FOOTNOTES:

Burmese Dacoits before trial—worst characters and native police guard.

Ya Nyun was the Myingaung (literally Captain of the Horse) of the Welaung sub-district of Myingyan, bound at call to furnish one hundred mounted men to the king's army. He had thirty headmen of villages under him. His father, who had been Myingaung before him, was a murderer and a scoundrel. He had been dismissed by King Mindon's Government and tattooed as a bad character with the Burmese words meaning: "Beware, cease to do evil," on his forearm.[27]The son, however, was at Court a hanger-on of the Yaw Mingyi, one of the big ministers. He obtained his father's post. He returned to Welaung and kept a large following of thieves and robbers, and lived on the people.

His oppression became intolerable, and two years before the war a deputation of the Thugyis (village headmen) went up to Mandalay to beg protection, but as the Taingda Mingyi, the most powerful and the worst man about the Court, took Ya Nyun's part, they could get no redress. Two years afterwards a second deputation was sent, and Ya Nyun was summoned to Mandalay. The matter was under inquiry when the British advance became known. Thereupon Ya Nyun was decorated with a gold umbrella (equivalent to a K.C.B.) and sent back to Welaung to fight against the British. So far his case resembles, to some extent, that of Bo Swè, who was, however, a gallant gentleman and an honest citizen beside Ya Nyun.

His first step was to gather around him his former followers, and he started with about fifty ruffians as the leaders and stiffening of his gang. They had to live, and his methods were the same as those of other dacoit leaders. Money and food and women were demanded from the villages, and those who refused supplies were unmercifully punished, their property seized, their villages burnt, their women dishonoured, and their cattle driven off by hundreds. Those who in any way assisted the troops were the objects of special barbarities. If they could not be caught, their fathers or brothers were taken. One of his followers deposed that he was with Ya Nyun when three men who were related to a man who had assisted the British were ordered to be crucified in front of the camp. He says: "I saw the bodies after they were crucified.[28]They were crucified alive and then shot, their hearts cut open," &c. In another case "five men were caught. Nga Kè [one of Ya Nyun's men] rode over them as they lay bound, and then shot them."

An Indian washerman, belonging, if I remember right, to the Rifle Brigade, straggled from a column on the march. This same witness, who acted as a clerk or secretary on Ya Nyun's staff, kept a diary and wrote letters and orders, goes on: "Ya Nyun ordered Aung Bet to cut a piece out of the Indian's thigh, morning and evening, and give it to him to eat. The flesh was fried. This was done three days. Six pieces were cut out, then Ya Nyun ordered him to be killed. He was killed. I saw all this with my own eyes."

The ill-treatment of women by these gangs was not unknown. Sometimes they were taken and ill-treated as a punishment to the village which had set at naught the Bo's order. Sometimes they were taken as concubines for Ya Nyun and his comrades. There is one case on record where seven young girls were selected from a village "on account of their youth," and after the dacoits had ill-used them, five were deliberately slaughtered for fear of their giving information. Two escaped. This occurred in January, 1890. The remains of the five girls were found in the jungle afterwards by our men.

The Deputy Commissioner, who examined 136 witnesses as to the doings of Ya Nyun's gang, concluded his inquiry in these words:—

"A perusal of the evidence shows that the organization, which had, perhaps, its first origin in a desire to resist the British Government, degenerated rapidly, as might have been expected from the disreputable persons who played the part of leaders, into a band of marauders who subsisted by terrorism, rapine, murder, dacoity, and other outrages. While remaining in open defiance of Government, they soon ceased to be political rebels, in any respectable sense, though they occasionally gathered in sufficient numbers to resist the troops or police, even so late as February, 1889. They showed no more mercy to their own countrymen than to foreigners. They can have no claim to the title of patriots, but merely to that ofdamya, dacoit, the title invariably applied to them by their own countrymen."

So wrote the Deputy Commissioner who made the inquiry in 1890. Ya Nyun has been in the Andamansever since. I have been told that he has shown there a capacity for command, and is in charge of a gang of convicts. Then by all means let him stay where he is useful and harmless.

I have given the history of Ya Nyun's rise to power and some indications of the nature of his gang. In 1887 to 1888 it was frequently encountered by troops and police, and was more than once roughly treated, but the wilderness around Popa afforded a shelter from which the small and scattered parties of dacoits could not be driven.

In March and April, 1888, a series of combined operations was organized. Four columns of military police acted under Captain Hastings, Commandant of the Myingyan battalion. Several of Ya Nyun's men[29]were killed and many captured.

