CHAPTER III.

A REJOINDER TO REV. C. VAN DER DONCKT'S REPLY.

I have read with great interest and I trust with due care the Rev. C. Van Der Donckt's Reply to my discourse on "Mormon Doctrine of Deity." With regard to his Reply in general, I observe three things: first, the Reverend gentleman labors with some pains to demonstrate that "Mormon" views of Deity with respect to the form and nature of God are at variance with the Catholic and even the orthodox Protestant views on that subject; second, the "Mormon" views of Deity are in conflict with the accepted Christian philosophy; third, that "Mormon" doctrines stand in sharp contrast to both Catholic and Protestant ideas respecting the unity of God. All this is easily proved; and would have been conceded cheerfully without proofs. "Mormons" not only admit the variances but glory in them. The foregoing, however, is not the issue between Mr. Van Der Donckt and myself. After the variances referred to are admitted, these questions remain: Which is most in agreement with what God has revealed concerning his form and nature, "Mormon" or orthodox Christian doctrine? Which is most in harmony with sound reason and the scriptures, "Mormon" doctrine, or the commonly accepted Christian philosophy? Which in their teaching presents the true doctrine of God's unity, "Mormons" or orthodox Christians? These are the issues; and so far as the Reverend gentleman has maintained the orthodox Christian doctrine against the "Mormon" doctrine, I undertake to controvert his arguments.

Following the order of my treatise, the gentleman first deals with the form of God. His first premise is that "God is a Spirit," quoting the words of the Savior (John 4:24;) and Paul's words, "The Lord is a spirit," (II Cor. 3:17.) He then argues that a spirit is different from a man, and quotes the remark of Jesus to his disciples, when he appeared to them after his resurrection: "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have" (Luke 24:37-39). Also the words of Jesus to Peter, "Flesh and blood hath not revealed it [that is, that Jesus is the Christ] unto thee, but myFatherwho is in heaven." (Matt. 16:17.) The gentleman in all this sees a striking contrast betweenmen, flesh and blood,and theFather; which "conveys the sense that God hath not flesh and blood like man, but is a spirit."

That God is a spirit Mr. V. holds is proved also from his being called "invisible" in the Bible; and from this premise argues: "All material beings are visible. Absolutely invisible beings are immaterial, or bodiless:" and therefore, to help the gentleman out a little, not like man in form.

With reference to the passage—"Flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father who is in heaven," and the Reverend gentleman's remarks thereon, I wish to say, in passing, that the antithesis between man and God in the passage extends merely to the fact that the source of Peter's revelation was God, not man; and is no attempt at defining a difference between the nature of God and the nature of man. Here also I may say that the Latter-day Saints do not hold that God is a personage offleshandblood, but a personage offlesh and bone, inhabited by a spirit, just as Jesus was after his resurrection. Joseph Smith taught concerning the resurrection that "all [men] will be raised by the power of God, havingspiritin their bodies, and notblood."[A]Again, in speaking of the general assembly and church of the first born in heaven (Heb. 12:23), he said: "Flesh and blood cannot go there; but flesh and bones, quickened by the Spirit of God, can."[B]So that it must be remembered throughout this discussion that the Latter-day Saints do not believe that God is a personage of flesh and blood; but a personage of flesh and bone and spirit, united.

[Footnote A: Discourse delivered at Nauvoo, March 20, 1842.Mill. Star, Vol. xix, p. 213.]

[Footnote B: Discourse delivered at Nauvoo, Oct. 9, 1843.Mill. Star, Vol. xxii, p. 231.]

I would remind the reader, also, that while Jesus said, "God is a spirit," and that a spirit "hath nor flesh and bone as ye see me have," he nowhere says that a spirit is immaterial or not substance. That is a conclusion drawn by the theologians from the false philosophy of the ancient pagans.

But let us examine these premises and arguments of Mr. Van Der Donckt, more in detail. The inspired apostle says: "Our God is a consuming fire" (Heb. 12:29). "Now," to use the words of Mr. V., "although we must believe whatever God reveals to us upon one single word of his, just as firmly as upon a thousand; nevertheless, I will add" that Moses, who solemnly received the word from God which he delivered unto Israel, also says, "The Lord thy God is a consuming fire" (Exod. 4:24). Is Mr. V. ready to believe on these solemn assertions of scripture—hence of the Lord—that God is a fire, and therefore that fire is God? Or would he insist upon interpreting these passages by others, and by reason? Would he not want to quote Moses again where he says, "Thy God is * * *asa consuming fire" (Ex. 9:3), and accept this as a reasonable interpretation of the passage stating so definitely that "God is a fire"?

Again, "God is light" (I John 1:5). Would Mr. V. from that definition of God believe and teach that God is light, mere cosmic light? Or would he find an interpretation, or explanation necessary? And still again, "God is love" (I John 4:7, 16). Love is an attribute of mind, of spirit; must one conclude then from this definition that God is a mere attribute of mind? These reflections will demonstrate that these definitions of God, so far as they are such, together with the one with which Mr. V. commences his argument, "God is a Spirit," need defining. He endeavors to anticipate the "Mormon" answer to this argument by saying:

I am well aware that the Latter-day Saints interpret those texts as meaning a spirit clothed with a body, but what nearly the whole of mankind, Christians, Jews, and Mohammedans, have believed for ages, cannot be upset by the gratuitous assertions of a religious innovator of this last century.

At this point I will not appeal to or quote the "gratuitous assertions of a religious innovator of this last century"—meaning Joseph Smith. There is no need of that. If I were an unbeliever in the true Deity of Christ, I might take up the gentleman's argument in this way: You say God is a spirit, and hence bodiless, immaterial? His answer must be, "Yes." But Jesus says, "a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have"—hence Jesus is not God, because he is a personage of flesh and bone, in the form of man—not bodiless or immaterial. This, of course, is notmypoint. I merely refer to it in the beaten way of good fellowship, and by way of caution to my Catholic friend, who, I am sure, in his way, is as anxious to maintain the true Deity of the Nazarene as I am; but his method of handling the text, "God is a spirit," might lead him into serious difficulty in upholding the truth that Jesus was and is true Deity, if in argument with an infidel.

But now for the "Mormon" exposition of the text. Is Jesus Christ God? Was he God as he stood there among his disciples in his glorious and, to use Mr. V.'s own word, "sacred," resurrected body? There is but one answer that the Reverend Catholic gentleman or any orthodox Protestant can give, and that is in the affirmative—"yes, Jesus is God."[A]But "God is a spirit!" True, he is; but Jesus is a spirit inside a body—inside an immortal, indestructible body of flesh and bone; therefore, if Jesus is God, and God is a spirit, he is an embodied spirit, just as the Latter-day Saints teach.

[Footnote A: "His acts proved his Deity; Jesus is Jehovah, and therefore we sing unto him as the Lord." "Treasury of David" (Spurgeon). Vol. iv, p. 371.]

Now let it be understood that Latter-day Saints are not so foolish as to believe that so much phosphate, lime, carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen as may compose the body of a perfected man, is God. They recognize the fact that the body without the spirit is dead, being alone; but the spirit having through natural processes gathered to itself a body, and that body having been purified by the power of God—who has promised in holy scripture that he will "change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby he is able even to subdue all things unto himself" (Phil. 3:20, 21)—when this is done, even the body takes upon it some of the divine nature. It indeed becomes "sacred," and something more than "sacred"—it becomes incorporated with and forever united to, a spirit that is divine, and henceforth becomes an integral part of God. Of which process, of a divine spirit taking on a body of flesh and bone, Jesus Christ is the most perfect example.

At this point, I shall pass for the present a few items that stand next in order in Mr. Van Der Donckt's argument, that I may consider some statements and arguments of his made further on in the "Reply," because they are immediately related to what has just been said. Mr. V. holds that it is proved by Holy Writ that "angels as well as God are bodiless beings." After quoting passages of scripture in support of this statement, he then adds: "Could plainer words be found to teach that angels, both good and bad, are spirits, devoid of bodies? Now, the Creator is certainly more perfect than his creatures, and pure minds are more perfectthan minds united to bodies[A](men)." In support of which he quotes the following: "The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind" (Wisdom 9:15)[B]; and Paul's saying, "who shall deliver me from this body of death?"[C](Rom. 6:24).Therefore the Creator is a pure spirit.

[Footnote A: Italics are mine.]

[Footnote B: This is a book received by the Catholic Church on alleged apostolical tradition, but not found in the Hebrew Bible nor Protestant versions of the Bible.]

