Part I. The New Constitution

Part I. The New Constitution[pg 003]I.—The Constitution: A Commentary.By Professor J. H. Morgan“Home Rule is at bottom Federalism,”we are told1by the most distinguished jurist among its opponents. It is urged against it that Federal Governments are almost invariably weak Governments, and that, in so far as they are strong, they are as“symmetrical”as the new constitution is unsymmetrical. Cornewall Lewis once thought it necessary to write a book on the Use and Abuse of Political Terms, and there is a great danger in the present controversy of our being enslaved by the poverty of our political vocabulary. The term“Federalism”is put to such new and alien uses as to darken counsel and confuse thought. That Federal Executives are usually weak, that in the dual allegiance of a Federal system men often prefer the State authority which is near to the Federal authority which is remote, that the respective limits of Federal and State legislation are defined with difficulty and observed with reluctance, that conflict of laws is more often the rule than the exception, that[pg 004]Federal constitutions are rigid rather than flexible, and, in a word, that progress is sacrificed to stability: all these things are true, and all these things are irrelevant. The Government of Ireland Bill is not, and cannot be, the corner-stone of a Federal system for the United Kingdom, although its duplication in the case of Scotland and of England would not be impossible, should it appear desirable. We may, for want of a better term, call it the foundation of a system of Devolution, but we must not call it Federalism.Putting on one side for the moment the question whether Home Rule is Federalism or not, I am inclined to enter a protest against all these attempts to fit the Bill into the categories of the jurist. It is very doubtful whether any two constitutions in the world, even federal constitutions, can be brought under one species. Two of the most successful“federal”constitutions present the gravest anomalies to the theorist. The Canadian Constitution, according to Professor Dicey, betrays a logical fallacy in the very words of its preamble;2and German jurists have wrangled no less inconclusively than incessantly about the legal character of the Empire and as to where its sovereignty resides;3yet in neither case has the practical operation of these constitutions been much the worse for the legal solecisms which they present. Indeed, it would not be too much to say with Aristotle that the“mixed”and not the“pure”type of government is the most successful,[pg 005]and that when Federalism is, as in the United States, at its purest, it is also at its weakest. The constitution of Imperial Germany ought, on this kind of reasoning, to be a flagrant perversion, and yet it has persisted in enduring for some forty-one years, and the prestige of its principal organ, the Bundesrath, although violating all Mr. Balfour's principles as to“equality”in its constitution, is, according to the doyen of the constitutional lawyers of Germany, increasing every day.4The argument that“Federalism”is incompatible with the preponderance of the“predominant partner,”and that no“federal”union is possible in these islands owing to the superior position occupied by England, would, even if it were relevant, be easily refuted by the example presented by the hegemony of Prussia.The same objection may be urged against the contention that the grant of self-government, whether to Ireland alone or to the rest of the United Kingdom, is both reactionary and unprecedented. The progress of all civilised communities, we are told, is towards political integration, not away from it. Devolution, it is said, is gratuitous in the case of a“United”Kingdom whose very union represents an ideal imperfectly achieved by the less fortunate countries which have had to be content with something less complete in the form of Federalism. Nations or Colonies mutually independent federate as a step towards union; it is“unprecedented”to reverse the process and qualify union by looser ties of cohesion. Now this attempt“to construct a normal programme for all portions of mankind”5cannot be sustained. If it[pg 006]could, it would avail as a conclusive argument against the grant of self-government to our Colonies whose claims to legislative independence grow with their growth and strengthen with their strength.6But it is not even true of Federal Unions. Anyone who takes the trouble to study the history of judicial interpretation of the American Constitution will find that there is a constant ebb and flow in the current of“unionism.”The intention of the framers of the 14th Amendment to create a United States citizenship has been largely neutralized by the decisions of the Supreme Court, which have inclined strongly in the direction of the legislative autonomy of the States.7Nor is this all. We are told that Federal Constitutions are“round and perfect and self-contained,”8—that they are characterized by“equality”of all the parts—and that, like the work of the divine law-giver of early communities, they are finished the moment they are begun.9But these confident inductions cannot be sustained. The history of the constitution of the United States and of Imperial Germany tells another story—a story of ancillary communities and dependencies in various stages of political apprenticeship. If we look for the American Constitution where all such constitutions must really be sought, that is to say not in the original text, but in the commentary of the courts, we shall find a truly remarkable tendency of late years to[pg 007]emphasize this heterogeneity, inequality and incompleteness.10The new Bill proposes a delegation of authority, both executive and legislative. Unlike a Federal constitution, it contemplates no distribution of sovereignty (begging a question which has often vexed the jurists as to the partibility of sovereignty). The new Government in Ireland will, indeed, be carried on in the name of the Crown, the writs of the Irish Court will run in the King's name, the statutes of the Irish Parliament will be enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and Commons. But the Imperial Government and the Imperial Parliament will remain supreme. The executive power in Ireland will continue vested in His Majesty, though some prerogatives may be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant who, as respects them, will exist in a dual capacity—some of these he will exercise on the advice of the Imperial Government, others on the advice of the Irish Government. So far, however, as the law, as distinguished from convention, is concerned, he will be in no way bound to act on the advice of his Irish Ministers except in so far as his“instructions”require him to do so. The words of the Bill do, indeed, contemplate with more explicitness than is usual in our written constitutions, a transfer of executive as well as of legislative authority, but they are by no means exhaustive, and[pg 008]they still leave it to His Majesty to determine11what prerogatives shall be delegated after the Act has come into force. As regards the legislative power, it will remain with the Imperial Government to give it effect by granting or withholding the King's assent to Irish legislation,12and the Imperial Parliament may, at any time, exercise its supremacy to the prejudice of such legislation, even after it has found its way on to the Irish statute-book. As regards the judiciary, there will, of course, be no dual judiciary: Irish Courts will interpret and enforce Imperial as well as Irish statutes, but both in the one case and in the other their judgments will be subject to appeal to an Imperial Court—the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In other words, the Imperial power will be supreme in the executive, the legislative, and the judicial sphere.Now in Federalism in the true sense—and I regard the constitution of the United States as the archetype—there is no such subordination. The authority of the constituent states and of the Federal nation are distinct and independent of one another. The Governor of the State is appointed not by the Federal authority, but by the State itself, whose servant he is. There[pg 009]is no“Crown”to serve as a common denominator of State and Federal Executives.13The one is not subordinate to the other, but is co-ordinate with it. The legislation of the State is subject to no external veto by the President. Nor is it subject to a legislative veto. In all matters not expressly conceded to the Federal Legislature, the State Legislatures remain as supreme after the enactment of the Federal Constitution as they were before it. In the legislative, as in the executive, sphere, the two authorities are co-ordinate. So with the judiciary. The decisions of the State Courts, in so far as they deal with State matters, and do not involve the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, are final and subject to no appeal to the Supreme Court at Washington. Conversely, Federal Circuit Courts exist independently of the State Courts to decide cases arising under Federal statutes or involving the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, and their judgments are enforced not by the State Executive but by the Federal Executive, which has its own marshals for the purpose. Nor can an act done by a Federal official, in obedience to a Federal statute, be punished by the State Court, even though it appear to involve a breach of a law of the State.14[pg 010]It is this dual allegiance that constitutes the inherent weakness of all Federal systems. Arguments based upon it have been urged against the grant of self-government to Ireland. Even those who admit that Federal analogies have no application so far as the relations of the Imperial and Irish legislatures are concerned, and who concede that the Irish Parliament will be as subordinate as a State Parliament in a Federal system is co-ordinate—none the less insist that in the relation of the two executives there is a real and perilous dualism. Many opponents allege, and no doubt, believe, that, with an Irish Parliament sitting at Dublin, the King's Writ will not run, the decisions of the Judicial Committee will not be enforced. Imperial statutes will not be obeyed, and Imperial taxes will not be collected. If there were a real delimitation of Courts and Executives, Imperial and Irish, under the new system, such a danger, though remote, would be conceivable. But no such sharp distinction is to be found in the Bill. In political unions, the central Government may act upon its subjects in a particular state directly through its own agencies—its own Courts, its own Executive officers, and its own police—this is the true Federal type; or it may act indirectly through the agency of the State authorities. Conversely, the State Governments may act directly through their own agencies—this again is the Federal principle, or they may act indirectly through Imperial agencies. Now wherever this indirect action is employed in both its forms the distinction between the two authorities is confused, the Federal principle undergoes a qualification which, by depriving it of half its symmetry, deprives it of all its weakness. Just this reciprocal relationship is established between the Imperial Government and the Irish Government.[pg 011]Imperial officials will be at the service of the Irish Government, and Irish officials at the service of the Imperial Government. For example, in the collection of taxes imposed by the Irish Parliament, the Irish Government will depend upon Imperial revenue officers to assess and collect them. The Imperial Government, on the other hand, will depend upon Irish Courts and Irish sheriffs to enforce their collection. Irish sheriffs will, in turn, depend upon an Imperial constabulary to assist them in levying execution. I shall return to some of these points in greater detail when I come to deal with the relations between the Executive and the Judiciary, and the maintenance of law and order. It is sufficient for me to remark here that the Irish Nationalist who wishes to defy the Imperial Government, and the Irish Unionist who wishes to defy the Irish Government, will each be hard put to define what he is pleased to regard as the limits of political obligation. He will find it difficult to distinguish where the authority of the Irish Government ends and that of the Imperial Government begins.The Supremacy of the Imperial Parliament.In the new Bill the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is secured by express words. The words are not necessary. No Parliament can bind its successors, and what one Parliament has done another Parliament may undo. Even when one Parliament has been at pains, by declaring its legislation“perpetual”or“unalterable”to bind posterity—as in the case of certain clauses in the Irish and Scotch Acts of Union—its injunctions have been disregarded by its successors with no more formality than is necessary in the case of any other legislation. An Act setting up a new Constitution is no more irrevocable than an Act authorising the[pg 012]imposition of the income tax. If, therefore, the Imperial Parliament chooses to grant a Constitution to Ireland, there is nothing to prevent its revoking or amending that grant, even (we submit) though it should have been at pains to enact that the Constitution could only be surrendered or altered by the consent of the Legislature which that Constitution created. Some doubts did, indeed, arise as to this point in the case of the Home Rule Bill of 1886, which not only excluded the Irish members from Westminster, but made provision for the amendment of the new Constitution by stipulating that such amendment should be made, if at all, by the joint authority of the Irish and English Parliaments. Whether this would have had the effect of preventing the“Imperial”Parliament from amending such a Home Rule Act without calling in the assistance of the Irish Parliament was much discussed at the time.15Obviously, the question does not now arise, as the Irish members are to continue to sit at Westminster.16[pg 013]It is therefore open to the Imperial Parliament at any time to repeal or amend the Government of Ireland Bill after it has become law. On the other hand, the Irish Parliament will have no power, except in so far as such power is conceded by the Act itself, to alter its provisions. This is stated in the Bill itself,17but the statement is superfluous. It follows from the doctrine of the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament that statutes of that Parliament can only be repealed by the Parliament itself. No constitution granted to a British Colony, however large the grant of self-government it contains, can be altered by that colony unless the power to alter it is expressly conceded. Such a power, when the Constitution itself does not prescribe some particular method of constitutional amendment, has indeed been granted in general terms by Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, but this Act could not apply to Ireland, which is outside the legal definition of a colony contained in the Interpretation Act of 1889. The only powers of constitutional amendment which the Irish Legislature will possess are those expressly conceded in Clause 9, which enables it after three years from the passing of the Act to deal with the franchise and with re-distribution.The Irish Parliament will, of course, have power to[pg 014]repeal any existing Acts of the Imperial Parliament in so far as they relate to Ireland, and do not deal with matters exempted from its authority. It would be impossible for it to legislate for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland if it had not this power, and the power is implied in the general grant. But if the Imperial Parliament chooses to continue to legislate for Ireland, even in matters in regard to which the Irish Parliament has been empowered to legislate, such Imperial legislation will be of superior obligation. This is also a corollary of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, and it was not necessary to state it in the Bill.18The grant of particular legislative powers to Ireland does not prevent the Imperial Parliament from subsequently legislating in derogation of those powers. The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is as inexhaustible as the fountain of honour.It is just here that the divergence from Federal principles is most marked. Under the British North America Act the legislative powers of the provinces are“exclusive”of Dominion legislation within their own sphere.19So, too, in the case of the Australian Constitution, under which the residuary legislative powers remain with the States, the Federal Parliament is excluded from legislating in any matters not expressly conceded to it. The result is seriously to limit the operations of such powers as it does possess. It has, for example,[pg 015]over Customs and Excise, but there are other ways of giving a preference to a trade than by the imposition of duties: a low standard of factory legislation may operate in the same direction, as the Federal Parliament found to its cost when it attempted to pass an Excise Tariff Act, depriving manufacturers of the advantages of the new tariff in those States in which a certain industrial minimum was not observed. The Act was held invalid by the High Court20on the ground that it exceeded the powers conferred on the Federal Parliament by the Constitution, and encroached on the exclusive powers of industrial legislation which belonged to the States. No such situation would be possible under the Government of Ireland Act, because the powers of the Irish Legislature are not exclusive of the powers of the Imperial Parliament, but merely concurrent. And whenever an Irish and an Imperial statute conflict, the rule of construction will be in favour of the latter.The Powers of the Irish ParliamentThe Irish Parliament is given a general power to make laws for“the peace, order, and good government”of Ireland. The words are those usually employed in the grant of legislative power in colonial constitutions, and they have been interpreted as authorising“the utmost discretion of enactment for the attainment of the objects appointed to them.”21No considerations of policy or equity or repugnancy to the common law would avail to challenge an Irish statute on the ground that it wasultra vires. Within the limits assigned to it the Irish Parliament will have authority[pg 016]as plenary and as ample as the Imperial Parliament itself possesses or can bestow, and it may, if it so pleases, delegate this authority.22The Irish legislature will, however, have no power to legislate extra-territorially.23It could not, for example, pass a law to punish the Irish subjects of the Crown for offences committed outside Ireland.Now, these powers are undeniably large—larger, indeed, than is usually the case even in Federal systems where the unenumerated or“residuary”powers are left to the State. It is conceivable that they might be exercised to the prejudice of the Imperial Government and of the union of the two kingdoms, and there is nothing in these clauses of the Act to prevent them being so exercised. Treating it as a statute on the ordinary principles of the interpretation of statutes, the Judicial Committee would have no option but to regard as valid any legislation of the Irish Parliament that did not come within the exempted powers. With policy they are not and would not be concerned. But then it must be remembered that there is the possibility of the exercise of the veto of the Imperial Government in cases where legislation, thoughintra vires, is inequitable, inexpedient, or contrary to Imperial interests. This executive veto is really a juristic fact of great importance—it has always been present to their lordships'24mind as a reason for refusing to apply to the interpretation of the Federal constitutions of Canada and Australia the restrictive principles of the Supreme[pg 017]Court, as laid down in Marshall's famous doctrine of“implied restraints.”25When no such veto is in the hands of the Central Government, it becomes necessary to restrict, either in the text of the constitution, or in judicial interpretation of it, with considerable precision, the powers of the local legislatures. This is why a true Federal system always involves a very large amount of litigation. But litigation is a thing to be avoided, if possible. It encourages political parties to carry test cases into the courts.Constitutional Restrictions.26The problem of protecting the rights and privileges of minorities in Ireland by constitutional restrictions is the most delicate that ever perplexed the mind of the jurist. It is one which puts the Irish problem in a category by itself. In no other Constitution in the Empire—with the exception of a single clause in the British North America Act—is any attempt made to fetter the discretion of Parliaments by the imposition of juristic limitations upon their legislative capacity. To say a Parliament shall not legislate except upon certain subjects is one thing, to attempt to definehowit shall legislate upon those very subjects is quite another. The latter is as difficult as the former is simple. To adopt a pedestrian illustration, it is easy enough to forbid motorists to drive along certain roads, but to forbid them to drive“recklessly”along any road is another matter.“Recklessly”at once raises[pg 018]questions of standards of negligence and actionable rights. How are we going to distinguish“just”from“unjust”legislation, taxes which discriminate from taxes which do not,“rights”of the subject which a Parliament may disregard from those which it must respect? There has never been any doubt that a colonial legislature may deal with the common law rights of the subject as it pleases, may abolish trial by jury, suspend the writ ofhabeas corpus, pass bills of attainder, enactex post factolegislation, take private property without compensation, and indemnify the Executive against actions for breaches of the law—if any doubt ever existed it was set at rest by the Colonial Laws Validity Act. But in the case of Ireland it was thought necessary—owing, doubtless, largely to the fears excited in the minds of Englishmen by the Protestant minority in Ulster and the commercial interests in both countries—to insert in the earlier Home Rule Bills an elaborate series of restrictions upon the exercise of even those legislative powers which the Irish Parliament might admittedly possess. For a parallel to these restrictions one would have to go back to the Constitution of the United States and the philosophy of“natural rights.”A more difficult problem it is impossible to conceive, because a Constitution of this kind runs counter to the whole tradition of Parliamentary sovereignty in this country and the colonies. Anyone who takes the trouble to study the decisions of the Privy Council when colonial legislation has been impugned on the ground of its infringing the common law rights of the subject or“natural justice”27will discover that constitutional limitations of this kind upon the powers of colonial Legislatures are not recognised by our judges. In the[pg 019]absence of express words in the colonial Constitutions, such restraints do not exist.“The only thing,”as Lord Halsbury grimly remarked on one occasion, for the subject whose actionable rights are taken away by a Colonial Act of Indemnity“to do is to submit.”The earlier Home Rule Bills were characterised by a most elaborate code of rights which the Irish Legislature might not infringe. Its main provisions might be classified as having three objects in view: (1) The protection of the subject in life, liberty, and property; (2) the prevention of legislation discriminating against any part of the United Kingdom, and (3) the preservation of the existing rights and privileges of the Protestant community in Ireland. In one form or another almost all these principles are to be found embodied in the Constitution of the United States, and in the case of the first of them a clause of the famous 14th Amendment was actually incorporated, with some slight alterations, in Sub-section 8 of Section 4 of the Bill of 1893, according to which the powers of the Irish Legislature should not extend to the making of any law“whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in accordance with settled principles and precedents or may be denied the equal protection of the laws or whereby private property may be taken without just compensation.”These impressive words bristled with legal controversy. Did they, for example, secure to the subject the preservation of the right to trial by jury? In the States of America it has been authoritatively laid down28that, in the absence of further defining words in the State constitutions, they do not. Such procedure is indeed safeguarded in the Federal Courts, but only in consequence of express words. In the case of the States,[pg 020]Cooley, a great authority, says that“whatever the State establishes will be due process of law,”and Story regarded the words by themselves as simply securing a judicial hearing—that is to say, as they stand they merely secure the separation of legislative and judicial functions and prevent the State Legislature from passing laws which are in effect judicial decrees.What the words would really have secured to the subject in Ireland was very doubtful. The object of the draughtsman appears to have been to secure to the subject in Ireland all the protection of the law, including trial by jury, which he would have enjoyed at the date of the passing of the Bill, understanding by law both common law and statute law. If the Imperial Parliament had, subsequent to the date of the Act itself, passed legislation limiting trial by jury or other common law rights, this would, presumably, have provided the Irish Parliament with a new“settled principle and precedent,”enabling it to go further. In other words, the clause might have operated to secure a certain standardization of legislation as between the two countries.The Argument Against Restrictions.But it seems to me that such standardization is best secured by definitely reserving certain subjects of legislation to the Imperial Parliament rather than by imposing upon the exercise of such legislation by the Irish Parliament constitutional limitations which are certain to raise great doubts and provoke excessive litigation. It would be far better to reserve criminal law, as has been done in Canada, in the case of the provincial legislatures—though not without difficulty—than to lay down certain abstract principles. Moreover, is it desirable to maintain such uniformity of legislative principle? There is a great deal to be said for reserving certain[pg 021]subjects of legislation to the Imperial Parliament, but to impose on the whole sphere of legislation entrusted to the Irish Parliament the same principles as those governing the English Statute-Book, or the common law, is to subject almost every conceivable Irish statute to the challenge of litigious politicians. This is what has happened in the United States. The clause, as it stood, might quite conceivably have prevented the Irish legislature from extending the procedure of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts to cases where it was not so extended in England—a most mischievous result, seeing that this procedure is the sanction by which nearly every new statute extending the scope of industrial or public health legislation or conferring powers on local authorities is enforced.Uniformity of legislation between the two countries is not desirable in all directions nor has it hitherto been followed. In matters of expropriation, for example, the drastic procedure of the Housing and Town Planning Act has not been adopted in Ireland. Ireland has her own standard in these matters in the case of the Irish Local Government Act, and the Land Purchase Acts, and I am not at all sure that the principles of the English Land Clauses Consolidation Act and Railway Clauses Consolidation Acts as to arbitration and compensation are by any means ideal. Still less has uniformity in the matter of criminal law been the rule hitherto between the two countries. It would be difficult to find a parallel in this country for the Crimes Act of 1887 (which is still on the Statute-Book although it is no longer put in force by proclamation) with its extensions of summary jurisdiction to cases of criminal conspiracy, intimidation, riot, and unlawful assembly, and its provisions for a change of venue.It is perhaps more open to question whether the[pg 022]words of the 1893 Bill designed to secure to the subject“the equal protection of the laws,”and to prevent legislation discriminating against Englishmen and Scotsmen29under certain circumstances, ought not to have been repeated. The words“equal protection of the laws”have been interpreted in the United States in such a way as to secure that legislation, particularly in the exercise of the“police power,”shall be impartial in its operation.30On this interpretation, they would for example, have prevented an Irish Legislature from exempting Catholic convents which are used as workshops from the operation of the Factory Acts. But that might be secured in another way, and the words might, if adopted, have operated to prevent much useful legislation. It seems likely enough that discriminating legislation, in so far as it tended to prevent a particular class of persons from residing in Ireland or penalised non-residents, would be held invalid in any case on the ground that it conflicted with the reservation to the Imperial Parliament of such subjects as“trade”and“naturalization.”31And, as regards non-residents, it must be remembered that the grant of legislative powers can only be exercised“in respect of matters exclusively relating to Ireland or some part thereof”—words which may be found to be of considerable importance.The same may be said of the omission in the Bill, to provide, as its predecessor of 1893 provided, for the maintenance of securities for the liberty of the subject and the preservation of his common law rights. It is almost impossible to do this without entering on an[pg 023]uncharted sea of litigation. Modern legislation, especially social and industrial legislation, infringes common law rights at every point. I have ventured elsewhere32to describe the modern tendency of industrial legislation as a tendency, inverting Maine's famous aphorism, to advance from contract to status, that is to say, to limit to an increasing extent the contractual freedom of the worker, and to confer on him a certain status by the protection of him against himself.33The greater part of our Irish land legislation impaired the obligation of contracts. Professor Dicey criticised the Bill of 1893 for not going further than it did in its incorporation of clauses taken from the Constitution of the United States with the intention of securing the common law rights of the subject. But it may be remarked that many of those clauses have proved an almost intolerable limitation upon the power of the legislatures to deal with the regulation of trade and industry, so intolerable that the Supreme Court has of late made a liberal use of the fiction of“the police power”34to enable the legislatures to pass legislation which otherwise might have seemed[pg 024]to“abridge the privileges”of citizens of the United States or deprive them of“liberty or property without due process of law.”35At the same time it must be remembered that, although the Irish Parliament is not debarred from statutory interference with common law rights, its legislation will be subject to rules of interpretation, at the hands of the Judicial Committee, by which statutes are always construed in favour of the subject. It is a well-accepted rule of construction in English courts that common law rights cannot be taken away except by express words.36It is something to secure that the interpretation of the new Constitution and of Irish statutes shall, in the last resort, be wholly in the hands of an Imperial Court. The chartered protection of the rights of the individual by a fundamental Act is always difficult and often impossible. In the last resort it depends very much on the interpretation which the judges choose to place upon such an Act.37[pg 025]The Executive Veto.It is obvious, therefore, that the principal and indeed almost the only safeguard provided in the Bill against inequitable or discriminating legislation38is the veto of the Lord-Lieutenant acting on the instructions of the Imperial Government. A political check is preferred to a juristic check. The apostolic maxim“all things are lawful but all things are not expedient,”appears to have been the motto of the draughtsman. Not law but policy will decide what Irish Acts are to be placed on the Statute-Book. It must be admitted that this is the principle most in harmony with precedent if the constitutions granted to the colonies are to be regarded as precedents. No colony would have tolerated for a moment the elaborate network of restrictions in Clause 4 of the Bill of 1893, through the finely-woven meshes of which it would have been hard for any Irish legislation of an original or experimental character to pass. If we are really in earnest about setting up a Parliament on College Green, we cannot do otherwise. The executive veto must be the real check, and in the presence of such a check, English judges would always be very loath39to declare the Acts of a legislatureultra viresmerely because they infringed common law rights.Now this check may be exercised on one of two grounds. The Imperial Government may“instruct”the Lord-Lieutenant to refuse his assent either on the ground that the bill in question is politically objectionable, or on the ground that it is, in their opinion, in[pg 026]excess of the powers conferred on the Irish Legislature. It is desirable in every way that the two should be distinguished in order that the Imperial Parliament may be able to hold the Cabinet of the day responsible when its action is purely a question of policy. On the other hand, it is no less desirable that the Cabinet should, in the interests of the public in Ireland, be in a position to test the validity of an Irish Bill which, though unobjectionable on the ground of policy, may be questionable on the ground of law. It is a common error that in all written constitutions the courts, particularly those of the United States, haveproprio motuthe power of declaringultra viresany legislative act which infringes the principles of the Constitution. Laboulaye fell into this error in his study of the American Constitution. But the American Courts have no such power. Until a case arises in the ordinary course of litigation, under the statute in question, there is no means of annulling it, and there have been many Acts40on the Federal Statute Book which are quite conceivably“unconstitutional”in the letter as well as in the spirit, but have never been declaredultra viresfor the simple reason that no one has found his private rights affected. This holds particulars of questions of the distribution of power. It might for example, occur in the case of an Irish Bill which proposed to deal with one of the reserved services. To meet this difficulty and to avoid the trouble which might arise from an Act being placed in the Irish Statute Book41and observed in Ireland only to be subsequently declaredultra viresin the course of litigation, it is[pg 027]provided in the Government of Ireland Bill42(Clause 29) that if it appears to the Lord-Lieutenant or a Secretary of State expedient in the public interest that the validity of an Irish Act should be tested he may represent the same to His Majesty in Council and the question may then be heard and determined by the Judicial Committee in the same manner as an appeal from a Court in Ireland. It is not necessary to suppose that the executive veto will be a dead letter, and to argue from its disuse in the case of the self-governing colonies is to argue from the like to the unlike. In the case of the provincial legislatures of Canada it has been exercised by the Dominion Government where provincial legislation is inequitable, or contrary to“the settled policy”of the Dominion.Exempted Powers.The enumeration of matters in respect of which the Irish Parliament shall have no power to make laws is a little deceptive, inasmuch as many of the matters so enumerated would have been outside its power in any case. Ireland is not, so long as the Act of Union remains on the Statute Book, a sovereign state, and“the making of peace or war”and the negotiation of[pg 028]treaties would, as a matter of international law, have been impossible in her case, even if they had not been expressly prohibited.