VI.Title to Slaves—

A more heart-rending act of villainy has rarely been committed than the following: on Monday, the 30th of May last, three children, viz., Elizabeth, ten years of age, Martha, eight, and a small boy, name forgotten, all bright mulattoes, were violently taken from the arms of their mother, Elizabeth Price, a free woman of color, living in Fayette County, Tennessee. Strong suspicion rests upon two men, gone from thence to the state of Missouri; and it is ardently hoped that the citizens of that state will interest themselves in the apprehension of the robbers and the restoration of the children. A handsome subscription has been raised in the neighborhood to reward any person who may restore them. Editors of papers, and especially such as are in and contiguous to the state of Missouri, are requested to give the above an insertion.[111]

One of the greatest organizations in the South for the stealing of negroes had its headquarters in West Tennessee and was managed by John A. Murrell. This organization consisted of 450 persons and operated throughout the Mississippi Valley. This organization was in collusion with slaves. It stole the same slaves repeatedly and sold them sometimes to their own masters. Murrell’s last stealing was two slaves from Rev. John Hennig, of Madison County, Tennessee. He was caught in 1835, tried, convicted, and sentenced for the maximum term of ten years in the state penitentiary.[112]

The foundation for the regulation of traffic with slaves was laid by the acts of 1741 and 1787, passed by the Colony and State of North Carolina.[113]In 1799, all traffic with slaves was forbidden unless they had a permit from their masters, designating time and place of the proposed transaction.[114]It was a ten dollar fine to be convicted of violating this regulation. If a slave forged a pass as a basis for such a transaction, he was corporally punished at the discretion of a justice of the peace. Trading with slaves was made a more serious matter in 1803.[115]The pass by this act was required to specify the articles to be traded. Any one violating it was punishable by a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty dollars. In 1806, it was made unlawful for a white person, free negro, or mulatto to be found in the company of a slave for any purpose without the consent of the owner.[116]In 1813, the restrictions on trading with slaves were made more lenient. The fine for trading in violation of the law was reduced to not less than five nor more than ten dollars and slaves might trade articles of their own make without passes from their masters.[117]

The liquor traffic was the most difficult part of trading with slaves to regulate. The North Carolina code left whiskey in the same category with other articles, but in 1813 Tennessee made it punishable by a fine of not less than five nor more than ten dollars to sell it to slaves.[118]If a person was convicted of violating this regulation and could not pay his fine, he went to jail until he could pay it with cost. By act of 1829, a slave was given from three to ten lashes for having whiskey in his possession and from five to ten for selling it to another slave.[119]Any merchant, tavern-keeper, distiller, or any other person, who sold whiskeyto a slave without permit from his master, was guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on being convicted, was subject to a fine of fifty dollars.[120]

The laws regulating this traffic became increasingly strict. By act of 1832, a dealer in order to secure a license to sell whiskey was required to take an oath not to sell a slave unless he had a written permit from his master.[121]Clerks in liquor houses, not considering themselves dealers, continued to sell whiskey to slaves; so in 1846, the oath was modified to include sales within the knowledge of the person receiving the license.[122]In 1842, the punishment for selling whiskey to slaves or letting a free negro be intoxicated on one’s premises was made imprisonment for a period of not exceeding thirty days.[123]

The policy of the state toward the liquor traffic with slaves was forcibly expressed by Judge Caruthers in the case of Jennings v. the State, as follows:

Under no circumstances, not even in the presence, or by permission in writing or otherwise, can spirits be sold or delivered to a slave for his own use, but only for the use of the master, and even in that case, the owner or master must be present or send a written order, specifying that it is for himself, and the quantity to be sent.... A general or indefinite order, such as those exhibited in this case, is of no avail. An order can cover only a single transaction, and then it is exhausted.[124]

It is noticed that this law applied to everybody and not merely to licensed liquor dealers.

The laws on traffic with slaves finally concluded: “Any person who sells, loans, or delivers to any slave, except for his master or owner, and then only in such owner or master’s presence, or upon his written order, any liquor, gun,or weapon ... is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be fined not less than fifty dollars, and imprisoned in the county jail at the discretion of the court.”[125]Judge Caruthers, commenting on this law, said: “This is intended to cut up the offense by the roots, and prescribes a penalty calculated to deter those that milder punishment had been found insufficient to restrain from the injury or destruction of their neighbor’s property.”[126]

Municipalities usually supplemented the laws of the state with special regulations of their own. The Board of Commissioners of Nashville, June 7, 1805,

Resolved, That it shall be the duty of the town sergeant to inspect each slave he may discover trading in town, and require of them a permit from their master or mistress, or the person under whose care they are, specifying the commodity which they may have for sale. And if such slave has no permit, the town sergeant shall immediately seize on the commodity he may have for sale, and take it with the slave before some justice of the peace, and make oath that such slave had transgressed the by-laws for the regulation of the town in the manner above described. The town sergeant shall then immediately expose to sale such commodity to the highest bidder for cash at the market house; one-half of the amount of such sales to go to the use of the town, and the other half to the use of the sergeant for his services.[127]

Traffic with slaves was very important for several reasons. The slave had very little sense of value, in the first place. He frequently exchanged the most valuable farm products for a pittance in order to obtain money with which to gamble or buy whiskey. The liquor traffic still more vitally touched the life of the plantation. An intoxicated slave was not only incapacitated, but he was inclined to raise trouble with other slaves. This might end in slaves being killed or an insurrection. Again, the element of societythat engaged in the liquor traffic with slaves was usually the poor whites, free negroes, or mulattoes, who were opposed to slavery and did not hesitate to propagate ideas of insurrection and freedom among slaves. The best way to keep slaves happy and contented and, consequently, efficient, was to have complete severance of relations between them and outsiders. Finally, it is noticed that traffic with slaves, in all its ramifications, seriously endangered property interests.

No one was permitted to speak disrespectfully of the owner in a slave’s presence, or to use language of an insurrectionary nature.[128]Words in favor of emancipation, rebellion, or conspiracy came under this head. The penalty was a fine of $10, one-half to the county and the other to the reporter.

