It is further understood and agreed between the parties hereto that a sale of the property by the party of the first part shall terminate this lease upon six months written notice to the party of the second part; and, in lieu of compensation, it is hereby agreed that the rent shall be waived during the six months notice to vacate.
By deed dated October 15, 1918, proved October 30, 1918, and recorded October 31, 1918, P. Ballentine & Sons conveyed the premisesin question by warranty deed to the plaintiff, subject to the above tenancy. By endorsement dated April 30, 1918, made upon the lease, P. Ballentine & Sons assigned said lease and all of the rights of the lessor thereunder, to the plaintiff.
October 30, 1918, there was served personally upon defendant a notice, dated on that day, signed by both the grantor and the grantee in the deed last mentioned, as follows:
You will please take notice that the premises leased by you from P. Ballentine & Sons by written lease dated the first day of August, 1917, have this day been sold to LaBrecque Company, Inc., and notice of the cancellation of your said lease is hereby given you pursuant to that clause of your lease reading as follows: It is further understood and agreed between the parties hereto that a sale of the property by the party of the first part shall terminate this lease upon six months written notice to the party of the second part, and in lieu of compensation it is hereby agreed that the rent shall be waived during the six months notice to vacate.
The defendant did not remove from said premises at the expiration of six months and the statutory demand for delivery of possession was personally served on defendant. After the expiration of said period, he refused to vacate the premises, and thereupon the defendant here instituted and prosecuted summary proceedings in the Second District Court of the City of Newark, in which Court judgment for possession of the premises was rendered May 23, 1919, and the removal of plaintiffs, being the alleged act of trespass for which this suit is brought, was, by virtue of the order of removal, made by that Court upon said judgment.
There is no contention that there was any irregularity in the proceedings of that Court, if the Court has jurisdiction; but the plaintiff here insists that the provisions of the lease above quoted constituted a condition, or covenant, and not a limitation of the term, and that consequently the District Court did not have jurisdiction.
The parties hereto have entered into a stipulation to submit this suit to the Court for judgment upon the complaint, answer and reply, which correctly sets forth the facts as above stated, and adds:
If the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, judgment is to be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and there is to be an assessment of the damages by a jury drawn for that purpose, reserving however all questions of law as to the measure of damages; and, if the Court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, judgment shall be entered in favor of the defendant as if said cause had been tried and a verdict in favor of the defendant had been rendered; both parties reserving the right to appeal from the judgment to be entered.
It is admitted on behalf of the plaintiff that, if the said provision of the lease constituted limitation of McGanns terms, then the District Court had jurisdiction and the plaintiff cannot recover in this suit.
The jurisdiction of the District Court in such cases is confined in its application to the instant case, to When any such person shall hold over and continue in possession ... after the expiration of his ... term, etc. Admittedly the decision of this case rests upon whether or not the sale of the premises and the notice given by the lessor and LaBrecque Company to the plaintiff ended the term of the McGann Company. If it did—if this was a limitation of the plaintiffs term,—the jurisdiction of the District Court was complete.
The case of Quidort v. Bullitt, 60 N. J. L. 119, is very much in point. In that case it appeared by the affidavit filed with the Justice that the defendants, in May, 1885, leased to the prosecutor a seaside cottage at Cape May for five years, which lease was extended for two successful periods. The lease contained the following provision: Lessors are to have the privilege of terminating the lease at any time upon giving six months notice of their intention to do so, prior to the first day of July or any year during the lease.. On October 19, 1895, the defendants caused to be served on the prosecutor a written notice, which, after reciting the terms of the lease stated:
We have determined to avail ourselves of the privilege of terminating the lease. We now give you notice of the exercise of our privilege and of our intention to terminate the said lease on the first day of May, 1896, and demand that you surrender us possession of the leased premises at that time, in accordance with the provisions contained in the lease. This right to terminate the lease is exercised in accordance with the lease and the several extensions thereof. We shall expect you to deliver to us, on the first day of May, 1896, the cottage and bath houses mentioned in the said lease, and also the articles mentioned and set out in the inventory annexed thereto.
