Is not this beautiful allegory, true as it certainly is in one sense, after all misleading? Is not theory and theory different? If theory means mere speculation, we heartily agree with the proposition to keep clear of and far away from theorising. It is at best a harmless play, and certainly a loss of valuable time. Yet if theory means methodical systematisation of facts, it is not mere waste of time; in that case it is the indispensable condition of all truly practical work. And it is this latter kind of theory which also in the practical work of ethical culture must be sought to be established. We must at least be clear as to basic principles so that the efforts of ethical teachers may not be at random, but directed by the progressive spirit of the age in harmony with our best scientific and philosophic thought.
Concerning religion Dr. Coit says (p. 19) in his article "Why Ethics Instead of Religion": "My own opinion is that there is one feature which distinguishes Religion from all other doctrines, ceremonies, and rules. This feature characterised Matthew Arnold's view. For he insisted not only upon morals and their importance, and thought of means for their propagation, but he proclaimed also that there was a power above the will of man to which he must bow. In the very moment he proposed that power which we have to obey, his ethics became religious…. But the recognition of this higher power, if I am allowed to propose my own views, appears to me of very little importance."
If there is such a power, and we have sufficient reasons not to doubt its existence, I should say that for ethical purposes it is of paramount importance to recognise it and to obey it. In another and a more recent lecture, Dr. Coit pronounces a very different view, he says:
"Anybody who has ever reflected a moment, must have discovered how dependent he is upon a power outside of his own will. He has no strength either for good or for evil, which he has made himself. The more he thinks about it, the deeper must become the feeling of his dependence. And being aware that God, or whatever we call that power in all things, does not mind his whims, he will find it easier not to mind, himself, his own whims. The constant thought that we are not the powers of life and death, will take away conceit and vanity and foolishness. And in this way, it brings us in times of tribulation to a quick resignation. It makes us loving brothers and sons."
Dr. Coit indeed aspires to make of ethical culture a religion for the people. He speaks on this subject in his last lecture. He opposes the Churches for mixing their ethics with theology, and he speaks with great enthusiasm about the poetry of ethics, which is much more powerful than the prose of ethics. He does not seem to see that the influence of the churches is mainly due to their poetry of ethics. Would it not be advisable to point out the prosaic truth in this poetry for the purpose of freeing the human mind of the obnoxious elements of a misunderstood poetry? Would it not be advisable to investigate the poetry of the basic idea in ethics, viz., of the God-idea, so as to let the ethical movement develop itself historically from the past. Dr. Coit's method of dealing with the God-idea is far from satisfactory. He is neither a theist nor an atheist. Sometimes he appears to appreciate the moral importance of the God-idea in its purified shape, and then again he seems to consider it as an ethically indifferent idea. Should not this problem be settled by every one who undertakes to preach ethics. It appears almost as if all the leaders of the ethical culture societies underrated the ethical importance and indispensableness of thought in general and of science and philosophy in particular.
The contradictions which appear in Dr. Coit's lectures show that he is still developing. The book is full of promise and we have every reason to hope that its author will overcome the unclearness that is still lurking in his mind, and that he will grow with the work he is doing.
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FREMDES UND EIGENES AUS DEM GEISTIGEN LEBEN DER GEGENWART. By Prof. Dr.Ludwig Büchner. Leipsic: Max Spohr.
Opinions admittedly are still divided with respect to the laudable efforts of a large class of scientists and writers whose main object is that of presenting the results of scientific research in an intelligible, popular form. Every department of the natural sciences, geology, astronomy, even psychology and comparative philology, each and all, are now represented by able and ardent popular interpreters, who at the same time by their aggressive style and by their polemical methods not unfrequently seem to impart a kind of militant and apostolic attitude to the cause of science. It must further be admitted, that many of these writers, by the unanimous verdict of the present age, are among the most instructive, readable, and actually the most widely read authors of contemporaneous German, French, and Anglo-American literature. At first glance, it accordingly may seem rather strange, that these same popular authors should also be subjected, not unfrequently, to their commensurate share of unfair, and even offensive, popular criticism; and yet it could hardly be otherwise.
The well-known writer of these scientific and critical essays, Prof. Ludwig Büchner, affords an exceptionally striking instance of the unenviable lot of some of our most popular writers of science. In one of these essays inscribed "Meine Philosophie," Professor Büchner has been compelled to defend the arduous work of his laborious life against a decidedly unfriendly and unappreciative criticism of his philosophy and whole scientific activity, that some time ago appeared in the AmericanFreidenkerof Milwaukee. Prof. Büchner, with a touch of legitimate bitterness, repudiates the imputation of having been, or still being, as he himself calls it, only the "popularisator," expounder and commentator, of the theories and systems of other thinkers; that, on the contrary, in Germany and elsewhere, among the highest representatives of science, for more than thirty years Professor Büchner himself has been recognised and honored as an original worker and thinker. His book on "Force and Matter" (Kraft und Stoff) was published five years before Darwin's great work on the "Origin of Species." Subsequently his well-known popular Lectures in connection with Darwin's work claim the distinguished merit, of having more widely generalised and extended the Darwinian theory by embracing the origin and evolution of man, which had until then been overlooked by Darwin himself. By the contemporary press of Germany Professor Büchner was then charged with premature rashness, and with being only a shallow, imitative scientific dilettante; but all this vituperative criticism was for ever silenced, when in the year 1871 Darwin's own work appeared on the "Descent of Man," in which Darwin himself accepted all the consequences of the theory of evolution, as set forth in Professor Büchner's Lectures, and, somewhat later, in Professor Haeckel's "Natural History of Creation" (Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte). Professor Büchner, moreover, is the author of the widely popular work "The Future Life and Modern Science" (Das künftige Leben und die moderne Wissenschaft). To deny him, accordingly, the rank and merit of a solid and original scientist and thinker, as he himself says, is to do him a signal injustice, a positive injury.
Let all this be willingly granted; but this concession, at all events, does not settle his final, mediating attitude to the entire satisfaction of philosophy, regarded as an independent science. Professor Büchner openly declares himself in favor of popular science. He maintains, that "Philosophy ought to step down from her lofty state of independent science, and henceforth content herself with the humble rôle of simply mediating the results of individual scientific research; that science, in such case, would no longer run the risk of being exposed to the scorn and contempt of the masses(!) … In popular scientific writings, at all times, there can and must occur contradictions, superficial estimates, even trivialities, but all this is perfectly understood by any fair-minded reader." … These remarks might almost tempt the reader to believe, that Professor Büchner, in his eagerness to popularise science, really ignores the value of philosophy as an independent science, and of philosophical research, irrespective of all popular results, and that the Professor wishes to inculcate a narrow and purely utilitarian estimate of philosophy. But, the impulsive Professor, of course, knows better; his mental vision embraces the entire field of the sciences, and he has written admirably and entertainingly upon almost every scientific topic, and moreover he admits, that possibly he sometimes contradicts himself.