A person knowingly aiding in circulating any printed matter that fostered discontent or insubordination among slaves or free persons of color, was guilty of felony, and might suffer an imprisonment of ten years for first offense and twenty for the second.[129]The same punishment was prescribed for addresses, or sermons of an inflammatory nature.

There were only two instances of threatened insurrection in the slave history of Tennessee. The first one of these occurred in 1831, and was nipped in the bud by information secured from a female slave.[130]It resulted in a petition being sent to the legislature signed by 108 people, asking for a better patrol system. The second was planned in 1857, and seems to have included the states of Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas.[131]The scheme was discovered in November of 1857 among the slaves employed at the Cumberland Iron Works in Tennessee just before they were ready to execute it. One accountsays, “more than sixty slaves in the Iron Works were implicated, and nine were hung, four by the decision of the court and five by a mob.” The Missouri Democrat of December 4 states that “For the past month, the Journals from different Southern states have been filled with numberless alarms respecting contemplated risings of the negro population. In Tennessee, in Missouri, in Virginia, and in Alabama, so imminent has been the danger that the most severe measures have been adopted to prevent their congregating or visiting after night, to suppress their customary attendance at neighborhood preachings and to keep a vigilant watch upon all their movements, by an efficient patrolling system. This is assuredly a most lamentable condition for the slave states, for nothing causes such terror upon the plantations as the bare suspicion of these insurrections.”[132]

All slave gatherings on the master’s plantation were exclusively under his control, as he was responsible for the results. It was considered dangerous to society, however, for slaves to collect miscellaneously. By act of 1803, it was made a ten-dollar fine for any one to permit the slaves of another to congregate on his premises without passes from their master.[133]To aid the justices of the peace in enforcing this act, the fine was equally divided between the county and the reporter of its violation. There was so much zeal shown in the enforcement of this act that the fine was reduced in 1813 to not less than five nor more than ten dollars.[134]

The insurrections over the country in the early thirties and rumors of an insurrection in Tennessee in 1831, combined with the abolition propaganda, gave added significance to the meetings of slaves. It now became necessary to punish slaves for participating in unlawful assemblies as well as to fine those permitting them.

The act of 1831 empowered justices of the peace, constables and patrols to disperse such meetings and to inflict twenty-five lashes upon the slaves engaged, if necessary. The fine for permitting unlawful assemblies was now left to the discretion of the court.[135]The amount of litigation likely to result from the enforcement of this measure made it necessary to define the terms unlawful assembly.[136]

1.Offenses Punishable by Stripes.Trading without permits from their masters or forging passes was punishable by stripes by act of 1799. The number of stripes was left to the discretion of the justice but was not to exceed thirty-nine.[137]In 1806, riots, unlawful assemblies, trespasses, seditious speeches, insulting language to whites, were made offenses punishable by stripes at the discretion of the justice.[138]By act of 1813, the slave was whipped for selling any article not made by himself.[139]The number of stripes was not less than five, nor more than thirty. He was punished for selling whiskey or keeping it at some other place than his own home. This offense was punishable by not less than three nor more than ten lashes.[140]It is interesting to notice the leniency in the punishment for selling this particular article. Conspiracy, which was punishable by death alone in the act 1741, might by act of 1831 be punished by whipping, pillory, or imprisonment.[141]Death still remained a proper punishment for this offense, but one of the others-could be substituted at the discretion of the justice, depending on the character and extent of the conspiracy. By act of 1844, the runaway could be workedon the streets of an incorporated town and his wages went to the poor.[142]

2.Capital Offenses.By act of 1741, killing of horses, hogs, or cattle without a permit from the master was punishable by death for second offense.[143]In 1819, murder, arson, rape, burglary, and robbery were made capital offenses and punishment in all other cases was not to extend to life or limb.[144]By this act the suffering of death by being outlawed as a runaway was abolished. By act of 1835, intent to commit rape upon a white woman was punishable by hanging.[145]The burning of a barn, a bridge, or a house with intent to kill was a capital offense.[146]

3.Offenses Punishable at the Discretion of the Jury.The burning of barns, houses, bridges, steamboats, manufacturing plants, and valuable buildings or property of any kind were offenses for which the jury could punish at their discretion, provided such punishment did not extend to life or limb. All offenses of slaves for which there was not a specific punishment fixed by law were left to the discretion of the jury.[147]The cutting off of ears, standing in the pillory, and branding were some of the older punishments for which whipping came to be a substitute.

A.By Deed.There was no statutory restriction upon the sale or transfer of slaves from one person to another.[148]Secret and fraudulent transfers became so numerous that sales of slaves and deeds of gifts were in 1784 required to be in writing attested by at least one creditible witness and recorded within nine months thereafter.[149]By an act of 1801, such transfers were no longer required to be recordedif possession accompanied the sale or gift.[150]In the case of Davis v. Mitchell, Judge Green charged the jury that “a deed registered is only necessary where possession does not accompany gift or sale.”[151]A bill of sale of slaves by a person indebted, who still retained possession of the slaves, after the execution of the bill of sale, was void against creditors, although a valuable consideration was received. A conveyance of personality presupposed a transfer of possession.[152]

B.By Devise.The transfer of slaves by will followed the same procedure as real estate. A will, valid in either law or equity, had to be in the handwriting of the deceased and signed by him or some other person in his presence representing him and by two witnesses. Such a devise was in fee simple unless an estate of less dignity was definitely conveyed.[153]If the deceased left no will, the slaves became the property of the widow for life, the widow being required to give bond to the county that such slaves with their increase would be returned at her death to the administrators of her deceased husband’s estate. In absence of the wife, the slaves were equally distributed among the children.[154]By act of 1796, half bloods were inherited equally with full brothers and sisters. In the absence of such brothers and sisters, the law of distribution was followed among the collateral heirs.[155]By act of 1819, foreigners who had settled in Tennessee and had not been naturalized inherited in the same manner as natural born citizens.[156]

