FOOTNOTES:

"The above is only a casual instance, chosen at random. What is certain is that these peoples do not yet understand what we mean by exactitude, and that the concept of a well-regulated existence has not yet penetrated their heads."[97]

What has just been written of course applies primarily to the ignorant masses. But this attitude of mind is more or less common to all classes of Oriental peoples. The habits of centuries are not easily transformed. In fact, it must not be forgotten that the upper classes were able to enjoy most fully the capricious personal liberty of the unmodified East, and that, therefore, though they may be better able to understand the value of Westernization, they have in one sense the most to lose.[98]

In fact, for all Orientals, high and low alike, the "goodold times" had charms which they mournfully regret. For the prince, the pasha, the courtier, existence was truly an Oriental paradise. To be sure, the prince might at any moment be defeated and slain by a rival monarch; the pasha strangled at his master's order; the courtier tortured through a superior's whim. But, meanwhile, it was "life," rich and full. "Each of these men had his own character and his own renown among his countrymen, and each enjoyed a position such as is now unattainable in Europe, in which he was released from laws, could indulge his own fancies, bad or good, and was fed every day and all day with the special flattery of Asia—that willing submissiveness to mere volition which is so like adoration, and which is to its recipients the most intoxicating of delights. Each, too, had his court of followers, and every courtier shared in the power, the luxury, and the adulation accruing to his lord. The power was that of life and death; the luxury included possession of every woman he desired; the adulation was, as I have said, almost religious worship."[99]

But, it may be asked, what about the poor man, exploited by this hierarchy of capricious despots? What had he to gain from all this? Well, in most cases, he got nothing at all; but hemightgain a great deal. Life in the old Orient was a gigantic lottery. Any one, however humble, who chanced to please a great man, might rise to fame and fortune at a bound. And this is just what pleases the Eastern temperament; for in the East, "luck" and caprice are more prized than the "security" cherished in the West. In the Orient the favourite stories are those narrating sudden and amazing shifts of fortune—beggars become viziers or viziers become beggars, and all in a single night. To the majority of Orientals it is still the uncertainties of life, and the capricious favour of the powerful, which make it most worth living; not the sure reward of honesty and well-regulated labour. All these things made the life of the Orient infinitelyinterestingtoall. And it is precisely this gambler's interest which Westernization has more or less destroyed. As an English writer very justly remarksà proposof modern Egypt: "Our rule may be perfect, but the East finds it dull. The old order was a ragged garment, but it was gay. Its very vicissitude had a charm. 'Ah! yes,' said an Egyptian to a champion of English rule, 'but in the old days a beggar might sit at the gate, and if he were found pleasing in the eyes of a great lady, he might be a great man on the morrow.' There is a natural and inevitable regret for the gorgeous and perilous past, when favour took the place of justice, and life had great heights and depths—for the Egypt of Joseph, Haroun-al-Rashid, and Ismail Pasha. We have spread the coat of broadcloth over the radiant garment."[100]

Saddened and irritated by the threatened loss of so much that they hold dear, it is not strange that many Eastern conservatives glorify the past as a sort of Golden Age, infinitely superior to anything the West can produce, and in this they are joined by many quondam liberals, disillusioned with Westernism and flying into the arms of reaction. The result is a spirit of hatred against everything Western, which sometimes assumes the most extravagant forms. Says Louis Bertrand: "During a lecture that I attended at Cairo the speaker contended that France owed Islam (1) its civilization and sciences; (2) half of its vocabulary; (3) all that was best in the character and mentality of its population, seeing that, from the Middle Ages to the Revolution of 1789, all the reformers who laboured for its enfranchisement—Albigensians, Vaudois, Calvinists, and Camisards—were probably descendants of the Saracens. It was nothing less than the total annexation of France to Morocco." Meanwhile, "it has become the fashion for fervent (Egyptian) nationalists to go to Spain and meditate in the gardens of the Alcazar of Seville or in the patios ofthe Alhambra of Granada on the defunct splendours of western Islam."[101]

Even more grotesque are the rhapsodies of the Hindu wing of this Golden Age school. These Hindu enthusiasts far outdo the wildest flights of their Moslem fellows. They solemnly assert that Hindustan is the nursery and home of all true religion, philosophy, culture, civilization, science, invention, and everything else; and they aver that when India's present regrettable eclipse is past (an eclipse of course caused entirely by English rule) she is again to shine forth in her glory for the salvation of the whole world. Employing to the full the old adage that there is nothing new under the sun, they have "discovered" in the Vedas and other Hindu sacred texts "irrefutable" evidence that the ancient Hindu sages anticipated all our modern ideas, including such up-to-date matters as bomb-dropping aeroplanes and the League of Nations.[102]

All this rhapsodical laudation of the past will, in the long run, prove futile. The East, like the West, has its peculiar virtues; but the East also has its special faults, and it is the faults which, for the last thousand years, have been gaining on the virtues, resulting in backwardness, stagnation, and inferiority. To-day the East is being penetrated—and quickened—by the West. The outcome will never be complete Westernization in the sense of a mere wholesale copying and absolute transformation; the East will always remain fundamentally itself. But it will be a new self, the result of a true assimilation of Western ideas. The reactionaries can only delay this process, and thereby prolong the Orient's inferiority and weakness.

Nevertheless, the reactionary attitude, though unintelligent, is intelligible. Westernization hurts too many cherished prejudices and vested interests not to arouse chronic resistance. This resistance would occur even if Western influences were all good and Westerners all angels of light. But of course Westernization has its dark side, while our Western culture-bearers are animated not merely by altruism, but also by far less worthy motives. This strengthens the hand of the Oriental reactionaries and lends them the cover of moral sanctions. In addition to the extremely painful nature of any transformative process, especially in economic and social matters, there are many incidental factors of an extremely irritating nature.

To begin with, the mere presence of the European, with his patent superiority of power and progress, is a constant annoyance and humiliation. This physical presence of the European is probably as necessary to the Orient's regeneration as it is inevitable in view of the Orient's present inferiority. But, however beneficial, it is none the less a source of profound irritation. These Europeans disturb everything, modify customs, raise living standards, erect separate "quarters" in the cities, where they form "extraterritorial" colonies exempt from native law and customary regulation. An English town rises in the heart of Cairo, a "Little Paris" eats into Arabesque Algiers, while European Pera flaunts itself opposite Turkish Stambul.

As for India, it is dotted with British "enclaves". "The great Presidency towns, Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, are European cities planted on Indian soil. All the prominent buildings are European, though in some of the more recent ones an endeavour has been made to adopt what is known as the 'Indo-Saracenic' style of architecture. For the rest, the streets are called by English names, generally the names of bygone viceroys and governors, or of the soldiers who conquered the land and quelled the mutiny—heroes whoseeffigies meet you at every turn. The shops are English shops, where English or Eurasian assistants traffic in English goods. English carriages and motors bowl along the macadamized or tarred roads of Old England. On every hand there is evidence of the instinctive effort to reproduce, as nearly as the climate will permit, English conditions of life.... Almost the whole life of the people of India is relegated to the back streets, not to say the slums—frankly called in Madras the Black Town. There are a few points—clubs and gymkhanas specially established to that end—where Englishmen, and even women, meet Indian men, and even women, of the wealthier classes, on a basis of social equality. But few indeed are the points of contact between the Asian town and the European city which has been superimposed upon it. The missionary, the Salvation Army outpost, perhaps the curiosity-hunting tourist, may go forth into the bazaars; but the European community as a whole cares no more for the swarming brown multitudes around it than the dwellers on an island care for the fishes in the circumambient sea."[103]And what is true of the great towns holds good for scores of provincial centres, "stations," and cantonments. The scale may be smaller, but the type is the same.

