, protected by our cavalry, and the Tlascallans, who at the same time covered our rear, that the enemy might not fall upon us from the mainland. After these precautions had been adopted, we began to carry out our principal object, which was to make ourselves master of the houses in the suburbs, and of the intervening canals. These last were then immediately filled up, and the houses pulled down; for, as I have before mentioned, it was difficult to destroy them by fire, as they were detached, and stood in the water. It was from the tops of the houses that we received most injury from the enemy; so that, by destroying these, we gained a considerable advantage. Whenever we had taken one of the enemy's entrenchments, a bridge, or forced any other strong position, we were obliged to occupy the spot night and day with our troops, which we regulated in the following manner:—Each company watched by turns; the first from the evening time until midnight; the second from midnight until a couple of hours before daylight; and the third from that time till morning, when they were relieved by forty other men. The watch was each time relieved by a like number, though none of these watches left the spot; but when the following arrived, the former lay themselves on the bare ground, and took a little repose; so that when daylight came there were always one hundred and twenty men collected together ready for action. On other nights, when we expected some sudden attack, the whole of the men marched up at once, and remained under arms untilthe enemy approached. We had every reason to be upon our guard, for we learnt from several Mexican officers, whom we had taken prisoners in the different engagements, that Quauhtemoctzin and his generals had come to the determination of falling some day or night suddenly upon our encampment on the causeway; and concluded that, after they had destroyed us, they might easily make themselves masters of the two other causeways occupied by Sandoval and Cortes. To accomplish this finishing stroke, the nine towns lying in the lake, besides Tlacupa, Escapuzalco, and Tenayucan, were to cooperate with them. While we should thus be attacked on every side, they meant to carry off the Indian females with our baggage, which we had left behind in Tlacupa.
As soon as we received this information, we sent notice of it to the Tlascallans and our cavalry, who were stationed at Tlacupa, and ordered them to be particularly upon their guard, and to keep a sharp look out all day and night. Nor was it long before the enemy put their scheme into operation; for one midnight an immense body of Mexicans came storming up against us; a couple of hours after another such a body; and with daylight a third came pouring forth. At one time they moved up with the utmost silence; at another they came fiercely along with hideous yells; and it was terrible to behold the innumerable quantities of lances, stones, and arrows they showered upon us. Though they wounded many of our men, we valiantly maintained our ground, and drove them back with great loss. The Mexicans had at the same time attacked the cavalry and Tlascallans on the mainland at Tlacupa; the latter suffered severely, as they were never much upon their guard during night-time.
In this way, amidst rain, wind, frost, up to our ancles in mud, and covered with wounds, we patiently bore our fatigues, with a morsel of maise cake, a few herbs and figs to stay our hunger, which was the more gnawing from the incessant exertions of our bodily strength. Yet, however bravely we might fight, we advanced but slowly, and the little advantages we gained cost us a number of killed and wounded. The bridges we forced were as often retaken by the enemy, and if we filled up an opening in the causeway new gaps were made, and this continued day after day, until the Mexicans altered their plan of operations, as will shortly be seen.
After thus enumerating these continued scenes of bloodshed and slaughter which took place at our station, and those of Cortes and Sandoval, the reader will ask, what advantage we had derived in destroying the aqueduct of Chapultepec? I must confess, very little;for the enemy received, during the night-time, a plentiful supply of water as well as of provisions from the towns surrounding Mexico, by means of their light canoes.
In order to cut off these supplies, Cortes determined that two brigantines should cruise about the lake during the whole of the night to capture these canoes, and it was agreed that the provisions found in them should be equally distributed among the three divisions. Although we sensibly felt the absence of our brigantines during the attacks which the enemy made upon us in the night-time, yet we soon began to find what great advantage we had gained by thus diminishing the enemy's supplies. No day passed without our brigantines capturing several of these transports laden with maise, fowls, and other necessaries of life, though a few always managed to elude our vessels and slip into the town. The Mexicans, therefore, were determined if possible to rid themselves of these troublesome brigantines, and thought of the following stratagem: They fitted out thirty large pirogues, manned with their best rowers and most courageous warriors, which they ran out during the night-time and concealed them among the reeds of the lake, where they could not be seen by the brigantines. At a short distance from the place where the pirogues lay concealed, stakes had been driven into the water, of which it was intended our two vessels should run foul. In the twilight the enemy sent out two or three canoes which were covered with green boughs, as if laden with provisions for Mexico; and these received instructions to move off in a direction where it was presumed they would be pursued by our brigantines.
