FOOTNOTES:

However, despite the French Government's firmness, there is an increasing public criticism of the "Syrian adventure," not merely from radical anti-imperialist quarters, but from unimpeachably conservative circles as well. The editor of one of the most conservative French political periodicals has stated: "Jealous of itsautonomy, the Arab people, liberated from the Ottoman yoke, do not desire a new foreign domination. To say that Syria demands our protection is a lie. Syria wishes to be entirely independent."[191]And recently Senator Victor Bérard, one of France's recognized authorities on Eastern affairs made a speech in the French Senate strongly criticising the Government's Syrian policy from the very start and declaring that a "free Syria" was "a question of both interest and honour."

Certainly, the French Government, still so unyielding toward the Arabs, has reversed its attitude toward the Turks. Side-stepping the Sèvres Treaty, it has lately agreed on provisional peace terms with the Turkish nationalists, actually agreeing to evacuate Cilicia. In fact, both France and England know that the Sèvres Treaty is unworkable, and that Turkish possession of virtually the whole of Asia Minor will have to be recognized.

In negotiating with Mustapha Kemal, France undoubtedly hopes to get him to throw over the Arabs. But this is scarcely thinkable. The whole trend of events betokens an increasing solidarity of the Near Eastern peoples against Western political control. A most remarkable portent in this direction is the Pan-Islamic conference held at Sivas early in 1921. This conference, called to draw up a definite scheme for effective Moslem co-operation the world over, was attended not merely by the high orthodox Moslem dignitaries and political leaders, but also by heterodox chiefs like the Shiah Emir of Kerbela, the Imam Yahya, and the Zaidite Emir of Yemen—leaders of heretical sects between whom and the orthodox Sunnis co-operation had previously been impossible. Most notable of all, the press reports state that the conference was presidedover by no less a personage than El Sennussi. This may well be so, for we have already seen how the Sennussi have always worked for a close union of all Islam against Western domination.

Such is the situation in the Near East—a situation very grave and full of trouble. The most hopeful portent is the apparent awakening of the British Government to the growing perils of the hour, and its consequent modifications of attitude. The labours of men like Lord Milner and Sir Percy Cox, however hampered by purblind influences, can scarcely be wholly barren of results. Such men are the diplomatic descendants of Chatham and of Durham; the upholders of that great political tradition which has steered the British Empire safely through crises that appeared hopeless.

On the other hand, the darkest portent in the Near East is the continued intransigeance of France. Steeped in its old traditions, French policy apparently refuses to face realities. If an explosion comes, as come it must unless France modifies her attitude; if, some dark day, thirty or forty French battalions are caught in a simoom of Arab fury blowing out of the desert and are annihilated in a new Adowa; the regretful verdict of many versed in Eastern affairs can only be: "French policy has deserved it."

Leaving the Near Eastern problem at this critical juncture to the inscrutable solution of the future, let us now turn to the great political problem of the Middle East—the nationalist movement in India.

