(10) Or, "which we are apt to think of as."
In what way? (he asked). How so?
Why, this way (Socrates answered): since incontinency will not suffer us to resist hunger and thirst, or to hold out against sexual appetite, or want of sleep (which abstinences are the only channels to true pleasure in eating and drinking, to the joys of love, to sweet repose and blissful slumber won by those who will patiently abide and endure till each particular happiness is at the flood) (11)—it comes to this: by incontinency we are cut off from the full fruition of the more obvious and constantly recurring pleasures. (12) To self-control, which alone enables us to endure the pains aforesaid, alone belongs the power to give us any pleasure worth remembering in these common cases.
(11) Or, "at its season." Lit. "is as sweet as possible."(12) Or, "from tasting to any extent worth speaking of the mostnecessary and all-pervading sources of happiness."
You speak the words of truth (13) (he answered).
(13) Lit. "What you say is absolutely and entirely true" (the "vraieverite" of the matter).
Soc. Furthermore, (14) if there be any joy in learning aught "beautiful and good," or in patient application to such rules as may enable a man to manage his body aright, or to administer his household well, or to prove himself useful to his friends and to the state, or to dominate his enemies—which things are the sources not only of advantage but of deepest satisfaction (15)—to the continent and self-controlled it is given to reap the fruits of them in their performance. It is the incontinent who have neither part nor lot in any one of them. Since we must be right in asserting that he is least concerned with such things who has least ability to do them, being tied down to take an interest in the pleasure which is nearest to hand.
(14) Or, "But indeed, if there be joy in the pursuit of any noblestudy or of such accomplishments as shall enable," etc.(15) Or, "of the highest pleasures."
Euthydemus replied: Socrates, you would say, it seems to me, that a man who is mastered by the pleasures of the body has no concern at all with virtue.
And what is the distinction, Euthydemus (he asked), between a man devoid of self-control and the dullest of brute beasts? A man who foregoes all height of aim, who gives up searching for the best and strives only to gratify his sense of pleasure, (16) is he better than the silliest of cattle? (17)... But to the self-controlled alone is it given to discover the hid treasures. These, by word and by deed, they will pick out and make selection of them according to their kinds, choosing deliberately the good and holding aloof from the evil. (18) Thus (he added) it is that a man reaches the zenith, as it were, of goodness and happiness, thus it is that he becomes most capable of reasoning and discussion. (19) The very name discussion ({dialegesthai}) is got from people coming together and deliberating in common by picking out and selecting things ({dialegein}) according to their kinds. (20) A man then is bound to prepare himself as much as possible for this business, and to pursue it beyond all else with earnest resolution; for this is the right road to excellence, this will make a man fittest to lead his fellows and be a master in debate. (21)
(16) Or, "and seeks by hook and by crook to do what is pleasantest."(17) i.e. he becomes an animal "feeding a blind life within thebrain."(18) Or, "selecting the ore and repudiating the dross." Kuhner cf.Plat. "Laws," v. 735 B.(19) Or, "draws nearer to happiness and perfection, and is mostcapable of truth-disclosing conversation." Cf. Plat. "Apol." 41:"What would not a man give, O judges, to be able to examine theleaders of the great Trojan expedition, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus,or numberless others, men and women too! What infinite delightwould there be in conversing with them and asking them questions!"(Jowett).(20) For {dialegein kata gene} = {dialegesthai}, cf. Grote, "H. G."viii. 590.(21) Cf. Plat. "Rep." 534 D; "Phaedr." 252 E; "Crat." 390 C;"Statesm." 286 D foll.
VI
At this point I will endeavour to explain in what way Socrates fostered this greater "dialectic" capacity among his intimates. (1) He held firmly to the opinion that if a man knew what each reality was, he would be able to explain this knowledge to others; but, failing the possession of that knowledge, it did not surprise him that men should stumble themselves and cause others to stumble also. (2) It was for this reason that he never ceased inquiring with those who were with him into the true nature of things that are. (3) It would be a long business certainly to go through in detail all the definitions at which he arrived; I will therefore content myself with such examples as will serve to show his method of procedure. As a first instance I will take the question of piety. The mode of investigation may be fairly represented as follows.