The European in the Orient is thus everywhere profoundly an alien, living apart from the native life. And the European is not merely an aloof alien; he is a ruling alien as well. Always his attitude is that of the superior, the master. This attitude is not due to brutality or snobbery; it is inherent in the very essence of the situation. Of course many Europeans have bad manners, but that does not change the basic reality of the case. And this reality is that, whatever the future may bring, the European first established himself in the Orient because the West was then infinitely ahead of the East; and he is still there to-day because, despite all recentchanges, the East is still behind the West. Therefore the European in the Orient is still the ruler, and so long as he stays theremustcontinue to rule—justly, temperately, with politic regard for Eastern progress and liberal devolution of power as the East becomes ripe for its liberal exercise—but, nevertheless,rule. Wherever the Occidental has established his political control, there are but two alternatives: govern or go. Furthermore, in his governing, the Occidental must rule according to his own lights; despite all concessions to local feeling, he must, in the last analysis, act as a Western, not as an Eastern, ruler. Lord Cromer voices the heart of all true colonial government when he says: "In governing Oriental races the first thought must be what is good for them, but not necessarily what they think is good for them."[104]

Now all this is inevitable, and should be self-evident. Nevertheless, the fact remains that even the most enlightened Oriental can hardly regard it as other than a bitter though salutary medicine, while most Orientals feel it to be humiliating or intolerable. The very virtues of the European are prime causes of his unpopularity. For, as Meredith Townsend well says: "The European is, in Asia, the man who will insist on his neighbour doing business just after dinner, and being exact when he is half-asleep, and being 'prompt' just when he wants to enjoy,—and he rules in Asia and is loved in Asia accordingly."[105]

Furthermore, the European in the Orient is disliked not merely as a ruler and a disturber, but also as a man of widely different race. This matter of race is very complicated,[106]but it cuts deep and is of fundamental importance. Most of the peoples of the Near and Middle East with which our present discussion is concerned belong to what is known as the "brown" category ofthe human species. Of course, in strict anthropology, the term is inexact. Anthropologically, we cannot set off a sharply differentiated group of "brown" types as a "brown race," as we can set off the "white" types of Europe as a "white race" or the "yellow" Mongoloid types of the Far East as a "yellow race." This is because the Near and Middle East have been racially a vast melting-pot, or series of melting-pots, wherein conquest and migration have continually poured new heterogeneous elements, producing the most diverse ethnic amalgamations. Thus to-day some of the Near and Middle Eastern peoples are largely white, like the Persians and Ottoman Turks; others, like the southern Indians and Yemenite Arabs, are largely black; while still others, like the Himalayan and Central Asian peoples, have much yellow blood. Again, as there is no brown racial type-norm, as there are white and yellow type-norms, so there is no generalized brown culture like those possessed by yellows and whites. The great brown spiritual bond is Islam, yet in India, the chief seat of brown population, Islam is professed by only one-fifth of the inhabitants. Lastly, while the spiritual frontiers of the Moslem world coincide mainly with the ethnic frontiers of the brown world, Islam overlaps at several points, including some pure whites in eastern Europe, many true yellows in the Far East, and multitudes of negroes in Africa.

Nevertheless, despite these partial modifications, the terms "brown race" and "brown world" do connote genuine realities which science and politics alike recognize to be essentially true. There certainly is a fundamental comity between the brown peoples. This comity is subtle and intangible in character; yet it exists, and under certain circumstances it is capable of momentous manifestations. Its salient feature is the instinctive recognition by all Near and Middle Eastern peoples that they are fellow "Asiatics," however bitter may be their internecine feuds. This instinctive "Asiatic" feeling hasbeen noted by historians for more than two thousand years, and it is true to-day as in the past.

The great racial divisions of mankind are the most fundamental, the most permanent, the most ineradicable things in human experience. They are not mere diverse colorations of skin. Matters like complexion, stature, and hair-formation are merely the outward, visible symbols of correlative mental and spiritual differences which reveal themselves in sharply contrasted temperaments and view-points, and which translate themselves into the infinite phenomena of divergent group-life.

Now it is one of these basic racial lines of cleavage which runs between "East" and "West." Broadly speaking, the Near and Middle East is the "brown world," and this differentiates it from the "white world" of the West in a way which never can be really obliterated. Indeed, to attempt to obliterate the difference by racial fusion would be the maddest of follies. East and West can mutually quicken each other by a mutual exchange of ideas and ideals. They can only harm each other by transfusions of blood. To unite physically would be the greatest of disasters. East and West have both given much to the world in the past, and promise to give more in the future. But whatever of true value they are to give can be given only on condition that they remain essentially themselves. Ethnic fusion would destroy both their race-souls and would result in a dreary mongrelization from which would issue nothing but degeneration and decay.

Both East and West instinctively recognize the truth of this, and show it by their common contempt for the "Eurasian"—the mongrel offspring of unions between the two races. As Meredith Townsend well says: "The chasm between the brown man and the white is unfathomable, has existed in all ages, and exists still everywhere. No white man marries a brown wife, no brown man marries a white wife, without an inner senseof having been false to some unintelligible but irresistible command."[107]

The above summary of the political, economic, social, and racial differences between East and West gives us a fair idea of the numerous cross-currents which complicate the relations of the two worlds and which hinder Westernization. The Westernizing process is assuredly going on, and in subsequent chapters we shall see how far-reaching is its scope. But the factors just considered will indicate the possibilities of reaction and will roughly assign the limits to which Westernization may ultimately extend.

One thing is certain: Western political control in the Orient, however prolonged and however imposing in appearance, must ever rest on essentially fragile foundations. The Western rulers will always remain an alien caste; tolerated, even respected, perhaps, but never loved and never regarded as anything but foreigners. Furthermore, Western rule must necessarily become more precarious with the increasing enlightenment of the subject peoples, so that the acquiescence of one generation may be followed by the hostile protest of the next. It is indeed an unstable equilibrium, hard to maintain and easily upset.

The latent instability of European political control over the Near and Middle East was dramatically shown by the moral effect of the Russo-Japanese War. Down to that time the Orient had been so helpless in face of European aggression that most Orientals had come to regard Western supremacy with fatalistic resignation. But the defeat of a first-class European Power by an Asiatic people instantly broke the spell, and all Asia and Africa thrilled with a wild intoxication which we can scarcely conceive. A Scotch missionary thus describes the effect of the Japanese victories on northern India, where he was stationed at the time: "A stir of excitement passed over the north of India. Even the remotevillagers talked over the victories of Japan as they sat in their circles and passed round the huqqa at night. One of the older men said to me, 'There has been nothing like it since the mutiny'. A Turkish consul of long experience in Western Asia told me that in the interior you could see everywhere the most ignorant peasants 'tingling' with the news. Asia was moved from end to end, and the sleep of the centuries was finally broken. It was a time when it was 'good to be alive,' for a new chapter was being written in the book of the world's history."[108]

Of course the Russo-Japanese War did not create this new spirit, whose roots lay in the previous epoch of subtle changes that had been going on. The Russo-Japanese War was thus rather the occasion than the cause of the wave of exultant self-confidence which swept over Asia and Africa in the year 1904. But it did dramatize and clarify ideas that had been germinating half-unconsciously in millions of Oriental minds, and was thus the sign manual of the whole nexus of forces making for a revivified Orient.