FOOTNOTES:[138]For these early stages of the Turkish nationalist movement, see Vambéry,La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans; and hisWestern Culture in Eastern Lands. Also the articles by Léon Cahun inLavisse et Rambaud, previously cited; and L. Rousseau,L'Effort Ottoman(Paris, 1907).[139]Bérard,Le Sultan, l'Islam et les Puissances, p. 16 (Paris, 1907).[140]Cited by Bérard, p. 19.[141]Cited by Bérard, p. 20.[142]Le Revéil de la Nation arabe, by Negib Azoury (Paris, 1905).[143]The semi-legendary founder of the Ottoman Empire.[144]The texts of both the above documents can be most conveniently found in E. Jung,Les Puissances devant la Révolte arabe: La Crise mondiale de Demain, pp. 23-25 (Paris, 1906).[145]A good analysis of Arab affairs on the eve of the Great War is that of the Moslem publicist "X," "Les Courants politiques dans le Monde arabe,"Revue du Monde musulman, December, 1913. Also see G. W. Bury,Arabia Infelix, or the Turks in Yemen(London, 1915).[146]For Arab affairs during the Great War, see E. Jung, "L'Indépendance arabe et la Révolte actuelle,"La Revue, 1 August, 1916; I. D. Levine, "Arabs versus Turks,"American Review of Reviews, November, 1916; A. Musil,Zur Zeitgeschichte von Arabien(Leipzig, 1918); G. W. Bury,Pan-Islam(London, 1919); S. Mylrea, "The Politico-Religious Situation in Arabia,"The Moslem World, July, 1919; L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution,"Asia, April, May, June, 1920.[147]Georg Schweinfurth,Die Wiedergeburt Ägyptens im Lichte eines aufgeklärten Islam(Berlin, 1895).[148]Low,Egypt in Transition, p. 260 (London, 1914).[149]The Asiatic Review, April, 1914.[150]"L'Égypte et les Débuts du Protectorat,"Revue des Sciences Politiques, 15 June, 1915.[151]Mohammed Farid Bey, "L'Égypte et la Guerre,"Revue Politique Internationale, May, 1915.[152]Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, "Die ägyptische Frage,"Asien, November, 1916.[153]A good summary of Berber history is H. Weisgerber,Les Blancs d'Afrique(Paris, 1910).[154]For analyses of differences between Arabs and Berbers, see Caix de Saint-Aymour,Arabes et Kabyles(Paris, 1891); A. Bel,Coup d'Œil sur l'Islam en Berbérie(Paris, 1917).[155]For short historical summary, see A. C. Coolidge, "The European Reconquest of North Africa,"American Historical Review, July, 1912.[156]For these nationalist movements in French North Africa, see A. Servier,Le Nationalisme musulman(Constantine, Algeria, 1913); P. Lapie,Les Civilisations tunisiennes(Paris, 1898); P. Millet, "Les Jeunes-Algériens,"Revue de Paris, 1 November, 1913.[157]A good analysis of the pre-revolutionary reformist movements is found in "X," "La Situation politique de la Perse,"Revue du Monde musulman, June, 1914. See also Vambéry,Western Culture in Eastern Lands; General Sir T. E. Gordon, "The Reform Movement in Persia,"Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, 13 March, 1907.[158]See W. Morgan Shuster,The Strangling of Persia(New York, 1912). Also, for earlier phase of the revolution, see E. G. Browne,The Revolution in Persia(London, 1910).[159]E. G. Browne, "The Present Situation in Persia,"Contemporary Review, November, 1912.[160]Vambéry,La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans, pp. 11-12.[161]For the Tartar revival, see S. Brobovnikov, "Moslems in Russia,"The Moslem World, January, 1911; Févret, "Les Tatars de Crimée,"Revue du Monde musulman, August, 1907; A. Le Chatelier, "Les Musulmans russes,"Revue du Monde musulman, December, 1906; Fr. von Mackay, "Die Erweckung Russlands asiatischen Völkerschaften,"Deutsche Rundschau, March, 1918; Arminius Vambéry,Western Culture in Eastern Lands; H. Williams, "The Russian Mohammedans,"Russian Review, February, 1914; "X," "Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme,"Revue du Monde musulman, March, 1913.[162]For these activities, see article by "X," quoted above; also Ahmed Emin,The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press(New York, 1914).[163]For these Pan-Turanian tendencies in Hungary and Bulgaria, see my article "Pan-Turanism,"American Political Science Review, February, 1917.[164]See article by "X," quoted above; also his article "Les Courants politiques dans la Turquie contemporaine,"Revue du Monde musulman, December, 1912.[165]Ex-Chief of General Staff (Ottoman) Ernst Paraquin, in theBerliner Tageblatt, January 24, 1920. For Turkish nationalist activities and attitudes during the war, see further I. D. 1199—A Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism. Compiled by the Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty(London, 1919); E. F. Benson,Crescent and Iron Cross(London, 1918); M. A. Czaplicka,The Turks of Central Asia: An Inquiry into the Pan-Turanian Problem(Oxford, 1918); H. Morgenthau,Ambassador Morgenthau's Story(New York, 1918); Dr. Harry Stürmer,Two War-Years in Constantinople(New York, 1917); A. Mandelstam, "The Turkish Spirit,"New Europe, April 22, 1920.[166]For Pan-Arab developments, see A. Musil,Zur Zeitgeschichte von Arabien(Leipzig, 1918); M. Pickthall, "Turkey, England, and the Present Crisis,"Asiatic Review, October 1, 1914; A. Servier,Le Nationalisme musulman; Sheick Abd-el-Aziz Schauisch, "Das Machtgebiet der arabischen Sprache,"Preussische Jahrbücher, September, 1916.[167]Literally "House of Islam." All non-Moslem lands are collectively known as "Dar-ul-Harb" or "House of War."[168]I. e., the organized group of followers of a particular religion.[169]Mohammed Ali, "Le Mouvement musulman dans l'Inde,"Revue Politique Internationale, January, 1914. He headed the so-called "Khilafat Delegation" sent by the Indian Moslems to England in 1919 to protest against the partition of the Ottoman Empire by the peace treaties.[170]A. Servier,Le Nationalisme musulman, p. 181.[171]For Pan-Islamic nationalism, besides Servier and Mohammed Ali, quoted above, see A. Le Chatelier,L'Islam au dix-neuvième Siècle(Paris, 1888); same author, "Politique musulmane,"Revue du Monde Musulman, September, 1910; Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam,"Nineteenth Century and After, July, 1919; G. Démorgny,La Question Persane, pp. 23-31 (Paris, 1916); W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia, Past and Present,"Quarterly Review, October, 1920.[172]Egyptian White Book: Collection of Official Correspondence of the Egyptian Delegation to the Peace Conference (Paris, 1919).[173]G. Civimini, in theCorriere della Sera, December 30, 1919.[174]Madame Jehan d'Ivray, "En Égypte,"Revue de Paris, September 15, 1920. Madame d'Ivray cites other picturesque incidents of a like character. See also Annexes toEgyptian White Book, previously quoted. These Annexes contain numerous depositions, often accompanied by photographs, alleging severities and atrocities by the British troops.[175]Contained in the press statements previously mentioned.[176]Sir M. McIlwraith, "Egyptian Nationalism,"Edinburgh Review, July, 1919. See also Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, "The Future in Egypt,"New Europe, November 6, 1919.[177]For unfortunate aspects of this delay, see Sir Valentine Chirol, "Conflicting Policies in the East,"New Europe, July 1, 1920.[178]For a good account of Lawrence and his work, see series of articles by L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution,"Asia, April, May, June, July, 1920.[179]A notable example is General Maude's proclamation to the Mesopotamian Arabs in March, 1917.[180]Article xxii.[181]From a speech delivered September 19, 1919.[182]For examples of this pre-war imperialist propaganda, see G. Poignant, "Les Intérêts français en Syrie,"Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, March 1-16, 1913. Among other interesting facts, the author cites Premier Poincaré's declaration before the Chamber of Deputies, December 21, 1912: "I need not remark that in the Lebanon and Syria particularly we have traditional interests and that we intend to make them respected." See also J. Atalla, "Les Trois Solutions de la Question syrienne,"Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, October 16, 1913; L. Le Fur,Le Protectorat de la France sur les Catholiques d'Orient(Paris, 1914).[183]Quoted by Senator E. Flandrin in his article "Nos Droits en Syrie et en Palestine,"[1]Revue Hebdomadaire, June 5, 1915. For other examples of French imperialist propaganda, see, besides above article, C. G. Bassim,La Question du Liban(Paris, 1915); H. Baudouin, "La Syrie: Champ de Bataille politique,"La Revue Mondiale, February 1-15, 1920; Comte Cressaty,La Syrie française(Paris, 1916); F. Laudet, "La France du Levant,"Revue Hebdomadaire, March 1, 1919.[184]Baudouin,supra. For other violent anti-British comment, see Laudet,supra.[185]For sharp British criticisms of the French attitude in Syria, see Beckles Wilson, "Our Amazing Syrian Adventure,"National Review, September, 1920; W. Urinowski, "The Arab Cause,"Balkan Review, September, 1920. Both of these writers were officers in the British forces in the Arab area. See also strong articles by "Taira" in theBalkan Review, August and October, 1920.[186]For accounts of French severities, see articles just quoted.[187]B. G. Gaulis inL'Opinion, April 24, 1920.[188]Le Populaire, February 16, 1920.[189]For the details of these events, see my article on Persia inThe Century, January, 1920.[190]Statement given to the press in August, 1920.[191]Henri de Chambon, editor ofLa Revue Parlementaire. Quoted by Beckles Wilson, "Our Amazing Syrian Adventure,"National Review, September, 1920.

[138]For these early stages of the Turkish nationalist movement, see Vambéry,La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans; and hisWestern Culture in Eastern Lands. Also the articles by Léon Cahun inLavisse et Rambaud, previously cited; and L. Rousseau,L'Effort Ottoman(Paris, 1907).

[139]Bérard,Le Sultan, l'Islam et les Puissances, p. 16 (Paris, 1907).

[140]Cited by Bérard, p. 19.

[141]Cited by Bérard, p. 20.

[142]Le Revéil de la Nation arabe, by Negib Azoury (Paris, 1905).

[143]The semi-legendary founder of the Ottoman Empire.

[144]The texts of both the above documents can be most conveniently found in E. Jung,Les Puissances devant la Révolte arabe: La Crise mondiale de Demain, pp. 23-25 (Paris, 1906).

[145]A good analysis of Arab affairs on the eve of the Great War is that of the Moslem publicist "X," "Les Courants politiques dans le Monde arabe,"Revue du Monde musulman, December, 1913. Also see G. W. Bury,Arabia Infelix, or the Turks in Yemen(London, 1915).

[146]For Arab affairs during the Great War, see E. Jung, "L'Indépendance arabe et la Révolte actuelle,"La Revue, 1 August, 1916; I. D. Levine, "Arabs versus Turks,"American Review of Reviews, November, 1916; A. Musil,Zur Zeitgeschichte von Arabien(Leipzig, 1918); G. W. Bury,Pan-Islam(London, 1919); S. Mylrea, "The Politico-Religious Situation in Arabia,"The Moslem World, July, 1919; L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution,"Asia, April, May, June, 1920.

[147]Georg Schweinfurth,Die Wiedergeburt Ägyptens im Lichte eines aufgeklärten Islam(Berlin, 1895).

