[259]Cf. Book i. chap. iii. §2.[260]It has been fairly urged that I leave the determinations of Common Sense very loose and indefinite: and if I were endeavouring to bring out a more positive result from this examination, I ought certainly to have discussed further how we are to ascertain the ‘experts’ on whose ‘consensus’ we are to rely, in this or any other subject. But my scientific conclusions are to so great an extent negative, that I thought it hardly necessary to enter upon this discussion. I have been careful not toexaggeratethe doubtfulness and inconsistency of Common Sense: should it turn out to bemoredoubtful and inconsistent than I have represented it, my argument will only be strengthened.[261]In chap.ix.Temperance was regarded as subordinate to, or a special application of, Prudence or Self-love moralised: because this seemed to be on the whole the view of Common Sense, which in the preceding chapters I have been endeavouring to follow as closely as possible, both in stating the principles educed and in the order of their exposition.[262]The admission that these maxims are self-evident must be taken subject to the distinction before established between “subjective” and “objective” rightness. It is a necessary condition of my acting rightly that I should not do what I judge to be wrong: but if my judgment is mistaken, my action in accordance with it will not be “objectively” right.[263]It may be noticed that a view very similar to this has often been maintained in considering what God is in justice bound to do for human beings in consequence of the quasi-parental relation in which He stands to them.[264]It is not irrelevant to notice the remarkable divergence of suggestions for the better regulation of marriage, to which reflective minds seem to be led when they are once set loose from the trammels of tradition and custom; as exhibited in the speculations of philosophers in all ages—especially of those (ase.g.Plato) to whom we cannot attribute any sensual or licentious bias.[265]For example, many seem to hold that wealth is, roughly speaking, rightly distributed when cultivated persons have abundance and the uncultivated a bare subsistence, since the former are far more capable of deriving happiness from wealth than the latter.[266]I refer later (p.360) to the difficulty before noticed in respect of such prior obligations as are not strictly determinate.[267]I have omitted as less important the special questions connected with promises to the dead or to the absent, or where a form of words is prescribed.[268]It was this conception that seemed to give the true standard of Humility, considered as a purely internal duty.[269]It should be observed that I am not asking for an exact quantitative decision, but whether we can really think that the decision depends upon considerations of this kind.[270]It should be observed that the more positive treatment of Common-sense Morality, in its relation to Utilitarianism, to which we shall proceed in chap.iii.of the following Book, is intended as an indispensable supplement of the negative criticism which has just been completed.[271]In Green’sProlegomena to Ethics, Book ii. chaps. i. and ii. a peculiar view is taken of “motives, of that kind by which it is the characteristic of moral or human action, to be determined.” Such motives, it is maintained, must be distinguished from desires in the sense of “mere solicitations of which a man is conscious”; they are “constituted by the reaction of the man’s self upon these, and its identification of itself with one of them.” In fact the “direction of the self-conscious self to the realisation of an object” which I should call an act of will, is the phenomenon to which Green would restrict the term “desire in that sense in which desire is the principle and notion of an imputable human action.”The use of terms here suggested appears to me inconvenient, and the psychological analysis implied in it to a great extent erroneous. I admit that in certain simple cases of choice, where the alternatives suggested are each prompted by a single definite desire, there is no psychological inaccuracy in saying that in willing the act to which he is stimulated by any such desire the agent “identifies himself with the desire.” But in more complex cases the phrase appears to me incorrect, as obliterating important distinctions between the two kinds of psychical phenomena which are usually and conveniently distinguished as “desires” and volitions. In the first place, as I have before pointed out (chap. i. §2of this Book), it often happens that certain foreseen consequences of volition, which as foreseen are undoubtedlywilledand—in a sense—chosenby the agents, are not objects of desire to him at all, but even possibly of aversion—aversion, of course, overcome by his desire of other consequences of the same act. In the second place, it is specially important, from an ethical point of view, to notice that, among the various desires or aversions aroused in us by the complex foreseen consequences of a contemplated act, there are often impulses with which we do not identify ourselves, but which we even try to suppress as far as possible: though as it is not possible to suppress them completely—especially if we do the act to which they prompt—we cannot say that they do not operate as motives.[272]Cf.ante, chap. i. §2of this Book.[273]Hutcheson,System of Moral Philosophy, Book i. chap. iv. § 10.[274]See the DissertationOf the Nature of Virtueappended to theAnalogy.[275]TheMetaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre: but it ought to be observed that the ethical view briefly expounded in theKritik der reinen Vernunftappears to have much more affinity with Butler’s.[276]Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. ii. p. 284, 2nd edition.[277]Cf.ante, chap. iv. §2of this Book.[278]Types of Ethical Theory, vol. ii. p. 266. Dr. Martineau explains that the chief composite springs are inserted in their approximate place, subject to the variations of which their composition renders them susceptible.[279]Thus we might ask why the class of “passions” is so strangely restricted, why conjugal affection is omitted, whether wonder can properly be regarded as a definite motive, whether “censoriousness” is properly ranked with “vindictiveness” as one of the “lowest passions,” etc.[280]Cf.ante, Book i. chap. viii. §4.[281]I am fully sensible of the peculiar interest and value of the ethical thought of ancient Greece. Indeed through a large part of the present work the influence of Plato and Aristotle on my treatment of this subject has been greater than that of any modern writer. But I am here only considering the value of the general principles for determining what ought to be done, which the ancient systems profess to supply.[282]The following remarks apply less tolaterStoicism—especially the Roman Stoicism which we know at first hand in the writings of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius; in which the relation of the individual man to Humanity generally is more prominent than it is in the earlier form of the system.[283]It should be observed that in determining the particulars of external duty the Stoics to some extent used the notion ‘nature’ in a different way: they tried to derive guidance from the complex adaptation of means to ends exhibited in the organic world. But since in their view the whole course of the Universe was both perfect and completely predetermined, it was impossible for them to obtain from any observation of actual existence a clear and consistent principle for preferring and rejecting alternatives of conduct: and in fact their most characteristic practical precepts show a curious conflict between the tendency to accept what was customary as ‘natural,’ and the tendency to reject what seemed arbitrary as unreasonable.[284]Cf.Analogy, Part ii. chap. i. and chap. viii.[285]Cf.ante, note to p.124.[286]To avoid misapprehension I should state that in these propositions the consideration of the different degrees ofcertaintyof Present and Future Good, Own and Others’ Good respectively, is supposed to have been fully taken into accountbeforethe future or alien Good is judged to be greater.