In the autumn murders, accompanied in some cases with atrocious cruelties, began again. Early in 1889 Ya Nyun, collecting several other leaders, mustered a strong force, and occupied a position near his own village of Welaung. A body of military police failed to dislodge him, and although the gang was met soon after by a party of the Rifle Brigade, and dispersed with heavy loss, the power of the organization was not destroyed.

After these events an experienced officer, with powers extending to all the country in which Ya Nyun and his accomplices acted, was given control of the operations against the brigands. At his suggestion a pardon was offered to Ya Nyun if he would surrender. I consented with much reluctance, but it seemed better to free the country from misery at any price. The man would not avail himself of it. Throughout the rains he and his men were more active than usual, and their raids were marked by more wanton cruelty and bloodshed than before; a symptom, as I have said before, that the people were becoming less submissive to the dacoits, who on their part were striving to retain their hold on them.

As little substantial progress was being made, I went to the Popa subdivision in January, 1890. I called up an additional police force and saw that the utmost pressure was put, under the Village Regulation, upon the villages which harboured and assisted the dacoits. Some success against the smaller leaders followed, but at the end of April all the greater men, ten in number, for whose capture rewards had been offered, were still at large.

In the middle of April the Commissioner, Mr Symes (the late Sir E. Symes), advised that the time had come for adopting the procedure followed so successfully in Sagaing, Minbu, and elsewhere. This was done. Proclamations were issued much in the same terms as those used in other districts, offering pardon to the rank and file, and warning all concerned that villages assisting the gangs would be severely fined, and that sympathizers and relatives would be deported to a distance. The rewards offered for the capture of the leaders were doubled.

The success was extraordinary. The whole dacoit organization fell to pieces. It collapsed as a tiger shot in the head falls in his tracks. On the 30th of May, 1890, Ya Nyun surrendered. Eleven of his lieutenants or comrades had fallen in action, and forty-two men of note surrendered with him.

One very influential leader of the bands in the Myingyan district, whose name was well known in the years preceding, was not caught. Bo Cho had not shown himself since 1888, and was reported to have disappeared. He lay low until 1896, when he managed to get together some men and began his old game. But in 1896 the Government knew what to do and did it. An officer with sufficient military police was at once appointed and empowered to take action against him, the provisions of the Village Regulation were put into effect, and in a few days he was a prisoner. He was not given an opportunity for further mischief.

FOOTNOTES:[27]This was the Burman substitute for finger-prints. I have often seen men who have endeavoured to cut the brand out of the flesh.[28]The usual practice was to kill the man and then tie the body to a bamboo railing, with the arms and legs stretched out.[29]Ya Nyun himself on this occasion had a narrow escape. His dah, or sword, was taken and presented to me by the officers and men of the Myingyan battalion. It is a handsome weapon, and was, I believe, presented to Ya Nyun by village headmen of the Yamèthin district.

[27]This was the Burman substitute for finger-prints. I have often seen men who have endeavoured to cut the brand out of the flesh.

[28]The usual practice was to kill the man and then tie the body to a bamboo railing, with the arms and legs stretched out.

[29]Ya Nyun himself on this occasion had a narrow escape. His dah, or sword, was taken and presented to me by the officers and men of the Myingyan battalion. It is a handsome weapon, and was, I believe, presented to Ya Nyun by village headmen of the Yamèthin district.

I have alluded several times to the Magwè district. It was in a very bad state and was a blot on the administration, which gave me much thought. This district was called Taungdwingyi at first, and took the name of Magwè when the subdivision of that name lying along the left of the river was added to it. It was not until the end of 1888 that it began to be very troublesome. The leader of most influence at first was Min Yaung, who was killed by a party of troops in May, 1887. Another leader, Tokgyi, rose afterwards and gave much trouble, but he was captured in April, 1888. It seemed that no formidable leaders remained. Small raids and dacoities occurred here, as in most parts of the province, at that time. The revenue collections had increased largely, which was a good sign.

In August, 1888, however, a pretender with the title of the Shwèkinyo Prince raised his standard, and was joined by a noted dacoit Bo Lè and others. They hatched their plots in a place on the border of the Magwè township, and began work in November, 1888. Unfortunately, everything in this district was unfortunate, at the very commencement the gang under Bo Lè encountered a party of thirty mounted men of the Magwè battalion, under a British Inspector of Police. The police were badly handled, and lost seven killed and two wounded, while six rifles and three ponies were taken by the dacoits. This gave the gang encouragement, while the police, who had not much cohesion, were for a time somewhat shaken. [See p. 96.]

