By this was meant that there should be, pending further parleys, no invasion of Servia by Austria and none of Austria by Russia.To this the German Foreign Minister opposed a categorical refusal.
On the same day the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had "a long and earnest conversation" with the Austrian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He expressed the earnest hope that
"something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Machio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been aggressors."
"something would be done before Servia was actually invaded. Baron Machio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been aggressors."
The Russian Ambassador then said that his country would do all it could to keep the Servians quiet,
"and even to fall back before an Austrian advance in order to gain time."
"and even to fall back before an Austrian advance in order to gain time."
He urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be furnished with full powers to continue discussions with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
"who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent power."
"who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could be fairly asked of her as an independent power."
The only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that it would be submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
[English "White Paper," No. 56.]
On the same day the German Ambassador at Paris called upon the French Foreign Office and strongly insisted on the "exclusion of all possibility of mediation or of conference," and yet contemporaneously the Imperial German Chancellor was advising London that he had
"started the efforts toward mediation in Vienna, immediately in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had further communicated to the Austrian Foreign Minister the wish of the Russian Foreign Minister for a direct talk in Vienna."
"started the efforts toward mediation in Vienna, immediately in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had further communicated to the Austrian Foreign Minister the wish of the Russian Foreign Minister for a direct talk in Vienna."
What hypocrisy! In the formal German defense, the official apologist for that country, after stating his conviction
"that an act of mediation could not take into consideration the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an Austro-Hungarian affair,"
"that an act of mediation could not take into consideration the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an Austro-Hungarian affair,"
claimed that Germany had transmitted Sir Edward Grey's further suggestion to Vienna, in which Austria-Hungary was urged
"either to agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations";
"either to agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or to look upon it as a basis for further conversations";
but the Austro-Hungarian Government—playing the rôle of the wicked partner of the combination—"in full appreciation of our mediatory activity," (so says the German "White Paper" with sardonic humor,) replied to this proposition that, coming as it did after the opening of hostilities, "it was too late."
Does any reasonable man question for a moment that, if Germany had done something more than merely "transmit" these wise and pacific suggestions, Austria would have complied with the suggestions of its powerful ally or that Austria would have suspended its military operations if Germany had given any intimation of such a wish?
On the following day, July 28, the door was further closed on any possibility of compromise when the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs
"said, quietly but firmly,that no discussion could be accepted on the basis of the Servian note; that war would be declared today, and that the well-known pacific character of the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just and inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned."
"said, quietly but firmly,that no discussion could be accepted on the basis of the Servian note; that war would be declared today, and that the well-known pacific character of the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just and inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned."
To this arrogant and unreasonable contention that Europe must accept the guarantee of the Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness of Austria's quarrel the British Ambassador suggested "the larger aspect of the question," namely, the peace of Europe, and to this "larger aspect," which should have given any reasonable official some ground for pause, the Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he
"had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be postponed."
"had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be postponed."
[English "White Paper," No. 62.]
The private conversations between Russia and Austria having thus failed, Russia returned to the proposition of a European conference to preserve its peace. Its Ambassador in Vienna on July 28 had a conference with Berchtold and pointed to the dangers to the peace of Europe and the desirability of good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia.
To this Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well the seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a frank explanation with the Cabinet at St. Petersburg.
"He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the energetic measures which it had taken against Servia,could now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note."
"He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the energetic measures which it had taken against Servia,could now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian note."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 45.]
On the same day, July 28, the German Imperial Chancellor sent for the English Ambassador and excused his failure to accept the proposal of conference of the neutral powers, on the ground that he did not think it would be effective,
"because such a conference would in his opinion have the appearance of an 'Areopagus' consisting of two powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining powers."
"because such a conference would in his opinion have the appearance of an 'Areopagus' consisting of two powers of each group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining powers."
After engaging in this pitiful and insincere quibble, and when reminded of Servia's conciliatory reply, amounting to a virtual surrender,
"his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss the Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern,with which Russia had nothing to do."
"his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss the Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern,with which Russia had nothing to do."
[English "White Paper," No. 71.]
At this point the rules of the countries intervened in the dispute. The Kaiser, having returned from Norway, telegraphed the Czar, under date of July 28, that he was
"exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia,"
"exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia,"
and invoked the Czar's aid.
[German "White Paper," Annex 20.]