C.By Parol Contract, and Gifts to Children in Consideration of Marriage.Conveyance of slaves was required to be in writing and properly attested by witnesses. Therecould be no transfer of title by parol and no deed of gift was recognized unless it was proved and registered.[157]By act of 1805, the transfer of slaves in consideration of marriage, to be valid against creditors, had to be acknowledged by the grantor or proved by two credible witnesses and recorded in the county of the grantor within nine months.[158]

D.By Statute of Limitation.In Tennessee, three years of adverse possession invested the title of a slave in the possessor by virtue of the statute of limitation.[159]By the statute of limitation, a gift of parol, which is absolutely void, would, after the lapse of three years’ possession, convey title.[160]Judge Green in Davis v. Mitchell, held that an infant might hold adverse possession of a slave, either by himself or through a guardian, and that three years of such possession invested the title of the slave in him.[161]Three years of uninterrupted possession not only invested title, but the right to convey that title.[162]

E.By Statute of Frauds and Fraudulent Conveyances.All gifts, grants, loans, alienations or conveyances made with fraudulent purposes were valid only between the parties making them and their heirs, assigns, and administrators, and in no way barred the action of creditors.[163]A conveyance of goods or chattels, without a valuable consideration, was considered fraudulent, unless it was made by a will duly proved and recorded or a deed acknowledged and proved. By act of 1805, such recording had to be done within nine months to be valid against creditors or future purchasers.[164]In Tennessee the want of possession was only prima facie evidence of fraud, and might be explained.[165]If a father represented a slave to be his son’sdelivered possession and permitted possession to continue during the lifetime of the son, who also claimed the slave as his own, it was a gift. The acknowledgment of the son that the slave belonged to the father would not bar the claim of the widow.[166]

F.By Prescription.Prescription passed the title and possession of slaves in Tennessee.[167]In the case of Andrews v. Hartsfield, Judge Green held that a bona fide loan of slaves by a father to a married daughter for five years subjected the slaves to sale for the debts of her husband.[168]

A.As to Condition of Increase.Tennessee adopted the rule of nature, pertaining to human creatures, in declaring that the condition of the mother should be that of the child. Children born of a mother emancipated at a future date received their freedom with the mother. In the case of Harris v. Clarissa, who was to receive her freedom at the age of twenty, Judge Catron, speaking of the condition of her children born after the bequest of her freedom, said: “Had she been a slave forever, their condition would have been the same, she being a slave for years, their condition could not be worse. The child before born is a part of the mother, and its condition the same; birth does not alter its rights.”[169]Children born of a mother conditionally manumitted were held to be slaves.[170]

B.As to the Ownership of the Increase.Tennessee held that there was only one title to mother and child. If a negro woman were devised to one person for life, with the remainder to another, and during the life estate, she gave birth to children, they belonged not to the tenant for life, but to the remainder man.[171]The first legatee held only aparticular interest, while the second held absolute title.[172]If the first devisee received an absolute estate, the increase went to him.[173]The term increase was usually qualified by the word “future” in order to restrict its application to only the issue after the bequest of freedom to the mother.[174]

What, then, in conclusion, was the legal status of the slave? Was he a chattel? Or was he a responsible person? By the civil law, the slave was a chattel; by the common law he was a person. Both of these systems of jurisprudence were combined into a compromise that actually represented the legal status of the slave in Tennessee. The slave was both a chattel and a person.

A.As a Chattel.The slave was personal property. He, therefore, could neither own property, nor make a commercial contract. He had neither civil marriage nor political rights. His movements in the community were under the control of his master. He could not be a party to a law suit in ordinary matters. He had no control over his time or labor. His punishments were usually whipping. Like a chattel, he was an article of merchandise to be sold to the highest bidder. He had no control over his children at law, and could not be a witness against a white man.

B.As a Person.The slave was emancipated and given his full rights at law. He could be a party to a suit for his freedom and for property that his freedom involved. He could represent his master as agent. His marriage, while not a civil one, was held binding by the courts. The children of a recognized marriage were not illegitimate, and took the legal status of the mother. He could make a binding contract with his master for his freedom. He was held responsible at law for murder. His intellectual and moral qualities were recognized at times. He eventually acquired the right of trial by jury.

This compromise legal basis of slavery in Tennessee was well stated by Judge Nelson in the case of Andrews v. Page, as follows:

While the institution of slavery existed it was generally held in the slaveholding states that the marriage of slaves was utterly null and void; because of the paramount ownership in them as property, their incapacity to make a contract, and the incompatibility of the duties and obligations of husband and wife with relation to slavery.... But we are not aware that this doctrine ever was distinctly and explicitly recognized in this state.[175]

In another connection in the same case, Judge Nelson said:

The numerous authorities above cited show that slaves, although regarded as property and subject to many restrictions, never were considered by the courts of this state as standing on the same footing as horses, cattle, and other personal property.[176]

Judge McKinney, in Jones v. Allen, said:

We are not to forget, nor are we to suppose, that it was lost sight of by the legislature, that, under our modified system of slavery, slaves are not mere chattels, but are regarded in the two-fold character of persons and property; that is, as persons they are considered by our laws as accountable moral agents, possessed of volition and locomotion, and that certain rights have been conferred upon them by positive law and judicial determination, and other privileges and indulgences have been conceded to them by the universal consent of their owners. By uniform and universal usage, they are constituted the agents of their owners, and are sent on their business without written authority; and in like manner they are sent to perform those neighborly good offices common in every community. They are not at all times in the service of their owners, and are allowed byuniversal sufferance, at night, on Sundays, holidays, and other occasions, to go abroad, to attend church, to visit those to whom they are related by nature, though the relation may not be recognized by municipal law; and to exercise other innocent enjoyments without its ever entering the mind of any good citizen to demand written authority of them. The simple truth is, such indulgences have been so long and so uniformly tolerated that public sentiment upon the subject has acquired almost the force of positive law.[177]