After this event the gangs separated, probably because the country could not feed them, and took up points at a distance from each other. In January, 1889, some of theleaders joining hands again, surprised a party of the Myingyan police, and inflicted some loss on them, but were soon afterwards punished by Mounted Infantry from Magwè.

Throughout March and April, the pursuit was kept up with varying success. At last in May, the Mounted Infantry got on to their tracks, killed Bo Lè, and dispersed the gang.

Hitherto the brigands had confined themselves to the west and north-west of the district, open dry country with a good deal of waste land offering a good field for the action of mounted troops.

After a time the Taungdwingyi subdivision also became disturbed, and dacoities became frequent. The conditions on the eastern side of the district were different. The hills known as the Pegu Yomas run along the eastern boundary dividing Magwè from Pyinmana for about sixty or seventy miles; from the Thayetmyo boundary on the south, to some distance beyond Natmauk on the north. From Natmauk the hills gradually diminish and slope away to the plains. The slopes of the Yomas are densely wooded, and between the Magwè boundary and the low country to the east there was much teak forest worked by the Bombay Burma Company. At that time there was also a good growth of the Acacia Catechu, and many of the Burmans employed in extracting cutch lived in the forests, and cultivated small cleared plots here and there. The richest villages and best rice-producing land in the district lay along the low lands at the foot of the Yomas, within raiding distance. No dacoit could have wished for better conditions, especially when an inefficient district officer and a poorly commanded police battalion were added.

At this period of the campaign I had lost by sickness and death some of the best and most experienced men. The strength of the Commission all told was not enough for the necessities of the province in its then state. I was compelled to place districts in charge of men who were unfit owing to inexperience and want of training.

It is a fact of which we may all be proud that the average young English gentleman when thrown into conditions which demand from him courage, energy, andjudgment, and the power of governing, answers to the call. Whether he comes from a good school or university, or from his regiment, from the sea or the ranch, whether he has come through the competitive system or has obtained his appointment by other means, he will in the majority of cases be found capable, and sometimes conspicuously able. It is necessary, however, that he should be taught and trained in his work. The Magwè district was in itself not specially hard to manage, not nearly so difficult as many others in Upper Burma. It was in charge of a junior man of the Indian Civil Service, clever but not very wise.

As it was necessary to take special measures against the Yoma gangs, an officer, who had been ten years in the police in Lower Burma and had done excellently in the adjacent district of Thayetmyo, was appointed to work on similar lines in Taungdwingyi.

He was in this matter independent of the Deputy Commissioner, who, although senior to him in the Commission, was much his junior in years and experience. One of the chief duties assigned to him was the removal of villages from which dacoits received their supplies. He removed those lying nearest the hills which harboured the brigands. No doubt the gangs were inconvenienced and exasperated by this measure. In April, 1889, the village of Myothit was attacked and the police post burnt. In May a large body of dacoits under the standard of Buddha Yaza, a pretended prince, who in preceding years had a large following in the Eastern Division, gathered in the Pin township in the north of the district east of Yénangyaung. A party of military police led by two Indian officers attacked them successfully, but they collected again in a stronger position and a second attack by one hundred rifles (military police), led by the Assistant Commissioner and the Assistant Superintendent of Police, neither of them trained soldiers, failed; but soon afterwards the gangs were again met and dispersed.

On the 1st of June, 1889, a small body of dacoits was encountered by Mr. Dyson, Assistant Commissioner, who had with him a party of police. A fight ensued, in which Mr. Dyson was killed. The man who led this gangwas killed afterwards and his followers surrendered. But this was no compensation for the loss of a promising young officer who could be ill spared.[30]

There was a force of police in the district quite able to hold it, if they had been properly handled, and they were supported by Mounted Infantry. There was evidently a want of some controlling authority which was not to be found in any of the local officers. Just at this time Colonel W. Penn Symons, who had been working in Sagaing, succeeded to the command of the Myingyan district, and at my earnest invitation he went to Magwè and assumed control over the operations for reducing the district to order. All civil and police officers were placed under General Symons absolutely so far as the operations were concerned.

A proclamation was then issued offering a pardon to all who were out, excepting only those who had committed murder and certain named leaders, on condition that they submitted and returned to a peaceful life. This proclamation had some effect, and more than 150 dacoits surrendered with their arms. Most of the men who came in belonged to the Pin and Yénangyaung townships.

In July (1889) I was able to devote a fortnight to this troublesome district and to meet General Symons at Magwè. With him and some of the local officials I marched round the district, going from Magwè to Taungdwingyi, and then up the east to the north, ending at Yénangyaung on the north-west.

