It can hardly be contended that the settlement at Astoria had a definite national character, much less that it could impart the national sovereignty of the United States, to the territory, wherein it was established. The Astorians might perhaps maintain their claim to the domain (dominium utile,)but that they should set up a title to the sovereignty (dominium eminens,) or be held to convey a title to any state which should choose to assert it through them, is not conformable to the practice of nations. But the plenipotentiaries of the United States contend that they have an exclusive title to the entire valley of the Columbia, by virtue of this settlement. Spain, however, did not admit this title in the negotiations preceding the Florida Treaty, nor did the United States venture to set it up. When Don Luis d’Onis, in resuming the negotiations, proposed, in his letter of January 16, 1819, (British and Foreign State Papers, 1819-20, p. 565,) to concede, on the part of his Catholic Majesty, as the boundary between the two states, “a line from the source of the Missouri, westward, to the Columbia River, and along the middle thereof to the Pacific Ocean,” and trusted it would be accepted, as presenting “the means of realizing the President’s great plan of extending a navigation from the Pacific to the remotest points of the northern seas, and of the ocean,” no claim was advanced to the valley of the Columbia; but Mr. Adams briefly stated, in reply, that “the proposal to draw the western boundary line between the United States and the Spanish territories on this continent, from the source of the Missouri to the Columbia River, cannot be admitted.” Again, when the Spanish commissioner, in his letter of February 1, 1819, stated that, “considering the motive for declining my proposal of extending the boundary line from the Missouri to the Columbia, and along that river to the Pacific, appears to be the wish of the President to include within the limits of the Union all the branches and rivers emptying into the said River Columbia,” and proposed to draw the boundary along the River S. Clemente, or Multnomah, to the sea; and delivered a project of a treaty, in which it was stipulated that his Catholic Majesty should cede all the country belonging to him eastward of the boundary line to the United States; no original title to the entire valley of the Columbia, no claim to the settlement of Astoria, as a national settlement, was advanced by the United States: yet Astoria was on the western side of the Multnomah or Willamette River, as it is now called, and was assumed in both the above proposals to be beyond the limits of “the dominions of the Republic.”
Astoria passed into the hands of the North-west Company by peaceable transfer. It was sold by the partners resident in the establishment, after they had dissolved the association,which, by the terms of the contract, the parties had power to do. When Captain Black, in his Britannic Majesty’s sloop-of-war the Racoon, arrived there in 1813, he did not capture Astoria, for it was not the property of an enemy, but he took possession of it in the name of his Britannic Majesty, and hoisted the British ensign; thereby formally asserting the sovereignty of Great Britain over the property of British subjects. In 1818, the government of the United States was formally placed in possession of Astoria; and this was the first occasion on which an act of sovereignty was exercised by that Power. Mr. Calhoun states that this act “placed our possession where it was before it passed into the hands of British subjects.” On the contrary, it placed Astoria in the hands of the government of the United States, in which hands it had never been before: for, antecedently to the transfer to the North-west Company by purchase, it was in the hands of an association, the majority of which were British subjects, who could not, according to any received principle of international law, be held to have represented the sovereignty of the United States.
It was admitted by Lord Castlereagh, in the discussions with Mr. Rush antecedent to the restoration of Astoria, that the United States were entitled to be reinstated there, and “to be the party in possessionwhilst treating of the title.” At that time the United States had confined their claims to the restitution of a post, which, as they asserted, “had been established by them on the Columbia River, and had been taken during the war, and consequently came within the provisions of the first article of the Treaty of Ghent.” Mr. Bagot, in his reply to Mr. Adams, of 26th November, 1817, (British and Foreign State Papers, 1821-22, p. 461,) stated that, “from the reports made to him, it appeared that the post had not been captured during the late war, but that the Americans had retired from it under an agreement made with the North-west Company, who had purchased their effects, and who had ever since retained peaceable possession of the coast.” The whole discussion was thus evidently limited to the settlement at Astoria; and Lord Castlereagh admitted, on the statement of the United States, that they had a primâ facie claim to be reinstated in the post, in conformity to the provisions of the treaty, andto be the party in possession whilst treating of the title.
Mr. Calhoun, in the further course of his argument,contends that, after this admission on the part of Lord Castlereagh, the Convention of 1818 “preserved and perpetuatedall our claims to the territory, including the acknowledged right to be consideredthe party in possession;” and Mr. Buchanan, in still more explicit language, maintains the same position. “He claims, and he thinks he has shown, a clear title, on the part of the United States,to the whole region drained by the Columbia, with the right of beingreinstated, and considered the party in possession whilst treating of the title; in which character he must insist on their being considered, in conformity withpositive treaty stipulations. He cannot, therefore, consent that they shall be regarded, during the negotiations, merely asoccupants in commonwith Great Britain. Nor can he, while thus regarding their rights, present a counter-proposal, based on the supposition of joint occupancy merely, until the question of title to the territory is fully discussed.” This argument is essentially unsound throughout. The title of the United States to possess the settlement, in other words,not to be excluded from the territory, is strangely confounded with the titleto exclude the British from the entire territory. These titles are assumed to be identical, being most distinct. Great Britain does not require to be considered as anoccupant in common of Astoria. The United States were never admittedby positive treaty stipulationsto be the party entitled to be consideredin possession of the whole region of the Columbia, which Mr. Buchanan maintains to have been conceded by Lord Castlereagh. But Great Britain does require to be considered asan occupant in common of the region of the Columbia, and the United States is entitled to theright of adverse possession as far as the settlement at the mouth of the river, on its south bank is concerned. What, however, is the effect of such a right of possession? Simply that, as far as the settlement of Astoria is concerned, it is not necessary for the United States to prove itsright of dominion. Itsright of possessionis a valid right, unless a right of dominion can be established by some other Power. But Great Britain asserts no right of dominion,—she does not claim to evict the United States from its actual possession,—but, as she claims no exclusive title for herself, so she recognises no exclusive title in any other Power. The principle of a mutual right of occupancy of the territory was admitted, when it was agreed that the United States should be placed in possessionsub modo, whilst treating of the title.The question, however, between the two governments was not one oflaw, but offact. Issue had been joined in the previous letters between the Secretary of State and the Minister of Great Britain, at Washington: whilst the former asserted Astoria had been captured during the war, the latter maintained that it had passed into the hands of the North-west Company by peaceable purchase.
