(10) Or, "to which their ears are already opened."
Per. I suppose you refer to that judgment of the gods which, for their virtue's sake, Cecrops and his followers were called on to decide? (11)
(11) See Apollodorus, iii. 14.
Soc. Yes, I refer to that and to the birth and rearing of Erectheus, (12) and also to the war (13) which in his days was waged to stay the tide of invasion from the whole adjoining continent; and that other war in the days of the Heraclidae (14) against the men of Peloponnese; and that series of battles fought in the days of Theseus (15)—in all which the virtuous pre-eminence of our ancestry above the men of their own times was made manifest. Or, if you please, we may come down to things of a later date, which their descendants and the heroes of days not so long anterior to our own wrought in the struggle with the lords of Asia, (16) nay of Europe also, as far as Macedonia: a people possessing a power and means of attack far exceeding any who had gone before—who, moreover, had accomplished the doughtiest deeds. These things the men of Athens wrought partly single-handed, (17) and partly as sharers with the Peloponnesians in laurels won by land and sea. Heroes were these men also, far outshining, as tradition tells us, the peoples of their time.
(12) Cf. "Il." ii. 547, {'Erekhtheos megaletoros k.t.l.}(13) Cf. Isoc. "Paneg." 19, who handles all the topics.(14) Commonly spoken of as "the Return." See Grote, "H. G." II. ch.xviii.(15) Against the Amazons and Thracians; cf. Herod. ix. 27; Plut."Thes." 27.(16) The "Persian" wars; cf. Thucyd. I. i.(17) He omits the Plataeans.
Per. Yes, so runs the story of their heroism.
Soc. Therefore it is that, amidst the many changes of inhabitants, and the migrations which have, wave after wave, swept over Hellas, these maintained themselves in their own land, unmoved; so that it was a common thing for others to turn to them as to a court of appeal on points of right, or to flee to Athens as a harbour of refuge from the hand of the oppressor. (18)
(18) Cf. (Plat.) "Menex."; Isocr. "Paneg."
Then Pericles: And the wonder to me, Socrates, is how our city ever came to decline.
Soc. I think we are victims of our own success. Like some athlete, (19) whose facile preponderance in the arena has betrayed him into laxity until he eventually succumbs to punier antagonists, so we Athenians, in the plenitude of our superiority, have neglected ourselves and are become degenerate.
(19) Reading {athletai tines}, or if {alloi tines}, translate "any oneelse."
Per. What then ought we to do now to recover our former virtue?
Soc. There need be no mystery about that, I think. We can rediscover the institutions of our forefathers—applying them to the regulation of our lives with something of their precision, and not improbably with like success; or we can imitate those who stand at the front of affairs to-day, (20) adapting to ourselves their rule of life, in which case, if we live up to the standard of our models, we may hope at least to rival their excellence, or, by a more conscientious adherence to what they aim at, rise superior.
(20) Sc. the Lacedaemonians. See W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 396.
You would seem to suggest (he answered) that the spirit of beautiful and brave manhood has taken wings and left our city; (21) as, for instance, when will Athenians, like the Lacedaemonians, reverence old age—the Athenian, who takes his own father as a starting-point for the contempt he pours upon grey hairs? When will he pay as strict an attention to the body, who is not content with neglecting a good habit, (22) but laughs to scorn those who are careful in this matter? When shall we Athenians so obey our magistrates—we who take a pride, as it were, in despising authority? When, once more, shall we be united as a people—we who, instead of combining to promote common interests, delight in blackening each other's characters, (23) envying one another more than we envy all the world besides; and—which is our worst failing—who, in private and public intercourse alike, are torn by dissension and are caught in a maze of litigation, and prefer to make capital out of our neighbour's difficulties rather than to render natural assistance? To make our conduct consistent, indeed, we treat our national interests no better than if they were the concerns of some foreign state; we make them bones of contention to wrangle over, and rejoice in nothing so much as in possessing means and ability to indulge these tastes. From this hotbed is engendered in the state a spirit of blind folly (24) and cowardice, and in the hearts of the citizens spreads a tangle of hatred and mutual hostility which, as I often shudder to think, will some day cause some disaster to befall the state greater than it can bear. (25)
(21) Or, "is far enough away from Athens."(22) See below, III. xii. 5; "Pol. Ath." i. 13; "Rev." iv. 52.(23) Or, "to deal despitefully with one another."(24) Reading {ateria}. See L. Dindorf ad loc., Ox. ed. lxii. Al.{apeiria}, a want of skill, or {ataxia}, disorderliness. Cf. "Pol.Ath." i. 5.(25) Possibly the author is thinking of the events of 406, 405 B.C.(see "Hell." I. vii. and II.), and history may repeat itself.