I found the country in a better condition than the reports of crime had led me to expect. Going north from Taungdwingyi a good deal of land was lying untilled. But elsewhere every possible field was ploughed and sown, and cattle were plentiful and in good case. This part of the district was a fine open country divided into big fields with thorn hedges. There were, however, here and there tracts of very difficult scrub jungle broken by ravines from which it would be difficult to drive dacoit gangs.

I had the principal men collected to meet me at all the halting-places and had much consultation with them. The people came readily with their petitions and spoke with perfect frankness of their grievances.

As a problem in administration the conditions differed much from those hitherto dealt with. In Sagaing, Minbu, and elsewhere, the lawlessness was universal and chronic. In Magwè the gangs were small and consisted mainly of professional criminals, not of peasants who had joined well-known leaders either to save their own lives and property or to resist the establishment of a foreign Government. Some of the leaders even were well-known outlaws from Lower Burma, and it was asserted that there were natives of India with the gangs. But only in one case was this substantiated. A native of India, a man of the sweeper caste, had been captured and he was in the Magwè jail. A note written a few days after I had left Magwè will give the impressions I brought away from my tour.

"The two main difficulties are the bad state of the Police Battalion and the nature of the country on the north and on the east of the district. These were aggravated by the injudicious action on the part of the subdivisional officer, for which I must take my share of the blame as I selected him and trusted him fully in consequence of his great success elsewhere. In his desire to force the dacoits to leave the slopes of the mountains, he moved villages too far from their fields and did not show a proper care and judgment in selecting the temporary sites for them to occupy. It was said that men joined the dacoit gangs in consequence. It may have been so in a few instances. The people spoke to me frankly and freely, and they did not allege this. Still, it may be true. I debated much with myself whether I should say, 'Go back at once to your old sites.' This would have pleased all.... All the headmen I saw admitted that the villages moved were those which added and fed the dacoits, and they admitted unreservedly that if they returned they must continue to aid and feed them. General Symons was of opinion that the removal of these villages would prove of the greatest assistance in capturing the gangs. The mischief for that season had been caused and some of the more distant landsmust lie empty. To let the people return now (July) was useless, while it would prolong our work.

"Their argument was, 'There are fewer dacoits now than there used to be even in the King's time. We prefer dacoits to inconvenience and hardship.'"

That was their attitude everywhere, and if peace was to be established we could not accept it. I removed the incompetent officers and sent the best officer I had at my disposal (the late Mr. Todd Naylor) to take charge of the district. At the same time a competent Commandant was posted to the military police battalion.

General Symons undertook to remain in the district for another month. Minbu had been cleared of the gangs which had harassed it so long, and I was able to transfer Mr. G. G. Collins to Magwè to help Mr. Todd Naylor.

Having put matters in train, my duties took me to Mandalay and then up the Chindwin to arrange matters connected with the coming expedition against the Chins. General Symons was appointed to command the Chin-Lushai expedition, and Magwè had to be left to the local officers. Progress was slow. The dacoits lay up in the forests of the Yomas, and until they were driven out and destroyed there would be no peace.

For the last three months of the year my health compelled me to take leave to the Nilgiri Hills. There was no hill station in Burma at that time. The climate varying between a stokehole and a fern-house was not invigorating, and labour, physical and mental, such as we were all sustaining was somewhat exhausting.

During my absence Mr. A. P. MacDonnell,[31]Home Secretary to the Government of India, was appointed to act for me. He took up the Magwè business vigorously, and under his direction several columns were organized to operate simultaneously in the unsettled tract from Yamèthin, Pyinmana, Magwè, and Thayetmyo. They commenced work in December, 1889. The party from Magwè encountered one of the gangs in the Yomas, but inflicted no punishment on them. One leader was driven out and captured or killed in the Yamèthin district. But there was no marked success. The dacoits were able to get food anywhere in the forests from the cutch boilers, and it was suspected ammunition from the Burman foresters in the Bombay Burma Company's service.

On my return, from leave in December 1889, I had the great honour of receiving His Royal Highness Prince Albert Victor of Wales, accompanying him to Mandalay by rail and returning by river. This duty necessarily delayed the ordinary work of administration.

On examining the situation in Magwè, I came to the conclusion that the operations in the Yomas must be placed under the control of one man. I selected Mr. Porter, Deputy Commissioner of Pyinmana, and made the whole business over to him with definite instructions as to the powers he was to exercise and the course of action he was to follow. Tracks had already been cleared through the Yomas. The different parties engaged in the work were well combined and held together by Mr. Porter. The gangs were dispersed and either captured or forced to surrender, and by the end of May the work was complete.