The United States asserted that Astoria had become a British possession by virtue of thejus belli, the operation of which was in this case expressly suspended by the first article of the Treaty of Ghent: on this plea they claimed that it should be restored to them. Great Britain, on the other hand, maintained that it had passed into the hands of the North-west Company by peaceable purchase: on this plea they contended that the United States were not entitled to demand its restoration. When, therefore, the United States acquiesced in the proposal of Lord Castlereagh, they admitted the legal effect of the fact asserted by Great Britain, if it could be substantiated. They thus admitted the common right of Great Britain to form settlements, by agreeing to treat of the title on the ground alleged by Great Britain, precisely as Great Britain admitted a corresponding right in the United States, by agreeing to discuss the alleged fact that Astoria had passed into the hands of the Britishjure belli, by which it was implied that it had been antecedently a possession of the United States. We thus find in the negotiations of 1818, which terminated in the Convention of the 20th October, concluded fourteen days after the actual restoration of Astoria, that Messrs. Gallatin and Rush nowhere hint at an exclusive title in the United States. “We did not assert,” they say in their letter to Mr. Adams, of October 20, 1818, “that the United States had aperfect rightto that country, but insisted that their claim was at least good against Great Britain,” (British and Foreign State Papers, 1819-20, p. 169.) Yet, in the face of this solemn admission, at the commencement of the earliest negotiations, and of the fact that the title has been treated of on so many occasions, Mr. Buchanan now asserts that “our own American title to the extent of the valley of the Columbia, resting as it does on discovery, exploration, and possession—a possession acknowledged by a most solemn act of the British government itself, is asufficient assurance against all mankind; whilst our superadded title derived from Spainextends our exclusive rightsover the whole territory in dispute against Great Britain.”
Such is the outline of the grounds on which the United States set up an exclusive title to the entire valley of the Columbia, that is, a title to exclude Great Britain from making settlements there. Mr. Buchanan observes, that this title is “older than the Florida Treaty of February 1819, under which the United States acquired all the right of Spain to the north-west coast of America, and exists independently of its provisions. Even supposing, then, that the British construction of the Nootka Sound Convention was correct, it could not apply to this portion of the territory in dispute. A convention between Great Britain and Spain, originating from a dispute concerning a petty trading establishment at Nootka Sound, could not abridge the rights of other nations. Both in public and private law, an agreement between two parties can never bind a third, without his consent, expressed or implied.”
Mr. Buchanan thus appears disposed to renounce the derivative title of Spain, upon which, as completing the defects in the original title of the United States, considerable stress had been elsewhere laid, “supposing the British construction of the Nootka Convention to be correct:” in other words the commissioners of the United States claim to avail themselves of the provisions of this convention, if they can be made to support their title, but to repudiate them, if they should be found to invalidate it, which of course is inadmissible. But when Mr. Buchanan says, “A convention between Great Britain and Spaincould not abridge the rights of other nations,” though the proposition be abstractedly true, yet on this occasion it does not apply. First of all, because Great Britain, in recognising the right of Spain to make settlements on the north-west coast in places not yet occupied, did not either at the time of the convention, or subsequently, recognise such a right as an exclusive right in respect to other nations. Secondly, because Spain, in recognising the right of Great Britain to make settlements in an analogous manner, did not thereby declare other nations excluded from making settlements; in fact, there is not a single word within “the four corners” of the treaty, which can be held to abridge the rights of other nations. Thirdly, because the United States, at the time when the convention was concluded, had no other right than that of making settlements, which Great Britain has never once maintained that the Nootka Convention abridged, nor does it at this moment contend so.
If, on the other hand, the United States had anexclusive titleto the valley of the Columbia before the Treaty of Florida, or in other words, as asserted in 1824, to the entire territory between 51° and 42°, and that title existed independently of its provisions, it is difficult to understand the object of the protracted negotiations between Don Luis de Onis and Mr. Adams, which resulted in his Catholic Majesty first withdrawing from the Rocky Mountains to the Columbia River, then from the Columbia to the Multnomah or Willamette River, and finally ceding all his rights, claims, and pretensions to the territory north of the parallel of 42°. Mr. Buchanan’s position is untenable in the face of the negotiations antecedent to the Florida Treaty.
The original title, however, of the United States, does not satisfy the requirements of the law of nations, in the extent in which it is maintained to be effective. Let it be kept in mind that Great Britain has never claimed the exclusive privilege of settling on the north-west coast of America, to the north of the parts occupied by Spain, but she maintains her right not to be excluded from any places not already occupied. The United States, on the other hand, are not satisfied with claiming a right to make settlements, but they assert a right to exclude Great Britain from making settlements, and this, too, by virtue of an act performed by a private citizen, without any commission from the state, subsequent to the time when the right of Great Britain to make settlements had been formally recognised by Spain in a solemn treaty, and was thuspatentto the civilised world.
This very act, however, Mr. Calhoun admits to be defective for the purpose of establishing an exclusive title, when he says, “Time, indeed, so far from impairing our claims, has greatly strengthened them since that period, for since then the Treaty of Florida transferred to us all the rights, claims, and pretensions of Spain to the whole territory, as has been stated. In consequence of this, our claims to the portion drained by the Columbia River—the point now the subject of consideration—have beenmuch strengthenedby giving us theincontestable claim to the discovery of the river by Hecetaabove stated.”
It is thus admitted, that the first entering of the River Columbia by Gray, was not adiscovery, but anexploration. There can beno second discoveryfor the purpose of founding an exclusive title. Heceta’s discovery is incontestable for thepurpose of barring any subsequent claim by discovery, andthe original title of the United States, resolves itself into a title founded upon the first exploration of the entrance of the Columbia from the sea, and on the first exploration of its southern branches from the Rocky Mountains. Such a title, however, can neither from the nature of things, nor the practice of nations, establish a right to exclude all other nations from every part of the entire valley of the Columbia. On the contrary, the assertion of such a right is altogether at variance withthe comity of nations, on which alone title by discovery rests. For, if the United States maintain that the discovery of the Columbia River, for the purpose of establishing a territorial title, dates from the enterprise of Gray, they set aside the discovery of Heceta, in opposition to the comity of nations; yet it is upon this very comity of nations that they must rely to obtain respect for their own asserted discovery.
But when Mr. Calhoun maintains that, by the Florida Treaty, the title of the United States was muchstrengthenedby the acquisition of the incontestable claim to the discovery of the river by Heceta, he admits that the title of the United States wasan imperfect titlebefore that treaty; for a perfect title is incapable of being strengthened,—exclusiveness does not admit of degree. That the title of the United States to form settlements in the parts not occupied was strengthened by the Florida Treaty, is perfectly true. Great Britain, before that treaty,might haverefused to recognise any title in the United States under the general law of nations; but after that treaty, she would be precluded by the provisions of the Nootka Sound Convention, as the United States would thence-forward represent Spain, and allege a recognised right of making settlements under that convention; but, that the original title of the United States, which was not an exclusive title by the law of nations, could become an exclusive title against Great Britain by the acquisition of the title of Spain, which was expressly not exclusive under a treaty concluded with Great Britain, independently of other considerations which were duly weighed at the conclusion of the Nootka Convention, requires only to be stated in plain language to carry with it its own refutation.