If the Kaiser were sincere, and he may have been,his attitude was not that of his Foreign Office. Upon the face of the record we have only his own assurance that he was doing everything to preserve peace, but the steps that he took or the communications he made to influence Austriaare not found in the formal defense which the German Government has given to the world. The Kaiser can only convince the world of his innocence of the crime of his Potsdam camarilla by giving the worldthe textof any advice he gave the Austrian officials. He has produced his telegrams to the Czar.Where are those he presumably sent to Francis Joseph or Count Berchtold? Where are the instructions he gave his own Ambassadors or Foreign Minister?
It is significant that on the same day Sazonof telegraphed to Count Benckendorff:
"My conversations with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is rather favorable to the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria,"
"My conversations with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is rather favorable to the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria,"
and he adds, and history will vindicate him in the conclusion, that
"the Berlin Cabinet, which might have been able to arrest the whole development of this crisis, seems to exercise no action on its ally."
"the Berlin Cabinet, which might have been able to arrest the whole development of this crisis, seems to exercise no action on its ally."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 43.]
On July 29 Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that he had that night seen the German Chancellor, who had "just returned from Potsdam," where he had presumably seen the Kaiser. The German Chancellor then showed clearly how the wind was blowing in making the suggestion to Sir Edward Goschen that if England would remain neutral, Germany would agree to guarantee that she would not take any French territory. When asked about the French colonies, no assurance was given.
[English "White Paper," No. 85.]
Later in the day the German Chancellor again saw the English Ambassador, and expressed regret
"that events had marched too rapidly, and that it was therefore too late to act upon your [Sir Edward Grey's] suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion."
"that events had marched too rapidly, and that it was therefore too late to act upon your [Sir Edward Grey's] suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion."
[English "White Paper," No. 75.]
On the same day the Ambassador for Germany at St. Petersburg called upon Sazonof and expressed himself in favor of further explanations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, to which Sazonof assented. [Russian "Orange Paper," No. 49.] On the same day Sir Edward Grey asked the German Government
"to suggest any form of procedureunder which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle,could be applied."
"to suggest any form of procedureunder which the idea of mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the German Government in principle,could be applied."
To which the German Foreign Office replied that it could not act for fear that if they made to their ally any suggestion that looked like pressure it might "cause them [Austria] to precipitate matter and present a fait accompli." [See letter of Sir Edward Goschen to Sir Edward Grey, July 29—English "White Paper," No. 70.]
This was the last and worst of the quibbles put forth to gain time while Austria was making progress toward Belgrade. It assumes that Austria might not only fail to respect the wish in a matter of common concern of its more powerful ally, but that it might act in disregard of Germany's wish. This strains human credulity to the breaking point. Did the German Secretary of State keep a straight face when he uttered this sardonic pleasantry? It may be the duty of a diplomat to lie on occasion, but is it ever necessary to utter such a stupid falsehood? The German Secretary of State sardonically added in the same conversation that he was not sure that the effort for peace had not hastened the declaration of war, as though the declaration of war against Servia had not been planned and expected from the first.
As a final effort to meet quibbles, the British Ambassador at Berlin then suggested that after Austria had satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be favorable for four disinterested powers to discuss the situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing graver complications.
To this proposal the German Secretary of State seemingly acquiesced, but, as usual,nothing whatever was done. [English "White Paper," No. 76.] It is true that on July 29 Sir Edward Grey was assured by the German Ambassador that the German Foreign Office was
"endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia,"
"endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings in Servia,"
but again the communications which the German Foreign Office sent to Vienna on this pointhave never yet been disclosed to the world.
[English "White Paper," No. 84.]
In this same conference Sir Edward Grey
"urged that theGerman Government should suggest any methodby which the influence of the four powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operationby any method that Germany could suggestif mine were not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible, if only Germany would 'press the button' in the interests of peace."
"urged that theGerman Government should suggest any methodby which the influence of the four powers could be used together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be put into operationby any method that Germany could suggestif mine were not acceptable. In fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible, if only Germany would 'press the button' in the interests of peace."
[English "White Paper," No. 84.]
The difficulty was, however, that Germany never "pressed the button," although obviously it would have been easy for her to do so, as the stronger and more influential member of the Double Alliance.
On the same day the Austrian Government left a memorandum with Sir Edward Grey to the effect that Count Mensdorff said that the war with Servia must proceed.
On the night of July 29 the British Ambassador at Berlin was informed that the German Foreign Office "had not had time to send an answer yet" to the proposal that Germany suggest the form of mediation, but that the question had been referred to the Austro-Hungarian Government with a request as to "what would satisfy them."