(1) Lit. "essayed to make those who were with him more potent indialectic."(2) Or, "Socrates believed that any one who knew the nature ofanything would be able to let others into his secret; but, failingthat knowledge, he thought the best of men would be but blindleaders of the blind, stumbling themselves and causing others tostumble also."(3) Or add, "'What is this among things? and what is its definition?'—such was the ever-recurrent question for which he sought ananswer."
Tell me (said he), Euthydemus, what sort of thing you take piety to be?
Something most fair and excellent, no doubt (the other answered). (4)
(4) Or, "A supreme excellence, no doubt."
Soc. And can you tell me what sort of person the pious man is? (5)
(5) Or, "can you give me a definition of the pious man?"; "tell me whoand what the pious man is."
I should say (he answered) he is a man who honours the gods.
Soc. And is it allowable to honour the gods in any mode or fashion one likes?
Euth. No; there are laws in accordance with which one must do that.
Soc. Then he who knows these laws will know how he must honour the gods?
I think so (he answered).
Soc. And he who knows how he must honour the gods conceives that he ought not to do so except in the manner which accords with his knowledge? (6) Is it not so?
(6) i.e. "his practice must square with his knowledge and be theoutward expression of his belief?"
Euth. That is so. (7)
(7) "That is so; you rightly describe his frame of mind andpersuasion."
Soc. And does any man honour the gods otherwise than he thinks he ought? (8)
(8) "As he should and must." See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 322 foll.
I think not (he answered).
Soc. It comes to this then: he who knows what the law requires in reference to the gods will honour the gods in the lawful way? (9)
(9) Or, "he who knows what is lawful with regard to Heaven pays honourto Heaven lawfully."
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. But now, he who honours lawfully honours as he ought? (10)
(10) "As he should and must."
Euth. I see no alternative.
Soc. And he who honours as he ought is a pious man?
Euth. Certainly.
Soc. It would appear that he who knows what the law requires with respect to the gods will correctly be defined as a pious man, and that is our definition?
So it appears to me, at any rate (he replied). (11)
(11) "I accept it at any rate as mine." N.B.—in reference to thisdefinition of Piety, the question is never raised {poion ti estinomos}; nor yet {poioi tines eisin oi theoi}; but clearly there isa growth in {ta nomima}. Cf. the conversation recorded in St. Johniv. 7 foll., and the words (verse 23) {pneuma o Theos kai tousproskunountas auton en pneumati kai aletheia dei proskunein},which the philosopher Socrates would perhaps readily have assentedto.
Soc. But now, with regard to human beings; is it allowable to deal with men in any way one pleases? (12)
(12) Or, "may a man deal with his fellow-men arbitrarily according tohis fancy?" See above, II. vii. 8.
Euth. No; with regard to men also, he will be a law-observing man (13) who knows what things are lawful as concerning men, in accordance with which our dealings with one another must be conducted. (14)
(13) Or, "he is a man full of the law (lawful) and law-abiding whoknows," etc.(14) Reading {kath' a dei pros allelous khresthai}, subaud.{allelois}, or if vulg. {kath' a dei pos allelois khresthai},translate "must be specifically conducted."
Soc. Then those who deal with one another in this way, deal with each other as they ought? (15)
(15) "As they should and must."
Obviously (he answered).
Soc. And they who deal with one another as they ought, deal well and nobly—is it not so?
Certainly (he answered).
Soc. And they who deal well and nobly by mankind are well-doers in respect of human affairs?
That would seem to follow (he replied).
Soc. I presume that those who obey the laws do what is just and right?
Without a doubt, (he answered).
Soc. And by things right and just you know what sort of things are meant?
What the laws ordain (he answered).
Soc. It would seem to follow that they who do what the laws ordain both do what is right and just and what they ought? (16)
(16) "What they should and must."
Euth. I see no alternative.
Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just? (17)
(17) This proposition, as Kuhner argues (ad loc.), is important asbeing the middle term of the double syllogism (A and B)—A. Those who do what the law demands concerning men do what isjust and right.Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.Ergo—Those who do what the law demands concerning men arerighteous and just.B. Those who know what is just and right ought (and are bound,cf. above, III. ix. 4) to do also what is just and right.Those who do what is just and right are righteous and just.Ergo—Righteous and Just ({dikaioi}) may be defined as "Thosewho know what the law demands (aliter things right and just)concerning men."
I should say so myself (he answered).
Soc. And should you say that any one obeys the laws without knowing what the laws ordain?
I should not (he answered).
Soc. And do you suppose that any one who knows what things he ought to do supposes that he ought not to do them? (18)
(18) Or, "and no one who knows what he must and should do imaginesthat he must and should not do it?"
No, I suppose not (he answered).
Soc. And do you know of anybody doing other than what he feels bound to do? (19)
(19) Or, "and nobody that you know of does the contrary of what hethinks he should do?"
No, I do not (he answered).
Soc. It would seem that he who knows what things are lawful (20) as concerning men does the things that are just and right?
(20) Or, "of lawful obligation."
Without a doubt (he answered).
Soc. But then, he who does what is just and right is upright and just? (21)
(21) N.B.—In reference to this definition of justice, see K. Joel,op. cit. p. 323 foll., "Das ist eine Karrikatur des SokratischenDialogs."
Who else, if not? (he replied).
Soc. It would seem, then, we shall have got to a right definition if we name as just and upright those who know the things which are lawful as concerning men?
That is my opinion (he answered).
Soc. And what shall we say that wisdom is? Tell me, does it seem to you that the wise are wise in what they know, (22) or are there any who are wise in what they know not?
(22) Or, "in that of which they have the knowledge ({episteme})."
Euth. Clearly they are wise in what they know; (23) for how could a man have wisdom in that which he does not know?
(23) Or, "their wisdom is confined to that of which they have the{episteme}. How could a man be wise in what he lacks the knowledgeof?"
Soc. In fact, then, the wise are wise in knowledge?
Euth. Why, in what else should a man be wise save only in knowledge?
Soc. And is wisdom anything else than that by which a man is wise, think you?
Euth. No; that, and that only, I think.
Soc. It would seem to follow that knowledge and wisdom are the same?
Euth. So it appears to me.
Soc. May I ask, does it seem to you possible for a man to know all the things that are?
Euth. No, indeed! not the hundredth part of them, I should say.
Soc. Then it would seem that it is impossible for a man to be all-wise?
Quite impossible (he answered).
Soc. It would seem the wisdom of each is limited to his knowledge; each is wise only in what he knows?
Euth. That is my opinion. (24)
(24) Cf. Plat. "Theaet." 145 D. N.B.—For this definition of wisdomsee K. Joel, ib. p. 324 foll.
Soc. Well! come now, Euthydemus, as concerning the good: ought we to search for the good in this way?
What way? (he asked).
Soc. Does it seem to you that the same thing is equally advantageous to all?
No, I should say not (he answered).
Soc. You would say that a thing which is beneficial to one is sometimes hurtful to another?
Decidedly (he replied).
Soc. And is there anything else good except that which is beneficial, should you say? (25)
(25) Or reading (1) {allo d' an ti phaies e agathon einai toophelimon}; or else (2) {allo d' an ti phaies agathon einai toophelimon}; (in which case {alloti} = {allo ti e};) translate (1)"and what is beneficial is good (or a good), should you not say?"lit. "could you say that the beneficial is anything else than good(or a good)?" or else (2) "and what is beneficial is good (or agood)? or is it anything else?"
Nothing else (he answered).
Soc. It would seem to follow that the beneficial is good relatively to him to whom it is beneficial?
That is how it appears to me (he answered).