FOOTNOTES[1]State v. Hale, 2 Hawks, 585 (1823).[2]Meigs and Cooper’s Code of 1858, Secs. 2603-9.[3]M. & C, Secs. 2610-11.[4]Ibid., Secs. 2612-13.[5]Ibid., Sec. 2603.[6]Acts of 1833. Ch. 3. Sec. 1.[7]M. & C, Secs. 2666-68.[8]Stewart v. Miller, 1 Meigs, 174 (1838).[9]Harris v. Clarissa, 6 Yerger, 227 (1834); Blackmore v. Negro Phill, 7 Yerger, 452 (1835).[10]Matilda v. Crenshaw, 4 Yerger, 299 (1833).[11]Vaughan v. Phebe, I Martin & Yerger, 1 (1827).[12]“Freedom in this country,” said Judge Crabb, “is not a mere name—a cheat with which the few gull the many. It is something substantial. It embraces within its comprehensive grasp, all the useful rights of man; and it makes itself manifest by many privileges, immunities, external public acts. It is not confined in its operation to privacy, or to the domestic circle. It walks abroad in its operations—transfers its possessor, even if he be black, or mulatto, or copper colored, from the kitchen and the cotton field, to the court house and the election ground, makes him talk of Magna Charta and the constitution; in some states renders him a politician—brings him acquainted with the leading citizens—busies himself in the political canvass for office—takes him to the ballot box; and, above all, secures to him the enviable and inestimable privilege of trial by jury. Can it be said, that there is nothing of a public nature in a right, that thus, from its necessary operation, places a man in many respects on an equality with the richest, and the greatest, and the best in the land, and brings him in contact with the whole community?” Vaughan v. Phebe, 1 Martin & Yerger, 1 (1827).[13]Matilda v. Crenshaw, 1 (1827).[14]Vaughan v. Phebe, 1 Martin & Yerger, 1 (1827).[15]Acts of 1817, Ch. 103, Sec. 1.[16]Sylvia and Phillis v. Covey, 4 Yerger, 27 (1883).[17]Acts of 1715, Ch. 19, Sec. 9; Acts of 1741, Ch. 24, Sec. 48.[18]Acts of 1783, Ch. 14, Sec. 2.[19]Manuscripts in State Archives.[20]Acts of 1815, Ch. 138, Sec. 1.[21]Acts of 1819, Ch. 35, Sec. 2.[22]Acts of 1825, Ch. 24, Sec. 1.[23]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 6.[24]Acts of 1835, Ch. 9, Secs. 9-11.[25]Kentucky, Maryland, Georgia, and Alabama were the other four. See footnote, Wheeler, Op. Cit., 213.[26]Acts of 1838, Ch. 133, Sec. 1.[27]Acts of 1848, Ch. 50, Sec. 1.[28]Acts of 1858, Ch. 86, Secs. 1-2.[29]Infra, pp.59-79;102-152.[30]Wheeler, Op. Cit., 190.[31]Porter v. Blackmore, 2 Caldwell, 555 (1865); see also 5 Caldwell, 209; 3 Heiskell, 662; and 10 Lea, 663.[32]Judge Catron held that “what is earned by the slave belongs to the master by the common law, the civil law, and the recognized rules of property in the slaveholding states of this Union.” University v. Cambreling, Yerger, 86 (1834).[33]Acts of 1803, Ch. 13, Sec. 4.[34]Turner v. Fisher, 4 Sneed, 210 (1856).[35]Judge Green held that “A slave is not in the condition of a horse or an ox. His liberty is restrained, it is true, and his owner controls his actions and claims his services. But he is made of the image of the Creator. He has mental capacities, and an immortal principle in his nature, that constitutes him equal to his owner but for the accidental position in which fortune has placed him. The owner has acquired conventional rights to him, but the laws under which he is held as a slave have not and can not extinguish his high-born nature nor deprive him of many rights which are inherent in man. Thus while he is a slave, he can make a contract for his freedom, and by the same will he can take personal or real estate.” Ford v. Ford, 7 Humphrey, 95-96 (1846). Cf. Miller v. Miller, 5 Heiskell, 734 (1871).[36]Stephenson v. Harrison, 3 Head, 733 (1859).[37]Wheeler, Op. Cit., 194.[38]Supra,16.[39]Acts of 1794, Ch. 1, Sec. 32.[40]Acts of 1813, Ch. 135, Sec. 5.[41]Acts of 1839, Ch. 7, Sec. 1.[42]Wheeler, Op. Cit., 197.[43]Stephenson v. Harrison, 3 Head, 733 (1859).[44]Andrews v. Page, 3 Heiskell, 665 (1870).[45]Haitsell v. George, 3 Humphrey, 255 (1842).[46]Andrews v. Page, 3 Heiskell, 666 (1870).[47]Act of 1753, Ch. 6, Sec. 10.[48]M. & C., Secs. 2563-64.[49]Acts of 1825, Ch. 24, Sec. 2.[50]Ibid., Secs. 3-5.[51]Thomas, T. Ebenezer, Anti-Slavery Correspondence, 71. The letter reads as follows: “Has the anti-slavery cause injured the condition of the slaves? Surely not. In my late journey through Kentucky and Tennessee, I did not see one dirty, ragged negro. The squads of little negroes I used to see naked as the pigs and calves with which they gamboled in the same grove, were now clad like human beings in shirts and pants or slips, and many of them had straw hats, such as my own little boys put on; nor did I; see, as formerly, boys and girls waiting at the table, in a state of stark nudity.”“I was happy to acknowledge that a great change had taken place since I was conversant about Nashville, fifty-five years ago, when negroes were naked and ignorant. I said I was pleased to see so much attention paid to their bodies and their minds, and I wished that the people of Tennessee might go ahead of the people in Ohio in good offices to the negro. God speed you, dear friends, in this work.”[52]Loftin v. Espy, 4 Yerger, 92 (1833).[53]Wheeler, Op. Cit., 225; University v. Cambreling, 6 Yerger, 79 (1834); Craig v. Leiper, 2 Yerger, 193 (1828); Pinson and Hawkins v. Ivey, 1 Yerger, 303 (1830).[54]Acts of 1741, Ch. 24, Sec. 40; Acts of 1753, Ch. 6, Sec. 2.[55]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 3.[56]Acts of 1835, Ch. 57, Sec. 2.[57]James v. State, 9 Humphrey, 310 (1848).[58]Acts of 1813, Ch. 56, Sec. 1.[59]Acts of 1779, Ch. 11, Sec. 4.[60]Acts of 1787, Ch. 6, Sec. 1.[61]Acts of 1835, Ch. 58, Sec. 1.[62]Ibid., Ch. 65, Sec. 2.[63]Acts of 1799, Ch. 9, Sec. 2.