Meanwhile in the north of the district Mr. Todd Naylor and Mr. Collins had succeeded in breaking up the small gang that still held out under two noted leaders, and the district was finally cleared. All the leaders had been killed, captured, or driven out of the district. Some sought refuge in Lower Burma. One Lugalégyi, a well-known Bo, was arrested in Prome before the end of the year. To quote once more from theGazetteer(1908): "Since then Magwè has been undisturbed" (vol ii., p. 56, article "Magwè").

I will give one more instance of dacoit methods reported to me by the late Mr. Donald Smeaton, then Commissioner of the Central Division, dated August 13, 1889, from the Pagyi country. Reading it over after the lapse of more than twenty years, I am glad that I was able to help in ending the anarchy which begat such crimes. Mr. Smeaton wrote: "Early in the forenoon of the 18th July I was riding back with Lieutenant Macnabb from Kyaw to Zeittaung. We were passing the village of Jut about four miles from Zeittaung, when we were hailed by a villager and a military policeman, who informed us that the village had just been dacoited by Saga and a gang of fourteen or fifteen men.We at once went into the village and were conducted by the Thugyi to the house which had been Saga's principal object of attack. We were there informed that this house had been singled out by Saga because its owner, Po Hkine, one of his late followers, had surrendered with his arms to the special officer, that Saga's object had been to kill Po Hkine. Fortunately Po Hkine and his wife were at Zeittaung when the attack was made. Not finding Po Hkine or his wife, Saga had dragged down from the house two old women, Po Hkine's mother and aunt, and tortured them by burning parts of their bodies with lighted torches. The elder of the two women was severely burnt and was lying on the ground: the other was sitting. Both were in great pain. We questioned the two women. They said the gang had come straight to their house shouting out 'Saga! Saga!' and on finding that Po Hkine was not there had gone up the bamboo steps and dragged them to the ground. They then reproached them with allowing Po Hkine to surrender and demanded all the money and jewelry in the house. The old women gave up all their money and their ornaments, but nevertheless they were tied up, a bamboo mat with a hole cut to allow the head to pass through was put over them, and two or three of the gang held lighted torches to their backs and between their legs. The villagers were too afraid to yield any assistance. The women fainted, and the dacoits left them lying on the ground. The villagers were doing their best to soothe the two women and alleviate the pain when we came to the house.

"I have known of several cases in which women have been regularly trussed and suspended over a fire by dacoits till they gave up their money and ornaments.

"I can recall one case in which dacoits pushed wood shavings up between a woman's legs and set them on fire.

"In several cases of this kind that have occurred within my own knowledge the unfortunate women have died."

But I must have surfeited the reader with robberies and murders and savage cruelties. My purpose has been to draw a true picture of the conditions with which we had to deal. There may be some who think that stern measures of repression are wrong and that under all conditionskindness and forbearance should be the only weapons of a civilized Government. It is to be wished that such persons could have an opportunity of testing their theories without danger to any but themselves.

It is well, however, to record as a matter of history that, so far as was practicable, the rank and file of those who joined insurgent or brigand gangs were treated leniently. They were freely pardoned, if they had not committed murder, on condition that they surrendered with their arms and engaged to live quietly in their villages. Where it was necessary and possible, work was provided for them. When I left Burma there were thousands who had so surrendered and were living honest lives. Very few, I believe, went back to the wild life.

There were a very large number of men, especially in the early years, who were run down and captured and sentenced by the magistrates to long terms of imprisonment. It would have done infinite mischief if these men had been released after a short time and allowed to join their old companions.

I opposed the idea of a general jail delivery. When it became possible, the cases were examined under my orders by an experienced officer and the sentences were revised. It was not a task that could be done without labour, care, and knowledge. It was necessary to consider the condition of the district to which each man belonged. If that district was still disturbed, and especially if the gang of which he had been a member was still holding together, it would have been foolish weakness to send him back again. As a dog returns to his vomit, so does a dacoit to his gang, if he can find it. The magistrate is bound to think of the people who may suffer, rather than of the criminal who had preyed upon them. In Burma at least we had not outgrown this primitive morality. No one who had had my experience of the difficulty of catching these very interesting gentlemen would have cared to let them loose again.

The First Durbar in the Shan States.

About this time I was able to carry out an intention I had formed of visiting Fort Stedman and meeting all the Shan chiefs and notables.