As soon as our brigantines espied the two canoes they went in pursuit of them, the latter keeping close into the reeds, and continually nearing the spot where the pirogues lay in ambush. The greater exertions the canoes made to escape, the more eager were our brigantines in pursuit, and when these were close in upon the spot where the pirogues lay concealed, the latter suddenly darted forth from the reeds, and attacked the brigantines on all sides. In an instant all the officers, soldiers, and sailors were wounded, nor could the brigantines seek refuge in flight, as they had become entangled among the stakes. In this unfortunate affair we lost one of the brigantines and two of our officers, one of whom, named Portillo, a man of great courage, and who had served in Italy, was killed on the spot; the other was Pedro Barba, a very clever officer, who died of his wounds three days after. Both these brigantines belonged to Cortes' division, and he was sorely grieved at the loss we had thus sustained; but wevery shortly after paid the enemy out in their own coin, as will presently be seen.
In the meantime Cortes and Sandoval, with their divisions, had many severe encounters with the enemy, but particularly Cortes, as he insisted that all the houses which were taken should be immediately pulled down, and the gaps in the causeway filled up. So that every inch of ground was rendered secure and level, of which possession was taken.
Alvarado had received similar instructions from our general, and was not to pass over any bridge or canal before the part which intersected the causeway was completely filled up; nor to advance beyond any house until it was levelled to the ground.
These commands were strictly adhered to, and with the woodwork and stones of the houses which we pulled down we filled up the openings in the causeways. In all these operations, and indeed during the whole of the siege, our Tlascallan friends lent us the most efficient services. When the Mexicans found we were thus by degrees pulling down their houses and filling up the canals, they determined to alter their plan of operation, and commenced by cutting a wide and deep opening in that part of the causeway lying between us and the city; they deepened the lake on each side of this opening, and threw up entrenchments near it; strong stakes were then driven into the water to keep off our brigantines, or that they might run foul of them on coming to our assistance. Besides this, great numbers of canoes full of men were constantly lurking in places where we could not see them, with orders not to rush out upon us before we had advanced up to the entrenchments on the causeway.
One Sunday morning large bodies of the enemy came advancing towards us from three different points, and fell so fiercely upon us that it was with much difficulty we could maintain our ground. I had forgotten to mention that Alvarado had posted half of the cavalry on the causeway, for they no longer ran so great a risk of being killed, as most of the houses lay in ruins, and there was more space for them to manœuvre in, without their being exposed to the attacks of the enemy from the house-tops or from the lake. The enemy, as I have just said, advanced bravely from three different points, one body from the quarter where the deep gap had been made in the causeway, the other from the direction where the houses lay in ruins, the third from the side of Tlacupa, so that we were almost surrounded. Our cavalry, with the Tlascallans, had the good fortune to cut their way through the dense crowds which fell upon our rear, while our foot bravely opposed the two other bodies, which, after a few moments' desperate fighting began to give ground; but this was a mere stratagem of the Mexicans to allow us to take possession of the first entrenchment, and after a short stand they even retreated beyond the second. We thought we had already gained the victory, and waded through the shallow part of the water in vigorous pursuit of the enemy up to some large buildings and towers; while they, to deceive us the more effectually, constantly faced about to fling their arrows at us; and, when we in the least expected it, they suddenly turned round upon us and in an instant we were surrounded and attacked with excessive fury from all sides. It was impossible to resist their overwhelming numbers, and we began to retreat towards the causeway in the best order we could, with our ranks firmly closed. The first opening in the causeway which we had just taken from the enemy was already occupied by numerous canoes, so that we were compelled to make for the opening which the enemy had recently cut, where the water was very deep, and additional large holes had been dug. Here we had no other resource left than to make our way, either by swimming or wading through; but most of us got into the deep holes, when the canoes were instantly at hand to take advantage of our perilous situation.
On this occasion five of our men were made prisoners, and immediately taken into the presence of Quauhtemoctzin; and most of us were severely wounded. The brigantines certainly made every attempt to assist us, but were unable to come near enough, owing to the heavy stakes that had been driven into the water, between which they stuck fast, and were instantly assailed by showers of missiles from the house-tops and the numberless canoes, by which two of the rowers were killed, and the greater part of the troops on board wounded.