[148]Low,Egypt in Transition, p. 260 (London, 1914).

[149]The Asiatic Review, April, 1914.

[150]"L'Égypte et les Débuts du Protectorat,"Revue des Sciences Politiques, 15 June, 1915.

[151]Mohammed Farid Bey, "L'Égypte et la Guerre,"Revue Politique Internationale, May, 1915.

[152]Abd-el-Malek Hamsa, "Die ägyptische Frage,"Asien, November, 1916.

[153]A good summary of Berber history is H. Weisgerber,Les Blancs d'Afrique(Paris, 1910).

[154]For analyses of differences between Arabs and Berbers, see Caix de Saint-Aymour,Arabes et Kabyles(Paris, 1891); A. Bel,Coup d'Œil sur l'Islam en Berbérie(Paris, 1917).

[155]For short historical summary, see A. C. Coolidge, "The European Reconquest of North Africa,"American Historical Review, July, 1912.

[156]For these nationalist movements in French North Africa, see A. Servier,Le Nationalisme musulman(Constantine, Algeria, 1913); P. Lapie,Les Civilisations tunisiennes(Paris, 1898); P. Millet, "Les Jeunes-Algériens,"Revue de Paris, 1 November, 1913.

[157]A good analysis of the pre-revolutionary reformist movements is found in "X," "La Situation politique de la Perse,"Revue du Monde musulman, June, 1914. See also Vambéry,Western Culture in Eastern Lands; General Sir T. E. Gordon, "The Reform Movement in Persia,"Proceedings of the Central Asian Society, 13 March, 1907.

[158]See W. Morgan Shuster,The Strangling of Persia(New York, 1912). Also, for earlier phase of the revolution, see E. G. Browne,The Revolution in Persia(London, 1910).

[159]E. G. Browne, "The Present Situation in Persia,"Contemporary Review, November, 1912.

[160]Vambéry,La Turquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant Quarante Ans, pp. 11-12.

[161]For the Tartar revival, see S. Brobovnikov, "Moslems in Russia,"The Moslem World, January, 1911; Févret, "Les Tatars de Crimée,"Revue du Monde musulman, August, 1907; A. Le Chatelier, "Les Musulmans russes,"Revue du Monde musulman, December, 1906; Fr. von Mackay, "Die Erweckung Russlands asiatischen Völkerschaften,"Deutsche Rundschau, March, 1918; Arminius Vambéry,Western Culture in Eastern Lands; H. Williams, "The Russian Mohammedans,"Russian Review, February, 1914; "X," "Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme,"Revue du Monde musulman, March, 1913.

[162]For these activities, see article by "X," quoted above; also Ahmed Emin,The Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by its Press(New York, 1914).

[163]For these Pan-Turanian tendencies in Hungary and Bulgaria, see my article "Pan-Turanism,"American Political Science Review, February, 1917.

[164]See article by "X," quoted above; also his article "Les Courants politiques dans la Turquie contemporaine,"Revue du Monde musulman, December, 1912.

[165]Ex-Chief of General Staff (Ottoman) Ernst Paraquin, in theBerliner Tageblatt, January 24, 1920. For Turkish nationalist activities and attitudes during the war, see further I. D. 1199—A Manual on the Turanians and Pan-Turanianism. Compiled by the Geographical Section of the Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff, Admiralty(London, 1919); E. F. Benson,Crescent and Iron Cross(London, 1918); M. A. Czaplicka,The Turks of Central Asia: An Inquiry into the Pan-Turanian Problem(Oxford, 1918); H. Morgenthau,Ambassador Morgenthau's Story(New York, 1918); Dr. Harry Stürmer,Two War-Years in Constantinople(New York, 1917); A. Mandelstam, "The Turkish Spirit,"New Europe, April 22, 1920.

[166]For Pan-Arab developments, see A. Musil,Zur Zeitgeschichte von Arabien(Leipzig, 1918); M. Pickthall, "Turkey, England, and the Present Crisis,"Asiatic Review, October 1, 1914; A. Servier,Le Nationalisme musulman; Sheick Abd-el-Aziz Schauisch, "Das Machtgebiet der arabischen Sprache,"Preussische Jahrbücher, September, 1916.

[167]Literally "House of Islam." All non-Moslem lands are collectively known as "Dar-ul-Harb" or "House of War."

[168]I. e., the organized group of followers of a particular religion.

[169]Mohammed Ali, "Le Mouvement musulman dans l'Inde,"Revue Politique Internationale, January, 1914. He headed the so-called "Khilafat Delegation" sent by the Indian Moslems to England in 1919 to protest against the partition of the Ottoman Empire by the peace treaties.

[170]A. Servier,Le Nationalisme musulman, p. 181.

[171]For Pan-Islamic nationalism, besides Servier and Mohammed Ali, quoted above, see A. Le Chatelier,L'Islam au dix-neuvième Siècle(Paris, 1888); same author, "Politique musulmane,"Revue du Monde Musulman, September, 1910; Sir T. Morison, "England and Islam,"Nineteenth Century and After, July, 1919; G. Démorgny,La Question Persane, pp. 23-31 (Paris, 1916); W. E. D. Allen, "Transcaucasia, Past and Present,"Quarterly Review, October, 1920.

[172]Egyptian White Book: Collection of Official Correspondence of the Egyptian Delegation to the Peace Conference (Paris, 1919).

[173]G. Civimini, in theCorriere della Sera, December 30, 1919.

[174]Madame Jehan d'Ivray, "En Égypte,"Revue de Paris, September 15, 1920. Madame d'Ivray cites other picturesque incidents of a like character. See also Annexes toEgyptian White Book, previously quoted. These Annexes contain numerous depositions, often accompanied by photographs, alleging severities and atrocities by the British troops.

[175]Contained in the press statements previously mentioned.

[176]Sir M. McIlwraith, "Egyptian Nationalism,"Edinburgh Review, July, 1919. See also Hon. W. Ormsby-Gore, "The Future in Egypt,"New Europe, November 6, 1919.

[177]For unfortunate aspects of this delay, see Sir Valentine Chirol, "Conflicting Policies in the East,"New Europe, July 1, 1920.

[178]For a good account of Lawrence and his work, see series of articles by L. Thomas, "Lawrence: The Soul of the Arabian Revolution,"Asia, April, May, June, July, 1920.

[179]A notable example is General Maude's proclamation to the Mesopotamian Arabs in March, 1917.

[180]Article xxii.

[181]From a speech delivered September 19, 1919.

[182]For examples of this pre-war imperialist propaganda, see G. Poignant, "Les Intérêts français en Syrie,"Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, March 1-16, 1913. Among other interesting facts, the author cites Premier Poincaré's declaration before the Chamber of Deputies, December 21, 1912: "I need not remark that in the Lebanon and Syria particularly we have traditional interests and that we intend to make them respected." See also J. Atalla, "Les Trois Solutions de la Question syrienne,"Questions diplomatiques et coloniales, October 16, 1913; L. Le Fur,Le Protectorat de la France sur les Catholiques d'Orient(Paris, 1914).