The effects of the Nootka Convention, or rather Convention of the Escurial, have already been discussed in the two preceding chapters. Mr. Buchanan, in his letter of July 12, 1845, says, “Its most important article (the third)does not even grant in affirmative terms the rightto the contractingparties to trade with the Indians and to make settlements. It merely engages in negative terms, that the subjects of the contracting parties ‘shall not be disturbed or molested’ in the exercise ofthese treaty-privileges.” Surely there is a contradiction of ideas in the above passages. How can the right to trade with the Indians and to make settlements be termed atreaty-privilegein the latter sentence, when in the former sentence it is expressly denied to have beengrantedby the treaty? Mr. Buchanan, however, in asserting that the third article did notgrant in affirmative terms the rightspecified in it, adopts precisely the same view that the British commissioners have throughout maintained; namely, that the third article did not contain agrant, but a mutualacknowledgmentof certain rights in the two contracting parties, with respect to those parts of the north-western coast of America not already occupied. Mr. Buchanan, however, in a subsequent letter says, “The Nootka Convention is arbitrary and artificial in the highest degree, and is anything rather than the mere acknowledgment of simple and elementary principles consecrated by the law of nations. In all its provisions it is expressly confined to Great Britain and Spain, and acknowledges no right whatever in any third Power to interfere with the north-west coast of America. Neither in its terms, nor in its essence, does it contain any acknowledgment ofpreviously subsisting territorial rightsin Great Britain, or any other nation. It is strictly confined to future engagements, and these are of a most peculiar character. Even under the construction of its provisions maintained by Great Britain, her claim does not extend toplant colonies, which she would have had a right to do under the law of nations, had the country been unappropriated; but it is limited to a mere right of joint occupancy, not in respect to any part, but to the whole, the sovereignty remaining in abeyance. And to what kind of occupancy?Not separate and distinct colonies, but scattered settlements, intermingled with each other, over the whole surface of the territory, for thesingle purpose of tradingwith the Indians, to all of which the subjects of each Power should have free access, the right of exclusive dominion remaining suspended. Surely, it cannot be successfully contended that such a treaty is ‘an admission of certain principles of international law,’ so sacred and so perpetual as not to be annulled by war. On the contrary, from thecharacter of its provisions, it cannot be supposed for a single moment that it was intendedfor any purpose but that of a meretemporary arrangementbetween Great Britain and Spain. Thelaw of nationsrecognises no such principles, in regard to unappropriated territory, as those embraced in this treaty, and the British plenipotentiary must fail in the attempt to prove that it contains ‘an admission of certain principles of international law’ which will survive the shock of war.”
Almost all the topics in the above passage have been already discussed in the two previous chapters, as they were very dextrously urged by the commissioners of the United States in the course of the previous negotiations; so that a detailed examination of them on this occasion will not be requisite. The first article, however, does contain an acknowledgment ofpreviously subsisting territorial rights, for it was agreed that “the buildings and tracts of land, of which the subjects of his Britannic Majesty weredispossessed, about the month of April 1789, by a Spanish officer, shall berestoredto the said British subjects.” This article of the treaty, when placed side by side with the declaration on the part of his Catholic Majesty of an exclusive right of forming establishments at the port of Nootka, and with the counter-declaration on the part of his Britannic Majesty of his right to such establishments as his subjects might have formed, or should be desirous of forming in future, at the said bay of Nootka, cannot be held to contain an acknowledgment on the part of Spain of a previously subsisting territorial right in Great Britain. In respect to its provisions for the future, and to the interpretation which the commissioners of the United States have sought to affix to the word “settlement,” namely, that mere trading posts or factories were contemplated, it has been shown in the previous chapters, that, from the language of the treaty itself, in which the word “settlements” is, in three other places, employed to designate territorial possessions, and from the general language of treaties, such as the Treaty of Paris in 1763, as contrasted with the Treaty of London in 1815, such a view is quite incapable of being satisfactorily established: on the contrary, it is by implication refuted by the very stipulations in the fifth article, for free access and unmolested trade with these very settlements. Again, the character of the provisions of the convention is alleged to evince the intention of its being a mere temporary arrangement. Such, however, was not the opinion of Mr. Fox, in respect to the sixth article, when he charged the BritishMinister with having renounced the previous rights of Great Britainto plant coloniesin the unoccupied parts of South America; nor of Mr. Stanley, in reference to the third article, when he said, “The southern fisheries will now be prosecuted in peace and security;” nor of the Duke of Montrose, when he said, “The great question of the southern fishery isfinallyestablished, on such grounds as must prevent all future dispute;” nor of Mr. Pitt, when he said, that it was evident that “no claim (of Spain’s) had been conceded,—that our right to the fisheries had been acknowledged,—and that satisfaction had been obtained for the insult offered to the Crown,” (Hansard’s Parliamentary History, vol. xxviii., p. 970;) or, as otherwise reported, “the claims of Spain had been receded from, and every thing stated in the royal message had been gained,” (Gentleman’s Magazine, vol. lxx.,A. D.1790, part ii., p. 1160.) Mr. Fox’s chief cause of complaint against the treaty was, that it was a treaty of concessions on the part of Great Britain, and not of acquisitions: and when Mr. Grey, in taunting the Minister, complained, as instanced by Mr. Buchanan, “that where we might form a settlement on one hill, the Spaniards might erect a fort upon another,” he in fact complained, not that we had not maintained a right to form territorial settlements, and to exercise acts of sovereignty in them, but that we had not asserted this right so as to exclude the Spaniards entirely from the country. Reference has been made to these debates in the British Houses of Parliament, rather to illustrate than to prove the fact of the treaty having been regarded in a very different light from a mere temporary engagement, by those who contended that Great Britain had conceded more advantages than she had acquired. Mr. Pitt, indeed, denied Mr. Fox’s positions, and in answer to them maintained, “that though what this country had gained consisted not of new rights, it certainly did of new advantages. We had before a right to the Southern Whale Fishery, and a right to navigate and carry on fisheries in the Pacific Ocean, and to trade on the coasts of any part of it north-west of America: but that right not only had not been acknowledged, but disputed and resisted: whereas, by the convention, it wassecured to us—a circumstance, which, thoughno new right, was anew advantage.” That the condition of intermixed settlements, in regard to unappropriated lands, is clearly recognised by the law of nations, as consistent with the full and absolute independence of two separate nations, has been already shown byreference to acknowledged authorities on international law, so that Mr. Buchanan’s entire argument appears to have been advanced rather upon specious than solid grounds.