[64]Fields v. The State of Tennessee, 1 Yerger, 156 (1829).[65]“If a slave commits a criminal offense while in the services of the hirer,” said Judge McKinney, “it would be sufficient cause to discharge him. And if the hirer desires to have him punished for such offense the law has pointed out the mode, and he has the right to pursue it, but he has no right to become himself the avenger of the violated law, much less to depute another person in his stead. And for a battery committed on the slave under such circumstances, the owner may well maintain an action against the wrong-doer, in which the jury would be justified in giving exemplary damages in a proper case.” James v. Carper, 4 Sneed, 404 (1857).[66]Acts of 1813, Ch. 135, Sec. 3.[67]Ibid., Sec. 5.[68]Acts of 1803, Ch. 13, Sec. 11.[69]Ibid., Sec. 3.[70]Acts of 1753, Ch. VI, Sec. 4.[71]Acts of 1779, Ch. 7, Sec. 3.[72]Acts of 1806, Ch. 32, Sec. 5.[73]Ibid., Secs. 6-7.[74]Acts of 1817, Ch. 184, Sec. 3.[75]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 2.[76]Acts of 1858, Ch. 3, Sec. 1.[77]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 10.[78]M. & C., Secs. 2577-2580.[79]Acts of 1856, Ch. 30, Secs. 1-4.[80]M. & C., Sec. 2576.[81]Acts of 1806, Ch. 32, Sec. 8.[82]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 10.[83]M. & C., Sec. 2575.[84]M. & C., Sec. 2576.[85]Tomlinson v. Doerall, 2 Head, 542 (1859).[86]Jones v. Allen, 1 Head, 627 (1858).[87]Jones v. Allen, 1 Head, 636 (1858).[88]M. & C., Secs. 2581-3.[89]Ibid., Sec. 2586.[90]P. G. was an abbreviation for public jail.[91]M. & C, Secs. 2596-8.[92]Acts of 1819, Ch. 35, Sec. 1.[93]Acts of 1825, Ch. 79, Secs. 1-2.[94]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 8.[95]Ibid., Sec. 9.[96]Acts of 1844, Ch. 129, Sec. 1.[97]Acts of 1852, Ch. 117, Sec. 2.[98]Acts of 1786, Ch. 5, Sec. 1.[99]Acts of 1812, Ch. 88, Sec. 1.[100]This oath reads: “I, A. B., do solemnly swear or affirm that I have removed myself and slaves to the State of Tennessee, with the full and sole view of becoming a citizen thereof, and that I have not brought my slave or slaves to this state with any view to the security of the same against any rebellion or apprehension of rebellion. So help me God.” Acts of 1812, Ch. 88, Sec. 2.[101]Acts of 1812, Ch. 88, Sec. 3.[102]Acts of 1815, Ch. 65, Sec. 1.[103]Acts of 1826, Ch. 22, Sec. 2.[104]Acts of 1826, Ch. 22, Sec. 3.[105]Acts of 1855, Ch. 64, Sec. 1.[106]Journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1834, 87-147.[107]Comptroller’s Report to General Assembly, 1859-60, 17.[108]Acts of 1799, Ch. 11, Sec. 2.[109]Acts of 1835, Ch. 58, Sec. 1.[110]Ibid., Sec. 2.[111]Christian Advocate and Journal, Bolivar, July 4, 1831.[112]Quarterly Anti-Slavery Magazine, II, 105-6.[113]Supra, pp.18-19.[114]Acts of 1799, Ch. 28, Sec. 1.[115]Acts of 1803, Ch. 13, Sec. 4.[116]Acts of 1806, Ch. 32, Sec. 4.[117]Acts of 1813, Ch. 135, Sec. 3.[118]Ibid., Sec. 1.[119]Acts of 1829, Ch. 74, Secs. 1-2.[120]Acts of 1829, Ch. 74, Sec. 4.[121]Acts of 1832, Ch. 34, Sec. 2.[122]Acts of 1846, Ch. 90, Sec. 3.[123]Acts of 1842, Ch. 141, Sec. 1.[124]Jennings v. the State, 3 Head, 519-520 (1859).[125]M. & C., Sec. 4865.[126]Jennings v. State, 3 Head, 522 (1859).[127]Tennessee Gazette and Mero District, Vol. 5, No. 22, July 3, 1805.[128]Acts of 1803, Ch. 13, Sec. 1.[129]Acts of 1836, Ch. 44, Sec. 2.[130]Niles Register, Vol. 41, pp. 340-1.[131]24th and 25th Annual Report of American Anti-Slavery Society, 1857-58, 76-78.[132]24th and 25th Annual Reports of American Anti-Slavery Society, 1857-58, p. 78.[133]Acts of 1803, Ch. 13, Sec. 3.[134]Acts of 1812, Ch. 135, Sec. 1.[135]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 1.[136]Unlawful assemblies was defined by the act of 1831 as being “all assemblages of slaves in unusual numbers, or at suspicious times and places not expressly authorized by their owners.”[137]Acts of 1799, Ch. 28, Sec. 1.[138]Acts of 1801, Ch. 32, Sec. 3.[139]Acts of 1813, Ch. 135, Sec. 6.[140]Acts of 1829, Ch. 74, Sec. 1.[141]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 4.[142]Acts of 1844, Ch. 129, Sec. 1.[143]Acts of 1741, Ch. 8, Sec. 10.[144]Acts of 1819, Ch. 35, Sec. 1.[145]Acts of 1835, Ch. 19, Sec. 10.[146]M. & C., Secs. 2625-28.[147]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 4.[148]Wheeler, Op. Cit., 41.[149]Acts of 1784, Ch. 10, Sec. 7.[150]Acts of 1801, Ch. 2, Sec. 11.[151]Davis v. Mitchell, 5 Yerger, 281 (1833); See also Cains and Wife v. Marley, 2 Yerger, 582 (1831); and Battle v. Stone, 4 Yerger, 168 (1833).[152]Ragan v. Kennedy, I Overton, 91 (1804).[153]Acts of 1784, Ch. 22, Sec. 11.[154]Ibid., Ch. 10, Sec. 4.[155]Acts of 1796, Ch. 14, Sec. 1.[156]Acts of 1819, Ch. 36, Sec. 1.[157]Young v. Pate, 4 Yerger, 164 (1833).[158]Acts of 1805, Ch. 16, Sec. 2.[159]Acts of 1715, Ch. 27, Sec. 5.[160]Hardeson v. Hays, 4 Yerger, 507 (1833); Kegler v. Miles, 1 Martin & Yerger, 426 (1825); Partee v. Badget, 4 Yerger, 174 (1833).[161]Davis v. Mitchell, 5 Yerger, 281 (1833).[162]Kegler v. Miles, 1 Martin & Yerger, 426 (1825).[163]Acts of 1801, Ch. 25, Sec. 2.[164]Acts of 1805, Ch. 16, Sec. 2.[165]Callen v. Thompson, 3 Yerger, 475 (1832).[166]Hooper’s Administratrix v. Hooper, 1 Overton, 187 (1801).[167]Acts of 1801, Ch. 25, Sec. 2.[168]Andrews v. Hartsfield. 3 Yerger, 39 (1832); see also Peters v. Chores, 4 Yerger, 176 (1833).[169]Harris v. Clarissa, 6 Yerger, 227 (1834).[170]Hope v. Johnson, 2 Yerger, 123 (1826).[171]Preston v. McGaughery, 1 Cook, 115 (1812).[172]Caines and Wife v. Marley, 2 Yerger, 586 (1831).[173]Smith v. Bell and Wife, 1 Martin & Yerger, 302 (1827).[174]Wheeler, Op. Cit., 225.[175]Andrews v. Page, 3 Heiskell, 661 (1868).[176]Ibid., 662.[177]Andrews v. Page, 3 Heiskell, 662-3 (1868).