[183]Quoted by Senator E. Flandrin in his article "Nos Droits en Syrie et en Palestine,"[1]Revue Hebdomadaire, June 5, 1915. For other examples of French imperialist propaganda, see, besides above article, C. G. Bassim,La Question du Liban(Paris, 1915); H. Baudouin, "La Syrie: Champ de Bataille politique,"La Revue Mondiale, February 1-15, 1920; Comte Cressaty,La Syrie française(Paris, 1916); F. Laudet, "La France du Levant,"Revue Hebdomadaire, March 1, 1919.

[184]Baudouin,supra. For other violent anti-British comment, see Laudet,supra.

[185]For sharp British criticisms of the French attitude in Syria, see Beckles Wilson, "Our Amazing Syrian Adventure,"National Review, September, 1920; W. Urinowski, "The Arab Cause,"Balkan Review, September, 1920. Both of these writers were officers in the British forces in the Arab area. See also strong articles by "Taira" in theBalkan Review, August and October, 1920.

[186]For accounts of French severities, see articles just quoted.

[187]B. G. Gaulis inL'Opinion, April 24, 1920.

[188]Le Populaire, February 16, 1920.

[189]For the details of these events, see my article on Persia inThe Century, January, 1920.

[190]Statement given to the press in August, 1920.

[191]Henri de Chambon, editor ofLa Revue Parlementaire. Quoted by Beckles Wilson, "Our Amazing Syrian Adventure,"National Review, September, 1920.

NATIONALISM IN INDIA

India is a land of paradox. Possessing a fundamental geographical unity, India has never known real political union save that recently imposed externally by the British "Raj." Full of warlike stocks, India has never been able to repel invaders. Occupied by many races, these races have never really fused, but have remained distinct and mutually hostile, sundered by barriers of blood, speech, culture, and creed. Thus India, large and populous as Europe or China, has neither, like China, evolved a generalized national unity; nor, like Europe, has developed a specialized national diversity; but has remained an amorphous, unstable indeterminate, with tendencies in both directions which were never carried to their logical conclusion.

India's history has been influenced mainly by three great invasions: the Aryan invasion, commencing about 1500b.c.; the Mohammedan invasion, extending roughly froma.d.1000 to 1700, and the English invasion, beginning abouta.d.1750 and culminating a century later in a complete conquest which has lasted to the present day.

The Aryans were a fair-skinned people, unquestionably of the same general stock as ourselves. Pressing down from Central Asia through those north-western passes where alone land-access is possible to India, elsewhere impregnably guarded by the mountain wall of the Himalayas, the Aryans subdued the dark-skinned Dravidian aborigines, and settled down as masters. This conquest was, however, superficial and partial. The bulk of the Aryans remained in the north-west,the more adventurous spirits scattering thinly over the rest of the vast peninsula. Even in the north large areas of hill-country and jungle remained in the exclusive possession of the aborigines, while very few Aryans ever penetrated the south. Over most of India, therefore, the Aryans were merely a small ruling class superimposed upon a much more numerous subject population. Fearing to be swallowed up in the Dravidian ocean, the Aryans attempted to preserve their political ascendancy and racial purity by the institution of "caste," which has ever since remained the basis of Indian social life. Caste was originally a "colour line." But it was enforced not so much by civil law as by religion. Society was divided into three castes: Brahmins, or priests; Kshatriyas, or warriors; and Sudras, or workers. The Aryans monopolized the two upper castes, the Sudras being the Dravidian subject population. These castes were kept apart by a rigorous series of religious taboos. Intermarriage, partaking of food and drink, even physical propinquity, entailed ceremonial defilement sometimes inexpiable. Disobedience to these taboos was punished with the terrible penalty of "outcasting," whereby the offender did not merely fall to a lower rank in the caste hierarchy but sank even below the Sudra and became a "Pariah," or man of no-caste, condemned to the most menial and revolting occupations, and with no rights which even the Sudra was bound to respect. Thus Indian society was governed, not by civil, but by ceremonially religious law; while, conversely, the nascent Indian religion ("Brahminism") became not ethical but social in character.

These things produced the most momentous consequences. As a "colour line," caste worked very imperfectly. Despite its prohibitions, even the Brahmins became more or less impregnated with Dravidian blood.[192]But as a social system caste continued to function in ways peculiar to itself. The three original castes gradually subdivided into hundreds and even thousands of sub-castes. These sub-castes had little or nothing of the original racial significance. But they were all just as exclusive as the primal trio, and the outcome was a shattering of Indian society into a chaos of rigid social atoms, between which co-operation or even understanding was impossible. The results upon Indian history are obvious. Says a British authority: "The effect of this permanent maintenance of human types is that the population is heterogeneous to the last degree. It is no question of rich and poor, of town and country, of employer and employed: the differences lie far deeper. The population of a district or a town is a collection of different nationalities—almost different species—of mankind that will not eat or drink or intermarry with one another, and that are governed in the more important affairs of life by committees of their own. It is hardly too much to say that by the caste system the inhabitants of India are differentiated into over two thousand species, which, in the intimate physical relations of life, have as little in common as the inmates of a zoological garden."[193]

Obviously, a land socially atomized and politically split into many principalities was destined to fall before the first strong invader. This invader was Islam. The Mohammedans attacked India soon after their conquest of Persia, but these early attacks were mere border raids without lasting significance. The first realMohammedan invasion was that of Mahmud of Ghazni, an Afghan prince, ina.d.1001. Following the road taken by the Aryans ages before, Mahmud conquered north-western India, the region known as the Punjab. Islam had thus obtained a firm foothold in India, and subsequent Moslem leaders spread gradually eastward until most of northern India was under Moslem rule. The invaders had two notable advantages: they were fanatically united against the despised "Idolaters," and they drew many converts from the native population. The very antithesis of Brahminism, Islam, with its doctrine that all Believers are brothers, could not fail to attract multitudes of low-castes and out-castes, who by conversion might rise to the status of the conquerors. This is the main reason why the Mohammedans in India to-day number more than 70,000,000—over one-fifth of the total population. These Indian Moslems are descended, not merely from Afghan, Turkish, Arab, and Persian invaders, but even more from the millions of Hindu converts who embraced Islam.

For many generations the Moslem hold on India was confined to the north. Then, early in the sixteenth century, the great Turko-Mongol leader Baber entered India and founded the "Mogul" Empire. Baber and his successors overran even the south, and united India politically as it had never been united before. But even this conquest was superficial. The Brahmins, threatened with destruction, preached a Hindu revival; the Mogul dynasty petered out; and at the beginning of the eighteenth century the Mogul Empire collapsed, leaving India a welter of warring principalities, Mohammedan and Hindu, fighting each other for religion, for politics, or for sheer lust of plunder.

Out of this anarchy the British rose to power. The British were at first merely one of several other European elements—Portuguese, Dutch, and French—who established small settlements along the Indian coasts.The Europeans never dreamed of conquering India while the Mogul power endured. In fact, the British connection with India began as a purely trading venture—the East India Company. But when India collapsed into anarchy the Europeans were first obliged to acquire local authority to protect their "factories," and later were lured into more ambitious schemes by the impotence of petty rulers. Gradually the British ousted their European rivals and established a solid political foothold in India. The one stable element in a seething chaos, the British inevitably extended their authority. At first they did so reluctantly. The East India Company long remained primarily a trading venture, aiming at dividends rather than dominion. However, it later evolved into a real government with an ambitious policy of annexation. This in turn awakened the fears of many Indians and brought on the "Mutiny" of 1857. The mutiny was quelled, the East India Company abolished, and India came directly under the British Crown, Queen Victoria being later proclaimed Empress of India. These events in turn resulted not only in a strengthening of British political authority but also in an increased penetration of Western influences of every description. Roads, railways, and canals opened up and unified India as never before; the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez facilitated communication with Europe; while education on European lines spread Western ideas.