The tenant refused to deliver possession and, on the 6th day of May, 1896, instituted proceedings before the Justice, which were the subject of review by certiorari in that case.
It is insisted on behalf of the plaintiff that whether or not the quoted provision of the lease and the giving of the notice constituted a mere condition or covenant or was a limitation, was not decided in that case; but, while it is not expressly so stated, it seems to me a decision of that question was absolutely essential to a decision of the case. Chief Justice Gummere, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court (page 120) said:
The question for determination is whether the Justice had jurisdiction of the cause; if he had jurisdiction, then the writ in this case should be dismissed, but, if he had not, then the proceedings before him should be set aside.
Again on page 122 he said:
It is alleged by the prosecutor that the facts above recited did not bring the case within the jurisdiction of the Justice for the following reasons: 1. That the privilege of terminating the lease was not a term, condition or limitation of the original lease, but a special privilege, reserved to the lessors, of ending the original term.
Thus it is plain that the precise question in issue in this case was before the Court, and that it was necessary for the Court, in order to reach the decision it did, to decide that the quoted provision would constitute a limitation upon the term fixed by the original lease.
The case of Miller v. Levi, 44 N. Y. 490, is also applicable to this case. In that case Miller demised to Levi, reserving the right to sell the demised premises and to limit Levis term thereon to the expiration of sixty days after notice of sale. The sale and notice specified in the lease was made. It was insisted that the Justice had no jurisdiction of the summary proceedings, because this can only be resorted to where the term of the lease of the lessee has expired by lapse of time, which it was said was not the fact in that case. The Court said:
Immediately upon sale by Miller and notice thereof to the tenant the limitation attached to the estate of the latter, without further act on the part of Miller. There then arose a limitation of his term, to wit, its expiration on the first of May following. The act itself, in the lease contemplated, to wit, a sale without notice, created the expiration. Nothing further was necessary.... The term of the lease must therefore be taken to have expired on the first of May, 1864.
I think, therefore, that when the leased property was sold, and the notice of sale given to McGann on October 30th, 1918, the term of McGann under the terms of the lease expired six months thereafter; that the sale and notice constituted a limitation of his term; that the Second District Court of the City of Newark, before which proceedings to remove McGann were instituted May 2nd, 1919, had jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter before it; and that, therefore, the defendant is not guilty of the trespass alleged against him.
Judgment is given, therefore, against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant.
One hunting on Sunday, in violation of statute, is held to be answerable for injuries accidentally inflicted upon a bystander by the voluntary discharge of his gun, in the Vermont case of White v. Levarn, 108 Atl. 564, annotated in 11 A.L.R. 1219, on violation of Sunday law as ground for civil action for damages.
The keeping of high explosives in a public highway in a populous community, without guard or signal, to the terror, alarm, and great danger of the citizens, is held to be a common nuisance, indictable at common law, in Kentucky Glycerine Co. v. Com. 188 Ky. 820, 224 S. W. 360, annotated in 11 A.L.R. 715.
False swearing by a witness is held to be such an obstruction of justice as to constitute a direct contempt of court, in Riley v. Wallace, 188 Ky. 471, 222 S. W. 1085, annotated in 11 A.L.R. 337.
A petition filed against a partnership by one partner alone must, under section 5a of the Bankruptcy Act and General Order No. 8, conform to the requirements of an involuntary petition and must, therefore, allege insolvency and that an act of bankruptcy was committed by the partnership. Matter of Ollinger & Perry. 47 Am. B. R. 203.
A parent who takes a deed from his child soon after it reaches majority and while it is living under his roof is held to have the burden of clearing the transaction of every suspicion, and establishing its fairness and good faith, in the Arkansas case of Shackleford v. Shackleford, 223, S. W. 561, annotated in 11 A.L.R. 730.