There are several other arguments in the correspondence of the Commissioners of the United States that might deserve attention, were it not that the discussion would exceed the contemplated limits of this work, which has probably already attained too large a bulk. It has, however, been found impossible to compress the inquiry within narrower bounds, without incurring the double risk, on the one hand, of appearing to those who are imperfectly informed on the subject, not to have given sufficient consideration to the arguments of the Commissioners of the United States,—and, on the other hand, of causing to those who are well acquainted with the facts, some dissatisfaction by too cursory an exposure of the unsoundness of those arguments. Besides, the course adopted has been thought to be well warranted by the importance of the question, and to be at the same time more consistent with the respect due to the distinguished negotiators.
REVIEW OF THE GENERAL QUESTION.
Presumption in Favour of the Common Right of Great Britain.—No exclusive Rights in Spain or the United States.—Convention of 1818.—Convention of 1827.—Mr. Rush’s Admission in 1824, that the United States had not a perfect Right.—Cession of Astoria.—Course of the Negotiations.—Messrs. Rush and Gallatin in 1818.—Mr. Rush in 1824.—Mr. Gallatin in 1826.—Negotiations of 1844-5.—Mr. Buchanan’s Offer.—Mr. President Polk’s Message to Congress.—Consequences involved in the two Proposals.—Valueless character of the Country north of 49°.—Consequences of the Convention of 1827 being abrogated.—Present condition of the Northern and Southern Banks of the Oregon.—Voyages of British Subjects:—Drake,—Cook,—Vancouver.—Settlements of Great Britain.—Settlements of the United States.—Rule of Partition advanced by the United States in their Negotiations with Spain.—Its Application to the present Question.—Objections to it.—Mr. Pakenham’s Letter of Sept. 12, 1844.—Suggestion as to a further Proposal on the Part of Great Britain.—Mr. Webster’s Anticipations of the future Destinies of Oregon.—Mr. Calhoun’s Declaration in 1843.
Presumption in Favour of the Common Right of Great Britain.—No exclusive Rights in Spain or the United States.—Convention of 1818.—Convention of 1827.—Mr. Rush’s Admission in 1824, that the United States had not a perfect Right.—Cession of Astoria.—Course of the Negotiations.—Messrs. Rush and Gallatin in 1818.—Mr. Rush in 1824.—Mr. Gallatin in 1826.—Negotiations of 1844-5.—Mr. Buchanan’s Offer.—Mr. President Polk’s Message to Congress.—Consequences involved in the two Proposals.—Valueless character of the Country north of 49°.—Consequences of the Convention of 1827 being abrogated.—Present condition of the Northern and Southern Banks of the Oregon.—Voyages of British Subjects:—Drake,—Cook,—Vancouver.—Settlements of Great Britain.—Settlements of the United States.—Rule of Partition advanced by the United States in their Negotiations with Spain.—Its Application to the present Question.—Objections to it.—Mr. Pakenham’s Letter of Sept. 12, 1844.—Suggestion as to a further Proposal on the Part of Great Britain.—Mr. Webster’s Anticipations of the future Destinies of Oregon.—Mr. Calhoun’s Declaration in 1843.
The failure on the part of the United States to make out theirexclusive claimestablishes at once a conclusive inference in favour of thecommon titleof Great Britain. The proof required in the two cases is essentially distinct. Where two nations are already settled in a country, theonus probandirests with the party that seeks to exclude the other. Independent of the presumption from inference, Great Britain has conclusiveprimâ facieevidence of a right to form settlements in the country; first, in the recognition of this right by a Power which had asserted an exclusive title to the entire country under the guarantee of the Treaty of Utrecht, to which all the great colonial Powers in America were parties, but which ultimately abandoned it by the signature of the Convention of the Escurial: secondly, in the undisturbed enjoyment of this right during a period which, according to the Civil Law, to which all civilised nations agree in appealing for the arbitration of public differences between one nation and another, from the necessity of some common standard,constitutes a valid prescription, such as was recognised in the case of Russia by the United States in 1824, and by Great Britain in 1825; thirdly, in the partition having been the subject of repeated negotiations, and more especially from the proposals to negotiate both in 1824 and 1826 having originated with the United States, which thereby admitted the claims of Great Britain to be similar inkindwith their own, though they might maintain them to be different indegree.
It seems to have been contended by the commissioners of the United States in the course of the last negotiation, that “whilst the proper title of the United States gave them exclusive rights against all mankind,the superadditionof the Spanish title extended their exclusive right as against Great Britain,” (Letter of Mr. Buchanan, July 12, 1845.) The enjoyment, however, of the territory by Great Britain was antecedent to the proper title of the United States, whereas the possession of the United States can be accounted for consistently with the continuance of the common right of Great Britain, which she claims by virtue of a title antecedent to such possession. But if the superadded Spanish title conferred an extension of exclusive rights on the United States, it must have beenproprio vigorean exclusive title; and if so, valid against the United States themselves: so that, on that supposition, the proper right of the United States could not be an exclusive right. There cannot be two exclusive titles in different nations to the same country, and Great Britain would be expressly debarred by the provisions of the Convention of the Escurial from recognising an exclusive title in the United States, antecedent to their acquisition of the Spanish title by the Treaty of Florida, because she had recognised in 1790 the right of Spain, in common with herself, to settle in any places of the north-west coast of America not as yet occupied: whilst she could not recognise the rights which devolved to the United States from Spain, in 1819, as exclusive rights, in the face of her previous admission that the United States were entitled to be considered as the party in possession of Astoria whilst treating of the title, and in contravention to the third article of the Convention of 1818, which was grounded upon the basis of both the United States and Great Britain, as well as other Powers, having at that time claims to the country. In fact, Great Britain had acknowledged the common title of Spain before the time when the United States assert their own exclusive title to havecommenced; and she had acknowledged the common title of the United States, pending the continuance of the recognised title of Spain: so that she is precluded from recognising the title of either state to be an exclusive one, if she were even disposed to do so, by her own previous acts.
On the other hand, the United States themselves are precluded by their own previous acts from setting up either their own original title, or their derivative title from Spain, as an exclusive title.