One might further be inclined to ask, whether, in view of his self-imposed, familiar contact with the popular mind, Professor Büchner upon the whole displays the expected equanimity and broad-minded consistency when resenting the harsh criticism of antagonists, which he does with a singularly thin-skinned sensitiveness scarcely worthy of a true philosopher. In all his other works and throughout these critical essays, Professor Büchner himself shows no tender regard for the feelings of his philosophical antagonists. In the critical essay "Against Materialism," (Wider den Materialismus), for example,—mainly directed against Prof. Harald Höffding,—he bluntly affirms that Professor Höffding's works have produced upon him the impression that the author is a man without the philosophical and scientific knowledge requisite for the solution of the problems he has ventured to approach.
From what has been said, the reader may expect to find much important, instructive, and readable matter even in Professor Büchner's critical essays, bearing upon the intellectual life of the period; but he also must be prepared to find them leavened in no small degree with the characteristic mental idiosyncrasies of their ever polemical author.
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DEACON HERBERT'S BIBLE CLASS. ByJames Freeman Clarke. Boston: Geo.H. Ellis.
This booklet is an unassuming little publication, but it is important as a symptom of the times. It was written by the late Mr. James Freeman Clarke many years ago as a series of papers for theChristian Inquirer. Yet it is well that they should not be forgotten and the lessons contained therein should be heeded by the clergy as well as the laity of this country. It is an attempt to make religion practical and to point out the true direction in which church-life has to develop.
There is a great truth in the general complaint made throughout the world that the religion of civilised mankind, especially Christianity in the shape it exists at present, has lost its life, its influence, and its usefulness. Our religious views must be transformed, they must be reconciled with the principles of science and must be adapted to the real needs of the people. The problem is, how to do it.
If a solution of the problem shall be found, it is certain that it will be first put into practice in the United States of America; for here the church is free. The many different churches of our country, with few exceptions (the Roman Catholic Church is perhaps the only one) are in principle churches of the people. A change of opinion, of belief, of religious conviction among the people will result in the appointment of such pastors and leaders as are in agreement with their congregations. Clergy and laity form here one organic body. The clergy are not imposed upon their congregations by the state; they are the exponents of their congregations, the representatives of the religious ideas (perhaps upon the whole of the conservative religious ideas) of their churches.
How different things are in Europe, where the state-churches of England and Germany, for instance, prevent all progress in religion, theology, and church-life.
Mr. Clarke's book, if read with these considerations in mind, shows the agencies that are at work in this country and that will (as we confidently hope) result in a new phase of religious life. Among the chapters of the book we note the following titles: "The way we helped our minister to write good sermons"; "Aim of Life"; "Temptation of Jesus"; "The Miracles"; "The Sermon on the Mount"; and others. The spirit in which the book is written is not exactly rationalistic, yet it shows in every line a strong monistic bias. For instance, the usual definition of miracles as a suspension of the laws of nature is discarded; and yet it would be erroneous to suppose that the style of the book is marked by a radical tendency. Not at all. Every faithful Christian can read it line for line without feeling the least offence. But it is plain that herein lies the author's force. The book is popular, but behind its popularity, unusual depth of thought is noticeable. In a similar way St. Paul gave milk to his followers because they were babes in Christ, and could not bear heavier food. Mr. Clarke's book is written especially for babes in Christ, yet every one who has given any serious thought to the religious problem will appreciate at once the difficulty and the importance of such an undertaking.
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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. September, 1890. Vol. III. No. 3.
ON THE BRAIN OF LAURA BRIDGMAN. ByH. H. Donaldson.
A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF REFLEX ACTION (II). ByC. F. Hodge.
ON A CURIOUS VISUAL PHENOMENON. ByJoseph Le Conte.
A COUNTING ATTACHMENT FOR THE PENDULUM CHRONOSCOPE. ByWilliamNoyes.
PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE. The Nervous System—byH. H.Donaldson; Experimental Psychology; Criminology—byArthurMacDonald; Psychiatry—byWilliam Noyes; Miscellaneous.
The full title of Dr. Donaldson's elaborate article isAnatomical Observations on the Brain and Several Sense-Organs of the blind Deaf-Mute, Laura Dewey Bridgman. The object had in view in the examination of the brain was "to determine, if possible, whether the peculiar mental existence of Laura Bridgman, which was the result of her defective sense-organs, has left any trace on her brain, or whether such anomalies as may be observed are sufficiently explained when considered as the direct consequences of the initial defect alone." The article is therefore "a special study in the general field of the inter-relation of brain-structure and intelligence." The final results are reserved for a second article, but it appears from the present one that the total area of Laura's brain is somewhat small for its weight, and that it is slightly inferior to two other female brains with which comparison was made, the inferiority depending mainly on the smaller average depth of the sulci, that of the left side being the most manifest. The difference can be explained in part at best, by the failure of certain portions of the brain to develop completely. Dr. Donaldson's article is illustrated by very carefully prepared plates.
In the present part of his sketch of the history of reflex action, Dr. Hodge treats of the law demonstrated by Bell, that theposterior roots of the spinal nerves are sensory, the anterior motor, which forms the beginning of the modern history of the nervous system, and of "the physical versus the psychic theory of reflex action." The mechanical theory of reflex action was first elaborated by Marshall Hall. It was opposed by Volkmann and others, among them Pflügel and Auerbach. On the other hand, Lotze supported the former view, but he advanced "a step beyond the comparatively crude, simple mechanism of Marshall Hall to a mechanism of the utmost delicacy, a mechanism susceptible of the nicest adjustments, capable of education, and of prolonged, independent, and complex activity." Habit is only another name for mechanism.
Under the head of Psychiatry, Dr. William Noyes gives an elaborate sketch of the life of Jean Jacques Rousseau bearing on the question of his insanity, which is exciting considerable interest at the present time. (E. C. Sanford, Clark University, Worcester, Mass.)
MIND. October, 1890. No. LX.
THE ORIGIN OF MUSIC. ByHerbert Spencer.
MENTAL ELABORATION. ByJames Sully.
VOLKMANN'S PSYCHOLOGY (II). ByThomas Whittaker.
BERKELEY AS A MORAL PHILOSOPHER. ByHugh W. Orange.
MUENSTERBERG ON 'MUSCULAR SENSE' AND 'TIME-SENSE.' By theEditor.
DISCUSSION: 1) Mr. Spencer's Derivation of Space. ByProf. JohnWatson.2) Dr. Pikler on the Cognition of Physical Reality. ByG. F.Stout.