[Footnote C: Quoted thus by Mr. V. In both Catholic and Protestant Bibles it stands: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"]

I fear Mr. V. in these statements has run into more difficulty. Let us see. According to his doctrine, "Angels as well as God are bodiless beings." "Angels, both good and bad, are spirits, devoid of bodies. The Creator is more perfect than his creatures,and pure minds[minds separated from bodies]are more perfect than minds united to bodies. * * * Therefore the Creator is a pure spirit." But where does this leave Jesus?

Was and is Jesus God—true Deity?

Yes.

But Jesus is a spirit and body united into one glorious personage. His mind was and is now united to and dwelling in a body. Our Catholic friend says, "pure minds [i. e. minds not united to bodies] are more perfect than minds united to bodies." He also says, "Angels, both good and bad, are spirits (i. e. minds) devoid of bodies." Therefore, it must follow from his premises and argument that angels are superior to Jesus since his spirit is united to a body, while they are mindsnotunited to bodies! I will not press the point, that the same conclusions could be drawn from his premises and argument with reference even to bad spirits, whom he says are bodiless, and hence, upon his theory, superior to minds or spirits united to bodies, for that would be ungenerous upon my part, and would lay upon his faulty argument the imputation of awful blasphemy, which I am sure was not intended and would be as revolting to him as it would be to myself. Mr. V., I am sure, would contend as earnestly as I would that Jesus is superior to the angels, though it is perfectly clear that he is a spirit united to a body. "When he had by himself purged our sins, [Jesus] sat down on the right hand of the majesty on high; being made so much better than the angels, as he hath by inheritance obtained a more excellent name than they. * * * And again, when he bringeth in the first begotten into the world, he saith, and let all the angels of God worship him. And of the angels he saith, who maketh his angels spirits, and his ministers a flame of fire.But unto the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever" (Heb. 1:3-8). In this passage the superiority of Jesus over the angels is manifested in four ways: first, by the direct affirmation of God, that he was made "better" than the angels; second, that by inheritance he obtained a more exalted name; third, that the angels are commanded to worship him; fourth, God, the Father, addressing Jesus, said, "Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever." In this passage the Father directly addresses Jesus by the title "God." And as God is exalted above all angels, Jesus must be superior to angels, for he is "God," if we may believe the words of the Father—whom to disbelieve would be blasphemy.

Mr. Van Der Donckt admits in his argument,'of course, that Jesus is God; and also admits the persistence of him in the physical condition in which he left the earth with his resurrected body. For in explaining the scripture passage about seeing God "face to face," he remarks:

The first and chief element of the happiness of heaven will consist in the beatific vision; that is, in seeing God face to face, unveiled, as he really is. The "face to face," however, is literally true only of our blessed Savior, who ascended into heaven with his sacred body. Otherwise, as God is a spirit, he has no body, and, consequently, no face.

From this it is clear that, in the mind of the Reverend gentleman, Jesus not only ascended into heaven with his "sacred body," but now dwells there spirit and body united; and the blessed, who shall inherit heaven will see him there literally "face to face."[A]Otherwise than this "face to face" view of Jesus—according to Mr. V.—we shall only see God, since he is a spirit, "with the spiritual eye; with the soul's intellectual perception, elevated by a supernatural influx from God!" This admission with reference to Jesus and his existence as an immortal personage of flesh and bone, and our literal view of him in heaven "face to face," draws with it some consequences which my Catholic friend evidently overlooked. In the creed usually named after St. Athanasius, it is said: "Such as the Father is, such is the Son." I take it that this, in the view of those who accept the Athanasian creed, has reference to the "substance of the Father," as well as to other things pertaining to him; for, according to that creed, the "substance" of the Father and Son is one and undivided. "We worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity," says the creed; "neither confounding the persons nordividing the substance." It must be, therefore, according to Mr. V.'s creed, that all the "substance" of God there is, is in Jesus Christ, as well as the attributes of God. The terms of the creed forbid us believing that part of the "substance" of God was enclosed in the flesh and bone body of Jesus, and the remainder existed outside of that body; for that would be dividing the "substance" of God, a thing the Athanasian creed forbids: therefore, all the "substance" of God inhabits the body of Jesus Christ, and he is wholly God. In this view of the subject, there is no God except the Deity enclosed in the flesh and body of Jesus Christ. But that would place our Catholic friend—after all he has said about God being a spirit, and about the superiority of pure minds (i. e. spirits not united to bodies) over minds united to bodies—under the necessity of accepting as God, the Supreme, the Almighty, a personage that is a spirit and body united in one glorious personage, and in form like man—a thing most abhorrent to our friend's principles.

[Footnote A: In an article for theImprovement Era, on the Doctrines and Claims of the Catholic Church, Bishop Scanlan, of Salt Lake City, also said of the Divinity of Christ; "The Catholic Church teaches that Jesus Christ is not a mere elect child or special creation of God, or in any sense or manner a creature, but that he is the eternal and only Son of God, God of God, Light of Light; the expression of the Eternal Father, with whom he is one in nature and substance, and to whom he is equal in all divine attributes, power and glory."—Improvement Era, vol. i, p. 14.]

On the other hand, if it be contended that besides the Son of God, Jesus, a personage of flesh and bone and spirit, there exists God, a spirit, then there is likely to arise again the conception of the "substance" being divided, and the existence of two individual Gods instead of one. The one a spirit unembodied, and the other a spirit enclosed in a body of flesh and bone—the glorified, exalted Man, Christ. This danger is also increased by the part of the creed now being considered,viz., "Such as the Father is, such is the Son;" for it must follow, if this be true that such as the Son is, such is the Father also. And this, must hold with reference to God, wholly; to his substance, essence, personality, form, as well as to all attributes possessed, or else it is not true at all. And if true, since we know that Jesus is an immortal being of flesh and bone and spirit united into one glorious personage (and Mr. V. admits that, and also that the blessed in heaven shall see him as such a personage, literally "face to face"), then God the Father must be the same, a personage of flesh and bone and spirit united—a thing most abhorrent to Mr. V.'s principles.

At this point, I must complain of the gentleman's argument a little. However able and fair his article may be considered on the whole, I think, on the question of the "form of God," I am justified in charging that he has not dealt at all with my strong scripture proofs relative to that matter. He makes but the very slightest reference to the passage:

And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. * * * So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them (Genesis 1:26, 27).

And he considered nowhere the very definite passage:

God * * hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son. * * * who, being the brightness of his gloryand the express image of his person, and upholding all things by the word of his power, when he hath by himself purged our sins, sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high (Heb. 1:3).

"Now," to use the solemn words of the Reverend gentleman himself, "we must believe whatever God reveals to us upon one single word of his, just as firmly as upon a thousand"—I shall hold that it was incumbent upon Mr. V. to deal with these passages, and set forth in what way they are to be understood, ifnotto be understood as they read.[A]I can think of no language that could express the truth more forcibly, that man was created in the form of God and, therefore, that God in form is like man, than the language of these two passages. When the word of God says: "God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him;" and then again, in speaking of Jesus, who certainly bore all the semblance, figure and stature of a man—who was a man—when the divine Spirit, I say, in speaking of him, says thathe was the express image of God's person—I shall despair of human language expressing any fact whatsoever, if this language does not say that in form God and man are alike. And what the word of God in plainness teaches—so plain that he who "runs may read," so plain that "wayfaring men though fools need not err therein"—"is not to be set aside by the gratuitous assertions" of "religious innovators" of early Christian centuries who corrupted the plain meaning of God's word by their vain philosophies, and oppositions of science, falsely so called. Mr. Van Der Donckt makes no reference to this plain passage in Hebrews 1:3; and I am under the necessity of thinking that in respect of this passage and the one in Genesis, he had no means at his command by which he could satisfactorily explain away their force. They stand, therefore, with their strength unimpaired, in proof of the doctrines taught in the discourse at which Mr V. leveled his Reply.

[Footnote A: The meaning of this language from the 26th verse of the first chapter of Genesis is made perfectly clear when compared with the third verse of the 5th chapter of Genesis where it is written: "And Adam lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat a son in his own likeness, after his image; and called his name Seth." What do these words imply but that Seth was like his father in features and also doubtless in intellectual and moral qualities? And if when it is said Adam begat a son in his "own likeness, after his image," it simply means that Seth in form and features and intellectual and moral qualities was like his father—then there can be no other conclusion formed upon the passage that says God created man in his own image and likeness than that man, in a general way, in form and feature and intellectual and moral qualities was like God.]