Over this rapidly changing India stood the British "Raj"—a system of government unique in the world's history. It was the government of a few hundred highly skilled administrative experts backed by a small professional army, ruling a vast agglomeration of subject peoples. It was frankly an absolute paternalism, governing as it saw fit, with no more responsibility to the governed than the native despots whom it had displaced. But it governed well. In efficiency, honesty, and sense of duty, the government of India is probablythe best example of benevolent absolutism that the world has ever seen. It gave India profound peace. It played no favourites, holding the scales even between rival races, creeds, and castes. Lastly, it made India a real political entity—something which India had never been before. For the first time in its history, India was firmly united under one rule—the rule of thePax Britannica.

Yet the very virtues of British rule sowed the seeds of future trouble. Generations grew up, peacefully united in unprecedented acquaintanceship, forgetful of past ills, seeing only European shortcomings, and, above all, familiar with Western ideas of self-government, liberty, and nationality. In India, as elsewhere in the East, there was bound to arise a growing movement of discontent against Western rule—a discontent varying from moderate demands for increasing autonomy to radical demands for immediate independence.

Down to the last quarter of the nineteenth century, organized political agitation against the British "Raj" was virtually unknown. Here and there isolated individuals uttered half-audible protests, but these voices found no popular echo. The Indian masses, pre-occupied with the ever-present problem of getting a living, accepted passively a government no more absolute, and infinitely more efficient, than its predecessors. Of anything like self-conscious Indian "Nationalism" there was virtually no trace.

The first symptom of organized discontent was the formation of the "Indian National Congress" in the year 1885. The very name showed that the British Raj, covering all India, was itself evoking among India's diverse elements a certain common point of view and aspiration. However, the early congresses were very far from representing Indian public opinion, in the general sense of the term. On the contrary, these congresses represented merely a small class of professional men, journalists, and politicians, all of them trainedin Western ideas. The European methods of education which the British had introduced had turned out an Indianintelligentsia, conversant with the English language and saturated with Westernism.

This newintelligentsia, convinced as it was of the value of Western ideals and achievements, could not fail to be dissatisfied with many aspects of Indian life. In fact, its first efforts were directed, not so much to politics, as to social and economic reforms like the suppression of child-marriage, the remarriage of widows, and wider education. But, as time passed, matters of political reform came steadily to the fore. Saturated with English history and political philosophy as they were, the Indian intellectuals felt more and more keenly their total lack of self-government, and aspired to endow India with those blessings of liberty so highly prized by their English rulers. Soon a vigorous native press developed, preaching the new gospel, welding the intellectuals into a self-conscious unity, and moulding a genuine public opinion. By the close of the nineteenth century the Indianintelligentsiawas frankly agitating for sweeping political innovations like representative councils, increasing control over taxation and the executive, and the opening of the public services to Indians all the way up the scale.

Down to the closing years of the nineteenth century Indian discontent was, as already said, confined to a small class of more or less Europeanized intellectuals who, despite their assumption of the title, could hardly be termed "Nationalists" in the ordinary sense of the word. With a few exceptions, their goal was neither independence nor the elimination of effective British oversight, but rather the reforming of Indian life along Western lines, including a growing degree of self-government under British paramount authority.

But by the close of the nineteenth century there came a change in the situation. India, like the rest of the Orient, was stirring to a new spirit of political andracial self-consciousness. True nationalist symptoms began to appear. Indian scholars delved into their musty chronicles and sacred texts, and proclaimed the glories of India's historic past. Reformed Hindu sects like the Arya Somaj lent religious sanctions. The little band of Europeanized intellectuals was joined by other elements, thinking, not in terms of piecemeal reforms on Western models, but of a new India, rejuvenated from its own vital forces, and free to work out its own destiny in its own way. From the nationalist ranks now arose the challenging slogan: "Bandemataram!" ("Hail, Motherland!")[194]

The outstanding feature about this early Indian nationalism was that it was a distinctively Hindu movement. The Mohammedans regarded it with suspicion or hostility. And for this they had good reasons. The ideal of the new nationalists was Aryan India, the India of the "Golden Age." "Back to the Vedas!" was a nationalist watchword, and this implied a veneration for the past, including a revival of aggressive Brahminism. An extraordinary change came over theintelligentsia. Men who, a few years before, had proclaimed the superiority of Western ideas and had openly flouted "superstitions" like idol-worship, now denounced everything Western and reverently sacrificed to the Hindu gods. The "sacred soil" of India must be purged of the foreigner.[195]But the "foreigner," as thesenationalists conceived him, was not merely the Englishman; he was the Mohammedan as well. This was stirring up the past with a vengeance. For centuries the great Hindu-Mohammedan division had run like a chasm athwart India. It had never been closed, but it had been somewhat veiled by the neutral overlordship of the British Raj. Now the veil was torn aside, and the Mohammedans saw themselves menaced by a recrudescence of militant Hinduism like that which had shattered the Mogul Empire after the death of the Emperor Aurangzeb two hundred years before. The Mohammedans were not merely alarmed; they were infuriated as well. Remembering the glories of the Mogul Empire just as the Hindus did the glories of Aryan India, they considered themselves the rightful lords of the land, and had no mind to fall under the sway of despised "Idolaters." The Mohammedans had no love for the British, but they hated the Hindus, and they saw in the British Raj a bulwark against the potential menace of hereditary enemies who outnumbered them nearly five to one. Thus the Mohammedans denounced Hindu nationalism and proclaimed their loyalty to the Raj. To be sure, the Indian Moslems were also affected by the general spirit of unrest which was sweeping over the East. They too felt a quickened sense of self-consciousness. But, being a minority in India, their feelings took the form, not of territorial "patriotism," but of those more diffused sentiments, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Islamic nationalism, which we have already discussed.[196]

Early Indian nationalism was not merely Hindu in character; it was distinctly "Brahminical" as well. More and more the Brahmins became the driving-power of the movement, seeking to perpetuate their supremacy in the India of the morrow as they had enjoyed it in the India of the past. But this aroused apprehension in certain sections of Hindu society. Many low-castes and Pariahs began to fear that an independent or even autonomous India might be ruled by a tyrannical Brahmin oligarchy which would deny them the benefits they now enjoyed under British rule.[197]Also, many of the Hindu princes disliked the thought of a theocratic régime which might reduce them to shadows.[198]Thus the nationalist movement stood out as an alliance between the Brahmins and the Western-educatedintelligentsia, who had pooled their ambitions in a programme for jointly ruling India.