CRITICAL NOTICES: Lewis's "A Text-Book of Mental Diseases."Mercier's "Sanity and Insanity"; Jones's "Elements of Logic asa Science of Propositions"; Coupland's "The Gain of Life andother Essays."
ON THE UTILITARIAN FORMULA. ByJames Sutherland.
The Origin of Music.This article is intended as a postscript to Mr. Spencer's essay on "The Origin and Function of Music," included in hisEssays, Scientific, Political, and Speculative, of which he is preparing a final edition. It is a reply to Mr. Darwin, who supposes music to have originated from a particular class of vocal noises, the amatory class, instead of, as Mr. Spencer asserts, its being derived from the sounds which the voice emits under excitement, eventually gaining this or that character according to the kind of excitement. After considering various objections by Mr. Edmund Gurney and others, Mr. Spencer concludes: "The origin of music as the developed language of motion seems to be no longer an inference but simply a description of the fact."
Mr. James Sully deals with Differentiation, Assimilation, and Association as the intellectual constituents in the process of Mental Elaboration. Differentiation is considered first as a process of marking off, by means of special adjustments of attention, particular sensations; followed by Discrimination, which involves change of psychical state, the dependence of mental life on which has been formulated as the Law of Relativity. Assimilation, described as a mode of unification or integration, is treated of under the headings,Psychological Nature of Likeness;Automatic Assimilation;Recognition; andTransition to Comparative Assimilation. Association is the "process of psychical combination or integration which binds together presentative elements occurring together or in immediate succession." This supposesRetentionor the tendency of a sensation to persist, andReproduction, or the reappearance "in consciousness" of the impression under a new representative form. The three processes of Differentiation, Assimilation, and Association do not follow each other, but are closely interconnected.
Mr. Orange furnishes a different explanation of Berkeley's ethical system from that given by Professor Fraser, in a note to the third dialogue ofAlciphron(ii. 107), and points out its agreement with Berkeley'sPrinciples of Human Knowledge. "Moral laws are laws of nature; but there is no value or force in them as laws, save in so far as they are the orderly expression of God's ideas." Man's ideas are true or good, when the human spirit is at one with the divine. Both in natural and moral philosophy the laws of nature are to be attained by the use of reason.
Prof. Robertson draws attention to the concessions involved in Münsterberg's idea of 'Muscular Sense.' To the term 'muscle-sensation' no exception can be taken, "provided it is meant for no more than mere external designation, as when we speak of 'eye-sensation,' 'skin-sensation,' or the like," and is not called 'sensation of movement.' Münsterberg finds that a whole class of factors have been overlooked, or hardly regarded, by previous inquirers into 'Time-Sense.' These are sensations (or representations) of muscular tension, by synthesis of which with sense-elements (sounds by preference) time-apprehension is explicable. He is struck particularly with the part played in his experiments by the breath-rhythm, and "it seems impossible to doubt that breathing has a prerogative position among the sense-factors concerned in the estimation of short time-intervals." The name 'Time-Sense' has through Münsterberg's investigations "more justification than it ever got from its inventors, for whom it has marked only the apparent immediacy of time-apprehension."
In his criticism of Mr. Spencer's theory of the derivation of space Prof. John Watson lays down as the fundamental position of Transcendentalism, or Idealism, as he prefers to call it, "that the universe is intelligible, and that man in virtue of his intelligence is capable of grasping it in its essential nature. It therefore rejects as unmeaning the doctrine of Mr. Spencer, that we know reality to be unknowable." While recognising that Mr. Spencer and others have done good service in drawing attention to certain outward aspects of the evolution of mind, Professor Watson "concludes that no psychology can be adequate which does not recognise that perception is not the mere occurrence of transient feelings, but the first step in that recognition of the true nature of reality which culminates in the comprehension of the world as a single organic unity of which the source and explanation is intelligence."
Mr. Stout points out, in reply to Dr. Pikler (Mind, No. 59), that the sole aim of his article on "The Genesis of the Cognition of Physical Reality" (Mind, No. 57) was to trace "the genesis of the presentation of physical reality as it appears to the ordinary consciousness: not as it may be modified, and perhaps rectified, by the reflective criticism of this or that philosopher," and that what he urged against Mill was simply that "he has confounded his own philosophical view of physical reality with the view which men ordinarily take when they are not in a philosophical mood."
It is shown by Mr. Sutherland that in the utilitarian ultimate conception there is, in addition to "the greatest happiness,plusan arithmetical truth," the element of absolute justice, the existence of which requires that "all subsidiary rights as means to greatest general happiness should at utmost be classed under relative justice." (London: Williams & Norgate.)
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. October, 1890. Vol. I. No. I.
THE MORALITY OF STRIFE. ByProfessor Henry Sidgwick.
THE FREEDOM OF ETHICAL FELLOWSHIP. ByFelix Adler, Ph. D.
THE LAW OF RELATIVITY IN ETHICS. ByProfessor Harald Höffding.
THE ETHICS OF LAND TENURE. ByProfessor J. B. Clark.
THE COMMUNICATION OF MORAL IDEAS AS A FUNCTION OF AN ETHICALSOCIETY ByBernard Bosanquet, M. A.
DR. ABBOT'S "WAY OUT OF AGNOSTICISM." ByProfessor Josiah Royce.
A SERVICE OF ETHICS TO PHILOSOPHY. ByWm. H. Salter.
This is the first number of theInternational Journal of Ethics, which is intended to take the place of theEthical Record. In the opening article, Professor Sidgwick affirms that the idea of a universal and complete harmony of the earthly interests of all human beings is "an optimistic illusion as to human relations, which in the present age of the world has nearly faded away." Nevertheless, "a very substantial gain would result if we could remove from men's minds all errors of judgment as to right and wrong, good and evil, even if we left other causes of bad conduct unchanged." What is practically wanted is improvement in moral insight, and the aim of the paper is to aid in the solution of certain intellectual difficulties which arise when we try to get a clear idea of duty. Warfare among modern nations "is normally not a mere conflict of interests, but also a conflict of opposing views of right and justice." Disputants may therefore be brought into harmony if they can be really and completely enlightened as to their true rights, as distinguished from their interests. The international law administered by arbitrators may be most useful "in removing minor occasions of controversy and in minimising the mischief resulting from graver conflicts," but it will not provide a settlement of all occasions of strife. Where the sphere of arbitration ends that of the moral method of attaining international peace begins; "if we must be judges in our own cause, we must endeavor to be just judges." The impartiality required is difficult, but "the judicial function—which, in a modern state under popular government, has become, in some degree, the business of every man"—might be performed with success, "if national consciences could be roused to feel the nobility and grapple practically and persistently with the difficulties of the task."