Mr. Van Der Donckt thinks he sees further proof of God's being a "Spirit," and therefore immaterial or bodiless, in the fact that he is spoken of in the Bible as being "invisible." Moses "was strong as seeing him that is invisible," (Heb. 11:27;) "No man hath seen God at any time" (I John 4:12;) "The King of kings—whom no man hath seen nor can see," (I Tim. 6:16); are the passages he relies upon for the proof of his contention.

Of course, Mr. V. is aware of the fact—for he mentions it—that these passages are confronted with the explicit statement of scripture that God has been seen by men. Moses saw him. At one stage of his experience, the great Hebrew prophet was told that he could not see God's face; "for," said the Lord, "there shall no man see me and live." But even at that time, Moses was placed in a cleft of the rock, "and thou shalt see my back parts," said the Lord to him; "but my face shall not be seen" (Exodus 23:18-23). On another occasion, Moses, Aaron, Nadab and Abihu, and seventy of the elders of Israel, saw God.

And they saw the God of Israel; and there was under his feet as it were a paved work of sapphire stone, and as it were the body of heaven in his clearness. And upon the nobles of the children of Israel he laid not his hand: also they saw God, and did eat and drink (Ex. 24:9-11).

Isaiah saw him: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple." At the same time the seraphims proclaimed his holiness, saying, "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hosts; the whole earth is full of his glory." Then said Isaiah: "Woe is me! for lam undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts" (Isaiah 6:1-5).

To harmonize these apparitions of God to men with his theory of the invisibility of God, Mr. V. appeals to the writings of some of the Christian fathers, and Cardinal Newman, from whose teachings he concludes that God the Father is called "invisible" because "he never appeared to bodily eyes; whereas the Son manifested himself as an angel, and as a man after his incarnation. * * * Whenever the Eternal Son of God, or angels at God's behest, showed themselves to man, they became visible only through a body,or a material garb assumed for the occasion!"

Surely Tertullian, Ambrose, Augustine, the great English Cardinal of the Roman church, and Mr. V. are in sore straits when they must needs take refuge in the belief of such jugglery with matter as this, in order to reconcile apparently conflicting scriptures. And what a shuffling off and on of material garbs there must have been, as from time to time hosts of angels and spirits appeared unto men!

It is but the materialization of the spiritualist mediums on a little larger scale. But there is a better way of harmonizing the seeming contradictions; and better authority for the conclusion to be reached than the Christian fathers and Cardinal Newman. I mean the scriptures themselves.

Take this expression of the scripture, "No man hath seen God at any time" (I John 4:12). Standing alone, it seems emphatic and conclusive. And in the same connection this also, from the testimony of John: "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him" (St. John 1:18). But consider these texts in connection with what the Master himself said on the same subject: "It is written in the prophets, And they shall be all taught of God. Every man, therefore, that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me. Not that any man hath seen the Father,save he which is of God, he hath seen the Father" (St. John 6:45, 46). Now we have the key to the matter. "No man hath seen God at any time,save[except]he which is of God, he hath seen the Father." If any one shall contend that this "he which is of God" has reference to Jesus only, the complete answer to that will be found in the account of the Martyr Stephen's glorious view of the Father and the Son together and at one time: "But he [Stephen] being full of the Holy Ghost, looked up steadfastly into heaven,and saw the glory or God, and Jesus standing on the right hand of God, and said, "Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the ton of Man standing on the right hand of God." (Acts 7:55-6). Undoubtedly, for reasons that are wise, God the Father has been "invisible" to men except under very special conditions; for the most part the "Only Begotten hath declared him," and stood as his representative; and in the absence of those special conditions, no man hath seen God the Father; no man in the absence of these conditions can see his face and live. He must be "of God," as Stephen was, then he may see God, even the Father, as that martyr evidently did. Here, too, may be cited a passage from one of the revelations of the Lord to Joseph the Prophet, which throws more light upon the subject. Speaking of the Higher or Melchizedek Priesthood, the Lord says:

This greater Priesthood administereth the gospel and holdeth the key of the mysteries of the kingdom, even the knowledge of God; therefore, in the ordinances thereof, the power of godliness is manifest; and without the ordinances thereof, and the authority of the Priesthood, the power of godliness is not manifest unto men in the flesh;for without this no man can see the face of God, even the Father, and live(Doc. and Cov. sec. 84:19-22).

God, then, in the Bible, is called "invisible," not because he is absolutely so by reason of his nature, because he is "immaterial or bodiless," but because he is not to be seen by men except under very special conditions. The special conditions complied with, however, certain holy men have seen God; the Father, and have borne witness of the fact. Of course, it follows that the "invisibility" of God as here set forth does not carry with it the idea that God is immaterial or bodiless; nor would it follow that God is immaterial, even if absolutely invisible to human eyes in our present existence. Mr. V. advances a strange doctrine when he says that "Allmaterialbeings are visible. Absolutely invisible beings areimmaterialor bodiless." I take it that his assertion is equivalent to saying that all material things are visible; and that absolutely invisible things, like "invisible beings," are immaterial or bodiless. Is that true? Is the atmosphere visible? No. But it is material. "It is composed of atoms of matter whose weight is such that the pressure upon every square inch amounts to fifteen pounds; and upon the body of an ordinary-sized man some fourteen tons; but notwithstanding this, man could not construct a microscope sufficiently powerful to render these atoms visible."[A]What of the ether extending throughout the universe, in which millions of suns and their attendant planets move as motes in a sunbeam; is that visible? No; but it is material nevertheless. So with many things that, notwithstanding they are absolutely invisible, are material for all that, and have some of the qualities in common with grosser matter. We know but little of substances, as yet; less of their essence; but since there are many material substances absolutely invisible to us, is it unreasonable to believe that there are also beings consisting of substances more refined, pure and glorious than the material that is visible to our limited and imperfect vision?—beings invisible to us, unless our eyes be quickened by the power of God, yet material, and having form, and limitations and relations to other beings and things; and also possessed of many other qualities common to matter. In view of these facts, is not Mr. Van Der Donckt a little reckless, and too dogmatic, in stating thedatumfrom which he argues for the absolute invisibility of God, and hence also his supposed immateriality, or bodiless state?

[Footnote A: Samuel Kinns' "Harmony of the Bible and Science," p. 338.]

Mr. Van Der Donckt argues that angels and spirits are also bodiless or immaterial. Was it a bodiless or immaterial angel that wrestled with Jacob until the breaking of the day; and who, when he could not prevail against the patriarch, touched the sinew of his thigh that it forthwith shrank? (Gen. 32:23-32). Were they immaterial or bodiless angels who called at the tent-home of the patriarch Abraham, on the plains of Mamre, for whom Sarah baked cakes, and Abraham's servant prepared a roast of veal; and, when all things were made ready, the patriarch stood by, and the three heavenly personages—one of them is called "the Lord"—"did eat" (Gen. 18)—were they immaterial or bodiless? Perhaps the Reverend gentleman will say, however, that these cases, and a score of others of similar nature that might be quoted, are answered by his statement—made on the authority of some Christian fathers and Cardinal Newman—that when angels "showed themselves to man they became visible [hence materialized, according to my friend's theory of visible and invisible beings] only through a body, or material garb assumed for the occasion!" For which theory, as whimsical as it is nonsensical, I venture to tell the Reverend gentleman there is no warrant of divine authority; nothing but the assumptions and speculations of churchmen seeking to harmonize Christian doctrine with the vain speculations of old pagan philosophers. I know nothing that equals this theory for absurdity, except it be the idea of Epicurus, who, after affirming that the gods were of human form, explained—"Yet that form is not body (i. e. material), but somethinglikebody; nor does it contain any blood, but somethinglikeblood!"[A]Or may I say that Mr. Van Der Donckt's absurdity is really equalled by that of Heracleitus, who taught that the sun was extinguished every evening and made new every morning?

[Footnote A:Tuscul. Dispt.Cicero, p. 227 (Younge's translation).]

As for the rest of Mr. V.'s theory of immateriality and invisibility of angels and spirits, I shall trust to what I have said on these subjects in dealing with the invisibility of God, to be a sufficient answer.

I must say a word upon Mr. V.'s remarks respecting the plain anthropomorphism of the Bible, and the matter of understanding that sacred book literally. With reference to the first he says:

All men after the example of the inspired writings, make frequent use of the figure called anthropomorphism, attributing to the Deity a human body, human members, human passions, etc., and that is done, not to imply that God is possessed of form, limbs, etc., but simply to make spiritual things or certain truths more intelligible to man.