Do not (replied Socrates), do not, I pray you, permit yourself to believe that Athenians are smitten with so incurable a depravity. Do you not observe their discipline in all naval matters? Look at their prompt and orderly obedience to the superintendents at the gymnastic contests, (26) their quite unrivalled subservience to their teachers in the training of our choruses.
(26) Epistatoi, i.e. stewards and training-masters.
Yes (he answered), there's the wonder of it; to think that all those good people should so obey their leaders, but that our hoplites and our cavalry, who may be supposed to rank before the rest of the citizens in excellence of manhood, (27) should be so entirely unamenable to discipline.
(27) {kalokagathia}.
Then Socrates: Well, but the council which sits on Areopagos is composed of citizens of approved (28) character, is it not?
(28) Technically, they must have passed the {dokimasia}. And for the"Aeropagos" see Grote, "H. G." v. 498; Aristot. "Pol." ii. 12;"Ath. Pol." 4. 4, where see Dr. Sandys' note, p. 18.
Certainly (he answered).
Soc. Then can you name any similar body, judicial or executive, trying cases or transacting other business with greater honour, stricter legality, higher dignity, or more impartial justice?
No, I have no fault to find on that score (he answered).
Soc. Then we ought not to despair as though all sense of orderliness and good discipline had died out of our countrymen.
Still (he answered), if it is not to harp upon one string, I maintain that in military service, where, if anywhere, sobreity and temperance, orderliness and good discipline are needed, none of these essentials receives any attention.
May it not perhaps be (asked Socrates) that in this department they are officered by those who have the least knowledge? (29) Do you not notice, to take the case of harp-players, choric performers, dancers, and the like, that no one would ever dream of leading if he lacked the requisite knowledge? and the same holds of wrestlers or pancratiasts.
(29) {episteme}. See below, III. ix. 10.
Moreover, while in these cases any one in command can tell you where he got the elementary knowledge of what he presides over, most generals are amateurs and improvisers. (30) I do not at all suppose that you are one of that sort. I believe you could give as clear an account of your schooling in strategy as you could in the matter of wrestling. No doubt you have got at first hand many of your father's "rules for generalship," which you carefully preserve, besides having collected many others from every quarter whence it was possible to pick up any knowledge which would be of use to a future general. Again, I feel sure you are deeply concerned to escape even unconscious ignorance of anything which will be serviceable to you in so high an office; and if you detect in yourself any ignorance, you turn to those who have knowledge in these matters (sparing neither gifts nor gratitude) to supplement your ignorance by their knowledge and to secure their help.
(30) Cf. "Pol. Lac." xiii. 5.
To which Pericles: I am not so blind, Socrates, as to imagine you say these words under the idea that I am truly so careful in these matters; but rather your object is to teach me that the would-be general must make such things his care. I admit in any case all you say.
Socrates proceeded: Has it ever caught your observation, Pericles, that a high mountain barrier stretches like a bulwark in front of our country down towards Boeotia—cleft, moreover, by narrow and precipitous passes, the only avenues into the heart of Attica, which lies engirdled by a ring of natural fortresses? (31)
(31) The mountains are Cithaeron and Parnes N., and Cerata N.W.
Per. Certainly I have.
Soc. Well, and have you ever heard tell of the Mysians and Pisidians living within the territory of the great king, (32) who, inside their mountain fortresses, lightly armed, are able to rush down and inflict much injury on the king's territory by their raids, while preserving their own freedom?
(32) For this illustration see "Anab." III. ii. 23; cf. "Econ." iv.18, where Socrates ({XS}) refers to Cyrus's expedition and death.
Per. Yes, the circumstance is not new to me.
And do you not think (added Socrates) that a corps of young able-bodied Athenians, accoutred with lighter arms, (33) and holding our natural mountain rampart in possession, would prove at once a thorn in the enemy's side offensively, whilst defensively they would form a splendid bulwark to protect the country?