Professor Adler's article is devoted to an account of the Ethical Societies, which are described as being "consecrated to the knowledge of the Good, but not to any special theory of the Good." To adopt a philosophical formula as the basis of union would be to become a philosophical sect, which he declares is "the most contemptible of all sects, because the sectarian bias is most repugnant to the spirit of genuine philosophy." The accepted norms of moral behavior form the starting points of Ethical Societies and their basis of union. They build on the common stock of moral judgment, which may be called the common conscience. Ethics is both a science and an art. As a science it has to explain the facts of the moral life, and it is necessary to begin with the facts and to test theories by their fitness to account for them. It is "the prime duty of every one in his individual capacity to rise to the ever clearer apprehension of first principles," but for this very reason Ethical Societies in their collective capacity abstain from laying down any set of first principles as binding.
It is not quite clear how Professor Adler can declare that the Ethical Societies are consecrated to the knowledge of the good, and yet make so strong an opposition to their stating such knowledge in the exact terms of a philosophical formula. Philosophy is nothing but knowledge of the world systematised into a world-conception. It will hardly be sufficient to make the "common conscience" the corner stone of any society devoted to the elevation of morality. Not only would it be difficult to ascertain what that "common conscience" at present is, but, in addition, we can be assured that the "common conscience" is constantly changing.
Ethics as a science means philosophical ethics; and Professor Adler's ethics is, in fact, the expression of a philosophy. Yet in spite of the advanced position of the Ethical Societies, which have discarded all religious views and ceremonial practices, we find that their leader still stands upon the ground of a dualistic extra-naturalism. Professor Adler says:
"There is a reality other than that of the senses, and the ultimate reality in things is, in a sense, transcending our comprehension, akin to the moral nature of men. But how shall we acquaint ourselves with this Supersensible. The ladder of science does not reach so far."
It is true that there are realities other than that of the senses; take as a most simple instance mathematical points and lines. But there is no reality which theoretically considered can not become an object of science. The statement that there are facts to which the ladder of science does not reach, is tantamount to a declaration of supernaturalism and dualism. Professor Adler has discarded the terminology of the old dogmatism, but he has not discarded its basic error. Instead of developing the old faith into a monistic religion, he throws away religion as a basis of ethics, but preserves carefully that element in it which is hostile to science and philosophy.
TheLaw of Relativityis a very important contribution by Professor Höffding to the Science of Ethics. After stating that the moral law, if it is to be truly universal, must "only judge the general direction of thetendencyof the will," he affirms that the individual relativity of ethics, or its personal equation, is a factor which enters into the ethical question, "when different individuals with like ethical principles and in like circumstances, but with different dispositions and capacities have to be considered." The individual is always a part of society, and the life of society is no other than that contained in its members, the ideal being "reached only when the individual's efforts in the cause of society also serve the free and harmonious development of his own faculties and impulses." In an ideal State only that would be demanded of each individual which lay within his range and power. Self-control, as a negative virtue, is a psychological impossibility. It is necessary to take note whether there is room for other inclinations that could absorb the store of energy. The struggle of self-control lasts until the new application of energy gains complete ascendancy. The happiest man is where morality has become organic and "there is an agreement between the task arising from the general principles and the particular circumstances, and the capacities and desires of the individual." Professor Höffding objects to the views of the Italiancriminal-psychologicalschool that atavism is a sign of social imperfection, that it "does not justify placing society and the criminal over against each other as absolute right and absolute wrong." He concludes that it is at least an open question whether there are any human beings "in whom no sympathy for the moral law can be awakened, however much the law may be individualised."
The arguments of Professor Clark onThe Ethics of Land Tenureare summed up in the following passage: "If a state originally owned its land, in the fullest sense of the term, it had the right of voluntary alienation which is inherent in such ownership. Increments of value, present and future, are its property; in alienating them it gives away its own. If the attainment of its ends requires that they be transferred to others, the title of the grantees is valid. To deny to the state the privilege of alienation is to essentially abridge its natural rights; it is to make its ownership of the land incomplete." In relation to what is incorrectly termed "unearned increments," it is remarked, "if the essence of property is regarded, and not its form, the increments of value attaching to land are not unearned by their proprietors. In an active market land has its fair price, and this is based partly on the future increments themselves." The loss arising from a confiscation of land-value would fall "not merely on millions who have titles in fee simple, but on all who have made loans on land as security…. To every one it would come in the shape of a seizure by the state of property invested in accordance with its own positive invitation."
The communication of moral ideas, and not ideas about morality, which are the abstract or scientific renderings of moral ideas, is considered by Mr. Bosanquet as the proper function of an Ethical Society. The fault of the present time is distraction, and "one great cause of this distraction is the notion of a general duty to do good, or something other than and apart from doing one's work well and intelligently." The only certain way of communicating moral ideas is contagion, and the most useful teacher of morality is "not so much a man of abstract theory as a man of reasonable experience."
Ethics may be of service to philosophy, says Mr. Salter, in opening up the realm of "what ought to be," beyond the realm of "what is and happens." Moral ideas belong to the realm of unverifiable ideas, which are believed in because of "their own intrinsic attractiveness and authority." Ethics tells us of the law according to which men should act, the law of justice and brotherhood; we may conclude "that whatever may be the actual forces in the world at any time, justice and love are rightfully supreme over them all, and that these are so interwoven with the order of things that nothing out of harmony with them can long stand." It is "the imperishable glory of transcendentalism in our country that in the decay and disintegration of the ancient creed," it sounded the high-note "that the soul can in some sense know the object of its worship; that it need not feed on hearsay, and tradition, and arguments, but can have vision." (Philadelphia:International Journal of Ethics, 1602 Chestnut St.)
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. September, 1890. No. 177.
REMARQUES SUR LE PRINCIPE DE CAUSALITE. ByA. Lalande.
PHILOSOPHES ESPAGNOLS.—J. HUARTE. ByJ. M. Guardia.
LES ORIGINES DE LA TECHNOLOGIE (fin). ByA. Espinas.
UN DOCUMENT INEDIT SUR LES MANUSCRITS DE DESCARTES. ByV. Egger.
The principle of causality belongs only to the world of sense, that of children and of the commonality of mankind who neither reflect nor analyse their knowledge. It represents confusedly the continuity and inertia which are proper to the scientific stage, as colors represent imperfectly the undulations of the ether, and sound the vibrations of ponderable matter. To make of causality a scientific property of things, a law of the phenomenal and mechanical world, is to affirm that bodies preserve their color in the absence of an eye to perceive it, or their sonorousness when no one hears them. Moreover, from a scientific standpoint, the words sound and color lose all proper meaning; while the principle of causality retains a sense, but then expresses a false proposition, and one which leads us incessantly into error. Several consequences flow from M. Lalande's conception of causality. The first is that this law is not a rational principle, but is anempiricalformula, in the mathematical sense of that word. The second is that we are thereby led to see in the idea ofefficiencyan artificial concept, and, as would be said by philologists, a disease of language, instead of a mysterious "power" that emanates from one phenomenon in order to create its effect. A third consequence is the great simplification it leads to in the problem of induction, which requires us merely to believe in the stability of the laws of nature, which are only mathematical laws proved by experience. The true foundation of induction is the universal value of mathematics, which rests finally on the principle of identity. The degree of perfection of a science can be measured by the quantity of mathematics it employs; and it is this preconceived idea which has given birth to all the psycho-physical measures that have been recently introduced into psychology.