The distance from the nearest point in the plains toFort Stedman was seventy miles, of which fifty-six were through the hills. The road was under construction, but in that state which made it worse travelling than the bullock-path it was meant to supersede.

The journey would take altogether about fourteen days, and it was not easy for me to get away from other business for so long a time. Nor was it possible always to summon the chiefs away from their headquarters.

The ride up through the hills was very beautiful, and the view from the range commanding the great lake of Inle was one of the finest I had seen in Burma.

Fort Stedman lies on the further or eastern shore of the lake, and after a long and hot ride we had to wait for a considerable time for the State boat of the Yawnghwè Sawbwa who was bringing Mr. Hildebrand across.

At the landing-place I found a guard of honour of the Shan levy under Captain Tonnochy, the Commandant, and at the village bazaar higher up all the chiefs had assembled to meet me. On the next day I held an informal reception of all the Sawbwas and other potentates.

A large hall, mostly of bamboo, had been constructed on the parade-ground, and in this, on the 19th of March, I received the chiefs. All the chiefs, with the exception of a few, were present. Many of them met me for the first time, and I learnt that to most of them also it was the first occasion of their meeting with their fellow-chiefs. They were presented to me in turn, and the Sawbwas of Möngnai and Yawnghwè, who it was considered had rendered services of some value to the British Government, received the medal and gold chain of honour given by the Viceroy for local services in Burma.

It was a notable assemblage. It was the first occasion on which all these potentates of various degrees, who had for years previously been fighting amongst themselves or rebelling against Burmese tyranny, had been brought together in peace and harmony under a strong rule. Each of them had made his formal submission to the Queen-Empress. Each had received a patent confirming him in his rights and position as head of his State. Each of them knew that the reign of peace had begun and that he was henceforth secure.

I reminded them that this was the work of the British power, and that it had been carried out without their assistance by the soldiers of the Queen-Empress and at the cost of her Government of India.

I pointed out to them that they, the Shan chiefs, had duties and obligations on their side: primarily the good government of their peoples, the impartial administration of justice, the development of their territories by roads, and the improvement of agriculture and trade. "I do not want you," I said, "to imitate or adopt the forms or methods of British government; but I think you can do much by a careful choice of your subordinates, by the judicious curtailment of the right to carry arms, by suppressing the extravagant and public gambling which, experience shows, invariably leads first to ruin and then to crime."

Lastly, I explained to them that they could not be excused from paying tribute, the amount of which would be adjusted to their ability. The British Government was maintaining garrisons for their benefit, and had undertaken costly expeditions for their defence. It was necessary to ask them to remember their obligations.

The first assessment of the Shan States to tribute was made in 1887-8, on the basis of the sums paid to the King of Burma, so far as they could be ascertained. The country had, however, suffered very greatly from the prevailing anarchy, and many of the States were depopulated and the land was lying waste. Much of the nominal demand had to be remitted. Even now (in 1911) the tribute received by the Government (which may be taken to be at most not more than one-third of the revenue collected from the people by their chiefs) hardly covers the expense of administration, including the garrison of fifteen hundred military police who maintain internal order and guard the frontiers. The vast sums expended on the Mandalay-Lashio railway in the Northern States and on the road connecting the Southern States with the Toungoo-Mandalay railway have not been repaid, except by the increased prosperity of the country.

The Shan population may be taken at about one million two hundred thousand persons. It would be a high estimateof the incidence of the tribute received by the Government if it were reckoned at sixpence per head. As a source of revenue, therefore, the Shan States are not of much account. The country, however, has improved—slowly, it is true, but without interruption. The railway from Mandalay to Lashio has done much for the Northern States. That now under construction from the Toungoo-Mandalay line to the headquarters of the Southern States will have greater and more rapid effect on that fertile country. I fully anticipate rapid progress in the near future. It is something to be able to say that since my visit to Fort Stedman in March, 1890, the peace of the Shan States has not been broken, except by a few small local risings of the wilder tribes (not Shans) in the mountains on the north and on the east.

To the student of the science of politics the Shan States will prove, perhaps, the most interesting field of observation in the province under the Lieutenant-Governor of Burma. There is nothing quite of the same character in India. When we occupied the country, the condition of the Shan chiefs had more resemblance to that of the petty chiefs and Rajas in the central provinces of India before Sir Richard Temple dealt with them, than to any other Indian example. But Temple gave to the larger States the character of feudatory rulers of foreign territory outside of British India, whereas, as I have mentioned below, in the chapter on the Shan Expedition of 1887-8, the Shan States one and all were made part of British India by the proclamation annexing Burma.