I would like to know upon what authority Mr. V. adjudges the "inspired writings" not to imply that God is really possessed of form, limbs, passions, etc., after attributing them to him in the clearest manner. The "inspired writings" plainly and most forcibly attribute to Deity a form like man's, with limbs, organs, etc., but the Bible does not teach that this ascription of form, limbs, organs and passions to God, is unreal, and "simply to make spiritual things or certain truths more intelligible to man." On the contrary, the Bible emphasizes the doctrine of anthropomorphism by declaring in its very first chapter that man was created in the image of God: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him." The explanation is offered that it was necessary to attribute human form, members and passions, to God, in order to make spiritual things intelligible to man;but what is the reason for ascribing the divine form to man,as in the passage just quoted? Was that done to make human beings or certain truths more intelligible to God? Or was it placed in the word of God because it is simply true?

The truth that God in form is like man is further emphasized by the fact that Jesus is declared to have been in "the express image" of the Father's person (Heb. 1:3); and until Mr. V. or some other person of his school of thought, can prove very clearly that the word of God supports his theory of the unreality of the Bible's description of form, organs, proportions, passions and feelings, to God and other heavenly beings, the truth that God in form is like man will stand secure on the foundation of the revelations it has pleased God to give of his own being and nature.[A]

[Footnote A: Dean Mansel administers a scathing reproof to the German philosophers Kant and Fichte (and also to Professor Jowett in his note xxii in Lecture 1.) for what he calls "that morbid terror of what they are pleased to call anthropomorphism, which poisons the speculation of so many modern philosophers, when they attempt to be wise above what is written, and seek for a metaphysical exposition of God's nature and attributes." These philosophers, while holding in abhorrence the idea that God has a form such as man's—or any form whatsoever—parts, organs, affections, sympathies, passions or any attributes seen in man's spirit, are, nevertheless, under the necessity of representing God as conscious, as knowing, as determining; all of which, as pointed out by Dean Mansel in the passage which follows, are, after all, qualities of the human mind as well as attributes of Deity; and hence the philosophers, after all their labor, have not escaped from anthropomorphism, but have merely represented Deity to our consciousness, shorn of some of the higher qualities of the human mind, which God is represented in the scriptures as possessing in their perfection—such as love, mercy, justice. As orthodox Christian ministers, both Catholic and Protestant alike, including Mr. V., are afflicted with the same madness, I see no reason why the Dean's reproof should not be made to apply to them, and hence quote the passagein extenso: "They may not forsooth, think of the unchangeable God as if he were their fellow man, influenced by human motives, and moved by human supplications. They want a truer, juster idea of the Deity as he is, than that under which he has been pleased to reveal himself; and they call on their reason to furnish it. Fools, to dream that man can escape from himself, that human reason can draw aught but a human portrait of God. They do but substitute a marred and mutilated humanity for one exalted and entire: they add nothing to their conception of God as he is, but only take away a part of their conception of man. Sympathy, and love, and fatherly kindness, and forgiving mercy, have evaporated in the crucible of their philosophy; and what is thecaput mortuumthat remains, but only the sterner features of humanity exhibited in repulsive nakedness? The God who listens to prayer, we are told, appears in the likeness of human mutability. Be it so. What is the God who does not listen, but the likeness of human obstinacy? Do we ascribe to him a fixed purpose? Our conception of a purpose is human. Do we speak of him as continuing unchanged? Our conception of continuance is human. Do we conceive him as knowing and determining? What are knowledge and determination but modes of human consciousness? and what know we of consciousness itself, but as the contrast between successive mental states? But our rational philosopher stops short in his reasoning. He strips off from humanity just so much as suits his purpose; 'and the residue thereof he maketh a God less pious in his idolatry than the carver of the graven image, in that he does not fall down unto it and pray unto it, but is content to stand off and reason concerning it. And why does he retain any conception of God at all, but that he retains some portions of an imperfect humanity? Man is still the residue that is left; deprived indeed of all that is amiable in humanity, but in the darker features which remain, still man. Man in his purposes; man in his inflexibility; man in that relation to time from which no philosophy, whatever its pretensions, can wholly free itself; pursuing with indomitable resolutions a preconceived design; deaf to the yearning instincts which compel his creatures to call upon him. Yet this, forsooth, is a philosophical conception of the Deity, more worthy of an enlightened reason than the human imagery of the Psalmist: 'The eyes of the Lord are over the righteous, and his ears are open unto their prayers.' Surely downright idolatry is better than this rational worship of a fragment of humanity. Better is the superstition which sees the image of God in the wonderful whole which God has fashioned, than the philosophy which would carve for itself a Deity out of the remnant which man has mutilated. Better to realize the satire of the eleatic philosopher, (Xenophanes) to make God in the likeness of man, even as the ox or the horse might conceive gods in the form of oxen or horses, than to adorn some half-hewn Hermes, the head of a man joined to a misshapen block. Better to fall down before that marvelous compound of human consciousness whose elements God has joined together, and no man can put asunder, than to strip reason of those cognate elements which together furnish all that we can conceive or imagine of conscious or personal existence, and to deify the emptiest of all abstractions, a something or nothing, with just enough of its human original left to form a theme for the disputation of philosophy, but not enough to furnish a single ground of appeal to the human feelings of love, of reverence, and of fear. Unmixed idolatry is more religious than this. Undisguised atheism is more logical." (Limits of Religious Thought, Mansel, pp. 56-58).

Notwithstanding this passage, however, it should be remarked that Dean Mansel holds on the very next page of this treatise that there is a principle of truth of which this philosophy is the perversion. "Surely," he remarks, "there is a sense in which we may not think of God as though he were a man; as there is also a sense in which we cannot help so thinking of him. * * * * * We feel that there is a true foundation for the system which denies human attributes to God;though the superstructure, which has been raised upon it, logically involves the denial of his very existence." The position of the Dean, as is well known, is that such are the limitations of the human mind—such the limitations of religious thought, that man may not hope to understand the divine nature, but as an act of faith must accept what is revealed concerning that nature.]

But the strangest part of the Reverend gentleman's contention on the matter now in hand is that the Latter-day Saints understand the anthropomorphic expressions in the scriptures as he explains them; and cites our catechisms (chapter 5, question 9) in proof of it![A]I quote the reference given:

[Footnote A: This is a thing so astonishing for Mr. Van Der Donckt to say, that lest the reader should think I had misunderstood him. I place before him in this note Mr. Van Der Donckt's statement at length. "It is a well known fact that all men after the example of the inspired writings, make frequent use of the figure called anthropomorphism, attributing to the Deity a human body, human members, human passions, etc.; and that is done, not to imply that God is possessed of form, limbs, etc., but simply to make spiritual things or certain truths more intelligible to man, who, while he tarries in this world, can perceive things and even ideas only through his senses, or through bodily organs.

"That even the Latter-day Saints thus understand such expressions is evident from their catechism (chapter 5: question 9), etc., etc."]

9. Q. If God is a person, how can he be everywhere present? A. His person cannot be in more than one place at the same time, but he is everywhere present by his Holy Spirit.

This is preceded by the following passages from the same book and chapter:

1. Q. What kind of a being is God?A. He is in the form of a man.2. Q. How do you learn this?A. The scriptures declare that man was made in the image of God. * * *3. Q. Have you any further proof of God's being in the form of a man?A. Yes, Jesus Christ was in the form of a man, and was at the same time in the image of God's person. * * *4. Q. Is it not said that God is a spirit?A. Yes; the scriptures say so. (John 4:24.) * * *5. Q. How, then, can God be like man?A. Man has a spirit, though clothed with a body, and God is similarly constituted.6. Q. Has God a body then?A. Yes; like unto man's body in figure.7. Q. Is the person of God very glorious?A. Yes; infinitely glorious.8. Q. Is God everywhere present?A. Yes; He is in all parts of the universe.