[287]It may, however, be thought that in exhibiting this aspect of the morality of Common Sense, psychogonical theory leads us to define in a particular way the general notion of ‘good’ or ‘well-being,’ regarded as a result which morality has a demonstrable natural tendency to produce. This point will be considered subsequently (chap. xiv. §1of this Book: and Book iv. chap.iv.).[288]Cf.ante, Book i. chap. viii. Note, pp.103,104.[289]In drawing attention to Clarke’s system, I ought perhaps to remark that his anxiety to exhibit the parallelism between ethical and mathematical truth (on which Locke before him had insisted) renders his general terminology inappropriate, and occasionally leads him into downright extravagances.E.g.it is patently absurd to say that “a man who wilfully acts contrary to Justice wills things to be what they are not and cannot be”: nor are “Relations and Proportions” or “fitnesses and unfitnesses of things” very suitable designations for the matter of moral intuition. But for the present purpose there is no reason to dwell on these defects.[290]Clarke’s statement of the “Rule of Righteousness with respect to ourselves” I pass over, because it is, as he states it, a derivative and subordinate rule. It is that we should preserve our being, be temperate, industrious, etc.,with a view to the performance of Duty: which of course supposes Duty (i.e.the ultimate and absolute rules of Duty) already determined. I may observe that the reasonableness of Prudence or Self-love is only recognised by Clarke indirectly; in a passage which I quoted before (p.120).[291]Boyle Lectures(1705), etc., pp. 86, 87.[292]l.c.p. 92.[293]I think that Kant, in applying this axiom, does not take due account of certain restrictive considerations. Cf. chap. vii. §3of this Book, and also Book iv. chap. v. §3.[294]Kant no doubt gives the agent’s own Perfection as another absolute end; but when we come to examine his notion of perfection, we find that it is not really determinate without the statement of other ends of reason, for the accomplishment of which we are to perfect ourselves. SeeMet. Anfangsgr. d. Tugendlehre, I. Theil, § v. “The perfection that belongs to men generally ... can be nothing else than the cultivation of one’s power, and also of one’s will, to satisfy the requirements of duty in general.”[295]Seenoteat the end of the chapter.[296]On the relation of Rational Egoism to Rational Benevolence—which I regard as the profoundest problem of Ethics—my final view is given in thelast chapterof this treatise.[297]Utilitarianism, chap. i. pp. 6, 7, and chap. ii. pp. 16, 17.[298]l.c.chap. iv. pp. 52, 53.[299]It has been suggested that I have overlooked a confusion in Mill’s mind between two possible meanings of the term ‘desirable,’ (1) what can be desired and (2) what ought to be desired. I intended to show by the two first sentences of this paragraph that I was aware of this confusion, but thought it unnecessary for my present purpose to discuss it.[300]See Book i. chap. i. §2.[301]Cf. Stephen,Science of Ethics, chap. iv. § 16.[302]Chap. xi. §3; see also chap. xii. §3.[303]Book ii. chap.ii.[304]Final, that is, so far as the quality of the present feeling is concerned. I have pointed out that so far as any estimate of the desirability or pleasantness of a feeling involves comparison with feelings only represented in idea, it is liable to be erroneous through imperfections in the representation.[305]The term “cognition” without qualification more often implies what is signified by “true” or “valid”: but for the present purpose it is necessary to eliminate this implication.[306]Cf. Lecky,History of European Morals, pp. 52seqq.[307]Book i. chap.iv.; cf. Book ii. chap.iii.[308]I ought at the same time to say that I hold it no less reasonable for an individual to take his own happiness as his ultimate end. This “Dualism of the Practical Reason” will be further discussed in theconcluding chapterof the treatise.[309]We may illustrate this double explanation by a reference to some of Plato’s Dialogues, such as theGorgias, where the ethical argument has a singularly mixed effect on the mind. Partly, it seems to us more or less dexterous sophistry, playing on a confusion of thought latent in the common notion of good: partly a noble and stirring expression of a profound moral faith.[310]Cf. Stewart,Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers, Book ii. chap. i.[311]The controversy on vivisection, to which I referred just now, affords a good illustration of the need that I am pointing out. I do not observe that any one in this controversy has ventured on the paradox that the pain of sentient beings is notper seto be avoided.[312]I have before noticed (Book ii. chap. iii. p.134) the metaphysical objection taken by certain writers to the view that Happiness is Ultimate Good; on the ground that Happiness (= sum of pleasures) can only be realised in successive parts, whereas a “Chief Good” must be “something of which some being can be conceived in possession”—something, that is, which he can have all at once. On considering this objection it seemed to me that, in so far as it is even plausible, its plausibility depends on the exact form of the notion ‘a Chief Good’ (or ‘Summum Bonum’), which is perhaps inappropriate as applied to Happiness. I have therefore in this chapter used the notion of ‘Ultimate Good’: as I can see no shadow of reason for affirming that that which is Good or Desirableper se, and not as a means to some further end, mustnecessarilybe capable of being possessed all at once. I can understand that a man may aspire after a Good of this latter kind: but so long as Time is a necessary form of human existence, it can hardly be surprising that human good should be subject to the condition of being realised in successive parts.[313]Book i. chap.vi.It may be worth while to notice, that in Mill’s well-known treatise on Utilitarianism this confusion, though expressly deprecated, is to some extent encouraged by the author’s treatment of the subject.[314]I have already criticised (Book iii. chap.xiii.) the mode in which Mill attempts to exhibit this inference.[315]Cf.post, chap.iv.[316]Those who held the opposite opinion appear generally to assume that the appetites and desires which are the mainspring of ordinary human action are in themselves painful: a view entirely contrary to my own experience, and, I believe, to the common experience of mankind. See chap. iv. §2of Book i. So far as their argument is not a development of this psychological error, any plausibility it has seems to me to be obtained by dwelling onesidedly on the annoyances and disappointments undoubtedly incident to normal human life, and on the exceptional sufferings of small minorities of the human race, or perhaps of most men during small portions of their lives.The reader who wishes to see the paradoxical results of pessimistic utilitarianism seriously worked out by a thoughtful and suggestive writer, may refer to Professor Macmillan’s book on thePromotion of General Happiness(Swan Sonnenschein and Co. 1890). The author considers that “the philosophical world is pretty equally divided between optimists and pessimists,” and his own judgment on the question at issue between the two schools appears to be held in suspense.[317]It should be observed that the question here is as to the distribution ofHappiness, not themeans of happiness. If more happiness on the whole is produced by giving the same means of happiness to B rather than to A, it is an obvious and incontrovertible deduction from the Utilitarian principle that it ought to be given to B, whatever inequality in the distribution of themeansof happiness this may involve.[318]The relation of Egoistic to Universalistic Hedonism is further examined in theconcluding chapter.[319]It is to be observed that he may be led to it in other ways than that of argument:i.e.by appeals to his sympathies, or to his moral or quasi-moral sentiments.