(33) Cf. the reforms of Iphicrates.
To which Pericles: I think, Socrates, these would be all useful measures, decidedly.
If, then (replied Socrates), these suggestions meet your approbation, try, O best of men, to realise them—if you can carry out a portion of them, it will be an honour to yourself and a blessing to the state; while, if you fail in any point, there will be no damage done to the city nor discredit to yourself.
VI
Glaucon, (1) the son of Ariston, had conceived such an ardour to gain the headship of the state that nothing could hinder him but he must deliver a course of public speeches, (2) though he had not yet reached the age of twenty. His friends and relatives tried in vain to stop him making himself ridiculous and being dragged down from the bema. (3) Socrates, who took a kindly interest in the youth for the sake of Charmides (4) the son of Glaucon, and of Plato, alone succeeded in restraining him. It happened thus. He fell in with him, and first of all, to get him to listen, detained him by some such remarks as the following: (5)
(1) Glaucon, Plato's brother. Grote, "Plato," i. 508.(2) "Harangue the People."(3) See Plat. "Protag." 319 C: "And if some person offers to give themadvice who is not supposed by them to have any skill in the art(sc. of politics), even though he be good-looking, and rich, andnoble, they will not listen to him, but laugh at him, and hoothim, until he is either clamoured down and retires of himself; orif he persists, he is dragged away or put out by the constables atthe command of the prytanes" (Jowett). Cf. Aristoph. "Knights,"665, {kath eilkon auton oi prutaneis kai toxotai}.(4) For Charmides (maternal uncle of Plato and Glaucon, cousin ofCritias) see ch. vii. below; Plato the philosopher, Glaucon'sbrother, see Cobet, "Pros. Xen." p. 28.(5) Or, "and in the first instance addressing him in such terms hecould not choose but hear, detained him." See above, II. vi. 11.Socrates applies his own theory.
Ah, Glaucon (he exclaimed), so you have determined to become prime minister? (6)
(6) {prostateuein}.
Glauc. Yes, Socrates, I have.
Soc. And what a noble aim! if aught human ever deserved to be called noble; since if you succeed in your design, it follows, as the night the day, you will be able not only to gratify your every wish, but you will be in a position to benefit your friends, you will raise up your father's house, you will exalt your fatherland, you will become a name thrice famous in the city first, and next in Hellas, and lastly even among barbarians perhaps, like Themistocles; but be it here or be it there, wherever you be, you will be the observed of all beholders. (7)
(7) "The centre of attraction—the cynosure of neighbouring eyes."
The heart of Glaucon swelled with pride as he drank in the words, and gladly he stayed to listen.
Presently Socrates proceeded: Then this is clear, Glaucon, is it not? that you must needs benefit the city, since you desire to reap her honours?
Glauc. Undoubtedly.
Then, by all that is sacred (Socrates continued), do not keep us in the dark, but tell us in what way do you propose first to benefit the state? what is your starting-point? (8) When Glaucon remained with sealed lips, as if he were now for the first time debating what this starting-point should be, Socrates continued: I presume, if you wished to improve a friend's estate, you would endeavour to do so by adding to its wealth, would you not? So here, maybe, you will try to add to the wealth of the state?
(8) Or, "tell us what your starting-point will be in the path ofbenefaction."
Most decidedly (he answered).
Soc. And we may take it the state will grow wealthier in proportion as her revenues increase?
Glauc. That seems probable, at any rate.
Soc. Then would you kindly tell us from what sources the revenues of the state are at present derived, and what is their present magnitude? No doubt you have gone carefully into the question, so that if any of these are failing you may make up the deficit, or if neglected for any reason, make some new provision. (9)
(9) Or, "or if others have dropped out or been negligently overlooked,you may replace them."
Glauc. Nay, to speak the truth, these are matters I have not thoroughly gone into.
Never mind (he said) if you have omitted the point; but you might oblige us by running through the items or heads of expenditure. Obviously you propose to remove all those which are superfluous?
Glauc. Well, no. Upon my word I have not had time to look into that side of the matter either as yet.
Soc. Then we will postpone for the present the problem of making the state wealthier; obviously without knowing the outgoings and the incomings it would be impossible to deal with the matter seriously.