It was indeed a real wonder that all of us did not perish in these deep gaps. I myself was in extreme danger, for several Mexicans had already laid hands on me, but I succeeded in freeing one of my arms, and the Almighty gave me power to cut my way through the enemy, though I was severely wounded in the arm, and just as I had reached a place of safety I fell down breathless and exhausted. This sudden prostration of strength was no doubt owing to the extraordinary exertions I had made to disengage myself from the enemy's grasp, and to the quantity of blood I had lost. I gave myself up for lost when the Mexicans laid hold of me, and commended my soul to God and the holy Virgin.
Alvarado, with the cavalry, had hard work to keep off the numerous bodies who attacked our rear from the side towards Tlacupa, and hadnot advanced up to this fearful passage; there was only one cavalry soldier, recently arrived from Spain, who ventured too far, and perished with his horse. Alvarado was already coming up to our assistance, with a small body of horse, but fortunately not before we had made good our retreat beyond the deep gap; for, had he arrived a few minutes earlier, we should, no doubt, have faced about, fought our way back again into the town, and the Mexicans would certainly have cut us off to a man.
This battle took place on a Sunday, and the Mexicans were so elated with the victory they had gained over us, that they fell upon our camp with renewed courage, and in so large a body that they would certainly have taken it by storm but for our cannon and the desperate courage we displayed for the preservation of our lives. During this night, the whole of us remained under arms ready for action, and the horses stood ready saddled and bridled. Cortes was excessively grieved at the defeat we had sustained, and despatched a letter to Alvarado by one of the brigantines in which he told him not, under any circumstances, in future to pass beyond a gap or opening in the causeway before it had been quite filled up; and to keep the horses saddled all day and night, and to observe the utmost vigilance.
Our recent defeat having taught us prudence, we set about filling up the larger opening with the utmost expedition, and completed the work in four days; though it was a labour of great difficulty, and we were the whole time exposed to the attacks of the enemy, who killed six of our men and wounded several others. During the night, each company watched by turns to prevent the Mexicans from destroying our day's work.
As the Mexicans were encamped over against us, we could observe how they regulated their night watches: they were relieved four times during the night, and the men posted at such distances around a large fire, which was kept up till morning, that they could not be seen excepting at the moments when they poked the fire or when the next watch came to relieve. On some nights the fire became extinguished by the rain, but it was instantly relit; though everything was done in the utmost silence and not a word was exchanged, for they only communicated with each other by whistling. Many a time when we heard the guard approaching to relieve the watch, our crossbow-men and musketeers would shoot in among them at random, but without doing them the slightest injury, as they were posted in places which, even during broad daylight, were beyond the reach of our fire, particularly behind a deep ditch, which they had recently dug, and strengthenedby a palisade and breastwork. The Mexicans never omitted to return the compliment, and let fly many an arrow at us in the same way.
The conflict on the causeway was daily renewed, and we always made our attacks in the best order possible, so that we soon became masters of the fosse just mentioned, behind which the enemy encamped at nights, but we had each time to encounter vast bodies of men, and the whole of us were more or less wounded. After fighting the whole day until nightfall, there was naturally nothing further to be done than to return to our former position; but each time we commenced our retreat, other bodies of the enemy fell furiously upon us. The Mexicans were confident they should, one time or other, be able to annihilate us during one of these retreats, and they rushed upon us with the very fury of tigers, and came in so close upon us that we were compelled to fight foot to foot. But after a time, when we had got more accustomed to their mode of fighting, we first ordered the Tlascallans off the causeway; for these were very numerous, and delighted in combating with the Mexicans, under our immediate protection, though they only embarrassed our movements, of which the enemy were sly enough to take advantage. As soon as we considered the Tlascallans sufficiently in advance of us, we firmly closed our ranks and began our retreat, which was covered by our crossbow-men and musketeers, and by the four brigantines, which kept up with us, two on each side of the causeway. When we reached our encampment we dressed our wounds with bandages steeped in warm oil, and ate our supper off the maize-cakes, the herbs, and the figs which were sent us from Tlacupa. When this was finished, a strong detachment was again posted for the night at the opening in the causeway, and when daylight broke forth the battle was renewed. Such was our life, day after day; and however early we might march out, we always found the enemy ready to receive us, or they had already advanced up to our outposts and defied us to the combat under the most abusive language. Cortes, with his division, fared no better than we did; the fighting was continued night and day, and many of his men were killed and wounded. For the rest, matters stood with him exactly as they did with us on the causeway of Tlacupa, and two brigantines still continued cruizing on the lake at night-time to intercept the canoes laden with water and provisions for Mexico.