Soc. And the beautiful: can we speak of a thing as beautiful in any other way than relatively? or can you name any beautiful thing, body, vessel, or whatever it be, which you know of as universally beautiful? (26)
(26) i.e. "beautiful in all relations into which it enters." Reading{to de kalon ekhoimen an pos allos eipein e estin onomazein kalone soma e skeuos e all' otioun, o oistha pros tanta kalon on; MaDi', ouk egog', ephe}. For other emendations of the vulg., and themany interpretations which have been given to the passage, see R.Kuhner ad loc.
Euth. I confess I do not know of any such myself. (27)
(27) Or, adopting the reading {ekhois an} in place of {ekhoimen an}above, translate "I certainly cannot, I confess."
Soc. I presume to turn a thing to its proper use is to apply it beautifully?
Euth. Undoubtedly it is a beautiful appliance. (28)
(28) Or, "I presume it is well and good and beautiful to use this,that, and the other thing for the purpose for which the particularthing is useful?"—"That nobody can deny (he answered)." It isimpossible to convey simply the verbal play and the quasi-argumentative force of the Greek {kalos ekhei pros ti tinikhresthai}. See K. Joel, p. 426.
Soc. And is this, that, and the other thing beautiful for aught else except that to which it may be beautifully applied?
Euth. No single thing else.
Soc. It would seem that the useful is beautiful relatively to that for which it is of use?
So it appears to me (he answered).
Soc. And what of courage, (29) Euthydemus? I presume you rank courage among things beautiful? It is a noble quality? (30)
(29) Or, perhaps better, "fortitude." See H. Sidgwick, "Hist. ofEthics," p. 43.(30) It is one of {ta kala}. See K. Joel, ib. p. 325, and in referenceto the definitions of the Good and of the Beautiful, ib. p. 425foll.
Nay, one of the most noble (he answered).
Soc. It seems that you regard courage as useful to no mean end?
Euth. Nay, rather the greatest of all ends, God knows.
Soc. Possibly in face of terrors and dangers you would consider it an advantage to be ignorant of them?
Certainly not (he answered).
Soc. It seems that those who have no fear in face of dangers, simply because they do not know what they are, are not courageous?
Most true (he answered); or, by the same showing, a large proportion of madmen and cowards would be courageous.
Soc. Well, and what of those who are in dread of things which are not dreadful, are they—
Euth. Courageous, Socrates?—still less so than the former, goodness knows.
Soc. Possibly, then, you would deem those who are good in the face of terrors and dangers to be courageous, and those who are bad in the face of the same to be cowards?
Certainly I should (he answered).
Soc. And can you suppose any other people to be good in respect of such things except those who are able to cope with them and turn them to noble account? (31)
(31) {kalos khresthai}, lit. "make a beautiful use of them."
No; these and these alone (he answered).
Soc. And those people who are of a kind to cope but badly with the same occurrences, it would seem, are bad?
Who else, if not they? (he asked).
Soc. May it be that both one and the other class do use these circumstances as they think they must and should? (32)
(32) Or, "feel bound and constrained to do."
Why, how else should they deal with them? (he asked).
Soc. Can it be said that those who are unable to cope well with them or to turn them to noble account know how they must and should deal with them? (33)
(33) Or, "Can it be said that those who are unable to cope nobly withtheir perilous surroundings know how they ought to deal withthem?"
I presume not (he answered).
Soc. It would seem to follow that those who have the knowledge how to behave are also those who have the power? (34)
(34) "He who kens can."
Yes; these, and these alone (he said).
Soc. Well, but now, what of those who have made no egregious blunder (in the matter); can it be they cope ill with the things and circumstances we are discussing?
I think not (he answered).
Soc. It would seem, conversely, that they who cope ill have made some egregious blunder?
Euth. Probably; indeed, it would appear to follow.
Soc. It would seem, then, that those who know (35) how to cope with terrors and dangers well and nobly are courageous, and those who fail utterly of this are cowards?
(35) "Who have the {episteme}."
So I judge them to be (he answered). (36)
(36) N.B.—For this definition of courage see Plat. "Laches," 195 Aand passim; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 325 foll.