[English "White Paper," No. 107.]
On the following day the German Ambassador informed Sir Edward Grey that the German Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in the region of the frontier, to promise not to advance further, while the powers endeavored to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria, but if Germany ever exercised any such pressure upon Vienna,no evidence of it has ever been given to the world. Certainly it was not very effective, and for the reasons mentioned it is impossible to conclude that the advice of Germany, if in good faith, would not have been followed by its weaker ally.
From all that appears in the record, Austria made no reply to this most conciliatory suggestion of England, but, in the meantime, the irrepressible Kaiser made the crisis more acute by cabling to the Czar that the mobilization of Russia to meet the mobilization of Austria was affecting his position of mediator, to which the Czar made a conciliatory reply, stating that Russia's mobilization was only for a defense against Austria.
The Czar, to put at rest any anxiety of the Kaiser as to Russia's intentions with respect to Germany, added:
"I thank you cordially for your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war.As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon.I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe."
"I thank you cordially for your mediation which permits the hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from us to want war.As long as the negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon.I confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for the success of your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe."
What more could Russia do? If Austria continued to mobilize, why not Russia?
On this day, July 30, the German Ambassador had two interviews at St. Petersburg with Sazonof, and it was then that Sazonof drew up the following formula as a basis for peace:
"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia,Russia engages to stop all military preparations."
"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has assumed character of question of European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which violate principle of sovereignty of Servia,Russia engages to stop all military preparations."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 60.]
At this stage King George telegraphed Prince Henry of Prussia that
"the English Government was doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations, if Austria will consent to be satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their war preparation."
"the English Government was doing its utmost, suggesting to Russia and France to suspend further military preparations, if Austria will consent to be satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and neighboring Servian territory as a hostage for satisfactory settlement of her demands, other countries meanwhile suspending their war preparation."
The King adds a hope that the Kaiser
"will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe."
"will use his great influence to induce Austria to accept this proposal, thus proving that Germany and England are working together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe."
[Second German "White Paper."]
This last proposition, however, was never accepted or declined, for the impetuous Kaiser gave his twelve-hour ultimatum to Russia to demobilize, and this was an arrogant demand which no self-respecting power, much less so great a one as Russia, could possibly accept.
While this demand was in progress Sir Edward Grey was making his last attempt to preserve peace by asking Germany to sound Vienna, as he would sound St. Petersburg, whether it would be possible for the four disinterested powers to offer to Austria that they would
"undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided they did not embarrass Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory."
"undertake to see that she obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Servia, provided they did not embarrass Servian sovereignty and the integrity of Servian territory."
Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that if this was not satisfactory, and if Germany would make any reasonable proposals to preserve peace and Russia and France rejected it, that
"his Majesty's Government would have nothing to do with the consequences,"
"his Majesty's Government would have nothing to do with the consequences,"
which obviously meant either neutrality or actual intervention in behalf of Germany and Austria.
On the same day the British Ambassador at Berlin besought the German Foreign Office to
"put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in the general interest to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis."
"put pressure on the authorities at Vienna to do something in the general interest to reassure Russia and to show themselves disposed to continue discussions on a friendly basis."
And Sir Edward Goschen reports that the German Foreign Minister replied that last night he had
"begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter."
"begged Austria to reply to your last proposal, and that he had received a reply to the effect that the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take the wishes of the Emperor this morning in the matter."
Again the text of the letter in which Germany "begged" Austria to be conciliatory is not found in the record.
The excuse of Germany that the mobilization of Russia compelled it to mobilize does not justify the war. Mobilization does not necessarily mean aggression, but simply preparation. If Russia had the right to mobilize because Austria mobilized, Germany equally had the right to mobilize when Russia mobilized, but it does not follow that either of the three nations could justify a war to compel the other parties to demobilize. Mobilization is only a preparation against eventualities. It is the right of the sovereign State and by no code of ethics acasus belli. The demand of Germany that Russia could not arm to defend itself, when Austria was preparing for a possible attack on Russia, has few, if any, parallels in history for bullying effrontery. It treated Russia as an inferior, almost a vassal, State.
It must be observed that, while Germany insisted that Russia should demobilize, the Kaiser offered no reciprocal promise. On his theory Germany and Austria were to be left free to complete their preparations, but Russia was to tie her own hands and leave herself "naked to her enemies." This is shown by the last telegrams which passed between the Czar and Kaiser. The Czar telegraphed:
"I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the same guaranty which I have given you, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long-tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence your urgent reply."