1. Q. What kind of a being is God?

A. He is in the form of a man.

2. Q. How do you learn this?

A. The scriptures declare that man was made in the image of God. * * *

3. Q. Have you any further proof of God's being in the form of a man?

A. Yes, Jesus Christ was in the form of a man, and was at the same time in the image of God's person. * * *

4. Q. Is it not said that God is a spirit?

A. Yes; the scriptures say so. (John 4:24.) * * *

5. Q. How, then, can God be like man?

A. Man has a spirit, though clothed with a body, and God is similarly constituted.

6. Q. Has God a body then?

A. Yes; like unto man's body in figure.

7. Q. Is the person of God very glorious?

A. Yes; infinitely glorious.

8. Q. Is God everywhere present?

A. Yes; He is in all parts of the universe.

Then follows, of course, question nine and its answer, quoted above and by Mr. V.; and yet the gentleman, in the very face of these explicit statements concerning the reality of God's form in our faith, would have it believed that the Latter-day Saints understand the expressions of scripture ascribing human forms, limbs and organs to God as he explains them—not to imply that God is possessed of form, limbs, etc., but simply to make spiritual things more intelligible to man! This is a splendid illustration of Mr. V.'s ability to misunderstand.

Mr. V. next takes up the subject of understanding the language of the Bible literally. He says it is from anthropomorphic passages of the Bible that the Latter-day Saints conclude that God has a body—such passages as speak of the face, hands feet and other limbs and organs of God. He holds these passages to be figurative. "I contend," he remarks, "that if we must understand the Bible literally in those passages ('God created man in his own image') from which they attempt to prove that God has a body, we must interpret it literally inother similar passages."[A]I assent to that. It is well known that the language of the Bible is highly figurative, almost extravagantly so in places, and much allowance must be made for the inclination to imagery of prophetic natures, which, like poetic temperaments, are given to imagery; and hyperbole is the vice of oriental speech. But Mr. V. is not true to this canon of interpretation he lays down,viz.,the same rule of interpretation must be applied to passages that are similar in character. After laying down this principle of interpretation, he proceeds to depart from it by placing for comparison verydissimilar passages. What similarity is there, for example, in the plain, matter of fact statement, "God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him;" and the passage he quotes from Psalms: "If I take my wings early in the morning, and dwell in the uttermost part of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me"? And this also: "Whither shall I flee from thy face. If I ascend into heaven, thou art there; If I descend into hell thou art there?" Has not the Reverend gentleman placed for comparison here the most dissimilar passages that perhaps could be found in the whole Bible? Yet he insists that the prosy passage from Genesis must be regarded as equally figurative with David's poetry, and insists that if "Mormons" believe literally that God made man in his own image and likeness, or that Moses and seventy elders saw the God of Israel, as plainly declared by Moses, then "They must believe that God had such a very long hand as to extend to the uttermost parts of the sea;" and "such an extremely long face, reaching from heaven to hell;" and "conclude that David had wings!" Further remarks on this head are not necessary. One is under no obligation to seriously discuss nonsense.

[Footnote A: Italics are mine—R.]

Another case of misapprehension of "Mormon" ideas will be found in what Mr. Van Der Donckt says with reference to the Latter-day Saints' sacred books not teaching the Christian truth of the incarnation of Deity in the person of Jesus Christ. The sacred books of the Latter-day Saints may not contain the verbiage of so-called Christian literature on the subject; but if full recognition of the fact that Jesus was in the beginning with the Father—was the "Word," and, moreover, the "Word" that "was God," and afterwards was made flesh and dwelt among men—is to believe in the incarnation of the Son of God, then the sacred books of the Latter-day Saints teach this doctrine, for over and over again in our sacred books will passages to that effect be found (especially section 93 of the Doctrine and Covenants). Moreover, the Reverend gentleman should remember that "Mormons" include among their sacred books the Holy Bible, and all the doctrine of incarnation taught in that book is our doctrine. I think the main difference between the Latter-day Saints and "Christians" on the subject of incarnation, is that the Latter-day Saints believe that incarnation does not stop with the Lord Jesus Christ. Our sacred books teach that not only was Jesus Christ in the beginning with God, but that the spirits of all men were also with him in the beginning, and that these sons of God, as well as the Lord Jesus Christ, became incarnated in bodies of flesh and bone (Doctrine and Covenants, section 93). But Mr. V. thinks he discovers in this doctrine of incarnation a proof that "God has not a body and therefore is not an exalted man," "It is plain," says he, "that the Son of God became flesh only at the time of his sojourn on earth. Now had he been flesh or man before, as the 'Mormons' hold, how could he become what he was already from all eternity?" This is another instance of Mr. V.'s misapprehension of what "Mormons" teach. We nowhere teach that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, was flesh and bone from all eternity.

When seeking to make "Mormonism" appear inconsistent with itself, the Reverend gentleman is in duty bound to keep in mind our whole doctrine on any particular subject he is treating. He should remember that our theology holds that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are distinct and separate personages, in the sense that they are three distinct individuals; and that the Father is a personage of flesh and bone, as Jesus now is; but previous to Messiah's birth into the world, he was a spirit, the First Born of the hosts of the spirits in heaven, and was with the Father in the beginning of the creation of our earth and its heavens. Indeed, under the direction of the Father, he was the creator of them (Heb. 1:3; Col. 15:17; John 1:3); but he came to the earth to receive a tabernacle, that in all things he might become as his Father is—a divine spirit inseparably united to a sacred and glorified body—one glorious spiritual personage. As much of Mr. V.'s argument on this head is built on a misapprehension of our doctrine, it will not be necessary for me to follow him through the interminable windings of his argument with reference to it. "There is never a proper ending to reasoning which proceeds on a false foundation" (Cicero).

Mr. V. next brings as proof against God's being an exalted man, what he calls the direct statement of the Bible, that God is not man: "God is not a man, that he should lie; neither the son of man, that he should be changed" (Numbers 23:19). "I am God and not man" (Psalm). These passages simply present the contrast between man as he is now, and with all his imperfections on his head, and God. The Latter-day Saints do not teach that man in his present state and condition is God; on the contrary, they hold that there is a very, very wide difference between them, all the difference indicated by the Bible: but they do believe that through the eternities that will pass over man's head, and with God for guide and teacher, he may become as his Father in heaven is, and that such is his destiny.[A]It follows that when man shall attain to that destiny, the contrast now so striking between man and God will not exist. The contrast noted in the scriptures by Mr. V. is not betweenperfectedmen and God, but between very imperfect men—men who lie, and are changeable—and God; and since the Latter-day Saints do not hold that man while imperfect is God, or like God, or God like him, the argument of the gentleman, based on the passages quoted, is of no force. It could be said of some grandly developed, noble, high-minded man, such as a Gladstone, a Bismarck, or a Washington: He is not a child that he should halt in reason, or falter in action, or be frightened by phantoms of the dark. But such a contrast does not include the idea that the child may not change his status, and finally become all that the great man is with whom he is now contrasted. Clearly, the contrast is one of conditions, more than of natures, and at its very highest value is the contrast between a perfected nature and one not yet perfected.

[Footnote A: In a discourse in which much of the "Mormon" doctrine concerning the Deity is unfolded by the Prophet Joseph Smith—the King Follett discourse (see chapter 5)—in a passage dealing with the time in which man may attain to some of the contemplated exaltations in the future, he remarks: "When you climb up a ladder, you must begin at the bottom and ascend step by step, until you arrive at the top; and so it is with the principles of the Gospel—you must begin with the first, and go on until you learn all the principles of exaltation.But it will be a great while after you have passed through the vail [of death] before you will have learned them. It is not all to be comprehended in this world: it will be a great work to learn our salvation and exaltation, even beyond the grave."]

The same answer applies to the Reverend gentleman's contention based on the passage, "Thou art always the selfsame;" "I am the Lord and change not;" "The Father of lights, with whom there is no change nor shadow of alteration." These passages teach what the Reverend gentleman calls the "immutability of God," which he holds to preclude the idea that God rose from a state of imperfection to that of perfection—since he is always the "selfsame." Before answering at length, I couple with this Mr. Van Der Donckt's final argument on this division of the subject—the scriptural evidences and arguments on the form and nature of God—namely, "The Latter day Saints' theory of the Man-God supposes a past and present with God. The Bible excludes that succession of time," says the Reverend gentleman, "and speaks of God as the everlasting present; 'I Am Who am,' 'From eternity to eternity thou art God.'" Against this argument, based upon God's reputed unchangeableness, and being always as he now is, from all eternity to eternity, I wish to say, first, that theGod-natureis doubtless always the same, without reference to those who may attain unto it; and speaking of the God-nature, it is always the "Selfsame," from eternity to eternity; but after that statement, against the Reverend gentleman's argument bottomed on God's immutability and eternity—and, in fact, against all his arguments, from first to last, respecting the form and nature of God, I place Jesus of Nazareth, the Messiah, the revelation of God to man, I place him as my premises, and my argument against all the reverend gentleman has said, or can say, on this division of the subject. I call attention to the fact that neither in my discourse which brought forth Mr. Van Der Donckt's Reply nor in this Rejoinder, have I turned to those numerous passages of the Bible that speak of the face, limbs or organs of God. Not that I mistrust the force of those passages as evidence, but because I have thought it unnecessary to appeal to them, so long as I had in Jesus, the Messiah, a full length and complete representation of God, not only as to therealityof his being, but as to thekindof being God is. And now I ask, as I did in my discourse,is Jesus God? Is he a manifestation of God—a revelation of him? If so, there must be in him an end of controversy; for whatever Jesus Christ was and is God must be, or Jesus Christ is no manifestation, no revelation of God. Is Jesus Christ in form like man? Is he possessed of a body of flesh and bone which is eternally united to him—and now an integral part of him? Does he possess body, parts and passions? There can be but one answer to all these questions, and that is, "Yes; he possessed and now possesses all these things." Then God also possesses them; for even according to both Catholic and orthodox Protestant Christian doctrine, Jesus Christ was and is God, and the complete manifestation and revelation of God the Father.