By the convention, signed at London, of October 20, 1818, it was agreed in the third article, “that any country that may be claimed by either party on the north-west coast of America, westward of the Stony Mountains, shall, together with its harbours, bays, and creeks, and the navigation of all the rivers within the same, be free and open for the term of ten years from the date of the present convention, to the vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two Powers; it being well understood that this agreement is not to be construed to theprejudice of any claim which either of the two contracting parties may have to any part of the said country, nor shall it be taken to affect theclaims of any other Power or stateto any part of the said country; the only object of the high contracting parties, in that respect, being to prevent disputes and differencesamong themselves.”
This article, in its very terms, implies the renunciation by both parties of an exclusive right to the entire territory, not merely in reference to each other, but still further in reference to other Powers.
By the convention, signed at London, of August 6, 1827, all the provisions of the third article of the Convention of 1818 were indefinitely extended, subject to abrogation, at the option of either party, upon twelve months’ notice; and by the third article it was stipulated, that “nothing contained in this convention, or in the third article of the convention of the 20th October, 1818, hereby continued in force, shall be construed toimpair, or in any manner affect, the claimswhich either party may have to any part of the country westward of the Stony or Rocky Mountains.”
What those claims were on the part of the United States at the time of the Convention of 1818, was explicitly stated by Messrs. Gallatin and Rush, the Commissioners of the United States, before it was concluded. In their letter to Mr. Adams, of October 20, 1818, which commences withthese words, “We have the honour to transmit a convention, which we concluded this day with the British plenipotentiaries,” they state in reference to the negotiations, “We did not assert that the United States had aperfect rightto that country, (i. e., the country westward of the Stony Mountains,) but insisted that their claim was at least good against Britain.” In other words, the plenipotentiaries on the part of the United States, at the first opening of the negotiations respecting the definitive adjustment of the mutual claims of the two parties westward of the Rocky Mountains, which has been a subject of subsequent negotiation on three separate occasions, limited their claims expressly to an imperfect right,—a right in common with Great Britain. They had already, in assenting to be placed in possession of Astoria “whilst treating of the title,” according to Lord Castlereagh’s agreement, as recorded by Mr. Rush, admitted thecommon rightof Great Britain to possess settlements in that country. The United States had contended that Astoria had become a British possessionjure belli, and Great Britain had covenanted by the first article of the Treaty of Ghent to restore all her acquisitions madejure belli. Great Britain, on the contrary, had maintained that Astoria had passed into the hands of the North-west Company by peaceable transfer. In agreeing then to treat of the title, the two parties agreed to discuss these two facts, the former implying the common right of the United States to make settlements, the latter, the common right of Great Britain. It was idle to enter into an inquiry into the respective truth of the alleged facts, unless it followed that the title of the party that could substantiate its statement would thereby be at once established. This however, implied a possibility on either side of a rightful title, on the side of the United States by the Treaty of Ghent, on the side of Great Britain by the Law of Nations. The United States relied upon thestatus ante bellum, the lawfulness of which, in this particular case, was admitted by Great Britain’s consenting to entertain such a title; Great Britain rested on the received principles of international law, according to which her subjects, in common with those of other states, were entitled to make peaceable acquisitions in such parts of the north-west coast as were not yet occupied by any other civilised nation, which the United States could not gainsay. After the consent of both sides to treat of the title upon this footing, it is out of the question to suppose that it is competent for eitherparty on the renewal of negotiations to set up an exclusive title: such a proceeding would be essentiallyaggressivein its character, and would be altogether inconsistent with the tacit admission on both sides, when they agreed to entertain the consideration of each other’s title.
Let us now proceed to examine what has been the conduct of the two parties throughout the course of the various negotiations.
It having been expressly stated in 1818, by Messrs. Rush and Gallatin, that the United Statesdid not assert a perfect right to the country, Mr. Rush, in his letter to Mr. Adams, proceeds to state, that “when the plenipotentiaries of the United States, on their part, stated, ‘that there was no reason why, if the two countries extended their claims westward, the boundary limit of the 49th parallel of north latitudeshould not be continued to the Pacific Ocean,” the British commissioners, though they made no formal proposition for a boundary, intimated that the river itself was the most convenient that could be adopted, and that they would not agree to any that did not give them the harbour of the mouth of the river,in common with the United States.
The history of the subsequent negotiations will show that on each occasion the United States have increased their claims and reduced their concessions, while Great Britain has not only not increased her claims, but on the contrary has advanced in her concessions.
Thus, in 1824, Mr. Rush commenced the negotiation by claiming for the United States, “in their own right, and as their absolute and exclusive sovereignty and dominion,the whole of the countrywest of the Rocky Mountains, from the 42d to at least as far up as the 51st degree of north latitude.” He further said, that “in the opinion of my government, the title of the United States to the whole of that coast, from latitude 42° to as far north as 60°, was superior to that of Britain or any other Power: first, through the proper claim of the United States by discovery and settlement; and secondly, as now standing in the place of Spain, and holding in their hands her title.”
In accordance with these views, Mr. Rush annexed to the Protocol of the 12th Conference a formal proposal, that Great Britain should stipulate that her subjects should make no settlement on the north-west coast of America,or the islands adjoining, south of the 51st degree of latitude; theUnited States stipulating, that none should be made by her citizens north of the 51st degree. The British negotiators in reply proposed to accede to a line along the 49th parallel of north latitude as far as the north-easternmost branch of the Columbia, and thence down the middle of that river to the sea, the navigation of the river to be for ever free to both parties. The commissioner of the United States, on the other hand, would only vary his proposed line to the south, so as to consent that it should be the 49th instead of the 51st degree of north latitude, which was the original proposal in 1818, with the navigation of the river free to both parties.
On the negotiations being resumed in 1826, Mr. Gallatin, on the part of the United States, having set up a new ground of title founded on the acquisition of Louisiana from France in 1803, and its contiguity through the intervening chain of the Rocky Mountains to the territory under discussion, limited his offer to the 49th parallel with the navigation of the river free to both parties, as before, whilst the British commissioners expressed their willingness to yield to the United States, in addition to what they first offered, a detached territory extending, on the Pacific and the Strait of Fuca, from Bullfinch’s Harbour to Hood’s Canal, and to stipulate that no works should at any time be erected at the mouth or on the banks of the Columbia, calculated to impede the free navigation of that river by either party.
This last stipulation was evidently adapted to obviate a difficulty which Mr. Prevost, the agent of the United States at the restoration of Astoria, had suggested to the United States Government as early as Nov. 11, 1818, in his report upon the Columbia River:—“In addition to this, it is susceptible of entire defence, because a ship, after passing the bar, in order to avoid the breaking of the sea on one of the banks, is obliged to bear up directly for the knoll forming the cape, at all times, to approach within a short distance of its base, and most frequently there to anchor. Thus a small battery erected on this point, in conjunction with the surges on the opposite side, would so endanger the approach as to deter an enemy, however hardy, from the attempt.” (British and Foreign State Papers, 1821-22, p. 467.)