But, Socrates (Glaucon remarked), it is possible to enrich the state out of the pockets of her enemies!
Yes, to be sure, considerably (answered Socrates), in the event of getting the better of them; but in the event of being worsted, it is also possible to lose what we have got.
A true observation (he replied).
And therefore (proceeded Socrates), before he makes up his mind with what enemy to go to war, a statesman should know the relative powers of his own city and the adversary's, so that, in case the superiority be on his own side, he may throw the weight of his advice into the scale of undertaking war; but if the opposite he may plead in favour of exercising caution.
You are right (he answered).
Soc. Then would you for our benefit enumerate the land and naval forces first of Athens and then of our opponents?
Glauc. Pardon me. I could not tell you them off-hand at a moment's notice.
Or (added Socrates), if you have got the figures on paper, you might produce them. I cannot tell how anxious I am to hear your statement.
Glauc. No, I assure you, I have not got them even on paper yet.
Soc. Well then, we will defer tending advice on the topic of peace or war, in a maiden speech at any rate. (10) I can understand that, owing to the magnitude of the questions, in these early days of your ministry you have not yet fully examined them. But come, I am sure that you have studied the defences of the country, at all events, and you know exactly how many forts and outposts are serviceable (11) and how many are not; you can tell us which garrisons are strong enough and which defective; and you are prepared to throw in the weight of your advice in favour of increasing the serviceable outposts and sweeping away those that are superfluous?
(10) See "Econ." xi. 1.(11) Or, "advantageously situated." See the author's own tract on"Revenues."
Glauc. Yes, sweep them all away, that's my advice; for any good that is likely to come of them! Defences indeed! so maintained that the property of the rural districts is simply pilfered.
But suppose you sweep away the outposts (he asked), may not something worse, think you, be the consequence? will not sheer plundering be free to any ruffian who likes?... But may I ask is this judgment the result of personal inspection? have you gone yourself and examined the defences? or how do you know that they are all maintained as you say?
Glauc. I conjecture that it is so.
Soc. Well then, until we have got beyond the region of conjecture shall we defer giving advice on the matter? (It will be time enough when we know the facts.)
Possibly it would be better to wait till then (replied Glaucon).
Soc. Then there are the mines, (12) but, of course, I am aware that you have not visited them in person, so as to be able to say why they are less productive than formerly.
(12) Again the author's tract on "Revenues" is a comment on thematter.
Well, no; I have never been there myself (he answered).
Soc. No, Heaven help us! an unhealthy district by all accounts; so that, when the moment for advice on that topic arrives, you will have an excuse ready to hand.
I see you are making fun of me (Glaucon answered).
Soc. Well, but here is a point, I am sure, which you have not neglected. No, you will have thoroughly gone into it, and you can tell us. For how long a time could the corn supplies from the country districts support the city? how much is requisite for a single year, so that the city may not run short of this prime necessary, before you are well aware; but on the contrary you with your full knowledge will be in a position to give advice on so vital a question, to the aid or may be the salvation of your country?
It is a colossal business this (Glaucon answered), if I am to be obliged to give attention to all these details.
Soc. On the other hand, a man could not even manage his own house or his estate well, without, in the first place, knowing what he requires, and, in the second place, taking pains, item by item, to supply his wants. But since this city consists of more than ten thousand houses, and it is not easy to pay minute attention to so many all at once, how is it you did not practise yourself by trying to augment the resources of one at any rate of these—I mean your own uncle's? The service would not be thrown away. Then if your strength suffices in the single case you might take in hand a larger number; but if you fail to relieve one, how could you possibly hope to succeed with many? How absurd for a man, if he cannot carry half a hundredweight, to attempt to carry a whole! (13)
(13) Lit. "a single talent's weight... to carry two."
Glauc. Nay, for my part, I am willing enough to assist my uncle's house, if my uncle would only be persuaded to listen to my advice.