“Merchant shipping”and“the return of fugitive offenders”would also have been excluded from her authority by the rule of law43which precludes a subordinate legislature from extra-territorial legislation. The same may be said of Copyright. The colonies have only been enabled to deal with these matters in virtue of clauses in Acts of the Imperial Parliament.44But it would not be true to say that the position of the Irish Parliament is assimilated to that of the legislature of a self-governing colony. The exclusion of subjects relating to allegiance, such as naturalization45and treason,46and of legislation as to aliens is exceptional. All the self-governing colonies have power to deal with these matters, as also with the subject of naval and military forces. Perhaps the most important exemption in the case of Ireland is that of trade, trade-marks, designs, merchandise marks and patent rights. I cannot help regretting that, inasmuch as the principle has been adopted of giving Ireland general and unenumerated powers, the number of specific exemptions has not been enlarged. It is highly desirable to avoid conflict of laws in the United Kingdom as far as possible. It must be remembered that the Statute Book has, quite apart from the Act[pg 029]of Union, bound Ireland to England by many legislative ties; there is a uniform system of industrial, commercial, and, to some extent, criminal law for the whole of these Islands—Factory Acts, Companies Acts, the law of negotiable instruments, criminal procedure, old-age pensions, and insurance legislation; in all these there is legislative standardization, and the tendency of all modern political unions, notably those of the Australian Commonwealth and the German Empire, is in this direction. Confusion, injustice, and economic inequalities constantly occur in a modern State whose inhabitants are living under a“conflict of laws.”Fiscal considerations point the same way. It may be safely assumed that English opinion will not tolerate any considerable divergence between the fiscal systems of England and Ireland. Moreover, financial considerations apart, the regulation of“trade”is, as in every political union, reserved for the central legislature. But to distinguish between“trade”on the one hand and“industry”on the other is not an easy problem, and Ireland may discriminate against England only less effectively by lowering the standard of the Factory Acts than by a tariff.The“subject matter”of the Old Age Pensions Acts, National Insurance Acts, and Labour Exchanges Acts has, it is true, been excluded. It seems regrettable that the category is not enlarged to include the Companies Acts, the Sale of Goods Act, the Bills of Exchange Act, and the Factory Acts. It would be highly undesirable to have the“industrial minimum”for the United Kingdom, so laboriously attained by our factory legislation, lowered in the interests of particular interests in Ireland. The advantages of securing uniformity by the inclusion of the three great statutes relating to commercial law is also very obvious. Two of them, indeed,[pg 030]represent a great step in that codification of English law which is the dream of English jurists, they have been adopted as a model in some of our colonies, and it would seem highly desirable that the standard thus attained should remain fixed. In urging this, I do not forget what I have already said, in connection with the subject of constitutional limitations, as to the undesirability of exacting too rigid a degree of uniformity in English and Irish legislation, but constitutional limitations are one thing and exceptions quite another. It is very difficult to subject the whole field of Irish legislation to juristic principles, but it is comparatively easy to exempt from that field the subject matter of particular Acts. The whole question resolves itself into a consideration of the point at which uniformity should be determined. The Bill seems to fix the point much too low.Of course, one way of dealing with the question would have been to grant Ireland only particular and enumerated powers of legislation, as has been done in the case of the provincial legislatures of Canada. There is much to be said for this. It seems the line of least resistance; it is always easier to add to powers which appear deficient than to withdraw powers which have proved excessive. But it undoubtedly invites litigation and it is very difficult, if not impossible, to define what are exclusively Irish matters without in the last resort using some such general term (as is used in the British North America Act) as“generally all matters of a merely local nature.”The great economy shown by the draughtsman in the number of the exceptions from the powers of the Irish legislature, as well as in the number of the restrictions upon the exercise of those powers, means, as we have already indicated, that the whole weight of control[pg 031]over the Irish legislature is thrown upon the executive and legislative veto of the Imperial Government. Is it sufficient to rely upon the paramount power of the Imperial Parliament to override by statute Irish legislation which may be inequitable or inexpedient, and upon the exercise of the veto of the Imperial Government? These checks are the exercise of aforce majeure, which is often invidious and always difficult. Above all they are political. The exercise of them depends on the party in power in Great Britain, and as such it may excite resentment among the Irish people as an invasion of the autonomy granted to them. On the other hand, exceptions and restrictions are a legal, not a political, check—they operate through the agency of the courts of law without the intervention of political considerations. Moreover—and this perhaps is the most important consideration—they rest upon the consent of the Irish people expressed in the terms of the Home Rule Act to which their representatives are a party. For an Irish Parliament to defy them would be to defy the very Act which was the charter of its existence. But they invite litigation. It all resolves itself into a question of hitting the mean between the dangers of litigation on the one hand and of political pressure on the other. Probably, however, the occasions of conflict will be few and unimportant, and the temper of the Irish Parliament may be much more conservative than its critics imagine.The ExecutiveThe new Bill is remarkable for the explicitness with which it invests Ireland with control over the Executive. For the first time in the written constitutions of the Empire we have a statutory Executive, and not only[pg 032]is it a statutory Executive, but it is to be a Parliamentary Executive defined by statute. In the earlier Bills nothing was more remarkable than the brevity and allusiveness with which this question of the Government of Ireland was treated.“The Executive power in Ireland shall continue vested in Her Majesty the Queen”was the language employed in the Bill of 1893. Under that Bill the Government of Ireland would have continued, even after its passage into law, to be in the hands of the English Cabinet and it would have rested with that Cabinet to determine how large or how small a part of the prerogatives of the Crown should be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant. Paradoxical as it may seem, it would have been quite possible for a Unionist Government, coming into power immediately after the Home Rule Bill had passed into law and an Irish Parliament had met at Dublin, to retain in their own hands the Executive authority in Ireland without any breach of statutory obligations. The Bills of 1886 and 1893 left it in the discretion of the Crown to decide what the powers of the Lord-Lieutenant should be. Following Colonial precedents, the Constitution would have had to be supplemented47by prerogative legislation in the shape of Letters Patent defining those powers. Moreover, these powers were to have been vested not in the Lord-Lieutenant in Council, but in the Lord-Lieutenant alone. Something was indeed, said about an“Executive Committee”of the Irish Privy Council to aid and advise in the Government of Ireland—this was the only hint of responsible Government that the Bill contained—but nothing was said of the powers or[pg 033]constitution of the Committee nor of the extent to which the Lord-Lieutenant was bound to act on its advice. Its constitution was left to the discretion of Her Majesty. Its powers would, of course, as in the case of the Colonies, have been decided by the tacit adoption of the unwritten conventions of the English Constitution that the advisers of the Governor must command the confidence of the Legislature which votes supplies.Very different is our new Bill. The Executive power does indeed continue“vested in His Majesty the King,”and nothing is to affect its exercise—in other words, it is to continue in the hands of the Imperial Government—except“as respects Irish services as defined for the purpose of this Act.”The exception is a new departure and the general effect of the whole clause (Clause IV.) is expressly to hand over in statutory terms“all public services in connection with the administration of the Government of Ireland”except the reserved services and such services as those in regard to which the Irish Parliament have no power to make laws. The effect of this is to hand over an executive authority co-extensive with the legislative authority.48Moreover, in regard to Irish services, the Executive power is to be exercised by the Lord-LieutenantthroughIrish Departments, and the heads of these Departments are given the Parliamentary title of“Ministers”and, what is more remarkable, it is expressly provided (a provision[pg 034]to be found in only one or two, and those the latest, of our Colonial Constitutions) that:“No such person shall hold office as an Irish Minister for a longer period than six months, unless he is or becomes a member of one of the Houses of the Irish Parliament.”Never in any constitution that emanated from the practised hand of the Parliamentary draughtsman has there been such a complete transfer in express statutory terms of the executive power. Taken together with the comparatively unrestricted grant of legislative power, it constitutes a grant of a larger measure of self-government than is to be found in any of the earlier Bills.At the same time there is here no cause for alarm. It must be remembered that the Lord-Lieutenant will exist in a dual capacity—like a constitutional king he will be bound in Irish matters to act on the advice of his Irish Ministers but, like a Colonial governor, he will also in all Imperial matters be bound to obey the instructions of the Imperial Government. In regard to legislation the position here is quite clear: he may veto measures which his own Ministers have promoted if the Imperial Government think it advisable so to instruct him. In regard to the executive, he will, of course, enjoy less latitude; it is quite clear that the Imperial Government will, under this clause, find it practically impossible to interfere in purely Irish administration. The Irish Government will, of course, be carried on in the name of the Crown, and it will enjoy the same prerogatives at common law as the Imperial Government in such matters as the use of the prerogative writsmandamusandcertiorari, and the immunity from actions in tort. Ireland has its own Petitions of Right Act.At the same time a distinction must be drawn between the prerogatives relating to the exercise of Irish[pg 035]services and prerogatives which cannot be so defined. Some of the latter may be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant by his patent, and these he will exercise not on the advice of the Irish, but of the Imperial, Government. Moreover, there are certain powers conferred by statute on the Lord-Lieutenant, or the Lord-Lieutenant in Council, such as the power of proclaiming disaffected districts under the Crimes Act, of suspending the operation of the Irish Habeas Corpus Act, and of controlling the constabulary, not all49of which will be exercisable on the advice of Irish Ministers. Prerogatives not so exercisable will no doubt be exercised on the advice of the Secretary of State for Home Affairs who is even now the medium of formal communications between the Lord-Lieutenant and the Crown. The Chief Secretary50will, of course, disappear altogether; he will be replaced by the Executive Committee. The Lord-Lieutenant will, of course, cease to be a member of the English Ministry; his position will be assimilated to that of a Colonial Governor, and his tenure fixed for a term of years so as to make his tenure of office independent, as it must be in the exercise of his new constitutional duties, of the fortunes of English Parties.The Irish LegislatureThe constitution of the legislature itself calls for little comment. It follows with some fidelity the features[pg 036]of Mr. Gladstone's Bills, but the substitution of a nominated Senate for the“Council”or“Order”elected on a property franchise is a new departure. Nomination of late has fallen into some discredit both in theory and in practice.51Colonial experience is not encouraging. Nomination by the Crown means in practice nomination by the Governor, on the advice of the Cabinet of the day, and Ministries in Canada and New South Wales have put this prerogative to such partizan uses as to reduce the Upper House to a very servile condition. When nomination is for life and not for a fixed term of years the evils of this system may be mitigated, but they are not removed. The one thing that can be said about the proposed Senate is that its powers in legislation are of such a limited character that an Irish Executive would be under little temptation to“pack”it. A Senate of only forty members compelled to meet in joint session a House of Commons of 164 members every second time that it rejects or objectionably amends a bill is not likely to prove a very formidable obstacle to legislation. But the nomination by the Executive is in any case somewhat objectionable, and it would seem better to provide that at the end of the first term of eight years the Senators should be appointed by some system of election, whether on a basis of proportional representation or otherwise.52But[pg 037]to their nomination for the first term by the Imperial Government I see no very cogent objection. Indeed, the expedient has much to be said for it, for the discretion, if wisely exercised, will enable the Imperial Government not only to secure to Irish minorities a degree of representation which no conceivable system of election could secure, but also to appoint men of moderate opinions—one immediately thinks of Sir Horace Plunkett—who, in the strife of extremists, might have no chance of election by either party. It has been argued in some quarters that a Second Chamber is wholly unnecessary, and the example of the single-chamber legislatures in some of the Canadian provinces has been cited. The argument, however, overlooks one really important function of the Senate, namely its duty to provide for the security of tenure of the Irish judges. Clause XXVII. provides that judges appointed after the passing of the Act shall only be removable on an Address of both Houses of the Irish Parliament, and, should the Senate refuse to concur in a demand by the lower House for the removal of a judge, there is no such means of overcoming its resistance in a joint session as is the case with legislation. This is well.There is one provision in the Bill53which will serve to strengthen the position of the Senate as an advisory body and may operate to give it an initiative in the introduction of Government legislation—the provision which enables an Irish Minister who is a member of either House to sit and to speak in both Houses. This is a practice common on the Continent, and not wholly unknown[pg 038]in the case of some of our Colonial Constitutions, and it has much to commend it. The Senate is placed under the same disabilities as to money bills as are imposed on the House of Lords by the Parliament Act. Thereby it is placed in an inferior position to that of most of the Second Chambers in the Colonies, all of which can reject, and some of which may also amend, money bills. The disability is the less surprising having regard to its character as a nominee body—it is when the Second Chambers of the Colonies are elective, that their powers in regard to money bills are considerable.54The privileges of the Imperial Parliament are conferred by the Government of Ireland Bill upon the Irish Parliament. In the absence of such grant the Irish Parliament would not have had such privileges—although it might have adopted them by legislation—for thelex et consuetudo Parliamentiare not implied in the grant of a constitution.55It is not uncommon to prescribe in Colonial Constitutions that the legislature shall have such privileges as are enjoyed by the House of Commons at the time of grant. In the present case, the Irish Parliament may define its privileges, if it thinks fit, by legislation, though it is difficult to imagine any occasion for its doing so. The really important thing is that it cannot enlarge those privileges beyond the scope of the privileges of the Imperial Parliament. This is the one constitutional limitation in the Bill—apart from the“safeguards”as to legislation in regard to religion and marriage contained in Clause III.—and it is by no means unimportant. The powers of the Imperial Parliament—particularly as to the right[pg 039]of the two Houses to commit for contempt without cause shewn—are a sufficiently high standard.Irish Representation in the House of Commons56Irish representation at Westminster has always been the riddle of the Home Rule problem. I have no space to examine here in detail the alternative solutions which were put forward in the earlier Home Rule Bills. But there is one general consideration which must always be borne in mind in the theoretical discussion of any solution. It is the very simple consideration that representation is what mathematicians would call a“function”of legislative power—the one is dependent upon the other. If the legislative powers over Ireland reserved to the Imperial Parliament are large, the representation of Ireland in that Parliament must not be small. It is at this point that Mr. Gladstone's original proposal for total exclusion broke down. He reserved to the Imperial Parliament considerable powers of legislation in regard to Ireland and yet proposed to exercise those powers in the absence of Irish representatives.It was no answer to cite colonial analogies. The Irish problem is not, as I have pointed out elsewhere, a colonial problem. No one at present proposes to give Ireland complete fiscal autonomy, for example. Nor is it strictly apposite to say that the Imperial Parliament legislates for the Colonies in the absence of colonial[pg 040]representatives. Such legislation is now almost exclusively confined to what I may call enabling legislation in matters in which the Colonies, owing to their status as Dependencies, are unable to legislate. In such matters as copyright, merchant shipping, marriage, extradition, the Imperial Parliament legislates for the Colonies largely because colonial laws cannot operate ex-territorially, and such Imperial legislation is usually effected by means of application clauses which enable the Colonies to adopt it or not as they please. But rarely if ever does the Imperial Parliament legislate for a self-governing colony as it has done and will continue to do in the case of such domestic Irish affairs as old-age pensions, land purchase, Customs and Excise, defence, naturalisation, to say nothing perhaps of industrial and commercial law. I have already indicated my opinion in favour of confining these subjects to the Imperial Parliament, but even were the opposite course taken there would still remain the fiscal question. We cannot continue to tax Ireland unless the Irish representatives are to remain at Westminster.The presence of the Irish members at Westminster is imperative if the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is not to be illusory. Mr. Balfour57contends that it will be as illusory as it has been in the case of the Colonies. But the Colonies are not represented in the Imperial Parliament, and to differentiate Ireland in this respect is to make all the difference between a legal formula and a political fact.There remains the question of inclusion. No one would question the propriety of reducing Irish representation to its true proportions on a population basis—in other words, from its present figure of 103 to one of 70. The real difficulty arises when we consider[pg 041]whether those members, whatever their numbers, are to attend at Westminster in the same capacity as the British members. We are to-day confronted by the same problem as that which vexed the Parliament of 1893: are Irish members to vote upon all occasions or only upon those occasions when exclusively Irish and exclusively Imperial affairs are under discussion? The original text of the 1893 Bill adopted the latter solution. At first it has much to commend it, for it avoids—or attempts to avoid—the anomaly of refusing self-government to Great Britain while granting it to Ireland: if Irish members are to govern themselves at Dublin without the interference of Englishmen, why, it has been pertinently asked, should not the converse hold good at Westminster? But two very grave difficulties stand in the way; one is the difficulty of distinguishing between Irish and non-Irish business at Westminster; the other is the difficulty, even when such distinction is made, of maintaining a single majority under such circumstances. Withdraw the Irish members on certain occasions and you might convert a Liberal majority at Westminster on certain days into a Unionist majority on other days. A Liberal Government might have responsibility without power in British matters and a Unionist Opposition power without responsibility. One Executive could not co-exist with two majorities. Such a state of affairs might have been conceivable some seventy or eighty years ago, when Ministries were not regarded as responsible for the passage of legislation into law. It would be conceivable in France, where Ministries come and go and the Deputies remain. But it would be fatal to the Cabinet system as we know it.Another objection to the“in-and-out”plan is the extreme difficulty of classifying the business of the[pg 042]House of Commons in such a way as to distinguish between what is“Irish”and what is not. If that business were purely legislative the difficulty would not be so great, but the House controls administration as well as legislation. Any question involving a vote of confidence in the Cabinet might legitimately be regarded as a matter in which the Irish members had a right to have a voice. The motion for the adjournment of the House, following on an unsatisfactory answer by a Minister, might be regarded as such. Who would decide these things? The Bill of 1893 provided for their determination by the House. In that event the Irish members would presumably have had a voice in determining on what subjects they should or should not vote, and they would have been masters of the situation under all circumstances. By their power to determine the fate of Imperial Ministries they might have determined the exercise of the Imperial veto on Irish legislation and reduced it to a nullity. It may, indeed, be urged that the Irish vote often dominates the situation at Westminster even under present circumstances, but it must be remembered that it is now exercised in the consistent support of the same administration, whereas under an“in-and-out”system its action might be capricious and apt to be determined solely by Irish exigencies of the moment.There remains the plan of the inclusion of Irish members for all purposes. This at least has the advantage of simplicity. If Irishmen constantly attended at Westminster without distinction of voting capacity they would be less likely to regard their presence there as an instrument for reducing to impotence the exercise of the Imperial veto upon Irish legislation. It is quite conceivable, indeed, that once Home Rule is granted Irishmen will be Imperialists at Westminster without[pg 043]becoming Nationalists at Dublin—the natural conservatism of the Irish character may reassert itself. Close observers of Irish thought are inclined to believe that the grant of Home Rule will act as a great solvent in Irish political life, and that with the iron discipline of Nationalism relaxed, and its cherished object attained, lines of cleavage, social, economic, and industrial, will appear in Ireland and vastly change the distribution of Irish parties both at Dublin and at Westminster. Ulster“Unionists”may be found voting with a Liberal Government on education questions and Irish“Nationalists”against it. Irish representatives at Westminster may become more, rather than less, closely identified with British interests. And it should be remembered that it would be no new thing for members from one part of the United Kingdom to be voting on measures which solely concerned another part of the Kingdom. This is happening every day. As Mr. Walker points out elsewhere, a process of legislative disintegration has been going on within the walls of the Imperial Parliament itself, which is already being forced to legislate separately for the three separate parts of the United Kingdom. He estimates that during the last twenty years no less than 49.7 per cent. of the public general Acts have applied only to some one part of the United Kingdom instead of to the whole.The Government of Ireland Bill adopts the principle of total inclusion, but qualifies the anomaly which is involved in the presence of Irish members voting on non-Irish questions by reducing the representation of Ireland to the number of forty-two, and thus to a figure far below that to which Ireland is entitled on the basis of population. At the same time it must be admitted that the anomaly is not thereby removed. The position of Irish members voting on purely English legislation[pg 044]after the grant of Home Rule will indeed—numbers apart—be more anomalous than it was before it. An anomaly can be tolerated so long as it is universal in its operation, and Scotch and English members can at present view with equanimity the spectacle of Irish members voting in their own affairs so long as they themselves exercise the same privilege in those of their neighbours. Reciprocity of this kind produces a certain unity of thought in a deliberative assembly. But the anomaly at once becomes invidious if Irishmen are placed in a privileged position. It is perhaps more theoretical than real, as the actual weight that could be thrown into the scale of the division lobby by a Nationalist majority (taking the present balance of parties in Ireland) of about twenty-six cannot be considerable, even if, as is very doubtful, it were consistently exercised.Still the anomaly remains. Is it possible to meet it by some extension of Home Rule to the legislative affairs of England and Scotland?The Further Extension of Home RuleThe anomaly, however, remains. How is it to be met? Obviously it is but a temporary difficulty if, as the Prime Minister has suggested in his speech on the first reading, the Bill is to be regarded as but the first step in a general devolution of the legislative powers of the Imperial Parliament. But everything depends on how far that devolution is to be carried. The Prime Minister's reference to a change in the Standing Orders suggests a further development of the Committee system already in operation in the case of the Scottish Standing Committee by which the House has delegated a certain degree of provincial autonomy to a group of members. It would be possible to extend[pg 045]this to the creation of a Standing Committee for England and Wales. Under such a system Irish Members would be excluded from the Committee stages of legislation which was neither Irish nor Imperial. But there remains the Report stage, which is always apt to resolve itself into a Second Committee stage58in which the whole House participates. Moreover, an impassable limit is set to this process of domestic devolution by the necessity that the Government of to-day should command a majority in each of these Committees. A Liberal Ministry would probably find itself in a minority in an English Standing Committee, and a Unionist Ministry would, with equal probability, find itself in a minority in a Scottish Committee. Committees have become not so much a sphere for the legislative initiative of the private member as a new outlet for Government business. Contentious bills introduced or adopted by the Government are referred to them, and the moment this is the case the Minister in charge who is confronted in Committee with amendments which he does not care to accept may invite the whole House on the Report stage of the Bill to disallow them. The House itself, jealous of any surrender of its prerogatives, is only too apt to turn the Report stage into a second Committee stage. The responsibility of a Government department for the preparation and execution of legislation is to-day so indispensable that effective legislative devolution is almost impossible without devolution of the executive also. A Committee to which the Minister in charge of the Bill is not responsible is not in a position to exercise effectual control over legislation. Indeed it seems impossible to contemplate a devolution of legislative power without a[pg 046]corresponding devolution of executive power. So long as we have but one Executive in the House of Commons it is impossible to have two or three legislatures within the walls of that House. Moreover, it is just as imperative to restore the diminishing control of members of Parliament over administration as it is to re-establish their authority in legislation. There is a growing and regrettable tendency to confer upon Government departments both legislative and judicial powers—powers to make statutory orders and to interpret them, which is depriving our constitution of what has hitherto been regarded by foreign students as one of its most distinctive features—the subordination of the executive to the legislature and to the courts. The distinction between Gesetz und Verordnung,59between statute and order, is fast disappearing in the enormous volume of statutory orders. Powers to make rules under particular statutes are entrusted to Scotch, Irish, and English Departments which have the effect of diminishing the control of the House of Commons without transferring it to any representative substitute. The great increase of grants-in-aid for administrative purposes has also given the departments a power of indirect legislation by the latitude they enjoy in the distribution of them such as is further calculated to diminish the control of the House of Commons over questions of Irish and Scotch policy. Rarely do any marked departures by the departments come under the review of the House of Commons; the claims of the Government over the time-table of the House, fortified by certain rulings of the Speaker,60[pg 047]may and frequently do preclude any examination of them. In the words of a famous resolution, one may say“the power of the Executive has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished.”But it is no remedy for this state of things to provide for administrative devolution alone. To devolve the authority which a great Department of State, such as the Board of Agriculture, exercises over the whole of Great Britain by the simple process of assigning its Scotch business to the Secretary for Scotland, does not increase the control of Scottish members over the executive. This process of administrative devolution, which is always going on, is not accompanied by any measure of legislative devolution; the Secretary for Scotland is not thereby brought under the control of the Scotch Standing Committee.To create a new Scottish or Irish Department does not increase Parliamentary control over Scottish or Irish administration; rather it diminishes it. The heads of a Scottish Education Office, Local Government Board, and Department of Agriculture have been made responsible not to the House of Commons but to the Secretary for Scotland. Like the Chief Secretary for Ireland, he is a Prime Minister without a Cabinet and without a Legislature, and his policy is determined primarily not by Scottish or Irish opinion, but by the alien issues of imperial politics. Obviously there will never be any remedy for these anomalies until we have a Legislature with an executive responsible to it.Scottish Home RuleAt the present moment we have in the case of Scotland devolution in a state of arrested development. This process of disintegration is reflected in separate Estimates in finance and in distinct draftsmanship in[pg 048]legislation. In legislation, indeed, marked changes have also taken place under cover of alterations in the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. An itinerant delegation of Scotch members has been set up to deal with private bill procedure in Scotland, and domestic devolution within the walls of the House of Commons has taken the shape of a Scotch Grand Committee. Few or none of these changes have any preconceived relation with the others; they represent experiments framed to meet the exigencies of the moment, but they all bear eloquent witness to a fact which has changed the whole aspect of the Home Rule problem and made that aspect at once more practical and less intimidating—the fact that the House of Commons has found itself increasingly incompetent to do its work. The fact is disguised by a multitude of expedients, all of them, however, amounting to a renunciation of legislative authority. These changes represent thedisjecta membraof Scottish Home Rule—they have no coherence, they point not so much to a solution of the problem as to its recognition.None the less, I think the Irish Government Bill does provide us with a prototype. There is nothing in it, with the exception of the financial clauses, which forbids its adoption in the case of Scotland and of England. But I think, as I have already indicated in another connection, that the category of reserved subjects ought to be considerably enlarged so as to secure the maintenance of the existing uniformity of legislation in commercial and industrial matters. There are, however, undeniable difficulties in the way of an identity of local constitutions. Legislation in regard to land is exempted from the control of the Irish Legislature to an extent which Scotland would hardly be prepared to accept. Control over legislation[pg 049]relating to marriage is retained in the case of Ireland; I doubt if it would be tolerated in Scotland, whose marriage law differs61from that of England to a far greater extent than is the case with the marriage law of Ireland. In common law England and Ireland have the same rules;62it is only in statute law that they differ. In Scotland the common law is radically different. There will, therefore, be some difficulty in finding a common denominator for the Imperial Parliament—and in avoiding, even under“Home Rule All Round”a certain divergence in the legislative capacities of the members from Scotland and Ireland, with the attendant risk of an“in-and-out”procedure.[pg 050]