M. Guardia's paper gives a sketch of the philosophical system laid down in the work of the Spanish writer J. Huarte,The Trial of the Spirits, with an introductory account of the author and his book, which first appeared in 1575. Huarte is described as unique among Spanish thinkers, and as a leading figure among natural philosophers on account of the daring novelty of his original views and the excellence of his method, which is that of the inductive philosophy. His doctrine is founded on that of Galen, and he proclaims the principle that the physical determines the moral. All his metaphysics reduce themselves to the recognition of the action of exterior causes, which are of inorganic nature, and of the organism which reacts to them. He thus explains all the manifestations of life, heredity intervening as a factor in its evolution. Huarte was less concerned, however, with physiology and psychology, than with the amelioration of the social state. He worked for the future by creating of psychology an organic science of observation and experience, founded on the knowledge of human nature, and by basing on it the art of education.
In concluding his valuable study of theOrigin of Technology, M. Espinas, after giving numerous examples drawn from ancient Greek life, says: "All the technical arts of this epoch have the same characters. They are religious, traditional, local. The myths referred to are at first the faithful as well as the symbolic expression of them." This mythological symbolism is "the product of a psychological and sociological projection, that is to say, the things of art are conceived as benevolent or angered feelings, as intelligent inventions or combinations that are attributed to fictitious idealised men, as exchanges that are made with them, as gifts or precepts that are received from them, or as orders imposed by their will. They are thus psychical operations or social products drawn from human consciousness unknown to it which, personified, find themselves invoked by it in order to explain to itself its own creations."
The unpublished matter referring to the manuscripts of Descartes is contained in a copy of the 1659 edition of thePrincipesof the French philosopher, and consists of numerous notes in the handwriting of its former owner Joseph de Beaumont. (Paris: Félix Alcan.)
REVUE PHILOSOPHIQUE. No. 178. October, 1890.
LE DELIT POLITIQUE. ByG. Tarde.
UNE NOUVELLE THÉORIE DE LA LIBERTÉ. ByA. Belot.
NOTE SUR LA PHYSIOLOGIE DE L'ATTENTION. ByCh. Féré.
LES BASES EXPÉRIMENTALES DE LA GEOMETRIE. ByJules Andrade.
NOTE SUR LE PRINCIPE DE LA CAUSALITE. ByJ.-J. Gourd.
M. Tarde finds M. Lombroso too severe and at the same time too kind towards the spirit of conservatism. Too severe in terming it misoneism and too kind in regarding it as the only normal condition of societies. The hospitable reception given to novelties is an equally normal function, although intermittent. If instead of making all his sociological ideas circle round the idea of thenew, and creating an unfruitful antithesis between the love and the hatred of novelty, he had taken as his central notion the idea of imitation, and proved the universal distinction between the imitation of the new and the imitation of the old, M. Lombroso would have escaped many errors. In all of us, caprice exists by the side of habit, due to physiological misoneism; and the conflict between them goes on in each individual throughout our life. Caprice triumphs at the commencement, but the contest is terminated in old age by the definite victory of habit. It is the same in the social life. The inclination to adopt new ideas is due to the law of imitation, which is a more important factor in great social movements than misoneism.
M. Belot remarks that he would not dare to write the titleUne théorie nouvelle de la libertéif it referred to a theory of his own. Under it he criticises the theory advanced by M. Bergson in hisEssai sur les données immédiates de la conscience; according to which freedom belongs, not to the empirical personality of the superficial ego, but to the deeper ego, the subjectivity itself, the alteration of which through the laws of thought and exigencies of science gives rise to the former. According to M. Belot, on the contrary, the will and freedom are shown in the forcing back of the lower ego, which comes to the surface, and its impulses by enlightened ideas. To act in harmony with these is freedom, which is not inconsistent with determinism in the proper sense. Determinism becomes freedom in becoming intelligent. Until then we obey concealed impulses, which may belong to our parents, our ancestors, or our social surroundings, and therefore we are not free.
By an excellent series of experiments, M. Féré has demonstrated that in attention all the qualities of movement are modified; its rapidity, its energy, and its precision, the physiological condition of the process being a general tension of the muscles. It is an error to suppose the intervention of arrestive action, of inhibition, in the physiology of attention. Voluntary immobility results from very intense muscular activities, and has for its physiological condition the general tension of the muscular system, which places the subject in such a condition that he can react in the quickest and most energetic manner possible to an excitation from whatever point it may come. This is the physiological condition of attention. The exercise of immobility is the most favorable to the development of intelligence, while the relaxation of the muscles which results from the removal of the tension tends to the suppression of attention, and of the psychical activity. Excitations of the skin determine exaggerated reflex activities, more rapid and more energetic movements. As intelligence is developed, the reflex movements become less imperious, the multiplicity of motives of action gives the illusion of freedom of choice. When the excitable centres are incompletely developed, as with women and children, and especially with degenerates, the impulsions and the reflex activities generally, of which the centres are better developed, are more violent and more uncontrollable. (Paris: Félix Alcan).
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Vol. I.Nos. 4 and 5.
UEBER DAS ERKENNEN DER SCHALLRICHTUNG. ByJ. v. Kries.
ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER KAUSALITAET. ByTh. Lipps.
ZUR INTERAUREALEN LOKALISATION DIOTISCHER WAHRNEHMUNGEN. ByKarlL. Schaefer.
ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DER FRAGE. ByRich. Wahle.
UEBER NEGATIVE EMPFINDUNGSWERTE (I). ByH. Ebbinghaus.
VERSAMMLUNGEN: Internationaler medizinischer Kongress zu Berlin 1890. I. Sektion für Augenheilkunde. Referiert vonClaude du Bois-Reymond.—II. Sektion für Ohrenheilkunde. Referiert vonKrakauer.
Professor J. von Kries examines the hypotheses propounded of late concerning the recognition of the direction in which sound-waves reach the ear. Professor Preyer maintains that different irritations, according to the source of sound, take place in the semi-circular canals, and Münsterberg, on the basis of his own experiments, has with some essential modifications accepted Preyer's views. The author devotes his chief attention to the localisation of sounds originating either to the right or to the left of the median plane. The experiments were made with two movable whistles, the intensity of which could easily be regulated. The result was that concerning right and left direction, and also with regard to simultaneous sounds from both directions at a different pitch, each note could be correctly localised. He adds that, so far as he can judge, even he who adopts Münsterberg's view has to fall back upon a comparison of the intensity in both ears. A localisation of whistle-sounds in the median line, be it in front or at the back, was not so certain. A single tone was, upon the whole, correctly localised; yet it was difficult to discriminate two sounds in the median plane.