Giving a broker the exclusive sale of a parcel of real estate is held not to preclude the owner from selling to one whom he had reason to believe had not been procured by the broker, in Roberts v. Harrington, 168 Wis. 217, 169 N. W. 603, annotated in 10 A.L.R. 810, on whether an ordinary brokers contract excludes right of sale by owner.
MISCELLANY
SOME STATE NOTES.
On Dec. 11 Mrs. Mary J. Rellstab, wife of United States District Court Judge John Rellstab, died at her home in Trenton. She had been an invalid for many years. Before her marriage, in 1905, she was Miss Mary Johnston Whittaker, daughter of the late George R. and Mrs. Mary Whittaker. Besides her husband, two sisters, Mrs. J. F. Clement of Philadelphia and Miss Emily Whittaker of Trenton, survive. Mrs. Rellstab was for many years active in church and charity work.
On Nov. 25 the Supreme Court suspended three lawyers charged with unprofessional conduct: Mr. William M. Rysdyk, of Jersey City, for one year; Mr. Charles Sloff, of Passaic, for one year, and Mr. Charles K. Richmond, of Passaic, for two years. In the first two cases the cause was financial misappropriation, and in the last case an endeavor to influence a juryman.
NEW JERSEY BAR EXAMINATIONS, NOVEMBER TERM, 1921.
Attorneys Questions.
1. A party in a proceeding in the Orphans Court appealed from the decree of said Court to the Court of Errors and Appeals. Was this proper?
2. A held in trust for F certain lands and also certain bonds. He died intestate, leaving two sons B and C, B being the elder. C was appointed administrator. To whom did the title to the land and to whom do the bonds descend?
3. W being under indictment by a Federal Grand Jury, applied to the Court for compulsory process for the purpose of obtaining witnesses in his behalf. His application was denied. Was the Court right?
4. A railroad company made a mortgage upon its lands, chattels and franchises. It was duly recorded as a real estate mortgage but it was not recorded as a chattel mortgage. Was it valid as to the chattels against creditors of the company?
5. S went to work for B and took two flags with him. He allowed B to use one of them and helped put it on Bs building. Subsequently a hail storm destroyed it. He then sued B for the value of the flag. Should he recover?
6. G agreed to sell and deliver to J certain goods on or before the 15th of July. Instead of delivering the whole of the goods he attempted to deliver the same in instalments, the last instalment to be delivered on July 15. J refused to accept the goods. Was he bound to do so?
7. Where there is a plain repugnancy between the provisions of an original contract, and those of a supplemental one between the same parties relating to the same subject matter, which one controls?
8. S, being indebted to a number of persons, advertised and sold at public sale all of his stock to one person. Was this contrary to the Bulk Sales Act of 1915?
9. One member of the firm of W & Co. which was still in existence, without the authority of the other member, confessed a judgment to Y, a creditor of the firm. Was the judgment binding upon the firm?
10. An agent acting within the scope of his authority, did certainfraudulent acts. Was the principal liable for these acts of the agent?
11. What are the requirements to make an instrument negotiable?
12. John Smith made a will, wherein he gave his son, Thomas, a legacy of $5,000, adding that the legacy should be void if Thomas married any one of the daughters of Robert Jones. Thomas having married one of Jones daughters, demanded the legacy, claiming that the condition was void. Was his claim good?
13. (a) How soon after the death of a testator may his will be admitted to probate? (b) How soon after the death of an intestate may administration of his estate be granted?
14. What is the difference between the relief granted in equity in cases of mutual mistake and of the mistake of one party?
15. A made a conveyance of real estate to B for the purpose of defrauding his creditors. A having died intestate, his heirs brought suit in Chancery to compel B to convey the property to them. What should the Court do?
16. B made a will leaving all his property to D, whom his (Bs) mistress had fraudulently represented to him to be his child. C, the heir at law of B, filed a bill in Chancery to set aside the will on the ground of fraud. D moves to strike out. What should the Court do?