Quickened by this ambition and fired by religious zeal, the nationalist movement rapidly acquired a fanatical temper characterized by a mystical abhorrence of everything Western and a ferocious hatred of all Europeans. The Russo-Japanese War greatly inflamed this spirit, and the very next year (1905) an act of the Indian Government precipitated the gathering storm. This act was the famous Partition of Bengal. The partition was a mere administrative measure, with no political intent. But the nationalists made it a "vital issue," and about this grievance they started an intense propaganda that soon filled India with seditious unrest. The leading spirit in this agitation was Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who has been called "the father of Indianunrest." Tilak typified the nationalist movement. A Brahmin with an excellent Western education, he was the sworn foe of English rule and Western civilization. An able propagandist, his speeches roused his hearers to frenzy, while his newspaper, theYugantar, of Calcutta, preached a campaign of hate, assassination, and rebellion. Tilak's incitements soon produced tangible results, numerous riots, "dacoities," and murders of Englishmen taking place. And of course theYugantarwas merely one of a large number of nationalist organs, some printed in the vernacular and others in English, which vied with one another in seditious invective.

The violence of the nationalist press may be judged by a few quotations. "Revolution," asserted theYugantar, "is the only way in which a slavish society can save itself. If you cannot prove yourself a man in life, play the man in death. Foreigners have come and decided how you are to live. But how you are to die depends entirely upon yourself." "Let preparations be made for a general revolution in every household! The handful of police and soldiers will never be able to withstand this ocean of revolutionists. Revolutionists may be made prisoners and may die, but thousands of others will spring into their places. Do not be afraid! With the blood of heroes the soil of Hindustan is ever fertile. Do not be downhearted. There is no dearth of heroes. There is no dearth of money; glory awaits you! A single frown (a few bombs) from your eyes has struck terror into the heart of the foe! The uproar of panic has filled the sky. Swim with renewed energy in the ocean of bloodshed!" The assassination note was vehemently stressed. Said S. Krishnavarma inThe Indian Sociologist: "Political assassination is not murder, and the rightful employment of physical force connotes 'force used defensively against force used aggressively.'" "The only subscription required," stated theYugantar, "is that every reader shall bring the head of a European." Not even women and childrenwere spared. Commenting on the murder of an English lady and her daughter, theYugantarexclaimed exultantly: "Many a female demon must be killed in course of time, in order to extirpate the race of Asuras from the breast of the earth." The fanaticism of the men (usually very young men) who committed these assassinations may be judged by the statement of the murderer of a high English official, Sir Curzon-Wyllie, made shortly before his execution: "I believe that a nation held down by foreign bayonets is in a perpetual state of war. Since open battle is rendered impossible to a disarmed race, I attacked by surprise; since guns were denied to me, I drew my pistol and fired. As a Hindu I feel that wrong to my country is an insult to the gods. Her cause is the cause of Shri Ram; her service is the service of Shri Krishna. Poor in wealth and intellect, a son like myself has nothing else to offer the Mother but his own blood, and so I have sacrificed the same on Her altar. The only lesson required in India at present is to learn how to die, and the only way to teach it is to die ourselves; therefore I die and glory in my martyrdom. This war will continue between England and India so long as the Hindee and English races last, if the present unnatural relation does not cease."[199]

The government's answer to this campaign of sedition and assassination was of course stern repression. The native press was muzzled, the agitators imprisoned or executed, and the hands of the authorities were strengthened by punitive legislation. In fact, so infuriated was the European community by the murders and outrages committed by the nationalists that many Englishmen urged the withdrawal of such political privileges as did exist, the limiting of Western education, and the establishment of extreme autocratic rule. Theseangry counsels were at once caught up by the nationalists, resulted in fresh outrages, and were answered by more punishment and fresh menaces. Thus the extremists on both sides lashed each other to hotter fury and worsened the situation. For several years India seethed with an unrest which jailings, hangings, and deportations did little to allay.

Presently, however, things took at least a temporary turn for the better. The extremists were, after all, a small minority, and cool heads, both British and Indian, were seeking a way out of theimpasse. Conservative Indian leaders like Mr. Gokhale condemned terrorism, and besought their countrymen to seek the realization of their aspirations by peaceful means. On the other hand, liberal-minded Englishmen, while refusing to be stampeded, sought a programme of conciliation. Indian affairs were then in the hands of the eminent Liberal statesman John Morley, and the fruit of his labours was the Indian Councils Act of 1909. The act was a distinct departure from the hitherto almost unlimited absolutism of British rule in India. It gave the Indian opposition greatly increased opportunities for advice, criticism, and debate, and it initiated a restricted scheme of elections to the legislative bodies which it established. The salutary effect of these concessions was soon apparent. The moderate nationalist elements, while not wholly satisfied, accepted the act as an earnest of subsequent concessions and as a proof of British good-will. The terrorism and seditious plottings of the extremists, while not stamped out, were held in check and driven underground. King George's visit to India in 1911 evoked a wave of loyal enthusiasm which swept the peninsula and augured well for the future.

The year 1911 was the high-water mark of this era of appeasement following the storms of 1905-9. The years after 1911 witnessed a gradual recrudescence of discontent as the first effect of the Councils Act wore off and the sense of unfulfilled aspiration sharpened theappetite for more. In fact, during these years, Indian nationalism was steadily broadening its base. In one sense this made for stability, for the nationalist movement ceased to be a small minority of extremists and came more under the influence of moderate leaders like Mr. Gokhale, who were content to work for distant goals by evolutionary methods. It did, however, mean an increasing pressure on the government for fresh devolutions of authority. The most noteworthy symptom of nationalist growth was the rallying of a certain section of Mohammedan opinion to the nationalist cause. The Mohammedans had by this time formed their own organization, the "All-India Moslem League." The league was the reverse of nationalist in complexion, having been formed primarily to protect Moslem interests against possible Hindu ascendancy. Nevertheless, as time passed, some Mohammedans, reassured by the friendly attitude and promises of the Hindu moderates, abandoned the league's anti-Hindu attitude and joined the moderate nationalists, though refraining from seditious agitation. Indeed, the nationalists presently split into two distinct groups, moderates and extremists. The extremists, condemned by their fellows, kept up a desultory campaign of violence, largely directed by exiled leaders who from the shelter of foreign countries incited their followers at home to seditious agitation and violent action.

Such was the situation in India on the outbreak of the Great War; a situation by no means free from difficulty, yet far less troubled than it had been a few years before. Of course, the war produced an increase of unrest and a certain amount of terrorism. Yet India, as a whole, remained quiet. Throughout the war India contributed men and money unstintedly to the imperial cause, and Indian troops figured notably on European, Asiatic, and African battlefields.

However, though the war-years passed without any serious outbreak of revolutionary violence, it must notbe thought that the far more widespread movement for increasing self-government had been either quenched or stilled. On the contrary, the war gave this movement fresh impetus. Louder and louder swelled the cry for not merely good government but government acceptable to Indian patriots because responsible to them. The very fact that India had proved her loyalty to the Empire and had given generously of her blood and treasure were so many fresh arguments adduced for the grant of a larger measure of self-direction. Numerous were the memoranda presented to the British authorities by various sections of Indian public opinion. These memoranda were an accurate reflection of the different shades of Indian nationalism. The ultimate goal of all was emancipation from British tutelage, but they differed widely among themselves as to how and when this emancipation was to be attained. The most conservative contented themselves with asking for modified self-government under British guidance, while the more ambitious asked for the full status of a dominion of the British Empire like Australia and Canada. The revolutionary element naturally held aloof, recognizing that only violence could serve their aim—immediate and unqualified independence.