"I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are forced to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the same guaranty which I have given you, viz., that these measures do not mean war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our long-tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect with full confidence your urgent reply."
To this the Kaiser replied:
"I thank you for your telegram. I have shown yesterday to your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by today noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear, and unmistakable reply of your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that you, without delay, order your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."
"I thank you for your telegram. I have shown yesterday to your Government the way through which alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by today noon, no telegram from my Ambassador has reached me with the reply of your Government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize my army. An immediate, clear, and unmistakable reply of your Government is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of your telegram. I must ask most earnestly that you, without delay, order your troops to commit, under no circumstances, the slightest violation of our frontiers."
This impetuous step of Germany to compel its great neighbor to desist from military preparations to defend itself came most inopportunely, for on Aug. 1 the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadorfor the first timedeclared to the Russian Government its willingness to discuss the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and it was then suggested that the form of the ultimatum and the questions arising thereon should be discussed in London. (Dispatch from British Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edward Grey, dated Sept. 1, 1914.) Sir Edward Grey at once advised the English Ambassador in Berlin of the fact, and urged that it was still possible to maintain peace
"if only a little respite in time can be gained before any great power begins war,"[English "White Paper," No. 131.]
"if only a little respite in time can be gained before any great power begins war,"
[English "White Paper," No. 131.]
but the Kaiser, having issued the arrogant ultimatum to Russia to demobilize in twelve hours, had gone too far for retreat, and, spurred on by the arrogant Potsdam military party, he "let slip the dogs of war." After the fatal Rubicon had been crossed and the die was cast the Czar telegraphed King George:
"In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more I have done all in my power to avert war."
Such will be the verdict of history.
These arethe factsas shown by the record, and upon them, in my judgment, an impartial court would not hesitate to pass the following judgment:
1—That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace secretly concerted together to impose their will upon Europe and upon Servia in a matter affecting the balance of power in Europe. Whether in so doing they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of conduct suggests this as a possibility. They made war almost inevitable by (a) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and disproportionate to any grievance that Austria had and (b) in giving to Servia, and Europe, insufficient time to consider the rights and obligations of all interested nations.
2—That Germany had at all times the power to compel Austria to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no time effectively exerted that influence. On the contrary, she certainly abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its unreasonable course.
3—That England, France, Italy, and Russia at all times sincerely worked for peace, and for this purpose not only overlooked the original misconduct of Austria but made every reasonable concession in the hope of preserving peace.
4—That Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of mobilization was the right of any sovereign State, and as long as the Russian armies did not cross the border or take any aggressive action no other nation had any just right to complain, each having the same right to make similar preparations.
5—That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia for failure to demobilize when the other powers had offered to make any reasonable concession and peace parleys were still in progress, precipitated the war.
6—That Belgium as a sovereign State has as an inherent right the power to determine when and under what conditions an alien can cross her frontiers. This right exists independently of treaties, but is, in the case of Belgium, reinforced by the Treaty of 1839 and The Hague Convention, whereby the leading European nations (including Germany) guarantee its "perpetual neutrality." The invasion of Belgium by Germany was in violation of these rights, and England only respected its own solemn covenant when, in defense of that neutrality, it declared war against Germany.
The writer of this article has reached these conclusions with reluctance, as he has a feeling of deep affection for the German people and equal admiration for their ideals and matchless progress. Even more he admires the magnificent courage with which the German Nation, beset on every hand by powerful antagonists, is now defending its prestige as a nation. The whole-hearted devotion of this great nation to its flag is worthy of the best traditions of the Teutonic race. Nevertheless, this cannot alter the ethical truth, which stands apart from any considerations of nationality; nor can it affect the conclusion that the German Nation has been plunged into this abyss by its scheming statesmen and its self-centred and highly neurotic Kaiser, who in the twentieth century sincerely believes that he is the proxy of Almighty God on earth, and therefore infallible.
In visiting its condemnation, the Supreme Court of Civilization should therefore distinguish between the military caste, headed by the Kaiser and the Crown Prince, which precipitated this great calamity, and the German people.
The very secrecy of the plot against the peace of the world and the failure to disclose to the German people the diplomatic communications hereinbefore quoted, strongly suggest that this detestable war is not merely a crime against civilization,but also against the deceived and misled German people. They have a vision and are essentially progressive and peace-loving in their national characteristics, while the ideals of their military caste are those of the Dark Ages.
One day the German people will know the full truth and then there will be a dreadful reckoning for those who have plunged a noble and peace-loving nation into this fathomless chasm of misfortune.