[1]State v. Hale, 2 Hawks, 585 (1823).

[2]Meigs and Cooper’s Code of 1858, Secs. 2603-9.

[3]M. & C, Secs. 2610-11.

[4]Ibid., Secs. 2612-13.

[5]Ibid., Sec. 2603.

[6]Acts of 1833. Ch. 3. Sec. 1.

[7]M. & C, Secs. 2666-68.

[8]Stewart v. Miller, 1 Meigs, 174 (1838).

[9]Harris v. Clarissa, 6 Yerger, 227 (1834); Blackmore v. Negro Phill, 7 Yerger, 452 (1835).

[10]Matilda v. Crenshaw, 4 Yerger, 299 (1833).

[11]Vaughan v. Phebe, I Martin & Yerger, 1 (1827).

[12]“Freedom in this country,” said Judge Crabb, “is not a mere name—a cheat with which the few gull the many. It is something substantial. It embraces within its comprehensive grasp, all the useful rights of man; and it makes itself manifest by many privileges, immunities, external public acts. It is not confined in its operation to privacy, or to the domestic circle. It walks abroad in its operations—transfers its possessor, even if he be black, or mulatto, or copper colored, from the kitchen and the cotton field, to the court house and the election ground, makes him talk of Magna Charta and the constitution; in some states renders him a politician—brings him acquainted with the leading citizens—busies himself in the political canvass for office—takes him to the ballot box; and, above all, secures to him the enviable and inestimable privilege of trial by jury. Can it be said, that there is nothing of a public nature in a right, that thus, from its necessary operation, places a man in many respects on an equality with the richest, and the greatest, and the best in the land, and brings him in contact with the whole community?” Vaughan v. Phebe, 1 Martin & Yerger, 1 (1827).

[13]Matilda v. Crenshaw, 1 (1827).

[14]Vaughan v. Phebe, 1 Martin & Yerger, 1 (1827).

[15]Acts of 1817, Ch. 103, Sec. 1.

[16]Sylvia and Phillis v. Covey, 4 Yerger, 27 (1883).

[17]Acts of 1715, Ch. 19, Sec. 9; Acts of 1741, Ch. 24, Sec. 48.

[18]Acts of 1783, Ch. 14, Sec. 2.

[19]Manuscripts in State Archives.

[20]Acts of 1815, Ch. 138, Sec. 1.

[21]Acts of 1819, Ch. 35, Sec. 2.

[22]Acts of 1825, Ch. 24, Sec. 1.

[23]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 6.

[24]Acts of 1835, Ch. 9, Secs. 9-11.

[25]Kentucky, Maryland, Georgia, and Alabama were the other four. See footnote, Wheeler, Op. Cit., 213.

[26]Acts of 1838, Ch. 133, Sec. 1.

[27]Acts of 1848, Ch. 50, Sec. 1.

[28]Acts of 1858, Ch. 86, Secs. 1-2.

[29]Infra, pp.59-79;102-152.

[30]Wheeler, Op. Cit., 190.

[31]Porter v. Blackmore, 2 Caldwell, 555 (1865); see also 5 Caldwell, 209; 3 Heiskell, 662; and 10 Lea, 663.

[32]Judge Catron held that “what is earned by the slave belongs to the master by the common law, the civil law, and the recognized rules of property in the slaveholding states of this Union.” University v. Cambreling, Yerger, 86 (1834).

[33]Acts of 1803, Ch. 13, Sec. 4.

[34]Turner v. Fisher, 4 Sneed, 210 (1856).