Also the specific points of argument based upon God's unchangeability, and there being no succession of time with God—that, too, is answered in the person and experience of Jesus Christ. According to Catholic teaching, Jesus was a spirit, identical with God the Father in substance, before he became man; but at a certain time he became man, was not that a change? By it, he became something he was not before. His humanity, according to their teaching, wasaddedto the Son of God when he received his tabernacle of flesh and bone; and he was certainly changed from an unembodied state to an embodied one; and there was a "before and after"—in reference to this great event, in the God Jesus' experience. Is it thinkable that this change was a deterioration? Was the Son of God's divinity debased to the human, or was so much of humanity as he took on raised to the divine nature, and henceforth made an integral part of it?

The orthodox doctrine of Christianity is—Catholic and Protestant alike—that Jesus Christ is God; that he always was and is God, according to both orthodox theology and Christian philosophy. Yet it is said of this Jesus that he "increased in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man" (Luke 2:52). Here is certainly a change in condition; here is succession of time with God—a before and after; here is being and becoming; for whereas, he was a spirit, he became man; and in becoming man, he passed through all the phases in life from infancy to manhood. It is significant also that it was not until Jesus had arisen from the tomb and stood in the presence of his disciples, a glorified personage, body and spirit united, that he exclaimed, "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth." If "given," there must have been a time when he did not possess all power in heaven and in earth; and hence, a change from possessing some power to the condition of possessing "all power," a fullness of power—"for it pleased the Father that in him should all fullness dwell" (Col. 1:19). But more of this when I come to deal with Mr. Van Der Donckt's philosophical proofs on the subject, I shall close this part of my rejoinder with the following summary of the facts maintained thus far in my argument:

First:—While the scriptures declare that God is a spirit, it does not follow that he is necessarily an unembodied spirit; on the contrary, it is clear that he is an embodied spirit; for Jesus Christ is God, and he, we know, is a spirit and body united; and he is said to be the express image of his Father's person; therefore, the Father of Jesus Christ, or God the Father, must be just what Jesus is—a spirit embodied in a tabernacle of flesh and bone.

Second:—Although the Bible says that God is a spirit, and speaks of angels as spirits also, and points out some differences between the nature of men and spirits, it does not follow that spirits are immaterial beings, and therefore without form. On the contrary, the evidence of scripture is to the effect that angels are very substantial personages. One wrestled bodily with Jacob and lamed him; while three others "did eat" of the substantial meal provided by Abraham; and there are many other proofs of angels being substantial, material personages.

Third:—It is an assumption absolutely unwarranted by authority of the word of God to say that when spirits, or angels, or Jesus—before his incarnation—showed themselves to men, they merely assumed the material garb for the occasion.

Fourth:—Although the Bible in sundry passages speaks of God the Father as "invisible," it does not follow that he is absolutely so, nor invisible from the nature of his being; on the contrary, it is clear from what has been set forth that under certain special conditions, God the Father as well as Jesus—before his incarnation—and certain angels, have been seen; and hence, the invisibility of God the Father, arises from his being invisible to men in their normal condition, unquickened by, and unclothed with, the power of God.

Fifth:—The doctrine that all absolutely invisible beings are immaterial is simply untrue, being contradicted by the fact that a number of absolutely invisible things are known to be material, and yet possess some of the properties of grosser matter; and it is reasonable to believe that the same truth holds as to spiritual beings.

Sixth:—The Bible distinctly ascribes to God and angels the form, limbs, organs, feelings and passions of men; and the Bible nowhere leads us to believe that this ascription of bodily form and organs and passions to God is simply to "make spiritual things, or certain truths more intelligible to man;" nor does it follow becausesomepassages of the Bible are figurative, and hence not to be taken literally, thatallthe passages ascribing human form, organs and feelings to God are figurative, and hence not to be taken literally. It is only when anthropomorphic passages and expressions are similarly used as other clearly figurative passages and expressions are, that they are to be adjudged as figurative andnotto be taken literally.

Seventh:—And lastly, beside all premises and arguments to the effect that God is an unembodied spirit, without form, without limbs, organs, features, human feelings, or passions, such as love, compassion, pity, etc., etc,—beside all this, I place the Lord Jesus, the Image of God the Father's person, the full length representation and revelation of God to men, as an all sufficient answer, and say that whatsoever Jesus Christ was and is, so, too, has been and is God, the Father; for such is the teaching of holy scripture.

Mr. Van Der Donckt, at the beginning of his argument under his "philosophical proofs of God's simplicity or spirituality," again exhibits the fact that he misapprehends the doctrines of the Latter-day Saints. He says: "The Latter-day Saints believe that God created the souls of men long before their conception." That is not the belief of the Latter-day Saints; and his misapprehension of what their doctrine is relative to man and God leads the gentleman to make statements, and indulge in lines of argumentation he would not have followed had he apprehended aright the teachings of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Since his philosophical argument has proceeded from a wrong basis, it becomes necessary to state what the "Mormon" doctrine is relative to the subject in hand, and then consider so much of his argument as may apply to the facts.

Latter-day Saints believe that the "soul of man" consists of both his spirit and his body united. "The spirit and the body is the soul of man; and the resurrection from the dead is the redemption of the soul" (Doc. and Cov. sec. 88:15, 16). This, I am aware, is not the usually accepted sense of the word "soul;" for it generally stands for what is regarded as the incorporeal nature of man, or the principle of mental and spiritual life of him. It is used variously in the scriptures. In one place, the Savior uses it in contrast with the body: "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matt. 10:28). But the word as used in the passage above quoted from the Doctrine and Covenants also has warrant of scriptural authority: "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul" (Gen. 2:7). Here body and "breath of life," the spirit, constitute the soul of man.

Of course, Mr. Van Der Donckt uses the phrase "souls of men" as we perhaps would use the phrase "spirits of men," and evidently makes reference to our doctrine of the pre-existence of spirits, that is, the doctrine of the actual existence of the spirits of men long ages before they tabernacled in the flesh, when he says: "The Latter-day Saints believe that God creates the souls of men long before their conception." But again explanation is necessary, as that statement does not quite meet our belief. Our doctrine is that "Intelligences are begotten spirits," which spirits are in form like men, and are really, substance, that is, matter, but of a more subtle and finer nature than the matter composing man's tabernacle of flesh and bone.[A]Christians believe that "the Word," that is, Jesus Christ, was in the beginning with God; and not only that "the Word" was with God, but also that "the Word was God" (John 1:1, 2), Latter-day Saints not only believe Jesus was in the beginning with God, but it is their doctrine that man was "also in the beginning with the Father, that which is spirit" (Doc. and Cov. sec. 93:23). And again: "Man was also in the beginning with God. Intelligence, or the light of truthwas not created or made, neither indeed can be.* * * * Every man whose spirit receiveth not the light is under condemnationfor man is spirit. The elements are eternal, and spirit and element, inseparably connected, receive a fullness of joy; and when separated, man cannot receive a fullness of joy. The elements are the tabernacle of God; yea man is the tabernacle of God, even temples" (Doc and Cov. sec. 93:29, 32-35). The point to be observed is that intelligences—whence the spirits of men—are not created or made, nor indeed can they be, for they are eternal—eternal as God the Father, and God the Son are. "The mind of man—the immortal spirit—where did it come from?" asks the Prophet Joseph Smith, in a discourse delivered at Nauvoo;[B]and then answers:

[Footnote A: The Prophet Joseph teaches that "all spirit is matter, but it is more fine or pure [than the gross matter tangible to our senses] and can only be discerned by purer eyes. We cannot see it, but when our bodies are purified, we shall see that it is all matter." (Doc. and Cov. sec 137.)]