"Though the mills of God grind slowly,Yet they grind exceeding small,Though with patience He stands waiting,With exactness grinds He all."
"Though the mills of God grind slowly,Yet they grind exceeding small,Though with patience He stands waiting,With exactness grinds He all."
"Though the mills of God grind slowly,Yet they grind exceeding small,Though with patience He stands waiting,With exactness grinds He all."
"Though the mills of God grind slowly,Yet they grind exceeding small,Though with patience He stands waiting,With exactness grinds He all."
"Though the mills of God grind slowly,Yet they grind exceeding small,Though with patience He stands waiting,With exactness grinds He all."
"Though the mills of God grind slowly,Yet they grind exceeding small,Though with patience He stands waiting,With exactness grinds He all."
"Though the mills of God grind slowly,Yet they grind exceeding small,Though with patience He stands waiting,With exactness grinds He all."
"Though the mills of God grind slowly,Yet they grind exceeding small,Though with patience He stands waiting,With exactness grinds He all."
To the Editor of The New York Times:
It is regrettable that President Wilson's admirable policy of strict neutrality is not more sincerely and carefully observed by the press and public of this country.
We are a cosmopolitan nation. Citizens of the five great warring countries and their descendants, to a very great extent, constitute our population. Partiality of any kind tends to destroy the elemental ties which bind us together, to disrupt our Union, and to make us a house divided against itself. James M. Beck's article in last Sunday's TIMES is of the kind which, serving no good purpose, helps to loosen, if not sever, our most vital domestic ties. While not for an instant doubting Mr. Beck's sincerity, we must take issue with his inadvertently ill-timed expression of opinion.
The article in question is based on the following statement: "Any discussion of the ethical merits of this great controversy must start with the assumption that there is such a thing as international morality." How does Mr. Beck define "international morality"? How can he assume that to exist which each of the contending nations by their diverse actions prove to be non-extant? How can he claim that there is an "international morality" of accepted form when each nation claims that its interpretation must be accepted by the others?
Mr. Beck's allegation that the question "Was England justified in declaring war against Germany?" is more easily disposed of than the questions "Was Austria justified in declaring war against Servia?" and "Was Germany justified in declaring war against Russia and France?" proves two things—first, that his interest lies primarily in the vindication of England; second, that he disregards the fundamental causes and recognizes only the precipitating causes of the war.
The precipitating cause of the war between England and Germany is verbosely if inadequately covered by his article. We must admit that a treaty was broken by Germany, yet we contend that this broken agreement was a pretext for a war fomented and impelled by basic economic causes. At the outset, let us distinguish between a contract and a treaty. A contract is an agreement between individuals contemplating enforcement by a court of law; punishment by money damages in the great majority of cases, by a specific performance in a very few. A treaty is an agreement between nations contemplating enforcement by a court of international public opinion; punishment by money indemnity in the great majority of cases, by specific performance (i.e., force of arms) in a very few.
Germany contends that her breach of treaty obligation is punishable by the payment of money indemnity to the aggrieved party. This she has offered to do in the case of Belgium, as she has already done in the case of Luxemburg. Germany's existence was so seriously threatened that her action seems justifiable, and there remains a sole moral obligation to compensate any neutral country injured by her.
The mere fact that Belgium had made an unfortunate alliance with England is deplorable in that Belgium has suffered terribly; but this suffering is not attributable to Germany. When Japan violated Chinese neutrality, China protested. Though she was entitled to a money indemnity, there is no valid reason under the sun why the United States as a guarantor of the integrity of China should declare war against Japan. England's justification, in so far as there can be any justification for adding to the toll of death, is the same as that of Germany, the preservation of national sovereignty.
Further: "It seems unnecessary to discuss the wanton disregard of these solemn obligations." There can be nothing wanton in a struggle for existence, and that this European war is such a struggle is the only possible explanation of its magnitude, ferocity, and vast possible consequences. Then, too, though deplorable, treaty obligations are not solemn, as Italy has proved to the complete satisfaction of so many. Italy's contention that this is an aggressive war on the part of Germany and Austria is as untenable as the German contention that it is an aggressive war on the part of England. For this war was not an aggressive war on the part of any nation, but an unavoidable war caused by the simultaneous bursting of the long-gathering economic storm clouds.