[320]I ought to remind the reader that the argument in chap.xiii.only leads to the first principle of Utilitarianism, if it be admitted that Happiness is the only thing ultimately and intrinsically Good or Desirable. I afterwards in chap.xiv.endeavoured to bring Common Sense to this admission.[321]That is, so far as we mean by Justice anything more than the simple negation of arbitrary inequality.[322]It ought to be observed that Cumberland does not adopt a hedonistic interpretation of Good. Still, I have followed Hallam in regarding him as the founder of English Utilitarianism: since it seems to have been by a gradual and half-unconscious process that ‘Good’ came to have the definitely hedonistic meaning which it has implicitly in Shaftesbury’s system, and explicitly in that of Hume.[323]I should point out that Hume uses “utility” in a narrower sense than that which Bentham gave it, and one more in accordance with the usage of ordinary language. He distinguishes the “useful” from the “immediately agreeable”: so that while recognising “utility” as the main ground of our moral approbation of the more important virtues, he holds that there are other elements of personal merit which we approve because they are “immediately agreeable,” either to the person possessed of them or to others. It appears, however, more convenient to use the word in the wider sense in which it has been current since Bentham.[324]Lecky,Hist. of Eur. Mor.chap. i, pp. 37, 40seqq. (13th impression).[325]Book iii. chap.x.[326]Book iii. chap. iv. §1.[327]It will be seen that I do not here assume in their full breadth the conclusions of chap.xiv.of the preceding Book.[328]Cf. J. Grote,An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy, chap. v.[329]Book iii. chap. iv. §1.[330]Strictly speaking, of course, the Law of modern states does not enforce this, but only refuses to recognise connubial contracts of any other kind: but the social effect is substantially the same.[331]Sometimes such unbargained requital is even legally obligatory: as when children are bound to repay the care spent on them by supporting their parents in decrepitude.[332]Further discussion of the method of dealing with these difficulties, in their utilitarian form, will be found in the two following chapters.[333]Utilitarianism, chap. v.[334]Cf. Book iii. chap. vi. §§2,3.[335]Cf. Book iii. chap.v.[336]Book iii. chap. xiii. §3.[337]Cf.ante, p.268note.[338]Book iii. chap.vi.[339]Cf.ante, Book iii. chap. vi. §8.[340]In the case of force, however, there is the counterbalancing consideration that the unlawful aggressor may be led to inflict worse injury on his victim, if he is unable to rely on the latter’s promise.[341]Cf. Book iii. chap. vi. §8.[342]Book iii. chap. v. §4.[343]In another work (Principles of Political Economy, Book iii. chap. ii.) I have tried to show that completelaisser faire, in the organisation of industry, tends in various ways to fall short of the most economic production of wealth.[344]The quotations are from myPrinciples of Political Economy, Book iii. chap. ix.; where these questions are discussed at somewhat greater length.[345]Cf.ante, §2, and Book iii. chap. ii. §1.[346]I have before observed that it is quite in harmony with Utilitarian principles to recognise a sphere of private conduct within which each individual may distribute his wealth and kind services as unequally as he chooses, without incurring censure as unjust.[347]It is obvious that so long as the social sanction is enforced, the lives of the women against whom society thus issues its ban must tend to be unhappy from disorder and shame, and the source of unhappiness to others; and also that the breach by men of a recognised and necessary moral rule must tend to have injurious effects on their moral habits generally.[348]Active and Moral Powers, Book ii. chap. iii.[349]Among definite changes in the current morality of the Græco-Roman civilised world, which are to be attributed mainly if not entirely to the extension and intensification of sympathy due to Christianity, the following may be especially noted: (1) the severe condemnation and final suppression of the practice of exposing infants; (2) effective abhorrence of the barbarism of gladiatorial combats; (3) immediate moral mitigation of slavery, and a strong encouragement of emancipation; (4) great extension of the eleemosynary provision made for the sick and poor.[350]This passage, which in the second and subsequent editions occurred in chap. ii. of Book i., was omitted by Professor Sidgwick from that chapter in the sixth edition, with the intention of incorporating it in Book iv., which he did not live to revise.[351]Cf. J. S. Mill,Utilitarianism, chap. ii. Mill, however, only affirms that the “rules of morality for the multitude” are to be accepted by the philosopher provisionally, until he has got something better.[352]I refer to the abstract principles of Prudence, Justice, and Rational Benevolence as defined in chap.xiii.of the preceding Book.[353]Theory of Moral Sentiments, Book i.
[259]Cf. Book i. chap. iii. §2.
[259]Cf. Book i. chap. iii. §2.
[260]It has been fairly urged that I leave the determinations of Common Sense very loose and indefinite: and if I were endeavouring to bring out a more positive result from this examination, I ought certainly to have discussed further how we are to ascertain the ‘experts’ on whose ‘consensus’ we are to rely, in this or any other subject. But my scientific conclusions are to so great an extent negative, that I thought it hardly necessary to enter upon this discussion. I have been careful not toexaggeratethe doubtfulness and inconsistency of Common Sense: should it turn out to bemoredoubtful and inconsistent than I have represented it, my argument will only be strengthened.
[260]It has been fairly urged that I leave the determinations of Common Sense very loose and indefinite: and if I were endeavouring to bring out a more positive result from this examination, I ought certainly to have discussed further how we are to ascertain the ‘experts’ on whose ‘consensus’ we are to rely, in this or any other subject. But my scientific conclusions are to so great an extent negative, that I thought it hardly necessary to enter upon this discussion. I have been careful not toexaggeratethe doubtfulness and inconsistency of Common Sense: should it turn out to bemoredoubtful and inconsistent than I have represented it, my argument will only be strengthened.
[261]In chap.ix.Temperance was regarded as subordinate to, or a special application of, Prudence or Self-love moralised: because this seemed to be on the whole the view of Common Sense, which in the preceding chapters I have been endeavouring to follow as closely as possible, both in stating the principles educed and in the order of their exposition.
[261]In chap.ix.Temperance was regarded as subordinate to, or a special application of, Prudence or Self-love moralised: because this seemed to be on the whole the view of Common Sense, which in the preceding chapters I have been endeavouring to follow as closely as possible, both in stating the principles educed and in the order of their exposition.
[262]The admission that these maxims are self-evident must be taken subject to the distinction before established between “subjective” and “objective” rightness. It is a necessary condition of my acting rightly that I should not do what I judge to be wrong: but if my judgment is mistaken, my action in accordance with it will not be “objectively” right.
[262]The admission that these maxims are self-evident must be taken subject to the distinction before established between “subjective” and “objective” rightness. It is a necessary condition of my acting rightly that I should not do what I judge to be wrong: but if my judgment is mistaken, my action in accordance with it will not be “objectively” right.
[263]It may be noticed that a view very similar to this has often been maintained in considering what God is in justice bound to do for human beings in consequence of the quasi-parental relation in which He stands to them.