Furthermore, this new temper profoundly influenced the Orient's attitude toward the series of fresh European aggressions which then began. It is a curious fact that just when the Far East had successfully resisted European encroachment, the Near and Middle East should have been subjected to European aggressions of unparalleled severity. We have already noted the furious protests and the unwonted moral solidarity of the Moslem world at these manifestations of WesternRealpolitik. It would be interesting to know exactly how much of this defiant temper was due to the hearteningexample of Japan. Certainly our ultra-imperialists of the West were playing a dangerous game during the decade between 1904 and 1914. As Arminius Vambéry remarked after the Italian raid on Tripoli: "The more the power and authority of the West gains ground in the Old World, the stronger becomes the bond of unity and mutual interest between the separate factions of Asiatics, and the deeper burns the fanatical hatred of Europe. Is it wise or expedient by useless provocation and unnecessary attacks to increase the feeling of animosity, to hurry on the struggle between the two worlds, and to nip in the bud the work of modern culture which is now going on in Asia?"[109]

The Great War of course immensely aggravated an already critical situation. The Orient suddenly saw the European peoples, who, in racial matters, had hitherto maintained something like solidarity, locked in an internecine death-grapple of unparalleled ferocity; it saw those same peoples put one another furiously to the ban as irreconcilable foes; it saw white race-unity cleft by moral and political gulfs which white men themselves continuously iterated would never be filled. The one redeeming feature of the struggle, in Oriental eyes, was the liberal programme which the Allied statesmen inscribed upon their banners. But when the war was over and the Allies had won, it promptly leaked out that at the very time when the Allied leaders were making their liberal speeches they had been negotiating a series of secret treaties partitioning the Near East between them in a spirit of the most cynical imperialism; and in the peace conferences that closed the war it was these secret treaties, not the liberal speeches, which determined the Oriental settlement, resulting (on paper at least) in the total subjugation of the Near and Middle East to European political control.

The wave of wrath which thereupon rolled over theEast was not confined to furious remonstrance like the protests of pre-war days. There was a note of immediate resistance and rebellion not audible before. This rebellious temper has translated itself into warlike action which has already forced the European Powers to abate some of their extreme pretensions and which will undoubtedly make them abate others in the near future. The details of this post-war unrest will be discussed in later chapters. Suffice it to say here that the Great War has shattered European prestige in the East and has opened the eyes of Orientals to the weaknesses of the West. To the Orient the war was a gigantic course of education. For one thing, millions of Orientals and negroes were taken from the remotest jungles of Asia and Africa to serve as soldiers and labourers in the White Man's War. Though the bulk of these auxiliaries were used in colonial operations, more than a million of them were brought to Europe itself. Here they killed white men, raped white women, tasted white luxuries, learned white weaknesses—and went home to tell their people the whole story.[110]Asia and Africa to-day know Europe as they never knew it before, and we may be sure that they will make use of their knowledge. The most serious factor in the situation is that the Orient realizes that the famous Versailles "Peace" which purports to have pacified Europe is no peace, but rather an unconstructive, unstatesmanlike futility that left old sores unhealed and even dealt fresh wounds. Europe to-day lies debilitated and uncured, while Asia and Africa see in this a standing incitement to rash dreams and violent action.

Such is the situation to-day: an East, torn by the conflict between new and old, facing a West riven with dissension and sick from its mad follies. Probablynever before have the relations between the two worlds contained so many incalculable, even cataclysmic, possibilities. The point to be here noted is that this strange new East which now faces us is mainly the result of Western influences permeating it in unprecedented fashion for the past hundred years. To the chief elements in that permeation let us now turn.