On one occasion two Mexicans of distinction were captured, who informed Cortes that forty pirogues and a great number of canoes lay hid among the reeds of the lake to make another attempt upon the two brigantines. Our general returned these men many thanks for what they had communicated, made them some presents, and promisedto bestow considerable lands upon them after Mexico should be taken; they then described to him the spot where the armed pirogues lay in ambush, and the different places where the heavy stakes had been driven in, of which it was intended the brigantines should run foul while pursuing the pirogues in their sham flight.
Cortes was now determined to pay the enemy out in their own coin, and in the night-time concealed six of our brigantines in a place where the reeds stood very thick, at about a mile distant from the spot where the pirogues lay in ambuscade. Each brigantine was entirely covered with green boughs, and the men on board were ordered not to make the least noise during the whole of the night. Very early next morning, Cortes ordered one of our other brigantines to run out as usual to waylay the convoys of provisions going to Mexico. Both the above-mentioned distinguished Mexicans were taken on board to point out the place where the pirogues lay concealed, as our brigantine was purposely to steer in that direction. As soon as the Mexicans observed the brigantine approaching, they run out two of their canoes into the lake to allure the brigantine to their pursuit. The stratagem was laid on both sides in the very same way, and it was now only to be seen which should outdo the other. Our brigantine sharply pursued the two canoes, which were moving off in the direction of the concealed pirogues, but suddenly turned round as if she durst not venture nearer land. The instant the pirogues found the brigantine was turning back, they rushed forth out of the reeds and pulled away at their utmost speed in pursuit of her. The brigantine pretended to seek her safety in flight, and steered in the direction where our six others lay concealed, the pirogues following with the utmost confidence. When these were near enough, a shot was fired as a signal to the Spanish vessels, upon which they, in their turn, rushed out upon the pirogues and canoes with the utmost velocity, and bored several of them into the ground. Now the other brigantine also came up which had shammed flight, so that many of the canoes were captured, and numbers of the enemy killed and wounded. From this moment the Mexicans never again attempted similar stratagems on the lake, nor durst they venture so close in our neighbourhood with their convoys of provisions.
When the inhabitants of those towns which lay in the lake found that we were daily gaining fresh victories both by land and water, and that our allies of Chalco, Tezcuco, Tlascalla, and other districts, became more and more closely united to us, they began to consider the great losses they continually sustained, and the numbers of prisoners we took. The chiefs of these towns, therefore, held a conference among themselves, which ended in their sending an embassy to Cortes to sue for peace, and humbly to beg forgiveness for the past; adding, that they had been obliged to obey the commands of Quauhtemoctzin.
Cortes was uncommonly rejoiced to find these people were coming to their senses, and we others belonging to the divisions of Alvarado and Sandoval likewise congratulated ourselves on this circumstance.
Our general received the ambassadors kindly, and told them their towns had certainly deserved severe punishment, but he would, nevertheless, pardon them. The towns which sued for peace on this occasion were Iztapalapan, Huitzilopuzco, Cojohuacan, Mizquic, and all the other towns lying in that part of the lake which contained sweet water.
On this occasion Cortes declared that he would not alter his present position until Mexico itself had sued for peace, or that the town was conquered by force of arms.
The above-mentioned towns were now ordered to assist us with all their canoes and troops in the siege of the metropolis, and to furnish us with provisions. They promised faithfully to obey these commands, joined us with all their armed men, but were very sparing with their supplies of provisions.
In our division, under Alvarado, there was no room to quarter any of these new troops, which those who have visited this country during the months of June, July, and August, can easily imagine, as the whole surrounding neighbourhood is covered with water. The fighting on the causeways in the meantime continued without intermission, and by degrees we had taken a number of temples, houses, bridges, and canals, which latter we instantly filled up with the ruins of the buildings we pulled down, and every foot of ground we gained from the enemy was instantly secured by our troops; yet, with all our exertions and watchfulness, the enemy still succeeded in making fresh apertures in the causeway, behind which they threw up new entrenchments.