17. B sued A for slander. A pleaded that he was intoxicated at the time he uttered the slander. B moved to strike out this defence. What should the Court do?
18. A sued the City of N for damages. He showed that he had been run over by an ash-cart owned and operated by the City by reason of the drivers negligence and that the driver was drunk at the time and was drunk to the knowledge of the Citys foreman when the latter sent him out with the cart. The City moved to nonsuit. Should the motion be granted?
19. A sued B for damages by reason of injuries caused by the joint negligence of B and C. He recovered a judgment which B paid. B then sued C for contribution. Could he recover?
20. A was indicted for murder of B. On the trial it was shown that A killed B while B was trying to rob him on the highway. The prosecutor contended that A could not be acquitted unless it appeared that he could not have rendered the attempt to rob abortive by any means less radical. The Court overruled this contention. Was the ruling correct?
21. A husband decided to move from New Jersey to New York. His wife refused to go with him and filed a bill for maintenance. Could she succeed?
22. How many incorporators must there be to incorporate a company in New Jersey? What facts should appear in the certificate and how should it be executed?
23. A witness at a trial desired to use his own memorandum to refresh his memory. Could he do so?
24. A promissory note on its face was made payable in money. Parol evidence was offered to prove it was payable in stock and that interest on the note was equivalent to the amount of dividends on such stock. Should this evidence be admitted?
25. A landlord and tenant were joined, as defendants, in an action for trespass arising out of the same act. An objection was made for misjoinder. Is the objection good?
26. In a civil action against a husband and wife for damages resulting from an atrocious assaultcommitted by the wife with the encouragement of the husband, an order was made to hold both to bail. Was this legal?
27. A sued the State of New Jersey on a book account. Could he maintain his action?
28. At the hearing of a suit in Chancery, defendant set up the statute of limitations, but this defense did not appear in the answer. Could the defendant avail himself of it?
29. A bill in equity failed to state any equitable cause of action. What would you advise your client to do?
30. A and B came into the office of C, an attorney, to have him draw a deed from A conveying property to B. Before the deed was drawn, C discovered that the title to the property was defective. Should he divulge this fact to B, who has had nothing to do with his employment?
Counselors Questions.
1. A final judgment in the Circuit Court was brought by writ of error directly into the Court of Errors and Appeals. Was this legal?
2. A widow, whose dower had not been assigned to her, remained upon the homestead of her deceased husband and took to her own use the crops growing thereon. Was she entitled to the same?
3. The Board of Aldermen of the City of J passed an ordinance that no one should conduct a grocery store in the city unless he was a citizen of the State of New Jersey. A, a citizen of New York, having been found guilty of violating this ordinance, certioraried his conviction to the Supreme Court. What should the Court do?
4. A mortgagee in a chattel mortgage held the same for ten days after the delivery of the mortgage and then recorded it. In the meantime a judgment was recovered against the mortgagor, execution issued and a levy made upon the goods and chattels named in the mortgage. Which has priority?
5. S agreed to take the automobile of T to a shop to be repaired and to return it after it was repaired. He took it to the shop, but failed to return it. It was later destroyed by fire while in the shop, and T sued S because of his failure to return the automobile. Was he liable?
6. A purchased an automobile from an infant and sold it to B in good faith for value, neither A nor B having notice of the infancy of As vendor. Was it a valid sale?
7. R was indebted to S and the latter started a suit to recover the amount due. Thereupon G agreed with S that if he would discontinue his suit and wait for three months before again suing, he would be responsible for the debt. This was done. At the end of the three months was G liable?
8. L agreed to do certain work, part of it to be done on Sunday. T subsequently agreed to pay L for such work. Was he liable?
9. An agent received the instructions of his principal, knowing that in order to carry them out he would have to commit a nuisance, and did actually commit such nuisance. The person injured sued the agent. Was he liable?
10. The partnership accounts between D and M were unsettled, although they had dissolved partnership. D alone could settle them, but refused to do so. What kind of action could M institute against D?