A kingdom and a tyranny (37) were, he opined, both of them forms of government, but forms which differed from one another, in his belief; a kingdom was a government over willing men in accordance with civil law, whereas a tyranny implied the government over unwilling subjects not according to law, but so as to suit the whims and wishes of the ruler.
(37) Or, "despotism."
There were, moreover, three forms of citizenship or polity; in the case where the magistrates were appointed from those who discharged the obligations prescribed by law, he held the polity to be an aristocracy (or rule of the best); (38) where the title to office depended on rateable property, it was a plutocracy (or rule of wealth); and lastly, where all the citizens without distinction held the reins of office, that was a democracy (or rule of the people).
(38) Or, "in which the due discharge of lawful (law-appointed)obligations gave the title to magisterial office and government,this form of polity he held to be an aristocracy (or rule of thebest)." See Newman, op. cit. i. 212, 235.
Let me explain his method of reply where the disputant had no clear statement to make, but without attempt at proof chose to contend that such or such a person named by himself was wiser, or more of a statesman, or more courageous, and so forth, than some other person. (39) Socrates had a way of bringing the whole discussion back to the underlying proposition, (40) as thus:
(39) Or, "if any one encountered him in argument about any topic orperson without any clear statement, but a mere ipse dixit, devoidof demonstration, that so and so," etc.(40) Or, "question at bottom." Cf. Plat. "Laws," 949 B.
Soc. You state that so and so, whom you admire, is a better citizen that this other whom I admire?
The Disputant. Yes; I repeat the assertion.
Soc. But would it not have been better to inquire first what is the work or function of a good citizen?
The Disputant. Let us do so.
Soc. To begin, then, with the matter of expenditure: his superiority will be shown by his increasing the resources and lightening the expenditure of the state? (41)
(41) Or, "In the management of moneys, then, his strength will consistin his rendering the state better provided with ways and means?"
Certainly (the disputant would answer).
Soc. And in the event of war, by rendering his state superior to her antagonists?
The Disputant. Clearly.
Soc. Or on an embassy as a diplomatist, I presume, by securing friends in place of enemies?
That I should imagine (replies the disputant).
Soc. Well, and in parliamentary debate, by putting a stop to party strife and fostering civic concord?
The Disputant. That is my opinion.
By this method of bringing back the argument to its true starting-point, even the disputant himself would be affected and the truth become manifest to his mind.
His own—that is, the Socratic—method of conducting a rational discussion (42) was to proceed step by step from one point of general agreement to another: "Herein lay the real security of reasoning," (43) he would say; and for this reason he was more successful in winning the common assent of his hearers than any one I ever knew. He had a saying that Homer had conferred on Odyesseus the title of a safe, unerring orator, (44) because he had the gift to lead the discussion from one commonly accepted opinion to another.
(42) Of, "of threading the mazes of an argument."(43) Reading {tauton asphaleian}; aliter. {tauten ten asphaleian} ="that this security was part and parcel of reasoning."(44) "Od." viii. 171, {o d' asphaleos agoreuei}, "and his speech runssurely on its way" (Butcher and Lang), where Odysseus isdescribing himself. Cf. Dion. Hal. "de Arte Rhet." xi. 8.
VII
The frankness and simplicity with which Socrates endeavoured to declare his own opinions, in dealing with those who conversed with him, (1) is, I think, conclusively proved by the above instances; at the same time, as I hope now to show, he was no less eager to cultivate a spirit of independence in others, which would enable them to stand alone in all transactions suited to their powers.
(1) Or, "who frequented his society, is, I hope, clear from what hasbeen said."
Of all the men I have ever known, he was most anxious to ascertain in what any of those about him was really versed; and within the range of his own knowledge he showed the greatest zeal in teaching everything which it befits the true gentleman (2) to know; or where he was deficient in knowledge himself, (3) he would introduce his friends to those who knew. (4) He did not fail to teach them also up to what point it was proper for an educated man to acquire empiric knowledge of any particular matter. (5)
(2) Lit. "a beautiful and good man."(3) Or, "where he lacked acquaintance with the matter himself." See,for an instance, "Econ." iii. 14.(4) "To those who had the special knowledge"; "a connoisseur in thematter."(5) Or, "of any particular branch of learning"; "in each department ofthings."