In the negotiations of 1844-5, lately brought to a close, Mr. Pakenham, the British plenipotentiary at a very early period, proposed in a letter of Aug. 26, 1844, in addition to what had been already offered on the part of the UnitedStates, and in proof of the earnest desire of her Britannic Majesty’s Government to arrive at an arrangement suitable to the interests and wishes of both parties, to undertake to make free to the United States any port or ports which the United States Government might desire either on the main-land, or on Vancouver’s Island, south of 49°; and on Mr. Calhoun’s declining to make any counter-proposal, based on the supposition of the United States and Great Britain being occupants in common, Mr. Pakenham suggested “an arbitration, to the result of which both parties should be bound to conform by the interchange of notes, as the most fair and honourable mode of settling the question,” which Mr. Calhoun declined. Mr. Buchanan, on resuming the negotiations after the election of Mr. Polk to the Presidency of the United States, concluded his communication of July 12, 1845, to Mr. Pakenham, by stating that the President would not have consented to yield any portion of the Oregon territory had he not found himself embarrassed, if not committed, by the acts of his predecessors, and that he was instructed to propose the 49th parallel as before to the Pacific Ocean, offering at the same time to make free any port or ports on Vancouver’s Island south of this parallel, which the British Government may desire.
“This proposal,” as justly observed by Mr. Pakenham, in his reply of July 29, 1835, “was less than that tendered by the American plenipotentiaries in the negotiation of 1826, and declined by the British Government. On that occasion it was proposed that the navigation of the Columbia should be made free to both parties.”
The President of the United States, in his message to Congress of the 1st of December, 1845, after briefly reviewing the course of the several negotiations, concludes that portion of his message with these remarkable words:—
“The civilised world will see in these proceedingsa spirit of liberal concessionon the part of the United States; and this Government will be relieved from all responsibility which may follow the failure to settle the controversy.”
Mr. Buchanan had stated to the same effect, at the conclusion of his letter of August 30, 1845, that not “only respect for the conduct of his predecessors, but a sincere desire to promote peace and harmony between the two governments,” had actuated the President to offera proposition so liberalto Great Britain.
“And how has this proposition been received by the British plenipotentiary? It has been rejected without even a reference to his own Government. Nay, more; the British plenipotentiary, to use his own language, ‘trusts that the American plenipotentiary, will be prepared to offer some further proposal for the settlement of the Oregon question more consistent with fairness and equity, and with the reasonable expectations of the British Government.’”
It could hardly require a reference from Mr. Pakenham to the British Government at home, to satisfy him that he should at once decline to accept a less liberal offer than that which his Government had already declined on two previous occasions. Surely the meaning of the word “liberal” must have acquired a different acceptation in the United States from what it bears in the mother-country, or the notions of what constitutes “a spirit of liberal concession,” must be very different on the eastern and western sides of the Atlantic; for, in the usual signification of the word in the mother-country, it would be bitter irony to apply such a term to the proposal authorised by President Polk, expressly, as alleged, in deference to what had been done by Presidents Monroe and Adams. It is an offer on the part of Mr. Polk to share a worthless haven with Great Britain, when his predecessors have offered to share the Great River of the West.
The offer of Great Britain, when first made by her in 1824, would have imposed upon her at that time, if accepted by the United States, as likewise at the present time, the necessity of ultimately breaking up four or five settlements, formed by her subjects within the limits that would become prohibited; and which they had formed under the belief of their full right, as British subjects, to settle there. “But their Government was willing to make these surrenders, for so they considered them, in a spirit of compromise, on points where the two nations stood so divided,” (British and Foreign State Papers, 1825-26, p. 519;) whereas the United States would not be required to abandon a single settlement; on the contrary, they would retain the fertile valley of the Willamette, where their settlers are mostly located. The proposal of the United States, on the other hand, would require that Great Britain should abandon the majority of her settlements, and amongst these Fort Vancouver, the dépôt of the Hudson’s Bay Company, from which fourteen other settlements receive their supplies; that she should resign the use of the river, thefree navigation of which is absolutely necessary for the transport of outfits and their returns; that she should be precluded, not merely from the harbour within the river, but from the harbours in Admiralty Inlet, the only really valuable harbours on the coast; that she should give up the agricultural district round Puget’s Sound, where the fixed population of British Canadians are located, and which bears a similar relation to the future destinies of Northern Oregon, that the valley of the Willamette does to those of Southern Oregon; and in this proposal Mr. Buchanan, in his letter of July 12, 1845, “trusts that the British Government will recognise the President’ssincere and anxious desire to cultivate the most friendly relationsbetween the two countries, and to manifest to the world that he is actuatedby a spirit of moderation.” In return Great Britain is to be allowed to retain a district of barren territory in Northern Oregon, in which Captain Wilkes has officially reported to the United States, that “there is no part on the coast where a settlement could be formed that would be able to supply its own wants,” and which even for hunting purposes is so unproductive, that the Hudson’s Bay Company have found it expedient to lease other hunting grounds within the Russian territories; and this too, when the future value of the country will consist, not in its capability to supply the fur-trader with the skins of the beaver and sea-otter, but in the adequacy of its grazing and agricultural produce to support a fixed body of inhabitants, as well as to victual the ships of various nations engaged in the China trade, and in the fisheries of the South Sea. Harder conditions could not well have been dictated by a conquering to a conquered nation as the price of peace, neither do they accord with that spirit of just accommodation with which Mr. Rush, in 1824, expressly declared the Government of the United States to be animated, nor with those principles of mutual convenience which it was then agreed on both sides to keep in view, in order to further the settlement of their mutual claims.