FOOTNOTES:[72]For the larger aspects, see my bookThe Rising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy(New York and London, 1920).[73]On these points, see Arminius Vambéry,Western Culture in Eastern Lands(London, 1906); also hisLa Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans(Paris, 1898); C. S. Cooper,The Modernizing of the Orient(New York, 1914); S. Khuda Bukhsh,Essays: Indian and Islamic(London, 1912); A. J. Brown, "Economic Changes in Asia,"The Century, March, 1904.[74]For the effect of the West intellectually and spiritually, see Vambéry,op. cit.; Sir Valentine Chirol,Indian Unrest(London, 1910); J. N. Farquhar,Modern Religious Movements in India(New York, 1915); Rev. J. Morrison,New Ideas in India: A Study of Social, Political, and Religious Developments(Edinburgh, 1906); the Earl of Cromer,Modern Egypt, especially Vol. II., pp. 228-243 (London, 1908).[75]For the Westernised élites, see L. Bertrand,Le Mirage Orientale(Paris, 1910); Cromer,op. cit.; A. Métin,L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: Étude Sociale(Paris, 1918); A. Le Chatelier, "Politique musulmane,"Revue du Monde musulman, September, 1910.[76]Chirol,op. cit., pp 321-322.[77]Bertrand,op. cit., p 39. See also Bukhsh,op. cit.; Farquhar,op. cit.; Morrison,op. cit.; R. Mukerjee,The Foundations of Indian Economics(London, 1916); D. H. Dodwell, "Economic Transition in India,"Economic Journal, December, 1910.[78]W. S. Lilly,India and Its Problems, p. 243 (London, 1902).[79]Cromer,op. cit., Vol. II., p. 231.[80]Ibid., p. 228.[81]J. Ramsay Macdonald,The Government of India, pp. 171-172 (London, 1920). On the evils of Westernization, see further: Bukhsh, Cromer, Dodwell, Mukerjee, already cited; Sir W. M. Ramsay, "The Turkish Peasantry of Anatolia,"Quarterly Review, January, 1918; H. M. Hyndman,The Awakening of Asia(New York, 1919); T. Rothstein,Egypt's Ruin(London, 1910); Captain P. Azan,Recherche d'une Solution de la Question indigène en Algérie(Paris, 1903).[82]E. J. Dillon, "Persia,"Contemporary Review, June, 1910.[83]Ramsay Muir, "Europe and the Non-European World,"The New Europe, June 28, 1917.[84]The Earl of Cromer,Political and Literary Essays, p. 5 (London, 1913).[85]For a full discussion of these changes in Western ideas, see myRising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy, especially chaps. vi. and vii.[86]Sidney Low, "The Most Christian Powers,"Fortnightly Review, March, 1912.[87]On this point see also A. Vambéry,Western Culture in Eastern Lands(London, 1906); W. S. Blunt,The Future of Islam(London, 1882); also the two articles by Léon Cahun on intellectual and social developments in the Islamic world during the nineteenth century in Lavisse et Rambaud,Histoire Générale, Vol. XI., chap. xv.; Vol. XII., chap. xiv.[88]See A. Vambéry,Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, chap. vi. (Leipzig, 1875).[89]"X," "La Situation politique de la Perse,"Revue du Monde musulman, June, 1914. As already stated, the editor vouches for this anonymous writer as a distinguished Mohammedan official—"un homme d'étât musulman."[90]Ahmed Emin,The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its Press, p. 108 (Columbia University Ph.D. Thesis, New York, 1914).[91]The ConstantinopleTanine. Quoted fromThe Literary Digest, October 24, 1914, p. 784. This attitude toward the Great War and the European Powers was not confined to Mohammedan peoples; it was common to non-white peoples everywhere. For a survey of this feeling throughout the world, see myRising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy, pp. 13-16.[92]Both the above instances are taken from C. S. Cooper,The Modernizing of the Orient, pp. 339-340 (New York, 1914).[93]An "Unbeliever"—in other words, a Christian.[94]Quoted by A. Woeikof,Le Turkestan russe(Paris, 1914).[95]B. L. Putnam Weale,The Conflict of Colour, p. 193 (London, 1910).[96]Quoted from H. H. Powers,The Great Peace, p. 82 (New York, 1918).[97]L. Bertrand,Le Mirage oriental, pp. 441-442 (Paris, 1910).[98]On this point see the very interesting essay by Meredith Townsend entitled "The Charm of Asia for Asiatics," in his bookAsia and Europe, pp. 120-128.[99]Townsend,op. cit., p. 104.[100]H. Spender, "England, Egypt, and Turkey,"Contemporary Review, October, 1906.[101]Bertrand, pp. 209, 210.[102]For discussion of this Hindu attitude see W. Archer,India and the Future(London, 1918); Young and Ferrers,India in Conflict(London, 1920). Also see Hindu writings of this nature: H. Maitra,Hinduism: The World-Ideal(London, 1916); A. Coomaraswamy,The Dance of Siva(New York, 1918); M. N. Chatterjee, "The World and the Next War,"Journal of Race Development, April, 1916.[103]Archer, pp. 11, 12.[104]Cromer,Political and Literary Essays, p. 25.[105]Townsend,Asia and Europe, p. 128.[106]I have dealt with it at length in myRising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy.[107]Townsend, p. 97.[108]Rev. C. F. Andrews,The Renaissance in India, p. 4 (London, 1911). For other similar accounts of the effect of the Russo-Japanese War upon Oriental peoples generally, see A. M. Low, "Egyptian Unrest,"The Forum, October, 1906; F. Farjanel, "Le Japon et l'Islam,"Revue du Monde musulman, November, 1906; "Oriental Ideals as Affected by the Russo-Japanese War,"American Review of Reviews, February, 1905; A. Vambéry, "Japan and the Mahometan World,"Nineteenth Century and After, April, 1905; Yahya Siddyk,op. cit., p. 42.[109]A. Vambéry, "An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists,"Nineteenth Century and After, April, 1912.[110]For the effect of the war on Asia and Africa, see A. Demangeon,Le Déclin de l'Europe(Paris, 1920); H. M. Hyndman,The Awakening of Asia(New York, 1919); E. D. Morel,The Black Man's Burden(New York, 1920); F. B. Fisher,India's Silent Revolution(New York, 1919); also, myRising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy.

[72]For the larger aspects, see my bookThe Rising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy(New York and London, 1920).

[73]On these points, see Arminius Vambéry,Western Culture in Eastern Lands(London, 1906); also hisLa Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans(Paris, 1898); C. S. Cooper,The Modernizing of the Orient(New York, 1914); S. Khuda Bukhsh,Essays: Indian and Islamic(London, 1912); A. J. Brown, "Economic Changes in Asia,"The Century, March, 1904.

[74]For the effect of the West intellectually and spiritually, see Vambéry,op. cit.; Sir Valentine Chirol,Indian Unrest(London, 1910); J. N. Farquhar,Modern Religious Movements in India(New York, 1915); Rev. J. Morrison,New Ideas in India: A Study of Social, Political, and Religious Developments(Edinburgh, 1906); the Earl of Cromer,Modern Egypt, especially Vol. II., pp. 228-243 (London, 1908).

[75]For the Westernised élites, see L. Bertrand,Le Mirage Orientale(Paris, 1910); Cromer,op. cit.; A. Métin,L'Inde d'aujourd'hui: Étude Sociale(Paris, 1918); A. Le Chatelier, "Politique musulmane,"Revue du Monde musulman, September, 1910.

[76]Chirol,op. cit., pp 321-322.

[77]Bertrand,op. cit., p 39. See also Bukhsh,op. cit.; Farquhar,op. cit.; Morrison,op. cit.; R. Mukerjee,The Foundations of Indian Economics(London, 1916); D. H. Dodwell, "Economic Transition in India,"Economic Journal, December, 1910.

[78]W. S. Lilly,India and Its Problems, p. 243 (London, 1902).

[79]Cromer,op. cit., Vol. II., p. 231.

[80]Ibid., p. 228.

[81]J. Ramsay Macdonald,The Government of India, pp. 171-172 (London, 1920). On the evils of Westernization, see further: Bukhsh, Cromer, Dodwell, Mukerjee, already cited; Sir W. M. Ramsay, "The Turkish Peasantry of Anatolia,"Quarterly Review, January, 1918; H. M. Hyndman,The Awakening of Asia(New York, 1919); T. Rothstein,Egypt's Ruin(London, 1910); Captain P. Azan,Recherche d'une Solution de la Question indigène en Algérie(Paris, 1903).

[82]E. J. Dillon, "Persia,"Contemporary Review, June, 1910.

[83]Ramsay Muir, "Europe and the Non-European World,"The New Europe, June 28, 1917.

[84]The Earl of Cromer,Political and Literary Essays, p. 5 (London, 1913).

[85]For a full discussion of these changes in Western ideas, see myRising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy, especially chaps. vi. and vii.

[86]Sidney Low, "The Most Christian Powers,"Fortnightly Review, March, 1912.

[87]On this point see also A. Vambéry,Western Culture in Eastern Lands(London, 1906); W. S. Blunt,The Future of Islam(London, 1882); also the two articles by Léon Cahun on intellectual and social developments in the Islamic world during the nineteenth century in Lavisse et Rambaud,Histoire Générale, Vol. XI., chap. xv.; Vol. XII., chap. xiv.

[88]See A. Vambéry,Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, chap. vi. (Leipzig, 1875).

[89]"X," "La Situation politique de la Perse,"Revue du Monde musulman, June, 1914. As already stated, the editor vouches for this anonymous writer as a distinguished Mohammedan official—"un homme d'étât musulman."

[90]Ahmed Emin,The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its Press, p. 108 (Columbia University Ph.D. Thesis, New York, 1914).

[91]The ConstantinopleTanine. Quoted fromThe Literary Digest, October 24, 1914, p. 784. This attitude toward the Great War and the European Powers was not confined to Mohammedan peoples; it was common to non-white peoples everywhere. For a survey of this feeling throughout the world, see myRising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy, pp. 13-16.