Part I. The New Constitution[pg 003]I.—The Constitution: A Commentary.By Professor J. H. Morgan“Home Rule is at bottom Federalism,”we are told1by the most distinguished jurist among its opponents. It is urged against it that Federal Governments are almost invariably weak Governments, and that, in so far as they are strong, they are as“symmetrical”as the new constitution is unsymmetrical. Cornewall Lewis once thought it necessary to write a book on the Use and Abuse of Political Terms, and there is a great danger in the present controversy of our being enslaved by the poverty of our political vocabulary. The term“Federalism”is put to such new and alien uses as to darken counsel and confuse thought. That Federal Executives are usually weak, that in the dual allegiance of a Federal system men often prefer the State authority which is near to the Federal authority which is remote, that the respective limits of Federal and State legislation are defined with difficulty and observed with reluctance, that conflict of laws is more often the rule than the exception, that[pg 004]Federal constitutions are rigid rather than flexible, and, in a word, that progress is sacrificed to stability: all these things are true, and all these things are irrelevant. The Government of Ireland Bill is not, and cannot be, the corner-stone of a Federal system for the United Kingdom, although its duplication in the case of Scotland and of England would not be impossible, should it appear desirable. We may, for want of a better term, call it the foundation of a system of Devolution, but we must not call it Federalism.Putting on one side for the moment the question whether Home Rule is Federalism or not, I am inclined to enter a protest against all these attempts to fit the Bill into the categories of the jurist. It is very doubtful whether any two constitutions in the world, even federal constitutions, can be brought under one species. Two of the most successful“federal”constitutions present the gravest anomalies to the theorist. The Canadian Constitution, according to Professor Dicey, betrays a logical fallacy in the very words of its preamble;2and German jurists have wrangled no less inconclusively than incessantly about the legal character of the Empire and as to where its sovereignty resides;3yet in neither case has the practical operation of these constitutions been much the worse for the legal solecisms which they present. Indeed, it would not be too much to say with Aristotle that the“mixed”and not the“pure”type of government is the most successful,[pg 005]and that when Federalism is, as in the United States, at its purest, it is also at its weakest. The constitution of Imperial Germany ought, on this kind of reasoning, to be a flagrant perversion, and yet it has persisted in enduring for some forty-one years, and the prestige of its principal organ, the Bundesrath, although violating all Mr. Balfour's principles as to“equality”in its constitution, is, according to the doyen of the constitutional lawyers of Germany, increasing every day.4The argument that“Federalism”is incompatible with the preponderance of the“predominant partner,”and that no“federal”union is possible in these islands owing to the superior position occupied by England, would, even if it were relevant, be easily refuted by the example presented by the hegemony of Prussia.The same objection may be urged against the contention that the grant of self-government, whether to Ireland alone or to the rest of the United Kingdom, is both reactionary and unprecedented. The progress of all civilised communities, we are told, is towards political integration, not away from it. Devolution, it is said, is gratuitous in the case of a“United”Kingdom whose very union represents an ideal imperfectly achieved by the less fortunate countries which have had to be content with something less complete in the form of Federalism. Nations or Colonies mutually independent federate as a step towards union; it is“unprecedented”to reverse the process and qualify union by looser ties of cohesion. Now this attempt“to construct a normal programme for all portions of mankind”5cannot be sustained. If it[pg 006]could, it would avail as a conclusive argument against the grant of self-government to our Colonies whose claims to legislative independence grow with their growth and strengthen with their strength.6But it is not even true of Federal Unions. Anyone who takes the trouble to study the history of judicial interpretation of the American Constitution will find that there is a constant ebb and flow in the current of“unionism.”The intention of the framers of the 14th Amendment to create a United States citizenship has been largely neutralized by the decisions of the Supreme Court, which have inclined strongly in the direction of the legislative autonomy of the States.7Nor is this all. We are told that Federal Constitutions are“round and perfect and self-contained,”8—that they are characterized by“equality”of all the parts—and that, like the work of the divine law-giver of early communities, they are finished the moment they are begun.9But these confident inductions cannot be sustained. The history of the constitution of the United States and of Imperial Germany tells another story—a story of ancillary communities and dependencies in various stages of political apprenticeship. If we look for the American Constitution where all such constitutions must really be sought, that is to say not in the original text, but in the commentary of the courts, we shall find a truly remarkable tendency of late years to[pg 007]emphasize this heterogeneity, inequality and incompleteness.10The new Bill proposes a delegation of authority, both executive and legislative. Unlike a Federal constitution, it contemplates no distribution of sovereignty (begging a question which has often vexed the jurists as to the partibility of sovereignty). The new Government in Ireland will, indeed, be carried on in the name of the Crown, the writs of the Irish Court will run in the King's name, the statutes of the Irish Parliament will be enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and Commons. But the Imperial Government and the Imperial Parliament will remain supreme. The executive power in Ireland will continue vested in His Majesty, though some prerogatives may be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant who, as respects them, will exist in a dual capacity—some of these he will exercise on the advice of the Imperial Government, others on the advice of the Irish Government. So far, however, as the law, as distinguished from convention, is concerned, he will be in no way bound to act on the advice of his Irish Ministers except in so far as his“instructions”require him to do so. The words of the Bill do, indeed, contemplate with more explicitness than is usual in our written constitutions, a transfer of executive as well as of legislative authority, but they are by no means exhaustive, and[pg 008]they still leave it to His Majesty to determine11what prerogatives shall be delegated after the Act has come into force. As regards the legislative power, it will remain with the Imperial Government to give it effect by granting or withholding the King's assent to Irish legislation,12and the Imperial Parliament may, at any time, exercise its supremacy to the prejudice of such legislation, even after it has found its way on to the Irish statute-book. As regards the judiciary, there will, of course, be no dual judiciary: Irish Courts will interpret and enforce Imperial as well as Irish statutes, but both in the one case and in the other their judgments will be subject to appeal to an Imperial Court—the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In other words, the Imperial power will be supreme in the executive, the legislative, and the judicial sphere.Now in Federalism in the true sense—and I regard the constitution of the United States as the archetype—there is no such subordination. The authority of the constituent states and of the Federal nation are distinct and independent of one another. The Governor of the State is appointed not by the Federal authority, but by the State itself, whose servant he is. There[pg 009]is no“Crown”to serve as a common denominator of State and Federal Executives.13The one is not subordinate to the other, but is co-ordinate with it. The legislation of the State is subject to no external veto by the President. Nor is it subject to a legislative veto. In all matters not expressly conceded to the Federal Legislature, the State Legislatures remain as supreme after the enactment of the Federal Constitution as they were before it. In the legislative, as in the executive, sphere, the two authorities are co-ordinate. So with the judiciary. The decisions of the State Courts, in so far as they deal with State matters, and do not involve the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, are final and subject to no appeal to the Supreme Court at Washington. Conversely, Federal Circuit Courts exist independently of the State Courts to decide cases arising under Federal statutes or involving the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, and their judgments are enforced not by the State Executive but by the Federal Executive, which has its own marshals for the purpose. Nor can an act done by a Federal official, in obedience to a Federal statute, be punished by the State Court, even though it appear to involve a breach of a law of the State.14[pg 010]It is this dual allegiance that constitutes the inherent weakness of all Federal systems. Arguments based upon it have been urged against the grant of self-government to Ireland. Even those who admit that Federal analogies have no application so far as the relations of the Imperial and Irish legislatures are concerned, and who concede that the Irish Parliament will be as subordinate as a State Parliament in a Federal system is co-ordinate—none the less insist that in the relation of the two executives there is a real and perilous dualism. Many opponents allege, and no doubt, believe, that, with an Irish Parliament sitting at Dublin, the King's Writ will not run, the decisions of the Judicial Committee will not be enforced. Imperial statutes will not be obeyed, and Imperial taxes will not be collected. If there were a real delimitation of Courts and Executives, Imperial and Irish, under the new system, such a danger, though remote, would be conceivable. But no such sharp distinction is to be found in the Bill. In political unions, the central Government may act upon its subjects in a particular state directly through its own agencies—its own Courts, its own Executive officers, and its own police—this is the true Federal type; or it may act indirectly through the agency of the State authorities. Conversely, the State Governments may act directly through their own agencies—this again is the Federal principle, or they may act indirectly through Imperial agencies. Now wherever this indirect action is employed in both its forms the distinction between the two authorities is confused, the Federal principle undergoes a qualification which, by depriving it of half its symmetry, deprives it of all its weakness. Just this reciprocal relationship is established between the Imperial Government and the Irish Government.[pg 011]Imperial officials will be at the service of the Irish Government, and Irish officials at the service of the Imperial Government. For example, in the collection of taxes imposed by the Irish Parliament, the Irish Government will depend upon Imperial revenue officers to assess and collect them. The Imperial Government, on the other hand, will depend upon Irish Courts and Irish sheriffs to enforce their collection. Irish sheriffs will, in turn, depend upon an Imperial constabulary to assist them in levying execution. I shall return to some of these points in greater detail when I come to deal with the relations between the Executive and the Judiciary, and the maintenance of law and order. It is sufficient for me to remark here that the Irish Nationalist who wishes to defy the Imperial Government, and the Irish Unionist who wishes to defy the Irish Government, will each be hard put to define what he is pleased to regard as the limits of political obligation. He will find it difficult to distinguish where the authority of the Irish Government ends and that of the Imperial Government begins.The Supremacy of the Imperial Parliament.In the new Bill the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is secured by express words. The words are not necessary. No Parliament can bind its successors, and what one Parliament has done another Parliament may undo. Even when one Parliament has been at pains, by declaring its legislation“perpetual”or“unalterable”to bind posterity—as in the case of certain clauses in the Irish and Scotch Acts of Union—its injunctions have been disregarded by its successors with no more formality than is necessary in the case of any other legislation. An Act setting up a new Constitution is no more irrevocable than an Act authorising the[pg 012]imposition of the income tax. If, therefore, the Imperial Parliament chooses to grant a Constitution to Ireland, there is nothing to prevent its revoking or amending that grant, even (we submit) though it should have been at pains to enact that the Constitution could only be surrendered or altered by the consent of the Legislature which that Constitution created. Some doubts did, indeed, arise as to this point in the case of the Home Rule Bill of 1886, which not only excluded the Irish members from Westminster, but made provision for the amendment of the new Constitution by stipulating that such amendment should be made, if at all, by the joint authority of the Irish and English Parliaments. Whether this would have had the effect of preventing the“Imperial”Parliament from amending such a Home Rule Act without calling in the assistance of the Irish Parliament was much discussed at the time.15Obviously, the question does not now arise, as the Irish members are to continue to sit at Westminster.16[pg 013]It is therefore open to the Imperial Parliament at any time to repeal or amend the Government of Ireland Bill after it has become law. On the other hand, the Irish Parliament will have no power, except in so far as such power is conceded by the Act itself, to alter its provisions. This is stated in the Bill itself,17but the statement is superfluous. It follows from the doctrine of the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament that statutes of that Parliament can only be repealed by the Parliament itself. No constitution granted to a British Colony, however large the grant of self-government it contains, can be altered by that colony unless the power to alter it is expressly conceded. Such a power, when the Constitution itself does not prescribe some particular method of constitutional amendment, has indeed been granted in general terms by Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, but this Act could not apply to Ireland, which is outside the legal definition of a colony contained in the Interpretation Act of 1889. The only powers of constitutional amendment which the Irish Legislature will possess are those expressly conceded in Clause 9, which enables it after three years from the passing of the Act to deal with the franchise and with re-distribution.The Irish Parliament will, of course, have power to[pg 014]repeal any existing Acts of the Imperial Parliament in so far as they relate to Ireland, and do not deal with matters exempted from its authority. It would be impossible for it to legislate for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland if it had not this power, and the power is implied in the general grant. But if the Imperial Parliament chooses to continue to legislate for Ireland, even in matters in regard to which the Irish Parliament has been empowered to legislate, such Imperial legislation will be of superior obligation. This is also a corollary of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, and it was not necessary to state it in the Bill.18The grant of particular legislative powers to Ireland does not prevent the Imperial Parliament from subsequently legislating in derogation of those powers. The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is as inexhaustible as the fountain of honour.It is just here that the divergence from Federal principles is most marked. Under the British North America Act the legislative powers of the provinces are“exclusive”of Dominion legislation within their own sphere.19So, too, in the case of the Australian Constitution, under which the residuary legislative powers remain with the States, the Federal Parliament is excluded from legislating in any matters not expressly conceded to it. The result is seriously to limit the operations of such powers as it does possess. It has, for example,[pg 015]over Customs and Excise, but there are other ways of giving a preference to a trade than by the imposition of duties: a low standard of factory legislation may operate in the same direction, as the Federal Parliament found to its cost when it attempted to pass an Excise Tariff Act, depriving manufacturers of the advantages of the new tariff in those States in which a certain industrial minimum was not observed. The Act was held invalid by the High Court20on the ground that it exceeded the powers conferred on the Federal Parliament by the Constitution, and encroached on the exclusive powers of industrial legislation which belonged to the States. No such situation would be possible under the Government of Ireland Act, because the powers of the Irish Legislature are not exclusive of the powers of the Imperial Parliament, but merely concurrent. And whenever an Irish and an Imperial statute conflict, the rule of construction will be in favour of the latter.The Powers of the Irish ParliamentThe Irish Parliament is given a general power to make laws for“the peace, order, and good government”of Ireland. The words are those usually employed in the grant of legislative power in colonial constitutions, and they have been interpreted as authorising“the utmost discretion of enactment for the attainment of the objects appointed to them.”21No considerations of policy or equity or repugnancy to the common law would avail to challenge an Irish statute on the ground that it wasultra vires. Within the limits assigned to it the Irish Parliament will have authority[pg 016]as plenary and as ample as the Imperial Parliament itself possesses or can bestow, and it may, if it so pleases, delegate this authority.22The Irish legislature will, however, have no power to legislate extra-territorially.23It could not, for example, pass a law to punish the Irish subjects of the Crown for offences committed outside Ireland.Now, these powers are undeniably large—larger, indeed, than is usually the case even in Federal systems where the unenumerated or“residuary”powers are left to the State. It is conceivable that they might be exercised to the prejudice of the Imperial Government and of the union of the two kingdoms, and there is nothing in these clauses of the Act to prevent them being so exercised. Treating it as a statute on the ordinary principles of the interpretation of statutes, the Judicial Committee would have no option but to regard as valid any legislation of the Irish Parliament that did not come within the exempted powers. With policy they are not and would not be concerned. But then it must be remembered that there is the possibility of the exercise of the veto of the Imperial Government in cases where legislation, thoughintra vires, is inequitable, inexpedient, or contrary to Imperial interests. This executive veto is really a juristic fact of great importance—it has always been present to their lordships'24mind as a reason for refusing to apply to the interpretation of the Federal constitutions of Canada and Australia the restrictive principles of the Supreme[pg 017]Court, as laid down in Marshall's famous doctrine of“implied restraints.”25When no such veto is in the hands of the Central Government, it becomes necessary to restrict, either in the text of the constitution, or in judicial interpretation of it, with considerable precision, the powers of the local legislatures. This is why a true Federal system always involves a very large amount of litigation. But litigation is a thing to be avoided, if possible. It encourages political parties to carry test cases into the courts.Constitutional Restrictions.26The problem of protecting the rights and privileges of minorities in Ireland by constitutional restrictions is the most delicate that ever perplexed the mind of the jurist. It is one which puts the Irish problem in a category by itself. In no other Constitution in the Empire—with the exception of a single clause in the British North America Act—is any attempt made to fetter the discretion of Parliaments by the imposition of juristic limitations upon their legislative capacity. To say a Parliament shall not legislate except upon certain subjects is one thing, to attempt to definehowit shall legislate upon those very subjects is quite another. The latter is as difficult as the former is simple. To adopt a pedestrian illustration, it is easy enough to forbid motorists to drive along certain roads, but to forbid them to drive“recklessly”along any road is another matter.“Recklessly”at once raises[pg 018]questions of standards of negligence and actionable rights. How are we going to distinguish“just”from“unjust”legislation, taxes which discriminate from taxes which do not,“rights”of the subject which a Parliament may disregard from those which it must respect? There has never been any doubt that a colonial legislature may deal with the common law rights of the subject as it pleases, may abolish trial by jury, suspend the writ ofhabeas corpus, pass bills of attainder, enactex post factolegislation, take private property without compensation, and indemnify the Executive against actions for breaches of the law—if any doubt ever existed it was set at rest by the Colonial Laws Validity Act. But in the case of Ireland it was thought necessary—owing, doubtless, largely to the fears excited in the minds of Englishmen by the Protestant minority in Ulster and the commercial interests in both countries—to insert in the earlier Home Rule Bills an elaborate series of restrictions upon the exercise of even those legislative powers which the Irish Parliament might admittedly possess. For a parallel to these restrictions one would have to go back to the Constitution of the United States and the philosophy of“natural rights.”A more difficult problem it is impossible to conceive, because a Constitution of this kind runs counter to the whole tradition of Parliamentary sovereignty in this country and the colonies. Anyone who takes the trouble to study the decisions of the Privy Council when colonial legislation has been impugned on the ground of its infringing the common law rights of the subject or“natural justice”27will discover that constitutional limitations of this kind upon the powers of colonial Legislatures are not recognised by our judges. In the[pg 019]absence of express words in the colonial Constitutions, such restraints do not exist.“The only thing,”as Lord Halsbury grimly remarked on one occasion, for the subject whose actionable rights are taken away by a Colonial Act of Indemnity“to do is to submit.”The earlier Home Rule Bills were characterised by a most elaborate code of rights which the Irish Legislature might not infringe. Its main provisions might be classified as having three objects in view: (1) The protection of the subject in life, liberty, and property; (2) the prevention of legislation discriminating against any part of the United Kingdom, and (3) the preservation of the existing rights and privileges of the Protestant community in Ireland. In one form or another almost all these principles are to be found embodied in the Constitution of the United States, and in the case of the first of them a clause of the famous 14th Amendment was actually incorporated, with some slight alterations, in Sub-section 8 of Section 4 of the Bill of 1893, according to which the powers of the Irish Legislature should not extend to the making of any law“whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in accordance with settled principles and precedents or may be denied the equal protection of the laws or whereby private property may be taken without just compensation.”These impressive words bristled with legal controversy. Did they, for example, secure to the subject the preservation of the right to trial by jury? In the States of America it has been authoritatively laid down28that, in the absence of further defining words in the State constitutions, they do not. Such procedure is indeed safeguarded in the Federal Courts, but only in consequence of express words. In the case of the States,[pg 020]Cooley, a great authority, says that“whatever the State establishes will be due process of law,”and Story regarded the words by themselves as simply securing a judicial hearing—that is to say, as they stand they merely secure the separation of legislative and judicial functions and prevent the State Legislature from passing laws which are in effect judicial decrees.What the words would really have secured to the subject in Ireland was very doubtful. The object of the draughtsman appears to have been to secure to the subject in Ireland all the protection of the law, including trial by jury, which he would have enjoyed at the date of the passing of the Bill, understanding by law both common law and statute law. If the Imperial Parliament had, subsequent to the date of the Act itself, passed legislation limiting trial by jury or other common law rights, this would, presumably, have provided the Irish Parliament with a new“settled principle and precedent,”enabling it to go further. In other words, the clause might have operated to secure a certain standardization of legislation as between the two countries.The Argument Against Restrictions.But it seems to me that such standardization is best secured by definitely reserving certain subjects of legislation to the Imperial Parliament rather than by imposing upon the exercise of such legislation by the Irish Parliament constitutional limitations which are certain to raise great doubts and provoke excessive litigation. It would be far better to reserve criminal law, as has been done in Canada, in the case of the provincial legislatures—though not without difficulty—than to lay down certain abstract principles. Moreover, is it desirable to maintain such uniformity of legislative principle? There is a great deal to be said for reserving certain[pg 021]subjects of legislation to the Imperial Parliament, but to impose on the whole sphere of legislation entrusted to the Irish Parliament the same principles as those governing the English Statute-Book, or the common law, is to subject almost every conceivable Irish statute to the challenge of litigious politicians. This is what has happened in the United States. The clause, as it stood, might quite conceivably have prevented the Irish legislature from extending the procedure of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts to cases where it was not so extended in England—a most mischievous result, seeing that this procedure is the sanction by which nearly every new statute extending the scope of industrial or public health legislation or conferring powers on local authorities is enforced.Uniformity of legislation between the two countries is not desirable in all directions nor has it hitherto been followed. In matters of expropriation, for example, the drastic procedure of the Housing and Town Planning Act has not been adopted in Ireland. Ireland has her own standard in these matters in the case of the Irish Local Government Act, and the Land Purchase Acts, and I am not at all sure that the principles of the English Land Clauses Consolidation Act and Railway Clauses Consolidation Acts as to arbitration and compensation are by any means ideal. Still less has uniformity in the matter of criminal law been the rule hitherto between the two countries. It would be difficult to find a parallel in this country for the Crimes Act of 1887 (which is still on the Statute-Book although it is no longer put in force by proclamation) with its extensions of summary jurisdiction to cases of criminal conspiracy, intimidation, riot, and unlawful assembly, and its provisions for a change of venue.It is perhaps more open to question whether the[pg 022]words of the 1893 Bill designed to secure to the subject“the equal protection of the laws,”and to prevent legislation discriminating against Englishmen and Scotsmen29under certain circumstances, ought not to have been repeated. The words“equal protection of the laws”have been interpreted in the United States in such a way as to secure that legislation, particularly in the exercise of the“police power,”shall be impartial in its operation.30On this interpretation, they would for example, have prevented an Irish Legislature from exempting Catholic convents which are used as workshops from the operation of the Factory Acts. But that might be secured in another way, and the words might, if adopted, have operated to prevent much useful legislation. It seems likely enough that discriminating legislation, in so far as it tended to prevent a particular class of persons from residing in Ireland or penalised non-residents, would be held invalid in any case on the ground that it conflicted with the reservation to the Imperial Parliament of such subjects as“trade”and“naturalization.”31And, as regards non-residents, it must be remembered that the grant of legislative powers can only be exercised“in respect of matters exclusively relating to Ireland or some part thereof”—words which may be found to be of considerable importance.The same may be said of the omission in the Bill, to provide, as its predecessor of 1893 provided, for the maintenance of securities for the liberty of the subject and the preservation of his common law rights. It is almost impossible to do this without entering on an[pg 023]uncharted sea of litigation. Modern legislation, especially social and industrial legislation, infringes common law rights at every point. I have ventured elsewhere32to describe the modern tendency of industrial legislation as a tendency, inverting Maine's famous aphorism, to advance from contract to status, that is to say, to limit to an increasing extent the contractual freedom of the worker, and to confer on him a certain status by the protection of him against himself.33The greater part of our Irish land legislation impaired the obligation of contracts. Professor Dicey criticised the Bill of 1893 for not going further than it did in its incorporation of clauses taken from the Constitution of the United States with the intention of securing the common law rights of the subject. But it may be remarked that many of those clauses have proved an almost intolerable limitation upon the power of the legislatures to deal with the regulation of trade and industry, so intolerable that the Supreme Court has of late made a liberal use of the fiction of“the police power”34to enable the legislatures to pass legislation which otherwise might have seemed[pg 024]to“abridge the privileges”of citizens of the United States or deprive them of“liberty or property without due process of law.”35At the same time it must be remembered that, although the Irish Parliament is not debarred from statutory interference with common law rights, its legislation will be subject to rules of interpretation, at the hands of the Judicial Committee, by which statutes are always construed in favour of the subject. It is a well-accepted rule of construction in English courts that common law rights cannot be taken away except by express words.36It is something to secure that the interpretation of the new Constitution and of Irish statutes shall, in the last resort, be wholly in the hands of an Imperial Court. The chartered protection of the rights of the individual by a fundamental Act is always difficult and often impossible. In the last resort it depends very much on the interpretation which the judges choose to place upon such an Act.37[pg 025]The Executive Veto.It is obvious, therefore, that the principal and indeed almost the only safeguard provided in the Bill against inequitable or discriminating legislation38is the veto of the Lord-Lieutenant acting on the instructions of the Imperial Government. A political check is preferred to a juristic check. The apostolic maxim“all things are lawful but all things are not expedient,”appears to have been the motto of the draughtsman. Not law but policy will decide what Irish Acts are to be placed on the Statute-Book. It must be admitted that this is the principle most in harmony with precedent if the constitutions granted to the colonies are to be regarded as precedents. No colony would have tolerated for a moment the elaborate network of restrictions in Clause 4 of the Bill of 1893, through the finely-woven meshes of which it would have been hard for any Irish legislation of an original or experimental character to pass. If we are really in earnest about setting up a Parliament on College Green, we cannot do otherwise. The executive veto must be the real check, and in the presence of such a check, English judges would always be very loath39to declare the Acts of a legislatureultra viresmerely because they infringed common law rights.Now this check may be exercised on one of two grounds. The Imperial Government may“instruct”the Lord-Lieutenant to refuse his assent either on the ground that the bill in question is politically objectionable, or on the ground that it is, in their opinion, in[pg 026]excess of the powers conferred on the Irish Legislature. It is desirable in every way that the two should be distinguished in order that the Imperial Parliament may be able to hold the Cabinet of the day responsible when its action is purely a question of policy. On the other hand, it is no less desirable that the Cabinet should, in the interests of the public in Ireland, be in a position to test the validity of an Irish Bill which, though unobjectionable on the ground of policy, may be questionable on the ground of law. It is a common error that in all written constitutions the courts, particularly those of the United States, haveproprio motuthe power of declaringultra viresany legislative act which infringes the principles of the Constitution. Laboulaye fell into this error in his study of the American Constitution. But the American Courts have no such power. Until a case arises in the ordinary course of litigation, under the statute in question, there is no means of annulling it, and there have been many Acts40on the Federal Statute Book which are quite conceivably“unconstitutional”in the letter as well as in the spirit, but have never been declaredultra viresfor the simple reason that no one has found his private rights affected. This holds particulars of questions of the distribution of power. It might for example, occur in the case of an Irish Bill which proposed to deal with one of the reserved services. To meet this difficulty and to avoid the trouble which might arise from an Act being placed in the Irish Statute Book41and observed in Ireland only to be subsequently declaredultra viresin the course of litigation, it is[pg 027]provided in the Government of Ireland Bill42(Clause 29) that if it appears to the Lord-Lieutenant or a Secretary of State expedient in the public interest that the validity of an Irish Act should be tested he may represent the same to His Majesty in Council and the question may then be heard and determined by the Judicial Committee in the same manner as an appeal from a Court in Ireland. It is not necessary to suppose that the executive veto will be a dead letter, and to argue from its disuse in the case of the self-governing colonies is to argue from the like to the unlike. In the case of the provincial legislatures of Canada it has been exercised by the Dominion Government where provincial legislation is inequitable, or contrary to“the settled policy”of the Dominion.Exempted Powers.The enumeration of matters in respect of which the Irish Parliament shall have no power to make laws is a little deceptive, inasmuch as many of the matters so enumerated would have been outside its power in any case. Ireland is not, so long as the Act of Union remains on the Statute Book, a sovereign state, and“the making of peace or war”and the negotiation of[pg 028]treaties would, as a matter of international law, have been impossible in her case, even if they had not been expressly prohibited.“Merchant shipping”and“the return of fugitive offenders”would also have been excluded from her authority by the rule of law43which precludes a subordinate legislature from extra-territorial legislation. The same may be said of Copyright. The colonies have only been enabled to deal with these matters in virtue of clauses in Acts of the Imperial Parliament.44But it would not be true to say that the position of the Irish Parliament is assimilated to that of the legislature of a self-governing colony. The exclusion of subjects relating to allegiance, such as naturalization45and treason,46and of legislation as to aliens is exceptional. All the self-governing colonies have power to deal with these matters, as also with the subject of naval and military forces. Perhaps the most important exemption in the case of Ireland is that of trade, trade-marks, designs, merchandise marks and patent rights. I cannot help regretting that, inasmuch as the principle has been adopted of giving Ireland general and unenumerated powers, the number of specific exemptions has not been enlarged. It is highly desirable to avoid conflict of laws in the United Kingdom as far as possible. It must be remembered that the Statute Book has, quite apart from the Act[pg 029]of Union, bound Ireland to England by many legislative ties; there is a uniform system of industrial, commercial, and, to some extent, criminal law for the whole of these Islands—Factory Acts, Companies Acts, the law of negotiable instruments, criminal procedure, old-age pensions, and insurance legislation; in all these there is legislative standardization, and the tendency of all modern political unions, notably those of the Australian Commonwealth and the German Empire, is in this direction. Confusion, injustice, and economic inequalities constantly occur in a modern State whose inhabitants are living under a“conflict of laws.”Fiscal considerations point the same way. It may be safely assumed that English opinion will not tolerate any considerable divergence between the fiscal systems of England and Ireland. Moreover, financial considerations apart, the regulation of“trade”is, as in every political union, reserved for the central legislature. But to distinguish between“trade”on the one hand and“industry”on the other is not an easy problem, and Ireland may discriminate against England only less effectively by lowering the standard of the Factory Acts than by a tariff.The“subject matter”of the Old Age Pensions Acts, National Insurance Acts, and Labour Exchanges Acts has, it is true, been excluded. It seems regrettable that the category is not enlarged to include the Companies Acts, the Sale of Goods Act, the Bills of Exchange Act, and the Factory Acts. It would be highly undesirable to have the“industrial minimum”for the United Kingdom, so laboriously attained by our factory legislation, lowered in the interests of particular interests in Ireland. The advantages of securing uniformity by the inclusion of the three great statutes relating to commercial law is also very obvious. Two of them, indeed,[pg 030]represent a great step in that codification of English law which is the dream of English jurists, they have been adopted as a model in some of our colonies, and it would seem highly desirable that the standard thus attained should remain fixed. In urging this, I do not forget what I have already said, in connection with the subject of constitutional limitations, as to the undesirability of exacting too rigid a degree of uniformity in English and Irish legislation, but constitutional limitations are one thing and exceptions quite another. It is very difficult to subject the whole field of Irish legislation to juristic principles, but it is comparatively easy to exempt from that field the subject matter of particular Acts. The whole question resolves itself into a consideration of the point at which uniformity should be determined. The Bill seems to fix the point much too low.Of course, one way of dealing with the question would have been to grant Ireland only particular and enumerated powers of legislation, as has been done in the case of the provincial legislatures of Canada. There is much to be said for this. It seems the line of least resistance; it is always easier to add to powers which appear deficient than to withdraw powers which have proved excessive. But it undoubtedly invites litigation and it is very difficult, if not impossible, to define what are exclusively Irish matters without in the last resort using some such general term (as is used in the British North America Act) as“generally all matters of a merely local nature.”The great economy shown by the draughtsman in the number of the exceptions from the powers of the Irish legislature, as well as in the number of the restrictions upon the exercise of those powers, means, as we have already indicated, that the whole weight of control[pg 031]over the Irish legislature is thrown upon the executive and legislative veto of the Imperial Government. Is it sufficient to rely upon the paramount power of the Imperial Parliament to override by statute Irish legislation which may be inequitable or inexpedient, and upon the exercise of the veto of the Imperial Government? These checks are the exercise of aforce majeure, which is often invidious and always difficult. Above all they are political. The exercise of them depends on the party in power in Great Britain, and as such it may excite resentment among the Irish people as an invasion of the autonomy granted to them. On the other hand, exceptions and restrictions are a legal, not a political, check—they operate through the agency of the courts of law without the intervention of political considerations. Moreover—and this perhaps is the most important consideration—they rest upon the consent of the Irish people expressed in the terms of the Home Rule Act to which their representatives are a party. For an Irish Parliament to defy them would be to defy the very Act which was the charter of its existence. But they invite litigation. It all resolves itself into a question of hitting the mean between the dangers of litigation on the one hand and of political pressure on the other. Probably, however, the occasions of conflict will be few and unimportant, and the temper of the Irish Parliament may be much more conservative than its critics imagine.The ExecutiveThe new Bill is remarkable for the explicitness with which it invests Ireland with control over the Executive. For the first time in the written constitutions of the Empire we have a statutory Executive, and not only[pg 032]is it a statutory Executive, but it is to be a Parliamentary Executive defined by statute. In the earlier Bills nothing was more remarkable than the brevity and allusiveness with which this question of the Government of Ireland was treated.“The Executive power in Ireland shall continue vested in Her Majesty the Queen”was the language employed in the Bill of 1893. Under that Bill the Government of Ireland would have continued, even after its passage into law, to be in the hands of the English Cabinet and it would have rested with that Cabinet to determine how large or how small a part of the prerogatives of the Crown should be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant. Paradoxical as it may seem, it would have been quite possible for a Unionist Government, coming into power immediately after the Home Rule Bill had passed into law and an Irish Parliament had met at Dublin, to retain in their own hands the Executive authority in Ireland without any breach of statutory obligations. The Bills of 1886 and 1893 left it in the discretion of the Crown to decide what the powers of the Lord-Lieutenant should be. Following Colonial precedents, the Constitution would have had to be supplemented47by prerogative legislation in the shape of Letters Patent defining those powers. Moreover, these powers were to have been vested not in the Lord-Lieutenant in Council, but in the Lord-Lieutenant alone. Something was indeed, said about an“Executive Committee”of the Irish Privy Council to aid and advise in the Government of Ireland—this was the only hint of responsible Government that the Bill contained—but nothing was said of the powers or[pg 033]constitution of the Committee nor of the extent to which the Lord-Lieutenant was bound to act on its advice. Its constitution was left to the discretion of Her Majesty. Its powers would, of course, as in the case of the Colonies, have been decided by the tacit adoption of the unwritten conventions of the English Constitution that the advisers of the Governor must command the confidence of the Legislature which votes supplies.Very different is our new Bill. The Executive power does indeed continue“vested in His Majesty the King,”and nothing is to affect its exercise—in other words, it is to continue in the hands of the Imperial Government—except“as respects Irish services as defined for the purpose of this Act.”The exception is a new departure and the general effect of the whole clause (Clause IV.) is expressly to hand over in statutory terms“all public services in connection with the administration of the Government of Ireland”except the reserved services and such services as those in regard to which the Irish Parliament have no power to make laws. The effect of this is to hand over an executive authority co-extensive with the legislative authority.48Moreover, in regard to Irish services, the Executive power is to be exercised by the Lord-LieutenantthroughIrish Departments, and the heads of these Departments are given the Parliamentary title of“Ministers”and, what is more remarkable, it is expressly provided (a provision[pg 034]to be found in only one or two, and those the latest, of our Colonial Constitutions) that:“No such person shall hold office as an Irish Minister for a longer period than six months, unless he is or becomes a member of one of the Houses of the Irish Parliament.”Never in any constitution that emanated from the practised hand of the Parliamentary draughtsman has there been such a complete transfer in express statutory terms of the executive power. Taken together with the comparatively unrestricted grant of legislative power, it constitutes a grant of a larger measure of self-government than is to be found in any of the earlier Bills.At the same time there is here no cause for alarm. It must be remembered that the Lord-Lieutenant will exist in a dual capacity—like a constitutional king he will be bound in Irish matters to act on the advice of his Irish Ministers but, like a Colonial governor, he will also in all Imperial matters be bound to obey the instructions of the Imperial Government. In regard to legislation the position here is quite clear: he may veto measures which his own Ministers have promoted if the Imperial Government think it advisable so to instruct him. In regard to the executive, he will, of course, enjoy less latitude; it is quite clear that the Imperial Government will, under this clause, find it practically impossible to interfere in purely Irish administration. The Irish Government will, of course, be carried on in the name of the Crown, and it will enjoy the same prerogatives at common law as the Imperial Government in such matters as the use of the prerogative writsmandamusandcertiorari, and the immunity from actions in tort. Ireland has its own Petitions of Right Act.At the same time a distinction must be drawn between the prerogatives relating to the exercise of Irish[pg 035]services and prerogatives which cannot be so defined. Some of the latter may be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant by his patent, and these he will exercise not on the advice of the Irish, but of the Imperial, Government. Moreover, there are certain powers conferred by statute on the Lord-Lieutenant, or the Lord-Lieutenant in Council, such as the power of proclaiming disaffected districts under the Crimes Act, of suspending the operation of the Irish Habeas Corpus Act, and of controlling the constabulary, not all49of which will be exercisable on the advice of Irish Ministers. Prerogatives not so exercisable will no doubt be exercised on the advice of the Secretary of State for Home Affairs who is even now the medium of formal communications between the Lord-Lieutenant and the Crown. The Chief Secretary50will, of course, disappear altogether; he will be replaced by the Executive Committee. The Lord-Lieutenant will, of course, cease to be a member of the English Ministry; his position will be assimilated to that of a Colonial Governor, and his tenure fixed for a term of years so as to make his tenure of office independent, as it must be in the exercise of his new constitutional duties, of the fortunes of English Parties.The Irish LegislatureThe constitution of the legislature itself calls for little comment. It follows with some fidelity the features[pg 036]of Mr. Gladstone's Bills, but the substitution of a nominated Senate for the“Council”or“Order”elected on a property franchise is a new departure. Nomination of late has fallen into some discredit both in theory and in practice.51Colonial experience is not encouraging. Nomination by the Crown means in practice nomination by the Governor, on the advice of the Cabinet of the day, and Ministries in Canada and New South Wales have put this prerogative to such partizan uses as to reduce the Upper House to a very servile condition. When nomination is for life and not for a fixed term of years the evils of this system may be mitigated, but they are not removed. The one thing that can be said about the proposed Senate is that its powers in legislation are of such a limited character that an Irish Executive would be under little temptation to“pack”it. A Senate of only forty members compelled to meet in joint session a House of Commons of 164 members every second time that it rejects or objectionably amends a bill is not likely to prove a very formidable obstacle to legislation. But the nomination by the Executive is in any case somewhat objectionable, and it would seem better to provide that at the end of the first term of eight years the Senators should be appointed by some system of election, whether on a basis of proportional representation or otherwise.52But[pg 037]to their nomination for the first term by the Imperial Government I see no very cogent objection. Indeed, the expedient has much to be said for it, for the discretion, if wisely exercised, will enable the Imperial Government not only to secure to Irish minorities a degree of representation which no conceivable system of election could secure, but also to appoint men of moderate opinions—one immediately thinks of Sir Horace Plunkett—who, in the strife of extremists, might have no chance of election by either party. It has been argued in some quarters that a Second Chamber is wholly unnecessary, and the example of the single-chamber legislatures in some of the Canadian provinces has been cited. The argument, however, overlooks one really important function of the Senate, namely its duty to provide for the security of tenure of the Irish judges. Clause XXVII. provides that judges appointed after the passing of the Act shall only be removable on an Address of both Houses of the Irish Parliament, and, should the Senate refuse to concur in a demand by the lower House for the removal of a judge, there is no such means of overcoming its resistance in a joint session as is the case with legislation. This is well.There is one provision in the Bill53which will serve to strengthen the position of the Senate as an advisory body and may operate to give it an initiative in the introduction of Government legislation—the provision which enables an Irish Minister who is a member of either House to sit and to speak in both Houses. This is a practice common on the Continent, and not wholly unknown[pg 038]in the case of some of our Colonial Constitutions, and it has much to commend it. The Senate is placed under the same disabilities as to money bills as are imposed on the House of Lords by the Parliament Act. Thereby it is placed in an inferior position to that of most of the Second Chambers in the Colonies, all of which can reject, and some of which may also amend, money bills. The disability is the less surprising having regard to its character as a nominee body—it is when the Second Chambers of the Colonies are elective, that their powers in regard to money bills are considerable.54The privileges of the Imperial Parliament are conferred by the Government of Ireland Bill upon the Irish Parliament. In the absence of such grant the Irish Parliament would not have had such privileges—although it might have adopted them by legislation—for thelex et consuetudo Parliamentiare not implied in the grant of a constitution.55It is not uncommon to prescribe in Colonial Constitutions that the legislature shall have such privileges as are enjoyed by the House of Commons at the time of grant. In the present case, the Irish Parliament may define its privileges, if it thinks fit, by legislation, though it is difficult to imagine any occasion for its doing so. The really important thing is that it cannot enlarge those privileges beyond the scope of the privileges of the Imperial Parliament. This is the one constitutional limitation in the Bill—apart from the“safeguards”as to legislation in regard to religion and marriage contained in Clause III.—and it is by no means unimportant. The powers of the Imperial Parliament—particularly as to the right[pg 039]of the two Houses to commit for contempt without cause shewn—are a sufficiently high standard.Irish Representation in the House of Commons56Irish representation at Westminster has always been the riddle of the Home Rule problem. I have no space to examine here in detail the alternative solutions which were put forward in the earlier Home Rule Bills. But there is one general consideration which must always be borne in mind in the theoretical discussion of any solution. It is the very simple consideration that representation is what mathematicians would call a“function”of legislative power—the one is dependent upon the other. If the legislative powers over Ireland reserved to the Imperial Parliament are large, the representation of Ireland in that Parliament must not be small. It is at this point that Mr. Gladstone's original proposal for total exclusion broke down. He reserved to the Imperial Parliament considerable powers of legislation in regard to Ireland and yet proposed to exercise those powers in the absence of Irish representatives.It was no answer to cite colonial analogies. The Irish problem is not, as I have pointed out elsewhere, a colonial problem. No one at present proposes to give Ireland complete fiscal autonomy, for example. Nor is it strictly apposite to say that the Imperial Parliament legislates for the Colonies in the absence of colonial[pg 040]representatives. Such legislation is now almost exclusively confined to what I may call enabling legislation in matters in which the Colonies, owing to their status as Dependencies, are unable to legislate. In such matters as copyright, merchant shipping, marriage, extradition, the Imperial Parliament legislates for the Colonies largely because colonial laws cannot operate ex-territorially, and such Imperial legislation is usually effected by means of application clauses which enable the Colonies to adopt it or not as they please. But rarely if ever does the Imperial Parliament legislate for a self-governing colony as it has done and will continue to do in the case of such domestic Irish affairs as old-age pensions, land purchase, Customs and Excise, defence, naturalisation, to say nothing perhaps of industrial and commercial law. I have already indicated my opinion in favour of confining these subjects to the Imperial Parliament, but even were the opposite course taken there would still remain the fiscal question. We cannot continue to tax Ireland unless the Irish representatives are to remain at Westminster.The presence of the Irish members at Westminster is imperative if the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is not to be illusory. Mr. Balfour57contends that it will be as illusory as it has been in the case of the Colonies. But the Colonies are not represented in the Imperial Parliament, and to differentiate Ireland in this respect is to make all the difference between a legal formula and a political fact.There remains the question of inclusion. No one would question the propriety of reducing Irish representation to its true proportions on a population basis—in other words, from its present figure of 103 to one of 70. The real difficulty arises when we consider[pg 041]whether those members, whatever their numbers, are to attend at Westminster in the same capacity as the British members. We are to-day confronted by the same problem as that which vexed the Parliament of 1893: are Irish members to vote upon all occasions or only upon those occasions when exclusively Irish and exclusively Imperial affairs are under discussion? The original text of the 1893 Bill adopted the latter solution. At first it has much to commend it, for it avoids—or attempts to avoid—the anomaly of refusing self-government to Great Britain while granting it to Ireland: if Irish members are to govern themselves at Dublin without the interference of Englishmen, why, it has been pertinently asked, should not the converse hold good at Westminster? But two very grave difficulties stand in the way; one is the difficulty of distinguishing between Irish and non-Irish business at Westminster; the other is the difficulty, even when such distinction is made, of maintaining a single majority under such circumstances. Withdraw the Irish members on certain occasions and you might convert a Liberal majority at Westminster on certain days into a Unionist majority on other days. A Liberal Government might have responsibility without power in British matters and a Unionist Opposition power without responsibility. One Executive could not co-exist with two majorities. Such a state of affairs might have been conceivable some seventy or eighty years ago, when Ministries were not regarded as responsible for the passage of legislation into law. It would be conceivable in France, where Ministries come and go and the Deputies remain. But it would be fatal to the Cabinet system as we know it.Another objection to the“in-and-out”plan is the extreme difficulty of classifying the business of the[pg 042]House of Commons in such a way as to distinguish between what is“Irish”and what is not. If that business were purely legislative the difficulty would not be so great, but the House controls administration as well as legislation. Any question involving a vote of confidence in the Cabinet might legitimately be regarded as a matter in which the Irish members had a right to have a voice. The motion for the adjournment of the House, following on an unsatisfactory answer by a Minister, might be regarded as such. Who would decide these things? The Bill of 1893 provided for their determination by the House. In that event the Irish members would presumably have had a voice in determining on what subjects they should or should not vote, and they would have been masters of the situation under all circumstances. By their power to determine the fate of Imperial Ministries they might have determined the exercise of the Imperial veto on Irish legislation and reduced it to a nullity. It may, indeed, be urged that the Irish vote often dominates the situation at Westminster even under present circumstances, but it must be remembered that it is now exercised in the consistent support of the same administration, whereas under an“in-and-out”system its action might be capricious and apt to be determined solely by Irish exigencies of the moment.There remains the plan of the inclusion of Irish members for all purposes. This at least has the advantage of simplicity. If Irishmen constantly attended at Westminster without distinction of voting capacity they would be less likely to regard their presence there as an instrument for reducing to impotence the exercise of the Imperial veto upon Irish legislation. It is quite conceivable, indeed, that once Home Rule is granted Irishmen will be Imperialists at Westminster without[pg 043]becoming Nationalists at Dublin—the natural conservatism of the Irish character may reassert itself. Close observers of Irish thought are inclined to believe that the grant of Home Rule will act as a great solvent in Irish political life, and that with the iron discipline of Nationalism relaxed, and its cherished object attained, lines of cleavage, social, economic, and industrial, will appear in Ireland and vastly change the distribution of Irish parties both at Dublin and at Westminster. Ulster“Unionists”may be found voting with a Liberal Government on education questions and Irish“Nationalists”against it. Irish representatives at Westminster may become more, rather than less, closely identified with British interests. And it should be remembered that it would be no new thing for members from one part of the United Kingdom to be voting on measures which solely concerned another part of the Kingdom. This is happening every day. As Mr. Walker points out elsewhere, a process of legislative disintegration has been going on within the walls of the Imperial Parliament itself, which is already being forced to legislate separately for the three separate parts of the United Kingdom. He estimates that during the last twenty years no less than 49.7 per cent. of the public general Acts have applied only to some one part of the United Kingdom instead of to the whole.The Government of Ireland Bill adopts the principle of total inclusion, but qualifies the anomaly which is involved in the presence of Irish members voting on non-Irish questions by reducing the representation of Ireland to the number of forty-two, and thus to a figure far below that to which Ireland is entitled on the basis of population. At the same time it must be admitted that the anomaly is not thereby removed. The position of Irish members voting on purely English legislation[pg 044]after the grant of Home Rule will indeed—numbers apart—be more anomalous than it was before it. An anomaly can be tolerated so long as it is universal in its operation, and Scotch and English members can at present view with equanimity the spectacle of Irish members voting in their own affairs so long as they themselves exercise the same privilege in those of their neighbours. Reciprocity of this kind produces a certain unity of thought in a deliberative assembly. But the anomaly at once becomes invidious if Irishmen are placed in a privileged position. It is perhaps more theoretical than real, as the actual weight that could be thrown into the scale of the division lobby by a Nationalist majority (taking the present balance of parties in Ireland) of about twenty-six cannot be considerable, even if, as is very doubtful, it were consistently exercised.Still the anomaly remains. Is it possible to meet it by some extension of Home Rule to the legislative affairs of England and Scotland?The Further Extension of Home RuleThe anomaly, however, remains. How is it to be met? Obviously it is but a temporary difficulty if, as the Prime Minister has suggested in his speech on the first reading, the Bill is to be regarded as but the first step in a general devolution of the legislative powers of the Imperial Parliament. But everything depends on how far that devolution is to be carried. The Prime Minister's reference to a change in the Standing Orders suggests a further development of the Committee system already in operation in the case of the Scottish Standing Committee by which the House has delegated a certain degree of provincial autonomy to a group of members. It would be possible to extend[pg 045]this to the creation of a Standing Committee for England and Wales. Under such a system Irish Members would be excluded from the Committee stages of legislation which was neither Irish nor Imperial. But there remains the Report stage, which is always apt to resolve itself into a Second Committee stage58in which the whole House participates. Moreover, an impassable limit is set to this process of domestic devolution by the necessity that the Government of to-day should command a majority in each of these Committees. A Liberal Ministry would probably find itself in a minority in an English Standing Committee, and a Unionist Ministry would, with equal probability, find itself in a minority in a Scottish Committee. Committees have become not so much a sphere for the legislative initiative of the private member as a new outlet for Government business. Contentious bills introduced or adopted by the Government are referred to them, and the moment this is the case the Minister in charge who is confronted in Committee with amendments which he does not care to accept may invite the whole House on the Report stage of the Bill to disallow them. The House itself, jealous of any surrender of its prerogatives, is only too apt to turn the Report stage into a second Committee stage. The responsibility of a Government department for the preparation and execution of legislation is to-day so indispensable that effective legislative devolution is almost impossible without devolution of the executive also. A Committee to which the Minister in charge of the Bill is not responsible is not in a position to exercise effectual control over legislation. Indeed it seems impossible to contemplate a devolution of legislative power without a[pg 046]corresponding devolution of executive power. So long as we have but one Executive in the House of Commons it is impossible to have two or three legislatures within the walls of that House. Moreover, it is just as imperative to restore the diminishing control of members of Parliament over administration as it is to re-establish their authority in legislation. There is a growing and regrettable tendency to confer upon Government departments both legislative and judicial powers—powers to make statutory orders and to interpret them, which is depriving our constitution of what has hitherto been regarded by foreign students as one of its most distinctive features—the subordination of the executive to the legislature and to the courts. The distinction between Gesetz und Verordnung,59between statute and order, is fast disappearing in the enormous volume of statutory orders. Powers to make rules under particular statutes are entrusted to Scotch, Irish, and English Departments which have the effect of diminishing the control of the House of Commons without transferring it to any representative substitute. The great increase of grants-in-aid for administrative purposes has also given the departments a power of indirect legislation by the latitude they enjoy in the distribution of them such as is further calculated to diminish the control of the House of Commons over questions of Irish and Scotch policy. Rarely do any marked departures by the departments come under the review of the House of Commons; the claims of the Government over the time-table of the House, fortified by certain rulings of the Speaker,60[pg 047]may and frequently do preclude any examination of them. In the words of a famous resolution, one may say“the power of the Executive has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished.”But it is no remedy for this state of things to provide for administrative devolution alone. To devolve the authority which a great Department of State, such as the Board of Agriculture, exercises over the whole of Great Britain by the simple process of assigning its Scotch business to the Secretary for Scotland, does not increase the control of Scottish members over the executive. This process of administrative devolution, which is always going on, is not accompanied by any measure of legislative devolution; the Secretary for Scotland is not thereby brought under the control of the Scotch Standing Committee.To create a new Scottish or Irish Department does not increase Parliamentary control over Scottish or Irish administration; rather it diminishes it. The heads of a Scottish Education Office, Local Government Board, and Department of Agriculture have been made responsible not to the House of Commons but to the Secretary for Scotland. Like the Chief Secretary for Ireland, he is a Prime Minister without a Cabinet and without a Legislature, and his policy is determined primarily not by Scottish or Irish opinion, but by the alien issues of imperial politics. Obviously there will never be any remedy for these anomalies until we have a Legislature with an executive responsible to it.Scottish Home RuleAt the present moment we have in the case of Scotland devolution in a state of arrested development. This process of disintegration is reflected in separate Estimates in finance and in distinct draftsmanship in[pg 048]legislation. In legislation, indeed, marked changes have also taken place under cover of alterations in the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. An itinerant delegation of Scotch members has been set up to deal with private bill procedure in Scotland, and domestic devolution within the walls of the House of Commons has taken the shape of a Scotch Grand Committee. Few or none of these changes have any preconceived relation with the others; they represent experiments framed to meet the exigencies of the moment, but they all bear eloquent witness to a fact which has changed the whole aspect of the Home Rule problem and made that aspect at once more practical and less intimidating—the fact that the House of Commons has found itself increasingly incompetent to do its work. The fact is disguised by a multitude of expedients, all of them, however, amounting to a renunciation of legislative authority. These changes represent thedisjecta membraof Scottish Home Rule—they have no coherence, they point not so much to a solution of the problem as to its recognition.None the less, I think the Irish Government Bill does provide us with a prototype. There is nothing in it, with the exception of the financial clauses, which forbids its adoption in the case of Scotland and of England. But I think, as I have already indicated in another connection, that the category of reserved subjects ought to be considerably enlarged so as to secure the maintenance of the existing uniformity of legislation in commercial and industrial matters. There are, however, undeniable difficulties in the way of an identity of local constitutions. Legislation in regard to land is exempted from the control of the Irish Legislature to an extent which Scotland would hardly be prepared to accept. Control over legislation[pg 049]relating to marriage is retained in the case of Ireland; I doubt if it would be tolerated in Scotland, whose marriage law differs61from that of England to a far greater extent than is the case with the marriage law of Ireland. In common law England and Ireland have the same rules;62it is only in statute law that they differ. In Scotland the common law is radically different. There will, therefore, be some difficulty in finding a common denominator for the Imperial Parliament—and in avoiding, even under“Home Rule All Round”a certain divergence in the legislative capacities of the members from Scotland and Ireland, with the attendant risk of an“in-and-out”procedure.[pg 050]