As the three companies of which our division was composed considered it a dishonour that one company should constantly be employed in filling up the canals, while the others were fighting, Alvarado, to put an end to all feelings of jealousy, arranged that the three companies should perform the same duties alternately.
By pursuing this mode of operation, in which we were ably assisted by the Tlascallans, we by degrees pulled down everything before us, so that at last the town lay open to our view. It was only in the evening, when we returned to our encampment, that the whole of the three companies were again under arms, as at that time we had most to fear from the enemy.
Cortes and Sandoval had likewise similar toils to go through day and night. On the land side they were incessantly attacked by immense bodies of the enemy, and from the lake by innumerable armed canoes. Cortes on one occasion marched with his division along the causeway, to force a very broad and deep opening, which the Mexicans had strengthened by means of a palisade and mound, defended by a large body of troops. Cortes finding it was impossible to pass across this opening but by swimming, ordered his men to make the attempt; but they were so vigorously assailed by the enemy from the entrenchments, and those stationed on the house-tops, who literally showered down stones upon them, while the canoes attacked them from each side of the opening, that a great number of his men were wounded, and a few killed. Here the brigantines were rendered totally useless, by the large stakes which had been driven into the water. Cortes and the whole of his troops were often on the brink of destruction; as it was, he had four men killed, and above thirty wounded. At length, by dint of hard fighting, he succeeded in forcing this formidable point; but the day was already so far advanced, that there was no time left to fill up the wide aperture, and he therefore sounded a retreat, in which he had again to fight his way through dense crowds of the enemy, who wounded the whole of his men, and the greater part of the Tlascallans.
Quauhtemoctzin now determined to adopt a new plan of operation, and this he commenced on St. John's day, in the summer month, the very day we made our second entry into Mexico, after the defeat of Narvaez. This day, it seems, the monarch had purposely fixed upon to attack the three divisions at the same moment with the whole of his armed force, both by land and water. It was his firm resolve to destroy us all at once, and his idols encouraged him to make the attempt. The attack was to commence before break of day, when it was yet dark, and the Mexicans had provided against the possibility of our obtaining any assistance from the brigantines, by driving numbers of additional stakes into the water. They now fell upon us with such fierceness and determination, that they would certainly have stormed our camp itself, if the one hundred and twenty men who had the watch had not been veterans in service. We were certainly very nigh our destruction, and had fifteen men wounded, of whom two died within the space of eight days. The two following nights the enemy sallied out in a similar manner, but we each time repulsed them with considerable loss. Cortes and Sandoval were likewise attacked in the same way.
Quauhtemoctzin, with his generals and papas, finding that no advantage was to be gained over us in this way, determined to attack our position at Tlacupa with his united forces. This was accordingly put into practice as soon as day began to dawn, and they fell upon us from all sides with great intrepidity, and threw our line into disorder; but at this moment it pleased the Almighty to refresh our strength; our troops rallied again, and in their turn fell courageously upon the infuriated foe. Our brigantines too lent us what assistance they could, and the cavalry, with lances fixed, spurred their horses on, while our crossbow-men and musketeers, strove to do their utmost; we others, armed with swords, thrusting and cutting in among the enemy most valiantly, so that at last we drove them back. This was a more terrible battle than any we had fought on the causeways. Alvarado himself was wounded in the head, and eight of our men were killed. If the Tlascallans had likewise encamped this night on the causeway, we should no doubt have suffered more severely, as their numbers would have embarrassed our movements; but experience had taught us prudence, and each night we ordered them to draw off to Tlacupa, and we only considered ourselves safe when assured they had left the causeway.
In this engagement we slew a great number of the enemy, and among the many men we took prisoners there were four personages of high rank.
By this time the reader will certainly be wearied of reading of battles which were every day renewed; but I have not exaggerated them, for during the ninety-three days we lay before this great and strong city, we were compelled to fight both day and night almost without intermission; and certainly, of all these numerous engagements, I am at least bound to mention the most striking occurrences. If I were desirous of relating every circumstance I should never finish, and my book would resemble 'Amadis de Gaule,' and other such romances, whose authors can find no end to their pretty stories. I will, however, be as brief as possible in my further account of this siege, and hasten on to St. Hippolytus' day, when we subdued this vast city, and took Quauhtemoctzin, with all his generals, prisoners. But, before we were so far successful, we suffered great hardships, and the whole of us were near perishing in the attempt, particularly the division under Cortes, as the reader will shortly see.