To take geometry as an instance: Every one (he would say) ought to be taught geometry so far, at any rate, as to be able, if necessary, to take over or part with a piece of land, or to divide it up or assign a portion of it for cultivation, (6) and in every case by geometric rule. (7) That amount of geometry was so simple indeed, and easy to learn, that it only needed ordinary application of the mind to the method of mensuration, and the student could at once ascertain the size of the piece of land, and, with the satisfaction of knowing its measurement, depart in peace. But he was unable to approve of the pursuit of geometry up to the point at which it became a study of unintelligible diagrams. (8) What the use of these might be, he failed, he said, to see; and yet he was not unversed in these recondite matters himself. (9) These things, he would say, were enough to wear out a man's life, and to hinder him from many other more useful studies. (10)
(6) {e ergon apodeixasthai}, or "and to explain the process." Cf.Plat. "Rep." vii. 528 D. See R. Kuhner ad loc. for otherinterpretations of the phrase. Cf. Max. Tyr. xxxvii. 7.(7) Or, "by correct measurement"; lit. "by measurement of the earth."(8) Cf. Aristot. "Pol." v. (viii.) 2; Cic. "Acad. Post." I. iv. 15.For the attitude compare the attitude of a philosopher in otherrespects most unlike Socrates—August Comte, e.g. as to thefutility of sidereal astronomy, "Pos. Pol." i. 412 (Bridges).(9) Cf. Isocr. "On the Antidosis," 258-269, as to the true place of"Eristic" in education. See above, IV. ii. 10.(10) Cf. A. Comte as to "perte intellectuelle" in the pursuit ofbarren studies.
Again, a certain practical knowledge of astronomy, a certain skill in the study of the stars, he strongly insisted on. Every one should know enough of the science to be able to discover the hour of the night or the season of the month or year, for the purposes of travel by land or sea—the march, the voyage, and the regulations of the watch; (11) and in general, with regard to all matters connected with the night season, or with the month, or the year, (12) it was well to have such reliable data to go upon as would serve to distinguish the various times and seasons. But these, again, were pieces of knowledge easily learnt from night sportsmen, (13) pilots of vessels, and many others who make it their business to know such things. As to pushing the study of astronomy so far as to include a knowledge of the movements of bodies outside our own orbit, whether planets or stars of eccentric movement, (14) or wearing oneself out endeavouring to discover their distances from the earth, their periods, and their causes, (15) all this he strongly discountenanced; for he saw (he said) no advantage in these any more than in the former studies. And yet he was not unversed (16) in the subtleties of astronomy any more than in those of geometry; only these, again, he insisted, were sufficient to wear out a man's lifetime, and to keep him away from many more useful pursuits.
(11) Schneid. cf. Plat. "Rep." vii. 527 D.(12) "Occurrences connected with the night, the month, or year." e.g.the festival of the Karneia, the {tekmerion} (point de repere) ofwhich is the full moon of August. Cf. Eur. "Alc." 449.(13) See Plat. "Soph." 220 D; above, III. xi. 8; "Cyrop." I. vi. 40;"Hunting," xii. 6; Hippocr. "Aer." 28.(14) See Lewis, "Astron. of the Ancients"; cf. Diog. Laert. vii. 1.144.(15) Or, "the causes of these."(16) {oude touton ge anekoos en}. He had "heard," it is said,Archelaus, a pupil of Anaxagoras. Cf. Cic. "Tusc." V. iv. 10.