[92]Both the above instances are taken from C. S. Cooper,The Modernizing of the Orient, pp. 339-340 (New York, 1914).

[93]An "Unbeliever"—in other words, a Christian.

[94]Quoted by A. Woeikof,Le Turkestan russe(Paris, 1914).

[95]B. L. Putnam Weale,The Conflict of Colour, p. 193 (London, 1910).

[96]Quoted from H. H. Powers,The Great Peace, p. 82 (New York, 1918).

[97]L. Bertrand,Le Mirage oriental, pp. 441-442 (Paris, 1910).

[98]On this point see the very interesting essay by Meredith Townsend entitled "The Charm of Asia for Asiatics," in his bookAsia and Europe, pp. 120-128.

[99]Townsend,op. cit., p. 104.

[100]H. Spender, "England, Egypt, and Turkey,"Contemporary Review, October, 1906.

[101]Bertrand, pp. 209, 210.

[102]For discussion of this Hindu attitude see W. Archer,India and the Future(London, 1918); Young and Ferrers,India in Conflict(London, 1920). Also see Hindu writings of this nature: H. Maitra,Hinduism: The World-Ideal(London, 1916); A. Coomaraswamy,The Dance of Siva(New York, 1918); M. N. Chatterjee, "The World and the Next War,"Journal of Race Development, April, 1916.

[103]Archer, pp. 11, 12.

[104]Cromer,Political and Literary Essays, p. 25.

[105]Townsend,Asia and Europe, p. 128.

[106]I have dealt with it at length in myRising Tide of Colour against White World-Supremacy.

[107]Townsend, p. 97.

[108]Rev. C. F. Andrews,The Renaissance in India, p. 4 (London, 1911). For other similar accounts of the effect of the Russo-Japanese War upon Oriental peoples generally, see A. M. Low, "Egyptian Unrest,"The Forum, October, 1906; F. Farjanel, "Le Japon et l'Islam,"Revue du Monde musulman, November, 1906; "Oriental Ideals as Affected by the Russo-Japanese War,"American Review of Reviews, February, 1905; A. Vambéry, "Japan and the Mahometan World,"Nineteenth Century and After, April, 1905; Yahya Siddyk,op. cit., p. 42.

[109]A. Vambéry, "An Approach between Moslems and Buddhists,"Nineteenth Century and After, April, 1912.

[110]For the effect of the war on Asia and Africa, see A. Demangeon,Le Déclin de l'Europe(Paris, 1920); H. M. Hyndman,The Awakening of Asia(New York, 1919); E. D. Morel,The Black Man's Burden(New York, 1920); F. B. Fisher,India's Silent Revolution(New York, 1919); also, myRising Tide of Color against White World-Supremacy.

POLITICAL CHANGE

The Orient's chief handicap has been its vicious political tradition. From earliest times the typical form of government in the East has been despotism—the arbitrary rule of an absolute monarch, whose subjects are slaves, holding their goods, their honours, their very lives, at his will and pleasure. The sole consistent check upon Oriental despotism has been religion. Some critics may add "custom"; but it amounts to the same thing, for in the East custom always acquires a religious sanction. The mantle of religion of course covers its ministers, the priests forming a privileged caste. But, with these exceptions, Oriental despotism has usually known no bounds; and the despot, so long as he respected religion and the priesthood, has been able to act pretty much as he chose. In the very dawn of history we see Pharaoh exhausting all Egypt to gratify his whim for a colossal pyramid tomb, and throughout history Oriental life has been cursed by this fatal political simplicity.

Now manifold human experience has conclusively proved that despotism is a bad form of government in the long run. Of course there is the legendary "benevolent despot"—the "father of his people," surrounded by wise counsellors and abolishing evils by a nod or a stroke of the pen. That is all very well in a fairy-tale. But in real life the "benevolent despot" rarely happens and still more rarely succeeds himself. The "father of his people" usually has a pompous son and a vicious grandson, who bring the people to ruin. The melancholy trinity—David, Solomon, Rehoboam—has reappeared with depressing regularity throughout history.

Furthermore, even the benevolent despot has his limitations. The trouble with all despots, good or bad, is that their rule is entirelypersonal. Everything, in the last analysis, depends on the despot's personal will. Nothing is fixed or certain. The benevolent despot himself may discard his benevolence overnight, and the fate of an empire may be jeopardized by the monarch's infatuation for a woman or by an upset in his digestion.

We Occidentals have, in fact, never known "despotism," in its Simon Pure, Oriental sense; not even under the Roman Empire. Indeed, we can hardly conceive what it means. When we speak of a benevolent despot we usually think of the "enlightened autocrats" of eighteenth-century Europe, such as Frederick the Great. But these monarchs were not "despots" as Orientals understand it. Take Frederick, for example. He was regarded as absolute. But his subjects were not slaves. Those proud Prussian officers, starched bureaucrats, stiff-necked burghers, and stubborn peasants each had his sense of personal dignity and legal status. The unquestioning obedience which they gave Frederick was given not merely because he was their king, but also because they knew that he was the hardest-working man in Prussia and tireless in his devotion to the state. If Frederick had suddenly changed into a lazy, depraved, capricious tyrant, his "obedient" Prussians would have soon showed him that there were limits to his power.

In the Orient it is quite otherwise. In the East "there lies upon the eyes and foreheads of all men a law which is not found in the European decalogue; and this law runs: 'Thou shalt honour and worship the man whom God shall set above thee for thy King: if he cherish thee, thou shalt love him; and if he plunder and oppress thee thou shalt still love him, for thou art his slave and his chattel.'"[111]The Eastern monarch may immure himself in his harem, casting the burdens of state upon the shoulders of a grand vizier. This vizier has thenceforthlimitless power; the life of every subject is in his hands. Yet, any evening, at the pout of a dancing-girl, the monarch may send from his harem to the vizier's palace a negro "mute," armed with the bowstring. And when that black mute arrives, the vizier, doffing his robe of office, and with neither question nor remonstrance, will bare his neck to be strangled. That is real despotism—the despotism that the East has known.

Such is the political tradition of the Orient. And it is surely obvious that under such a tradition neither ordered government nor consistent progress is possible. Eastern history is, in fact, largely a record of sudden flowerings and equally sudden declines. A strong, able man cuts his way to power in a period of confusion and decay. He must be strong and able, or he would not win over other men of similar nature struggling for the coveted prize. His energy and ability soon work wonders. He knows the rough-and-ready way of getting things done. His vigour and resolution supply the driving-power required to compel his subordinates to act with reasonable efficiency, especially since incompetence or dishonesty are punished with the terrible severity of the Persian king who flayed an unjust satrap alive and made the skin into the seat of the official chair on which the new satrap sat to administer justice.

While the master lives, things may go well. But the master dies, and is succeeded by his son. This son, even assuming that he has inherited much of his father's ability, has had the worst possible upbringing. Raised in the harem, surrounded by obsequious slaves and designing women, neither his pride nor his passions have been effectively restrained, and he grows up a pompous tyrant and probably precociously depraved. Such a man will not be apt to look after things as his father did. And as soon as the master's eye shifts, things begin to go to pieces. How can it be otherwise? His father built up no governmental machine, functioning almost automatically, as in the West. His officers worked fromfear or personal loyalty; not out of a patriotic sense of duty or impersonalesprit de corps. Under the grandson, matters get even worse, power slips from his incompetent hands and is parcelled out among many local despots, of whom the strongest cuts his way to power, assuming that the decadent state is not overrun by some foreign conqueror. In either eventuality, the old cycle—David, Solomon, Rehoboam—is finished, and a new cycle begins—with the same destined end.