Part I. The New Constitution[pg 003]I.—The Constitution: A Commentary.By Professor J. H. Morgan“Home Rule is at bottom Federalism,”we are told1by the most distinguished jurist among its opponents. It is urged against it that Federal Governments are almost invariably weak Governments, and that, in so far as they are strong, they are as“symmetrical”as the new constitution is unsymmetrical. Cornewall Lewis once thought it necessary to write a book on the Use and Abuse of Political Terms, and there is a great danger in the present controversy of our being enslaved by the poverty of our political vocabulary. The term“Federalism”is put to such new and alien uses as to darken counsel and confuse thought. That Federal Executives are usually weak, that in the dual allegiance of a Federal system men often prefer the State authority which is near to the Federal authority which is remote, that the respective limits of Federal and State legislation are defined with difficulty and observed with reluctance, that conflict of laws is more often the rule than the exception, that[pg 004]Federal constitutions are rigid rather than flexible, and, in a word, that progress is sacrificed to stability: all these things are true, and all these things are irrelevant. The Government of Ireland Bill is not, and cannot be, the corner-stone of a Federal system for the United Kingdom, although its duplication in the case of Scotland and of England would not be impossible, should it appear desirable. We may, for want of a better term, call it the foundation of a system of Devolution, but we must not call it Federalism.Putting on one side for the moment the question whether Home Rule is Federalism or not, I am inclined to enter a protest against all these attempts to fit the Bill into the categories of the jurist. It is very doubtful whether any two constitutions in the world, even federal constitutions, can be brought under one species. Two of the most successful“federal”constitutions present the gravest anomalies to the theorist. The Canadian Constitution, according to Professor Dicey, betrays a logical fallacy in the very words of its preamble;2and German jurists have wrangled no less inconclusively than incessantly about the legal character of the Empire and as to where its sovereignty resides;3yet in neither case has the practical operation of these constitutions been much the worse for the legal solecisms which they present. Indeed, it would not be too much to say with Aristotle that the“mixed”and not the“pure”type of government is the most successful,[pg 005]and that when Federalism is, as in the United States, at its purest, it is also at its weakest. The constitution of Imperial Germany ought, on this kind of reasoning, to be a flagrant perversion, and yet it has persisted in enduring for some forty-one years, and the prestige of its principal organ, the Bundesrath, although violating all Mr. Balfour's principles as to“equality”in its constitution, is, according to the doyen of the constitutional lawyers of Germany, increasing every day.4The argument that“Federalism”is incompatible with the preponderance of the“predominant partner,”and that no“federal”union is possible in these islands owing to the superior position occupied by England, would, even if it were relevant, be easily refuted by the example presented by the hegemony of Prussia.The same objection may be urged against the contention that the grant of self-government, whether to Ireland alone or to the rest of the United Kingdom, is both reactionary and unprecedented. The progress of all civilised communities, we are told, is towards political integration, not away from it. Devolution, it is said, is gratuitous in the case of a“United”Kingdom whose very union represents an ideal imperfectly achieved by the less fortunate countries which have had to be content with something less complete in the form of Federalism. Nations or Colonies mutually independent federate as a step towards union; it is“unprecedented”to reverse the process and qualify union by looser ties of cohesion. Now this attempt“to construct a normal programme for all portions of mankind”5cannot be sustained. If it[pg 006]could, it would avail as a conclusive argument against the grant of self-government to our Colonies whose claims to legislative independence grow with their growth and strengthen with their strength.6But it is not even true of Federal Unions. Anyone who takes the trouble to study the history of judicial interpretation of the American Constitution will find that there is a constant ebb and flow in the current of“unionism.”The intention of the framers of the 14th Amendment to create a United States citizenship has been largely neutralized by the decisions of the Supreme Court, which have inclined strongly in the direction of the legislative autonomy of the States.7Nor is this all. We are told that Federal Constitutions are“round and perfect and self-contained,”8—that they are characterized by“equality”of all the parts—and that, like the work of the divine law-giver of early communities, they are finished the moment they are begun.9But these confident inductions cannot be sustained. The history of the constitution of the United States and of Imperial Germany tells another story—a story of ancillary communities and dependencies in various stages of political apprenticeship. If we look for the American Constitution where all such constitutions must really be sought, that is to say not in the original text, but in the commentary of the courts, we shall find a truly remarkable tendency of late years to[pg 007]emphasize this heterogeneity, inequality and incompleteness.10The new Bill proposes a delegation of authority, both executive and legislative. Unlike a Federal constitution, it contemplates no distribution of sovereignty (begging a question which has often vexed the jurists as to the partibility of sovereignty). The new Government in Ireland will, indeed, be carried on in the name of the Crown, the writs of the Irish Court will run in the King's name, the statutes of the Irish Parliament will be enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and Commons. But the Imperial Government and the Imperial Parliament will remain supreme. The executive power in Ireland will continue vested in His Majesty, though some prerogatives may be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant who, as respects them, will exist in a dual capacity—some of these he will exercise on the advice of the Imperial Government, others on the advice of the Irish Government. So far, however, as the law, as distinguished from convention, is concerned, he will be in no way bound to act on the advice of his Irish Ministers except in so far as his“instructions”require him to do so. The words of the Bill do, indeed, contemplate with more explicitness than is usual in our written constitutions, a transfer of executive as well as of legislative authority, but they are by no means exhaustive, and[pg 008]they still leave it to His Majesty to determine11what prerogatives shall be delegated after the Act has come into force. As regards the legislative power, it will remain with the Imperial Government to give it effect by granting or withholding the King's assent to Irish legislation,12and the Imperial Parliament may, at any time, exercise its supremacy to the prejudice of such legislation, even after it has found its way on to the Irish statute-book. As regards the judiciary, there will, of course, be no dual judiciary: Irish Courts will interpret and enforce Imperial as well as Irish statutes, but both in the one case and in the other their judgments will be subject to appeal to an Imperial Court—the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In other words, the Imperial power will be supreme in the executive, the legislative, and the judicial sphere.Now in Federalism in the true sense—and I regard the constitution of the United States as the archetype—there is no such subordination. The authority of the constituent states and of the Federal nation are distinct and independent of one another. The Governor of the State is appointed not by the Federal authority, but by the State itself, whose servant he is. There[pg 009]is no“Crown”to serve as a common denominator of State and Federal Executives.13The one is not subordinate to the other, but is co-ordinate with it. The legislation of the State is subject to no external veto by the President. Nor is it subject to a legislative veto. In all matters not expressly conceded to the Federal Legislature, the State Legislatures remain as supreme after the enactment of the Federal Constitution as they were before it. In the legislative, as in the executive, sphere, the two authorities are co-ordinate. So with the judiciary. The decisions of the State Courts, in so far as they deal with State matters, and do not involve the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, are final and subject to no appeal to the Supreme Court at Washington. Conversely, Federal Circuit Courts exist independently of the State Courts to decide cases arising under Federal statutes or involving the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, and their judgments are enforced not by the State Executive but by the Federal Executive, which has its own marshals for the purpose. Nor can an act done by a Federal official, in obedience to a Federal statute, be punished by the State Court, even though it appear to involve a breach of a law of the State.14[pg 010]It is this dual allegiance that constitutes the inherent weakness of all Federal systems. Arguments based upon it have been urged against the grant of self-government to Ireland. Even those who admit that Federal analogies have no application so far as the relations of the Imperial and Irish legislatures are concerned, and who concede that the Irish Parliament will be as subordinate as a State Parliament in a Federal system is co-ordinate—none the less insist that in the relation of the two executives there is a real and perilous dualism. Many opponents allege, and no doubt, believe, that, with an Irish Parliament sitting at Dublin, the King's Writ will not run, the decisions of the Judicial Committee will not be enforced. Imperial statutes will not be obeyed, and Imperial taxes will not be collected. If there were a real delimitation of Courts and Executives, Imperial and Irish, under the new system, such a danger, though remote, would be conceivable. But no such sharp distinction is to be found in the Bill. In political unions, the central Government may act upon its subjects in a particular state directly through its own agencies—its own Courts, its own Executive officers, and its own police—this is the true Federal type; or it may act indirectly through the agency of the State authorities. Conversely, the State Governments may act directly through their own agencies—this again is the Federal principle, or they may act indirectly through Imperial agencies. Now wherever this indirect action is employed in both its forms the distinction between the two authorities is confused, the Federal principle undergoes a qualification which, by depriving it of half its symmetry, deprives it of all its weakness. Just this reciprocal relationship is established between the Imperial Government and the Irish Government.[pg 011]Imperial officials will be at the service of the Irish Government, and Irish officials at the service of the Imperial Government. For example, in the collection of taxes imposed by the Irish Parliament, the Irish Government will depend upon Imperial revenue officers to assess and collect them. The Imperial Government, on the other hand, will depend upon Irish Courts and Irish sheriffs to enforce their collection. Irish sheriffs will, in turn, depend upon an Imperial constabulary to assist them in levying execution. I shall return to some of these points in greater detail when I come to deal with the relations between the Executive and the Judiciary, and the maintenance of law and order. It is sufficient for me to remark here that the Irish Nationalist who wishes to defy the Imperial Government, and the Irish Unionist who wishes to defy the Irish Government, will each be hard put to define what he is pleased to regard as the limits of political obligation. He will find it difficult to distinguish where the authority of the Irish Government ends and that of the Imperial Government begins.The Supremacy of the Imperial Parliament.In the new Bill the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is secured by express words. The words are not necessary. No Parliament can bind its successors, and what one Parliament has done another Parliament may undo. Even when one Parliament has been at pains, by declaring its legislation“perpetual”or“unalterable”to bind posterity—as in the case of certain clauses in the Irish and Scotch Acts of Union—its injunctions have been disregarded by its successors with no more formality than is necessary in the case of any other legislation. An Act setting up a new Constitution is no more irrevocable than an Act authorising the[pg 012]imposition of the income tax. If, therefore, the Imperial Parliament chooses to grant a Constitution to Ireland, there is nothing to prevent its revoking or amending that grant, even (we submit) though it should have been at pains to enact that the Constitution could only be surrendered or altered by the consent of the Legislature which that Constitution created. Some doubts did, indeed, arise as to this point in the case of the Home Rule Bill of 1886, which not only excluded the Irish members from Westminster, but made provision for the amendment of the new Constitution by stipulating that such amendment should be made, if at all, by the joint authority of the Irish and English Parliaments. Whether this would have had the effect of preventing the“Imperial”Parliament from amending such a Home Rule Act without calling in the assistance of the Irish Parliament was much discussed at the time.15Obviously, the question does not now arise, as the Irish members are to continue to sit at Westminster.16[pg 013]It is therefore open to the Imperial Parliament at any time to repeal or amend the Government of Ireland Bill after it has become law. On the other hand, the Irish Parliament will have no power, except in so far as such power is conceded by the Act itself, to alter its provisions. This is stated in the Bill itself,17but the statement is superfluous. It follows from the doctrine of the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament that statutes of that Parliament can only be repealed by the Parliament itself. No constitution granted to a British Colony, however large the grant of self-government it contains, can be altered by that colony unless the power to alter it is expressly conceded. Such a power, when the Constitution itself does not prescribe some particular method of constitutional amendment, has indeed been granted in general terms by Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, but this Act could not apply to Ireland, which is outside the legal definition of a colony contained in the Interpretation Act of 1889. The only powers of constitutional amendment which the Irish Legislature will possess are those expressly conceded in Clause 9, which enables it after three years from the passing of the Act to deal with the franchise and with re-distribution.The Irish Parliament will, of course, have power to[pg 014]repeal any existing Acts of the Imperial Parliament in so far as they relate to Ireland, and do not deal with matters exempted from its authority. It would be impossible for it to legislate for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland if it had not this power, and the power is implied in the general grant. But if the Imperial Parliament chooses to continue to legislate for Ireland, even in matters in regard to which the Irish Parliament has been empowered to legislate, such Imperial legislation will be of superior obligation. This is also a corollary of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, and it was not necessary to state it in the Bill.18The grant of particular legislative powers to Ireland does not prevent the Imperial Parliament from subsequently legislating in derogation of those powers. The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is as inexhaustible as the fountain of honour.It is just here that the divergence from Federal principles is most marked. Under the British North America Act the legislative powers of the provinces are“exclusive”of Dominion legislation within their own sphere.19So, too, in the case of the Australian Constitution, under which the residuary legislative powers remain with the States, the Federal Parliament is excluded from legislating in any matters not expressly conceded to it. The result is seriously to limit the operations of such powers as it does possess. It has, for example,[pg 015]over Customs and Excise, but there are other ways of giving a preference to a trade than by the imposition of duties: a low standard of factory legislation may operate in the same direction, as the Federal Parliament found to its cost when it attempted to pass an Excise Tariff Act, depriving manufacturers of the advantages of the new tariff in those States in which a certain industrial minimum was not observed. The Act was held invalid by the High Court20on the ground that it exceeded the powers conferred on the Federal Parliament by the Constitution, and encroached on the exclusive powers of industrial legislation which belonged to the States. No such situation would be possible under the Government of Ireland Act, because the powers of the Irish Legislature are not exclusive of the powers of the Imperial Parliament, but merely concurrent. And whenever an Irish and an Imperial statute conflict, the rule of construction will be in favour of the latter.The Powers of the Irish ParliamentThe Irish Parliament is given a general power to make laws for“the peace, order, and good government”of Ireland. The words are those usually employed in the grant of legislative power in colonial constitutions, and they have been interpreted as authorising“the utmost discretion of enactment for the attainment of the objects appointed to them.”21No considerations of policy or equity or repugnancy to the common law would avail to challenge an Irish statute on the ground that it wasultra vires. Within the limits assigned to it the Irish Parliament will have authority[pg 016]as plenary and as ample as the Imperial Parliament itself possesses or can bestow, and it may, if it so pleases, delegate this authority.22The Irish legislature will, however, have no power to legislate extra-territorially.23It could not, for example, pass a law to punish the Irish subjects of the Crown for offences committed outside Ireland.Now, these powers are undeniably large—larger, indeed, than is usually the case even in Federal systems where the unenumerated or“residuary”powers are left to the State. It is conceivable that they might be exercised to the prejudice of the Imperial Government and of the union of the two kingdoms, and there is nothing in these clauses of the Act to prevent them being so exercised. Treating it as a statute on the ordinary principles of the interpretation of statutes, the Judicial Committee would have no option but to regard as valid any legislation of the Irish Parliament that did not come within the exempted powers. With policy they are not and would not be concerned. But then it must be remembered that there is the possibility of the exercise of the veto of the Imperial Government in cases where legislation, thoughintra vires, is inequitable, inexpedient, or contrary to Imperial interests. This executive veto is really a juristic fact of great importance—it has always been present to their lordships'24mind as a reason for refusing to apply to the interpretation of the Federal constitutions of Canada and Australia the restrictive principles of the Supreme[pg 017]Court, as laid down in Marshall's famous doctrine of“implied restraints.”25When no such veto is in the hands of the Central Government, it becomes necessary to restrict, either in the text of the constitution, or in judicial interpretation of it, with considerable precision, the powers of the local legislatures. This is why a true Federal system always involves a very large amount of litigation. But litigation is a thing to be avoided, if possible. It encourages political parties to carry test cases into the courts.Constitutional Restrictions.26The problem of protecting the rights and privileges of minorities in Ireland by constitutional restrictions is the most delicate that ever perplexed the mind of the jurist. It is one which puts the Irish problem in a category by itself. In no other Constitution in the Empire—with the exception of a single clause in the British North America Act—is any attempt made to fetter the discretion of Parliaments by the imposition of juristic limitations upon their legislative capacity. To say a Parliament shall not legislate except upon certain subjects is one thing, to attempt to definehowit shall legislate upon those very subjects is quite another. The latter is as difficult as the former is simple. To adopt a pedestrian illustration, it is easy enough to forbid motorists to drive along certain roads, but to forbid them to drive“recklessly”along any road is another matter.“Recklessly”at once raises[pg 018]questions of standards of negligence and actionable rights. How are we going to distinguish“just”from“unjust”legislation, taxes which discriminate from taxes which do not,“rights”of the subject which a Parliament may disregard from those which it must respect? There has never been any doubt that a colonial legislature may deal with the common law rights of the subject as it pleases, may abolish trial by jury, suspend the writ ofhabeas corpus, pass bills of attainder, enactex post factolegislation, take private property without compensation, and indemnify the Executive against actions for breaches of the law—if any doubt ever existed it was set at rest by the Colonial Laws Validity Act. But in the case of Ireland it was thought necessary—owing, doubtless, largely to the fears excited in the minds of Englishmen by the Protestant minority in Ulster and the commercial interests in both countries—to insert in the earlier Home Rule Bills an elaborate series of restrictions upon the exercise of even those legislative powers which the Irish Parliament might admittedly possess. For a parallel to these restrictions one would have to go back to the Constitution of the United States and the philosophy of“natural rights.”A more difficult problem it is impossible to conceive, because a Constitution of this kind runs counter to the whole tradition of Parliamentary sovereignty in this country and the colonies. Anyone who takes the trouble to study the decisions of the Privy Council when colonial legislation has been impugned on the ground of its infringing the common law rights of the subject or“natural justice”27will discover that constitutional limitations of this kind upon the powers of colonial Legislatures are not recognised by our judges. In the[pg 019]absence of express words in the colonial Constitutions, such restraints do not exist.“The only thing,”as Lord Halsbury grimly remarked on one occasion, for the subject whose actionable rights are taken away by a Colonial Act of Indemnity“to do is to submit.”The earlier Home Rule Bills were characterised by a most elaborate code of rights which the Irish Legislature might not infringe. Its main provisions might be classified as having three objects in view: (1) The protection of the subject in life, liberty, and property; (2) the prevention of legislation discriminating against any part of the United Kingdom, and (3) the preservation of the existing rights and privileges of the Protestant community in Ireland. In one form or another almost all these principles are to be found embodied in the Constitution of the United States, and in the case of the first of them a clause of the famous 14th Amendment was actually incorporated, with some slight alterations, in Sub-section 8 of Section 4 of the Bill of 1893, according to which the powers of the Irish Legislature should not extend to the making of any law“whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in accordance with settled principles and precedents or may be denied the equal protection of the laws or whereby private property may be taken without just compensation.”These impressive words bristled with legal controversy. Did they, for example, secure to the subject the preservation of the right to trial by jury? In the States of America it has been authoritatively laid down28that, in the absence of further defining words in the State constitutions, they do not. Such procedure is indeed safeguarded in the Federal Courts, but only in consequence of express words. In the case of the States,[pg 020]Cooley, a great authority, says that“whatever the State establishes will be due process of law,”and Story regarded the words by themselves as simply securing a judicial hearing—that is to say, as they stand they merely secure the separation of legislative and judicial functions and prevent the State Legislature from passing laws which are in effect judicial decrees.What the words would really have secured to the subject in Ireland was very doubtful. The object of the draughtsman appears to have been to secure to the subject in Ireland all the protection of the law, including trial by jury, which he would have enjoyed at the date of the passing of the Bill, understanding by law both common law and statute law. If the Imperial Parliament had, subsequent to the date of the Act itself, passed legislation limiting trial by jury or other common law rights, this would, presumably, have provided the Irish Parliament with a new“settled principle and precedent,”enabling it to go further. In other words, the clause might have operated to secure a certain standardization of legislation as between the two countries.The Argument Against Restrictions.But it seems to me that such standardization is best secured by definitely reserving certain subjects of legislation to the Imperial Parliament rather than by imposing upon the exercise of such legislation by the Irish Parliament constitutional limitations which are certain to raise great doubts and provoke excessive litigation. It would be far better to reserve criminal law, as has been done in Canada, in the case of the provincial legislatures—though not without difficulty—than to lay down certain abstract principles. Moreover, is it desirable to maintain such uniformity of legislative principle? There is a great deal to be said for reserving certain[pg 021]subjects of legislation to the Imperial Parliament, but to impose on the whole sphere of legislation entrusted to the Irish Parliament the same principles as those governing the English Statute-Book, or the common law, is to subject almost every conceivable Irish statute to the challenge of litigious politicians. This is what has happened in the United States. The clause, as it stood, might quite conceivably have prevented the Irish legislature from extending the procedure of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts to cases where it was not so extended in England—a most mischievous result, seeing that this procedure is the sanction by which nearly every new statute extending the scope of industrial or public health legislation or conferring powers on local authorities is enforced.Uniformity of legislation between the two countries is not desirable in all directions nor has it hitherto been followed. In matters of expropriation, for example, the drastic procedure of the Housing and Town Planning Act has not been adopted in Ireland. Ireland has her own standard in these matters in the case of the Irish Local Government Act, and the Land Purchase Acts, and I am not at all sure that the principles of the English Land Clauses Consolidation Act and Railway Clauses Consolidation Acts as to arbitration and compensation are by any means ideal. Still less has uniformity in the matter of criminal law been the rule hitherto between the two countries. It would be difficult to find a parallel in this country for the Crimes Act of 1887 (which is still on the Statute-Book although it is no longer put in force by proclamation) with its extensions of summary jurisdiction to cases of criminal conspiracy, intimidation, riot, and unlawful assembly, and its provisions for a change of venue.It is perhaps more open to question whether the[pg 022]words of the 1893 Bill designed to secure to the subject“the equal protection of the laws,”and to prevent legislation discriminating against Englishmen and Scotsmen29under certain circumstances, ought not to have been repeated. The words“equal protection of the laws”have been interpreted in the United States in such a way as to secure that legislation, particularly in the exercise of the“police power,”shall be impartial in its operation.30On this interpretation, they would for example, have prevented an Irish Legislature from exempting Catholic convents which are used as workshops from the operation of the Factory Acts. But that might be secured in another way, and the words might, if adopted, have operated to prevent much useful legislation. It seems likely enough that discriminating legislation, in so far as it tended to prevent a particular class of persons from residing in Ireland or penalised non-residents, would be held invalid in any case on the ground that it conflicted with the reservation to the Imperial Parliament of such subjects as“trade”and“naturalization.”31And, as regards non-residents, it must be remembered that the grant of legislative powers can only be exercised“in respect of matters exclusively relating to Ireland or some part thereof”—words which may be found to be of considerable importance.The same may be said of the omission in the Bill, to provide, as its predecessor of 1893 provided, for the maintenance of securities for the liberty of the subject and the preservation of his common law rights. It is almost impossible to do this without entering on an[pg 023]uncharted sea of litigation. Modern legislation, especially social and industrial legislation, infringes common law rights at every point. I have ventured elsewhere32to describe the modern tendency of industrial legislation as a tendency, inverting Maine's famous aphorism, to advance from contract to status, that is to say, to limit to an increasing extent the contractual freedom of the worker, and to confer on him a certain status by the protection of him against himself.33The greater part of our Irish land legislation impaired the obligation of contracts. Professor Dicey criticised the Bill of 1893 for not going further than it did in its incorporation of clauses taken from the Constitution of the United States with the intention of securing the common law rights of the subject. But it may be remarked that many of those clauses have proved an almost intolerable limitation upon the power of the legislatures to deal with the regulation of trade and industry, so intolerable that the Supreme Court has of late made a liberal use of the fiction of“the police power”34to enable the legislatures to pass legislation which otherwise might have seemed[pg 024]to“abridge the privileges”of citizens of the United States or deprive them of“liberty or property without due process of law.”35At the same time it must be remembered that, although the Irish Parliament is not debarred from statutory interference with common law rights, its legislation will be subject to rules of interpretation, at the hands of the Judicial Committee, by which statutes are always construed in favour of the subject. It is a well-accepted rule of construction in English courts that common law rights cannot be taken away except by express words.36It is something to secure that the interpretation of the new Constitution and of Irish statutes shall, in the last resort, be wholly in the hands of an Imperial Court. The chartered protection of the rights of the individual by a fundamental Act is always difficult and often impossible. In the last resort it depends very much on the interpretation which the judges choose to place upon such an Act.37[pg 025]The Executive Veto.It is obvious, therefore, that the principal and indeed almost the only safeguard provided in the Bill against inequitable or discriminating legislation38is the veto of the Lord-Lieutenant acting on the instructions of the Imperial Government. A political check is preferred to a juristic check. The apostolic maxim“all things are lawful but all things are not expedient,”appears to have been the motto of the draughtsman. Not law but policy will decide what Irish Acts are to be placed on the Statute-Book. It must be admitted that this is the principle most in harmony with precedent if the constitutions granted to the colonies are to be regarded as precedents. No colony would have tolerated for a moment the elaborate network of restrictions in Clause 4 of the Bill of 1893, through the finely-woven meshes of which it would have been hard for any Irish legislation of an original or experimental character to pass. If we are really in earnest about setting up a Parliament on College Green, we cannot do otherwise. The executive veto must be the real check, and in the presence of such a check, English judges would always be very loath39to declare the Acts of a legislatureultra viresmerely because they infringed common law rights.Now this check may be exercised on one of two grounds. The Imperial Government may“instruct”the Lord-Lieutenant to refuse his assent either on the ground that the bill in question is politically objectionable, or on the ground that it is, in their opinion, in[pg 026]excess of the powers conferred on the Irish Legislature. It is desirable in every way that the two should be distinguished in order that the Imperial Parliament may be able to hold the Cabinet of the day responsible when its action is purely a question of policy. On the other hand, it is no less desirable that the Cabinet should, in the interests of the public in Ireland, be in a position to test the validity of an Irish Bill which, though unobjectionable on the ground of policy, may be questionable on the ground of law. It is a common error that in all written constitutions the courts, particularly those of the United States, haveproprio motuthe power of declaringultra viresany legislative act which infringes the principles of the Constitution. Laboulaye fell into this error in his study of the American Constitution. But the American Courts have no such power. Until a case arises in the ordinary course of litigation, under the statute in question, there is no means of annulling it, and there have been many Acts40on the Federal Statute Book which are quite conceivably“unconstitutional”in the letter as well as in the spirit, but have never been declaredultra viresfor the simple reason that no one has found his private rights affected. This holds particulars of questions of the distribution of power. It might for example, occur in the case of an Irish Bill which proposed to deal with one of the reserved services. To meet this difficulty and to avoid the trouble which might arise from an Act being placed in the Irish Statute Book41and observed in Ireland only to be subsequently declaredultra viresin the course of litigation, it is[pg 027]provided in the Government of Ireland Bill42(Clause 29) that if it appears to the Lord-Lieutenant or a Secretary of State expedient in the public interest that the validity of an Irish Act should be tested he may represent the same to His Majesty in Council and the question may then be heard and determined by the Judicial Committee in the same manner as an appeal from a Court in Ireland. It is not necessary to suppose that the executive veto will be a dead letter, and to argue from its disuse in the case of the self-governing colonies is to argue from the like to the unlike. In the case of the provincial legislatures of Canada it has been exercised by the Dominion Government where provincial legislation is inequitable, or contrary to“the settled policy”of the Dominion.Exempted Powers.The enumeration of matters in respect of which the Irish Parliament shall have no power to make laws is a little deceptive, inasmuch as many of the matters so enumerated would have been outside its power in any case. Ireland is not, so long as the Act of Union remains on the Statute Book, a sovereign state, and“the making of peace or war”and the negotiation of[pg 028]treaties would, as a matter of international law, have been impossible in her case, even if they had not been expressly prohibited.“Merchant shipping”and“the return of fugitive offenders”would also have been excluded from her authority by the rule of law43which precludes a subordinate legislature from extra-territorial legislation. The same may be said of Copyright. The colonies have only been enabled to deal with these matters in virtue of clauses in Acts of the Imperial Parliament.44But it would not be true to say that the position of the Irish Parliament is assimilated to that of the legislature of a self-governing colony. The exclusion of subjects relating to allegiance, such as naturalization45and treason,46and of legislation as to aliens is exceptional. All the self-governing colonies have power to deal with these matters, as also with the subject of naval and military forces. Perhaps the most important exemption in the case of Ireland is that of trade, trade-marks, designs, merchandise marks and patent rights. I cannot help regretting that, inasmuch as the principle has been adopted of giving Ireland general and unenumerated powers, the number of specific exemptions has not been enlarged. It is highly desirable to avoid conflict of laws in the United Kingdom as far as possible. It must be remembered that the Statute Book has, quite apart from the Act[pg 029]of Union, bound Ireland to England by many legislative ties; there is a uniform system of industrial, commercial, and, to some extent, criminal law for the whole of these Islands—Factory Acts, Companies Acts, the law of negotiable instruments, criminal procedure, old-age pensions, and insurance legislation; in all these there is legislative standardization, and the tendency of all modern political unions, notably those of the Australian Commonwealth and the German Empire, is in this direction. Confusion, injustice, and economic inequalities constantly occur in a modern State whose inhabitants are living under a“conflict of laws.”Fiscal considerations point the same way. It may be safely assumed that English opinion will not tolerate any considerable divergence between the fiscal systems of England and Ireland. Moreover, financial considerations apart, the regulation of“trade”is, as in every political union, reserved for the central legislature. But to distinguish between“trade”on the one hand and“industry”on the other is not an easy problem, and Ireland may discriminate against England only less effectively by lowering the standard of the Factory Acts than by a tariff.The“subject matter”of the Old Age Pensions Acts, National Insurance Acts, and Labour Exchanges Acts has, it is true, been excluded. It seems regrettable that the category is not enlarged to include the Companies Acts, the Sale of Goods Act, the Bills of Exchange Act, and the Factory Acts. It would be highly undesirable to have the“industrial minimum”for the United Kingdom, so laboriously attained by our factory legislation, lowered in the interests of particular interests in Ireland. The advantages of securing uniformity by the inclusion of the three great statutes relating to commercial law is also very obvious. Two of them, indeed,[pg 030]represent a great step in that codification of English law which is the dream of English jurists, they have been adopted as a model in some of our colonies, and it would seem highly desirable that the standard thus attained should remain fixed. In urging this, I do not forget what I have already said, in connection with the subject of constitutional limitations, as to the undesirability of exacting too rigid a degree of uniformity in English and Irish legislation, but constitutional limitations are one thing and exceptions quite another. It is very difficult to subject the whole field of Irish legislation to juristic principles, but it is comparatively easy to exempt from that field the subject matter of particular Acts. The whole question resolves itself into a consideration of the point at which uniformity should be determined. The Bill seems to fix the point much too low.Of course, one way of dealing with the question would have been to grant Ireland only particular and enumerated powers of legislation, as has been done in the case of the provincial legislatures of Canada. There is much to be said for this. It seems the line of least resistance; it is always easier to add to powers which appear deficient than to withdraw powers which have proved excessive. But it undoubtedly invites litigation and it is very difficult, if not impossible, to define what are exclusively Irish matters without in the last resort using some such general term (as is used in the British North America Act) as“generally all matters of a merely local nature.”The great economy shown by the draughtsman in the number of the exceptions from the powers of the Irish legislature, as well as in the number of the restrictions upon the exercise of those powers, means, as we have already indicated, that the whole weight of control[pg 031]over the Irish legislature is thrown upon the executive and legislative veto of the Imperial Government. Is it sufficient to rely upon the paramount power of the Imperial Parliament to override by statute Irish legislation which may be inequitable or inexpedient, and upon the exercise of the veto of the Imperial Government? These checks are the exercise of aforce majeure, which is often invidious and always difficult. Above all they are political. The exercise of them depends on the party in power in Great Britain, and as such it may excite resentment among the Irish people as an invasion of the autonomy granted to them. On the other hand, exceptions and restrictions are a legal, not a political, check—they operate through the agency of the courts of law without the intervention of political considerations. Moreover—and this perhaps is the most important consideration—they rest upon the consent of the Irish people expressed in the terms of the Home Rule Act to which their representatives are a party. For an Irish Parliament to defy them would be to defy the very Act which was the charter of its existence. But they invite litigation. It all resolves itself into a question of hitting the mean between the dangers of litigation on the one hand and of political pressure on the other. Probably, however, the occasions of conflict will be few and unimportant, and the temper of the Irish Parliament may be much more conservative than its critics imagine.The ExecutiveThe new Bill is remarkable for the explicitness with which it invests Ireland with control over the Executive. For the first time in the written constitutions of the Empire we have a statutory Executive, and not only[pg 032]is it a statutory Executive, but it is to be a Parliamentary Executive defined by statute. In the earlier Bills nothing was more remarkable than the brevity and allusiveness with which this question of the Government of Ireland was treated.“The Executive power in Ireland shall continue vested in Her Majesty the Queen”was the language employed in the Bill of 1893. Under that Bill the Government of Ireland would have continued, even after its passage into law, to be in the hands of the English Cabinet and it would have rested with that Cabinet to determine how large or how small a part of the prerogatives of the Crown should be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant. Paradoxical as it may seem, it would have been quite possible for a Unionist Government, coming into power immediately after the Home Rule Bill had passed into law and an Irish Parliament had met at Dublin, to retain in their own hands the Executive authority in Ireland without any breach of statutory obligations. The Bills of 1886 and 1893 left it in the discretion of the Crown to decide what the powers of the Lord-Lieutenant should be. Following Colonial precedents, the Constitution would have had to be supplemented47by prerogative legislation in the shape of Letters Patent defining those powers. Moreover, these powers were to have been vested not in the Lord-Lieutenant in Council, but in the Lord-Lieutenant alone. Something was indeed, said about an“Executive Committee”of the Irish Privy Council to aid and advise in the Government of Ireland—this was the only hint of responsible Government that the Bill contained—but nothing was said of the powers or[pg 033]constitution of the Committee nor of the extent to which the Lord-Lieutenant was bound to act on its advice. Its constitution was left to the discretion of Her Majesty. Its powers would, of course, as in the case of the Colonies, have been decided by the tacit adoption of the unwritten conventions of the English Constitution that the advisers of the Governor must command the confidence of the Legislature which votes supplies.Very different is our new Bill. The Executive power does indeed continue“vested in His Majesty the King,”and nothing is to affect its exercise—in other words, it is to continue in the hands of the Imperial Government—except“as respects Irish services as defined for the purpose of this Act.”The exception is a new departure and the general effect of the whole clause (Clause IV.) is expressly to hand over in statutory terms“all public services in connection with the administration of the Government of Ireland”except the reserved services and such services as those in regard to which the Irish Parliament have no power to make laws. The effect of this is to hand over an executive authority co-extensive with the legislative authority.48Moreover, in regard to Irish services, the Executive power is to be exercised by the Lord-LieutenantthroughIrish Departments, and the heads of these Departments are given the Parliamentary title of“Ministers”and, what is more remarkable, it is expressly provided (a provision[pg 034]to be found in only one or two, and those the latest, of our Colonial Constitutions) that:“No such person shall hold office as an Irish Minister for a longer period than six months, unless he is or becomes a member of one of the Houses of the Irish Parliament.”Never in any constitution that emanated from the practised hand of the Parliamentary draughtsman has there been such a complete transfer in express statutory terms of the executive power. Taken together with the comparatively unrestricted grant of legislative power, it constitutes a grant of a larger measure of self-government than is to be found in any of the earlier Bills.At the same time there is here no cause for alarm. It must be remembered that the Lord-Lieutenant will exist in a dual capacity—like a constitutional king he will be bound in Irish matters to act on the advice of his Irish Ministers but, like a Colonial governor, he will also in all Imperial matters be bound to obey the instructions of the Imperial Government. In regard to legislation the position here is quite clear: he may veto measures which his own Ministers have promoted if the Imperial Government think it advisable so to instruct him. In regard to the executive, he will, of course, enjoy less latitude; it is quite clear that the Imperial Government will, under this clause, find it practically impossible to interfere in purely Irish administration. The Irish Government will, of course, be carried on in the name of the Crown, and it will enjoy the same prerogatives at common law as the Imperial Government in such matters as the use of the prerogative writsmandamusandcertiorari, and the immunity from actions in tort. Ireland has its own Petitions of Right Act.At the same time a distinction must be drawn between the prerogatives relating to the exercise of Irish[pg 035]services and prerogatives which cannot be so defined. Some of the latter may be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant by his patent, and these he will exercise not on the advice of the Irish, but of the Imperial, Government. Moreover, there are certain powers conferred by statute on the Lord-Lieutenant, or the Lord-Lieutenant in Council, such as the power of proclaiming disaffected districts under the Crimes Act, of suspending the operation of the Irish Habeas Corpus Act, and of controlling the constabulary, not all49of which will be exercisable on the advice of Irish Ministers. Prerogatives not so exercisable will no doubt be exercised on the advice of the Secretary of State for Home Affairs who is even now the medium of formal communications between the Lord-Lieutenant and the Crown. The Chief Secretary50will, of course, disappear altogether; he will be replaced by the Executive Committee. The Lord-Lieutenant will, of course, cease to be a member of the English Ministry; his position will be assimilated to that of a Colonial Governor, and his tenure fixed for a term of years so as to make his tenure of office independent, as it must be in the exercise of his new constitutional duties, of the fortunes of English Parties.The Irish LegislatureThe constitution of the legislature itself calls for little comment. It follows with some fidelity the features[pg 036]of Mr. Gladstone's Bills, but the substitution of a nominated Senate for the“Council”or“Order”elected on a property franchise is a new departure. Nomination of late has fallen into some discredit both in theory and in practice.51Colonial experience is not encouraging. Nomination by the Crown means in practice nomination by the Governor, on the advice of the Cabinet of the day, and Ministries in Canada and New South Wales have put this prerogative to such partizan uses as to reduce the Upper House to a very servile condition. When nomination is for life and not for a fixed term of years the evils of this system may be mitigated, but they are not removed. The one thing that can be said about the proposed Senate is that its powers in legislation are of such a limited character that an Irish Executive would be under little temptation to“pack”it. A Senate of only forty members compelled to meet in joint session a House of Commons of 164 members every second time that it rejects or objectionably amends a bill is not likely to prove a very formidable obstacle to legislation. But the nomination by the Executive is in any case somewhat objectionable, and it would seem better to provide that at the end of the first term of eight years the Senators should be appointed by some system of election, whether on a basis of proportional representation or otherwise.52But[pg 037]to their nomination for the first term by the Imperial Government I see no very cogent objection. Indeed, the expedient has much to be said for it, for the discretion, if wisely exercised, will enable the Imperial Government not only to secure to Irish minorities a degree of representation which no conceivable system of election could secure, but also to appoint men of moderate opinions—one immediately thinks of Sir Horace Plunkett—who, in the strife of extremists, might have no chance of election by either party. It has been argued in some quarters that a Second Chamber is wholly unnecessary, and the example of the single-chamber legislatures in some of the Canadian provinces has been cited. The argument, however, overlooks one really important function of the Senate, namely its duty to provide for the security of tenure of the Irish judges. Clause XXVII. provides that judges appointed after the passing of the Act shall only be removable on an Address of both Houses of the Irish Parliament, and, should the Senate refuse to concur in a demand by the lower House for the removal of a judge, there is no such means of overcoming its resistance in a joint session as is the case with legislation. This is well.There is one provision in the Bill53which will serve to strengthen the position of the Senate as an advisory body and may operate to give it an initiative in the introduction of Government legislation—the provision which enables an Irish Minister who is a member of either House to sit and to speak in both Houses. This is a practice common on the Continent, and not wholly unknown[pg 038]in the case of some of our Colonial Constitutions, and it has much to commend it. The Senate is placed under the same disabilities as to money bills as are imposed on the House of Lords by the Parliament Act. Thereby it is placed in an inferior position to that of most of the Second Chambers in the Colonies, all of which can reject, and some of which may also amend, money bills. The disability is the less surprising having regard to its character as a nominee body—it is when the Second Chambers of the Colonies are elective, that their powers in regard to money bills are considerable.54The privileges of the Imperial Parliament are conferred by the Government of Ireland Bill upon the Irish Parliament. In the absence of such grant the Irish Parliament would not have had such privileges—although it might have adopted them by legislation—for thelex et consuetudo Parliamentiare not implied in the grant of a constitution.55It is not uncommon to prescribe in Colonial Constitutions that the legislature shall have such privileges as are enjoyed by the House of Commons at the time of grant. In the present case, the Irish Parliament may define its privileges, if it thinks fit, by legislation, though it is difficult to imagine any occasion for its doing so. The really important thing is that it cannot enlarge those privileges beyond the scope of the privileges of the Imperial Parliament. This is the one constitutional limitation in the Bill—apart from the“safeguards”as to legislation in regard to religion and marriage contained in Clause III.—and it is by no means unimportant. The powers of the Imperial Parliament—particularly as to the right[pg 039]of the two Houses to commit for contempt without cause shewn—are a sufficiently high standard.Irish Representation in the House of Commons56Irish representation at Westminster has always been the riddle of the Home Rule problem. I have no space to examine here in detail the alternative solutions which were put forward in the earlier Home Rule Bills. But there is one general consideration which must always be borne in mind in the theoretical discussion of any solution. It is the very simple consideration that representation is what mathematicians would call a“function”of legislative power—the one is dependent upon the other. If the legislative powers over Ireland reserved to the Imperial Parliament are large, the representation of Ireland in that Parliament must not be small. It is at this point that Mr. Gladstone's original proposal for total exclusion broke down. He reserved to the Imperial Parliament considerable powers of legislation in regard to Ireland and yet proposed to exercise those powers in the absence of Irish representatives.It was no answer to cite colonial analogies. The Irish problem is not, as I have pointed out elsewhere, a colonial problem. No one at present proposes to give Ireland complete fiscal autonomy, for example. Nor is it strictly apposite to say that the Imperial Parliament legislates for the Colonies in the absence of colonial[pg 040]representatives. Such legislation is now almost exclusively confined to what I may call enabling legislation in matters in which the Colonies, owing to their status as Dependencies, are unable to legislate. In such matters as copyright, merchant shipping, marriage, extradition, the Imperial Parliament legislates for the Colonies largely because colonial laws cannot operate ex-territorially, and such Imperial legislation is usually effected by means of application clauses which enable the Colonies to adopt it or not as they please. But rarely if ever does the Imperial Parliament legislate for a self-governing colony as it has done and will continue to do in the case of such domestic Irish affairs as old-age pensions, land purchase, Customs and Excise, defence, naturalisation, to say nothing perhaps of industrial and commercial law. I have already indicated my opinion in favour of confining these subjects to the Imperial Parliament, but even were the opposite course taken there would still remain the fiscal question. We cannot continue to tax Ireland unless the Irish representatives are to remain at Westminster.The presence of the Irish members at Westminster is imperative if the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is not to be illusory. Mr. Balfour57contends that it will be as illusory as it has been in the case of the Colonies. But the Colonies are not represented in the Imperial Parliament, and to differentiate Ireland in this respect is to make all the difference between a legal formula and a political fact.There remains the question of inclusion. No one would question the propriety of reducing Irish representation to its true proportions on a population basis—in other words, from its present figure of 103 to one of 70. The real difficulty arises when we consider[pg 041]whether those members, whatever their numbers, are to attend at Westminster in the same capacity as the British members. We are to-day confronted by the same problem as that which vexed the Parliament of 1893: are Irish members to vote upon all occasions or only upon those occasions when exclusively Irish and exclusively Imperial affairs are under discussion? The original text of the 1893 Bill adopted the latter solution. At first it has much to commend it, for it avoids—or attempts to avoid—the anomaly of refusing self-government to Great Britain while granting it to Ireland: if Irish members are to govern themselves at Dublin without the interference of Englishmen, why, it has been pertinently asked, should not the converse hold good at Westminster? But two very grave difficulties stand in the way; one is the difficulty of distinguishing between Irish and non-Irish business at Westminster; the other is the difficulty, even when such distinction is made, of maintaining a single majority under such circumstances. Withdraw the Irish members on certain occasions and you might convert a Liberal majority at Westminster on certain days into a Unionist majority on other days. A Liberal Government might have responsibility without power in British matters and a Unionist Opposition power without responsibility. One Executive could not co-exist with two majorities. Such a state of affairs might have been conceivable some seventy or eighty years ago, when Ministries were not regarded as responsible for the passage of legislation into law. It would be conceivable in France, where Ministries come and go and the Deputies remain. But it would be fatal to the Cabinet system as we know it.Another objection to the“in-and-out”plan is the extreme difficulty of classifying the business of the[pg 042]House of Commons in such a way as to distinguish between what is“Irish”and what is not. If that business were purely legislative the difficulty would not be so great, but the House controls administration as well as legislation. Any question involving a vote of confidence in the Cabinet might legitimately be regarded as a matter in which the Irish members had a right to have a voice. The motion for the adjournment of the House, following on an unsatisfactory answer by a Minister, might be regarded as such. Who would decide these things? The Bill of 1893 provided for their determination by the House. In that event the Irish members would presumably have had a voice in determining on what subjects they should or should not vote, and they would have been masters of the situation under all circumstances. By their power to determine the fate of Imperial Ministries they might have determined the exercise of the Imperial veto on Irish legislation and reduced it to a nullity. It may, indeed, be urged that the Irish vote often dominates the situation at Westminster even under present circumstances, but it must be remembered that it is now exercised in the consistent support of the same administration, whereas under an“in-and-out”system its action might be capricious and apt to be determined solely by Irish exigencies of the moment.There remains the plan of the inclusion of Irish members for all purposes. This at least has the advantage of simplicity. If Irishmen constantly attended at Westminster without distinction of voting capacity they would be less likely to regard their presence there as an instrument for reducing to impotence the exercise of the Imperial veto upon Irish legislation. It is quite conceivable, indeed, that once Home Rule is granted Irishmen will be Imperialists at Westminster without[pg 043]becoming Nationalists at Dublin—the natural conservatism of the Irish character may reassert itself. Close observers of Irish thought are inclined to believe that the grant of Home Rule will act as a great solvent in Irish political life, and that with the iron discipline of Nationalism relaxed, and its cherished object attained, lines of cleavage, social, economic, and industrial, will appear in Ireland and vastly change the distribution of Irish parties both at Dublin and at Westminster. Ulster“Unionists”may be found voting with a Liberal Government on education questions and Irish“Nationalists”against it. Irish representatives at Westminster may become more, rather than less, closely identified with British interests. And it should be remembered that it would be no new thing for members from one part of the United Kingdom to be voting on measures which solely concerned another part of the Kingdom. This is happening every day. As Mr. Walker points out elsewhere, a process of legislative disintegration has been going on within the walls of the Imperial Parliament itself, which is already being forced to legislate separately for the three separate parts of the United Kingdom. He estimates that during the last twenty years no less than 49.7 per cent. of the public general Acts have applied only to some one part of the United Kingdom instead of to the whole.The Government of Ireland Bill adopts the principle of total inclusion, but qualifies the anomaly which is involved in the presence of Irish members voting on non-Irish questions by reducing the representation of Ireland to the number of forty-two, and thus to a figure far below that to which Ireland is entitled on the basis of population. At the same time it must be admitted that the anomaly is not thereby removed. The position of Irish members voting on purely English legislation[pg 044]after the grant of Home Rule will indeed—numbers apart—be more anomalous than it was before it. An anomaly can be tolerated so long as it is universal in its operation, and Scotch and English members can at present view with equanimity the spectacle of Irish members voting in their own affairs so long as they themselves exercise the same privilege in those of their neighbours. Reciprocity of this kind produces a certain unity of thought in a deliberative assembly. But the anomaly at once becomes invidious if Irishmen are placed in a privileged position. It is perhaps more theoretical than real, as the actual weight that could be thrown into the scale of the division lobby by a Nationalist majority (taking the present balance of parties in Ireland) of about twenty-six cannot be considerable, even if, as is very doubtful, it were consistently exercised.Still the anomaly remains. Is it possible to meet it by some extension of Home Rule to the legislative affairs of England and Scotland?The Further Extension of Home RuleThe anomaly, however, remains. How is it to be met? Obviously it is but a temporary difficulty if, as the Prime Minister has suggested in his speech on the first reading, the Bill is to be regarded as but the first step in a general devolution of the legislative powers of the Imperial Parliament. But everything depends on how far that devolution is to be carried. The Prime Minister's reference to a change in the Standing Orders suggests a further development of the Committee system already in operation in the case of the Scottish Standing Committee by which the House has delegated a certain degree of provincial autonomy to a group of members. It would be possible to extend[pg 045]this to the creation of a Standing Committee for England and Wales. Under such a system Irish Members would be excluded from the Committee stages of legislation which was neither Irish nor Imperial. But there remains the Report stage, which is always apt to resolve itself into a Second Committee stage58in which the whole House participates. Moreover, an impassable limit is set to this process of domestic devolution by the necessity that the Government of to-day should command a majority in each of these Committees. A Liberal Ministry would probably find itself in a minority in an English Standing Committee, and a Unionist Ministry would, with equal probability, find itself in a minority in a Scottish Committee. Committees have become not so much a sphere for the legislative initiative of the private member as a new outlet for Government business. Contentious bills introduced or adopted by the Government are referred to them, and the moment this is the case the Minister in charge who is confronted in Committee with amendments which he does not care to accept may invite the whole House on the Report stage of the Bill to disallow them. The House itself, jealous of any surrender of its prerogatives, is only too apt to turn the Report stage into a second Committee stage. The responsibility of a Government department for the preparation and execution of legislation is to-day so indispensable that effective legislative devolution is almost impossible without devolution of the executive also. A Committee to which the Minister in charge of the Bill is not responsible is not in a position to exercise effectual control over legislation. Indeed it seems impossible to contemplate a devolution of legislative power without a[pg 046]corresponding devolution of executive power. So long as we have but one Executive in the House of Commons it is impossible to have two or three legislatures within the walls of that House. Moreover, it is just as imperative to restore the diminishing control of members of Parliament over administration as it is to re-establish their authority in legislation. There is a growing and regrettable tendency to confer upon Government departments both legislative and judicial powers—powers to make statutory orders and to interpret them, which is depriving our constitution of what has hitherto been regarded by foreign students as one of its most distinctive features—the subordination of the executive to the legislature and to the courts. The distinction between Gesetz und Verordnung,59between statute and order, is fast disappearing in the enormous volume of statutory orders. Powers to make rules under particular statutes are entrusted to Scotch, Irish, and English Departments which have the effect of diminishing the control of the House of Commons without transferring it to any representative substitute. The great increase of grants-in-aid for administrative purposes has also given the departments a power of indirect legislation by the latitude they enjoy in the distribution of them such as is further calculated to diminish the control of the House of Commons over questions of Irish and Scotch policy. Rarely do any marked departures by the departments come under the review of the House of Commons; the claims of the Government over the time-table of the House, fortified by certain rulings of the Speaker,60[pg 047]may and frequently do preclude any examination of them. In the words of a famous resolution, one may say“the power of the Executive has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished.”But it is no remedy for this state of things to provide for administrative devolution alone. To devolve the authority which a great Department of State, such as the Board of Agriculture, exercises over the whole of Great Britain by the simple process of assigning its Scotch business to the Secretary for Scotland, does not increase the control of Scottish members over the executive. This process of administrative devolution, which is always going on, is not accompanied by any measure of legislative devolution; the Secretary for Scotland is not thereby brought under the control of the Scotch Standing Committee.To create a new Scottish or Irish Department does not increase Parliamentary control over Scottish or Irish administration; rather it diminishes it. The heads of a Scottish Education Office, Local Government Board, and Department of Agriculture have been made responsible not to the House of Commons but to the Secretary for Scotland. Like the Chief Secretary for Ireland, he is a Prime Minister without a Cabinet and without a Legislature, and his policy is determined primarily not by Scottish or Irish opinion, but by the alien issues of imperial politics. Obviously there will never be any remedy for these anomalies until we have a Legislature with an executive responsible to it.Scottish Home RuleAt the present moment we have in the case of Scotland devolution in a state of arrested development. This process of disintegration is reflected in separate Estimates in finance and in distinct draftsmanship in[pg 048]legislation. In legislation, indeed, marked changes have also taken place under cover of alterations in the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. An itinerant delegation of Scotch members has been set up to deal with private bill procedure in Scotland, and domestic devolution within the walls of the House of Commons has taken the shape of a Scotch Grand Committee. Few or none of these changes have any preconceived relation with the others; they represent experiments framed to meet the exigencies of the moment, but they all bear eloquent witness to a fact which has changed the whole aspect of the Home Rule problem and made that aspect at once more practical and less intimidating—the fact that the House of Commons has found itself increasingly incompetent to do its work. The fact is disguised by a multitude of expedients, all of them, however, amounting to a renunciation of legislative authority. These changes represent thedisjecta membraof Scottish Home Rule—they have no coherence, they point not so much to a solution of the problem as to its recognition.None the less, I think the Irish Government Bill does provide us with a prototype. There is nothing in it, with the exception of the financial clauses, which forbids its adoption in the case of Scotland and of England. But I think, as I have already indicated in another connection, that the category of reserved subjects ought to be considerably enlarged so as to secure the maintenance of the existing uniformity of legislation in commercial and industrial matters. There are, however, undeniable difficulties in the way of an identity of local constitutions. Legislation in regard to land is exempted from the control of the Irish Legislature to an extent which Scotland would hardly be prepared to accept. Control over legislation[pg 049]relating to marriage is retained in the case of Ireland; I doubt if it would be tolerated in Scotland, whose marriage law differs61from that of England to a far greater extent than is the case with the marriage law of Ireland. In common law England and Ireland have the same rules;62it is only in statute law that they differ. In Scotland the common law is radically different. There will, therefore, be some difficulty in finding a common denominator for the Imperial Parliament—and in avoiding, even under“Home Rule All Round”a certain divergence in the legislative capacities of the members from Scotland and Ireland, with the attendant risk of an“in-and-out”procedure.[pg 050]