If the present convention should be abrogated by either party, the only object of which, according to the express declaration of the two contracting parties, was “to prevent disputes and differences amongst themselves,” the existing condition of common occupancy does not thereby terminate. Each nation will still be bound to respect the settlements of the other. The mutual rights and obligationsrecognised by Great Britain and Spain in respect to each other, in the Convention of the Escurial, were recognised once and for all. The United States now stands in the place of Spain; she asserts that by the Treaty of Florida she holds in her hands all the Spanish title, but her hands are also bound by the obligations of Spain. By the Convention of the Escurial, the liberty of free access and unmolested trade with the settlements of each other, made subsequent to April 1789, was secured to either party: in other respects their settlements would carry with them the independent rights, which the law of nations secures to the settlements of independent powers. Oregon would thus be dotted over with the settlements of subjects of Great Britain, and citizens of the United States, in juxta-position to each other, like the Protestant and Catholic cantons of Switzerland. The tribunals of the United States have decided in Washbourne’s case (4 John’s C. R. 108) and in other cases, “that the 27th article of the Treaty of 1793, which provided for the delivery of criminals charged with murder and forgery, was only declaratory of the law of nations, and is equally obligatory on the two nations under the sanction of public law, and since the expiration of that treaty, as it was before.” So far the recurrence of mutual outrages might be checked. Still, such a condition of things would leave open, as Mr. Rush observed in 1824, “sources of future disagreement, which time might multiply and aggravate.” It is, therefore, for the interest of both parties, that a line of demarcation should be drawn, to prevent the possible conflict of jurisdiction. A few square miles, more or less, where the entire territory to be shared between the two nations extends over a district of more than 500,000 square miles, can form but a secondary element of consideration in the question. If we look to the original rights of the United States, as founded on use and settlement, they point exclusively to the southern bank, whilst those of Great Britain point, in a similar manner, to the northern. Citizens of the United States first explored the southern branch of the Columbia, whilst subjects of Great Britain first explored the northern. The flag of the United States has been authoritatively displayed on the southern bank alone, whilst the British ensign has exclusively been hoisted on the northern. Whilst the valley of the Willamette in Southern Oregon is cultivated, according to Captain Wilkes, by settlers from other countries besides the UnitedStates, the agricultural establishments on the Cowlitz River, and on the shores of Puget’s Sound, in Northern Oregon, are exclusively the creation of British subjects.
Great Britain having expressly declared in 1826, that she claimed “no exclusive sovereignty over any portion of that territory,” it has been thought unnecessary to set out in full her original title, as against the United States. It is impossible in the present day to ascertain how far Drake was authorised to make discoveries in the South Seas on account of his sovereign. We are informed by Stow the annalist, that he had obtained the approval of Queen Elizabeth to the plan of his expedition, through the interest of Sir Christopher Hatton; and the author of “The World Encompassed” affirms that he hada commission from his sovereign, and that she delivered to him a sword with this remarkable speech:—“We do account that he which striketh at thee, Drake, strikes at us.” Captain Burney’s opinion, however, seems most to accord with probability—that he hadno written commission. The Queen, however, on his return, after a protracted inquiry before her Council, upon the complaint of the ambassador of Spain, approved and ratified his acts; and in her reply to the ambassador’s remonstrances against Drake’s territorial aggressions, expressly asserted, according to Camden, that as she did not acknowledge the Spaniards to have any title by sanction of the Bishop of Rome, so she knew no right they had to any places other than those they were in possession of, (Cf. supr., p. 161.) Vattel (b. xi., § 74) states the law that, “if a nation or its chief approves and ratifies the act of the individual, it then becomes a public concern.” Drake thus appears to have been recognised as an instrument of his sovereign; and though the moderation of the British Government has led it not to insist upon Drake’s discovery of the northwest coast as far as 48°, though it was coupled with formal acts of taking possession with the consent of the natives, because Great Britain did not follow it up within a reasonable time with actual settlements, still that discovery has not lost its validity as a bar to any asserted discovery of a later period.
On the other hand, the expeditions of Captains Cook and Vancouver satisfied all the conditions required by the law of nations for making discoveries and forming settlements. Unless Captain King, the companion of Cook, had published his account of the high prices which had been obtained by hissailors for the furs of the north-west coast of America in the markets of China, the American fur-trader, as Mr. Greenhow terms Captain Gray, would never have resorted to the coast of Oregon. But before any trading vessel of the United States had appeared off those shores, Captain Cook had traced the American coast, from a little above Cape Mendocino to Icy Cape, in 70° 29′; whilst Vancouver was despatched in 1791 expressly by the British Government, to ascertain what parts of the north-west coast were open for settlement to subjects of Great Britain, in accordance with the 3d article of the Convention of the Escurial; and after an accurate survey reported, that the Presidio of San Francisco, in about 38°, was “the northernmost settlement of any description formed by the Court of Spain on the continental shore of North-west America.” To Vancouver the civilised world was indebted for the first accurate chart of the entire coast. The important services rendered to navigation and science by Vancouver and Lieutenant Broughton, were fully acknowledged by Mr. Gallatin in the negotiations of 1826; yet all these, it is contended by the Commissioners of the United States, are entirely superseded by Captain Gray having first entered the mouth of the chief river of the country.
When Mr. Buchanan, therefore, at the commencement of his letter of August 30, 1845, states, “that the precise question under consideration simply is, were thetitlesof Spain and the United States, when united by the Florida treaty on the 22d of February 1819,good as against Great Britain, to the Oregon territory as far north as the Russian line, in the latitude of 54° 40′?” and assumes, as a consequence, that if they were, it will be admitted this whole territory nowbelongsto the United States; he avails himself of the ambiguity of the termtitle, to infer that the establishment of acommon titlemust lead to the admission of anexclusive title.
With much more reason might Great Britain have set up an exclusive title against the United States, which she has, in the spirit of moderation, forborne to do. She might have said, “We were entitled by the general law of nations to make settlements in this country, as being unoccupied by any civilised nation. We were the first civilised nation that established a permanent occupation of it, which has never been abandoned, by a settlement in the year 1806 on Frazer’s River. We have since that time, steadily occupied the entire country north and south of the River Columbia, as far as thesources of Lewis River, where Fort Hall, the most southern settlement of the Hudson’s Bay Company, supplies shelter and food to the wasted and famished settler from the United States, on his first entry into the promised land of Oregon.” She might have said, “Before 1833, American citizens, on the testimony of their own countrymen, had no settlements of a permanent kind west of the Rocky Mountains. Even in the valley of the Willamette, where Captain Wilkes, in 1840; found not more thansixtyfamilies, many of them being British subjects, and late servants of the Hudson’s Bay Company, the first settlements were made by officers of that Company, under the encouragement of the Company. It was owing to the report of the thriving condition of these farms having been carried to the United States by American trappers, that settlers from that country were led to undertake the long and perilous journey across the Rocky Mountains, which they would never have survived, had not the British settlements preceded their adventurous enterprise, and furnished them with supplies on their arrival.” Yet after an indisputable use and enjoyment of this country by British subjects for a greater period of time, than that which the United States admitted by treaty in 1824, to establish a valid title by prescription in favour of Russia, from 60° north latitude to 54° 40′, against their own Spanish derivative title, the President of the United States declares, in his solemn message, his “settled conviction that the British pretensions of title could not be maintained to any portion of the Oregon territory, upon any principle of public law recognised by nations.”