Again: "The ethical aspects of this great conflict must largely depend upon the record that has been made up by the official communications." This is similar to a contention that the ethical rights in a case in court must depend upon the astuteness of counsel in summing up to the jury. "A court would be deeply impressed ... by the significant omissions of documents known to be in existence." A court of law, as our former Assistant Attorney General of the United States surely knows, compels no one to give testimony that tends to incriminate, and, furthermore, does not construe failure to testify on the grounds that it will tend to incriminate against the defendant. In the law the defendant is entitled to every reasonable doubt. It is also conceivable that a reasonable time for the defense to present its case would be granted before passing judgment.
Passing on: "To discuss the justice of Austria's grievances against Servia would take us ... into the realm of disputed facts." This seems a delectable bit of humor. We respectfully submit that Mr. Beck's other assertions might also be considered as "in the realm of disputed facts." Mr. Beck admits that Austria had a just grievance against Servia, though he questions her method of redress. Though we conceive that in the unfortunate European tangle Austria relied on German support in the event of international conflict, we submit that reliance on Russian support was a bigger factor in encouraging little Servia to defy her big neighbor than the remoter help that Germany would furnish Austria in the event of the conflict spreading.
Austria, in the exercise of her right to engage in a punitive expedition against Servia, guaranteed that she would do nothing to generalize the conflict by her assurances to Russia and to the world that there would be no annexation of Servian territory or annihilation of the Servian Kingdom. Whether these assurances were genuine or not is impossible of determination. We have no right to constitute ourselves arbiters of their sincerity.
Mr. Beck speaks of "the solidarity of European civilization and the fact that by policy and diplomatic intercourse ... a United European State exists, even though its organization be as yet inchoate." This solidarity is conspicuous only by its utter non-existence. Whatever may have been achieved by policy and diplomatic intercourse has been marred and rendered useless by the lines of demarkation of the spheres of influence of the great powers of Europe and by the racial and temperamental incongruities of Europe's population.
We read: "Servia had forty-eight hours to answer; ... the other European nations had barely a day to consider what could be done to preserve the peace of Europe. Why should an Austro-Servian war compromise the peace of Europe?" Was it not because of the tangled web of international diplomacy, the Triple Entente as well as the Triple Alliance?
Referring to a German warning in regard to Austria's demands on Servia, "the German Foreign Office anticipates that Servia 'will refuse to comply with these demands'—why, if they were justified?" We grieve at the shattered ideal of Mr. Beck, who, in the face of the international calamity which has befallen the world, still can believe that all justifiable demands are complied with.
Again, quoting German "White Paper," Annex 1B, Germany desired "that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of another power, on account of the various alliance obligations, would bring consequences impossible to measure." The explanation of this statement is not—an aggressor threatens his adversary, but, rather, a prudent man begs opposing factions to keep cool.
Great space is devoted in the article in question to Germany's unwillingness to place the Austro-Servian controversy in the hands of France, England, Germany, and Italy. As Germany disavows all interest in the controversy, if she speaks truly, it was not within her power to dictate to her ally in a matter which she could in nowise control except by force of arms. Furthermore, had she had the power, how could she be expected to exert pressure on her ally to leave a vital controversy to a court of four, two of whom were bound by alliances with Russia, Austria's real antagonist, and a third, (Italy,) as subsequent events have shown, Austria's natural, geographical, and hereditary enemy? At best, had each power held to its treaty obligations, there would have been a deadlock.
Further: "The Russian Minister ... called at the German Foreign Office and asked it 'to urge upon Vienna ... to take up this line of conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not advise Austria to yield.'" Elsewhere in the article a statement is made that the Austro-Servian and Austro-Russian questions "for all practical purposes ... were indistinguishable." This inconsistency of having Servia in the light of a principal and then again in the light of an agent is the greatest stumbling block to a clear analysis of the precipitating cause of the war. The logical explanation of Servia's position is that of Russia's agent. Hence Germany could not be expected to exert the same pressure on an allied principal that Russia could exert on her agent.
It is true that Germany engaged in many blundering diplomatic quibbles in the final stages of preparation for the war; but it is also true that England quibbled, though with greater diplomatic finesse; for instance, "Sir Edward Grey went so far as to tell the German Ambassador that ... if Germany would make any reasonable proposals to preserve peace, and Russia and France rejected it, that 'his Majesty's Government would have nothing to do with the consequences.'" Here it is apparent to every one that the word "reasonable" begs the questions.