Of course even the more moderate nationalist demands implied great changes in the existing governmental system and a diminution of British control such as the Government of India was not prepared at present to concede. Nevertheless, the government met these demands by a conciliatory attitude foreshadowing fresh concessions in the near future. In 1916 the Viceroy, Lord Harding, said: "I do not for a moment wish to discountenance self-government for India as a national ideal. It is a perfectly legitimate aspiration and has the sympathy of all moderate men, but in the present position of India it is not idealism that is needed but practical politics. We should do our utmost to grapple with realities, and lightly to raise extravagant hopes andencourage unrealizable demands can only tend to delay and will not accelerate political progress. I know this is the sentiment of wise and thoughtful Indians. Nobody is more anxious than I am to see the early realization of the legitimate aspirations of India, but I am equally desirous of avoiding all danger of reaction from the birth of institutions which experience might prove to be premature."

As a matter of fact, toward the close of 1917, Mr. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, came out from England with the object of thoroughly canvassing Indian public opinion on the question of constitutional reform. For months the problem was carefully weighed, conferences being held with the representatives of all races, classes, and creeds. The result of these researches was a monumental report signed by Mr. Montagu and by the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, and published in July, 1918.

The report recommended concessions far beyond any which Great Britain had hitherto made. It frankly envisaged the gift of home rule for India "as soon as possible," and went on to state that the gift was to be conferred not because of Indian agitation, but because of "the faith that is in us." There followed these memorable words: "We believe profoundly that the time has come when the sheltered existence which we have given India cannot be prolonged without damage to her national life; that we have a richer gift for her people than any that we have yet bestowed on them; that nationhood within the Empire represents something better than anything India has hitherto attained; that the placid, pathetic contentment of the masses is not the soil on which such Indian nationhood will grow, and that in deliberately disturbing it we are working for her highest good."

The essence of the report was its recommendation of the principle of "diarchy," or division of governmental responsibility between councillors nominated by theBritish executive and ministers chosen from elective legislative bodies. This diarchy was to hold for both the central and provincial governments. The legislatures were to be elected by a much more extensive franchise than had previously prevailed and were to have greatly enlarged powers. Previously they had been little more than advisory bodies; now they were to become "legislatures" in the Western sense, though their powers were still limited, many powers, particularly that of the purse, being still "reserved" to the executive. The British executive thus retained ultimate control and had the last word; thus no true "balance of power" was to exist, the scales being frankly weighted in favour of the British Raj. But the report went on to state that this scheme of government was not intended to be permanent; that it was frankly a transitional measure, a school in which the Indian people was to serve its apprenticeship, and that when these first lessons in self-government had been learned, India would be given a thoroughly representative government which would not only initiate and legislate, but which would also control the executive officials.

The Montagu-Chelmsford Report was exhaustively discussed both in India and in England, and from these frank discussions an excellent idea of the Indian problem in all its challenging complexity can be obtained. The nationalists split sharply on the issue, the moderates welcoming the report and agreeing to give the proposed scheme of government their loyal co-operation, the extremists condemning the proposals as a snare and a sham. The moderate attitude was stated in a manifesto signed by their leaders, headed by the eminent Indian economist Sir Dinshaw Wacha, which stated: "The proposed scheme forms a complicated structure capable of improvement in some particulars, especially at the top, but is nevertheless a progressive measure. The reforms are calculated to make the provinces of India reach the goal of complete responsible government.On the whole, the proposals are evolved with great foresight and conceived in a spirit of genuine sympathy with Indian political aspirations, for which the distinguished authors are entitled to the country's gratitude." The condemnation of the radicals was voiced by leaders like Mr. Tilak, who urged "standing fast by the Indian National Congress ideal," and Mr. Bepin Chander Pal, who asserted: "It is my deliberate opinion that if the scheme is accepted, the Government will be more powerful and more autocratic than it is to-day."

Extremely interesting was the protest of the anti-nationalist groups, particularly the Mohammedans and the low-caste Hindus. For it is a fact significant of the complexity of the Indian problem that many millions of Indians fear the nationalist movement and look upon the autocracy of the British Raj as a shield against nationalist oppression and discrimination. The Mohammedans of India are, on the question of self-government for India, sharply divided among themselves. The majority still dislike and fear the nationalist movement, owing to its "Hindu" character. A minority, however, as already stated, have rallied to the nationalist cause. This minority grew greatly in numbers during the war-years, their increased friendliness being due not merely to desire for self-government but also to anger at the Allies' policy of dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and kindred policies in the Near and Middle East.[200]The Hindu nationalists were quick to sympathize with the Mohammedans on these external matters, and the result was a cordiality between the two elements never known before.

The predominance of high-caste Brahmins in the nationalist movement explains the opposition of many low-caste Hindus to Indian home rule. So great is the low-caste fear of losing their present protection under the British Raj and of being subjected to the dominationof a high-caste Brahmin oligarchy that in recent years they have formed an association known as the "Namasudra," led by well-known persons like Doctor Nair.[201]The Namasudra points out what might happen by citing the Brahminic pressure which occurs even in such political activity as already exists. For example: in many elections the Brahmins have terrorized low-caste voters by threatening to "out-caste" all who should not vote the Brahmin ticket, thus making them "Pariahs"—untouchables, with no rights in Hindu society.

Such protests against home rule from large sections of the Indian population gave pause even to many English students of the problem who had become convinced of home rule's theoretical desirability. And of course they greatly strengthened the arguments of those numerous Englishmen, particularly Anglo-Indians, who asserted that India was as yet unfit for self-government. Said one of these objectors inThe Round Table: "The masses care not one whit for politics; Home Rule they do not understand. They prefer the English District Magistrate. They only ask to remain in eternal and bovine quiescence. They feel confidence in the Englishman because he has always shown himself the 'Protector of the Poor,' and because he is neither Hindu nor Mussulman, and has a reputation for honesty." And Lord Sydenham, in a detailed criticism of the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals, stated: "There are many defects in our system of government in India. Reforms are needed; but they must be based solely upon considerations of the welfare of the masses of India as a whole. If the policy of 'deliberately' disturbing their 'contentment' which the Viceroy and the Secretary of State have announced is carried out; if, through the 'whispering galleries of the East,' the word is passed that the only authority that can maintain law and order and secure the gradual building-up of an Indian nation is weakening; if, as is proposed, the great public servicesare emasculated; then the fierce old animosities will break out afresh, and, assisted by a recrudescence of the reactionary forces of Brahminism, they will within a few years bring to nought the noblest work which the British race has ever accomplished."[202]

Yet other English authorities on Indian affairs asserted that the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals were sound and must be enacted into law if the gravest perils were to be averted. Such were the opinions of men like Lionel Curtis[203]and Sir Valentine Chirol, who stated: "It is of the utmost importance that there should be no unnecessary delay. We have had object-lessons enough as to the danger of procrastination, and in India as elsewhere time is on the side of the troublemakers.... We cannot hope to reconcile Indian Extremism. What we can hope to do is to free from its insidious influence all that is best in Indian public life by opening up a larger field of useful activity."[204]

As a matter of fact, the Montagu-Chelmsford Report was accepted as the basis of discussion by the British Parliament, and at the close of the year 1919 its recommendations were formally embodied in law. Unfortunately, during the eighteen months which elapsed between the publication of the report and its legal enactment, the situation in India had darkened. Militant unrest had again raised its head, and India was more disturbed than it had been since 1909.