Soc. Then, when you cannot persuade your uncle, do you imagine you will be able to make the whole Athenian people, uncle and all, obey you? Be careful, Glaucon (he added), lest in your thirst for glory and high repute you come to the opposite. Do you not see how dangerous it is for a man to speak or act beyond the range (14) of his knowledge? To take the cases known to you of people whose conversation or conduct clearly transcends these limits: should you say they gain more praise or more blame on that account? Are they admired the rather or despised? Or, again, consider those who do know what they say and what they do; and you will find, I venture to say, that in every sort of undertaking those who enjoy repute and admiration belong to the class of those endowed with the highest knowledge; whilst conversely the people of sinister reputation, the mean and the contemptible, emanate from some depth of ignorance and dulness. If therefore what you thirst for is repute and admiration as a statesman, try to make sure of one accomplishment: in other words, the knowledge as far as in you lies of what you wish to do. (15) If, indeed, with this to distinguish you from the rest of the world you venture to concern yourself with state affairs, it would not surprise me but that you might reach the goal of your ambition easily.
(14) Or, "to talk of things which he does not know, or to meddle withthem."(15) Or, "try as far as possible to achieve one thing, and that is toknow the business which you propose to carry out."
VII
Now Charmides, (1) the son of Glaucon, was, as Socrates observed, a man of mark and influence: a much more powerful person in fact than the mass of those devoted to politics at that date, but at the same time he was a man who shrank from approaching the people or busying himself with the concerns of the state. Accordingly Socrates addressed him thus:
(1) See last chapter for his relationship to Glaucon (the younger) andPlato; for a conception of his character, Plato's dialogue"Charmides"; "Theag." 128 E; "Hell." II. iv. 19; "Symp." iv. 31;Grote, "Plato," i. 480.
Tell me, Charmides, supposing some one competent to win a victory in the arena and to receive a crown, (2) whereby he will gain honour himself and make the land of his fathers more glorious in Hellas, (3) were to refuse to enter the lists—what kind of person should you set him down to be?
(2) In some conquest (e.g. of the Olympic games) where the prize is amere wreath.(3) Cf. Pindar passim.
Clearly an effeminate and cowardly fellow (he answered).
Soc. And what if another man, who had it in him, by devotion to affairs of state, to exalt his city and win honour himself thereby, were to shrink and hesitate and hang back—would he too not reasonably be regarded as a coward?
Possibly (he answered); but why do you address these questions to me?
Because (replied Socrates) I think that you, who have this power, do hesitate to devote yourself to matters which, as being a citizen, if for no other reason, you are bound to take part in. (4)
(4) Or add, "and cannot escape from."
Charm. And wherein have you detected in me this power, that you pass so severe a sentence upon me?
Soc. I have detected it plainly enough in those gatherings (5) in which you meet the politicians of the day, when, as I observe, each time they consult you on any point you have always good advice to offer, and when they make a blunder you lay your finger on the weak point immediately.
(5) See above, I. v. 4; here possibly of political club conversation.
Charm. To discuss and reason in private is one thing, Socrates, to battle in the throng of the assembly is another.
Soc. And yet a man who can count, counts every bit as well in a crowd as when seated alone by himself; and it is the best performer on the harp in private who carries off the palm of victory in public.
Charm. But do you not see that modesty and timidity are feelings implanted in man's nature? and these are much more powerfully present to us in a crowd than within the circle of our intimates.
Soc. Yes, but what I am bent on teaching you is that while you feel no such bashfulness and timidity before the wisest and strongest of men, you are ashamed of opening your lips in the midst of weaklings and dullards. (6) Is it the fullers among them of whom you stand in awe, or the cobblers, or the carpenters, or the coppersmiths, or the merchants, or the farmers, or the hucksters of the market-place exchanging their wares, and bethinking them how they are to buy this thing cheap, and to sell the other dear—is it before these you are ashamed, for these are the individual atoms out of which the Public Assembly is composed? (7) And what is the difference, pray, between your behaviour and that of a man who, being the superior of trained athletes, quails before a set of amateurs? Is it not the case that you who can argue so readily with the foremost statesmen in the city, some of whom affect to look down upon you—you, with your vast superiority over practised popular debaters—are no sooner confronted with a set of folk who never in their lives gave politics a thought, and into whose heads certainly it never entered to look down upon you—than you are afraid to open your lips in mortal terror of being laughed at?
(6) Cf. Cic. "Tusc." v. 36, 104; Plat. "Gorg." 452 E, 454 B.(7) Cf. Plat. "Protag." 319 C. See W. L. Newman, op. cit. i. 103.