That, in a nutshell, is the political history of the East. It has, however, been modified or temporarily interrupted by the impact of more liberal political influences, exerted sometimes from special Eastern regions and sometimes from the West. Not all the Orient has been given over to unrelieved despotism. Here and there have been peoples (mostly mountain or pastoral peoples) who abhorred despotism. Such a people have always been the Arabs. We have already seen how the Arabs, fired by Islam, established a mighty caliphate which, in its early days, was a theocratic democracy. Of course we have also seen how the older tradition of despotism reasserted itself over most of the Moslem world, how the democratic caliphate turned into a despotic sultanate, and how the liberty-loving Arabs retired sullenly to their deserts. Political liberalism, like religious liberalism, was crushed and almost forgotten. Almost—not quite; for memories of the Meccan caliphate, like memories of Motazelism, remained in the back of men's minds, ready to come forth again with better days. After all, free Arabia still stood, with every Arab tribesman armed to the teeth to see that it kept free. And then, there was Islam. No court theologian could entirely explain away the fact that Mohammed had said things like "All Believers are brothers" and "All Moslems are free." No court chronicler could entirely expunge from Moslem annals the story of Islam's early days, known as the Wakti-Seadet, or "Age of Blessedness." Even in the darkest timesMoslems of liberal tendencies must have been greatly interested to read that the first caliph, Abu Bekr, after his election by the people, said: "Oh nation! you have chosen me, the most unworthy among you, for your caliph. Support me as long as my actions are just. If otherwise, admonish me, rouse me to a sense of my duty. Truth alone is desirable, and lies are despicable.... As I am the guardian of the weak, obey me only so long as I obey the Sheriat [Divine Law]. But if you see that I deviate but in the minutest details from this law, you need obey me no more."[112]

In fine, no subsequent distortions could entirely obliterate the fact that primitive Islam was the supreme expression of a freedom-loving folk whose religion must necessarily contain many liberal tendencies. Even the sheriat, or canon law, is, as Professor Lybyer states, "fundamentally democratic and opposed in essence to absolutism."[113]Vambéry well summarizes this matter when he writes: "It is not Islam and its doctrines which have devastated the western portion of Asia and brought about the present sad state of things; but it is the tyranny of the Moslem princes, who have wilfully perverted the doctrines of the Prophet, and sought and found maxims in the Koran as a basis for their despotic rule. They have not allowed the faintest suspicion of doubt in matters of religion, and, efficaciously distorting and crushing all liberal principles, they have prevented the dawn of a Moslem Renaissance."[114]

In the opening chapter we saw how Oriental despotism reached its evil maximum in the eighteenth century, and how the Mohammedan Revival was not merely a puritan reformation of religion, but was also in part a political protest against the vicious and contemptible tyrants who misruled the Moslem world. This internalmovement of political liberalism was soon cross-cut by another political current coming in from the West. Comparing the miserable decrepitude of the Moslem East with Europe's prosperity and vigour, thinking Moslems were beginning to recognize their shortcomings, and they could not avoid the conclusion that their woes were in large part due to their wretched governments. Indeed, a few even of the Moslem princes came to realize that there must be some adoption of Western political methods if their countries were to be saved from destruction. The most notable examples of this new type of Oriental sovereign were Sultan Mahmud II of Turkey and Mehemet Ali of Egypt, both of whom came to power about the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Of course none of these reforming princes had the slightest idea of granting their subjects constitutional liberties or of transforming themselves into limited monarchs. They intended to remain absolute, but absolute more in the sense of the "enlightened autocrat" of Europe and less in the sense of the purely Oriental despot. What they wanted were true organs of government—army, civil service, judiciary, etc.—which would function efficiently and semi-automatically as governmental machinery, and not as mere amorphous masses of individuals who had to be continuously prodded and punished by the sovereign in order to get anything done.

Mahmud II, Mehemet Ali, and their princely colleagues persisted in their new policies, but the outcome of these "reforms from above" was, on the whole, disappointing. The monarchs might build barracks and bureaux on European models and fill them with soldiers and bureaucrats in European clothes, but they did not get European results. Most of these "Western-type" officials knew almost nothing about the West, and were therefore incapable of doing things in Western fashion. In fact, they had small heart for the business. Devoidof any sort of enthusiasm for ideas and institutions which they did not comprehend, they applied themselves to the work of reform with secret ill-will and repugnance, moved only by blind obedience to their sovereign's command. As time passed, the military branches did gain some modern efficiency, but the civil services made little progress, adopting many Western bureaucratic vices but few or none of the virtues.

Meanwhile reformers of quite a different sort began to appear: men demanding Western innovations like constitutions, parliaments, and other phenomena of modern political life. Their numbers were constantly recruited from the widening circles of men acquainted with Western ideas through the books, pamphlets, and newspapers which were being increasingly published, and through the education given by schools on the Western model which were springing up. The third quarter of the nineteenth century saw the formation of genuine political parties in Turkey, and in 1876 the liberal groups actually wrung from a weak sultan the grant of a parliament.

These early successes of Moslem political liberalism were, however, followed by a period of reaction. The Moslem princes had become increasingly alarmed at the growth of liberal agitation among their subjects and were determined to maintain their despotic authority. The new Sultan of Turkey, Abdul Hamid, promptly suppressed his parliament, savagely persecuted the liberals, and restored the most uncompromising despotism. In Persia the Shah repressed a nascent liberal movement with equal severity, while in Egypt the spendthrift rule of Khedive Ismail ended all native political life by provoking European intervention and the imposition of British rule. Down to the Young-Turk revolution of 1908 there were few overt signs of liberal agitation in those Moslem countries which still retained their independence. Nevertheless, the agitation was there, working underground. Hundreds of youthful patriotsfled abroad, both to obtain an education and to conduct their liberal propaganda, and from havens of refuge like Switzerland these "Young-Turks," "Young-Persians," and others issued manifestoes and published revolutionary literature which was smuggled into their homelands and eagerly read by their oppressed brethren.[115]

As the years passed, the cry for liberty grew steadily in strength. A young Turkish poet wrote at this time: "All that we admire in European culture as the fruit of science and art is simply the outcome of liberty. Everything derives its light from the bright star of liberty. Without liberty a nation has no power, no prosperity; without liberty there is no happiness; and without happiness, existence, true life, eternal life, is impossible. Everlasting praise and glory to the shining light of freedom!"[116]By the close of the nineteenth century keen-sighted European observers noted the working of the liberal ferment under the surface calm of absolutist repression. Thus, Arminius Vambéry, revisiting Constantinople in 1896, was astounded by the liberal evolution that had taken place since his first sojourn in Turkey forty years before. Although Constantinople was subjected to the severest phase of Hamidian despotism, Vambéry wrote, "The old attachment of Turkey for the absolute régime is done for. We hear much in Europe of the 'Young-Turk' Party; we hear even of a constitutional movement, political emigrés, revolutionary pamphlets. But what we do not realize is the ferment which exists in the different social classes, and which gives us the conviction that the Turk is in progress and is no longer clay in the hands of his despotic potter. In Turkey, therefore, it is not a question of a Young-Turk Party, because every civilized Ottoman belongs to this party."[117]

In this connection we should note the stirrings of unrest that were now rapidly developing in the Eastern lands subject to European political control. By the close of the nineteenth century only four considerable Moslem states—Turkey, Persia, Morocco, and Afghanistan—retained anything like independence from European domination. Since Afghanistan and Morocco were so backward that they could hardly be reckoned as civilized countries, it was only in Turkey and Persia that genuine liberal movements against native despotism could arise. But in European-ruled countries like India, Egypt, and Algeria, the cultural level of the inhabitants was high enough to engender liberal political aspirations as well as that mere dislike of foreign rule which may be felt by savages as well as by civilized peoples.