11. Smith purchased a horse from Jones, giving him in payment a check on a bank which he (Smith) had had certified. Smith having learned that Jones had no title to the horse stopped payment on the check. Jones sued the bankwhich answered, setting up want of consideration for the check. Could it do so?
12. A died January 1, 1915, leaving a last will wherein he bequeathed $5,000 to his son, John, then aged 18, and $5,000 to the A hospital, and the residue of his estate to his daughter, Jane. The legacies remaining unpaid on January 1, 1918, John and the hospital sued the executors for them, claiming also interest. From what date should interest be allowed, if at all?
13. Mary Jones died June 1, 1921, leaving a husband, Peter Jones, by whom she had never had children, and three children by a prior marriage. She left a will devising her real estate to her children, but made no disposition of her personal estate. To whom did her real and personal estate go on her death?
14. B, a creditor of the insolvent firm of J. & S., agreed to sell and assign his claim to D for the sum of $2,000. B thereafter refused to make the assignment. D thereupon filed a bill in Chancery against B for specific performance. Could he maintain his action?
15. A was in possession of a house and lot. B, his neighbor, insisted that As house was over his line by a foot. How could A test his title, B refusing to bring an action?
16. Brown, as executor of Smith, filed his final account in the Orphans Court of Salem County, and gave notice of settlement. Grey, one of the residuary legatees, desired to have the accounting in Chancery. Was this possible? If so, how should he proceed and what must he show?
17. In the trial of an action for libel wherein plaintiff claimed compensatory damages only, defendant offered in mitigation of damages evidence that the publication was made in good faith and with honest belief in its truth. The Court excluded the offer, and this ruling was attacked on appeal. Was it correct?
18. Plaintiff, aged nine, who was struck and injured by an automobile while crossing a street, brought suit. The defense was contributory negligence. The Court charged that a child of that age could be charged with contributory negligence, but that in considering that question it was for the jury to consider whether the plaintiff had exercised the caution which would reasonably be expected from one of his years. Was this charge correct?
19. A, an owner of a dwelling house, brought an action against B, who had a tannery in the next block, alleging and showing on trial that noxious fumes from Bs tannery had made plaintiffs house untenantable. B moved to nonsuit on the ground that these fumes injured a large number of houses, were a public nuisance and the only remedy was by indictment. The court refused to nonsuit. Was this ruling correct?
20. In what case and under what circumstances can a writ of error issue directly from the Court of Errors and Appeals to the Court of Oyer and Terminer?
21. At common law what right had a husband in personal property acquired by the wife during coverture? What is the rule in New Jersey?
22. The treasurer of a corporation died. There was no provision in the by-laws for the election of his successor. How can the place be filled?
23. On a bill for the construction of a will, evidence was offered of declarations made by the testator at the time of making the will as to his meaning and intention. Should this evidence be received?
24. In a suit involving an account, it appears that the defendant had admitted that a certain sum was due. The defendant, however, demanded the production of the plaintiffs books and on refusal moved for a nonsuit. Should the motion be granted?
25. How is an issue of fact created in a lawsuit?
26. Where may the venue be laid in a transitory action?
27. How should service of summons and complaint be made in a case where an affidavit of merits is desired?
28. X in a bill against Y in his prayer asked for answer without oath. Y answered under oath. How should the answer be construed?
29. A filed a bill in Chancery and failed to pray for general relief. Can he succeed if the special relief prayed for fails?
30. A, clerk in a law firm, not yet admitted to the Bar, receiving a regular salary, had his friends retain his employers. Should the firm divide its fees with the clerk?
NEW JERSEY BAR ADMISSIONS, NOVEMBER TERM, 1921.
The following were admitted as attorneys by the Supreme Court of this State at the November Term, 1921:
Elizabeth.
Bender, Albert C., 714 Elizabeth Ave.
Eisenberg, Henry M., 39 Third St.