The plenipotentiaries of the United States, in their negotiations with Spain respecting the boundary of Louisiana, laid down this principle as adopted in practice by European Powers, in the discoveries and acquisitions which they have respectively made in the New World,—that “whenever one European nation makes a discovery, andtakes possession of any portion of that continent, and another afterwards does the same at some distance from it, when the boundary between them is not determined by the principle above mentioned (viz., the taking possession of an extent of sea coast,) the middle distance becomes such of course.” (Cf. supr., Ch. XIII.) If we apply this rule to the settlement of the claims of Great Britain and the United States, either in respect to the conflict of their original titles, or in respect to the conflict ofthe title of Great Britain recognised in the Convention of the Escurial, with the title of the United States devolved to them by the Treaty of Washington, we shall find it confirm the reasonableness of the offer made by Great Britain. It was ascertained by Vancouver, who had been despatched by his sovereign with this express commission, that the northernmost part of the north-west coastalready occupiedby Spain, at the signature of the Convention of 1790, was the Presidio of San Francisco, in about 38° north latitude. Vancouver at the same time ascertained that the settlements of the Russians extended as far south as Port Etches, at the eastern extremity of Prince William’s Sound, a little to the south of 60°, and thus determined the extent of the common rights of Great Britain and Spain under the convention, which Mr. Pitt declared, as first Minister of the Crown of England, “he should esteem the Government of his Britannic Majesty highly culpable if they neglected to ascertain, by actual survey,” (St. James’s Chronicle, December 15, 1790.) Both the United States, however, subsequently to their acquisition of their derivative Spanish title, and Great Britain, have recognised, by separate treaties in 1824 and 1825, the territorial rights of Russia as far south as 54° 40′ north latitude, founded on the use and enjoyment of the coast by Russian subjects, during the intervening period between Vancouver’s visit and the publication of the Imperial Ukase of September 16, 1821; so that the rights of Great Britain to form settlements under the Convention of the Escurial, are thus limited by her own act to the parts of the coast between 38° and 54° 40′, and the United States, by a similar act, have confined their derivative title to the same northern boundary. When, however, the United States claim to hold in their hands the title of Spain against Great Britain, and upon the strength of that title propose to make a final partition of the territory hitherto the subject of a common occupation, if they would abide by their own rule, as solemnly propounded by their commissioners on two distinct occasions, the middle distance between 38° and 54° 40′ becomes the boundary line of course. The extremities of the country to be divided are thus marked out by the Presidio of San Francisco on the southern side, and by Fort Frazer on the northern, and nature seems to have accorded the embouchure of the Columbia River, in the latitude of 46° 18′, to meet the conditions of so reasonable a rule, as that which the UnitedStates then maintained to be grounded on an acknowledged principle of international law.
Such a rule might reasonably be resorted to on this occasion, as furnishing a solution to the problem of converting the common rights of the United States and Great Britain into separate rights. The United States, however, might admit that the principle was abstractedly sound, but that its application, as proposed, was inadmissible, as their claim commenced at 42°, and not at 38°. It is evident, however, that the derivative title from Spain as against Great Britain, if it be advanced as the basis of the negotiation, which has been the case, cannot assume a different form in the hands of the United States, from that which it would have presented in the hands of Spain herself: otherwise,the lessSpain had ceded to the United States,the morethe United States would be entitled to claim from Great Britain, which of course is untenable. But Great Britain has conceded to the United States more than the limits which this rule would assign to them, namely, the entire left bank of the Columbia River as far as the 49th parallel, thereby giving up to them the exclusive possession of the Lewis River and the Clarke River, and the intermediate territory.
The general character, however, of the proposals of Great Britain cannot be better described than in the words of Mr. Pakenham’s letter of Sept. 12, 1844:—
“It is believed that by this arrangement ample justice would be done to the claims of the United States, on whatever ground advanced, with relation to the Oregon territory. As regards extent of territory, they would obtain acre for acre, nearly half of the entire territory to be divided. As relates to the navigation of the principal river, they would enjoy a perfect equality of right with Great Britain: and with respect to harbours, Great Britain shows every disposition to consult their convenience in this particular. On the other hand, were Great Britain to abandon the line of the Columbia as a frontier, and to surrender the right to the navigation of that river, the prejudice occasioned to them by such an arrangement, would, beyond all proportion, exceed the advantage accruing to the United States from the possession of a few more square miles of territory. It must be obvious to every impartial investigator of the subject, that in adhering to the line of the Columbia, Great Britain is not influenced by motives of ambition, with reference to extension ofterritory, but by considerations of utility, not to say necessity, which cannot be lost sight of, and for which allowance ought to be made, in an arrangement professing to be based on considerations of mutual convenience and advantage.”
Great Britain has advanced in her offers on each separate negotiation. Let her make one step more in advance. Let her offer to the United States to declare the ports in Admiralty Inlet and Puget’s Sound to be “Free Ports,” with a givenradiusof free territory. The advantage which she would give to the United States, would far exceed the prejudice occasioned to herself by such an arrangement, and the proposal would be in accordance with the principle sanctioned by the 5th article of the Convention of the Escurial, which guaranteed a mutual freedom of access to the future settlements of either party for the purposes of trade. If her Britannic Majesty’s Government should deem it consistent with a just regard to the interests of Great Britain, as it would certainly be in accordance with the spirit of moderation which has hitherto influenced her Majesty’s councils, to make this further offer, and if the President of the United States should instruct his plenipotentiary to reject it, the attempt to effect a partition of the territory by treaty may be regarded as hopeless. It will then be best for both parties that the Convention of 1827 should be abrogated, and the future destinies of the country be regulated by the general law of nations. It would be idle to speculate upon those future destinies,—whether the circumstances of the country justify Mr. Webster’s anticipations that it will form at some not very distant day an independent confederation, or whether the natural divisions of Northern and Southern Oregon are likely to attach ultimately the former by community of interests to Canada, and the latter to the United States of America. When it is remembered that Mr. Calhoun declared in 1843, that “the distance for a fleet to sail from New York to the Columbia is more than 13,000 miles, a voyage that would require six months,” and that “the distance overland, from the State of Missouri to the mouth of the Columbia River is about 2,000 miles, over an unsettled country of naked plains and mountains, a march, if unopposed, of 120 days,” the scepticism of such as doubt the inevitable absorption of Oregon into the United States, seems at least to be excusable.
THE END.
INDEX.