I.—The Constitution: A Commentary.By Professor J. H. Morgan“Home Rule is at bottom Federalism,”we are told1by the most distinguished jurist among its opponents. It is urged against it that Federal Governments are almost invariably weak Governments, and that, in so far as they are strong, they are as“symmetrical”as the new constitution is unsymmetrical. Cornewall Lewis once thought it necessary to write a book on the Use and Abuse of Political Terms, and there is a great danger in the present controversy of our being enslaved by the poverty of our political vocabulary. The term“Federalism”is put to such new and alien uses as to darken counsel and confuse thought. That Federal Executives are usually weak, that in the dual allegiance of a Federal system men often prefer the State authority which is near to the Federal authority which is remote, that the respective limits of Federal and State legislation are defined with difficulty and observed with reluctance, that conflict of laws is more often the rule than the exception, that[pg 004]Federal constitutions are rigid rather than flexible, and, in a word, that progress is sacrificed to stability: all these things are true, and all these things are irrelevant. The Government of Ireland Bill is not, and cannot be, the corner-stone of a Federal system for the United Kingdom, although its duplication in the case of Scotland and of England would not be impossible, should it appear desirable. We may, for want of a better term, call it the foundation of a system of Devolution, but we must not call it Federalism.Putting on one side for the moment the question whether Home Rule is Federalism or not, I am inclined to enter a protest against all these attempts to fit the Bill into the categories of the jurist. It is very doubtful whether any two constitutions in the world, even federal constitutions, can be brought under one species. Two of the most successful“federal”constitutions present the gravest anomalies to the theorist. The Canadian Constitution, according to Professor Dicey, betrays a logical fallacy in the very words of its preamble;2and German jurists have wrangled no less inconclusively than incessantly about the legal character of the Empire and as to where its sovereignty resides;3yet in neither case has the practical operation of these constitutions been much the worse for the legal solecisms which they present. Indeed, it would not be too much to say with Aristotle that the“mixed”and not the“pure”type of government is the most successful,[pg 005]and that when Federalism is, as in the United States, at its purest, it is also at its weakest. The constitution of Imperial Germany ought, on this kind of reasoning, to be a flagrant perversion, and yet it has persisted in enduring for some forty-one years, and the prestige of its principal organ, the Bundesrath, although violating all Mr. Balfour's principles as to“equality”in its constitution, is, according to the doyen of the constitutional lawyers of Germany, increasing every day.4The argument that“Federalism”is incompatible with the preponderance of the“predominant partner,”and that no“federal”union is possible in these islands owing to the superior position occupied by England, would, even if it were relevant, be easily refuted by the example presented by the hegemony of Prussia.The same objection may be urged against the contention that the grant of self-government, whether to Ireland alone or to the rest of the United Kingdom, is both reactionary and unprecedented. The progress of all civilised communities, we are told, is towards political integration, not away from it. Devolution, it is said, is gratuitous in the case of a“United”Kingdom whose very union represents an ideal imperfectly achieved by the less fortunate countries which have had to be content with something less complete in the form of Federalism. Nations or Colonies mutually independent federate as a step towards union; it is“unprecedented”to reverse the process and qualify union by looser ties of cohesion. Now this attempt“to construct a normal programme for all portions of mankind”5cannot be sustained. If it[pg 006]could, it would avail as a conclusive argument against the grant of self-government to our Colonies whose claims to legislative independence grow with their growth and strengthen with their strength.6But it is not even true of Federal Unions. Anyone who takes the trouble to study the history of judicial interpretation of the American Constitution will find that there is a constant ebb and flow in the current of“unionism.”The intention of the framers of the 14th Amendment to create a United States citizenship has been largely neutralized by the decisions of the Supreme Court, which have inclined strongly in the direction of the legislative autonomy of the States.7Nor is this all. We are told that Federal Constitutions are“round and perfect and self-contained,”8—that they are characterized by“equality”of all the parts—and that, like the work of the divine law-giver of early communities, they are finished the moment they are begun.9But these confident inductions cannot be sustained. The history of the constitution of the United States and of Imperial Germany tells another story—a story of ancillary communities and dependencies in various stages of political apprenticeship. If we look for the American Constitution where all such constitutions must really be sought, that is to say not in the original text, but in the commentary of the courts, we shall find a truly remarkable tendency of late years to[pg 007]emphasize this heterogeneity, inequality and incompleteness.10The new Bill proposes a delegation of authority, both executive and legislative. Unlike a Federal constitution, it contemplates no distribution of sovereignty (begging a question which has often vexed the jurists as to the partibility of sovereignty). The new Government in Ireland will, indeed, be carried on in the name of the Crown, the writs of the Irish Court will run in the King's name, the statutes of the Irish Parliament will be enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and Commons. But the Imperial Government and the Imperial Parliament will remain supreme. The executive power in Ireland will continue vested in His Majesty, though some prerogatives may be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant who, as respects them, will exist in a dual capacity—some of these he will exercise on the advice of the Imperial Government, others on the advice of the Irish Government. So far, however, as the law, as distinguished from convention, is concerned, he will be in no way bound to act on the advice of his Irish Ministers except in so far as his“instructions”require him to do so. The words of the Bill do, indeed, contemplate with more explicitness than is usual in our written constitutions, a transfer of executive as well as of legislative authority, but they are by no means exhaustive, and[pg 008]they still leave it to His Majesty to determine11what prerogatives shall be delegated after the Act has come into force. As regards the legislative power, it will remain with the Imperial Government to give it effect by granting or withholding the King's assent to Irish legislation,12and the Imperial Parliament may, at any time, exercise its supremacy to the prejudice of such legislation, even after it has found its way on to the Irish statute-book. As regards the judiciary, there will, of course, be no dual judiciary: Irish Courts will interpret and enforce Imperial as well as Irish statutes, but both in the one case and in the other their judgments will be subject to appeal to an Imperial Court—the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In other words, the Imperial power will be supreme in the executive, the legislative, and the judicial sphere.Now in Federalism in the true sense—and I regard the constitution of the United States as the archetype—there is no such subordination. The authority of the constituent states and of the Federal nation are distinct and independent of one another. The Governor of the State is appointed not by the Federal authority, but by the State itself, whose servant he is. There[pg 009]is no“Crown”to serve as a common denominator of State and Federal Executives.13The one is not subordinate to the other, but is co-ordinate with it. The legislation of the State is subject to no external veto by the President. Nor is it subject to a legislative veto. In all matters not expressly conceded to the Federal Legislature, the State Legislatures remain as supreme after the enactment of the Federal Constitution as they were before it. In the legislative, as in the executive, sphere, the two authorities are co-ordinate. So with the judiciary. The decisions of the State Courts, in so far as they deal with State matters, and do not involve the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, are final and subject to no appeal to the Supreme Court at Washington. Conversely, Federal Circuit Courts exist independently of the State Courts to decide cases arising under Federal statutes or involving the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, and their judgments are enforced not by the State Executive but by the Federal Executive, which has its own marshals for the purpose. Nor can an act done by a Federal official, in obedience to a Federal statute, be punished by the State Court, even though it appear to involve a breach of a law of the State.14[pg 010]It is this dual allegiance that constitutes the inherent weakness of all Federal systems. Arguments based upon it have been urged against the grant of self-government to Ireland. Even those who admit that Federal analogies have no application so far as the relations of the Imperial and Irish legislatures are concerned, and who concede that the Irish Parliament will be as subordinate as a State Parliament in a Federal system is co-ordinate—none the less insist that in the relation of the two executives there is a real and perilous dualism. Many opponents allege, and no doubt, believe, that, with an Irish Parliament sitting at Dublin, the King's Writ will not run, the decisions of the Judicial Committee will not be enforced. Imperial statutes will not be obeyed, and Imperial taxes will not be collected. If there were a real delimitation of Courts and Executives, Imperial and Irish, under the new system, such a danger, though remote, would be conceivable. But no such sharp distinction is to be found in the Bill. In political unions, the central Government may act upon its subjects in a particular state directly through its own agencies—its own Courts, its own Executive officers, and its own police—this is the true Federal type; or it may act indirectly through the agency of the State authorities. Conversely, the State Governments may act directly through their own agencies—this again is the Federal principle, or they may act indirectly through Imperial agencies. Now wherever this indirect action is employed in both its forms the distinction between the two authorities is confused, the Federal principle undergoes a qualification which, by depriving it of half its symmetry, deprives it of all its weakness. Just this reciprocal relationship is established between the Imperial Government and the Irish Government.[pg 011]Imperial officials will be at the service of the Irish Government, and Irish officials at the service of the Imperial Government. For example, in the collection of taxes imposed by the Irish Parliament, the Irish Government will depend upon Imperial revenue officers to assess and collect them. The Imperial Government, on the other hand, will depend upon Irish Courts and Irish sheriffs to enforce their collection. Irish sheriffs will, in turn, depend upon an Imperial constabulary to assist them in levying execution. I shall return to some of these points in greater detail when I come to deal with the relations between the Executive and the Judiciary, and the maintenance of law and order. It is sufficient for me to remark here that the Irish Nationalist who wishes to defy the Imperial Government, and the Irish Unionist who wishes to defy the Irish Government, will each be hard put to define what he is pleased to regard as the limits of political obligation. He will find it difficult to distinguish where the authority of the Irish Government ends and that of the Imperial Government begins.The Supremacy of the Imperial Parliament.In the new Bill the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is secured by express words. The words are not necessary. No Parliament can bind its successors, and what one Parliament has done another Parliament may undo. Even when one Parliament has been at pains, by declaring its legislation“perpetual”or“unalterable”to bind posterity—as in the case of certain clauses in the Irish and Scotch Acts of Union—its injunctions have been disregarded by its successors with no more formality than is necessary in the case of any other legislation. An Act setting up a new Constitution is no more irrevocable than an Act authorising the[pg 012]imposition of the income tax. If, therefore, the Imperial Parliament chooses to grant a Constitution to Ireland, there is nothing to prevent its revoking or amending that grant, even (we submit) though it should have been at pains to enact that the Constitution could only be surrendered or altered by the consent of the Legislature which that Constitution created. Some doubts did, indeed, arise as to this point in the case of the Home Rule Bill of 1886, which not only excluded the Irish members from Westminster, but made provision for the amendment of the new Constitution by stipulating that such amendment should be made, if at all, by the joint authority of the Irish and English Parliaments. Whether this would have had the effect of preventing the“Imperial”Parliament from amending such a Home Rule Act without calling in the assistance of the Irish Parliament was much discussed at the time.15Obviously, the question does not now arise, as the Irish members are to continue to sit at Westminster.16[pg 013]It is therefore open to the Imperial Parliament at any time to repeal or amend the Government of Ireland Bill after it has become law. On the other hand, the Irish Parliament will have no power, except in so far as such power is conceded by the Act itself, to alter its provisions. This is stated in the Bill itself,17but the statement is superfluous. It follows from the doctrine of the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament that statutes of that Parliament can only be repealed by the Parliament itself. No constitution granted to a British Colony, however large the grant of self-government it contains, can be altered by that colony unless the power to alter it is expressly conceded. Such a power, when the Constitution itself does not prescribe some particular method of constitutional amendment, has indeed been granted in general terms by Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, but this Act could not apply to Ireland, which is outside the legal definition of a colony contained in the Interpretation Act of 1889. The only powers of constitutional amendment which the Irish Legislature will possess are those expressly conceded in Clause 9, which enables it after three years from the passing of the Act to deal with the franchise and with re-distribution.The Irish Parliament will, of course, have power to[pg 014]repeal any existing Acts of the Imperial Parliament in so far as they relate to Ireland, and do not deal with matters exempted from its authority. It would be impossible for it to legislate for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland if it had not this power, and the power is implied in the general grant. But if the Imperial Parliament chooses to continue to legislate for Ireland, even in matters in regard to which the Irish Parliament has been empowered to legislate, such Imperial legislation will be of superior obligation. This is also a corollary of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, and it was not necessary to state it in the Bill.18The grant of particular legislative powers to Ireland does not prevent the Imperial Parliament from subsequently legislating in derogation of those powers. The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is as inexhaustible as the fountain of honour.It is just here that the divergence from Federal principles is most marked. Under the British North America Act the legislative powers of the provinces are“exclusive”of Dominion legislation within their own sphere.19So, too, in the case of the Australian Constitution, under which the residuary legislative powers remain with the States, the Federal Parliament is excluded from legislating in any matters not expressly conceded to it. The result is seriously to limit the operations of such powers as it does possess. It has, for example,[pg 015]over Customs and Excise, but there are other ways of giving a preference to a trade than by the imposition of duties: a low standard of factory legislation may operate in the same direction, as the Federal Parliament found to its cost when it attempted to pass an Excise Tariff Act, depriving manufacturers of the advantages of the new tariff in those States in which a certain industrial minimum was not observed. The Act was held invalid by the High Court20on the ground that it exceeded the powers conferred on the Federal Parliament by the Constitution, and encroached on the exclusive powers of industrial legislation which belonged to the States. No such situation would be possible under the Government of Ireland Act, because the powers of the Irish Legislature are not exclusive of the powers of the Imperial Parliament, but merely concurrent. And whenever an Irish and an Imperial statute conflict, the rule of construction will be in favour of the latter.The Powers of the Irish ParliamentThe Irish Parliament is given a general power to make laws for“the peace, order, and good government”of Ireland. The words are those usually employed in the grant of legislative power in colonial constitutions, and they have been interpreted as authorising“the utmost discretion of enactment for the attainment of the objects appointed to them.”21No considerations of policy or equity or repugnancy to the common law would avail to challenge an Irish statute on the ground that it wasultra vires. Within the limits assigned to it the Irish Parliament will have authority[pg 016]as plenary and as ample as the Imperial Parliament itself possesses or can bestow, and it may, if it so pleases, delegate this authority.22The Irish legislature will, however, have no power to legislate extra-territorially.23It could not, for example, pass a law to punish the Irish subjects of the Crown for offences committed outside Ireland.Now, these powers are undeniably large—larger, indeed, than is usually the case even in Federal systems where the unenumerated or“residuary”powers are left to the State. It is conceivable that they might be exercised to the prejudice of the Imperial Government and of the union of the two kingdoms, and there is nothing in these clauses of the Act to prevent them being so exercised. Treating it as a statute on the ordinary principles of the interpretation of statutes, the Judicial Committee would have no option but to regard as valid any legislation of the Irish Parliament that did not come within the exempted powers. With policy they are not and would not be concerned. But then it must be remembered that there is the possibility of the exercise of the veto of the Imperial Government in cases where legislation, thoughintra vires, is inequitable, inexpedient, or contrary to Imperial interests. This executive veto is really a juristic fact of great importance—it has always been present to their lordships'24mind as a reason for refusing to apply to the interpretation of the Federal constitutions of Canada and Australia the restrictive principles of the Supreme[pg 017]Court, as laid down in Marshall's famous doctrine of“implied restraints.”25When no such veto is in the hands of the Central Government, it becomes necessary to restrict, either in the text of the constitution, or in judicial interpretation of it, with considerable precision, the powers of the local legislatures. This is why a true Federal system always involves a very large amount of litigation. But litigation is a thing to be avoided, if possible. It encourages political parties to carry test cases into the courts.Constitutional Restrictions.26The problem of protecting the rights and privileges of minorities in Ireland by constitutional restrictions is the most delicate that ever perplexed the mind of the jurist. It is one which puts the Irish problem in a category by itself. In no other Constitution in the Empire—with the exception of a single clause in the British North America Act—is any attempt made to fetter the discretion of Parliaments by the imposition of juristic limitations upon their legislative capacity. To say a Parliament shall not legislate except upon certain subjects is one thing, to attempt to definehowit shall legislate upon those very subjects is quite another. The latter is as difficult as the former is simple. To adopt a pedestrian illustration, it is easy enough to forbid motorists to drive along certain roads, but to forbid them to drive“recklessly”along any road is another matter.“Recklessly”at once raises[pg 018]questions of standards of negligence and actionable rights. How are we going to distinguish“just”from“unjust”legislation, taxes which discriminate from taxes which do not,“rights”of the subject which a Parliament may disregard from those which it must respect? There has never been any doubt that a colonial legislature may deal with the common law rights of the subject as it pleases, may abolish trial by jury, suspend the writ ofhabeas corpus, pass bills of attainder, enactex post factolegislation, take private property without compensation, and indemnify the Executive against actions for breaches of the law—if any doubt ever existed it was set at rest by the Colonial Laws Validity Act. But in the case of Ireland it was thought necessary—owing, doubtless, largely to the fears excited in the minds of Englishmen by the Protestant minority in Ulster and the commercial interests in both countries—to insert in the earlier Home Rule Bills an elaborate series of restrictions upon the exercise of even those legislative powers which the Irish Parliament might admittedly possess. For a parallel to these restrictions one would have to go back to the Constitution of the United States and the philosophy of“natural rights.”A more difficult problem it is impossible to conceive, because a Constitution of this kind runs counter to the whole tradition of Parliamentary sovereignty in this country and the colonies. Anyone who takes the trouble to study the decisions of the Privy Council when colonial legislation has been impugned on the ground of its infringing the common law rights of the subject or“natural justice”27will discover that constitutional limitations of this kind upon the powers of colonial Legislatures are not recognised by our judges. In the[pg 019]absence of express words in the colonial Constitutions, such restraints do not exist.“The only thing,”as Lord Halsbury grimly remarked on one occasion, for the subject whose actionable rights are taken away by a Colonial Act of Indemnity“to do is to submit.”The earlier Home Rule Bills were characterised by a most elaborate code of rights which the Irish Legislature might not infringe. Its main provisions might be classified as having three objects in view: (1) The protection of the subject in life, liberty, and property; (2) the prevention of legislation discriminating against any part of the United Kingdom, and (3) the preservation of the existing rights and privileges of the Protestant community in Ireland. In one form or another almost all these principles are to be found embodied in the Constitution of the United States, and in the case of the first of them a clause of the famous 14th Amendment was actually incorporated, with some slight alterations, in Sub-section 8 of Section 4 of the Bill of 1893, according to which the powers of the Irish Legislature should not extend to the making of any law“whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in accordance with settled principles and precedents or may be denied the equal protection of the laws or whereby private property may be taken without just compensation.”These impressive words bristled with legal controversy. Did they, for example, secure to the subject the preservation of the right to trial by jury? In the States of America it has been authoritatively laid down28that, in the absence of further defining words in the State constitutions, they do not. Such procedure is indeed safeguarded in the Federal Courts, but only in consequence of express words. In the case of the States,[pg 020]Cooley, a great authority, says that“whatever the State establishes will be due process of law,”and Story regarded the words by themselves as simply securing a judicial hearing—that is to say, as they stand they merely secure the separation of legislative and judicial functions and prevent the State Legislature from passing laws which are in effect judicial decrees.What the words would really have secured to the subject in Ireland was very doubtful. The object of the draughtsman appears to have been to secure to the subject in Ireland all the protection of the law, including trial by jury, which he would have enjoyed at the date of the passing of the Bill, understanding by law both common law and statute law. If the Imperial Parliament had, subsequent to the date of the Act itself, passed legislation limiting trial by jury or other common law rights, this would, presumably, have provided the Irish Parliament with a new“settled principle and precedent,”enabling it to go further. In other words, the clause might have operated to secure a certain standardization of legislation as between the two countries.The Argument Against Restrictions.But it seems to me that such standardization is best secured by definitely reserving certain subjects of legislation to the Imperial Parliament rather than by imposing upon the exercise of such legislation by the Irish Parliament constitutional limitations which are certain to raise great doubts and provoke excessive litigation. It would be far better to reserve criminal law, as has been done in Canada, in the case of the provincial legislatures—though not without difficulty—than to lay down certain abstract principles. Moreover, is it desirable to maintain such uniformity of legislative principle? There is a great deal to be said for reserving certain[pg 021]subjects of legislation to the Imperial Parliament, but to impose on the whole sphere of legislation entrusted to the Irish Parliament the same principles as those governing the English Statute-Book, or the common law, is to subject almost every conceivable Irish statute to the challenge of litigious politicians. This is what has happened in the United States. The clause, as it stood, might quite conceivably have prevented the Irish legislature from extending the procedure of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts to cases where it was not so extended in England—a most mischievous result, seeing that this procedure is the sanction by which nearly every new statute extending the scope of industrial or public health legislation or conferring powers on local authorities is enforced.Uniformity of legislation between the two countries is not desirable in all directions nor has it hitherto been followed. In matters of expropriation, for example, the drastic procedure of the Housing and Town Planning Act has not been adopted in Ireland. Ireland has her own standard in these matters in the case of the Irish Local Government Act, and the Land Purchase Acts, and I am not at all sure that the principles of the English Land Clauses Consolidation Act and Railway Clauses Consolidation Acts as to arbitration and compensation are by any means ideal. Still less has uniformity in the matter of criminal law been the rule hitherto between the two countries. It would be difficult to find a parallel in this country for the Crimes Act of 1887 (which is still on the Statute-Book although it is no longer put in force by proclamation) with its extensions of summary jurisdiction to cases of criminal conspiracy, intimidation, riot, and unlawful assembly, and its provisions for a change of venue.It is perhaps more open to question whether the[pg 022]words of the 1893 Bill designed to secure to the subject“the equal protection of the laws,”and to prevent legislation discriminating against Englishmen and Scotsmen29under certain circumstances, ought not to have been repeated. The words“equal protection of the laws”have been interpreted in the United States in such a way as to secure that legislation, particularly in the exercise of the“police power,”shall be impartial in its operation.30On this interpretation, they would for example, have prevented an Irish Legislature from exempting Catholic convents which are used as workshops from the operation of the Factory Acts. But that might be secured in another way, and the words might, if adopted, have operated to prevent much useful legislation. It seems likely enough that discriminating legislation, in so far as it tended to prevent a particular class of persons from residing in Ireland or penalised non-residents, would be held invalid in any case on the ground that it conflicted with the reservation to the Imperial Parliament of such subjects as“trade”and“naturalization.”31And, as regards non-residents, it must be remembered that the grant of legislative powers can only be exercised“in respect of matters exclusively relating to Ireland or some part thereof”—words which may be found to be of considerable importance.The same may be said of the omission in the Bill, to provide, as its predecessor of 1893 provided, for the maintenance of securities for the liberty of the subject and the preservation of his common law rights. It is almost impossible to do this without entering on an[pg 023]uncharted sea of litigation. Modern legislation, especially social and industrial legislation, infringes common law rights at every point. I have ventured elsewhere32to describe the modern tendency of industrial legislation as a tendency, inverting Maine's famous aphorism, to advance from contract to status, that is to say, to limit to an increasing extent the contractual freedom of the worker, and to confer on him a certain status by the protection of him against himself.33The greater part of our Irish land legislation impaired the obligation of contracts. Professor Dicey criticised the Bill of 1893 for not going further than it did in its incorporation of clauses taken from the Constitution of the United States with the intention of securing the common law rights of the subject. But it may be remarked that many of those clauses have proved an almost intolerable limitation upon the power of the legislatures to deal with the regulation of trade and industry, so intolerable that the Supreme Court has of late made a liberal use of the fiction of“the police power”34to enable the legislatures to pass legislation which otherwise might have seemed[pg 024]to“abridge the privileges”of citizens of the United States or deprive them of“liberty or property without due process of law.”35At the same time it must be remembered that, although the Irish Parliament is not debarred from statutory interference with common law rights, its legislation will be subject to rules of interpretation, at the hands of the Judicial Committee, by which statutes are always construed in favour of the subject. It is a well-accepted rule of construction in English courts that common law rights cannot be taken away except by express words.36It is something to secure that the interpretation of the new Constitution and of Irish statutes shall, in the last resort, be wholly in the hands of an Imperial Court. The chartered protection of the rights of the individual by a fundamental Act is always difficult and often impossible. In the last resort it depends very much on the interpretation which the judges choose to place upon such an Act.37[pg 025]The Executive Veto.It is obvious, therefore, that the principal and indeed almost the only safeguard provided in the Bill against inequitable or discriminating legislation38is the veto of the Lord-Lieutenant acting on the instructions of the Imperial Government. A political check is preferred to a juristic check. The apostolic maxim“all things are lawful but all things are not expedient,”appears to have been the motto of the draughtsman. Not law but policy will decide what Irish Acts are to be placed on the Statute-Book. It must be admitted that this is the principle most in harmony with precedent if the constitutions granted to the colonies are to be regarded as precedents. No colony would have tolerated for a moment the elaborate network of restrictions in Clause 4 of the Bill of 1893, through the finely-woven meshes of which it would have been hard for any Irish legislation of an original or experimental character to pass. If we are really in earnest about setting up a Parliament on College Green, we cannot do otherwise. The executive veto must be the real check, and in the presence of such a check, English judges would always be very loath39to declare the Acts of a legislatureultra viresmerely because they infringed common law rights.Now this check may be exercised on one of two grounds. The Imperial Government may“instruct”the Lord-Lieutenant to refuse his assent either on the ground that the bill in question is politically objectionable, or on the ground that it is, in their opinion, in[pg 026]excess of the powers conferred on the Irish Legislature. It is desirable in every way that the two should be distinguished in order that the Imperial Parliament may be able to hold the Cabinet of the day responsible when its action is purely a question of policy. On the other hand, it is no less desirable that the Cabinet should, in the interests of the public in Ireland, be in a position to test the validity of an Irish Bill which, though unobjectionable on the ground of policy, may be questionable on the ground of law. It is a common error that in all written constitutions the courts, particularly those of the United States, haveproprio motuthe power of declaringultra viresany legislative act which infringes the principles of the Constitution. Laboulaye fell into this error in his study of the American Constitution. But the American Courts have no such power. Until a case arises in the ordinary course of litigation, under the statute in question, there is no means of annulling it, and there have been many Acts40on the Federal Statute Book which are quite conceivably“unconstitutional”in the letter as well as in the spirit, but have never been declaredultra viresfor the simple reason that no one has found his private rights affected. This holds particulars of questions of the distribution of power. It might for example, occur in the case of an Irish Bill which proposed to deal with one of the reserved services. To meet this difficulty and to avoid the trouble which might arise from an Act being placed in the Irish Statute Book41and observed in Ireland only to be subsequently declaredultra viresin the course of litigation, it is[pg 027]provided in the Government of Ireland Bill42(Clause 29) that if it appears to the Lord-Lieutenant or a Secretary of State expedient in the public interest that the validity of an Irish Act should be tested he may represent the same to His Majesty in Council and the question may then be heard and determined by the Judicial Committee in the same manner as an appeal from a Court in Ireland. It is not necessary to suppose that the executive veto will be a dead letter, and to argue from its disuse in the case of the self-governing colonies is to argue from the like to the unlike. In the case of the provincial legislatures of Canada it has been exercised by the Dominion Government where provincial legislation is inequitable, or contrary to“the settled policy”of the Dominion.Exempted Powers.The enumeration of matters in respect of which the Irish Parliament shall have no power to make laws is a little deceptive, inasmuch as many of the matters so enumerated would have been outside its power in any case. Ireland is not, so long as the Act of Union remains on the Statute Book, a sovereign state, and“the making of peace or war”and the negotiation of[pg 028]treaties would, as a matter of international law, have been impossible in her case, even if they had not been expressly prohibited.“Merchant shipping”and“the return of fugitive offenders”would also have been excluded from her authority by the rule of law43which precludes a subordinate legislature from extra-territorial legislation. The same may be said of Copyright. The colonies have only been enabled to deal with these matters in virtue of clauses in Acts of the Imperial Parliament.44But it would not be true to say that the position of the Irish Parliament is assimilated to that of the legislature of a self-governing colony. The exclusion of subjects relating to allegiance, such as naturalization45and treason,46and of legislation as to aliens is exceptional. All the self-governing colonies have power to deal with these matters, as also with the subject of naval and military forces. Perhaps the most important exemption in the case of Ireland is that of trade, trade-marks, designs, merchandise marks and patent rights. I cannot help regretting that, inasmuch as the principle has been adopted of giving Ireland general and unenumerated powers, the number of specific exemptions has not been enlarged. It is highly desirable to avoid conflict of laws in the United Kingdom as far as possible. It must be remembered that the Statute Book has, quite apart from the Act[pg 029]of Union, bound Ireland to England by many legislative ties; there is a uniform system of industrial, commercial, and, to some extent, criminal law for the whole of these Islands—Factory Acts, Companies Acts, the law of negotiable instruments, criminal procedure, old-age pensions, and insurance legislation; in all these there is legislative standardization, and the tendency of all modern political unions, notably those of the Australian Commonwealth and the German Empire, is in this direction. Confusion, injustice, and economic inequalities constantly occur in a modern State whose inhabitants are living under a“conflict of laws.”Fiscal considerations point the same way. It may be safely assumed that English opinion will not tolerate any considerable divergence between the fiscal systems of England and Ireland. Moreover, financial considerations apart, the regulation of“trade”is, as in every political union, reserved for the central legislature. But to distinguish between“trade”on the one hand and“industry”on the other is not an easy problem, and Ireland may discriminate against England only less effectively by lowering the standard of the Factory Acts than by a tariff.The“subject matter”of the Old Age Pensions Acts, National Insurance Acts, and Labour Exchanges Acts has, it is true, been excluded. It seems regrettable that the category is not enlarged to include the Companies Acts, the Sale of Goods Act, the Bills of Exchange Act, and the Factory Acts. It would be highly undesirable to have the“industrial minimum”for the United Kingdom, so laboriously attained by our factory legislation, lowered in the interests of particular interests in Ireland. The advantages of securing uniformity by the inclusion of the three great statutes relating to commercial law is also very obvious. Two of them, indeed,[pg 030]represent a great step in that codification of English law which is the dream of English jurists, they have been adopted as a model in some of our colonies, and it would seem highly desirable that the standard thus attained should remain fixed. In urging this, I do not forget what I have already said, in connection with the subject of constitutional limitations, as to the undesirability of exacting too rigid a degree of uniformity in English and Irish legislation, but constitutional limitations are one thing and exceptions quite another. It is very difficult to subject the whole field of Irish legislation to juristic principles, but it is comparatively easy to exempt from that field the subject matter of particular Acts. The whole question resolves itself into a consideration of the point at which uniformity should be determined. The Bill seems to fix the point much too low.Of course, one way of dealing with the question would have been to grant Ireland only particular and enumerated powers of legislation, as has been done in the case of the provincial legislatures of Canada. There is much to be said for this. It seems the line of least resistance; it is always easier to add to powers which appear deficient than to withdraw powers which have proved excessive. But it undoubtedly invites litigation and it is very difficult, if not impossible, to define what are exclusively Irish matters without in the last resort using some such general term (as is used in the British North America Act) as“generally all matters of a merely local nature.”The great economy shown by the draughtsman in the number of the exceptions from the powers of the Irish legislature, as well as in the number of the restrictions upon the exercise of those powers, means, as we have already indicated, that the whole weight of control[pg 031]over the Irish legislature is thrown upon the executive and legislative veto of the Imperial Government. Is it sufficient to rely upon the paramount power of the Imperial Parliament to override by statute Irish legislation which may be inequitable or inexpedient, and upon the exercise of the veto of the Imperial Government? These checks are the exercise of aforce majeure, which is often invidious and always difficult. Above all they are political. The exercise of them depends on the party in power in Great Britain, and as such it may excite resentment among the Irish people as an invasion of the autonomy granted to them. On the other hand, exceptions and restrictions are a legal, not a political, check—they operate through the agency of the courts of law without the intervention of political considerations. Moreover—and this perhaps is the most important consideration—they rest upon the consent of the Irish people expressed in the terms of the Home Rule Act to which their representatives are a party. For an Irish Parliament to defy them would be to defy the very Act which was the charter of its existence. But they invite litigation. It all resolves itself into a question of hitting the mean between the dangers of litigation on the one hand and of political pressure on the other. Probably, however, the occasions of conflict will be few and unimportant, and the temper of the Irish Parliament may be much more conservative than its critics imagine.The ExecutiveThe new Bill is remarkable for the explicitness with which it invests Ireland with control over the Executive. For the first time in the written constitutions of the Empire we have a statutory Executive, and not only[pg 032]is it a statutory Executive, but it is to be a Parliamentary Executive defined by statute. In the earlier Bills nothing was more remarkable than the brevity and allusiveness with which this question of the Government of Ireland was treated.“The Executive power in Ireland shall continue vested in Her Majesty the Queen”was the language employed in the Bill of 1893. Under that Bill the Government of Ireland would have continued, even after its passage into law, to be in the hands of the English Cabinet and it would have rested with that Cabinet to determine how large or how small a part of the prerogatives of the Crown should be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant. Paradoxical as it may seem, it would have been quite possible for a Unionist Government, coming into power immediately after the Home Rule Bill had passed into law and an Irish Parliament had met at Dublin, to retain in their own hands the Executive authority in Ireland without any breach of statutory obligations. The Bills of 1886 and 1893 left it in the discretion of the Crown to decide what the powers of the Lord-Lieutenant should be. Following Colonial precedents, the Constitution would have had to be supplemented47by prerogative legislation in the shape of Letters Patent defining those powers. Moreover, these powers were to have been vested not in the Lord-Lieutenant in Council, but in the Lord-Lieutenant alone. Something was indeed, said about an“Executive Committee”of the Irish Privy Council to aid and advise in the Government of Ireland—this was the only hint of responsible Government that the Bill contained—but nothing was said of the powers or[pg 033]constitution of the Committee nor of the extent to which the Lord-Lieutenant was bound to act on its advice. Its constitution was left to the discretion of Her Majesty. Its powers would, of course, as in the case of the Colonies, have been decided by the tacit adoption of the unwritten conventions of the English Constitution that the advisers of the Governor must command the confidence of the Legislature which votes supplies.Very different is our new Bill. The Executive power does indeed continue“vested in His Majesty the King,”and nothing is to affect its exercise—in other words, it is to continue in the hands of the Imperial Government—except“as respects Irish services as defined for the purpose of this Act.”The exception is a new departure and the general effect of the whole clause (Clause IV.) is expressly to hand over in statutory terms“all public services in connection with the administration of the Government of Ireland”except the reserved services and such services as those in regard to which the Irish Parliament have no power to make laws. The effect of this is to hand over an executive authority co-extensive with the legislative authority.48Moreover, in regard to Irish services, the Executive power is to be exercised by the Lord-LieutenantthroughIrish Departments, and the heads of these Departments are given the Parliamentary title of“Ministers”and, what is more remarkable, it is expressly provided (a provision[pg 034]to be found in only one or two, and those the latest, of our Colonial Constitutions) that:“No such person shall hold office as an Irish Minister for a longer period than six months, unless he is or becomes a member of one of the Houses of the Irish Parliament.”Never in any constitution that emanated from the practised hand of the Parliamentary draughtsman has there been such a complete transfer in express statutory terms of the executive power. Taken together with the comparatively unrestricted grant of legislative power, it constitutes a grant of a larger measure of self-government than is to be found in any of the earlier Bills.At the same time there is here no cause for alarm. It must be remembered that the Lord-Lieutenant will exist in a dual capacity—like a constitutional king he will be bound in Irish matters to act on the advice of his Irish Ministers but, like a Colonial governor, he will also in all Imperial matters be bound to obey the instructions of the Imperial Government. In regard to legislation the position here is quite clear: he may veto measures which his own Ministers have promoted if the Imperial Government think it advisable so to instruct him. In regard to the executive, he will, of course, enjoy less latitude; it is quite clear that the Imperial Government will, under this clause, find it practically impossible to interfere in purely Irish administration. The Irish Government will, of course, be carried on in the name of the Crown, and it will enjoy the same prerogatives at common law as the Imperial Government in such matters as the use of the prerogative writsmandamusandcertiorari, and the immunity from actions in tort. Ireland has its own Petitions of Right Act.At the same time a distinction must be drawn between the prerogatives relating to the exercise of Irish[pg 035]services and prerogatives which cannot be so defined. Some of the latter may be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant by his patent, and these he will exercise not on the advice of the Irish, but of the Imperial, Government. Moreover, there are certain powers conferred by statute on the Lord-Lieutenant, or the Lord-Lieutenant in Council, such as the power of proclaiming disaffected districts under the Crimes Act, of suspending the operation of the Irish Habeas Corpus Act, and of controlling the constabulary, not all49of which will be exercisable on the advice of Irish Ministers. Prerogatives not so exercisable will no doubt be exercised on the advice of the Secretary of State for Home Affairs who is even now the medium of formal communications between the Lord-Lieutenant and the Crown. The Chief Secretary50will, of course, disappear altogether; he will be replaced by the Executive Committee. The Lord-Lieutenant will, of course, cease to be a member of the English Ministry; his position will be assimilated to that of a Colonial Governor, and his tenure fixed for a term of years so as to make his tenure of office independent, as it must be in the exercise of his new constitutional duties, of the fortunes of English Parties.The Irish LegislatureThe constitution of the legislature itself calls for little comment. It follows with some fidelity the features[pg 036]of Mr. Gladstone's Bills, but the substitution of a nominated Senate for the“Council”or“Order”elected on a property franchise is a new departure. Nomination of late has fallen into some discredit both in theory and in practice.51Colonial experience is not encouraging. Nomination by the Crown means in practice nomination by the Governor, on the advice of the Cabinet of the day, and Ministries in Canada and New South Wales have put this prerogative to such partizan uses as to reduce the Upper House to a very servile condition. When nomination is for life and not for a fixed term of years the evils of this system may be mitigated, but they are not removed. The one thing that can be said about the proposed Senate is that its powers in legislation are of such a limited character that an Irish Executive would be under little temptation to“pack”it. A Senate of only forty members compelled to meet in joint session a House of Commons of 164 members every second time that it rejects or objectionably amends a bill is not likely to prove a very formidable obstacle to legislation. But the nomination by the Executive is in any case somewhat objectionable, and it would seem better to provide that at the end of the first term of eight years the Senators should be appointed by some system of election, whether on a basis of proportional representation or otherwise.52But[pg 037]to their nomination for the first term by the Imperial Government I see no very cogent objection. Indeed, the expedient has much to be said for it, for the discretion, if wisely exercised, will enable the Imperial Government not only to secure to Irish minorities a degree of representation which no conceivable system of election could secure, but also to appoint men of moderate opinions—one immediately thinks of Sir Horace Plunkett—who, in the strife of extremists, might have no chance of election by either party. It has been argued in some quarters that a Second Chamber is wholly unnecessary, and the example of the single-chamber legislatures in some of the Canadian provinces has been cited. The argument, however, overlooks one really important function of the Senate, namely its duty to provide for the security of tenure of the Irish judges. Clause XXVII. provides that judges appointed after the passing of the Act shall only be removable on an Address of both Houses of the Irish Parliament, and, should the Senate refuse to concur in a demand by the lower House for the removal of a judge, there is no such means of overcoming its resistance in a joint session as is the case with legislation. This is well.There is one provision in the Bill53which will serve to strengthen the position of the Senate as an advisory body and may operate to give it an initiative in the introduction of Government legislation—the provision which enables an Irish Minister who is a member of either House to sit and to speak in both Houses. This is a practice common on the Continent, and not wholly unknown[pg 038]in the case of some of our Colonial Constitutions, and it has much to commend it. The Senate is placed under the same disabilities as to money bills as are imposed on the House of Lords by the Parliament Act. Thereby it is placed in an inferior position to that of most of the Second Chambers in the Colonies, all of which can reject, and some of which may also amend, money bills. The disability is the less surprising having regard to its character as a nominee body—it is when the Second Chambers of the Colonies are elective, that their powers in regard to money bills are considerable.54The privileges of the Imperial Parliament are conferred by the Government of Ireland Bill upon the Irish Parliament. In the absence of such grant the Irish Parliament would not have had such privileges—although it might have adopted them by legislation—for thelex et consuetudo Parliamentiare not implied in the grant of a constitution.55It is not uncommon to prescribe in Colonial Constitutions that the legislature shall have such privileges as are enjoyed by the House of Commons at the time of grant. In the present case, the Irish Parliament may define its privileges, if it thinks fit, by legislation, though it is difficult to imagine any occasion for its doing so. The really important thing is that it cannot enlarge those privileges beyond the scope of the privileges of the Imperial Parliament. This is the one constitutional limitation in the Bill—apart from the“safeguards”as to legislation in regard to religion and marriage contained in Clause III.—and it is by no means unimportant. The powers of the Imperial Parliament—particularly as to the right[pg 039]of the two Houses to commit for contempt without cause shewn—are a sufficiently high standard.Irish Representation in the House of Commons56Irish representation at Westminster has always been the riddle of the Home Rule problem. I have no space to examine here in detail the alternative solutions which were put forward in the earlier Home Rule Bills. But there is one general consideration which must always be borne in mind in the theoretical discussion of any solution. It is the very simple consideration that representation is what mathematicians would call a“function”of legislative power—the one is dependent upon the other. If the legislative powers over Ireland reserved to the Imperial Parliament are large, the representation of Ireland in that Parliament must not be small. It is at this point that Mr. Gladstone's original proposal for total exclusion broke down. He reserved to the Imperial Parliament considerable powers of legislation in regard to Ireland and yet proposed to exercise those powers in the absence of Irish representatives.It was no answer to cite colonial analogies. The Irish problem is not, as I have pointed out elsewhere, a colonial problem. No one at present proposes to give Ireland complete fiscal autonomy, for example. Nor is it strictly apposite to say that the Imperial Parliament legislates for the Colonies in the absence of colonial[pg 040]representatives. Such legislation is now almost exclusively confined to what I may call enabling legislation in matters in which the Colonies, owing to their status as Dependencies, are unable to legislate. In such matters as copyright, merchant shipping, marriage, extradition, the Imperial Parliament legislates for the Colonies largely because colonial laws cannot operate ex-territorially, and such Imperial legislation is usually effected by means of application clauses which enable the Colonies to adopt it or not as they please. But rarely if ever does the Imperial Parliament legislate for a self-governing colony as it has done and will continue to do in the case of such domestic Irish affairs as old-age pensions, land purchase, Customs and Excise, defence, naturalisation, to say nothing perhaps of industrial and commercial law. I have already indicated my opinion in favour of confining these subjects to the Imperial Parliament, but even were the opposite course taken there would still remain the fiscal question. We cannot continue to tax Ireland unless the Irish representatives are to remain at Westminster.The presence of the Irish members at Westminster is imperative if the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is not to be illusory. Mr. Balfour57contends that it will be as illusory as it has been in the case of the Colonies. But the Colonies are not represented in the Imperial Parliament, and to differentiate Ireland in this respect is to make all the difference between a legal formula and a political fact.There remains the question of inclusion. No one would question the propriety of reducing Irish representation to its true proportions on a population basis—in other words, from its present figure of 103 to one of 70. The real difficulty arises when we consider[pg 041]whether those members, whatever their numbers, are to attend at Westminster in the same capacity as the British members. We are to-day confronted by the same problem as that which vexed the Parliament of 1893: are Irish members to vote upon all occasions or only upon those occasions when exclusively Irish and exclusively Imperial affairs are under discussion? The original text of the 1893 Bill adopted the latter solution. At first it has much to commend it, for it avoids—or attempts to avoid—the anomaly of refusing self-government to Great Britain while granting it to Ireland: if Irish members are to govern themselves at Dublin without the interference of Englishmen, why, it has been pertinently asked, should not the converse hold good at Westminster? But two very grave difficulties stand in the way; one is the difficulty of distinguishing between Irish and non-Irish business at Westminster; the other is the difficulty, even when such distinction is made, of maintaining a single majority under such circumstances. Withdraw the Irish members on certain occasions and you might convert a Liberal majority at Westminster on certain days into a Unionist majority on other days. A Liberal Government might have responsibility without power in British matters and a Unionist Opposition power without responsibility. One Executive could not co-exist with two majorities. Such a state of affairs might have been conceivable some seventy or eighty years ago, when Ministries were not regarded as responsible for the passage of legislation into law. It would be conceivable in France, where Ministries come and go and the Deputies remain. But it would be fatal to the Cabinet system as we know it.Another objection to the“in-and-out”plan is the extreme difficulty of classifying the business of the[pg 042]House of Commons in such a way as to distinguish between what is“Irish”and what is not. If that business were purely legislative the difficulty would not be so great, but the House controls administration as well as legislation. Any question involving a vote of confidence in the Cabinet might legitimately be regarded as a matter in which the Irish members had a right to have a voice. The motion for the adjournment of the House, following on an unsatisfactory answer by a Minister, might be regarded as such. Who would decide these things? The Bill of 1893 provided for their determination by the House. In that event the Irish members would presumably have had a voice in determining on what subjects they should or should not vote, and they would have been masters of the situation under all circumstances. By their power to determine the fate of Imperial Ministries they might have determined the exercise of the Imperial veto on Irish legislation and reduced it to a nullity. It may, indeed, be urged that the Irish vote often dominates the situation at Westminster even under present circumstances, but it must be remembered that it is now exercised in the consistent support of the same administration, whereas under an“in-and-out”system its action might be capricious and apt to be determined solely by Irish exigencies of the moment.There remains the plan of the inclusion of Irish members for all purposes. This at least has the advantage of simplicity. If Irishmen constantly attended at Westminster without distinction of voting capacity they would be less likely to regard their presence there as an instrument for reducing to impotence the exercise of the Imperial veto upon Irish legislation. It is quite conceivable, indeed, that once Home Rule is granted Irishmen will be Imperialists at Westminster without[pg 043]becoming Nationalists at Dublin—the natural conservatism of the Irish character may reassert itself. Close observers of Irish thought are inclined to believe that the grant of Home Rule will act as a great solvent in Irish political life, and that with the iron discipline of Nationalism relaxed, and its cherished object attained, lines of cleavage, social, economic, and industrial, will appear in Ireland and vastly change the distribution of Irish parties both at Dublin and at Westminster. Ulster“Unionists”may be found voting with a Liberal Government on education questions and Irish“Nationalists”against it. Irish representatives at Westminster may become more, rather than less, closely identified with British interests. And it should be remembered that it would be no new thing for members from one part of the United Kingdom to be voting on measures which solely concerned another part of the Kingdom. This is happening every day. As Mr. Walker points out elsewhere, a process of legislative disintegration has been going on within the walls of the Imperial Parliament itself, which is already being forced to legislate separately for the three separate parts of the United Kingdom. He estimates that during the last twenty years no less than 49.7 per cent. of the public general Acts have applied only to some one part of the United Kingdom instead of to the whole.The Government of Ireland Bill adopts the principle of total inclusion, but qualifies the anomaly which is involved in the presence of Irish members voting on non-Irish questions by reducing the representation of Ireland to the number of forty-two, and thus to a figure far below that to which Ireland is entitled on the basis of population. At the same time it must be admitted that the anomaly is not thereby removed. The position of Irish members voting on purely English legislation[pg 044]after the grant of Home Rule will indeed—numbers apart—be more anomalous than it was before it. An anomaly can be tolerated so long as it is universal in its operation, and Scotch and English members can at present view with equanimity the spectacle of Irish members voting in their own affairs so long as they themselves exercise the same privilege in those of their neighbours. Reciprocity of this kind produces a certain unity of thought in a deliberative assembly. But the anomaly at once becomes invidious if Irishmen are placed in a privileged position. It is perhaps more theoretical than real, as the actual weight that could be thrown into the scale of the division lobby by a Nationalist majority (taking the present balance of parties in Ireland) of about twenty-six cannot be considerable, even if, as is very doubtful, it were consistently exercised.Still the anomaly remains. Is it possible to meet it by some extension of Home Rule to the legislative affairs of England and Scotland?The Further Extension of Home RuleThe anomaly, however, remains. How is it to be met? Obviously it is but a temporary difficulty if, as the Prime Minister has suggested in his speech on the first reading, the Bill is to be regarded as but the first step in a general devolution of the legislative powers of the Imperial Parliament. But everything depends on how far that devolution is to be carried. The Prime Minister's reference to a change in the Standing Orders suggests a further development of the Committee system already in operation in the case of the Scottish Standing Committee by which the House has delegated a certain degree of provincial autonomy to a group of members. It would be possible to extend[pg 045]this to the creation of a Standing Committee for England and Wales. Under such a system Irish Members would be excluded from the Committee stages of legislation which was neither Irish nor Imperial. But there remains the Report stage, which is always apt to resolve itself into a Second Committee stage58in which the whole House participates. Moreover, an impassable limit is set to this process of domestic devolution by the necessity that the Government of to-day should command a majority in each of these Committees. A Liberal Ministry would probably find itself in a minority in an English Standing Committee, and a Unionist Ministry would, with equal probability, find itself in a minority in a Scottish Committee. Committees have become not so much a sphere for the legislative initiative of the private member as a new outlet for Government business. Contentious bills introduced or adopted by the Government are referred to them, and the moment this is the case the Minister in charge who is confronted in Committee with amendments which he does not care to accept may invite the whole House on the Report stage of the Bill to disallow them. The House itself, jealous of any surrender of its prerogatives, is only too apt to turn the Report stage into a second Committee stage. The responsibility of a Government department for the preparation and execution of legislation is to-day so indispensable that effective legislative devolution is almost impossible without devolution of the executive also. A Committee to which the Minister in charge of the Bill is not responsible is not in a position to exercise effectual control over legislation. Indeed it seems impossible to contemplate a devolution of legislative power without a[pg 046]corresponding devolution of executive power. So long as we have but one Executive in the House of Commons it is impossible to have two or three legislatures within the walls of that House. Moreover, it is just as imperative to restore the diminishing control of members of Parliament over administration as it is to re-establish their authority in legislation. There is a growing and regrettable tendency to confer upon Government departments both legislative and judicial powers—powers to make statutory orders and to interpret them, which is depriving our constitution of what has hitherto been regarded by foreign students as one of its most distinctive features—the subordination of the executive to the legislature and to the courts. The distinction between Gesetz und Verordnung,59between statute and order, is fast disappearing in the enormous volume of statutory orders. Powers to make rules under particular statutes are entrusted to Scotch, Irish, and English Departments which have the effect of diminishing the control of the House of Commons without transferring it to any representative substitute. The great increase of grants-in-aid for administrative purposes has also given the departments a power of indirect legislation by the latitude they enjoy in the distribution of them such as is further calculated to diminish the control of the House of Commons over questions of Irish and Scotch policy. Rarely do any marked departures by the departments come under the review of the House of Commons; the claims of the Government over the time-table of the House, fortified by certain rulings of the Speaker,60[pg 047]may and frequently do preclude any examination of them. In the words of a famous resolution, one may say“the power of the Executive has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished.”But it is no remedy for this state of things to provide for administrative devolution alone. To devolve the authority which a great Department of State, such as the Board of Agriculture, exercises over the whole of Great Britain by the simple process of assigning its Scotch business to the Secretary for Scotland, does not increase the control of Scottish members over the executive. This process of administrative devolution, which is always going on, is not accompanied by any measure of legislative devolution; the Secretary for Scotland is not thereby brought under the control of the Scotch Standing Committee.To create a new Scottish or Irish Department does not increase Parliamentary control over Scottish or Irish administration; rather it diminishes it. The heads of a Scottish Education Office, Local Government Board, and Department of Agriculture have been made responsible not to the House of Commons but to the Secretary for Scotland. Like the Chief Secretary for Ireland, he is a Prime Minister without a Cabinet and without a Legislature, and his policy is determined primarily not by Scottish or Irish opinion, but by the alien issues of imperial politics. Obviously there will never be any remedy for these anomalies until we have a Legislature with an executive responsible to it.Scottish Home RuleAt the present moment we have in the case of Scotland devolution in a state of arrested development. This process of disintegration is reflected in separate Estimates in finance and in distinct draftsmanship in[pg 048]legislation. In legislation, indeed, marked changes have also taken place under cover of alterations in the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. An itinerant delegation of Scotch members has been set up to deal with private bill procedure in Scotland, and domestic devolution within the walls of the House of Commons has taken the shape of a Scotch Grand Committee. Few or none of these changes have any preconceived relation with the others; they represent experiments framed to meet the exigencies of the moment, but they all bear eloquent witness to a fact which has changed the whole aspect of the Home Rule problem and made that aspect at once more practical and less intimidating—the fact that the House of Commons has found itself increasingly incompetent to do its work. The fact is disguised by a multitude of expedients, all of them, however, amounting to a renunciation of legislative authority. These changes represent thedisjecta membraof Scottish Home Rule—they have no coherence, they point not so much to a solution of the problem as to its recognition.None the less, I think the Irish Government Bill does provide us with a prototype. There is nothing in it, with the exception of the financial clauses, which forbids its adoption in the case of Scotland and of England. But I think, as I have already indicated in another connection, that the category of reserved subjects ought to be considerably enlarged so as to secure the maintenance of the existing uniformity of legislation in commercial and industrial matters. There are, however, undeniable difficulties in the way of an identity of local constitutions. Legislation in regard to land is exempted from the control of the Irish Legislature to an extent which Scotland would hardly be prepared to accept. Control over legislation[pg 049]relating to marriage is retained in the case of Ireland; I doubt if it would be tolerated in Scotland, whose marriage law differs61from that of England to a far greater extent than is the case with the marriage law of Ireland. In common law England and Ireland have the same rules;62it is only in statute law that they differ. In Scotland the common law is radically different. There will, therefore, be some difficulty in finding a common denominator for the Imperial Parliament—and in avoiding, even under“Home Rule All Round”a certain divergence in the legislative capacities of the members from Scotland and Ireland, with the attendant risk of an“in-and-out”procedure.