Liotta, Eugene A., 95 Broad St.
Weiner, Frank S., 128 Broad St.
Hoboken.
Capelli, George A., 227 Madison St.
Greenberg, William, 84 Washington St.
Levenson, Jay M., 51 Newark St.
Stover, Harriet C., 1037 Bloomfield St.
Jersey City.
Blumberg, Leo, 139 Magnolia Ave.
Ewald, Henry, Jr., 587 Summit Ave.
Hoagland, Inez, City Hall.
Kelly, James Francis, Lincoln Trust Bldg.
Kriegel, Louis J., 665 Newark Ave.
Kuebler, Carl S., 75 Montgomery St.
McCarthy, James J., 15 Exchange Pl.
Pforr, Arthur, 75 Montgomery St.
Newark.
Brown, John S., Central High School, New and High Sts.
Citret, Harry, 790 Broad St.
Dorgeval, Harold F., 164 Market St.
Eisner, Mortimer, 585 High St.
Eppston, Joseph G., 20 Clinton St.
Federici, Christine A., 1025 Kinney Bldg.
Kinkelstein, Milton J., 828 Broad St.
Giordano, John C., 226 Hunterdon St.
Halpin, Julius H., 133 Somerset St.
Merz, Charles D., 324 Hawthorne Ave.
Padalino, Frank P., 216 Camden St.
Pollard, Robert S., 164 Market St.
Potoker, Benjamin, 40 Beacon St.
Reid, Alexander F., Jr., 296 Mulberry St.
Schneider, Louis, 790 Broad St.
Thiele, Richard Hardie, Prudential Ins. Co.
Vanderbilt, Leslie L., 14 N. 9th St.
Trenton.
Cella, G. Andrew, 345 Hamilton Ave.
Heher, John L., 301 Commonwealth Bldg.
Josephson, Leon, 1009 Greenwood Ave.
Other Places.
Bremer, Philip M., 41 Paterson St., New Brunswick.
Colver, Frederick B., Tenafly.
Dart, William A., 201 Sheen Bldg., Atlantic City.
DeYoe, Willard L., U. S. Trust Bldg., Paterson.
Fuller, Ernest, 60 Fairview Ave., So. Orange.
Galanti, Benjamin P., Main St., Hackensack.
Greenberg, Victor, 153 Grove St., Passaic.
Gottko, Anthony A., 37 E. 26th St., Bayonne.
Hahn, Harold H., 120 Broadway, N. Y. City.
Hendler, Louis L., 165 French St., New Brunswick.
Hendrickson, Frank A., 117 Main St., Mt. Holly.
Jackson, George T., 706 N. Ohio Ave., Atlantic City.
Loder, William W., 107 E. Commerce St., Bridgeton.
Lore, Harry T., Section of Surety Bonds, Treas. Dept., Washington, D. C.
McDonough, Peter J., Jr., Babcock Bldg., Plainfield.
McElroy, Leon E., 115 Main St., Woodbridge.
Plympton, George F., 117 Clinton Pl., Hackensack.
Preston, Joseph A., 224 Park Ave., Cliffside.
Ridgeway, S. Paul, 1 N. Iowa Ave., Atlantic City.
Thompson, Rufus B., 505 Federal St., Camden.
Visscher, Barent L., 84 William St., N. Y. City.
Warsinski, Carl H., 50 Burnside Ave., Cranford.
Woods, Elmer B., Glassboro.
Zirpoli, Anthony P., 126 Market St., Paterson.
The following were also admitted as Counselors-at-Law:
Counselors.
Bergen, Francis L., 2nd Nat. Bk. Bldg., Somerville.
Bowne, Edward A., South River.
Braelow, Joseph C., 800 Broad St., Newark.
Buchanan, Jessie C., 40 W. State St., Trenton.
Deegan, Joseph F., 415 Raritan Bldg., Perth Amboy.
Fleming, Russell, 790 Broad St., Newark.