[35]Judge Green held that “A slave is not in the condition of a horse or an ox. His liberty is restrained, it is true, and his owner controls his actions and claims his services. But he is made of the image of the Creator. He has mental capacities, and an immortal principle in his nature, that constitutes him equal to his owner but for the accidental position in which fortune has placed him. The owner has acquired conventional rights to him, but the laws under which he is held as a slave have not and can not extinguish his high-born nature nor deprive him of many rights which are inherent in man. Thus while he is a slave, he can make a contract for his freedom, and by the same will he can take personal or real estate.” Ford v. Ford, 7 Humphrey, 95-96 (1846). Cf. Miller v. Miller, 5 Heiskell, 734 (1871).

[36]Stephenson v. Harrison, 3 Head, 733 (1859).

[37]Wheeler, Op. Cit., 194.

[38]Supra,16.

[39]Acts of 1794, Ch. 1, Sec. 32.

[40]Acts of 1813, Ch. 135, Sec. 5.

[41]Acts of 1839, Ch. 7, Sec. 1.

[42]Wheeler, Op. Cit., 197.

[43]Stephenson v. Harrison, 3 Head, 733 (1859).

[44]Andrews v. Page, 3 Heiskell, 665 (1870).

[45]Haitsell v. George, 3 Humphrey, 255 (1842).

[46]Andrews v. Page, 3 Heiskell, 666 (1870).

[47]Act of 1753, Ch. 6, Sec. 10.

[48]M. & C., Secs. 2563-64.

[49]Acts of 1825, Ch. 24, Sec. 2.

[50]Ibid., Secs. 3-5.

[51]Thomas, T. Ebenezer, Anti-Slavery Correspondence, 71. The letter reads as follows: “Has the anti-slavery cause injured the condition of the slaves? Surely not. In my late journey through Kentucky and Tennessee, I did not see one dirty, ragged negro. The squads of little negroes I used to see naked as the pigs and calves with which they gamboled in the same grove, were now clad like human beings in shirts and pants or slips, and many of them had straw hats, such as my own little boys put on; nor did I; see, as formerly, boys and girls waiting at the table, in a state of stark nudity.”“I was happy to acknowledge that a great change had taken place since I was conversant about Nashville, fifty-five years ago, when negroes were naked and ignorant. I said I was pleased to see so much attention paid to their bodies and their minds, and I wished that the people of Tennessee might go ahead of the people in Ohio in good offices to the negro. God speed you, dear friends, in this work.”

“I was happy to acknowledge that a great change had taken place since I was conversant about Nashville, fifty-five years ago, when negroes were naked and ignorant. I said I was pleased to see so much attention paid to their bodies and their minds, and I wished that the people of Tennessee might go ahead of the people in Ohio in good offices to the negro. God speed you, dear friends, in this work.”

[52]Loftin v. Espy, 4 Yerger, 92 (1833).

[53]Wheeler, Op. Cit., 225; University v. Cambreling, 6 Yerger, 79 (1834); Craig v. Leiper, 2 Yerger, 193 (1828); Pinson and Hawkins v. Ivey, 1 Yerger, 303 (1830).

[54]Acts of 1741, Ch. 24, Sec. 40; Acts of 1753, Ch. 6, Sec. 2.

[55]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 3.

[56]Acts of 1835, Ch. 57, Sec. 2.

[57]James v. State, 9 Humphrey, 310 (1848).

[58]Acts of 1813, Ch. 56, Sec. 1.

[59]Acts of 1779, Ch. 11, Sec. 4.

[60]Acts of 1787, Ch. 6, Sec. 1.

[61]Acts of 1835, Ch. 58, Sec. 1.

[62]Ibid., Ch. 65, Sec. 2.

[63]Acts of 1799, Ch. 9, Sec. 2.

[64]Fields v. The State of Tennessee, 1 Yerger, 156 (1829).

[65]“If a slave commits a criminal offense while in the services of the hirer,” said Judge McKinney, “it would be sufficient cause to discharge him. And if the hirer desires to have him punished for such offense the law has pointed out the mode, and he has the right to pursue it, but he has no right to become himself the avenger of the violated law, much less to depute another person in his stead. And for a battery committed on the slave under such circumstances, the owner may well maintain an action against the wrong-doer, in which the jury would be justified in giving exemplary damages in a proper case.” James v. Carper, 4 Sneed, 404 (1857).

[66]Acts of 1813, Ch. 135, Sec. 3.

[67]Ibid., Sec. 5.

[68]Acts of 1803, Ch. 13, Sec. 11.

[69]Ibid., Sec. 3.

[70]Acts of 1753, Ch. VI, Sec. 4.

[71]Acts of 1779, Ch. 7, Sec. 3.

[72]Acts of 1806, Ch. 32, Sec. 5.

[73]Ibid., Secs. 6-7.

[74]Acts of 1817, Ch. 184, Sec. 3.

[75]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 2.

[76]Acts of 1858, Ch. 3, Sec. 1.

[77]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 10.

[78]M. & C., Secs. 2577-2580.

[79]Acts of 1856, Ch. 30, Secs. 1-4.

[80]M. & C., Sec. 2576.

[81]Acts of 1806, Ch. 32, Sec. 8.

[82]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 10.

[83]M. & C., Sec. 2575.

[84]M. & C., Sec. 2576.

[85]Tomlinson v. Doerall, 2 Head, 542 (1859).

[86]Jones v. Allen, 1 Head, 627 (1858).

[87]Jones v. Allen, 1 Head, 636 (1858).

[88]M. & C., Secs. 2581-3.

[89]Ibid., Sec. 2586.

[90]P. G. was an abbreviation for public jail.

[91]M. & C, Secs. 2596-8.

[92]Acts of 1819, Ch. 35, Sec. 1.

[93]Acts of 1825, Ch. 79, Secs. 1-2.

[94]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 8.

[95]Ibid., Sec. 9.

[96]Acts of 1844, Ch. 129, Sec. 1.