[263]It may be noticed that a view very similar to this has often been maintained in considering what God is in justice bound to do for human beings in consequence of the quasi-parental relation in which He stands to them.
[264]It is not irrelevant to notice the remarkable divergence of suggestions for the better regulation of marriage, to which reflective minds seem to be led when they are once set loose from the trammels of tradition and custom; as exhibited in the speculations of philosophers in all ages—especially of those (ase.g.Plato) to whom we cannot attribute any sensual or licentious bias.
[264]It is not irrelevant to notice the remarkable divergence of suggestions for the better regulation of marriage, to which reflective minds seem to be led when they are once set loose from the trammels of tradition and custom; as exhibited in the speculations of philosophers in all ages—especially of those (ase.g.Plato) to whom we cannot attribute any sensual or licentious bias.
[265]For example, many seem to hold that wealth is, roughly speaking, rightly distributed when cultivated persons have abundance and the uncultivated a bare subsistence, since the former are far more capable of deriving happiness from wealth than the latter.
[265]For example, many seem to hold that wealth is, roughly speaking, rightly distributed when cultivated persons have abundance and the uncultivated a bare subsistence, since the former are far more capable of deriving happiness from wealth than the latter.
[266]I refer later (p.360) to the difficulty before noticed in respect of such prior obligations as are not strictly determinate.
[266]I refer later (p.360) to the difficulty before noticed in respect of such prior obligations as are not strictly determinate.
[267]I have omitted as less important the special questions connected with promises to the dead or to the absent, or where a form of words is prescribed.
[267]I have omitted as less important the special questions connected with promises to the dead or to the absent, or where a form of words is prescribed.
[268]It was this conception that seemed to give the true standard of Humility, considered as a purely internal duty.
[268]It was this conception that seemed to give the true standard of Humility, considered as a purely internal duty.
[269]It should be observed that I am not asking for an exact quantitative decision, but whether we can really think that the decision depends upon considerations of this kind.
[269]It should be observed that I am not asking for an exact quantitative decision, but whether we can really think that the decision depends upon considerations of this kind.
[270]It should be observed that the more positive treatment of Common-sense Morality, in its relation to Utilitarianism, to which we shall proceed in chap.iii.of the following Book, is intended as an indispensable supplement of the negative criticism which has just been completed.
[270]It should be observed that the more positive treatment of Common-sense Morality, in its relation to Utilitarianism, to which we shall proceed in chap.iii.of the following Book, is intended as an indispensable supplement of the negative criticism which has just been completed.
[271]In Green’sProlegomena to Ethics, Book ii. chaps. i. and ii. a peculiar view is taken of “motives, of that kind by which it is the characteristic of moral or human action, to be determined.” Such motives, it is maintained, must be distinguished from desires in the sense of “mere solicitations of which a man is conscious”; they are “constituted by the reaction of the man’s self upon these, and its identification of itself with one of them.” In fact the “direction of the self-conscious self to the realisation of an object” which I should call an act of will, is the phenomenon to which Green would restrict the term “desire in that sense in which desire is the principle and notion of an imputable human action.”The use of terms here suggested appears to me inconvenient, and the psychological analysis implied in it to a great extent erroneous. I admit that in certain simple cases of choice, where the alternatives suggested are each prompted by a single definite desire, there is no psychological inaccuracy in saying that in willing the act to which he is stimulated by any such desire the agent “identifies himself with the desire.” But in more complex cases the phrase appears to me incorrect, as obliterating important distinctions between the two kinds of psychical phenomena which are usually and conveniently distinguished as “desires” and volitions. In the first place, as I have before pointed out (chap. i. §2of this Book), it often happens that certain foreseen consequences of volition, which as foreseen are undoubtedlywilledand—in a sense—chosenby the agents, are not objects of desire to him at all, but even possibly of aversion—aversion, of course, overcome by his desire of other consequences of the same act. In the second place, it is specially important, from an ethical point of view, to notice that, among the various desires or aversions aroused in us by the complex foreseen consequences of a contemplated act, there are often impulses with which we do not identify ourselves, but which we even try to suppress as far as possible: though as it is not possible to suppress them completely—especially if we do the act to which they prompt—we cannot say that they do not operate as motives.
[271]In Green’sProlegomena to Ethics, Book ii. chaps. i. and ii. a peculiar view is taken of “motives, of that kind by which it is the characteristic of moral or human action, to be determined.” Such motives, it is maintained, must be distinguished from desires in the sense of “mere solicitations of which a man is conscious”; they are “constituted by the reaction of the man’s self upon these, and its identification of itself with one of them.” In fact the “direction of the self-conscious self to the realisation of an object” which I should call an act of will, is the phenomenon to which Green would restrict the term “desire in that sense in which desire is the principle and notion of an imputable human action.”
The use of terms here suggested appears to me inconvenient, and the psychological analysis implied in it to a great extent erroneous. I admit that in certain simple cases of choice, where the alternatives suggested are each prompted by a single definite desire, there is no psychological inaccuracy in saying that in willing the act to which he is stimulated by any such desire the agent “identifies himself with the desire.” But in more complex cases the phrase appears to me incorrect, as obliterating important distinctions between the two kinds of psychical phenomena which are usually and conveniently distinguished as “desires” and volitions. In the first place, as I have before pointed out (chap. i. §2of this Book), it often happens that certain foreseen consequences of volition, which as foreseen are undoubtedlywilledand—in a sense—chosenby the agents, are not objects of desire to him at all, but even possibly of aversion—aversion, of course, overcome by his desire of other consequences of the same act. In the second place, it is specially important, from an ethical point of view, to notice that, among the various desires or aversions aroused in us by the complex foreseen consequences of a contemplated act, there are often impulses with which we do not identify ourselves, but which we even try to suppress as far as possible: though as it is not possible to suppress them completely—especially if we do the act to which they prompt—we cannot say that they do not operate as motives.
[272]Cf.ante, chap. i. §2of this Book.
[272]Cf.ante, chap. i. §2of this Book.
[273]Hutcheson,System of Moral Philosophy, Book i. chap. iv. § 10.
[273]Hutcheson,System of Moral Philosophy, Book i. chap. iv. § 10.
[274]See the DissertationOf the Nature of Virtueappended to theAnalogy.
[274]See the DissertationOf the Nature of Virtueappended to theAnalogy.
[275]TheMetaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre: but it ought to be observed that the ethical view briefly expounded in theKritik der reinen Vernunftappears to have much more affinity with Butler’s.
[275]TheMetaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre: but it ought to be observed that the ethical view briefly expounded in theKritik der reinen Vernunftappears to have much more affinity with Butler’s.
[276]Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. ii. p. 284, 2nd edition.
[276]Types of Ethical Theory, Vol. ii. p. 284, 2nd edition.