“Home Rule is at bottom Federalism,”we are told1by the most distinguished jurist among its opponents. It is urged against it that Federal Governments are almost invariably weak Governments, and that, in so far as they are strong, they are as“symmetrical”as the new constitution is unsymmetrical. Cornewall Lewis once thought it necessary to write a book on the Use and Abuse of Political Terms, and there is a great danger in the present controversy of our being enslaved by the poverty of our political vocabulary. The term“Federalism”is put to such new and alien uses as to darken counsel and confuse thought. That Federal Executives are usually weak, that in the dual allegiance of a Federal system men often prefer the State authority which is near to the Federal authority which is remote, that the respective limits of Federal and State legislation are defined with difficulty and observed with reluctance, that conflict of laws is more often the rule than the exception, that[pg 004]Federal constitutions are rigid rather than flexible, and, in a word, that progress is sacrificed to stability: all these things are true, and all these things are irrelevant. The Government of Ireland Bill is not, and cannot be, the corner-stone of a Federal system for the United Kingdom, although its duplication in the case of Scotland and of England would not be impossible, should it appear desirable. We may, for want of a better term, call it the foundation of a system of Devolution, but we must not call it Federalism.

Putting on one side for the moment the question whether Home Rule is Federalism or not, I am inclined to enter a protest against all these attempts to fit the Bill into the categories of the jurist. It is very doubtful whether any two constitutions in the world, even federal constitutions, can be brought under one species. Two of the most successful“federal”constitutions present the gravest anomalies to the theorist. The Canadian Constitution, according to Professor Dicey, betrays a logical fallacy in the very words of its preamble;2and German jurists have wrangled no less inconclusively than incessantly about the legal character of the Empire and as to where its sovereignty resides;3yet in neither case has the practical operation of these constitutions been much the worse for the legal solecisms which they present. Indeed, it would not be too much to say with Aristotle that the“mixed”and not the“pure”type of government is the most successful,[pg 005]and that when Federalism is, as in the United States, at its purest, it is also at its weakest. The constitution of Imperial Germany ought, on this kind of reasoning, to be a flagrant perversion, and yet it has persisted in enduring for some forty-one years, and the prestige of its principal organ, the Bundesrath, although violating all Mr. Balfour's principles as to“equality”in its constitution, is, according to the doyen of the constitutional lawyers of Germany, increasing every day.4The argument that“Federalism”is incompatible with the preponderance of the“predominant partner,”and that no“federal”union is possible in these islands owing to the superior position occupied by England, would, even if it were relevant, be easily refuted by the example presented by the hegemony of Prussia.

The same objection may be urged against the contention that the grant of self-government, whether to Ireland alone or to the rest of the United Kingdom, is both reactionary and unprecedented. The progress of all civilised communities, we are told, is towards political integration, not away from it. Devolution, it is said, is gratuitous in the case of a“United”Kingdom whose very union represents an ideal imperfectly achieved by the less fortunate countries which have had to be content with something less complete in the form of Federalism. Nations or Colonies mutually independent federate as a step towards union; it is“unprecedented”to reverse the process and qualify union by looser ties of cohesion. Now this attempt“to construct a normal programme for all portions of mankind”5cannot be sustained. If it[pg 006]could, it would avail as a conclusive argument against the grant of self-government to our Colonies whose claims to legislative independence grow with their growth and strengthen with their strength.6But it is not even true of Federal Unions. Anyone who takes the trouble to study the history of judicial interpretation of the American Constitution will find that there is a constant ebb and flow in the current of“unionism.”The intention of the framers of the 14th Amendment to create a United States citizenship has been largely neutralized by the decisions of the Supreme Court, which have inclined strongly in the direction of the legislative autonomy of the States.7Nor is this all. We are told that Federal Constitutions are“round and perfect and self-contained,”8—that they are characterized by“equality”of all the parts—and that, like the work of the divine law-giver of early communities, they are finished the moment they are begun.9But these confident inductions cannot be sustained. The history of the constitution of the United States and of Imperial Germany tells another story—a story of ancillary communities and dependencies in various stages of political apprenticeship. If we look for the American Constitution where all such constitutions must really be sought, that is to say not in the original text, but in the commentary of the courts, we shall find a truly remarkable tendency of late years to[pg 007]emphasize this heterogeneity, inequality and incompleteness.10

The new Bill proposes a delegation of authority, both executive and legislative. Unlike a Federal constitution, it contemplates no distribution of sovereignty (begging a question which has often vexed the jurists as to the partibility of sovereignty). The new Government in Ireland will, indeed, be carried on in the name of the Crown, the writs of the Irish Court will run in the King's name, the statutes of the Irish Parliament will be enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and Commons. But the Imperial Government and the Imperial Parliament will remain supreme. The executive power in Ireland will continue vested in His Majesty, though some prerogatives may be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant who, as respects them, will exist in a dual capacity—some of these he will exercise on the advice of the Imperial Government, others on the advice of the Irish Government. So far, however, as the law, as distinguished from convention, is concerned, he will be in no way bound to act on the advice of his Irish Ministers except in so far as his“instructions”require him to do so. The words of the Bill do, indeed, contemplate with more explicitness than is usual in our written constitutions, a transfer of executive as well as of legislative authority, but they are by no means exhaustive, and[pg 008]they still leave it to His Majesty to determine11what prerogatives shall be delegated after the Act has come into force. As regards the legislative power, it will remain with the Imperial Government to give it effect by granting or withholding the King's assent to Irish legislation,12and the Imperial Parliament may, at any time, exercise its supremacy to the prejudice of such legislation, even after it has found its way on to the Irish statute-book. As regards the judiciary, there will, of course, be no dual judiciary: Irish Courts will interpret and enforce Imperial as well as Irish statutes, but both in the one case and in the other their judgments will be subject to appeal to an Imperial Court—the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In other words, the Imperial power will be supreme in the executive, the legislative, and the judicial sphere.

Now in Federalism in the true sense—and I regard the constitution of the United States as the archetype—there is no such subordination. The authority of the constituent states and of the Federal nation are distinct and independent of one another. The Governor of the State is appointed not by the Federal authority, but by the State itself, whose servant he is. There[pg 009]is no“Crown”to serve as a common denominator of State and Federal Executives.13The one is not subordinate to the other, but is co-ordinate with it. The legislation of the State is subject to no external veto by the President. Nor is it subject to a legislative veto. In all matters not expressly conceded to the Federal Legislature, the State Legislatures remain as supreme after the enactment of the Federal Constitution as they were before it. In the legislative, as in the executive, sphere, the two authorities are co-ordinate. So with the judiciary. The decisions of the State Courts, in so far as they deal with State matters, and do not involve the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, are final and subject to no appeal to the Supreme Court at Washington. Conversely, Federal Circuit Courts exist independently of the State Courts to decide cases arising under Federal statutes or involving the interpretation of the Federal Constitution, and their judgments are enforced not by the State Executive but by the Federal Executive, which has its own marshals for the purpose. Nor can an act done by a Federal official, in obedience to a Federal statute, be punished by the State Court, even though it appear to involve a breach of a law of the State.14

It is this dual allegiance that constitutes the inherent weakness of all Federal systems. Arguments based upon it have been urged against the grant of self-government to Ireland. Even those who admit that Federal analogies have no application so far as the relations of the Imperial and Irish legislatures are concerned, and who concede that the Irish Parliament will be as subordinate as a State Parliament in a Federal system is co-ordinate—none the less insist that in the relation of the two executives there is a real and perilous dualism. Many opponents allege, and no doubt, believe, that, with an Irish Parliament sitting at Dublin, the King's Writ will not run, the decisions of the Judicial Committee will not be enforced. Imperial statutes will not be obeyed, and Imperial taxes will not be collected. If there were a real delimitation of Courts and Executives, Imperial and Irish, under the new system, such a danger, though remote, would be conceivable. But no such sharp distinction is to be found in the Bill. In political unions, the central Government may act upon its subjects in a particular state directly through its own agencies—its own Courts, its own Executive officers, and its own police—this is the true Federal type; or it may act indirectly through the agency of the State authorities. Conversely, the State Governments may act directly through their own agencies—this again is the Federal principle, or they may act indirectly through Imperial agencies. Now wherever this indirect action is employed in both its forms the distinction between the two authorities is confused, the Federal principle undergoes a qualification which, by depriving it of half its symmetry, deprives it of all its weakness. Just this reciprocal relationship is established between the Imperial Government and the Irish Government.

Imperial officials will be at the service of the Irish Government, and Irish officials at the service of the Imperial Government. For example, in the collection of taxes imposed by the Irish Parliament, the Irish Government will depend upon Imperial revenue officers to assess and collect them. The Imperial Government, on the other hand, will depend upon Irish Courts and Irish sheriffs to enforce their collection. Irish sheriffs will, in turn, depend upon an Imperial constabulary to assist them in levying execution. I shall return to some of these points in greater detail when I come to deal with the relations between the Executive and the Judiciary, and the maintenance of law and order. It is sufficient for me to remark here that the Irish Nationalist who wishes to defy the Imperial Government, and the Irish Unionist who wishes to defy the Irish Government, will each be hard put to define what he is pleased to regard as the limits of political obligation. He will find it difficult to distinguish where the authority of the Irish Government ends and that of the Imperial Government begins.

The Supremacy of the Imperial Parliament.In the new Bill the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is secured by express words. The words are not necessary. No Parliament can bind its successors, and what one Parliament has done another Parliament may undo. Even when one Parliament has been at pains, by declaring its legislation“perpetual”or“unalterable”to bind posterity—as in the case of certain clauses in the Irish and Scotch Acts of Union—its injunctions have been disregarded by its successors with no more formality than is necessary in the case of any other legislation. An Act setting up a new Constitution is no more irrevocable than an Act authorising the[pg 012]imposition of the income tax. If, therefore, the Imperial Parliament chooses to grant a Constitution to Ireland, there is nothing to prevent its revoking or amending that grant, even (we submit) though it should have been at pains to enact that the Constitution could only be surrendered or altered by the consent of the Legislature which that Constitution created. Some doubts did, indeed, arise as to this point in the case of the Home Rule Bill of 1886, which not only excluded the Irish members from Westminster, but made provision for the amendment of the new Constitution by stipulating that such amendment should be made, if at all, by the joint authority of the Irish and English Parliaments. Whether this would have had the effect of preventing the“Imperial”Parliament from amending such a Home Rule Act without calling in the assistance of the Irish Parliament was much discussed at the time.15Obviously, the question does not now arise, as the Irish members are to continue to sit at Westminster.16[pg 013]It is therefore open to the Imperial Parliament at any time to repeal or amend the Government of Ireland Bill after it has become law. On the other hand, the Irish Parliament will have no power, except in so far as such power is conceded by the Act itself, to alter its provisions. This is stated in the Bill itself,17but the statement is superfluous. It follows from the doctrine of the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament that statutes of that Parliament can only be repealed by the Parliament itself. No constitution granted to a British Colony, however large the grant of self-government it contains, can be altered by that colony unless the power to alter it is expressly conceded. Such a power, when the Constitution itself does not prescribe some particular method of constitutional amendment, has indeed been granted in general terms by Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, but this Act could not apply to Ireland, which is outside the legal definition of a colony contained in the Interpretation Act of 1889. The only powers of constitutional amendment which the Irish Legislature will possess are those expressly conceded in Clause 9, which enables it after three years from the passing of the Act to deal with the franchise and with re-distribution.The Irish Parliament will, of course, have power to[pg 014]repeal any existing Acts of the Imperial Parliament in so far as they relate to Ireland, and do not deal with matters exempted from its authority. It would be impossible for it to legislate for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland if it had not this power, and the power is implied in the general grant. But if the Imperial Parliament chooses to continue to legislate for Ireland, even in matters in regard to which the Irish Parliament has been empowered to legislate, such Imperial legislation will be of superior obligation. This is also a corollary of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, and it was not necessary to state it in the Bill.18The grant of particular legislative powers to Ireland does not prevent the Imperial Parliament from subsequently legislating in derogation of those powers. The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is as inexhaustible as the fountain of honour.It is just here that the divergence from Federal principles is most marked. Under the British North America Act the legislative powers of the provinces are“exclusive”of Dominion legislation within their own sphere.19So, too, in the case of the Australian Constitution, under which the residuary legislative powers remain with the States, the Federal Parliament is excluded from legislating in any matters not expressly conceded to it. The result is seriously to limit the operations of such powers as it does possess. It has, for example,[pg 015]over Customs and Excise, but there are other ways of giving a preference to a trade than by the imposition of duties: a low standard of factory legislation may operate in the same direction, as the Federal Parliament found to its cost when it attempted to pass an Excise Tariff Act, depriving manufacturers of the advantages of the new tariff in those States in which a certain industrial minimum was not observed. The Act was held invalid by the High Court20on the ground that it exceeded the powers conferred on the Federal Parliament by the Constitution, and encroached on the exclusive powers of industrial legislation which belonged to the States. No such situation would be possible under the Government of Ireland Act, because the powers of the Irish Legislature are not exclusive of the powers of the Imperial Parliament, but merely concurrent. And whenever an Irish and an Imperial statute conflict, the rule of construction will be in favour of the latter.

In the new Bill the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is secured by express words. The words are not necessary. No Parliament can bind its successors, and what one Parliament has done another Parliament may undo. Even when one Parliament has been at pains, by declaring its legislation“perpetual”or“unalterable”to bind posterity—as in the case of certain clauses in the Irish and Scotch Acts of Union—its injunctions have been disregarded by its successors with no more formality than is necessary in the case of any other legislation. An Act setting up a new Constitution is no more irrevocable than an Act authorising the[pg 012]imposition of the income tax. If, therefore, the Imperial Parliament chooses to grant a Constitution to Ireland, there is nothing to prevent its revoking or amending that grant, even (we submit) though it should have been at pains to enact that the Constitution could only be surrendered or altered by the consent of the Legislature which that Constitution created. Some doubts did, indeed, arise as to this point in the case of the Home Rule Bill of 1886, which not only excluded the Irish members from Westminster, but made provision for the amendment of the new Constitution by stipulating that such amendment should be made, if at all, by the joint authority of the Irish and English Parliaments. Whether this would have had the effect of preventing the“Imperial”Parliament from amending such a Home Rule Act without calling in the assistance of the Irish Parliament was much discussed at the time.15Obviously, the question does not now arise, as the Irish members are to continue to sit at Westminster.16

It is therefore open to the Imperial Parliament at any time to repeal or amend the Government of Ireland Bill after it has become law. On the other hand, the Irish Parliament will have no power, except in so far as such power is conceded by the Act itself, to alter its provisions. This is stated in the Bill itself,17but the statement is superfluous. It follows from the doctrine of the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament that statutes of that Parliament can only be repealed by the Parliament itself. No constitution granted to a British Colony, however large the grant of self-government it contains, can be altered by that colony unless the power to alter it is expressly conceded. Such a power, when the Constitution itself does not prescribe some particular method of constitutional amendment, has indeed been granted in general terms by Section 5 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, but this Act could not apply to Ireland, which is outside the legal definition of a colony contained in the Interpretation Act of 1889. The only powers of constitutional amendment which the Irish Legislature will possess are those expressly conceded in Clause 9, which enables it after three years from the passing of the Act to deal with the franchise and with re-distribution.

The Irish Parliament will, of course, have power to[pg 014]repeal any existing Acts of the Imperial Parliament in so far as they relate to Ireland, and do not deal with matters exempted from its authority. It would be impossible for it to legislate for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland if it had not this power, and the power is implied in the general grant. But if the Imperial Parliament chooses to continue to legislate for Ireland, even in matters in regard to which the Irish Parliament has been empowered to legislate, such Imperial legislation will be of superior obligation. This is also a corollary of the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament, and it was not necessary to state it in the Bill.18The grant of particular legislative powers to Ireland does not prevent the Imperial Parliament from subsequently legislating in derogation of those powers. The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is as inexhaustible as the fountain of honour.

It is just here that the divergence from Federal principles is most marked. Under the British North America Act the legislative powers of the provinces are“exclusive”of Dominion legislation within their own sphere.19So, too, in the case of the Australian Constitution, under which the residuary legislative powers remain with the States, the Federal Parliament is excluded from legislating in any matters not expressly conceded to it. The result is seriously to limit the operations of such powers as it does possess. It has, for example,[pg 015]over Customs and Excise, but there are other ways of giving a preference to a trade than by the imposition of duties: a low standard of factory legislation may operate in the same direction, as the Federal Parliament found to its cost when it attempted to pass an Excise Tariff Act, depriving manufacturers of the advantages of the new tariff in those States in which a certain industrial minimum was not observed. The Act was held invalid by the High Court20on the ground that it exceeded the powers conferred on the Federal Parliament by the Constitution, and encroached on the exclusive powers of industrial legislation which belonged to the States. No such situation would be possible under the Government of Ireland Act, because the powers of the Irish Legislature are not exclusive of the powers of the Imperial Parliament, but merely concurrent. And whenever an Irish and an Imperial statute conflict, the rule of construction will be in favour of the latter.

The Powers of the Irish ParliamentThe Irish Parliament is given a general power to make laws for“the peace, order, and good government”of Ireland. The words are those usually employed in the grant of legislative power in colonial constitutions, and they have been interpreted as authorising“the utmost discretion of enactment for the attainment of the objects appointed to them.”21No considerations of policy or equity or repugnancy to the common law would avail to challenge an Irish statute on the ground that it wasultra vires. Within the limits assigned to it the Irish Parliament will have authority[pg 016]as plenary and as ample as the Imperial Parliament itself possesses or can bestow, and it may, if it so pleases, delegate this authority.22The Irish legislature will, however, have no power to legislate extra-territorially.23It could not, for example, pass a law to punish the Irish subjects of the Crown for offences committed outside Ireland.Now, these powers are undeniably large—larger, indeed, than is usually the case even in Federal systems where the unenumerated or“residuary”powers are left to the State. It is conceivable that they might be exercised to the prejudice of the Imperial Government and of the union of the two kingdoms, and there is nothing in these clauses of the Act to prevent them being so exercised. Treating it as a statute on the ordinary principles of the interpretation of statutes, the Judicial Committee would have no option but to regard as valid any legislation of the Irish Parliament that did not come within the exempted powers. With policy they are not and would not be concerned. But then it must be remembered that there is the possibility of the exercise of the veto of the Imperial Government in cases where legislation, thoughintra vires, is inequitable, inexpedient, or contrary to Imperial interests. This executive veto is really a juristic fact of great importance—it has always been present to their lordships'24mind as a reason for refusing to apply to the interpretation of the Federal constitutions of Canada and Australia the restrictive principles of the Supreme[pg 017]Court, as laid down in Marshall's famous doctrine of“implied restraints.”25When no such veto is in the hands of the Central Government, it becomes necessary to restrict, either in the text of the constitution, or in judicial interpretation of it, with considerable precision, the powers of the local legislatures. This is why a true Federal system always involves a very large amount of litigation. But litigation is a thing to be avoided, if possible. It encourages political parties to carry test cases into the courts.

The Irish Parliament is given a general power to make laws for“the peace, order, and good government”of Ireland. The words are those usually employed in the grant of legislative power in colonial constitutions, and they have been interpreted as authorising“the utmost discretion of enactment for the attainment of the objects appointed to them.”21No considerations of policy or equity or repugnancy to the common law would avail to challenge an Irish statute on the ground that it wasultra vires. Within the limits assigned to it the Irish Parliament will have authority[pg 016]as plenary and as ample as the Imperial Parliament itself possesses or can bestow, and it may, if it so pleases, delegate this authority.22The Irish legislature will, however, have no power to legislate extra-territorially.23It could not, for example, pass a law to punish the Irish subjects of the Crown for offences committed outside Ireland.