The German people were encouraged to relish the idea of a war against Russia once that war became likely, for sooner or later it seemed inevitable that Slav and Teuton would clash, and Germany felt confident that at the present time she outmatched her enemy. The Russians, too, were encouraged to desire the Slav provinces of Austria, which racially are a part of the Russian domain. The English people were made to relish this opportunity to strike their great commercial competitor, especially when they could do so with little likelihood of unfavorable criticisms. Finally, the impressionable French people were stirred to thoughts of revenge and recovery of their lost provinces.
Sympathy with any country in this most disgraceful yet most inevitable of wars brands the sympathizer as a party to the material and lustful purposes of at least one of the combatants. There is no ethical justification of this war from any standpoint. There is no justification of this war from any standpoint. There is only an explanation of the war from an economic standpoint. All these specious arguments on the precipitating causes of the war can be but for the display of brilliant forensic oratory and matchless diction. Let us thrust aside in these dark moments of peril and horror all subterfuge.
England, overburdened with taxation, was on the verge of civil war. Russia, whose masses were overridden roughshod by a bureaucracy weighting down the peasants with onerous national burdens, expected sooner or later the cataclysmic upheaval with which the Nihilistic societies have long been threatening its tyrannical Government. France, seriously financially embarrassed because of crop impoverishment and bad foreign investments in Brazil, Russia, and the Balkans, was subject to continued internal political upheavals, with ever-changing Ministries and a growing Socialist Party.
Austria, "the ramshackle empire," was in danger of disintegrating from a variety of causes, not the least of which was the infusibility of its racially different elements. Germany, in a blind race for commercial supremacy, suffered from industrial overproduction, thus creating an unhealthy financial condition which fortified the Socialist Party to an extent which threatened her imperialistic form of government itself.
So these monarchies whose days were numbered, because of dissatisfaction at the waste and extravagance of a world gone mad with national excesses committed in the name of civilization, in reality the price of our modernization, in a final desperate effort to rally their waning fortunes stampeded their awakening masses into a ruinous interracial war in order to stave off the torch and the guillotine.
GEORGE E. BERNHEIMER.
New York, Oct. 30, 1914.
To the Editor of The New York Times:
Allow me to submit the following in answer to the article of James M. Beck, entitled "Case of the Double Alliance vs. the Triple Entente," published in THE NEW YORK TIMES of Oct. 25, 1914:
The case of "Russian Mobilization vs. German Mediation." Q.—Upon whom was the duty to yield?
Mr. Beck has spent considerable time and effort to prove, at least by inference, that Germany must have been informed beforehand of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia. Personally, I am convinced that the ultimatum in question was sent with the full knowledge and consent of Germany; and, whether this is true or not, I maintain that it was Austria's duty to inform her ally before taking a step which was likely to endanger the peace of Europe.
The concession of this point takes me immediately to the ultimatum itself and to the question, "Was the tenor of the ultimatum justified?" Mr. Beck, in his judgment, says: "The ultimatum is grossly unreasonable and disappropriate to any grievance that Austria had." Perhaps Mr. Beck is right, but I have good reasons to think that the tenor of the ultimatum was fully justified, in view of Servia's former conduct.
Austria was dealing here with a Government the real spirits of which had come into power by the commission of one of the most dastardly crimes of modern times. A crime which, at the time of its commission, sent a shock of horror through the entire civilized world, to wit, "the outrageous murder of the former King and Queen of Servia," outrageous because it was perpetrated by the so-called aristocracy of Servia. The long-continued agitation carried on by Servia against Austria, at the instigation of Russia, which finally culminated in another no less outrageous assassination, that of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his consort, to my idea fully justified Austria in making demands which under ordinary circumstances might have been termed "unreasonable."
The question whether Austria was justified in going to war against Servia is a debatable one, but I respectfully refer to the fact that our own country, the United States, was only very recently on the verge of precipitating war with a "much weaker" nation than ours, on account of the latter's refusal to salute the American flag. Neither did we stop on that occasion with the ultimatum, but we followed it up with dispatching a fleet of warships, the landing of troops, and the seizure of Vera Cruz.
From the time Austria's ultimatum was sent all the great powers seemed to have professed a great eagerness for the preservation of peace. Mr. Beck asserts that Germany was not sincere in its desire for peace and could have avoided the war if it had seriously tried to exert its influence over Austria. This finding is based on the inference drawn from the fact that Germany failed to achieve any results.
To determine whether Mr. Beck is justified in finding as he does, it is necessary, first of all, to examine the exact status of the powers at the time the ultimatum was sent. We find that Austria had a just grievance against Servia, for which it was seeking redress. An issue was therefore raised between Austria and Servia. Germany, although Austria's ally, immediately defined its attitude by declaring emphatically that "the question at issue was one for settlement between Servia and Austria alone."