[277]Cf.ante, chap. iv. §2of this Book.
[277]Cf.ante, chap. iv. §2of this Book.
[278]Types of Ethical Theory, vol. ii. p. 266. Dr. Martineau explains that the chief composite springs are inserted in their approximate place, subject to the variations of which their composition renders them susceptible.
[278]Types of Ethical Theory, vol. ii. p. 266. Dr. Martineau explains that the chief composite springs are inserted in their approximate place, subject to the variations of which their composition renders them susceptible.
[279]Thus we might ask why the class of “passions” is so strangely restricted, why conjugal affection is omitted, whether wonder can properly be regarded as a definite motive, whether “censoriousness” is properly ranked with “vindictiveness” as one of the “lowest passions,” etc.
[279]Thus we might ask why the class of “passions” is so strangely restricted, why conjugal affection is omitted, whether wonder can properly be regarded as a definite motive, whether “censoriousness” is properly ranked with “vindictiveness” as one of the “lowest passions,” etc.
[280]Cf.ante, Book i. chap. viii. §4.
[280]Cf.ante, Book i. chap. viii. §4.
[281]I am fully sensible of the peculiar interest and value of the ethical thought of ancient Greece. Indeed through a large part of the present work the influence of Plato and Aristotle on my treatment of this subject has been greater than that of any modern writer. But I am here only considering the value of the general principles for determining what ought to be done, which the ancient systems profess to supply.
[281]I am fully sensible of the peculiar interest and value of the ethical thought of ancient Greece. Indeed through a large part of the present work the influence of Plato and Aristotle on my treatment of this subject has been greater than that of any modern writer. But I am here only considering the value of the general principles for determining what ought to be done, which the ancient systems profess to supply.
[282]The following remarks apply less tolaterStoicism—especially the Roman Stoicism which we know at first hand in the writings of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius; in which the relation of the individual man to Humanity generally is more prominent than it is in the earlier form of the system.
[282]The following remarks apply less tolaterStoicism—especially the Roman Stoicism which we know at first hand in the writings of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius; in which the relation of the individual man to Humanity generally is more prominent than it is in the earlier form of the system.
[283]It should be observed that in determining the particulars of external duty the Stoics to some extent used the notion ‘nature’ in a different way: they tried to derive guidance from the complex adaptation of means to ends exhibited in the organic world. But since in their view the whole course of the Universe was both perfect and completely predetermined, it was impossible for them to obtain from any observation of actual existence a clear and consistent principle for preferring and rejecting alternatives of conduct: and in fact their most characteristic practical precepts show a curious conflict between the tendency to accept what was customary as ‘natural,’ and the tendency to reject what seemed arbitrary as unreasonable.
[283]It should be observed that in determining the particulars of external duty the Stoics to some extent used the notion ‘nature’ in a different way: they tried to derive guidance from the complex adaptation of means to ends exhibited in the organic world. But since in their view the whole course of the Universe was both perfect and completely predetermined, it was impossible for them to obtain from any observation of actual existence a clear and consistent principle for preferring and rejecting alternatives of conduct: and in fact their most characteristic practical precepts show a curious conflict between the tendency to accept what was customary as ‘natural,’ and the tendency to reject what seemed arbitrary as unreasonable.
[284]Cf.Analogy, Part ii. chap. i. and chap. viii.
[284]Cf.Analogy, Part ii. chap. i. and chap. viii.
[285]Cf.ante, note to p.124.
[285]Cf.ante, note to p.124.
[286]To avoid misapprehension I should state that in these propositions the consideration of the different degrees ofcertaintyof Present and Future Good, Own and Others’ Good respectively, is supposed to have been fully taken into accountbeforethe future or alien Good is judged to be greater.
[286]To avoid misapprehension I should state that in these propositions the consideration of the different degrees ofcertaintyof Present and Future Good, Own and Others’ Good respectively, is supposed to have been fully taken into accountbeforethe future or alien Good is judged to be greater.
[287]It may, however, be thought that in exhibiting this aspect of the morality of Common Sense, psychogonical theory leads us to define in a particular way the general notion of ‘good’ or ‘well-being,’ regarded as a result which morality has a demonstrable natural tendency to produce. This point will be considered subsequently (chap. xiv. §1of this Book: and Book iv. chap.iv.).
[287]It may, however, be thought that in exhibiting this aspect of the morality of Common Sense, psychogonical theory leads us to define in a particular way the general notion of ‘good’ or ‘well-being,’ regarded as a result which morality has a demonstrable natural tendency to produce. This point will be considered subsequently (chap. xiv. §1of this Book: and Book iv. chap.iv.).
[288]Cf.ante, Book i. chap. viii. Note, pp.103,104.
[288]Cf.ante, Book i. chap. viii. Note, pp.103,104.
[289]In drawing attention to Clarke’s system, I ought perhaps to remark that his anxiety to exhibit the parallelism between ethical and mathematical truth (on which Locke before him had insisted) renders his general terminology inappropriate, and occasionally leads him into downright extravagances.E.g.it is patently absurd to say that “a man who wilfully acts contrary to Justice wills things to be what they are not and cannot be”: nor are “Relations and Proportions” or “fitnesses and unfitnesses of things” very suitable designations for the matter of moral intuition. But for the present purpose there is no reason to dwell on these defects.
[289]In drawing attention to Clarke’s system, I ought perhaps to remark that his anxiety to exhibit the parallelism between ethical and mathematical truth (on which Locke before him had insisted) renders his general terminology inappropriate, and occasionally leads him into downright extravagances.E.g.it is patently absurd to say that “a man who wilfully acts contrary to Justice wills things to be what they are not and cannot be”: nor are “Relations and Proportions” or “fitnesses and unfitnesses of things” very suitable designations for the matter of moral intuition. But for the present purpose there is no reason to dwell on these defects.
[290]Clarke’s statement of the “Rule of Righteousness with respect to ourselves” I pass over, because it is, as he states it, a derivative and subordinate rule. It is that we should preserve our being, be temperate, industrious, etc.,with a view to the performance of Duty: which of course supposes Duty (i.e.the ultimate and absolute rules of Duty) already determined. I may observe that the reasonableness of Prudence or Self-love is only recognised by Clarke indirectly; in a passage which I quoted before (p.120).
[290]Clarke’s statement of the “Rule of Righteousness with respect to ourselves” I pass over, because it is, as he states it, a derivative and subordinate rule. It is that we should preserve our being, be temperate, industrious, etc.,with a view to the performance of Duty: which of course supposes Duty (i.e.the ultimate and absolute rules of Duty) already determined. I may observe that the reasonableness of Prudence or Self-love is only recognised by Clarke indirectly; in a passage which I quoted before (p.120).