And to speak generally, in regard of things celestial he set his face against attempts to excogitate the machinery by which the divine power formed its several operations. (17) Not only were these matters beyond man's faculties to discover, as he believed, but the attempt to search out what the gods had not chosen to reveal could hardly (he supposed) be well pleasing in their sight. Indeed, the man who tortured his brains about such subjects stood a fair chance of losing his wits entirely, just as Anaxagoras, (18) the headiest speculator of them all, in his attempt to explain the divine mechanism, had somewhat lost his head. Anaxagoras took on himself to assert that sun and fire are identical, (19) ignoring the fact that human beings can easily look at fire, but to gaze steadily into the face of the sun is given to no man; or that under the influence of his rays the colour of the skin changes, but under the rays of fire not. (20) He forgot that no plant or vegetation springs from earth's bosom with healthy growth without the help of sunlight, whilst the influence of fire is to parch up everything, and to destroy life; and when he came to speak of the sun as being a "red-hot stone" he ignored another fact, that a stone in fire neither lights up nor lasts, whereas the sun-god abides for ever with intensist brilliancy undimmed.
(17) Or, "he tried to divert one from becoming overly-wise in heavenlymatters and the 'mecanique celeste' of the Godhead in His severaloperations." See above, I. i. 11. See Grote, "Plato," i. 438.(18) Of Clazomenae. Cf. Plat. "Apol." 14; Diog. Laert. II. vi; Cic."Tusc." V. iv. 10; Cobet, "Prosop. Xen." s.n.; Grote, "H. G." i.501.(19) Or, "that the sun was simply a fire, forgetting so simple a factas that."(20) Or, "the complexion darkens, whereas fire has no such effect."
Socrates inculcated the study of reasoning processes, (21) but in these, equally with the rest, he bade the student beware of vain and idle over-occupation. Up to the limit set by utility, he was ready to join in any investigation, and to follow out an argument with those who were with him; but there he stopped. He particularly urged those who were with him to pay the utmost attention to health. They would learn all it was possible to learn from adepts, and not only so, but each one individually should take pains to discover, by a lifelong observation of his own case, what particular regimen, what meat or drink, or what kind of work, best suited him; these he should turn to account with a view to leading the healthiest possible life. It would be no easy matter for any one who would follow this advice, and study his own idiosyncrasy, to find a doctor to improve either on the diagnosis or the treatment requisite. (22)
(21) {logismous} = (1) "arithmetic," (2) "calculation," (3)"syllogistic reasoning." See L. Dind. "Index. Gr." s.v., andKuhner ad loc.; cf. Plat. "Gorg." 451 C. It is important to decidewhich form of "logism" is meant here.(22) Or, "to find a doctor better able than himself to 'diagnose' andprescribe a treatment congenial to health." Cf. Tac. "Ann." vi.46; Plut. "de San." 136 E, ap. Schneid. ad loc.
Where any one came seeking for help which no human wisdom could supply, he would counsel him to give heed to "divination." He who has the secret of the means whereby the gods give signs to men touching their affairs can never surely find himself bereft of heavenly guidance.
VIII
Now if any one should be disposed to set the statement of Socrates touching the divinity (1) which warned him what he ought to do or not to do, against the fact that he was sentenced to death by the board of judges, and argue that thereby Socrates stood convicted of lying and delusion in respect of this "divinity" of his, I would have him to note in the first place that, at the date of his trial, Socrates was already so far advanced in years that had he not died then his life would have reached its natural term soon afterwards; and secondly, as matters went, he escaped life's bitterest load (2) in escaping those years which bring a diminution of intellectual force to all—instead of which he was called upon to exhibit the full robustness of his soul and acquire glory in addition, (3) partly by the style of his defence—felicitous alike in its truthfulness, its freedom, and its rectitude (4)—and partly by the manner in which he bore the sentence of condemnation with infinite gentleness and manliness. Since no one within the memory of man, it is admitted, ever bowed his head to death more nobly. After the sentence he must needs live for thirty days, since it was the month of the "Delia," (5) and the law does not suffer any man to die by the hand of the public executioner until the sacred embassy return from Delos. During the whole of that period (as his acquaintances without exception can testify) his life proceeded as usual. There was nothing to mark the difference between now and formerly in the even tenour of its courage; and it was a life which at all times had been a marvel of cheerfulness and calm content. (6)
(1) Or, "the words of Socrates with regard to a divine something whichwarned him," etc.(2) The phraseology is poetical.(3) Or, "in a manner which redounded to his glory."(4) Or, "marvellous alike for the sincerity of its language, the freeunbroken spirit of its delivery, and the absolute rectitude of thespeaker."(5) i.e. the lesser "Delian" solemnities, an annual festivalinstituted, it was said, by Theseus. See Plut. "Theseus," 23(Clough, i. 19); and for the whole matter see Plat. "Phaed." 58foll.(6) Cf. Arist. "Frogs," 82; of Sophocles, {o d' eukolos men enthad',eukolos d' ekei}.(Let us pause and ask how could man die more nobly and morebeautifully than in the way described? or put it thus: dying so,then was his death most noble and most beautiful; and being the mostbeautiful, then was it also the most fortunate and heaven-blest; andbeing most blessed of heaven, then was it also most precious in thesight of God.) (7)(7) This is bracketed as spurious by Sauppe and other commentators.But see "Cyrop." VIII. ii. 7, 8, for similar ineptitude of style.R. Kuhner defends the passage as genuine.