Well, but you would admit (he answered) that sound argument does frequently bring down the ridicule of the Popular Assembly.
Soc. Which is equally true of the others. (8) And that is just what rouses my astonishment, that you who can cope so easily with these lordly people (when guilty of ridicule) should persuade yourself that you cannot stand up against a set of commoners. (9) My good fellow, do not be ignorant of yourself! (10) do not fall into that commonest of errors—theirs who rush off to investigate the concerns of the rest of the world, and have no time to turn and examine themselves. Yet that is a duty which you must not in cowardly sort draw back from: rather must you brace ourself to give good heed to your own self; and as to public affairs, if by any manner of means they may be improved through you, do not neglect them. Success in the sphere of politics means that not only the mass of your fellow-citizens, but your personal friends and you yourself last but not least, will profit by your action.
(8) {oi eteroi}, i.e. "the foremost statesmen" mentioned before. Al."the opposite party," the "Tories," if one may so say, of thepolitical clubs.(9) Lit. "those... these."(10) Ernesti aptly cf. Cic. "ad Quint." iii. 6. See below, III. ix. 6;IV. ii. 24.
VIII
Once when Aristippus (1) set himself to subject Socrates to a cross-examination, such as he had himself undergone at the hands of Socrates on a former occasion, (2) Socrates, being minded to benefit those who were with him, gave his answers less in the style of a debater guarding against perversions of his argument, than of a man persuaded of the supreme importance of right conduct. (3)
(1) For Aristippus see above, p. 38; for the connection, {boulomenostous sunontas ophelein}, between this and the preceeding chapter,see above, Conspectus, p. xxvi.(2) Possibly in reference to the conversation above. In reference tothe present dialogue see Grote, "Plato," I. xi. p. 380 foll.(3) For {prattein ta deonta} cf. below, III. ix. 4, 11; Plat. "Charm."164 B; but see J. J. Hartman, "An. Xen." p. 141.
Aristippus asked him "if he knew of anything good," (4) intending in case he assented and named any particular good thing, like food or drink, or wealth, or health, or strength, or courage, to point out that the thing named was sometimes bad. But he, knowing that if a thing troubles us, we immediately want that which will put an end to our trouble, answered precisely as it was best to do. (5)
(4) See Grote, "Plato," ii. 585, on Philebus.(5) Or, "made the happiest answer."
Soc. Do I understand you to ask me whether I know anything good for fever?
No (he replied), that is not my question.
Soc. Then for inflammation of the eyes?
Aristip. No, nor yet that.
Soc. Well then, for hunger?
Aristip. No, nor yet for hunger.
Well, but (answered Socrates) if you ask me whether I know of any good thing which is good for nothing, I neither know of it nor want to know.
And when Aristippus, returning to the charge, asked him "if he knew of any thing beautiful."
He answered: Yes, many things.
Aristip. Are they all like each other?
Soc. On the contrary, they are often as unlike as possible.
How then (he asked) can that be beautiful which is unlike the beautiful?
Soc. Bless me! for the simple reason that it is possible for a man who is a beautiful runner to be quite unlike another man who is a beautiful boxer, (6) or for a shield, which is a beautiful weapon for the purpose of defence, to be absolutely unlike a javelin, which is a beautiful weapon of swift and sure discharge.
(6) See Grote, "H. G." x. 164, in reference to Epaminondas and hisgymnastic training; below, III. x. 6.
Aristip. Your answers are no better now than (7) when I asked you whether you knew any good thing. They are both of a pattern.
(7) Or, "You answer precisely as you did when..."
Soc. And so they should be. Do you imagine that one thing is good and another beautiful? Do not you know that relatively to the same standard all things are at once beautiful and good? (8) In the first place, virtue is not a good thing relatively to one standard and a beautiful thing relatively to another standard; and in the next place, human beings, on the same principle (9) and relatively to the same standard, are called "beautiful and good"; and so the bodily frames of men relatively to the same standards are seen to be "beautiful and good," and in general all things capable of being used by man are regarded as at once beautiful and good relatively to the same standard—the standing being in each case what the thing happens to be useful for. (10)
(8) Or, "good and beautiful are convertible terms: whatever is good isbeautiful, or whatever is beautiful is good."(9) Or, "in the same breath." Cf. Plat. "Hipp. maj." 295 D; "Gorg."474 D.(10) Or, "and this standard is the serviceableness of the thing inquestion."