[291]Boyle Lectures(1705), etc., pp. 86, 87.
[291]Boyle Lectures(1705), etc., pp. 86, 87.
[292]l.c.p. 92.
[292]l.c.p. 92.
[293]I think that Kant, in applying this axiom, does not take due account of certain restrictive considerations. Cf. chap. vii. §3of this Book, and also Book iv. chap. v. §3.
[293]I think that Kant, in applying this axiom, does not take due account of certain restrictive considerations. Cf. chap. vii. §3of this Book, and also Book iv. chap. v. §3.
[294]Kant no doubt gives the agent’s own Perfection as another absolute end; but when we come to examine his notion of perfection, we find that it is not really determinate without the statement of other ends of reason, for the accomplishment of which we are to perfect ourselves. SeeMet. Anfangsgr. d. Tugendlehre, I. Theil, § v. “The perfection that belongs to men generally ... can be nothing else than the cultivation of one’s power, and also of one’s will, to satisfy the requirements of duty in general.”
[294]Kant no doubt gives the agent’s own Perfection as another absolute end; but when we come to examine his notion of perfection, we find that it is not really determinate without the statement of other ends of reason, for the accomplishment of which we are to perfect ourselves. SeeMet. Anfangsgr. d. Tugendlehre, I. Theil, § v. “The perfection that belongs to men generally ... can be nothing else than the cultivation of one’s power, and also of one’s will, to satisfy the requirements of duty in general.”
[295]Seenoteat the end of the chapter.
[295]Seenoteat the end of the chapter.
[296]On the relation of Rational Egoism to Rational Benevolence—which I regard as the profoundest problem of Ethics—my final view is given in thelast chapterof this treatise.
[296]On the relation of Rational Egoism to Rational Benevolence—which I regard as the profoundest problem of Ethics—my final view is given in thelast chapterof this treatise.
[297]Utilitarianism, chap. i. pp. 6, 7, and chap. ii. pp. 16, 17.
[297]Utilitarianism, chap. i. pp. 6, 7, and chap. ii. pp. 16, 17.
[298]l.c.chap. iv. pp. 52, 53.
[298]l.c.chap. iv. pp. 52, 53.
[299]It has been suggested that I have overlooked a confusion in Mill’s mind between two possible meanings of the term ‘desirable,’ (1) what can be desired and (2) what ought to be desired. I intended to show by the two first sentences of this paragraph that I was aware of this confusion, but thought it unnecessary for my present purpose to discuss it.
[299]It has been suggested that I have overlooked a confusion in Mill’s mind between two possible meanings of the term ‘desirable,’ (1) what can be desired and (2) what ought to be desired. I intended to show by the two first sentences of this paragraph that I was aware of this confusion, but thought it unnecessary for my present purpose to discuss it.
[300]See Book i. chap. i. §2.
[300]See Book i. chap. i. §2.
[301]Cf. Stephen,Science of Ethics, chap. iv. § 16.
[301]Cf. Stephen,Science of Ethics, chap. iv. § 16.
[302]Chap. xi. §3; see also chap. xii. §3.
[302]Chap. xi. §3; see also chap. xii. §3.
[303]Book ii. chap.ii.
[303]Book ii. chap.ii.
[304]Final, that is, so far as the quality of the present feeling is concerned. I have pointed out that so far as any estimate of the desirability or pleasantness of a feeling involves comparison with feelings only represented in idea, it is liable to be erroneous through imperfections in the representation.
[304]Final, that is, so far as the quality of the present feeling is concerned. I have pointed out that so far as any estimate of the desirability or pleasantness of a feeling involves comparison with feelings only represented in idea, it is liable to be erroneous through imperfections in the representation.
[305]The term “cognition” without qualification more often implies what is signified by “true” or “valid”: but for the present purpose it is necessary to eliminate this implication.
[305]The term “cognition” without qualification more often implies what is signified by “true” or “valid”: but for the present purpose it is necessary to eliminate this implication.
[306]Cf. Lecky,History of European Morals, pp. 52seqq.
[306]Cf. Lecky,History of European Morals, pp. 52seqq.
[307]Book i. chap.iv.; cf. Book ii. chap.iii.
[307]Book i. chap.iv.; cf. Book ii. chap.iii.
[308]I ought at the same time to say that I hold it no less reasonable for an individual to take his own happiness as his ultimate end. This “Dualism of the Practical Reason” will be further discussed in theconcluding chapterof the treatise.
[308]I ought at the same time to say that I hold it no less reasonable for an individual to take his own happiness as his ultimate end. This “Dualism of the Practical Reason” will be further discussed in theconcluding chapterof the treatise.
[309]We may illustrate this double explanation by a reference to some of Plato’s Dialogues, such as theGorgias, where the ethical argument has a singularly mixed effect on the mind. Partly, it seems to us more or less dexterous sophistry, playing on a confusion of thought latent in the common notion of good: partly a noble and stirring expression of a profound moral faith.
[309]We may illustrate this double explanation by a reference to some of Plato’s Dialogues, such as theGorgias, where the ethical argument has a singularly mixed effect on the mind. Partly, it seems to us more or less dexterous sophistry, playing on a confusion of thought latent in the common notion of good: partly a noble and stirring expression of a profound moral faith.
[310]Cf. Stewart,Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers, Book ii. chap. i.
[310]Cf. Stewart,Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers, Book ii. chap. i.
[311]The controversy on vivisection, to which I referred just now, affords a good illustration of the need that I am pointing out. I do not observe that any one in this controversy has ventured on the paradox that the pain of sentient beings is notper seto be avoided.
[311]The controversy on vivisection, to which I referred just now, affords a good illustration of the need that I am pointing out. I do not observe that any one in this controversy has ventured on the paradox that the pain of sentient beings is notper seto be avoided.
[312]I have before noticed (Book ii. chap. iii. p.134) the metaphysical objection taken by certain writers to the view that Happiness is Ultimate Good; on the ground that Happiness (= sum of pleasures) can only be realised in successive parts, whereas a “Chief Good” must be “something of which some being can be conceived in possession”—something, that is, which he can have all at once. On considering this objection it seemed to me that, in so far as it is even plausible, its plausibility depends on the exact form of the notion ‘a Chief Good’ (or ‘Summum Bonum’), which is perhaps inappropriate as applied to Happiness. I have therefore in this chapter used the notion of ‘Ultimate Good’: as I can see no shadow of reason for affirming that that which is Good or Desirableper se, and not as a means to some further end, mustnecessarilybe capable of being possessed all at once. I can understand that a man may aspire after a Good of this latter kind: but so long as Time is a necessary form of human existence, it can hardly be surprising that human good should be subject to the condition of being realised in successive parts.