In another article on the same subject, entitledOn Interaureal Localisation of Diotic SensationsKarl L. Schaefer of Jena recapitulates in brief the monotic and diotic experiments made by Silvanus B. Thompson, Purkynés, Urbantschitsch, and Preyer; completing the inquiries of Fechner on the subject he states the following result: "Let two tuning forks be placed at an equal distance from the median plane in front of the ears, so that their sound is medianly localised: 1) Synchronal vibrations of any pitch, at the same distance, and in exactly opposite directions, produce median oscillations; 2) If the forks are moved a tempo to the right or to the left, i. e. in the same direction, the sound rolls from ear to ear, so long as the motions are not too rapid; 3) If they are executed as quickly as possible the vibrations have their seats in both ears."
The Psychology of Causalityis the subject of a longer article (47 pages) by Prof. Th. Lipps. Lipps declares that his "investigation intends to reduce causality to association, and the law of causality to the law of association." The author does not identify his undertaking with the psychology of association, and protests against considering mind-activity as passive processes. He devotes almost too much space to stating what is, or can easily become, an anthropomorphic conception of causation. Where he propounds his positive views, we miss discriminative exactness.UrsacheandGrundare not sufficiently distinguished, and the definitions of formal and material cognitions, are not lucidly stated. Dr. Lipps says: "All cognition is objectively conditioned representation; respectively associations of representations. In purely formal cognition the objectiveraison d'être(Grund) consists in the presence of a contents of consciousness. In material cognition, or cognition by experience in the narrower sense, it consists in the consciousness of the objective reality of a contents of consciousness."[66] The author's conclusion is summarised as follows:
[66] The passage being so difficult to translate, we quote the original in full: "Alle Erkenntniss ist objectiv begründetes Vorstellen, bezw. Verbinden von Vorstellungen. Bei der lediglich formalen Erkenntniss besteht der objective Grund im Dasein eines Bewusstseinsinhaltes, bei der materialen oder Erfahrungserkenntniss im engeren Sinne besteht er im Bewusstsein der objectiven Wirklichkeit eines Bewusstseinsinhaltes."
"Hume's work and his mistake can thus plainly be recognised. That causal connection is a connection among our ideas, not a connection among the objects represented, that the necessity which distinguishes this connection consists in the psychological compulsion to combine one fact with another, that this compulsion has its reason in association, is the discovery of Hume; and this discovery of Hume is one of the most important in the history of philosophy. That the world becomes a world regulated by law, by being subjected to the law of our mind, this anthropocentric standpoint was therewith determined. Hume's mistake consisted only in this: He did not recognise the full importance of the law of association. Therefore he did not see what associative relations are directly identical with the causal relation. An attempt was made to cover the defect rising therefrom by the principle of habit. Not the principle of association, but the principle of habit depriving the principle of association of its strength, hindered Hume from proposing the correct answer to the question, 'How in experience are general and necessary judgments possible?'" Professor Lipps does not answer this question satisfactorily either; he gives no explanation of the fact that in experience general and necessary judgments are possible. He simply states the fact. Every natural scientist, he says, expects that a certain result that has been observed once, will always take place again if the experiment be repeated under exactly the same conditions.
Professor Lipps states, in concluding, that he is fully conscious of having discussed only a small part of that which might be said on this subject, and adds: "Perhaps objections or criticisms will give me an occasion for additional remarks." We here call his attention to the treatment of the subject in Dr. Paul Carus's pamphletUrsache, Grund und Zweck(Dresden: Grumbkow, 1881) and also to his articles on Form and Formal Thought and on Causality inFundamental Problems.
Dr. Richard Wahle, Privat-docent in Vienna, defines in a short sketch onThe Psychology of the Questionthe meaning of Question in the following way: a question is "the preparation during a state of indecision for a perception of the decision." In explaining the meaning of this decision Richard Wahle makes an occasional fling at that kind of psychology which divorced from physiology confines itself to the method of introspection.
The last article, by Prof. H. Ebbinghaus, is the first part of a criticism of Fechner's posthumous letters onNegative Empfindungs verthe, published in the first numbers of this periodical. These letters, Ebbinghaus declares, afford an interesting insight into the scientific personality of Fechner; yet the doctrine contained therein, he adds, has its drawbacks. Ebbinghaus does not accept Fechner's presentation of the case, but refers us to Delbœuf from whose experiments alone, he says, the correct interpretation of negative values of sensations can be derived. Delbœuf's views are not so clearly presented in his first statement as in a later article written in answer to the objections of Tannery, published in theRevue PhilosophiqueV. 1878, and republished under the titleExamen critique de la loi psychophysique(Paris, 1883). Ebbinghaus adopts Langer's definition of negative values of sensations. They are "such as under all circumstances if additively connected with equally great positive ones produce as a result zero."
The reports of the proceedings of the International Congress of Physicians, Berlin, 1890, will be of special value to physicians. The present number contains those of the sections of oculists and aurists.
The number contains a valuable bibliographical catalogue of the chief works on physiological psychology for the year 1889. (Hamburg and Leipsic: L. Voss.)
PHILOSOPHISCHE MONATSHEFTE. Vol. XXVII. Nos. 1 and 2.
QUANTITAET UND QUALITAET IN BEGRIFF, URTHEIL UNDGEGENSTAENDLICHER ERKENNTNISS. ByPaul Natorp.
ZUM BEGRIFF DES NAIVEN REALISMUS. ByE. von Hartmann.
BEMERKUNGEN ZU VORSTEHENDEM AUFSATZ. ByA. Döring.
Professor Paul Natorp, the editor, discusses Quantity and Quality in Concept, Judgment, and Objective Cognition. His object is the attempt not to proceed subjectively, or psychologically, or genetically, or causally, or teleologically, but purely objectively in the same sense as mathematics proceeds objectively. The result which he reaches is summarily expressed in the statement "that there is no formal logic … and that it cannot exist at all—except it be based upon the logic of objective cognition (transcendental logic), or represents a part thereof, the severance of which from the whole to which it belongs can have merely technical not scientific reasons." (Heidelberg: Georg Weiss.)
RIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA. September and October, 1890.
DELLA PERCEZIONE DEL CORPO UMANO. ByL. Pietrobono.
DELL' ATTENZIONE. ByV. Benini.
LA SCUOLA E LA FILOSOFIA PITAGORICHE. ByS. Ferrari.