Aristip. Then I presume even a basket for carrying dung (11) is a beautiful thing?
(11) Cf. Plat. "Hipp. maj." 288 D, 290 D; and Grote's note, loc. cit.p. 381: "in regard to the question wherein consists {to kalon}?"
Soc. To be sure, and a spear of gold an ugly thing, if for their respective uses—the former is well and the latter ill adapted.
Aristip. Do you mean to assert that the same things may be beautiful and ugly?
Soc. Yes, to be sure; and by the same showing things may be good and bad: as, for instance, what is good for hunger may be bad for fever, and what is good for fever bad for hunger; or again, what is beautiful for wrestling is often ugly for running; and in general everything is good and beautiful when well adapted for the end in view, bad and ugly when ill adapted for the same.
Similarly when he spoke about houses, (12) and argued that "the same house must be at once beautiful and useful"—I could not help feeling that he was giving a good lesson on the problem: "how a house ought to be built." He investigated the matter thus:
(12) See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 488; "Classical Review," vii. 262.
Soc. "Do you admit that any one purposing to build a perfect house (13) will plan to make it at once as pleasant and as useful to live in as possible?" and that point being admitted, (14) the next question would be:
(13) Or, "the ideal house"; lit. "a house as it should be."(14) See below, IV. vi. 15.
"It is pleasant to have one's house cool in summer and warm in winter, is it not?" and this proposition also having obtained assent, "Now, supposing a house to have a southern aspect, sunshine during winter will steal in under the verandah, (15) but in summer, when the sun traverses a path right over our heads, the roof will afford an agreeable shade, will it not? If, then, such an arrangement is desirable, the southern side of a house should be built higher to catch the rays of the winter sun, and the northern side lower to prevent the cold winds finding ingress; in a word, it is reasonable to suppose that the pleasantest and most beautiful dwelling place will be one in which the owner can at all seasons of the year find the pleasantest retreat, and stow away his goods with the greatest security."
(15) Or, "porticoes" or "collonades."
Paintings (16) and ornamental mouldings are apt (he said) to deprive one of more joy (17) than they confer.
(16) See "Econ." ix. 2; Plat. "Hipp. maj." 298 A; "Rep." 529; Becker,"Charicles," 268 (Engl. trans.)(17) {euphrosunas}, archaic or "poetical" = "joyance." See "Hiero,"vi. 1.
The fittest place for a temple or an altar (he maintained) was some site visible from afar, and untrodden by foot of man: (18) since it was a glad thing for the worshipper to lift up his eyes afar off and offer up his orison; glad also to wend his way peaceful to prayer unsullied. (19)
(18) e.g. the summit of Lycabettos, or the height on which stands thetemple of Phygaleia. Cf. Eur. "Phoen." 1372, {Palladoskhrusaspidos blepsas pros oikon euxato} of Eteocles.(19) See Vitruvius, i. 7, iv. 5, ap. Schneid. ad loc.; W. L. Newman,op. cit. i. 338.
IX
Being again asked by some one: could courage be taught, (1) or did it come by nature? he answered: I imagine that just as one body is by nature stronger than another body to encounter toils, so one soul by nature grows more robust than another soul in face of dangers. Certainly I do note that people brought up under the same condition of laws and customs differ greatly in respect of daring. Still my belief is that by learning and practice the natural aptitude may always be strengthened towards courage. It is clear, for instance, that Scythians or Thracians would not venture to take shield and spear and contend with Lacedaemonians; and it is equally evident that Lacedaemonians would demur to entering the lists of battle against Thracians if limited to their light shields and javelins, or against Scythians without some weapon more familiar than their bows and arrows. (2) And as far as I can see, this principle holds generally: the natural differences of one man from another may be compensated by artificial progress, the result of care and attention. All which proves clearly that whether nature has endowed us with keener or blunter sensibilities, the duty of all alike is to learn and practise those things in which we would fain achieve distinction.