There is nothing in India similar to this case; where a great territory of sixty thousand square miles, being by law an integral part of British India, is administered not through the regular officials and courts, but directly by many quasi-independent chiefs, each supreme in his own territory, but guided and controlled by British officers, whose advice they are bound by their engagements to follow.

It results from these conflicting conditions that everything has to be done by or under some legal enactment. If the ordinary laws of British India (for example, the codes of criminal law and procedure) do not apply, it isbecause under the Shan States Act or some other enactment the local Government has suspended their operation and has substituted other rules to which the force of law has been given.

In the Feudatory States of India, on the other hand, any interference which becomes necessary is exercised not by virtue of an enactment of the legislature, but by the use of the sovereign executive power.

That this difference is vital there can be little doubt. At present it is the policy, and no doubt the wise policy, of the Government of India to avoid interfering with the native States, as much as may be, even by way of advice.

An Indian ruler can do as he likes, and it is only in gross cases of misrule which are clearly injurious to the people, and the consequences of which extend, or are likely to extend, beyond the boundaries of the State, that the sovereign Government feels compelled to intervene.

In the Shan case the local Government has the power by law of interfering and controlling the chief, and it will feel bound to use it.

It will be interesting to watch to which side the tendency will be. As the people advance in condition and education, and as the chiefs become more intelligent and trained to affairs, will the control of the executive increase or diminish? Will the tendency be, as in India, for the executive Government to withdraw into the background and leave the chief to govern, or will the chief tend to become an official of the State, exercising his powers under the restrictions and forms, and subject to the appellate and revisional powers of the regular courts? Up to the present time the control has tended to become more close.

FOOTNOTES:[30]Mr. Dyson had come to us from the Public Works Department. He had been employed in the Ava subdivision of Sagaing and had shown himself keen and energetic, but he was still very inexperienced in this sort of work.[31]Now Lord MacDonnell, P.C., G.C.S.I.

[30]Mr. Dyson had come to us from the Public Works Department. He had been employed in the Ava subdivision of Sagaing and had shown himself keen and energetic, but he was still very inexperienced in this sort of work.

[31]Now Lord MacDonnell, P.C., G.C.S.I.

Lord Dufferin left India in December, 1888. I went to Calcutta to see him before he left, and had the honour of being introduced by him to the new Viceroy, the Marquis of Lansdowne. I had reason to be very grateful to Lord Dufferin for his confidence and encouragement and unceasing support, and if he could have stayed to see the work finished it would have given me infinite satisfaction. I had no less cause, however, to be thankful to Lord Lansdowne.

During the four years I was in Burma, I was in constant communication with the Viceroy; and every week, unless I was absent in distant places, I wrote to him confidentially, keeping him fully informed of events and of my wants and wishes. Lord Dufferin had asked me to write to him in full confidence and regularly, and Lord Lansdowne allowed me to continue the practice. It was an addition, and often not an insignificant addition, to my work. It repaid me, for it established and maintained confidential relations between the Viceroy and his subordinate in Burma. It was a great help to the Chief Commissioner, who had no one on the spot to whom he could open his mind.

I have noticed already the change in the province and the diversion of attention from the interior to the frontier districts. This change shows itself very clearly in my correspondence with the Viceroy, which reflected the matters giving me most anxiety from week to week. During the first half of 1889 the affairs of the frontiers occupied the chief place. I have given their history in separate chapters.

It might be thought, from the space I have given todacoits and their leaders, that the time had hardly yet come for reducing the military police. In truth the struggle with the dacoits was drawing to a close, and the forces of order were winning all along the line. The outbursts in Magwè and elsewhere were like the last dying efforts of a fire.

The extent to which the military police and the troops had changed places can best be understood from this, that on the 1st of January, 1887, the troops held one hundred and forty-two posts and the military police fifty-six. On the 1st of January, 1889, the police held one hundred and ninety-two posts and the troops forty-one. And the state of the province was such as to lead me to consider the possibility of reducing the military police strength.

It has been seen how the withdrawal of the troops led for a time to renewed activity on the part of the discontented and criminal classes.

With this experience before us it was resolved to move with the greatest caution, and to feel our way step by step. The following procedure was adopted. The state of each district and of its subdivisions was carefully reviewed. The posts which might be altogether withdrawn were first selected, then those of which the garrisons might be reduced in numbers. The changes thus determined were to be made gradually, so as to attract as little attention as might be. The men brought in from the posts were not to leave the district at once, but were to remain at headquarters, where their discipline, drill, and musketry could be worked up.