RIVISTA ITALIANA DI FILOSOFIA. November and December, 1890.
IL PRESENTE DELLA STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA. ByL. Credaro.
LA PEDAGOGIA DI JACOPO SADOLETO. ByA. Piazzi.
DELLA PERCEZIONE DEL CORPO UMANO. ByL. Pietrobono.
BIBLIOGRAFIA, etc.
There are two problems which at present command a general and a keen interest in all countries; viz. the psychological problem and the ethical problem, the latter comprising all the questions of education and instruction, religious as well as secular. If this is true of Germany, France, England, and the United States, it is no less true of Italy. TheRivista Italiana di Filosofia, so ably edited by Luigi Ferri, Professor at the University of Rome, shows this tendency in its latest numbers in a marked degree. They contain among other valuable materials an article by Luigi Pietrobono on the perception of the human body, a psycho-physiological investigation of sentient substance with special reference to sensation and perception. The author arrives at a result, which, if it could be sustained, would lead to an outspoken dualism. Pietrobono believes in two principles, a psychical and an organical, forming an original synthesis and antithesis, interdependent upon and inseparable from each other. Vittorio Benini discusses in the same number the captivating subject of Attention, starting from a discussion of Ribot's monograph on the subject, and devoting his main interest to what he calls "l' attenzione perceptiva è accompagnata dall' intelligenza." The latter kind of attention is of especial importance in education, a subject which is discussed in the conclusion of the article. This leads us to another essay which treats of an exclusively educational subject, proposing the pedagogical ideas of Pietro Ceretti. This article does not contain new truths, but emphasises truths which have perhaps been too little recognised in Italy. Starting from the maxim that all education must develop the faculties of body, soul, and mind (le facoltà del corpo, dell' anima e della mente), and that all education must be conducted so as to let the social body derive the benefits therefrom, he urges besides demanding the moral and intellectual culture of man a technical instruction, and among the sciences, literature, and history, he would give mathematics a prominent place.
It may be added that the department of Bibliography contains among other reviews discussions of the following works: 1) Reich's book on Gian Vincenzo Gravina as an author of æsthetics; 2) Antonio Rosmini's Fragments of a Philosophy of Law and Politics; 3) Robert Benzoni's The Philosophy of Our Day; 4) Pietro Ellero's The Social Question; 5), in the December number, Ferdinando Puglia's Evolution in the History of Italian Philosophical Systems; 6) The national edition of Galileo Galilei's works; and 7) La Somiglianza nella Scuola Positivista e l'Identità nella Metafisica Nuova, by Donato Jaia.
VOPROSY FILOSOFI I PSICHOLOGUII.[67] Vol. I. No. 4.
[67]Questions of Philosophy and Psychology.In the Russian language.
REMARKS. By the Editor,Prof N. Grote.
THE POLITICAL IDEALS OF PLATO AND OF ARISTOTLE IN THEIR UNIVERSALHISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE. ByPrince E. N. Trubetzkoi.
THE RELATIONS OF VOLTAIRE TO ROUSSEAU. (Conclusion.) ByE.Radlow.
THE ETHICAL DOCTRINE OF KANT. ByL. Lopatine.
HYPNOTISM IN PEDAGOGY. ByA. Tokarsky.
CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF FREEWILL FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OFHISTORICAL PROCESS. ByN. Karyew.
THE VITAL PROBLEMS OF PSYCHOLOGY. ByN. Grote.
NECROLOGY. M. I. Vladislavlew, Rector of the University of St.Petersburg. ByK.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: The Elements of Will. ByN. Lange.
COMMON CHARACTERISTICS. Concerning the conflict with the Occidentin connection with the literary activity of a Slavophil. ByV.Rotzanow. The ethical doctrine of Count Tolstoi and its mostrecent criticism. ByP. E. Astafiew.
The distinguished Editor, Prof. N. Grote, in his introductory remarks calls attention to the fact that the present issue of this philosophical and literary review in the Russian language, completes the series that had been promised during the first year of its existence. The review does not claim, during this brief lapse of time, to have been able to solve all the many problems incident to the task that it had assumed at the outset of its career; but it may at least modestly claim to have won the hearty sympathy of an intelligent fraction of the Russian people, expressed by the acquisition of a comparatively large number of subscribers. This material success, moreover, attests the fact that the editor did not deceive himself when at the original publication of the review he seemed to notice an awakening in his country of more serious intellectual interests, and the rise of a desire for a philosophical analysis of the principles of knowledge and of life.
On the other hand, with regard to whether the problems treated of in the pages of the review are identical with those that occupy by preference the minds of intelligent Russian readers; or whether the exposition and the methods of investigation have been properly adjusted to the degree of development and to the mental calibre of the mass of its readers, it will suffice to remark, says the editor, that the full development of all the potential forces of nature and of mind can be attained only through slow and persistent action. We have to bear in mind that the attempt is by no means easy to organise for the first time in a project of this kind the many active workers of a country in which people had never before been associated in a similar undertaking. Yet in confidently entering upon the publication of this review, the editor well knew that there existed in Russia abundant intellectual powers, perfectly adequate to the demands of a high-class philosophical magazine—scientists, learned specialists, talented thinkers, and men of letters; and the review without doubt will not fail to enlist the valuable assistance of all these men in the arduous task, which it will continue steadily to pursue. The main task above all, is to advance the development ofself-consciousnessin modern Russian society, but the success of this aspiration depends of necessity on the continued sympathy and good will of the public.
As regards the external form of the review, for the greater convenience of the public, instead of four volumes of 20 sheets, as hitherto, there will be issued during the present year five volumes in all—one volume of 15-16 sheets bimonthly, except during the midsummer months.
The editor in conclusion expresses his acknowledgment to several of his western colleagues, to the editors ofMind, theRevue Philosophique, theArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, andThe Open Court—all of whom have promised to note with genuine interest the contents of the Russian review "Questions of Philosophy and of Psychology." (Moscow, 1890.)
The usually recognised factors of evolution are at least five; viz.: (1) Pressure of a changingenvironmentaffecting function and function affecting structure, and the changed structure and function inherited and integrated through successive generations indefinitely. (2)Use and disuseof organs reacting on growth-force and producing change in form, structure, and relative size of parts, and such change inherited and integrated through successive generations. (3)Natural selectionamong individuals of a varying progeny, of those most in accord with an ever-changing environment—or as it has been otherwise called "survival of the fittest" in each successive generation. (4)Sexual selection: the selection by the female, among varying male individuals all competing for her possession, of the strongest or the most attractive. Among mammals the selection is mainly of the strongest as decided bybattle; among birds, of the most attractive as determined by splendor of color or beauty of song. (5)Physiological selection, or selection of those varieties, the individuals of which are fertile among themselves, but sterile or less fertile with other varieties and with the parent stock. This has also been called "segregate fecundity" by Gulick, and homogamy by Romanes.