These liberal aspirations were of course stimulated by the movements against native despotism in Turkey and Persia. Nevertheless, the two sets of phenomena must be sharply distinguished from each other. The Turkish and Persian agitations were essentially movements of liberal reform. The Indian, Egyptian, Algerian, and kindred agitations were essentially movements for independence, with no settled programme as to how that independence should be used after it had been attained. These latter movements are, in fact, "nationalist" rather than liberal in character, and it is in the chapters devoted to nationalism that they will be discussed. The point to be noted here is that they are really coalitions, against the foreign ruler, of men holding very diverse political ideas, embracing as these "nationalist" coalitions do not merely genuine liberals but also self-seeking demagogues and even stark reactionaries who would like to fasten upon their liberatedcountries the yoke of the blackest despotism. Of course all the nationalist groups use the familiar slogans "freedom" and "liberty"; nevertheless, what many of them mean is merely freedom and libertyfrom foreign tutelage—in other words, independence. We must always remember that patriotism has no essential connection with liberalism. The Spanish peasants, who shouted "liberty" as they rose against Napoleon's armies, greeted their contemptible tyrant-king with delirious enthusiasm and welcomed his glorification of absolutism with cries of "Long live chains!"

The period of despotic reaction which had afflicted Turkey and Persia since the beginning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century came dramatically to an end in the year 1908. Both countries exploded into revolution, the Turks deposing the tyrant Abdul Hamid, the Persians rising against their infamous ruler Muhammad Ali Shah, "perhaps the most perverted, cowardly, and vice-sodden monster that had disgraced the throne of Persia in many generations."[118]These revolutions released the pent-up liberal forces which had been slowly gathering strength under the repression of the previous generation, and the upshot was that Turkey and Persia alike blossomed out with constitutions, parliaments, and all the other political machinery of the West.

How the new régimes would have worked in normal times it is profitless to speculate, because, as a matter of fact, the times were abnormal to the highest degree. Unfortunately for the Turks and Persians, they had made their revolutions just when the world was entering that profoundmalaisewhich culminated in the Great War. Neither Turkey nor Persia were allowed time to attempt the difficult process of political transformation. Lynx-eyed Western chancelleries noted every blunder and, in the inevitable weakness of transition, pounced upon them to their undoing. TheGreat War merely completed a process of Western aggression and intervention which had begun some years before.

This virtual absence of specific fact-data renders largely academic any discussion of the much-debated question whether or not the peoples of the Near and Middle East are capable of "self-government"; that is, of establishing and maintaining ordered, constitutional political life. Opinions on this point are at absolute variance. Personally, I have not been able to make up my mind on the matter, so I shall content myself with stating the various arguments without attempting to draw any general conclusion. Before stating these contrasted view-points, however, I would draw attention to the distinction which should be made between the Mohammedan peoples and the non-Mohammedan Hindus of India. Moslems everywhere possess the democratic political example of Arabia as well as a religion which, as regards its own followers at least, contains many liberal tendencies. The Hindus have nothing like this. Their political tradition has been practically that of unrelieved Oriental despotism, the only exceptions being a few primitive self-governing communities in very early times, which never exerted any widespread influence and quickly faded away. As for Brahminism, the Hindu religion, it is perhaps the most illiberal cult which ever afflicted mankind, dividing society as it does into an infinity of rigid castes between which no real intercourse is possible; each caste regarding all those of lesser rank as unclean, polluting creatures, scarcely to be distinguished from animals. It is obvious that with such handicaps the establishment of true self-government will be apt to be more difficult for Hindus than for Mohammedans, and the reader should keep this point in mind in the discussion which follows.

Considering first the attitude of those who do not believe the peoples of the Near and Middle East capable of real self-government in the Western sense either nowor in the immediate future, we find this thesis both ably and emphatically stated by Lord Cromer. Lord Cromer believed that the ancient tradition of despotism was far too strong to be overcome, at least in our time. "From the dawn of history," he asserts, "Eastern politics have been stricken with a fatal simplicity. Do not let us for one moment imagine that the fatally simple idea of despotic rule will readily give way to the far more complex conception of ordered liberty. The transformation, if it ever takes place at all, will probably be the work, not of generations, but of centuries.... Our primary duty, therefore, is, not to introduce a system which, under the specious cloak of free institutions, will enable a small minority of natives to misgovern their countrymen, but to establish one which will enable the mass of the population to be governed according to the code of Christian morality. A freely elected Egyptian parliament, supposing such a thing to be possible, would not improbably legislate for the protection of the slave-owner, if not the slave-dealer, and no assurance can be felt that the electors of Rajputana, if they had their own way, would not re-establish suttee. Good government has the merit of presenting a more or less attainable ideal. Before Orientals can attain anything approaching to the British ideal of self-government, they will have to undergo very numerous transmigrations of political thought." And Lord Cromer concludes pessimistically: "It will probably never be possible to make a Western silk purse out of an Eastern sow's ear."[119]

In similar vein, the veteran English publicist Doctor Dillon, writing after the Turkish and Persian revolutions, had little hope in their success, and ridiculed the current "faith in the sacramental virtue of constitutional government." For, he continues: "No parchment yet manufactured, and no constitution drafted by the sons of men, can do away with the foundations of nationalcharacter. Flashy phrases and elegant declamations may persuade people that they have been transmuted; but they alter no facts, and in Persia's case the facts point to utter incapacity for self-government." Referring to the Persian revolution, Doctor Dillon continues: "At bottom, only names of persons and things have been altered; men may come and men may go, but anarchy goes on for ever.... Financial support of the new government is impossible. For foreign capitalists will not give money to be squandered by filibusters and irresponsible agitators who, like bubbles in boiling water, appear on the surface and disappear at once."[120]

A high French colonial official thus characterizes the Algerians and other Moslem populations of French North Africa: "Our natives need to be governed. They are big children, incapable of going alone. We should guide them firmly, stand no nonsense from them, and crush intriguers and agents of sedition. At the same time, we should protect them, direct them paternally, and especially obtain influence over them by the constant example of our moral superiority. Above all: no vain humanitarian illusions, both in the interest of France and of the natives themselves."[121]