[312]I have before noticed (Book ii. chap. iii. p.134) the metaphysical objection taken by certain writers to the view that Happiness is Ultimate Good; on the ground that Happiness (= sum of pleasures) can only be realised in successive parts, whereas a “Chief Good” must be “something of which some being can be conceived in possession”—something, that is, which he can have all at once. On considering this objection it seemed to me that, in so far as it is even plausible, its plausibility depends on the exact form of the notion ‘a Chief Good’ (or ‘Summum Bonum’), which is perhaps inappropriate as applied to Happiness. I have therefore in this chapter used the notion of ‘Ultimate Good’: as I can see no shadow of reason for affirming that that which is Good or Desirableper se, and not as a means to some further end, mustnecessarilybe capable of being possessed all at once. I can understand that a man may aspire after a Good of this latter kind: but so long as Time is a necessary form of human existence, it can hardly be surprising that human good should be subject to the condition of being realised in successive parts.
[313]Book i. chap.vi.It may be worth while to notice, that in Mill’s well-known treatise on Utilitarianism this confusion, though expressly deprecated, is to some extent encouraged by the author’s treatment of the subject.
[313]Book i. chap.vi.It may be worth while to notice, that in Mill’s well-known treatise on Utilitarianism this confusion, though expressly deprecated, is to some extent encouraged by the author’s treatment of the subject.
[314]I have already criticised (Book iii. chap.xiii.) the mode in which Mill attempts to exhibit this inference.
[314]I have already criticised (Book iii. chap.xiii.) the mode in which Mill attempts to exhibit this inference.
[315]Cf.post, chap.iv.
[315]Cf.post, chap.iv.
[316]Those who held the opposite opinion appear generally to assume that the appetites and desires which are the mainspring of ordinary human action are in themselves painful: a view entirely contrary to my own experience, and, I believe, to the common experience of mankind. See chap. iv. §2of Book i. So far as their argument is not a development of this psychological error, any plausibility it has seems to me to be obtained by dwelling onesidedly on the annoyances and disappointments undoubtedly incident to normal human life, and on the exceptional sufferings of small minorities of the human race, or perhaps of most men during small portions of their lives.The reader who wishes to see the paradoxical results of pessimistic utilitarianism seriously worked out by a thoughtful and suggestive writer, may refer to Professor Macmillan’s book on thePromotion of General Happiness(Swan Sonnenschein and Co. 1890). The author considers that “the philosophical world is pretty equally divided between optimists and pessimists,” and his own judgment on the question at issue between the two schools appears to be held in suspense.
[316]Those who held the opposite opinion appear generally to assume that the appetites and desires which are the mainspring of ordinary human action are in themselves painful: a view entirely contrary to my own experience, and, I believe, to the common experience of mankind. See chap. iv. §2of Book i. So far as their argument is not a development of this psychological error, any plausibility it has seems to me to be obtained by dwelling onesidedly on the annoyances and disappointments undoubtedly incident to normal human life, and on the exceptional sufferings of small minorities of the human race, or perhaps of most men during small portions of their lives.
The reader who wishes to see the paradoxical results of pessimistic utilitarianism seriously worked out by a thoughtful and suggestive writer, may refer to Professor Macmillan’s book on thePromotion of General Happiness(Swan Sonnenschein and Co. 1890). The author considers that “the philosophical world is pretty equally divided between optimists and pessimists,” and his own judgment on the question at issue between the two schools appears to be held in suspense.
[317]It should be observed that the question here is as to the distribution ofHappiness, not themeans of happiness. If more happiness on the whole is produced by giving the same means of happiness to B rather than to A, it is an obvious and incontrovertible deduction from the Utilitarian principle that it ought to be given to B, whatever inequality in the distribution of themeansof happiness this may involve.
[317]It should be observed that the question here is as to the distribution ofHappiness, not themeans of happiness. If more happiness on the whole is produced by giving the same means of happiness to B rather than to A, it is an obvious and incontrovertible deduction from the Utilitarian principle that it ought to be given to B, whatever inequality in the distribution of themeansof happiness this may involve.
[318]The relation of Egoistic to Universalistic Hedonism is further examined in theconcluding chapter.
[318]The relation of Egoistic to Universalistic Hedonism is further examined in theconcluding chapter.
[319]It is to be observed that he may be led to it in other ways than that of argument:i.e.by appeals to his sympathies, or to his moral or quasi-moral sentiments.
[319]It is to be observed that he may be led to it in other ways than that of argument:i.e.by appeals to his sympathies, or to his moral or quasi-moral sentiments.
[320]I ought to remind the reader that the argument in chap.xiii.only leads to the first principle of Utilitarianism, if it be admitted that Happiness is the only thing ultimately and intrinsically Good or Desirable. I afterwards in chap.xiv.endeavoured to bring Common Sense to this admission.
[320]I ought to remind the reader that the argument in chap.xiii.only leads to the first principle of Utilitarianism, if it be admitted that Happiness is the only thing ultimately and intrinsically Good or Desirable. I afterwards in chap.xiv.endeavoured to bring Common Sense to this admission.
[321]That is, so far as we mean by Justice anything more than the simple negation of arbitrary inequality.
[321]That is, so far as we mean by Justice anything more than the simple negation of arbitrary inequality.
[322]It ought to be observed that Cumberland does not adopt a hedonistic interpretation of Good. Still, I have followed Hallam in regarding him as the founder of English Utilitarianism: since it seems to have been by a gradual and half-unconscious process that ‘Good’ came to have the definitely hedonistic meaning which it has implicitly in Shaftesbury’s system, and explicitly in that of Hume.
[322]It ought to be observed that Cumberland does not adopt a hedonistic interpretation of Good. Still, I have followed Hallam in regarding him as the founder of English Utilitarianism: since it seems to have been by a gradual and half-unconscious process that ‘Good’ came to have the definitely hedonistic meaning which it has implicitly in Shaftesbury’s system, and explicitly in that of Hume.
[323]I should point out that Hume uses “utility” in a narrower sense than that which Bentham gave it, and one more in accordance with the usage of ordinary language. He distinguishes the “useful” from the “immediately agreeable”: so that while recognising “utility” as the main ground of our moral approbation of the more important virtues, he holds that there are other elements of personal merit which we approve because they are “immediately agreeable,” either to the person possessed of them or to others. It appears, however, more convenient to use the word in the wider sense in which it has been current since Bentham.
[323]I should point out that Hume uses “utility” in a narrower sense than that which Bentham gave it, and one more in accordance with the usage of ordinary language. He distinguishes the “useful” from the “immediately agreeable”: so that while recognising “utility” as the main ground of our moral approbation of the more important virtues, he holds that there are other elements of personal merit which we approve because they are “immediately agreeable,” either to the person possessed of them or to others. It appears, however, more convenient to use the word in the wider sense in which it has been current since Bentham.