And now I will mention further certain things which I have heard from Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus, (8) concerning him. He said that even after Meletus (9) had drawn up the indictment, he himself used to hear Socrates conversing and discussing everything rather than the suit impending, and had ventured to suggest that he ought to be considering the line of his defence, to which, in the first instance, the master answered: "Do I not seem to you to have been practising that my whole life long?" And upon his asking "How?" added in explanation that he had passed his days in nothing else save in distinguishing between what is just and what is unjust (right and wrong), and in doing what is right and abstaining from what is wrong; "which conduct" (he added) "I hold to be the finest possible practice for my defence"; and when he (Hermogenes), returning to the point again, pleaded with Socrates: "Do you not see, Socrates, how commonly it happens that an Athenian jury, under the influence of argument, condemns innocent people to death and acquits real criminals?"—Socrates replied, "I assure you, Hermogenes, that each time I have essayed to give my thoughts to the defence which I am to make before the court, the divinity (10) has opposed me." And when he (Hermogenes) exclaimed, "How strange!"—"Do you find it strange" (he continued), "that to the Godhead it should appear better for me to close my life at once? Do you not know that up to the present moment there is no man whom I can admit to have spent a better or happier life than mine. Since theirs I regard as the best of lives who study best to become as good as may be, and theirs the happiest who have the liveliest sense of growth in goodness; and such, hitherto, is the happy fortune which I perceive to have fallen to my lot. To such conclusion I have come, not only in accidental intercourse with others, but by a strict comparison drawn between myself and others, and in this faith I continue to this day; and not I only, but my friends continue in a like persuasion with regard to me, not for the lame reason that they are my friends and love me (or else would others have been in like case as regards their friends), but because they are persuaded that by being with me they will attain to their full height of goodness. But, if I am destined to prolong my days, maybe I shall be enforced to pay in full the penalties of old age—to see and hear less keenly, to fail in intellectual force, and to leave school, as it were, more of a dunce than when I came, less learned and more forgetful—in a word, I shall fall from my high estate, and daily grow worse in that wherein aforetime I excelled. But indeed, were it possible to remain unconscious of the change, the life left would scarcely be worth living; but given that there is a consciousness of the change, then must the existence left to live be found by comparison insipid, joyless, a death in life, devoid of life's charm. But indeed, if it is reserved for me to die unjustly, then on those who unjustly slay me lies the shame (since, given injustice is base, how can any unjust action whatsoever fail of baseness?) (11) But for me what disgrace is it that others should fail of a just decision and right acts concerning me?... I see before me a long line of predecessors on this road, and I mark the reputation also among posterity which they have left. (12) I note how it varies according as they did or suffered wrong, and for myself I know that I too, although I die to-day, shall obtain from mankind a consideration far different from that which will be accorded to those who put me to death. I know that undying witness will be borne me to this effect, that I never at any time did wrong to any man, or made him a worse man, but ever tried to make those better who were with me."