Gunther, Edward C., Hudson Tr. Bldg., W. Hoboken.
Handford, James L., 790 Broad St., Newark.
Hirschberg, Samuel L., 84 Washington St., Hoboken.
Isaacs, Lionel, 143 Summit Ave., W. Hoboken.
Kaplan, Joseph D., 200 S. Broad St., Trenton.
Kepsel, Julius A., 243 Montgomery St., Jersey City.
Krohn, Herman, 763 Broad St., Newark.
Lesser, Louis B., 9 Clinton St., Newark.
Matthews, John A., 31 Clinton St., Newark.
McCloskey, W. Durward, Thompson Bldg., Lakewood.
Miele, Philip J., 75 Montgomery St., Jersey City.
Morrison, George R., 190 College Ave., New Brunswick.
Praissman, Maurice L., 537 Arch St., Camden.
Rauch, Sylvan J., 53 Penna. Ave., Newark.
Reussille, Leon, Jr., 34 Broad St., Red Bank.
Satz, David M., 763 Broad St., Newark.
Schroth, Godfrey W., Jr., 412 Broad St., Trenton.
Schultz, Vincent, 790 Broad St., Newark.
Seiler, Isaac W., 472 Broadway, Bayonne.
Silberman, Paul R., 776 Broad St., Newark.
Simandl, Harold, 790 Broad St., Newark.
Stiles, Harry A., 95 River St., Hoboken.
Stover, Charles W., 84 Washington St., Hoboken.
Sullivan, James A., 15 Exchange Pl., Jersey City.
Tepper, Harry L., 800 Broad St., Newark.
Varbalow, Joseph, 540 Federal St., Camden.
Waldman, Herman, 19 Clinton St., Newark.
Zimmerman, Thomas L., Jr., 232 Rider Ave., N. Y. City.
Zucker, Maurice J., 790 Broad St., Newark.
OBITUARIES.
Ex-Justice Bennet Van Syckel.
On Dec. 20th last, following a brief illness of bronchial pneumonia, Supreme Court Justice Bennet Van Syckel, almost ninety-two years old, the oldest alumnus of Princeton University, died at his home in Trenton.
Judge Van Syckel was the son of Aaron Van Syckel, and Mary Van Syckel, of Bethlehem, Hunterdon county, and was born there April 17, 1830. His father and his grandfather were country merchants, whose ancestors came with the old Dutch settlers to that part of New Jersey. His father was considered wealthy in those days and was able to give his four sons an excellent education. When Bennet was nine years old he was sent to a boarding school at Easton. At the age of thirteen he completed his preparatory studies and entered Princeton in the Sophomore class. Three years later he was graduated with high honors and for one year was resident graduate Assistant Professor to Joseph Henry, who occupied the chair of Natural Philosophy.
Bennet next took up the study of law in the office of Alexander Wurts of Flemington, and was prepared to take his law examination some time before he was of age, but as he could not be admitted to the Bar while under twenty-one was forced to wait. On the twenty-first anniversary of his birthday, at the April Term of the Supreme Court, 1851, he was admitted to the Bar, and became counselor at the June Term, 1854. He at once opened office in Flemington, and practiced there with unusual success until February, 1858, when Governor Randolph appointed him Justice of the Supreme Court. At that time he was the youngest member of the Court. His Circuits were in the counties of Salem, Cumberland, Atlantic and Cape May. When the number of Supreme Court Justices was increased from seven to nine and the districts were readjusted, Justice Van Syckel was assigned to Union and Ocean counties, where he presided twenty-nine years. He was five times reappointed. Only a few months after his last appointment in 1904 he resigned because of ill health and increasing age.
After his retirement Justice Van Syckel was made the guest of the New Jersey Bench and Bar, at Trenton, upon which occasion a portrait of him painted in oil was presented to the State, to be hung on the wall of the Supreme Court room at the Capitol. A few monthslater another portrait was hung in the new court house in Union County, in honor of the Justice who had presided there for so many years.