[97]Acts of 1852, Ch. 117, Sec. 2.

[98]Acts of 1786, Ch. 5, Sec. 1.

[99]Acts of 1812, Ch. 88, Sec. 1.

[100]This oath reads: “I, A. B., do solemnly swear or affirm that I have removed myself and slaves to the State of Tennessee, with the full and sole view of becoming a citizen thereof, and that I have not brought my slave or slaves to this state with any view to the security of the same against any rebellion or apprehension of rebellion. So help me God.” Acts of 1812, Ch. 88, Sec. 2.

[101]Acts of 1812, Ch. 88, Sec. 3.

[102]Acts of 1815, Ch. 65, Sec. 1.

[103]Acts of 1826, Ch. 22, Sec. 2.

[104]Acts of 1826, Ch. 22, Sec. 3.

[105]Acts of 1855, Ch. 64, Sec. 1.

[106]Journal of the Constitutional Convention of 1834, 87-147.

[107]Comptroller’s Report to General Assembly, 1859-60, 17.

[108]Acts of 1799, Ch. 11, Sec. 2.

[109]Acts of 1835, Ch. 58, Sec. 1.

[110]Ibid., Sec. 2.

[111]Christian Advocate and Journal, Bolivar, July 4, 1831.

[112]Quarterly Anti-Slavery Magazine, II, 105-6.

[113]Supra, pp.18-19.

[114]Acts of 1799, Ch. 28, Sec. 1.

[115]Acts of 1803, Ch. 13, Sec. 4.

[116]Acts of 1806, Ch. 32, Sec. 4.

[117]Acts of 1813, Ch. 135, Sec. 3.

[118]Ibid., Sec. 1.

[119]Acts of 1829, Ch. 74, Secs. 1-2.

[120]Acts of 1829, Ch. 74, Sec. 4.

[121]Acts of 1832, Ch. 34, Sec. 2.

[122]Acts of 1846, Ch. 90, Sec. 3.

[123]Acts of 1842, Ch. 141, Sec. 1.

[124]Jennings v. the State, 3 Head, 519-520 (1859).

[125]M. & C., Sec. 4865.

[126]Jennings v. State, 3 Head, 522 (1859).

[127]Tennessee Gazette and Mero District, Vol. 5, No. 22, July 3, 1805.

[128]Acts of 1803, Ch. 13, Sec. 1.

[129]Acts of 1836, Ch. 44, Sec. 2.

[130]Niles Register, Vol. 41, pp. 340-1.

[131]24th and 25th Annual Report of American Anti-Slavery Society, 1857-58, 76-78.

[132]24th and 25th Annual Reports of American Anti-Slavery Society, 1857-58, p. 78.

[133]Acts of 1803, Ch. 13, Sec. 3.

[134]Acts of 1812, Ch. 135, Sec. 1.

[135]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 1.

[136]Unlawful assemblies was defined by the act of 1831 as being “all assemblages of slaves in unusual numbers, or at suspicious times and places not expressly authorized by their owners.”

[137]Acts of 1799, Ch. 28, Sec. 1.

[138]Acts of 1801, Ch. 32, Sec. 3.

[139]Acts of 1813, Ch. 135, Sec. 6.

[140]Acts of 1829, Ch. 74, Sec. 1.

[141]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 4.

[142]Acts of 1844, Ch. 129, Sec. 1.

[143]Acts of 1741, Ch. 8, Sec. 10.

[144]Acts of 1819, Ch. 35, Sec. 1.

[145]Acts of 1835, Ch. 19, Sec. 10.

[146]M. & C., Secs. 2625-28.

[147]Acts of 1831, Ch. 103, Sec. 4.

[148]Wheeler, Op. Cit., 41.

[149]Acts of 1784, Ch. 10, Sec. 7.

[150]Acts of 1801, Ch. 2, Sec. 11.

[151]Davis v. Mitchell, 5 Yerger, 281 (1833); See also Cains and Wife v. Marley, 2 Yerger, 582 (1831); and Battle v. Stone, 4 Yerger, 168 (1833).

[152]Ragan v. Kennedy, I Overton, 91 (1804).

[153]Acts of 1784, Ch. 22, Sec. 11.

[154]Ibid., Ch. 10, Sec. 4.

[155]Acts of 1796, Ch. 14, Sec. 1.

[156]Acts of 1819, Ch. 36, Sec. 1.

[157]Young v. Pate, 4 Yerger, 164 (1833).

[158]Acts of 1805, Ch. 16, Sec. 2.

[159]Acts of 1715, Ch. 27, Sec. 5.

[160]Hardeson v. Hays, 4 Yerger, 507 (1833); Kegler v. Miles, 1 Martin & Yerger, 426 (1825); Partee v. Badget, 4 Yerger, 174 (1833).

[161]Davis v. Mitchell, 5 Yerger, 281 (1833).

[162]Kegler v. Miles, 1 Martin & Yerger, 426 (1825).

[163]Acts of 1801, Ch. 25, Sec. 2.

[164]Acts of 1805, Ch. 16, Sec. 2.

[165]Callen v. Thompson, 3 Yerger, 475 (1832).

[166]Hooper’s Administratrix v. Hooper, 1 Overton, 187 (1801).

[167]Acts of 1801, Ch. 25, Sec. 2.

[168]Andrews v. Hartsfield. 3 Yerger, 39 (1832); see also Peters v. Chores, 4 Yerger, 176 (1833).

[169]Harris v. Clarissa, 6 Yerger, 227 (1834).

[170]Hope v. Johnson, 2 Yerger, 123 (1826).

[171]Preston v. McGaughery, 1 Cook, 115 (1812).

[172]Caines and Wife v. Marley, 2 Yerger, 586 (1831).

[173]Smith v. Bell and Wife, 1 Martin & Yerger, 302 (1827).

[174]Wheeler, Op. Cit., 225.

[175]Andrews v. Page, 3 Heiskell, 661 (1868).

[176]Ibid., 662.

[177]Andrews v. Page, 3 Heiskell, 662-3 (1868).

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