I beg to ask Mr. Beck to answer the following question: By what right—moral, legal, or equitable—did Russia make Servia's cause its own? Did Russia have any alliance with Servia? I further ask: What privity existed between Austria, Servia, and Russia?
Suppose Mr. Beck can justify the action of Russia, although a "rank outsider," in taking Servia's part, how can he possibly justify the positively unreasonable and, under the circumstances, most dangerous step of "actual mobilization" on the part of Russia?
Mr. Beck has tried to justify the mobilization by quoting the Russian excuse "that Russia's mobilization was only for a defense against Austria." On close examination what does this amount to? It resolves itself into a situation somewhat like this: A sends an ultimatum to B seeking redress for a wrong committed by B upon A, whereupon C mobilizes "for defense against A." I leave it to the average American of ordinary intelligence to find a reason for C's mobilization "for defense against A." Mr. Beck might as well try to justify a mobilization on the part of Japan if the United States was preparing to invade Mexico for the purpose of redressing an insult to the American flag. Does Mr. Beck realize the seriousness of actual mobilization by Russia at that critical moment? Not one of the other powers dared to take this one step which among nations is regarded as tantamount to a declaration of war.
And what did the Kaiser do at this moment? He did the only thing he could do, and, I dare say, the only thing our American Nation could have done under the same circumstances. He wired the Czar and stated: "I am willing to bring my influences to bear upon Austria, provided you agree to cease mobilization." Was this demand unreasonable? What else could Germany have done, I ask, with the Russian bear standing on the border with the sword already drawn? This moment was the crucial and decisive one in the prologue to this awful world drama.
The only question therefore and the all-important one to be submitted to the Court of Civilization, is, Whose duty was it to yield? Was it Russia's, with the sword already drawn against a country which had not attacked it, not even threatened it, or was it Germany's, with the sword in the sheath?
In his "conclusion," Mr. Beck speaks of Germany as "beset on every hand by powerful antagonists." Does he really mean to deprive the German Emperor of the right to demand as a condition precedent to mediation on his part the discontinuance of mobilization by Russia?
Mr. Beck in his "judgment" under Paragraph 4 says "that Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces." The use of the qualifying word "reasonably" seems to indicate that even Mr. Beck is not quite certain that Russia was in fact justified in mobilizing its forces.
Is it reasonable, just, and fair of Mr. Beck to expect Germany, "beset on every hand by powerful antagonists," to permit Russia to continue mobilizing its 18,000,000 soldiers and have Germany believe that Russia was sincere in its "peaceful intentions" in the face of actual mobilization? At this moment the German Kaiser made a very reasonable demand upon Russia to cease mobilization, and I ask every fair-minded American, whether lawyer or layman, "whose duty it was to yield" at this moment. The answer to this question will settle the much-disputed point as to the actual cause of the war.
In conclusion, I beg to ask Mr. Beck: Why expect so much of Germany and nothing of Russia, when Germany had not merely professed her peaceful intentions, but actually maintained peace for over forty years, during which period not a foot of territory had been acquired by her through conquest? This is a fact.
Coming into a court of law supported by such a reputation, does Mr. Beck really believe that the decision of the court would have been in favor of Russia? Does Mr. Beck really believe that the decision would have been against Germany, whose war lord was begging the Czar almost on his knees to avoid the awful calamity by the discontinuance of mobilization?
Picture the United States about to invade Mexico to redress an insult to the American flag. Picture England as the ally of the United States, and Japan supporting Mexico, without any alliance existing between the two latter countries. To make this example conform to the actual facts under discussion, we must, of course, assume that both Japan and England are situated in the North American Continent, and across the border from the United States and England. Japan, with an army of 18,000,000 soldiers, (assumed for the purpose of argument,) mobilizes her army, professedly for defense against the United States. Could any fair-minded American possibly expect England to intercede with her ally, the United States, without first demanding the demobilization of Japan? Whose duty was it to yield?
The actual fact is that Germany even then did not declare war against Russia until Russian soldiers had actually crossed not the Austrian but the German border.
I may add that in writing the above I am prompted only by the very natural desire, viz., to impress upon the jury composed of the American people the one fact which should be given the most careful consideration in order to enable it to arrive at a just verdict in the case submitted, and this fact is "the mobilization of Russia."
FRANK SEGGEBRUCH.
New York, Oct. 29, 1914.