Now, these powers are undeniably large—larger, indeed, than is usually the case even in Federal systems where the unenumerated or“residuary”powers are left to the State. It is conceivable that they might be exercised to the prejudice of the Imperial Government and of the union of the two kingdoms, and there is nothing in these clauses of the Act to prevent them being so exercised. Treating it as a statute on the ordinary principles of the interpretation of statutes, the Judicial Committee would have no option but to regard as valid any legislation of the Irish Parliament that did not come within the exempted powers. With policy they are not and would not be concerned. But then it must be remembered that there is the possibility of the exercise of the veto of the Imperial Government in cases where legislation, thoughintra vires, is inequitable, inexpedient, or contrary to Imperial interests. This executive veto is really a juristic fact of great importance—it has always been present to their lordships'24mind as a reason for refusing to apply to the interpretation of the Federal constitutions of Canada and Australia the restrictive principles of the Supreme[pg 017]Court, as laid down in Marshall's famous doctrine of“implied restraints.”25When no such veto is in the hands of the Central Government, it becomes necessary to restrict, either in the text of the constitution, or in judicial interpretation of it, with considerable precision, the powers of the local legislatures. This is why a true Federal system always involves a very large amount of litigation. But litigation is a thing to be avoided, if possible. It encourages political parties to carry test cases into the courts.

Constitutional Restrictions.26The problem of protecting the rights and privileges of minorities in Ireland by constitutional restrictions is the most delicate that ever perplexed the mind of the jurist. It is one which puts the Irish problem in a category by itself. In no other Constitution in the Empire—with the exception of a single clause in the British North America Act—is any attempt made to fetter the discretion of Parliaments by the imposition of juristic limitations upon their legislative capacity. To say a Parliament shall not legislate except upon certain subjects is one thing, to attempt to definehowit shall legislate upon those very subjects is quite another. The latter is as difficult as the former is simple. To adopt a pedestrian illustration, it is easy enough to forbid motorists to drive along certain roads, but to forbid them to drive“recklessly”along any road is another matter.“Recklessly”at once raises[pg 018]questions of standards of negligence and actionable rights. How are we going to distinguish“just”from“unjust”legislation, taxes which discriminate from taxes which do not,“rights”of the subject which a Parliament may disregard from those which it must respect? There has never been any doubt that a colonial legislature may deal with the common law rights of the subject as it pleases, may abolish trial by jury, suspend the writ ofhabeas corpus, pass bills of attainder, enactex post factolegislation, take private property without compensation, and indemnify the Executive against actions for breaches of the law—if any doubt ever existed it was set at rest by the Colonial Laws Validity Act. But in the case of Ireland it was thought necessary—owing, doubtless, largely to the fears excited in the minds of Englishmen by the Protestant minority in Ulster and the commercial interests in both countries—to insert in the earlier Home Rule Bills an elaborate series of restrictions upon the exercise of even those legislative powers which the Irish Parliament might admittedly possess. For a parallel to these restrictions one would have to go back to the Constitution of the United States and the philosophy of“natural rights.”A more difficult problem it is impossible to conceive, because a Constitution of this kind runs counter to the whole tradition of Parliamentary sovereignty in this country and the colonies. Anyone who takes the trouble to study the decisions of the Privy Council when colonial legislation has been impugned on the ground of its infringing the common law rights of the subject or“natural justice”27will discover that constitutional limitations of this kind upon the powers of colonial Legislatures are not recognised by our judges. In the[pg 019]absence of express words in the colonial Constitutions, such restraints do not exist.“The only thing,”as Lord Halsbury grimly remarked on one occasion, for the subject whose actionable rights are taken away by a Colonial Act of Indemnity“to do is to submit.”The earlier Home Rule Bills were characterised by a most elaborate code of rights which the Irish Legislature might not infringe. Its main provisions might be classified as having three objects in view: (1) The protection of the subject in life, liberty, and property; (2) the prevention of legislation discriminating against any part of the United Kingdom, and (3) the preservation of the existing rights and privileges of the Protestant community in Ireland. In one form or another almost all these principles are to be found embodied in the Constitution of the United States, and in the case of the first of them a clause of the famous 14th Amendment was actually incorporated, with some slight alterations, in Sub-section 8 of Section 4 of the Bill of 1893, according to which the powers of the Irish Legislature should not extend to the making of any law“whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in accordance with settled principles and precedents or may be denied the equal protection of the laws or whereby private property may be taken without just compensation.”These impressive words bristled with legal controversy. Did they, for example, secure to the subject the preservation of the right to trial by jury? In the States of America it has been authoritatively laid down28that, in the absence of further defining words in the State constitutions, they do not. Such procedure is indeed safeguarded in the Federal Courts, but only in consequence of express words. In the case of the States,[pg 020]Cooley, a great authority, says that“whatever the State establishes will be due process of law,”and Story regarded the words by themselves as simply securing a judicial hearing—that is to say, as they stand they merely secure the separation of legislative and judicial functions and prevent the State Legislature from passing laws which are in effect judicial decrees.What the words would really have secured to the subject in Ireland was very doubtful. The object of the draughtsman appears to have been to secure to the subject in Ireland all the protection of the law, including trial by jury, which he would have enjoyed at the date of the passing of the Bill, understanding by law both common law and statute law. If the Imperial Parliament had, subsequent to the date of the Act itself, passed legislation limiting trial by jury or other common law rights, this would, presumably, have provided the Irish Parliament with a new“settled principle and precedent,”enabling it to go further. In other words, the clause might have operated to secure a certain standardization of legislation as between the two countries.

The problem of protecting the rights and privileges of minorities in Ireland by constitutional restrictions is the most delicate that ever perplexed the mind of the jurist. It is one which puts the Irish problem in a category by itself. In no other Constitution in the Empire—with the exception of a single clause in the British North America Act—is any attempt made to fetter the discretion of Parliaments by the imposition of juristic limitations upon their legislative capacity. To say a Parliament shall not legislate except upon certain subjects is one thing, to attempt to definehowit shall legislate upon those very subjects is quite another. The latter is as difficult as the former is simple. To adopt a pedestrian illustration, it is easy enough to forbid motorists to drive along certain roads, but to forbid them to drive“recklessly”along any road is another matter.“Recklessly”at once raises[pg 018]questions of standards of negligence and actionable rights. How are we going to distinguish“just”from“unjust”legislation, taxes which discriminate from taxes which do not,“rights”of the subject which a Parliament may disregard from those which it must respect? There has never been any doubt that a colonial legislature may deal with the common law rights of the subject as it pleases, may abolish trial by jury, suspend the writ ofhabeas corpus, pass bills of attainder, enactex post factolegislation, take private property without compensation, and indemnify the Executive against actions for breaches of the law—if any doubt ever existed it was set at rest by the Colonial Laws Validity Act. But in the case of Ireland it was thought necessary—owing, doubtless, largely to the fears excited in the minds of Englishmen by the Protestant minority in Ulster and the commercial interests in both countries—to insert in the earlier Home Rule Bills an elaborate series of restrictions upon the exercise of even those legislative powers which the Irish Parliament might admittedly possess. For a parallel to these restrictions one would have to go back to the Constitution of the United States and the philosophy of“natural rights.”A more difficult problem it is impossible to conceive, because a Constitution of this kind runs counter to the whole tradition of Parliamentary sovereignty in this country and the colonies. Anyone who takes the trouble to study the decisions of the Privy Council when colonial legislation has been impugned on the ground of its infringing the common law rights of the subject or“natural justice”27will discover that constitutional limitations of this kind upon the powers of colonial Legislatures are not recognised by our judges. In the[pg 019]absence of express words in the colonial Constitutions, such restraints do not exist.“The only thing,”as Lord Halsbury grimly remarked on one occasion, for the subject whose actionable rights are taken away by a Colonial Act of Indemnity“to do is to submit.”

The earlier Home Rule Bills were characterised by a most elaborate code of rights which the Irish Legislature might not infringe. Its main provisions might be classified as having three objects in view: (1) The protection of the subject in life, liberty, and property; (2) the prevention of legislation discriminating against any part of the United Kingdom, and (3) the preservation of the existing rights and privileges of the Protestant community in Ireland. In one form or another almost all these principles are to be found embodied in the Constitution of the United States, and in the case of the first of them a clause of the famous 14th Amendment was actually incorporated, with some slight alterations, in Sub-section 8 of Section 4 of the Bill of 1893, according to which the powers of the Irish Legislature should not extend to the making of any law

“whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law in accordance with settled principles and precedents or may be denied the equal protection of the laws or whereby private property may be taken without just compensation.”

These impressive words bristled with legal controversy. Did they, for example, secure to the subject the preservation of the right to trial by jury? In the States of America it has been authoritatively laid down28that, in the absence of further defining words in the State constitutions, they do not. Such procedure is indeed safeguarded in the Federal Courts, but only in consequence of express words. In the case of the States,[pg 020]Cooley, a great authority, says that“whatever the State establishes will be due process of law,”and Story regarded the words by themselves as simply securing a judicial hearing—that is to say, as they stand they merely secure the separation of legislative and judicial functions and prevent the State Legislature from passing laws which are in effect judicial decrees.

What the words would really have secured to the subject in Ireland was very doubtful. The object of the draughtsman appears to have been to secure to the subject in Ireland all the protection of the law, including trial by jury, which he would have enjoyed at the date of the passing of the Bill, understanding by law both common law and statute law. If the Imperial Parliament had, subsequent to the date of the Act itself, passed legislation limiting trial by jury or other common law rights, this would, presumably, have provided the Irish Parliament with a new“settled principle and precedent,”enabling it to go further. In other words, the clause might have operated to secure a certain standardization of legislation as between the two countries.

The Argument Against Restrictions.But it seems to me that such standardization is best secured by definitely reserving certain subjects of legislation to the Imperial Parliament rather than by imposing upon the exercise of such legislation by the Irish Parliament constitutional limitations which are certain to raise great doubts and provoke excessive litigation. It would be far better to reserve criminal law, as has been done in Canada, in the case of the provincial legislatures—though not without difficulty—than to lay down certain abstract principles. Moreover, is it desirable to maintain such uniformity of legislative principle? There is a great deal to be said for reserving certain[pg 021]subjects of legislation to the Imperial Parliament, but to impose on the whole sphere of legislation entrusted to the Irish Parliament the same principles as those governing the English Statute-Book, or the common law, is to subject almost every conceivable Irish statute to the challenge of litigious politicians. This is what has happened in the United States. The clause, as it stood, might quite conceivably have prevented the Irish legislature from extending the procedure of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts to cases where it was not so extended in England—a most mischievous result, seeing that this procedure is the sanction by which nearly every new statute extending the scope of industrial or public health legislation or conferring powers on local authorities is enforced.Uniformity of legislation between the two countries is not desirable in all directions nor has it hitherto been followed. In matters of expropriation, for example, the drastic procedure of the Housing and Town Planning Act has not been adopted in Ireland. Ireland has her own standard in these matters in the case of the Irish Local Government Act, and the Land Purchase Acts, and I am not at all sure that the principles of the English Land Clauses Consolidation Act and Railway Clauses Consolidation Acts as to arbitration and compensation are by any means ideal. Still less has uniformity in the matter of criminal law been the rule hitherto between the two countries. It would be difficult to find a parallel in this country for the Crimes Act of 1887 (which is still on the Statute-Book although it is no longer put in force by proclamation) with its extensions of summary jurisdiction to cases of criminal conspiracy, intimidation, riot, and unlawful assembly, and its provisions for a change of venue.It is perhaps more open to question whether the[pg 022]words of the 1893 Bill designed to secure to the subject“the equal protection of the laws,”and to prevent legislation discriminating against Englishmen and Scotsmen29under certain circumstances, ought not to have been repeated. The words“equal protection of the laws”have been interpreted in the United States in such a way as to secure that legislation, particularly in the exercise of the“police power,”shall be impartial in its operation.30On this interpretation, they would for example, have prevented an Irish Legislature from exempting Catholic convents which are used as workshops from the operation of the Factory Acts. But that might be secured in another way, and the words might, if adopted, have operated to prevent much useful legislation. It seems likely enough that discriminating legislation, in so far as it tended to prevent a particular class of persons from residing in Ireland or penalised non-residents, would be held invalid in any case on the ground that it conflicted with the reservation to the Imperial Parliament of such subjects as“trade”and“naturalization.”31And, as regards non-residents, it must be remembered that the grant of legislative powers can only be exercised“in respect of matters exclusively relating to Ireland or some part thereof”—words which may be found to be of considerable importance.The same may be said of the omission in the Bill, to provide, as its predecessor of 1893 provided, for the maintenance of securities for the liberty of the subject and the preservation of his common law rights. It is almost impossible to do this without entering on an[pg 023]uncharted sea of litigation. Modern legislation, especially social and industrial legislation, infringes common law rights at every point. I have ventured elsewhere32to describe the modern tendency of industrial legislation as a tendency, inverting Maine's famous aphorism, to advance from contract to status, that is to say, to limit to an increasing extent the contractual freedom of the worker, and to confer on him a certain status by the protection of him against himself.33The greater part of our Irish land legislation impaired the obligation of contracts. Professor Dicey criticised the Bill of 1893 for not going further than it did in its incorporation of clauses taken from the Constitution of the United States with the intention of securing the common law rights of the subject. But it may be remarked that many of those clauses have proved an almost intolerable limitation upon the power of the legislatures to deal with the regulation of trade and industry, so intolerable that the Supreme Court has of late made a liberal use of the fiction of“the police power”34to enable the legislatures to pass legislation which otherwise might have seemed[pg 024]to“abridge the privileges”of citizens of the United States or deprive them of“liberty or property without due process of law.”35At the same time it must be remembered that, although the Irish Parliament is not debarred from statutory interference with common law rights, its legislation will be subject to rules of interpretation, at the hands of the Judicial Committee, by which statutes are always construed in favour of the subject. It is a well-accepted rule of construction in English courts that common law rights cannot be taken away except by express words.36It is something to secure that the interpretation of the new Constitution and of Irish statutes shall, in the last resort, be wholly in the hands of an Imperial Court. The chartered protection of the rights of the individual by a fundamental Act is always difficult and often impossible. In the last resort it depends very much on the interpretation which the judges choose to place upon such an Act.37

But it seems to me that such standardization is best secured by definitely reserving certain subjects of legislation to the Imperial Parliament rather than by imposing upon the exercise of such legislation by the Irish Parliament constitutional limitations which are certain to raise great doubts and provoke excessive litigation. It would be far better to reserve criminal law, as has been done in Canada, in the case of the provincial legislatures—though not without difficulty—than to lay down certain abstract principles. Moreover, is it desirable to maintain such uniformity of legislative principle? There is a great deal to be said for reserving certain[pg 021]subjects of legislation to the Imperial Parliament, but to impose on the whole sphere of legislation entrusted to the Irish Parliament the same principles as those governing the English Statute-Book, or the common law, is to subject almost every conceivable Irish statute to the challenge of litigious politicians. This is what has happened in the United States. The clause, as it stood, might quite conceivably have prevented the Irish legislature from extending the procedure of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts to cases where it was not so extended in England—a most mischievous result, seeing that this procedure is the sanction by which nearly every new statute extending the scope of industrial or public health legislation or conferring powers on local authorities is enforced.

Uniformity of legislation between the two countries is not desirable in all directions nor has it hitherto been followed. In matters of expropriation, for example, the drastic procedure of the Housing and Town Planning Act has not been adopted in Ireland. Ireland has her own standard in these matters in the case of the Irish Local Government Act, and the Land Purchase Acts, and I am not at all sure that the principles of the English Land Clauses Consolidation Act and Railway Clauses Consolidation Acts as to arbitration and compensation are by any means ideal. Still less has uniformity in the matter of criminal law been the rule hitherto between the two countries. It would be difficult to find a parallel in this country for the Crimes Act of 1887 (which is still on the Statute-Book although it is no longer put in force by proclamation) with its extensions of summary jurisdiction to cases of criminal conspiracy, intimidation, riot, and unlawful assembly, and its provisions for a change of venue.

It is perhaps more open to question whether the[pg 022]words of the 1893 Bill designed to secure to the subject“the equal protection of the laws,”and to prevent legislation discriminating against Englishmen and Scotsmen29under certain circumstances, ought not to have been repeated. The words“equal protection of the laws”have been interpreted in the United States in such a way as to secure that legislation, particularly in the exercise of the“police power,”shall be impartial in its operation.30On this interpretation, they would for example, have prevented an Irish Legislature from exempting Catholic convents which are used as workshops from the operation of the Factory Acts. But that might be secured in another way, and the words might, if adopted, have operated to prevent much useful legislation. It seems likely enough that discriminating legislation, in so far as it tended to prevent a particular class of persons from residing in Ireland or penalised non-residents, would be held invalid in any case on the ground that it conflicted with the reservation to the Imperial Parliament of such subjects as“trade”and“naturalization.”31And, as regards non-residents, it must be remembered that the grant of legislative powers can only be exercised“in respect of matters exclusively relating to Ireland or some part thereof”—words which may be found to be of considerable importance.

The same may be said of the omission in the Bill, to provide, as its predecessor of 1893 provided, for the maintenance of securities for the liberty of the subject and the preservation of his common law rights. It is almost impossible to do this without entering on an[pg 023]uncharted sea of litigation. Modern legislation, especially social and industrial legislation, infringes common law rights at every point. I have ventured elsewhere32to describe the modern tendency of industrial legislation as a tendency, inverting Maine's famous aphorism, to advance from contract to status, that is to say, to limit to an increasing extent the contractual freedom of the worker, and to confer on him a certain status by the protection of him against himself.33The greater part of our Irish land legislation impaired the obligation of contracts. Professor Dicey criticised the Bill of 1893 for not going further than it did in its incorporation of clauses taken from the Constitution of the United States with the intention of securing the common law rights of the subject. But it may be remarked that many of those clauses have proved an almost intolerable limitation upon the power of the legislatures to deal with the regulation of trade and industry, so intolerable that the Supreme Court has of late made a liberal use of the fiction of“the police power”34to enable the legislatures to pass legislation which otherwise might have seemed[pg 024]to“abridge the privileges”of citizens of the United States or deprive them of“liberty or property without due process of law.”35

At the same time it must be remembered that, although the Irish Parliament is not debarred from statutory interference with common law rights, its legislation will be subject to rules of interpretation, at the hands of the Judicial Committee, by which statutes are always construed in favour of the subject. It is a well-accepted rule of construction in English courts that common law rights cannot be taken away except by express words.36It is something to secure that the interpretation of the new Constitution and of Irish statutes shall, in the last resort, be wholly in the hands of an Imperial Court. The chartered protection of the rights of the individual by a fundamental Act is always difficult and often impossible. In the last resort it depends very much on the interpretation which the judges choose to place upon such an Act.37

The Executive Veto.It is obvious, therefore, that the principal and indeed almost the only safeguard provided in the Bill against inequitable or discriminating legislation38is the veto of the Lord-Lieutenant acting on the instructions of the Imperial Government. A political check is preferred to a juristic check. The apostolic maxim“all things are lawful but all things are not expedient,”appears to have been the motto of the draughtsman. Not law but policy will decide what Irish Acts are to be placed on the Statute-Book. It must be admitted that this is the principle most in harmony with precedent if the constitutions granted to the colonies are to be regarded as precedents. No colony would have tolerated for a moment the elaborate network of restrictions in Clause 4 of the Bill of 1893, through the finely-woven meshes of which it would have been hard for any Irish legislation of an original or experimental character to pass. If we are really in earnest about setting up a Parliament on College Green, we cannot do otherwise. The executive veto must be the real check, and in the presence of such a check, English judges would always be very loath39to declare the Acts of a legislatureultra viresmerely because they infringed common law rights.Now this check may be exercised on one of two grounds. The Imperial Government may“instruct”the Lord-Lieutenant to refuse his assent either on the ground that the bill in question is politically objectionable, or on the ground that it is, in their opinion, in[pg 026]excess of the powers conferred on the Irish Legislature. It is desirable in every way that the two should be distinguished in order that the Imperial Parliament may be able to hold the Cabinet of the day responsible when its action is purely a question of policy. On the other hand, it is no less desirable that the Cabinet should, in the interests of the public in Ireland, be in a position to test the validity of an Irish Bill which, though unobjectionable on the ground of policy, may be questionable on the ground of law. It is a common error that in all written constitutions the courts, particularly those of the United States, haveproprio motuthe power of declaringultra viresany legislative act which infringes the principles of the Constitution. Laboulaye fell into this error in his study of the American Constitution. But the American Courts have no such power. Until a case arises in the ordinary course of litigation, under the statute in question, there is no means of annulling it, and there have been many Acts40on the Federal Statute Book which are quite conceivably“unconstitutional”in the letter as well as in the spirit, but have never been declaredultra viresfor the simple reason that no one has found his private rights affected. This holds particulars of questions of the distribution of power. It might for example, occur in the case of an Irish Bill which proposed to deal with one of the reserved services. To meet this difficulty and to avoid the trouble which might arise from an Act being placed in the Irish Statute Book41and observed in Ireland only to be subsequently declaredultra viresin the course of litigation, it is[pg 027]provided in the Government of Ireland Bill42(Clause 29) that if it appears to the Lord-Lieutenant or a Secretary of State expedient in the public interest that the validity of an Irish Act should be tested he may represent the same to His Majesty in Council and the question may then be heard and determined by the Judicial Committee in the same manner as an appeal from a Court in Ireland. It is not necessary to suppose that the executive veto will be a dead letter, and to argue from its disuse in the case of the self-governing colonies is to argue from the like to the unlike. In the case of the provincial legislatures of Canada it has been exercised by the Dominion Government where provincial legislation is inequitable, or contrary to“the settled policy”of the Dominion.

It is obvious, therefore, that the principal and indeed almost the only safeguard provided in the Bill against inequitable or discriminating legislation38is the veto of the Lord-Lieutenant acting on the instructions of the Imperial Government. A political check is preferred to a juristic check. The apostolic maxim“all things are lawful but all things are not expedient,”appears to have been the motto of the draughtsman. Not law but policy will decide what Irish Acts are to be placed on the Statute-Book. It must be admitted that this is the principle most in harmony with precedent if the constitutions granted to the colonies are to be regarded as precedents. No colony would have tolerated for a moment the elaborate network of restrictions in Clause 4 of the Bill of 1893, through the finely-woven meshes of which it would have been hard for any Irish legislation of an original or experimental character to pass. If we are really in earnest about setting up a Parliament on College Green, we cannot do otherwise. The executive veto must be the real check, and in the presence of such a check, English judges would always be very loath39to declare the Acts of a legislatureultra viresmerely because they infringed common law rights.

Now this check may be exercised on one of two grounds. The Imperial Government may“instruct”the Lord-Lieutenant to refuse his assent either on the ground that the bill in question is politically objectionable, or on the ground that it is, in their opinion, in[pg 026]excess of the powers conferred on the Irish Legislature. It is desirable in every way that the two should be distinguished in order that the Imperial Parliament may be able to hold the Cabinet of the day responsible when its action is purely a question of policy. On the other hand, it is no less desirable that the Cabinet should, in the interests of the public in Ireland, be in a position to test the validity of an Irish Bill which, though unobjectionable on the ground of policy, may be questionable on the ground of law. It is a common error that in all written constitutions the courts, particularly those of the United States, haveproprio motuthe power of declaringultra viresany legislative act which infringes the principles of the Constitution. Laboulaye fell into this error in his study of the American Constitution. But the American Courts have no such power. Until a case arises in the ordinary course of litigation, under the statute in question, there is no means of annulling it, and there have been many Acts40on the Federal Statute Book which are quite conceivably“unconstitutional”in the letter as well as in the spirit, but have never been declaredultra viresfor the simple reason that no one has found his private rights affected. This holds particulars of questions of the distribution of power. It might for example, occur in the case of an Irish Bill which proposed to deal with one of the reserved services. To meet this difficulty and to avoid the trouble which might arise from an Act being placed in the Irish Statute Book41and observed in Ireland only to be subsequently declaredultra viresin the course of litigation, it is[pg 027]provided in the Government of Ireland Bill42(Clause 29) that if it appears to the Lord-Lieutenant or a Secretary of State expedient in the public interest that the validity of an Irish Act should be tested he may represent the same to His Majesty in Council and the question may then be heard and determined by the Judicial Committee in the same manner as an appeal from a Court in Ireland. It is not necessary to suppose that the executive veto will be a dead letter, and to argue from its disuse in the case of the self-governing colonies is to argue from the like to the unlike. In the case of the provincial legislatures of Canada it has been exercised by the Dominion Government where provincial legislation is inequitable, or contrary to“the settled policy”of the Dominion.

Exempted Powers.The enumeration of matters in respect of which the Irish Parliament shall have no power to make laws is a little deceptive, inasmuch as many of the matters so enumerated would have been outside its power in any case. Ireland is not, so long as the Act of Union remains on the Statute Book, a sovereign state, and“the making of peace or war”and the negotiation of[pg 028]treaties would, as a matter of international law, have been impossible in her case, even if they had not been expressly prohibited.“Merchant shipping”and“the return of fugitive offenders”would also have been excluded from her authority by the rule of law43which precludes a subordinate legislature from extra-territorial legislation. The same may be said of Copyright. The colonies have only been enabled to deal with these matters in virtue of clauses in Acts of the Imperial Parliament.44But it would not be true to say that the position of the Irish Parliament is assimilated to that of the legislature of a self-governing colony. The exclusion of subjects relating to allegiance, such as naturalization45and treason,46and of legislation as to aliens is exceptional. All the self-governing colonies have power to deal with these matters, as also with the subject of naval and military forces. Perhaps the most important exemption in the case of Ireland is that of trade, trade-marks, designs, merchandise marks and patent rights. I cannot help regretting that, inasmuch as the principle has been adopted of giving Ireland general and unenumerated powers, the number of specific exemptions has not been enlarged. It is highly desirable to avoid conflict of laws in the United Kingdom as far as possible. It must be remembered that the Statute Book has, quite apart from the Act[pg 029]of Union, bound Ireland to England by many legislative ties; there is a uniform system of industrial, commercial, and, to some extent, criminal law for the whole of these Islands—Factory Acts, Companies Acts, the law of negotiable instruments, criminal procedure, old-age pensions, and insurance legislation; in all these there is legislative standardization, and the tendency of all modern political unions, notably those of the Australian Commonwealth and the German Empire, is in this direction. Confusion, injustice, and economic inequalities constantly occur in a modern State whose inhabitants are living under a“conflict of laws.”Fiscal considerations point the same way. It may be safely assumed that English opinion will not tolerate any considerable divergence between the fiscal systems of England and Ireland. Moreover, financial considerations apart, the regulation of“trade”is, as in every political union, reserved for the central legislature. But to distinguish between“trade”on the one hand and“industry”on the other is not an easy problem, and Ireland may discriminate against England only less effectively by lowering the standard of the Factory Acts than by a tariff.The“subject matter”of the Old Age Pensions Acts, National Insurance Acts, and Labour Exchanges Acts has, it is true, been excluded. It seems regrettable that the category is not enlarged to include the Companies Acts, the Sale of Goods Act, the Bills of Exchange Act, and the Factory Acts. It would be highly undesirable to have the“industrial minimum”for the United Kingdom, so laboriously attained by our factory legislation, lowered in the interests of particular interests in Ireland. The advantages of securing uniformity by the inclusion of the three great statutes relating to commercial law is also very obvious. Two of them, indeed,[pg 030]represent a great step in that codification of English law which is the dream of English jurists, they have been adopted as a model in some of our colonies, and it would seem highly desirable that the standard thus attained should remain fixed. In urging this, I do not forget what I have already said, in connection with the subject of constitutional limitations, as to the undesirability of exacting too rigid a degree of uniformity in English and Irish legislation, but constitutional limitations are one thing and exceptions quite another. It is very difficult to subject the whole field of Irish legislation to juristic principles, but it is comparatively easy to exempt from that field the subject matter of particular Acts. The whole question resolves itself into a consideration of the point at which uniformity should be determined. The Bill seems to fix the point much too low.Of course, one way of dealing with the question would have been to grant Ireland only particular and enumerated powers of legislation, as has been done in the case of the provincial legislatures of Canada. There is much to be said for this. It seems the line of least resistance; it is always easier to add to powers which appear deficient than to withdraw powers which have proved excessive. But it undoubtedly invites litigation and it is very difficult, if not impossible, to define what are exclusively Irish matters without in the last resort using some such general term (as is used in the British North America Act) as“generally all matters of a merely local nature.”The great economy shown by the draughtsman in the number of the exceptions from the powers of the Irish legislature, as well as in the number of the restrictions upon the exercise of those powers, means, as we have already indicated, that the whole weight of control[pg 031]over the Irish legislature is thrown upon the executive and legislative veto of the Imperial Government. Is it sufficient to rely upon the paramount power of the Imperial Parliament to override by statute Irish legislation which may be inequitable or inexpedient, and upon the exercise of the veto of the Imperial Government? These checks are the exercise of aforce majeure, which is often invidious and always difficult. Above all they are political. The exercise of them depends on the party in power in Great Britain, and as such it may excite resentment among the Irish people as an invasion of the autonomy granted to them. On the other hand, exceptions and restrictions are a legal, not a political, check—they operate through the agency of the courts of law without the intervention of political considerations. Moreover—and this perhaps is the most important consideration—they rest upon the consent of the Irish people expressed in the terms of the Home Rule Act to which their representatives are a party. For an Irish Parliament to defy them would be to defy the very Act which was the charter of its existence. But they invite litigation. It all resolves itself into a question of hitting the mean between the dangers of litigation on the one hand and of political pressure on the other. Probably, however, the occasions of conflict will be few and unimportant, and the temper of the Irish Parliament may be much more conservative than its critics imagine.

The enumeration of matters in respect of which the Irish Parliament shall have no power to make laws is a little deceptive, inasmuch as many of the matters so enumerated would have been outside its power in any case. Ireland is not, so long as the Act of Union remains on the Statute Book, a sovereign state, and“the making of peace or war”and the negotiation of[pg 028]treaties would, as a matter of international law, have been impossible in her case, even if they had not been expressly prohibited.“Merchant shipping”and“the return of fugitive offenders”would also have been excluded from her authority by the rule of law43which precludes a subordinate legislature from extra-territorial legislation. The same may be said of Copyright. The colonies have only been enabled to deal with these matters in virtue of clauses in Acts of the Imperial Parliament.44But it would not be true to say that the position of the Irish Parliament is assimilated to that of the legislature of a self-governing colony. The exclusion of subjects relating to allegiance, such as naturalization45and treason,46and of legislation as to aliens is exceptional. All the self-governing colonies have power to deal with these matters, as also with the subject of naval and military forces. Perhaps the most important exemption in the case of Ireland is that of trade, trade-marks, designs, merchandise marks and patent rights. I cannot help regretting that, inasmuch as the principle has been adopted of giving Ireland general and unenumerated powers, the number of specific exemptions has not been enlarged. It is highly desirable to avoid conflict of laws in the United Kingdom as far as possible. It must be remembered that the Statute Book has, quite apart from the Act[pg 029]of Union, bound Ireland to England by many legislative ties; there is a uniform system of industrial, commercial, and, to some extent, criminal law for the whole of these Islands—Factory Acts, Companies Acts, the law of negotiable instruments, criminal procedure, old-age pensions, and insurance legislation; in all these there is legislative standardization, and the tendency of all modern political unions, notably those of the Australian Commonwealth and the German Empire, is in this direction. Confusion, injustice, and economic inequalities constantly occur in a modern State whose inhabitants are living under a“conflict of laws.”Fiscal considerations point the same way. It may be safely assumed that English opinion will not tolerate any considerable divergence between the fiscal systems of England and Ireland. Moreover, financial considerations apart, the regulation of“trade”is, as in every political union, reserved for the central legislature. But to distinguish between“trade”on the one hand and“industry”on the other is not an easy problem, and Ireland may discriminate against England only less effectively by lowering the standard of the Factory Acts than by a tariff.

The“subject matter”of the Old Age Pensions Acts, National Insurance Acts, and Labour Exchanges Acts has, it is true, been excluded. It seems regrettable that the category is not enlarged to include the Companies Acts, the Sale of Goods Act, the Bills of Exchange Act, and the Factory Acts. It would be highly undesirable to have the“industrial minimum”for the United Kingdom, so laboriously attained by our factory legislation, lowered in the interests of particular interests in Ireland. The advantages of securing uniformity by the inclusion of the three great statutes relating to commercial law is also very obvious. Two of them, indeed,[pg 030]represent a great step in that codification of English law which is the dream of English jurists, they have been adopted as a model in some of our colonies, and it would seem highly desirable that the standard thus attained should remain fixed. In urging this, I do not forget what I have already said, in connection with the subject of constitutional limitations, as to the undesirability of exacting too rigid a degree of uniformity in English and Irish legislation, but constitutional limitations are one thing and exceptions quite another. It is very difficult to subject the whole field of Irish legislation to juristic principles, but it is comparatively easy to exempt from that field the subject matter of particular Acts. The whole question resolves itself into a consideration of the point at which uniformity should be determined. The Bill seems to fix the point much too low.

Of course, one way of dealing with the question would have been to grant Ireland only particular and enumerated powers of legislation, as has been done in the case of the provincial legislatures of Canada. There is much to be said for this. It seems the line of least resistance; it is always easier to add to powers which appear deficient than to withdraw powers which have proved excessive. But it undoubtedly invites litigation and it is very difficult, if not impossible, to define what are exclusively Irish matters without in the last resort using some such general term (as is used in the British North America Act) as“generally all matters of a merely local nature.”

The great economy shown by the draughtsman in the number of the exceptions from the powers of the Irish legislature, as well as in the number of the restrictions upon the exercise of those powers, means, as we have already indicated, that the whole weight of control[pg 031]over the Irish legislature is thrown upon the executive and legislative veto of the Imperial Government. Is it sufficient to rely upon the paramount power of the Imperial Parliament to override by statute Irish legislation which may be inequitable or inexpedient, and upon the exercise of the veto of the Imperial Government? These checks are the exercise of aforce majeure, which is often invidious and always difficult. Above all they are political. The exercise of them depends on the party in power in Great Britain, and as such it may excite resentment among the Irish people as an invasion of the autonomy granted to them. On the other hand, exceptions and restrictions are a legal, not a political, check—they operate through the agency of the courts of law without the intervention of political considerations. Moreover—and this perhaps is the most important consideration—they rest upon the consent of the Irish people expressed in the terms of the Home Rule Act to which their representatives are a party. For an Irish Parliament to defy them would be to defy the very Act which was the charter of its existence. But they invite litigation. It all resolves itself into a question of hitting the mean between the dangers of litigation on the one hand and of political pressure on the other. Probably, however, the occasions of conflict will be few and unimportant, and the temper of the Irish Parliament may be much more conservative than its critics imagine.

The ExecutiveThe new Bill is remarkable for the explicitness with which it invests Ireland with control over the Executive. For the first time in the written constitutions of the Empire we have a statutory Executive, and not only[pg 032]is it a statutory Executive, but it is to be a Parliamentary Executive defined by statute. In the earlier Bills nothing was more remarkable than the brevity and allusiveness with which this question of the Government of Ireland was treated.“The Executive power in Ireland shall continue vested in Her Majesty the Queen”was the language employed in the Bill of 1893. Under that Bill the Government of Ireland would have continued, even after its passage into law, to be in the hands of the English Cabinet and it would have rested with that Cabinet to determine how large or how small a part of the prerogatives of the Crown should be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant. Paradoxical as it may seem, it would have been quite possible for a Unionist Government, coming into power immediately after the Home Rule Bill had passed into law and an Irish Parliament had met at Dublin, to retain in their own hands the Executive authority in Ireland without any breach of statutory obligations. The Bills of 1886 and 1893 left it in the discretion of the Crown to decide what the powers of the Lord-Lieutenant should be. Following Colonial precedents, the Constitution would have had to be supplemented47by prerogative legislation in the shape of Letters Patent defining those powers. Moreover, these powers were to have been vested not in the Lord-Lieutenant in Council, but in the Lord-Lieutenant alone. Something was indeed, said about an“Executive Committee”of the Irish Privy Council to aid and advise in the Government of Ireland—this was the only hint of responsible Government that the Bill contained—but nothing was said of the powers or[pg 033]constitution of the Committee nor of the extent to which the Lord-Lieutenant was bound to act on its advice. Its constitution was left to the discretion of Her Majesty. Its powers would, of course, as in the case of the Colonies, have been decided by the tacit adoption of the unwritten conventions of the English Constitution that the advisers of the Governor must command the confidence of the Legislature which votes supplies.Very different is our new Bill. The Executive power does indeed continue“vested in His Majesty the King,”and nothing is to affect its exercise—in other words, it is to continue in the hands of the Imperial Government—except“as respects Irish services as defined for the purpose of this Act.”The exception is a new departure and the general effect of the whole clause (Clause IV.) is expressly to hand over in statutory terms“all public services in connection with the administration of the Government of Ireland”except the reserved services and such services as those in regard to which the Irish Parliament have no power to make laws. The effect of this is to hand over an executive authority co-extensive with the legislative authority.48Moreover, in regard to Irish services, the Executive power is to be exercised by the Lord-LieutenantthroughIrish Departments, and the heads of these Departments are given the Parliamentary title of“Ministers”and, what is more remarkable, it is expressly provided (a provision[pg 034]to be found in only one or two, and those the latest, of our Colonial Constitutions) that:“No such person shall hold office as an Irish Minister for a longer period than six months, unless he is or becomes a member of one of the Houses of the Irish Parliament.”Never in any constitution that emanated from the practised hand of the Parliamentary draughtsman has there been such a complete transfer in express statutory terms of the executive power. Taken together with the comparatively unrestricted grant of legislative power, it constitutes a grant of a larger measure of self-government than is to be found in any of the earlier Bills.At the same time there is here no cause for alarm. It must be remembered that the Lord-Lieutenant will exist in a dual capacity—like a constitutional king he will be bound in Irish matters to act on the advice of his Irish Ministers but, like a Colonial governor, he will also in all Imperial matters be bound to obey the instructions of the Imperial Government. In regard to legislation the position here is quite clear: he may veto measures which his own Ministers have promoted if the Imperial Government think it advisable so to instruct him. In regard to the executive, he will, of course, enjoy less latitude; it is quite clear that the Imperial Government will, under this clause, find it practically impossible to interfere in purely Irish administration. The Irish Government will, of course, be carried on in the name of the Crown, and it will enjoy the same prerogatives at common law as the Imperial Government in such matters as the use of the prerogative writsmandamusandcertiorari, and the immunity from actions in tort. Ireland has its own Petitions of Right Act.At the same time a distinction must be drawn between the prerogatives relating to the exercise of Irish[pg 035]services and prerogatives which cannot be so defined. Some of the latter may be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant by his patent, and these he will exercise not on the advice of the Irish, but of the Imperial, Government. Moreover, there are certain powers conferred by statute on the Lord-Lieutenant, or the Lord-Lieutenant in Council, such as the power of proclaiming disaffected districts under the Crimes Act, of suspending the operation of the Irish Habeas Corpus Act, and of controlling the constabulary, not all49of which will be exercisable on the advice of Irish Ministers. Prerogatives not so exercisable will no doubt be exercised on the advice of the Secretary of State for Home Affairs who is even now the medium of formal communications between the Lord-Lieutenant and the Crown. The Chief Secretary50will, of course, disappear altogether; he will be replaced by the Executive Committee. The Lord-Lieutenant will, of course, cease to be a member of the English Ministry; his position will be assimilated to that of a Colonial Governor, and his tenure fixed for a term of years so as to make his tenure of office independent, as it must be in the exercise of his new constitutional duties, of the fortunes of English Parties.