[Footnote B: April 7th, 1844, Mill. Star, vol. xxiii p. 245, et seq.]

All learned men, and doctors of divinity, say that God created it in the beginning; but it is not so; the very idea lessens man in my estimation. I do not believe the doctrine. I know better. Hear it, all ye ends of the world, for God has told me so. If you don't believe me it will not make the truth without effect. * * * * We say that God himself is a self-existent being. Who told you so? It is correct enough, but who told you that man did not exist in like manner upon the same principle? God made a tabernacle and put his [man's] spirit into it, and it became a living soul. How does it read in Hebrew? It does not say in Hebrew that God created the spirit of man. It says, "God made man out of earth and put in him Adam's spirit, and so became a living body." The mind, or the intelligence which man possesses is co-eternal with God himself. * * * * * I am dwelling on the immortality of the spirit of man. Is it logical to say that the intelligence of spirits is immortal, and yet that it had a beginning? The intelligence of spirits had no beginning, neither will it have an end. That is good logic. That which has a beginning may have an end. There never was a time when there were not spirits, for they are co-eternal with our Father in heaven. I want to reason more on the spirit of man; for I am dwelling on the body and spirit of man—on the subject of the dead. I take my ring from my finger and liken it unto the mind of man—the immortal part, because it has no beginning. Suppose you cut it in two; then it has a beginning and an end; but join it again, and it continues one eternal round. So with the spirit of man. As the Lord liveth, if it has a beginning it will have an end. All the fools and learned and wise men from the beginning of creation, who say that the spirit of man had a beginning, prove that it must have an end: and if that doctrine is true, then the doctrine of annihilation would be true. But if I am right, I might with boldness proclaim from the house tops that God never had the power to create the spirit of man at all, God himself could not create himself. Intelligence is eternal, and exists upon a self-existent principle. It is a spirit from age to age, and there is no creation about it. * * * * The spirit of man is not a created being; it existed from eternity, and will exist to eternity. Anything created cannot be eternal: and earth, water, etc., had their existence in an elementary state, from eternity.

Mr. Van Der Donckt will recognize quite a difference between the doctrine here stated as to the spirits of men, and the one he states for us when he says, "Latter-day Saints believe that God creates the souls of men long before their conception." There is that in man, according to our doctrine, which is not created at all; there is in him an "ego"—a "spirit" uncreated, never made, a self-existent entity, eternal as God himself; and of the same kind of substance or essence with him, and, indeed, part of him, when God is conceived of in the generic sense.

With the doctrine of "Mormonism" relative to man and God thus stated, the question is, what part of Mr. Van Der Donckt's philosophical argument touches it?

Mr. Van Der Donckt, it must be remembered, bases his philosophical argument upon the absolute "simplicity or spirituality" of God. "I Am Who Am," is the definition of God about which circle all his arguments. God is "the Necessary Being," is his contention; infinite, illimitable; not limited by his own essence, by another, or by himself. From which I understand him to mean, after the philosophers of his school, that God, the very essence of him, is pure being-"Actual being or existence" are his own words. (Page 53).

This his premise; and the part of his argument which affects our doctrine is the following:

If God were an aggregation of parts, these parts would be either necessary beings or contingent (that do not necessarily exist), or some would be necessary and some contingent. None of these suppositions are tenable, therefore God is not an aggregate of parts. * * * * If the parts of God were necessary beings, there would be several independent beings, which the infinity of God precludes. God would not be infinite, if there were even one other being independent of him, as his power, etc., would not reach that being.The infinite being is most simple, or not compound. Were he compound, his parts would be either all finite, or all infinite, or one infinite and the others finite. None of these suppositions are possible, therefore he is not compound.Several finite things cannot produce an infinite or an illimitable, as there would always be a first and last.Many infinite beings are inconceivable, for, if there were several they would have to differ from each other by some perfection. Now, from the moment one would have a perfection the other one lacks, the latter would not be infinite. Therefore, God cannot be a compound of infinite parts.If one is infinite, nothing can be added to it. Finite parts could not belong to the infinite essence, else they would communicate their limitations to God.Therefore, the infinite Being is not composite, but simple or spiritual. Therefore he is not, nor ever was, a man, who is a composite being.

The infinite being is most simple, or not compound. Were he compound, his parts would be either all finite, or all infinite, or one infinite and the others finite. None of these suppositions are possible, therefore he is not compound.

Several finite things cannot produce an infinite or an illimitable, as there would always be a first and last.

Many infinite beings are inconceivable, for, if there were several they would have to differ from each other by some perfection. Now, from the moment one would have a perfection the other one lacks, the latter would not be infinite. Therefore, God cannot be a compound of infinite parts.

If one is infinite, nothing can be added to it. Finite parts could not belong to the infinite essence, else they would communicate their limitations to God.

Therefore, the infinite Being is not composite, but simple or spiritual. Therefore he is not, nor ever was, a man, who is a composite being.

I have to do first of all with Mr. Van Der Donckt's premise—"the simplicity or spirituality" of God.

So far as it is possible to make language do it, the gentleman teaches that God is "pure being," "most [therefore absolutely] simple—not compound." He is not only infinite, then, but infinity. It follows that he is without quality, other than being—mere existence—"I Am Who Am;" without attributes; not susceptible of division, or of relation; for if he possessed quality or attribute or was susceptible of division or of relation, his absolute simplicity—that tremulously precarious thing on which, according to Mr. V.'s philosophy, his very existence and all his excellence depends—would be destroyed. It was doubtless these considerations that led the Church of England—which, by the way, is at one with the Roman Catholic Church in the doctrine of God—to say of the "one true and living God," that he iswithout body, parts or passions.[A]With which also the Westminster Confession of Faith agrees, by saying: "There is but one only living and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a most pure spirit, invisible,without body, parts or passions, immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible," etc.[B]

[Footnote A: Bk. Com. Prayer, Articles of Religion, Art. 1.]

[Footnote B: Westminster Confession, Art. 2, Sec. 1.]

The German school of philosophy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, which ends in inevitable agnosticism, went but one step further than these creeds; a step made inevitable by the creeds themselves. The creeds postulate God as "pure being"—"existence" "the one who could notnotexist," Mr. V.'s interpretation of "I Am Who Am." But "existence," says Fichte, "implies origin," and "God is beyond origin"—i. e. beyond "being," "existence." Schelling reached substantially the same conclusion when, by a pathway but little divergent from that followed by Fichte, he was led to regard God as neither "real or ideal;" "neither thought nor being." While Hegel, by similar subtleties, established the identity of "Being and Non-Being." This German philosophy, which but extends the philosophy of the orthodox creeds to its legitimate conclusion, leaves us with the paradox on our hands of regarding God at once as the most real existence, and as the most absolute non-existence. The conclusions from the premise are just; and Mr. V.'s "most simple," "infinite being," he who is "pure existence itself," vanishes amid the metaphysical subtleties of the learned Germans.[A]

[Footnote A: "Existence itself, that so-called highest category of thought, is only conceivable in the form of existence modified in some particular manner. Strip off its modification, and the apparent paradox of the German philosopher becomes literally true;—pure being is pure nothing. We have no conception of existence which is not existence in some particular manner; and if we abstract from the manner, we have nothing left to constitute the existence. Those who, in their horror of what they call anthropomorphism, or anthropopathy, refuse to represent the Deity under symbols borrowed from the limitations of human consciousness, are bound in consistency, to deny that God exists; for the conception of existence is as human and as limited as any other" (Limits of Religious Thought, Mansel, pp. 95, 96).]

Let us examine the effect of this Deity-destroying postulate in England. Mr. Van Der Donckt's "Infinite being," "most simple or not compound," is identical with the "absolute," the "unconditioned;" the "first cause," hence the "uncaused." These terms, it is well known, Mr. Herbert Spencer seized upon, in his volume on "First Principles," and ran them down to logical absurdity, showing them to be "unthinkable," and that ultimate religious ideas (arising from the postulates of orthodox creeds) lead to the "Unknown!" In reaching this conclusion he was wonderfully helped by Henry L. Mansel, some time Dean of St. Paul's, who in his celebrated Bampton Lecture arrives at substantially the same conclusion—with an exception to be noted later.[A]Indeed, so nearly at one are the churchman and the philosopher, in their methods of thought, in their deductions, that the latter reaches his conclusions from the data and reasoning of the former, whom he quotes with approval and at great length. I select from these writers a few typical passages tending to show the absurdity of God's "simplicity," or "spirituality," as held by Mr. Van Der Donckt, reminding the reader that Mr. V.'s "Infinite Being," "most simple or not compound," is identical with the "absolute," "unconditioned," the "first cause," the "uncaused" of both Mr. Mansel and Mr. Spencer.