For this there were several reasons. In the first place, all those nationalist elements who were dissatisfied with the report began coquetting with the revolutionary irreconcilables and encouraging them to fresh terrorism, perhaps in the hope of stampeding the BritishParliament into wider concessions than the report had contemplated. But there were other causes of a more general nature. The year 1918 was a black one for India. The world-wide influenza epidemic hit India particularly hard, millions of persons being carried off by the grim plague. Furthermore, India was cursed with drought, the crops failed, and the spectre of famine stalked through the land. The year 1919 saw an even worse drought, involving an almost record famine. By the late summer it was estimated that millions of persons had died of hunger, with millions more on the verge of starvation. And on top of all came an Afghan war, throwing the north-west border into tumult and further unsettling the already restless Mohammedan element.

The upshot was a wave of unrest revealing itself in an epidemic of riots, terrorism, and seditious activity which gave the British authorities serious concern. So critical appeared the situation that a special commission was appointed to investigate conditions, and the report handed in by its chairman, Justice Rowlatt, painted a depressing picture of the strength of revolutionary unrest. The report stated that not only had a considerable number of young men of the educated upper classes become involved in the promotion of anarchical movements, but that the ranks were filled with men belonging to other social orders, including the military, and that there was clear evidence of successful tampering with the loyalty of the native troops. To combat this growing disaffection, the Rowlatt committee recommended fresh repressive legislation.

Impressed with the gravity of the committee's report, the Government of India formulated a project of law officially known as the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act, though generally known as the Rowlatt Bill. By its provisions the authorities were endowed with greatly increased powers, such as the right to search premises and arrest persons on mere suspicionof seditious activity, without definite evidence of the same.

The Rowlatt Bill at once aroused bitter nationalist opposition. Not merely extremists, but many moderates, condemned it as a backward step and as a provoker of fresh trouble. When the bill came up for debate in the Indian legislative body, the Imperial Legislative Council, all the native members save one opposed it, and the bill was finally passed on strictly racial lines by the votes of the appointed English majority. However, the government considered the bill an absolute pre-requisite to the successful maintenance of order, and it was passed into law in the spring of 1919.

This brought matters to a head. The nationalists, stigmatizing the Rowlatt law as the "Black Cobra Act," were unmeasured in their condemnation. The extremists engineered a campaign of militant protest and decreed the date of the bill's enactment, April 6, 1919, as a national "Humiliation Day." On that day monster mass-meetings were held, at which nationalist orators made seditious speeches and inflamed the passions of the multitude. "Humiliation Day" was in fact the beginning of the worst wave of unrest since the mutiny. For the next three months a veritable epidemic of rioting and terrorism swept India, particularly the northern provinces. Officials were assassinated, English civilians were murdered, and there was wholesale destruction of property. At some moments it looked as though India were on the verge of revolution and anarchy.

However, the government stood firm. Violence was countered with stern repression. Riotous mobs were mowed down wholesale by rifle and machine-gun fire or were scattered by bombs dropped from low-flying aeroplanes. The most noted of these occurrences was the so-called "Amritsar Massacre," where British troops fired into a seditious mass-meeting, killing 500 and wounding 1500 persons. In the end the government mastered the situation. Order was restored, the seditiousleaders were swept into custody, and the revolutionary agitation was once more driven underground. The enactment of the Montagu-Chelmsford reform bill by the British Parliament toward the close of the year did much to relax the tension and assuage discontent, though the situation of India was still far from normal. The deplorable events of the earlier part of 1919 had roused animosities which were by no means allayed. The revolutionary elements, though driven underground, were more bitter and uncompromising than ever, while opponents of home rule were confirmed in their conviction that India could not be trusted and that any relaxation of autocracy must spell anarchy.

This was obviously not the best mental atmosphere in which to apply the compromises of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. In fact, the extremists were determined that they should not be given a fair trial, regarding the reforms as a snare which must be avoided at all costs. Recognizing that armed rebellion was still impossible, at least for the present, the extremists evolved the idea known as "non-co-operation." This was, in fact, a gigantic boycott of everything British. Not merely were the new voters urged to stay away from the polls and thus elect no members to the proposed legislative bodies, but lawyers and litigants were to avoid the courts, taxpayers refuse to pay imposts, workmen to go on strike, shopkeepers to refuse to buy or sell British-made goods, and even pupils to leave the schools and colleges. This wholesale "out-casting" of everything British would make the English in India a new sort of Pariah—"untouchables"; the British Government and the British community in India would be left in absolute isolation, and the Raj, rendered unworkable, would have to capitulate to the extremist demands for complete self-government.

Such was the non-co-operation idea. And the idea soon found an able exponent: a certain M. K. Gandhi, who had long possessed a reputation for personalsanctity and thus inspired the Hindu masses with that peculiar religious fervour which certain types of Indian ascetics have always known how to arouse. Gandhi's propaganda can be judged by the following extract from one of his speeches: "It is as amazing as it is humiliating that less than 100,000 white men should be able to rule 315,000,000 Indians. They do so somewhat, undoubtedly, by force, but more by securing our co-operation in a thousand ways and making us more and more helpless and dependent on them, as time goes forward. Let us not mistake reformed councils (legislatures), more law-courts, and even governorships for real freedom or power. They are but subtler methods of emasculation. The British cannot rule us by mere force. And so they resort to all means, honourable and dishonourable, in order to retain their hold on India. They want India's billions and they want India's man-power for their imperialistic greed. If we refuse to supply them with men and money, we achieve our goal: namely,Swaraj,[205]equality, manliness."

The extreme hopes of the non-co-operation movement have not been realized. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms have been put in operation, and the first elections under them were held at the beginning of 1921. But the outlook is far from bright. The very light vote cast at the elections revealed the effect of the non-co-operation movement, which showed itself in countless other ways, from strikes in factories to strikes of school-children. India to-day is in a turmoil of unrest. And this unrest is not merely political; it is social as well. The vast economic changes which have been going on in India for the past half-century have profoundly disorganized Indian society. These changes will be discussed in later chapters. The point to be here noted is that the extremist leaders are capitalizing social discontent and are unquestionably in touch with Bolshevik Russia. Meanwhile the older factors of disturbanceare by no means eliminated. The recent atrocious massacre of dissident Sikh pilgrims by orthodox Sikh fanatics, and the three-cornered riots between Hindus, Mohammedans, and native Christians which broke out about the same time in southern India, reveal the hidden fires of religious and racial fanaticism that smoulder beneath the surface of Indian life.

The truth of the matter is that India is to-day a battle-ground between the forces of evolutionary and revolutionary change. It is an anxious and a troubled time. The old order is obviously passing, and the new order is not yet fairly in sight. The hour is big with possibilities of both good and evil, and no one can confidently predict the outcome.

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