(1) Or, "When some one retorted upon him with the question: 'Cancourage be taught?'" and for this problem see IV. vi. 10, 11;"Symp." ii. 12; Plat. "Lach."; "Protag." 349; "Phaedr." 269 D; K.Joel, op. cit. p. 325 foll.; Grote, "Plato," i. 468 foll., ii. 60;Jowett, "Plato," i. 77, 119; Newman, op. cit. i. 343.(2) Or, "against Thracians with light shields and javelins, or againstScythians with bows and arrows"; and for the national arms ofthese peoples respectively see Arist. "Lysistr." 563; "Anab." III.iv. 15; VI. VII. passim.
Between wisdom and sobriety of soul (which is temperance) he drew no distinction. (3) Was a man able on the one hand to recognise things beautiful and good sufficiently to live in them? Had he, on the other hand, knowledge of the "base and foul" so as to beware of them? If so, Socrates judged him to be wise at once and sound of soul (or temperate). (4)
(3) But cf. IV. vi. 7; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 363.(4) Reading {alla to... kai to}, or more lit. "he discovered thewise man and sound of soul in his power not only to recognisethings 'beautiful and good,' but to live and move and have hisbeing in them; as also in his gift of avoiding consciously thingsbase." Or if {alla ton... kai ton...} transl. "The man whonot only could recognise the beautiful and good, but lived, etc.,in that world, and who moreover consciously avoided things base, inthe judgment of Socrates was wise and sound of soul." Cf. Plat."Charm."
And being further questioned whether "he considered those who have the knowledge of right action, but do not apply it, to be wise and self-controlled?"—"Not a whit more," he answered, "than I consider them to be unwise and intemperate. (5) Every one, I conceive, deliberately chooses what, within the limits open to him, he considers most conducive to his interest, and acts accordingly. I must hold therefore that those who act against rule and crookedly (6) are neither wise nor self-controlled.
(5) For the phrase "not a whit the more" see below, III. xii. 1;"Econ." xii. 18. Al. "I should by no means choose to consider themwise and self-controlled rather than foolish and intemperate."(6) "Who cannot draw a straight line, ethically speaking."
He said that justice, moreover, and all other virtue is wisdom. That is to say, things just, and all things else that are done with virtue, are "beautiful and good"; and neither will those who know these things deliberately choose aught else in their stead, nor will he who lacks the special knowledge of them be able to do them, but even if he makes the attempt he will miss the mark and fail. So the wise alone can perform the things which are "beautiful and good"; they that are unwise cannot, but even if they try they fail. Therefore, since all things just, and generally all things "beautiful and good," are wrought with virtue, it is clear that justice and all other virtue is wisdom.
On the other hand, madness (he maintained) was the opposite to wisdom; not that he regarded simple ignorance as madness, (7) but he put it thus: for a man to be ignorant of himself, to imagine and suppose that he knows what he knows not, was (he argued), if not madness itself, yet something very like it. The mass of men no doubt hold a different language: if a man is all abroad on some matter of which the mass of mankind are ignorant, they do not pronounce him "mad"; (8) but a like aberration of mind, if only it be about matters within the scope of ordinary knowledge, they call madness. For instance, any one who imagined himself too tall to pass under a gateway of the Long Wall without stooping, or so strong as to try to lift a house, or to attempt any other obvious impossibility, is a madman according to them; but in the popular sense he is not mad, if his obliquity is confined to small matters. In fact, just as strong desire goes by the name of passion in popular parlance, so mental obliquity on a grand scale is entitled madness.
(7) See K. Joel, op. cit. p. 346; Grote, "Plato," i. 400.(8) Or, "they resent the term 'mad' being applied to people who areall abroad," etc. See Comte, "Pos. Pol." i. 575; ii. 373 (Engl.trans.)
In answer to the question: what is envy? he discovered it to be a certain kind of pain; not certainly the sorrow felt at the misfortunes of a friend or the good fortune of an enemy—that is not envy; but, as he said, "envy is felt by those alone who are annoyed at the successes of their friends." And when some one or other expressed astonishment that any one friendlily disposed to another should be pained at his well-doing, he reminded him of a common tendency in people: when any one is faring ill their sympathies are touched, they rush to the aid of the unfortunate; but when fortune smiles on others, they are somehow pained. "I do not say," he added, "this could happen to a thoughtful person; but it is no uncommon condition of a silly mind." (9)