During his term of service Justice Van Syckel delivered some of the most important opinions of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Errors and Appeals. In the prosecution of the Linden and Elizabeth race track gamblers in 1893 he proved a terror to poolsellers, bookmakers and evildoers. It was Justice Van Syckel who wrote the opinion of the Supreme Court when an effort was made to challenge the majority cast in favor of the anti-gambling amendment to the State Constitution, and his opinion upholding the adoption of the amendments was sustained by the Court of Errors and Appeals.
At the time of his death a membership in the directorate of the Prudential Life Insurance Company was the former Justices sole business affiliation. His activity in connection with this post caused his associates to marvel. He attended all the meetings and was as alert as the youngest of his colleagues. At the Princeton alumni reunion in June, 1920, he led the Parade around the baseball field and got a big ovation from the throng in attendance. In his automobile he arose repeatedly and raised his hat in acknowledgment of the applause.
In 1911, Woodrow Wilson, when Governor, appointed him and former State Attorney General Edmund Wilson, of Red Bank, as a commission to study the proposed abandonment of the Morris Canal. The report was adverse to the State taking over the canal. The Justice aided in the drafting of the Seven Sisters Acts, passed during the Wilson administration, which were designed to curb the activities of the trusts in New Jersey.
Justice Van Syckel was a lover of outdoor sports. In his younger days he played town ball and football and later was a great admirer of baseball. He rode horseback, played golf and was a fine wing shot. In politics he was a Democrat, but politics had no place with him while he sat on the Bench.
Mr. Van Syckel married Miss Mary Elizabeth Sloane, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. William Hand Sloane. He is survived by two sons, Charles S. and William S., and a daughter, Bessie.
Judge William R. Francis.
Former New Jersey State Senator and former Supreme Court Judge of Dakota, William R. Francis, died in the City Hospital in Newark, this State, on Dec. 15th last, aged 82 years. His death was the result of a fall in the bedroom of his home, 324 S. Orange Ave., Newark.
Judge Francis was born in Connecticut. He was a graduate from Oberlin College and then came to Newark, where he became a member of the law firm of Titsworth, Francis & Marsh. He served as city counsel of Newark from 1871 to 1875 and in the State Senate from 1879 to 1881. In 1882 Mr. Francis went to Dakota. At that time the two Dakotas were united in a territory of the United States. After completing his term as Supreme Court Judge there he became attorney for the Northern Pacific Railroad. About twenty years ago he returned to Newark. Mr. Francis was a Master in Chancery and had offices with Scharringhausen & Hartpence, 800 Broad street. Mr. Francis is survived by a widow, who was Miss Annie Yeomans of Newark. He is also survived by a niece, Mrs. C. L. Bryant of Danbury, Conn., and a cousin, Miss Mary Francis, of Newark.
Transcriber Notes:Throughout the dialogues, there were words used to mimic accents of the speakers. Those words were retained as-is.Errors in punctuations and inconsistent hyphenation were not corrected unless otherwise noted.On page 9, migh was replaced with might.On page 22, the term plaintiffs term was obscured by a Google logo.On page 23, provsion was replaced with provision.On page 27, the phrase committed by the wife with the en- was moved to the top of the page, since it seemed to be put in the wrong line initially.On page 28, the question mark after B thereafter refused to make the assignment was replaced by a periodOn page 32, Prinecton was replaced with Princeton.
Throughout the dialogues, there were words used to mimic accents of the speakers. Those words were retained as-is.
Errors in punctuations and inconsistent hyphenation were not corrected unless otherwise noted.
On page 9, migh was replaced with might.
On page 22, the term plaintiffs term was obscured by a Google logo.
On page 23, provsion was replaced with provision.
On page 27, the phrase committed by the wife with the en- was moved to the top of the page, since it seemed to be put in the wrong line initially.
On page 28, the question mark after B thereafter refused to make the assignment was replaced by a period
On page 32, Prinecton was replaced with Princeton.