Many observers, particularly colonial officials, have been disappointed with the way Orientals have used experimental first steps in self-government like Advisory Councils granted by the European rulers; have used them, that is, to play politics and grasp for more power, instead of devoting themselves to the duties assigned. As Lord Kitchener said in his 1913 report on the state of Egypt: "Representative bodies can only be safely developed when it is shown that they are capable of performing adequately their present functions, and that there is good hope that they could undertake still more important and arduous responsibilities. If representative government, in its simplest form, is found to be unworkable, there is little prospect of its becoming more useful when its scope is extended. No government would be insane enough to consider that, because an Advisory Council had proved itself unable to carry out its functions in a reasonable and satisfactory manner, it should therefore be given a larger measure of power and control."[122]

These nationalist agitations arise primarily among the native upper classes and Western-educated élites, however successful they may be in inflaming the ignorant masses, who are often quite contented with the material benefits of enlightened European rule. This point is well brought out by a leading American missionary in India, with a lifetime of experience in that country, who wrote some years ago: "The common people of India are, now, on the whole, more contented with their government than they ever were before. It is the classes, rather, who reveal the real spirit of discontent.... If the common people were let alone by the agitators, there would not be a more loyal people on earth than the people of India. But the educated classes are certainly possessed of a new ambition, politically, and will no longer remain satisfied with inferior places of responsibility and lower posts of emolument.... These people have little or no sympathy with the kind of government which is gradually being extended to them. Ultimately they do not ask for representative institutions, which will give them a share in the government of their own land. What they really seek is absolute control. The Brahmin (only five per cent. of the community) believes that he has been divinely appointed to rule the country and would withhold the franchise from all others. The Sudra—the Bourgeois of India—would no more think of giving the ballot to the fifty million Pariahs of the land than he would give it to his dog. It is the British power that has introduced, and nowmaintains, the equality of rights and privileges for all the people of the land."[123]

The apprehension that India, if liberated from British control, might be exploited by a tyrannical Brahmin oligarchy is shared not only by Western observers but also by multitudes of low-caste Hindus, known collectively as the "Depressed Classes". These people oppose the Indian nationalist agitation for fear of losing their present protection under the British "Raj." They believe that India still needs generations of education and social reform before it is fit for "home rule," much less independence, and they have organized into a powerful association the "Namasudra," which is loyalist and anti-nationalist in character.

The Namasudra view-point is well expressed by its leader, Doctor Nair. "Democracy as a catchword," he says, "has already reached India and is widely used. But the spirit of democracy still pauses east of Suez, and will find it hard to secure a footing in a country where caste is strongly intrenched.... I do not want to lay the charge of oppressing the lower castes at the door of any particular caste. All the higher castes take a hand in the game. The Brahmin oppresses all the non-Brahmin castes. The high-caste non-Brahmin oppresses all the castes below him.... We want a real democracy and not an oligarchy, however camouflaged by many high-sounding words. Moreover, if an oligarchy is established now, it will be a perpetual oligarchy. We further say that we should prefer a delayed democracy to an immediate oligarchy, having more trust in a sympathetic British bureaucracy than in an unsympathetic oligarchy of the so-called high castes who have been oppressing us in the past and will do so again but for the British Government. Our attitude is based, not on 'faith' alone, but on the instinct of self-preservation."[124]

Many Mohammedans as well as Hindus feel that India is not ripe for self-government, and that the relaxing of British authority now, or in the immediate future, would be a grave disaster for India itself. The Moslem loyalists reprobate the nationalist agitation for the reasons expressed by one of their representative men, S. Khuda Bukhsh, who remarks: "Rightly or wrongly, I have always kept aloof from modern Indian politics, and I have always held that we should devote more attention to social problems and intellectual advancement and less to politics, which, in our present condition, is an unmixed evil. I am firmly persuaded that we would consult our interest better by leaving politics severely alone.... It is not a handful of men armed with the learning and culture of the West, but it is the masses that must feel, understand, and take an intelligent interest in their own affairs. The infinitesimal educated minority do not constitute the population of India. It is the masses, therefore, that must be trained, educated, brought to the level of unassailable uprightness and devotion to their country. This goal is yet far beyond measurable reach, but until we attain it our hopes will be a chimera, and our efforts futile and illusory. Even the educated minority have scarcely cast off the swaddling-clothes of political infancy, or have risen above the illusions of power and the ambitions of fortune. We have yet to learn austerity of principle and rectitude of conduct. Nor can we hope to raise the standard of private and public morality so long as we continue to subordinate the interest of our community and country to our own."[125]

Such pronouncements as these from considerable portions of the native population give pause even to those liberal English students of Indian affairs who are convinced of the theoretical desirability of Indian home rule. As one of these, Edwyn Bevan, says: "When Indian Nationalists ask for freedom, they meanautonomy; they want to get rid of the foreigner. Our answer as given in the reforms is:[126]'Yes, autonomy you shall have, but on one condition—that you have democracy as well. We will give up the control as soon as there is an Indian people which can control its native rulers; we will not give up the control to an Indian oligarchy.' This is the root of the disagreement between those who say that India might have self-government immediately and those who say that India can only become capable of self-government with time. For the former, by 'self-government', mean autonomy, and it is perfectly true that India might be made autonomous immediately. If the foreign control were withdrawn to-day, some sort of indigenous government or group of governments would, no doubt, after a period of confusion, come into being in India. But it would not be democratic government; it would be the despotic rule of the stronger or more cunning."[127]

The citations just quoted portray the standpoint of those critics, both Western and Oriental, who maintain that the peoples of the Near and Middle East are incapable of self-government in our sense, at least to-day or in the immediate future. Let us now examine the views of those who hold a more optimistic attitude. Some observers stress strongly Islam's liberal tendencies as a foundation on which to erect political structures in the modern sense. Vambéry says, "Islam is still the most democratic religion in the world, a religion favouring both liberty and equality. If there ever was a constitutional government, it was that of the first Caliphs."[128]A close English student of the Near East declares: "Tribal Arabia has the only true form of democratic government, and the Arab tribesman goes armed to make sure that it continues democratic—as many a would-bedespot knows to his cost."[129]Regarding the Young-Turk revolution of 1908, Professor Lybyer remarks: "Turkey was not so unprepared for parliamentary institutions as might at first sight appear. There lay hidden some precedent, much preparation, and a strong desire, for parliamentary government. Both the religious and the secular institutions of Turkey involve precedents for a parliament. Mohammed himself conferred with the wisest of his companions. The Ulema[130]have taken counsel together up to the present time. The Sacred Law (Sheriat) is fundamentally democratic and opposed in essence to absolutism. The habit of regarding it as fundamental law enables even the most ignorant of Mohammedans to grasp the idea of a Constitution." He points out that the early sultans had their "Divan," or assemblage of high officials, meeting regularly to give the sultan information and advice, while more recently there have been a Council of State and a Council of Ministers. Also, there were the parliaments of 1877 and 1878. Abortive though these were and followed by Hamidian absolutism, they were legal precedents, never forgotten. From all this Professor Lybyer concludes: "The Turkish Parliament may therefore be regarded, not as a complete innovation, but as an enlargement and improvement of familiar institutions."[131]

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