The new Bill is remarkable for the explicitness with which it invests Ireland with control over the Executive. For the first time in the written constitutions of the Empire we have a statutory Executive, and not only[pg 032]is it a statutory Executive, but it is to be a Parliamentary Executive defined by statute. In the earlier Bills nothing was more remarkable than the brevity and allusiveness with which this question of the Government of Ireland was treated.“The Executive power in Ireland shall continue vested in Her Majesty the Queen”was the language employed in the Bill of 1893. Under that Bill the Government of Ireland would have continued, even after its passage into law, to be in the hands of the English Cabinet and it would have rested with that Cabinet to determine how large or how small a part of the prerogatives of the Crown should be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant. Paradoxical as it may seem, it would have been quite possible for a Unionist Government, coming into power immediately after the Home Rule Bill had passed into law and an Irish Parliament had met at Dublin, to retain in their own hands the Executive authority in Ireland without any breach of statutory obligations. The Bills of 1886 and 1893 left it in the discretion of the Crown to decide what the powers of the Lord-Lieutenant should be. Following Colonial precedents, the Constitution would have had to be supplemented47by prerogative legislation in the shape of Letters Patent defining those powers. Moreover, these powers were to have been vested not in the Lord-Lieutenant in Council, but in the Lord-Lieutenant alone. Something was indeed, said about an“Executive Committee”of the Irish Privy Council to aid and advise in the Government of Ireland—this was the only hint of responsible Government that the Bill contained—but nothing was said of the powers or[pg 033]constitution of the Committee nor of the extent to which the Lord-Lieutenant was bound to act on its advice. Its constitution was left to the discretion of Her Majesty. Its powers would, of course, as in the case of the Colonies, have been decided by the tacit adoption of the unwritten conventions of the English Constitution that the advisers of the Governor must command the confidence of the Legislature which votes supplies.

Very different is our new Bill. The Executive power does indeed continue“vested in His Majesty the King,”and nothing is to affect its exercise—in other words, it is to continue in the hands of the Imperial Government—except“as respects Irish services as defined for the purpose of this Act.”The exception is a new departure and the general effect of the whole clause (Clause IV.) is expressly to hand over in statutory terms“all public services in connection with the administration of the Government of Ireland”except the reserved services and such services as those in regard to which the Irish Parliament have no power to make laws. The effect of this is to hand over an executive authority co-extensive with the legislative authority.48Moreover, in regard to Irish services, the Executive power is to be exercised by the Lord-LieutenantthroughIrish Departments, and the heads of these Departments are given the Parliamentary title of“Ministers”and, what is more remarkable, it is expressly provided (a provision[pg 034]to be found in only one or two, and those the latest, of our Colonial Constitutions) that:

“No such person shall hold office as an Irish Minister for a longer period than six months, unless he is or becomes a member of one of the Houses of the Irish Parliament.”

Never in any constitution that emanated from the practised hand of the Parliamentary draughtsman has there been such a complete transfer in express statutory terms of the executive power. Taken together with the comparatively unrestricted grant of legislative power, it constitutes a grant of a larger measure of self-government than is to be found in any of the earlier Bills.

At the same time there is here no cause for alarm. It must be remembered that the Lord-Lieutenant will exist in a dual capacity—like a constitutional king he will be bound in Irish matters to act on the advice of his Irish Ministers but, like a Colonial governor, he will also in all Imperial matters be bound to obey the instructions of the Imperial Government. In regard to legislation the position here is quite clear: he may veto measures which his own Ministers have promoted if the Imperial Government think it advisable so to instruct him. In regard to the executive, he will, of course, enjoy less latitude; it is quite clear that the Imperial Government will, under this clause, find it practically impossible to interfere in purely Irish administration. The Irish Government will, of course, be carried on in the name of the Crown, and it will enjoy the same prerogatives at common law as the Imperial Government in such matters as the use of the prerogative writsmandamusandcertiorari, and the immunity from actions in tort. Ireland has its own Petitions of Right Act.

At the same time a distinction must be drawn between the prerogatives relating to the exercise of Irish[pg 035]services and prerogatives which cannot be so defined. Some of the latter may be delegated to the Lord-Lieutenant by his patent, and these he will exercise not on the advice of the Irish, but of the Imperial, Government. Moreover, there are certain powers conferred by statute on the Lord-Lieutenant, or the Lord-Lieutenant in Council, such as the power of proclaiming disaffected districts under the Crimes Act, of suspending the operation of the Irish Habeas Corpus Act, and of controlling the constabulary, not all49of which will be exercisable on the advice of Irish Ministers. Prerogatives not so exercisable will no doubt be exercised on the advice of the Secretary of State for Home Affairs who is even now the medium of formal communications between the Lord-Lieutenant and the Crown. The Chief Secretary50will, of course, disappear altogether; he will be replaced by the Executive Committee. The Lord-Lieutenant will, of course, cease to be a member of the English Ministry; his position will be assimilated to that of a Colonial Governor, and his tenure fixed for a term of years so as to make his tenure of office independent, as it must be in the exercise of his new constitutional duties, of the fortunes of English Parties.

The Irish LegislatureThe constitution of the legislature itself calls for little comment. It follows with some fidelity the features[pg 036]of Mr. Gladstone's Bills, but the substitution of a nominated Senate for the“Council”or“Order”elected on a property franchise is a new departure. Nomination of late has fallen into some discredit both in theory and in practice.51Colonial experience is not encouraging. Nomination by the Crown means in practice nomination by the Governor, on the advice of the Cabinet of the day, and Ministries in Canada and New South Wales have put this prerogative to such partizan uses as to reduce the Upper House to a very servile condition. When nomination is for life and not for a fixed term of years the evils of this system may be mitigated, but they are not removed. The one thing that can be said about the proposed Senate is that its powers in legislation are of such a limited character that an Irish Executive would be under little temptation to“pack”it. A Senate of only forty members compelled to meet in joint session a House of Commons of 164 members every second time that it rejects or objectionably amends a bill is not likely to prove a very formidable obstacle to legislation. But the nomination by the Executive is in any case somewhat objectionable, and it would seem better to provide that at the end of the first term of eight years the Senators should be appointed by some system of election, whether on a basis of proportional representation or otherwise.52But[pg 037]to their nomination for the first term by the Imperial Government I see no very cogent objection. Indeed, the expedient has much to be said for it, for the discretion, if wisely exercised, will enable the Imperial Government not only to secure to Irish minorities a degree of representation which no conceivable system of election could secure, but also to appoint men of moderate opinions—one immediately thinks of Sir Horace Plunkett—who, in the strife of extremists, might have no chance of election by either party. It has been argued in some quarters that a Second Chamber is wholly unnecessary, and the example of the single-chamber legislatures in some of the Canadian provinces has been cited. The argument, however, overlooks one really important function of the Senate, namely its duty to provide for the security of tenure of the Irish judges. Clause XXVII. provides that judges appointed after the passing of the Act shall only be removable on an Address of both Houses of the Irish Parliament, and, should the Senate refuse to concur in a demand by the lower House for the removal of a judge, there is no such means of overcoming its resistance in a joint session as is the case with legislation. This is well.There is one provision in the Bill53which will serve to strengthen the position of the Senate as an advisory body and may operate to give it an initiative in the introduction of Government legislation—the provision which enables an Irish Minister who is a member of either House to sit and to speak in both Houses. This is a practice common on the Continent, and not wholly unknown[pg 038]in the case of some of our Colonial Constitutions, and it has much to commend it. The Senate is placed under the same disabilities as to money bills as are imposed on the House of Lords by the Parliament Act. Thereby it is placed in an inferior position to that of most of the Second Chambers in the Colonies, all of which can reject, and some of which may also amend, money bills. The disability is the less surprising having regard to its character as a nominee body—it is when the Second Chambers of the Colonies are elective, that their powers in regard to money bills are considerable.54The privileges of the Imperial Parliament are conferred by the Government of Ireland Bill upon the Irish Parliament. In the absence of such grant the Irish Parliament would not have had such privileges—although it might have adopted them by legislation—for thelex et consuetudo Parliamentiare not implied in the grant of a constitution.55It is not uncommon to prescribe in Colonial Constitutions that the legislature shall have such privileges as are enjoyed by the House of Commons at the time of grant. In the present case, the Irish Parliament may define its privileges, if it thinks fit, by legislation, though it is difficult to imagine any occasion for its doing so. The really important thing is that it cannot enlarge those privileges beyond the scope of the privileges of the Imperial Parliament. This is the one constitutional limitation in the Bill—apart from the“safeguards”as to legislation in regard to religion and marriage contained in Clause III.—and it is by no means unimportant. The powers of the Imperial Parliament—particularly as to the right[pg 039]of the two Houses to commit for contempt without cause shewn—are a sufficiently high standard.

The constitution of the legislature itself calls for little comment. It follows with some fidelity the features[pg 036]of Mr. Gladstone's Bills, but the substitution of a nominated Senate for the“Council”or“Order”elected on a property franchise is a new departure. Nomination of late has fallen into some discredit both in theory and in practice.51Colonial experience is not encouraging. Nomination by the Crown means in practice nomination by the Governor, on the advice of the Cabinet of the day, and Ministries in Canada and New South Wales have put this prerogative to such partizan uses as to reduce the Upper House to a very servile condition. When nomination is for life and not for a fixed term of years the evils of this system may be mitigated, but they are not removed. The one thing that can be said about the proposed Senate is that its powers in legislation are of such a limited character that an Irish Executive would be under little temptation to“pack”it. A Senate of only forty members compelled to meet in joint session a House of Commons of 164 members every second time that it rejects or objectionably amends a bill is not likely to prove a very formidable obstacle to legislation. But the nomination by the Executive is in any case somewhat objectionable, and it would seem better to provide that at the end of the first term of eight years the Senators should be appointed by some system of election, whether on a basis of proportional representation or otherwise.52But[pg 037]to their nomination for the first term by the Imperial Government I see no very cogent objection. Indeed, the expedient has much to be said for it, for the discretion, if wisely exercised, will enable the Imperial Government not only to secure to Irish minorities a degree of representation which no conceivable system of election could secure, but also to appoint men of moderate opinions—one immediately thinks of Sir Horace Plunkett—who, in the strife of extremists, might have no chance of election by either party. It has been argued in some quarters that a Second Chamber is wholly unnecessary, and the example of the single-chamber legislatures in some of the Canadian provinces has been cited. The argument, however, overlooks one really important function of the Senate, namely its duty to provide for the security of tenure of the Irish judges. Clause XXVII. provides that judges appointed after the passing of the Act shall only be removable on an Address of both Houses of the Irish Parliament, and, should the Senate refuse to concur in a demand by the lower House for the removal of a judge, there is no such means of overcoming its resistance in a joint session as is the case with legislation. This is well.

There is one provision in the Bill53which will serve to strengthen the position of the Senate as an advisory body and may operate to give it an initiative in the introduction of Government legislation—the provision which enables an Irish Minister who is a member of either House to sit and to speak in both Houses. This is a practice common on the Continent, and not wholly unknown[pg 038]in the case of some of our Colonial Constitutions, and it has much to commend it. The Senate is placed under the same disabilities as to money bills as are imposed on the House of Lords by the Parliament Act. Thereby it is placed in an inferior position to that of most of the Second Chambers in the Colonies, all of which can reject, and some of which may also amend, money bills. The disability is the less surprising having regard to its character as a nominee body—it is when the Second Chambers of the Colonies are elective, that their powers in regard to money bills are considerable.54

The privileges of the Imperial Parliament are conferred by the Government of Ireland Bill upon the Irish Parliament. In the absence of such grant the Irish Parliament would not have had such privileges—although it might have adopted them by legislation—for thelex et consuetudo Parliamentiare not implied in the grant of a constitution.55It is not uncommon to prescribe in Colonial Constitutions that the legislature shall have such privileges as are enjoyed by the House of Commons at the time of grant. In the present case, the Irish Parliament may define its privileges, if it thinks fit, by legislation, though it is difficult to imagine any occasion for its doing so. The really important thing is that it cannot enlarge those privileges beyond the scope of the privileges of the Imperial Parliament. This is the one constitutional limitation in the Bill—apart from the“safeguards”as to legislation in regard to religion and marriage contained in Clause III.—and it is by no means unimportant. The powers of the Imperial Parliament—particularly as to the right[pg 039]of the two Houses to commit for contempt without cause shewn—are a sufficiently high standard.

Irish Representation in the House of Commons56Irish representation at Westminster has always been the riddle of the Home Rule problem. I have no space to examine here in detail the alternative solutions which were put forward in the earlier Home Rule Bills. But there is one general consideration which must always be borne in mind in the theoretical discussion of any solution. It is the very simple consideration that representation is what mathematicians would call a“function”of legislative power—the one is dependent upon the other. If the legislative powers over Ireland reserved to the Imperial Parliament are large, the representation of Ireland in that Parliament must not be small. It is at this point that Mr. Gladstone's original proposal for total exclusion broke down. He reserved to the Imperial Parliament considerable powers of legislation in regard to Ireland and yet proposed to exercise those powers in the absence of Irish representatives.It was no answer to cite colonial analogies. The Irish problem is not, as I have pointed out elsewhere, a colonial problem. No one at present proposes to give Ireland complete fiscal autonomy, for example. Nor is it strictly apposite to say that the Imperial Parliament legislates for the Colonies in the absence of colonial[pg 040]representatives. Such legislation is now almost exclusively confined to what I may call enabling legislation in matters in which the Colonies, owing to their status as Dependencies, are unable to legislate. In such matters as copyright, merchant shipping, marriage, extradition, the Imperial Parliament legislates for the Colonies largely because colonial laws cannot operate ex-territorially, and such Imperial legislation is usually effected by means of application clauses which enable the Colonies to adopt it or not as they please. But rarely if ever does the Imperial Parliament legislate for a self-governing colony as it has done and will continue to do in the case of such domestic Irish affairs as old-age pensions, land purchase, Customs and Excise, defence, naturalisation, to say nothing perhaps of industrial and commercial law. I have already indicated my opinion in favour of confining these subjects to the Imperial Parliament, but even were the opposite course taken there would still remain the fiscal question. We cannot continue to tax Ireland unless the Irish representatives are to remain at Westminster.The presence of the Irish members at Westminster is imperative if the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is not to be illusory. Mr. Balfour57contends that it will be as illusory as it has been in the case of the Colonies. But the Colonies are not represented in the Imperial Parliament, and to differentiate Ireland in this respect is to make all the difference between a legal formula and a political fact.There remains the question of inclusion. No one would question the propriety of reducing Irish representation to its true proportions on a population basis—in other words, from its present figure of 103 to one of 70. The real difficulty arises when we consider[pg 041]whether those members, whatever their numbers, are to attend at Westminster in the same capacity as the British members. We are to-day confronted by the same problem as that which vexed the Parliament of 1893: are Irish members to vote upon all occasions or only upon those occasions when exclusively Irish and exclusively Imperial affairs are under discussion? The original text of the 1893 Bill adopted the latter solution. At first it has much to commend it, for it avoids—or attempts to avoid—the anomaly of refusing self-government to Great Britain while granting it to Ireland: if Irish members are to govern themselves at Dublin without the interference of Englishmen, why, it has been pertinently asked, should not the converse hold good at Westminster? But two very grave difficulties stand in the way; one is the difficulty of distinguishing between Irish and non-Irish business at Westminster; the other is the difficulty, even when such distinction is made, of maintaining a single majority under such circumstances. Withdraw the Irish members on certain occasions and you might convert a Liberal majority at Westminster on certain days into a Unionist majority on other days. A Liberal Government might have responsibility without power in British matters and a Unionist Opposition power without responsibility. One Executive could not co-exist with two majorities. Such a state of affairs might have been conceivable some seventy or eighty years ago, when Ministries were not regarded as responsible for the passage of legislation into law. It would be conceivable in France, where Ministries come and go and the Deputies remain. But it would be fatal to the Cabinet system as we know it.Another objection to the“in-and-out”plan is the extreme difficulty of classifying the business of the[pg 042]House of Commons in such a way as to distinguish between what is“Irish”and what is not. If that business were purely legislative the difficulty would not be so great, but the House controls administration as well as legislation. Any question involving a vote of confidence in the Cabinet might legitimately be regarded as a matter in which the Irish members had a right to have a voice. The motion for the adjournment of the House, following on an unsatisfactory answer by a Minister, might be regarded as such. Who would decide these things? The Bill of 1893 provided for their determination by the House. In that event the Irish members would presumably have had a voice in determining on what subjects they should or should not vote, and they would have been masters of the situation under all circumstances. By their power to determine the fate of Imperial Ministries they might have determined the exercise of the Imperial veto on Irish legislation and reduced it to a nullity. It may, indeed, be urged that the Irish vote often dominates the situation at Westminster even under present circumstances, but it must be remembered that it is now exercised in the consistent support of the same administration, whereas under an“in-and-out”system its action might be capricious and apt to be determined solely by Irish exigencies of the moment.There remains the plan of the inclusion of Irish members for all purposes. This at least has the advantage of simplicity. If Irishmen constantly attended at Westminster without distinction of voting capacity they would be less likely to regard their presence there as an instrument for reducing to impotence the exercise of the Imperial veto upon Irish legislation. It is quite conceivable, indeed, that once Home Rule is granted Irishmen will be Imperialists at Westminster without[pg 043]becoming Nationalists at Dublin—the natural conservatism of the Irish character may reassert itself. Close observers of Irish thought are inclined to believe that the grant of Home Rule will act as a great solvent in Irish political life, and that with the iron discipline of Nationalism relaxed, and its cherished object attained, lines of cleavage, social, economic, and industrial, will appear in Ireland and vastly change the distribution of Irish parties both at Dublin and at Westminster. Ulster“Unionists”may be found voting with a Liberal Government on education questions and Irish“Nationalists”against it. Irish representatives at Westminster may become more, rather than less, closely identified with British interests. And it should be remembered that it would be no new thing for members from one part of the United Kingdom to be voting on measures which solely concerned another part of the Kingdom. This is happening every day. As Mr. Walker points out elsewhere, a process of legislative disintegration has been going on within the walls of the Imperial Parliament itself, which is already being forced to legislate separately for the three separate parts of the United Kingdom. He estimates that during the last twenty years no less than 49.7 per cent. of the public general Acts have applied only to some one part of the United Kingdom instead of to the whole.The Government of Ireland Bill adopts the principle of total inclusion, but qualifies the anomaly which is involved in the presence of Irish members voting on non-Irish questions by reducing the representation of Ireland to the number of forty-two, and thus to a figure far below that to which Ireland is entitled on the basis of population. At the same time it must be admitted that the anomaly is not thereby removed. The position of Irish members voting on purely English legislation[pg 044]after the grant of Home Rule will indeed—numbers apart—be more anomalous than it was before it. An anomaly can be tolerated so long as it is universal in its operation, and Scotch and English members can at present view with equanimity the spectacle of Irish members voting in their own affairs so long as they themselves exercise the same privilege in those of their neighbours. Reciprocity of this kind produces a certain unity of thought in a deliberative assembly. But the anomaly at once becomes invidious if Irishmen are placed in a privileged position. It is perhaps more theoretical than real, as the actual weight that could be thrown into the scale of the division lobby by a Nationalist majority (taking the present balance of parties in Ireland) of about twenty-six cannot be considerable, even if, as is very doubtful, it were consistently exercised.Still the anomaly remains. Is it possible to meet it by some extension of Home Rule to the legislative affairs of England and Scotland?

Irish representation at Westminster has always been the riddle of the Home Rule problem. I have no space to examine here in detail the alternative solutions which were put forward in the earlier Home Rule Bills. But there is one general consideration which must always be borne in mind in the theoretical discussion of any solution. It is the very simple consideration that representation is what mathematicians would call a“function”of legislative power—the one is dependent upon the other. If the legislative powers over Ireland reserved to the Imperial Parliament are large, the representation of Ireland in that Parliament must not be small. It is at this point that Mr. Gladstone's original proposal for total exclusion broke down. He reserved to the Imperial Parliament considerable powers of legislation in regard to Ireland and yet proposed to exercise those powers in the absence of Irish representatives.

It was no answer to cite colonial analogies. The Irish problem is not, as I have pointed out elsewhere, a colonial problem. No one at present proposes to give Ireland complete fiscal autonomy, for example. Nor is it strictly apposite to say that the Imperial Parliament legislates for the Colonies in the absence of colonial[pg 040]representatives. Such legislation is now almost exclusively confined to what I may call enabling legislation in matters in which the Colonies, owing to their status as Dependencies, are unable to legislate. In such matters as copyright, merchant shipping, marriage, extradition, the Imperial Parliament legislates for the Colonies largely because colonial laws cannot operate ex-territorially, and such Imperial legislation is usually effected by means of application clauses which enable the Colonies to adopt it or not as they please. But rarely if ever does the Imperial Parliament legislate for a self-governing colony as it has done and will continue to do in the case of such domestic Irish affairs as old-age pensions, land purchase, Customs and Excise, defence, naturalisation, to say nothing perhaps of industrial and commercial law. I have already indicated my opinion in favour of confining these subjects to the Imperial Parliament, but even were the opposite course taken there would still remain the fiscal question. We cannot continue to tax Ireland unless the Irish representatives are to remain at Westminster.

The presence of the Irish members at Westminster is imperative if the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament is not to be illusory. Mr. Balfour57contends that it will be as illusory as it has been in the case of the Colonies. But the Colonies are not represented in the Imperial Parliament, and to differentiate Ireland in this respect is to make all the difference between a legal formula and a political fact.

There remains the question of inclusion. No one would question the propriety of reducing Irish representation to its true proportions on a population basis—in other words, from its present figure of 103 to one of 70. The real difficulty arises when we consider[pg 041]whether those members, whatever their numbers, are to attend at Westminster in the same capacity as the British members. We are to-day confronted by the same problem as that which vexed the Parliament of 1893: are Irish members to vote upon all occasions or only upon those occasions when exclusively Irish and exclusively Imperial affairs are under discussion? The original text of the 1893 Bill adopted the latter solution. At first it has much to commend it, for it avoids—or attempts to avoid—the anomaly of refusing self-government to Great Britain while granting it to Ireland: if Irish members are to govern themselves at Dublin without the interference of Englishmen, why, it has been pertinently asked, should not the converse hold good at Westminster? But two very grave difficulties stand in the way; one is the difficulty of distinguishing between Irish and non-Irish business at Westminster; the other is the difficulty, even when such distinction is made, of maintaining a single majority under such circumstances. Withdraw the Irish members on certain occasions and you might convert a Liberal majority at Westminster on certain days into a Unionist majority on other days. A Liberal Government might have responsibility without power in British matters and a Unionist Opposition power without responsibility. One Executive could not co-exist with two majorities. Such a state of affairs might have been conceivable some seventy or eighty years ago, when Ministries were not regarded as responsible for the passage of legislation into law. It would be conceivable in France, where Ministries come and go and the Deputies remain. But it would be fatal to the Cabinet system as we know it.

Another objection to the“in-and-out”plan is the extreme difficulty of classifying the business of the[pg 042]House of Commons in such a way as to distinguish between what is“Irish”and what is not. If that business were purely legislative the difficulty would not be so great, but the House controls administration as well as legislation. Any question involving a vote of confidence in the Cabinet might legitimately be regarded as a matter in which the Irish members had a right to have a voice. The motion for the adjournment of the House, following on an unsatisfactory answer by a Minister, might be regarded as such. Who would decide these things? The Bill of 1893 provided for their determination by the House. In that event the Irish members would presumably have had a voice in determining on what subjects they should or should not vote, and they would have been masters of the situation under all circumstances. By their power to determine the fate of Imperial Ministries they might have determined the exercise of the Imperial veto on Irish legislation and reduced it to a nullity. It may, indeed, be urged that the Irish vote often dominates the situation at Westminster even under present circumstances, but it must be remembered that it is now exercised in the consistent support of the same administration, whereas under an“in-and-out”system its action might be capricious and apt to be determined solely by Irish exigencies of the moment.

There remains the plan of the inclusion of Irish members for all purposes. This at least has the advantage of simplicity. If Irishmen constantly attended at Westminster without distinction of voting capacity they would be less likely to regard their presence there as an instrument for reducing to impotence the exercise of the Imperial veto upon Irish legislation. It is quite conceivable, indeed, that once Home Rule is granted Irishmen will be Imperialists at Westminster without[pg 043]becoming Nationalists at Dublin—the natural conservatism of the Irish character may reassert itself. Close observers of Irish thought are inclined to believe that the grant of Home Rule will act as a great solvent in Irish political life, and that with the iron discipline of Nationalism relaxed, and its cherished object attained, lines of cleavage, social, economic, and industrial, will appear in Ireland and vastly change the distribution of Irish parties both at Dublin and at Westminster. Ulster“Unionists”may be found voting with a Liberal Government on education questions and Irish“Nationalists”against it. Irish representatives at Westminster may become more, rather than less, closely identified with British interests. And it should be remembered that it would be no new thing for members from one part of the United Kingdom to be voting on measures which solely concerned another part of the Kingdom. This is happening every day. As Mr. Walker points out elsewhere, a process of legislative disintegration has been going on within the walls of the Imperial Parliament itself, which is already being forced to legislate separately for the three separate parts of the United Kingdom. He estimates that during the last twenty years no less than 49.7 per cent. of the public general Acts have applied only to some one part of the United Kingdom instead of to the whole.

The Government of Ireland Bill adopts the principle of total inclusion, but qualifies the anomaly which is involved in the presence of Irish members voting on non-Irish questions by reducing the representation of Ireland to the number of forty-two, and thus to a figure far below that to which Ireland is entitled on the basis of population. At the same time it must be admitted that the anomaly is not thereby removed. The position of Irish members voting on purely English legislation[pg 044]after the grant of Home Rule will indeed—numbers apart—be more anomalous than it was before it. An anomaly can be tolerated so long as it is universal in its operation, and Scotch and English members can at present view with equanimity the spectacle of Irish members voting in their own affairs so long as they themselves exercise the same privilege in those of their neighbours. Reciprocity of this kind produces a certain unity of thought in a deliberative assembly. But the anomaly at once becomes invidious if Irishmen are placed in a privileged position. It is perhaps more theoretical than real, as the actual weight that could be thrown into the scale of the division lobby by a Nationalist majority (taking the present balance of parties in Ireland) of about twenty-six cannot be considerable, even if, as is very doubtful, it were consistently exercised.

Still the anomaly remains. Is it possible to meet it by some extension of Home Rule to the legislative affairs of England and Scotland?

The Further Extension of Home RuleThe anomaly, however, remains. How is it to be met? Obviously it is but a temporary difficulty if, as the Prime Minister has suggested in his speech on the first reading, the Bill is to be regarded as but the first step in a general devolution of the legislative powers of the Imperial Parliament. But everything depends on how far that devolution is to be carried. The Prime Minister's reference to a change in the Standing Orders suggests a further development of the Committee system already in operation in the case of the Scottish Standing Committee by which the House has delegated a certain degree of provincial autonomy to a group of members. It would be possible to extend[pg 045]this to the creation of a Standing Committee for England and Wales. Under such a system Irish Members would be excluded from the Committee stages of legislation which was neither Irish nor Imperial. But there remains the Report stage, which is always apt to resolve itself into a Second Committee stage58in which the whole House participates. Moreover, an impassable limit is set to this process of domestic devolution by the necessity that the Government of to-day should command a majority in each of these Committees. A Liberal Ministry would probably find itself in a minority in an English Standing Committee, and a Unionist Ministry would, with equal probability, find itself in a minority in a Scottish Committee. Committees have become not so much a sphere for the legislative initiative of the private member as a new outlet for Government business. Contentious bills introduced or adopted by the Government are referred to them, and the moment this is the case the Minister in charge who is confronted in Committee with amendments which he does not care to accept may invite the whole House on the Report stage of the Bill to disallow them. The House itself, jealous of any surrender of its prerogatives, is only too apt to turn the Report stage into a second Committee stage. The responsibility of a Government department for the preparation and execution of legislation is to-day so indispensable that effective legislative devolution is almost impossible without devolution of the executive also. A Committee to which the Minister in charge of the Bill is not responsible is not in a position to exercise effectual control over legislation. Indeed it seems impossible to contemplate a devolution of legislative power without a[pg 046]corresponding devolution of executive power. So long as we have but one Executive in the House of Commons it is impossible to have two or three legislatures within the walls of that House. Moreover, it is just as imperative to restore the diminishing control of members of Parliament over administration as it is to re-establish their authority in legislation. There is a growing and regrettable tendency to confer upon Government departments both legislative and judicial powers—powers to make statutory orders and to interpret them, which is depriving our constitution of what has hitherto been regarded by foreign students as one of its most distinctive features—the subordination of the executive to the legislature and to the courts. The distinction between Gesetz und Verordnung,59between statute and order, is fast disappearing in the enormous volume of statutory orders. Powers to make rules under particular statutes are entrusted to Scotch, Irish, and English Departments which have the effect of diminishing the control of the House of Commons without transferring it to any representative substitute. The great increase of grants-in-aid for administrative purposes has also given the departments a power of indirect legislation by the latitude they enjoy in the distribution of them such as is further calculated to diminish the control of the House of Commons over questions of Irish and Scotch policy. Rarely do any marked departures by the departments come under the review of the House of Commons; the claims of the Government over the time-table of the House, fortified by certain rulings of the Speaker,60[pg 047]may and frequently do preclude any examination of them. In the words of a famous resolution, one may say“the power of the Executive has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished.”But it is no remedy for this state of things to provide for administrative devolution alone. To devolve the authority which a great Department of State, such as the Board of Agriculture, exercises over the whole of Great Britain by the simple process of assigning its Scotch business to the Secretary for Scotland, does not increase the control of Scottish members over the executive. This process of administrative devolution, which is always going on, is not accompanied by any measure of legislative devolution; the Secretary for Scotland is not thereby brought under the control of the Scotch Standing Committee.To create a new Scottish or Irish Department does not increase Parliamentary control over Scottish or Irish administration; rather it diminishes it. The heads of a Scottish Education Office, Local Government Board, and Department of Agriculture have been made responsible not to the House of Commons but to the Secretary for Scotland. Like the Chief Secretary for Ireland, he is a Prime Minister without a Cabinet and without a Legislature, and his policy is determined primarily not by Scottish or Irish opinion, but by the alien issues of imperial politics. Obviously there will never be any remedy for these anomalies until we have a Legislature with an executive responsible to it.

The anomaly, however, remains. How is it to be met? Obviously it is but a temporary difficulty if, as the Prime Minister has suggested in his speech on the first reading, the Bill is to be regarded as but the first step in a general devolution of the legislative powers of the Imperial Parliament. But everything depends on how far that devolution is to be carried. The Prime Minister's reference to a change in the Standing Orders suggests a further development of the Committee system already in operation in the case of the Scottish Standing Committee by which the House has delegated a certain degree of provincial autonomy to a group of members. It would be possible to extend[pg 045]this to the creation of a Standing Committee for England and Wales. Under such a system Irish Members would be excluded from the Committee stages of legislation which was neither Irish nor Imperial. But there remains the Report stage, which is always apt to resolve itself into a Second Committee stage58in which the whole House participates. Moreover, an impassable limit is set to this process of domestic devolution by the necessity that the Government of to-day should command a majority in each of these Committees. A Liberal Ministry would probably find itself in a minority in an English Standing Committee, and a Unionist Ministry would, with equal probability, find itself in a minority in a Scottish Committee. Committees have become not so much a sphere for the legislative initiative of the private member as a new outlet for Government business. Contentious bills introduced or adopted by the Government are referred to them, and the moment this is the case the Minister in charge who is confronted in Committee with amendments which he does not care to accept may invite the whole House on the Report stage of the Bill to disallow them. The House itself, jealous of any surrender of its prerogatives, is only too apt to turn the Report stage into a second Committee stage. The responsibility of a Government department for the preparation and execution of legislation is to-day so indispensable that effective legislative devolution is almost impossible without devolution of the executive also. A Committee to which the Minister in charge of the Bill is not responsible is not in a position to exercise effectual control over legislation. Indeed it seems impossible to contemplate a devolution of legislative power without a[pg 046]corresponding devolution of executive power. So long as we have but one Executive in the House of Commons it is impossible to have two or three legislatures within the walls of that House. Moreover, it is just as imperative to restore the diminishing control of members of Parliament over administration as it is to re-establish their authority in legislation. There is a growing and regrettable tendency to confer upon Government departments both legislative and judicial powers—powers to make statutory orders and to interpret them, which is depriving our constitution of what has hitherto been regarded by foreign students as one of its most distinctive features—the subordination of the executive to the legislature and to the courts. The distinction between Gesetz und Verordnung,59between statute and order, is fast disappearing in the enormous volume of statutory orders. Powers to make rules under particular statutes are entrusted to Scotch, Irish, and English Departments which have the effect of diminishing the control of the House of Commons without transferring it to any representative substitute. The great increase of grants-in-aid for administrative purposes has also given the departments a power of indirect legislation by the latitude they enjoy in the distribution of them such as is further calculated to diminish the control of the House of Commons over questions of Irish and Scotch policy. Rarely do any marked departures by the departments come under the review of the House of Commons; the claims of the Government over the time-table of the House, fortified by certain rulings of the Speaker,60[pg 047]may and frequently do preclude any examination of them. In the words of a famous resolution, one may say“the power of the Executive has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished.”

But it is no remedy for this state of things to provide for administrative devolution alone. To devolve the authority which a great Department of State, such as the Board of Agriculture, exercises over the whole of Great Britain by the simple process of assigning its Scotch business to the Secretary for Scotland, does not increase the control of Scottish members over the executive. This process of administrative devolution, which is always going on, is not accompanied by any measure of legislative devolution; the Secretary for Scotland is not thereby brought under the control of the Scotch Standing Committee.

To create a new Scottish or Irish Department does not increase Parliamentary control over Scottish or Irish administration; rather it diminishes it. The heads of a Scottish Education Office, Local Government Board, and Department of Agriculture have been made responsible not to the House of Commons but to the Secretary for Scotland. Like the Chief Secretary for Ireland, he is a Prime Minister without a Cabinet and without a Legislature, and his policy is determined primarily not by Scottish or Irish opinion, but by the alien issues of imperial politics. Obviously there will never be any remedy for these anomalies until we have a Legislature with an executive responsible to it.

Scottish Home RuleAt the present moment we have in the case of Scotland devolution in a state of arrested development. This process of disintegration is reflected in separate Estimates in finance and in distinct draftsmanship in[pg 048]legislation. In legislation, indeed, marked changes have also taken place under cover of alterations in the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. An itinerant delegation of Scotch members has been set up to deal with private bill procedure in Scotland, and domestic devolution within the walls of the House of Commons has taken the shape of a Scotch Grand Committee. Few or none of these changes have any preconceived relation with the others; they represent experiments framed to meet the exigencies of the moment, but they all bear eloquent witness to a fact which has changed the whole aspect of the Home Rule problem and made that aspect at once more practical and less intimidating—the fact that the House of Commons has found itself increasingly incompetent to do its work. The fact is disguised by a multitude of expedients, all of them, however, amounting to a renunciation of legislative authority. These changes represent thedisjecta membraof Scottish Home Rule—they have no coherence, they point not so much to a solution of the problem as to its recognition.None the less, I think the Irish Government Bill does provide us with a prototype. There is nothing in it, with the exception of the financial clauses, which forbids its adoption in the case of Scotland and of England. But I think, as I have already indicated in another connection, that the category of reserved subjects ought to be considerably enlarged so as to secure the maintenance of the existing uniformity of legislation in commercial and industrial matters. There are, however, undeniable difficulties in the way of an identity of local constitutions. Legislation in regard to land is exempted from the control of the Irish Legislature to an extent which Scotland would hardly be prepared to accept. Control over legislation[pg 049]relating to marriage is retained in the case of Ireland; I doubt if it would be tolerated in Scotland, whose marriage law differs61from that of England to a far greater extent than is the case with the marriage law of Ireland. In common law England and Ireland have the same rules;62it is only in statute law that they differ. In Scotland the common law is radically different. There will, therefore, be some difficulty in finding a common denominator for the Imperial Parliament—and in avoiding, even under“Home Rule All Round”a certain divergence in the legislative capacities of the members from Scotland and Ireland, with the attendant risk of an“in-and-out”procedure.

At the present moment we have in the case of Scotland devolution in a state of arrested development. This process of disintegration is reflected in separate Estimates in finance and in distinct draftsmanship in[pg 048]legislation. In legislation, indeed, marked changes have also taken place under cover of alterations in the Standing Orders of the House of Commons. An itinerant delegation of Scotch members has been set up to deal with private bill procedure in Scotland, and domestic devolution within the walls of the House of Commons has taken the shape of a Scotch Grand Committee. Few or none of these changes have any preconceived relation with the others; they represent experiments framed to meet the exigencies of the moment, but they all bear eloquent witness to a fact which has changed the whole aspect of the Home Rule problem and made that aspect at once more practical and less intimidating—the fact that the House of Commons has found itself increasingly incompetent to do its work. The fact is disguised by a multitude of expedients, all of them, however, amounting to a renunciation of legislative authority. These changes represent thedisjecta membraof Scottish Home Rule—they have no coherence, they point not so much to a solution of the problem as to its recognition.

None the less, I think the Irish Government Bill does provide us with a prototype. There is nothing in it, with the exception of the financial clauses, which forbids its adoption in the case of Scotland and of England. But I think, as I have already indicated in another connection, that the category of reserved subjects ought to be considerably enlarged so as to secure the maintenance of the existing uniformity of legislation in commercial and industrial matters. There are, however, undeniable difficulties in the way of an identity of local constitutions. Legislation in regard to land is exempted from the control of the Irish Legislature to an extent which Scotland would hardly be prepared to accept. Control over legislation[pg 049]relating to marriage is retained in the case of Ireland; I doubt if it would be tolerated in Scotland, whose marriage law differs61from that of England to a far greater extent than is the case with the marriage law of Ireland. In common law England and Ireland have the same rules;62it is only in statute law that they differ. In Scotland the common law is radically different. There will, therefore, be some difficulty in finding a common denominator for the Imperial Parliament—and in avoiding, even under“Home Rule All Round”a certain divergence in the legislative capacities of the members from Scotland and Ireland, with the attendant risk of an“in-and-out”procedure.

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