[Footnote A: Page 109.]

Mr. Spencer, after showing that the First Cause cannot be finite, nor dependent, reaches the conclusion that it must be infinite and independent; and then proceeds:

But to think of the First Cause as totally independent is to think of it as that which existed in the absence of all other existence; seeing that if the presence of any other existence is necessary, it must be partially dependent on that other existence, and so cannot be the First Cause. Not only, however, must the First Cause be a form of being which has no necessary relation to any other form of being, but it can have no necessary relation within itself. There can be nothing in it which determines change, and yet nothing which prevents change. For if it contains something which imposes such necessities or restraints, this something must be a cause higher than the First Cause, which is absurd. Thus the First Cause must be in every sense perfect, complete, total; including within itself all power, and transcending all law. Or to use the established word, it must be absolute.[A]

[Footnote A: First Principles (Spencer) pp. 29, 30; 1896 edition, D. Appleton & Co., N. Y.]

Thus far the philosopher; and even Mr. Van Der Donckt, I think, could not complain that he has not stated the "simplicity" of the First Cause most clearly. But at this point the philosopher, Mr. Spencer, introduces the churchman, Dean Mansel, to abolish the structure of the "First Cause," the "simple" or "spiritual being," or "God," as held by Mr. V. and all orthodox Christians. I quote Mr. Mansel:

But these three conceptions—the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite—all equally indispensable, do they not imply contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as attributes of one and the same Being? A Cause cannot, as such, be absolute:the Absolute cannot as such be a cause. The cause, as such, exists only in relation to its effect; the effect is an effect of the cause. On the other hand, the conception of the Absolute implies a possible existence out of all relation. We attempt to escape from this apparent contradiction by introducing the idea of succession in time. The Absolute exists first by itself, and afterwards becomes a cause. But here we are checked by the third conception, that of the infinite. How can the infinite become that which it was not from the first? If Causation is a possible mode of existence, that which exists without causing is not infinite; that which becomes a cause has passed beyond its former limits. * * Supposing the Absolute to be a cause, it will follow that it operates by means of free will and consciousness. For a necessary cause cannot be conceived as absolute and infinite. If necessitated by something beyond itself, it is thereby limited by a superior power: and if necessitated by itself, it has in its own nature a necessary relation to its effect. The act of causation must therefore be voluntary, and volition is only possible in a conscious being. But consciousness again is only conceivable as a relation. There must be a conscious subject and an object of which he is conscious. The subject is a subject to the object; the object is an object to the subject; and neither can exist by itself as the absolute. This difficulty, again, may be for the moment evaded, by distinguishing between the absolute as related to another and the absolute as related to itself. The absolute, it may be said, may possibly be conscious provided it is only conscious of itself. But this alternative is, in ultimate analysis, no less self-destructive than the other. For the object of consciousness, whether a mode of the subject's existence or not, is either created in and by the act of consciousness, or has an existence independent of it. In the former case the object depends upon the subject, and the subject alone is the true absolute. In the latter case, the subject depends upon the object, and the object alone is the true absolute. Or, if we attempt a third hypothesis, and maintain that each exists independently of the other, we have no absolute at all, but only a pair of relatives; for coexistence, whether in consciousness or not, is itself a relation.The corollary from this reasoning is obvious. Not only is the absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary relation to anything else, but it is also incapable of containing, by the constitution of its own nature, an essential relation within itself; as a whole, for instance composed of parts, or as a substance consisting of attributes, or as a conscious subject in antithesis to an object. For, if there is in the absolute any principle of unity, distinct from the mere accumulation of parts or attributes, this principle alone is the true absolute. If, on the other hand, there is no such principle, then there is no absolute at all, but only a plurality of relatives. The almost unanimous voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and simple, must be accepted as the voice of reason also, as far as reason has any voice in the matter. But this absolute unity, as indifferent and containing no attributes, can neither be distinguished from the multiplicity of finite beings by any characteristic feature, nor be identified with them in their multiplicity. Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious: it cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple; it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of difference: it cannot be identified with the universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible.Let us, however, suppose, for an instance, that these difficulties are surmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely established on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea with that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the relative—the infinite to the finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state than that of quiescence, the Absolute, whether acting voluntarily or involuntarily, has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection to one of comparative perfection; and, therefore, was not originally perfect. If the state of activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence, the Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfection. There remains only the supposition that the two states are equal, and the act of creation one of complete indifference. But this supposition annihilates the unity of the absolute, or it annihilates itself. If the act of creation is real, and yet indifferent, we must admit the possibility of two conceptions of the absolute—the one as productive, the other as non-productive. If the act is not real, the supposition itself vanishes. * * *Again, how can the relative be conceived as coming into being? If it is a distinct reality from the absolute, it must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence. But to conceive an object as non-existent is again a self-contradiction; for that which is conceived exists, as an object of thought, in and by that conception. We may abstain from thinking of an object at all; but, if we think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It is possible at one time not to think of an object at all, and at another to think of it as already in being; but to think of it in the act of becoming, in the progress from not being into being, is to think that which, in the very thought, annihilates itself. * * *To sum up briefly this portion of my argument:The conception of the absolute and the infinite, from whatever side we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions.There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others; and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist.There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as many.There is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal.It cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active, nor, without equal contradiction, be represented as inactive.It cannot be conceived as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only of that sum.[A]

The corollary from this reasoning is obvious. Not only is the absolute, as conceived, incapable of a necessary relation to anything else, but it is also incapable of containing, by the constitution of its own nature, an essential relation within itself; as a whole, for instance composed of parts, or as a substance consisting of attributes, or as a conscious subject in antithesis to an object. For, if there is in the absolute any principle of unity, distinct from the mere accumulation of parts or attributes, this principle alone is the true absolute. If, on the other hand, there is no such principle, then there is no absolute at all, but only a plurality of relatives. The almost unanimous voice of philosophy, in pronouncing that the absolute is both one and simple, must be accepted as the voice of reason also, as far as reason has any voice in the matter. But this absolute unity, as indifferent and containing no attributes, can neither be distinguished from the multiplicity of finite beings by any characteristic feature, nor be identified with them in their multiplicity. Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The absolute cannot be conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious: it cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple; it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by the absence of difference: it cannot be identified with the universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike incomprehensible.

Let us, however, suppose, for an instance, that these difficulties are surmounted, and the existence of the Absolute securely established on the testimony of reason. Still we have not succeeded in reconciling this idea with that of a Cause: we have done nothing towards explaining how the absolute can give rise to the relative—the infinite to the finite. If the condition of causal activity is a higher state than that of quiescence, the Absolute, whether acting voluntarily or involuntarily, has passed from a condition of comparative imperfection to one of comparative perfection; and, therefore, was not originally perfect. If the state of activity is an inferior state to that of quiescence, the Absolute, in becoming a cause, has lost its original perfection. There remains only the supposition that the two states are equal, and the act of creation one of complete indifference. But this supposition annihilates the unity of the absolute, or it annihilates itself. If the act of creation is real, and yet indifferent, we must admit the possibility of two conceptions of the absolute—the one as productive, the other as non-productive. If the act is not real, the supposition itself vanishes. * * *

Again, how can the relative be conceived as coming into being? If it is a distinct reality from the absolute, it must be conceived as passing from non-existence into existence. But to conceive an object as non-existent is again a self-contradiction; for that which is conceived exists, as an object of thought, in and by that conception. We may abstain from thinking of an object at all; but, if we think of it, we cannot but think of it as existing. It is possible at one time not to think of an object at all, and at another to think of it as already in being; but to think of it in the act of becoming, in the progress from not being into being, is to think that which, in the very thought, annihilates itself. * * *

To sum up briefly this portion of my argument:

The conception of the absolute and the infinite, from whatever side we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions.

There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others; and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist.

There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as many.

There is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal.

It cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active, nor, without equal contradiction, be represented as inactive.

It cannot be conceived as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be conceived as a part only of that sum.[A]

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