[324]Lecky,Hist. of Eur. Mor.chap. i, pp. 37, 40seqq. (13th impression).
[324]Lecky,Hist. of Eur. Mor.chap. i, pp. 37, 40seqq. (13th impression).
[325]Book iii. chap.x.
[325]Book iii. chap.x.
[326]Book iii. chap. iv. §1.
[326]Book iii. chap. iv. §1.
[327]It will be seen that I do not here assume in their full breadth the conclusions of chap.xiv.of the preceding Book.
[327]It will be seen that I do not here assume in their full breadth the conclusions of chap.xiv.of the preceding Book.
[328]Cf. J. Grote,An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy, chap. v.
[328]Cf. J. Grote,An Examination of the Utilitarian Philosophy, chap. v.
[329]Book iii. chap. iv. §1.
[329]Book iii. chap. iv. §1.
[330]Strictly speaking, of course, the Law of modern states does not enforce this, but only refuses to recognise connubial contracts of any other kind: but the social effect is substantially the same.
[330]Strictly speaking, of course, the Law of modern states does not enforce this, but only refuses to recognise connubial contracts of any other kind: but the social effect is substantially the same.
[331]Sometimes such unbargained requital is even legally obligatory: as when children are bound to repay the care spent on them by supporting their parents in decrepitude.
[331]Sometimes such unbargained requital is even legally obligatory: as when children are bound to repay the care spent on them by supporting their parents in decrepitude.
[332]Further discussion of the method of dealing with these difficulties, in their utilitarian form, will be found in the two following chapters.
[332]Further discussion of the method of dealing with these difficulties, in their utilitarian form, will be found in the two following chapters.
[333]Utilitarianism, chap. v.
[333]Utilitarianism, chap. v.
[334]Cf. Book iii. chap. vi. §§2,3.
[334]Cf. Book iii. chap. vi. §§2,3.
[335]Cf. Book iii. chap.v.
[335]Cf. Book iii. chap.v.
[336]Book iii. chap. xiii. §3.
[336]Book iii. chap. xiii. §3.
[337]Cf.ante, p.268note.
[337]Cf.ante, p.268note.
[338]Book iii. chap.vi.
[338]Book iii. chap.vi.
[339]Cf.ante, Book iii. chap. vi. §8.
[339]Cf.ante, Book iii. chap. vi. §8.
[340]In the case of force, however, there is the counterbalancing consideration that the unlawful aggressor may be led to inflict worse injury on his victim, if he is unable to rely on the latter’s promise.
[340]In the case of force, however, there is the counterbalancing consideration that the unlawful aggressor may be led to inflict worse injury on his victim, if he is unable to rely on the latter’s promise.
[341]Cf. Book iii. chap. vi. §8.
[341]Cf. Book iii. chap. vi. §8.
[342]Book iii. chap. v. §4.
[342]Book iii. chap. v. §4.
[343]In another work (Principles of Political Economy, Book iii. chap. ii.) I have tried to show that completelaisser faire, in the organisation of industry, tends in various ways to fall short of the most economic production of wealth.
[343]In another work (Principles of Political Economy, Book iii. chap. ii.) I have tried to show that completelaisser faire, in the organisation of industry, tends in various ways to fall short of the most economic production of wealth.
[344]The quotations are from myPrinciples of Political Economy, Book iii. chap. ix.; where these questions are discussed at somewhat greater length.
[344]The quotations are from myPrinciples of Political Economy, Book iii. chap. ix.; where these questions are discussed at somewhat greater length.
[345]Cf.ante, §2, and Book iii. chap. ii. §1.
[345]Cf.ante, §2, and Book iii. chap. ii. §1.
[346]I have before observed that it is quite in harmony with Utilitarian principles to recognise a sphere of private conduct within which each individual may distribute his wealth and kind services as unequally as he chooses, without incurring censure as unjust.
[346]I have before observed that it is quite in harmony with Utilitarian principles to recognise a sphere of private conduct within which each individual may distribute his wealth and kind services as unequally as he chooses, without incurring censure as unjust.
[347]It is obvious that so long as the social sanction is enforced, the lives of the women against whom society thus issues its ban must tend to be unhappy from disorder and shame, and the source of unhappiness to others; and also that the breach by men of a recognised and necessary moral rule must tend to have injurious effects on their moral habits generally.
[347]It is obvious that so long as the social sanction is enforced, the lives of the women against whom society thus issues its ban must tend to be unhappy from disorder and shame, and the source of unhappiness to others; and also that the breach by men of a recognised and necessary moral rule must tend to have injurious effects on their moral habits generally.
[348]Active and Moral Powers, Book ii. chap. iii.
[348]Active and Moral Powers, Book ii. chap. iii.
[349]Among definite changes in the current morality of the Græco-Roman civilised world, which are to be attributed mainly if not entirely to the extension and intensification of sympathy due to Christianity, the following may be especially noted: (1) the severe condemnation and final suppression of the practice of exposing infants; (2) effective abhorrence of the barbarism of gladiatorial combats; (3) immediate moral mitigation of slavery, and a strong encouragement of emancipation; (4) great extension of the eleemosynary provision made for the sick and poor.
[349]Among definite changes in the current morality of the Græco-Roman civilised world, which are to be attributed mainly if not entirely to the extension and intensification of sympathy due to Christianity, the following may be especially noted: (1) the severe condemnation and final suppression of the practice of exposing infants; (2) effective abhorrence of the barbarism of gladiatorial combats; (3) immediate moral mitigation of slavery, and a strong encouragement of emancipation; (4) great extension of the eleemosynary provision made for the sick and poor.
[350]This passage, which in the second and subsequent editions occurred in chap. ii. of Book i., was omitted by Professor Sidgwick from that chapter in the sixth edition, with the intention of incorporating it in Book iv., which he did not live to revise.
[350]This passage, which in the second and subsequent editions occurred in chap. ii. of Book i., was omitted by Professor Sidgwick from that chapter in the sixth edition, with the intention of incorporating it in Book iv., which he did not live to revise.
[351]Cf. J. S. Mill,Utilitarianism, chap. ii. Mill, however, only affirms that the “rules of morality for the multitude” are to be accepted by the philosopher provisionally, until he has got something better.
[351]Cf. J. S. Mill,Utilitarianism, chap. ii. Mill, however, only affirms that the “rules of morality for the multitude” are to be accepted by the philosopher provisionally, until he has got something better.
[352]I refer to the abstract principles of Prudence, Justice, and Rational Benevolence as defined in chap.xiii.of the preceding Book.
[352]I refer to the abstract principles of Prudence, Justice, and Rational Benevolence as defined in chap.xiii.of the preceding Book.
[353]Theory of Moral Sentiments, Book i.
[353]Theory of Moral Sentiments, Book i.