These five factors are all usually but not universally recognised. The first two are Lamarckian, the second two Darwinian factors. In the Lamarckian factors the changes occurduring individual life, and the offspring is supposed to inherit them unchanged. In the Darwinian factors on the contrary thechanges are in the offspring, and the individuals during life are supposed to remain substantially unchanged. The fifth factor has, only very recently, been brought forward by Romanes and Gulick and is not yet universally recognised; but we believe that with perhaps some modifications it is certain to triumph. (6) To these recognised factors of organic evolution must now be added, inhuman evolution, another and far higher factor, viz. conscious, voluntaryco-operation in the work of evolution, conscious striving for the betterment of the individual and of the race. This factor consists essentially in theformation and pursuit of ideals. We call this a factor, but it is also much more than a factor. It stands in place of nature herself—it is a higher-rational nature using all the factors of physical nature for its own higher purposes. To distinguish the evolution determined by this factor from organic evolution, we often call itprogress.
Underlying all these factors as their necessary condition, and therefore themselves not called factors, are two opposite operative principles, viz.heredity and variability. Like the conservative and progressive elements in society, one tends to fixedness, the other to change. The one initiates change, the other accumulates its effects in successive generations. The one tries all things, the other holds fast to whatever is good. They are both equally necessary to the successful operation of any or all of the factors.
Let us now compare these six factors, as to their grade or position in the scale of energy and as to the order of their introduction.
The first two—Pressure of the environment and Use and disuse, i. e. the Lamarckian factors—are the lowest in position, most fundamental in importance, and therefore most universal in their operation. They are therefore also first in the order of time. They precede all other factors and werefor a long time the only ones in operation. For observe: all the selective factors, viz. those of Darwin and Romanes, are wholly conditioned on Reproduction; for the changes in the case of these are not in the individual life but only in the offspring. And not only so but they are also strictlyconditioned on sexual modes of reproduction. For all non-sexual modes of reproduction such as fission and budding are but slight modifications of the process of growth, and the resulting multitude of organisms may be regarded as in some senseonly an extension of the first individual. There is thus a kind of immortality in these lowest protozoa. Of course therefore the identical characters of the first individual are continued indefinitelyexcept in so far as they are modifiedin successive generations by the effect of the environment or by use and disuse of organs—i. e. byLamarckian factors. In sexual generation, on the contrary, the characters of two diverse individuals are funded in a common offspring; and the same continuing through successive generations, it is evident that the inheritance in each individual offspring is infinitely multiple. Now the tendency to variation in offspring is in proportion to the multiplicity of the inheritance: for among the infinite number of slightly different characters, as it were offered for inheritance in every generation, some individuals will inherit more of one and some more of another character. In a word, sexual generation, by multiple inheritance, tends to variation of offspring and thusfurnishes material for natural selection.
Thus then I repeat, all the selective factors are absolutely dependent for their operation upon sexual reproduction.But there was a time when this mode of reproduction did not exist.It is certain the non-sexual preceded the sexual modes of reproduction. I cannot stop now to give the reasons for believing this. I have already given them in some detail in a previous article[68] to which I would refer the reader. Suffice it to say now that the order of introduction of the various modes of reproduction culminating in the highest sexual modes is briefly as follows: (1)Fission.An organism of the lowest kind grows and divides into two. Each half grows to mature size and again divides; and so on indefinitely. In this case there is no distinction between parents and offspring. Each seems either or neither. (2)Budding.Growth-force concentrating in one part produces abud, which continues to grow and individuate itself more and more until it separates as a distinct individual. This is a higher form than the last because in this case the individual is not sacrificed. Only a small part separates and the separated part is in some sense anoffspring. We have therefore for the first time the distinction of parent and offspring. (3) By thelaw of differentiation and localisation of functions, the bud-forming function is next relegated to a special place and we now have a bud-forming organ. (4) By another general law, the law ofinterior transfer, the bud-forming organ is next transferred for greater safety to an interior surface and thussimulatesan ovary, although not yet a true ovary oregg-formingorgan. Examples of all these steps are found among existing animals.
[68]Genesis of Sex, Pop. Sci. Monthly, 1879, Vol. xvi. p. 167.Revue Scientifique, Feb. 14, 1880.
Thus far reproduction is non-sexual. But now comes the great step, i. e. the introduction of sexual reproduction, in its lowest forms. (5) This simulated ovary or bud-forming organ becomes a true ovary or egg-forming organ; or rather, at first, a combination of ovary and spermary. The same organ prepares two kinds of cells, male and female, germ-cell and sperm-cell, which by their union produce an egg which develops into an offspring; and not only an offspring in the sense of a separated part of a previous individual, but in some sense a new creature, the creation of anew individual. There is an enormous difference and even contrast between this and all preceding modes. In non-sexual modes one individual becomes two; in this, two individual cells unite to form one. It is an expensive, even wasteful mode unless attended with some great advantage. The nature of this advantage we will presently see.
Thus far we have given only the lowest form of sexual generation. The two sexualelementsonly, germ-cell and sperm-cell are separated from each other, but not yet even the sexual organs, ovary and spermary, much less the sexual individuals, male and female. (6) The sex-element-forming function is next differentiated and localised in two different organs, ovary and spermary, but not yet in two different individuals. This is hermaphroditism so common in plants and in lower animals. (7) The already separated sexual organs are next localised in different individuals, and we now have male and female individuals. This is the case in many plants and in all the higher animals. (8) And finally these male and female individuals become more and more diverse in character.
The object of this whole process of separation, first of the elements, then of the organs, then of the individuals, and last the increasing divergence of the individuals, is undoubtedly the funding of more and more diverse characters in a common offspring; and thus by increasing multiplicity of inheritance to insure larger variation in offspring and thereby furnish more abundant material for natural selection. This is far more than a compensation for the apparent wastefulness of this mode of reproduction.
If then the non-sexual preceded the sexual modes of reproduction, evidently,at first, only Lamarckian factors could operate. Evolution was then carried forward wholly by changes in the individual produced bythe environmentand byuse and disuse of organs, continued and increased through successive generations indefinitely. It is probable therefore that for want of the selective factors, the rate of evolution was at first comparatively slow; unless indeed, as seems probable, the earliest forms were, as the lowest forms are now, more plastic under pressure of physical conditions than are the present higher forms. The great contrast between the Lamarckian and Darwinian factors in this regard, and the slowness of changenowin higher forms underLamarckian factors alone, is best shown in plants where either kind of factors may be used at pleasure. In these, if we wish tomakevarieties, we propagate by seeds—sexual reproduction—but if we wish topreservevarieties, we propagate by buds and cuttings—non-sexual reproduction.