If it should appear from an increase in disorder that reduction had been premature, the mistake could be remedied at once by ordering the men back to their posts. If, on the contrary, no mischief followed, the surplus men were to be drafted, by companies if possible, into a provincial reserve battalion, which would be brought to a high standard of military efficiency, and would be available in case of need for any part of the province. Finally, when the reserve battalion became crowded, I proposed to offer the trained companies to the army, if the Commander-in-Chief would accept them and if the men would take military service, of which there was no doubt.

This scheme was carried out, and continued until the strength of the military police force was not greater than the Government of Burma needed.

Another change was made in order to reduce the forces, namely, the amalgamation of two or more battalions under one Commandant. It was necessary at first to give a separate battalion to each district, in order that each Deputy Commissioner should have a sufficient force of military police at his hand and under his control. But when the country became peaceful and active service was rarely called for, there was no reason for maintaining an organization that was costly in money and men. Thus by doubling up the battalions, aggregating nineteen companies, in the Eastern Division, into one battalion of fifteen companies, four companies were saved and drafted into the Reserve.

This process went on until, in the year 1892, seven fine regiments had been given to the army. These were treated at first and for some time as local regiments attached to the province. Of late years, however, the policy in the Indian Army has been to obliterate all local distinctions and to make service general.

The strength of the military police in Upper Burma now is, I understand, fifteen thousand men in round numbers. The strength in 1889 was eighteen thousand. The reduction, therefore, has not been so very great. The fact is that no sooner had the interior of the province been reduced to order, than fresh territory began to come under administration. Vast tracts of hill country on the east, on the north, and on the west, which were left to themselves in 1890, are now held by the military police. From the frontier of French Indo-China on the east to the Bengal boundary on the west, and northwards along the Chinese boundary wherever it may be, the military police keep the marches of Burma. In the mountains inhabited by Kachin tribes on the north and east of the Myitkyina district, the whole of this troublesome borderland is held by the police. Sixteen hundred and twelve rifles, with forty-one native officers and nine British officers, more than a tenth of the whole strength, are stationed in this district, which in 1887was outside the pale. The Shan States and the Chin country are similarly garrisoned.[32]

I have always felt that our failure to train the Burmans to be soldiers is a blot on our escutcheon. I have mentioned an experiment to enlist Karens. This succeeded for a time. The men learnt their drill quickly, and as trackers and for forest work they were very useful. It was decided in 1891 to raise a Karen battalion, with which, and an Indian battalion, it was proposed to form a military police force for Lower Burma. The Karens were placed on the same footing as the Indians, and British officers were appointed to command them. In drill, endurance in the field, and courage, the Karen showed himself a good man. But from some cause he failed in discipline, and in 1899 it was found advisable, owing to insubordinate conduct, to disband the battalion and distribute the companies among the Indian battalions. There has been more success, I am told, with the Kachins, who are showing themselves trustworthy. They are certainly a strong race, probably the strongest we have in Burma.

Another direction in which the change from the sword to the plough and the pen was showing itself was in the prominence given to the administration of the civil police. It is very easy to get up a cry against the police in Burma or in India, but they will not be improved by constant abuse, frequent prosecutions, censures, and condemnations by High Court judges, or still less competent critics, or by other methods of giving a service a bad name.

One of the hardest tasks connected with the administration of a country by foreign rulers is the creation of a good police force. When the people from whom the force has to be recruited have lived for years under a despotic and altogether corrupt government, the task becomes doubly hard. And when the foreigners appointed to officer and train the force have for the most part no knowledge of police work and no acquaintance with the vernacular of the people, the task would have made Hercules drown himself in the nearest ditch.

It had to be done, however, and it was undertaken. The work had not gone far in 1890, but it was started, and two good and experienced police officers of high standing had been appointed to go round Upper Burma, district by district, and instruct the English officers. It was not possible at that time to find Burmans fit to take charge of the police of a district. I do not know whether such men are yet forthcoming.[33]We are well advanced in the second century of our rule in India, yet I believe there are few Indian gentlemen who are willing to take an appointment in the police and fewer still who are well fitted for it.

The question of the civil police in Lower Burma was taken up systematically in 1888. A committee was appointed by me to diagnose the ailment from which the police were suffering, and to prescribe remedies. On their report in 1889 a scheme was drawn up, the main features of which were the division of the Lower Burma force into military and civil, the former, as in Upper Burma, to be recruited from India and partly, it was then hoped, from the Karen people, the latter to be natives of the country. To the latter was to be entrusted all police work of detection and prevention. They were to be subjected to drill and discipline and accustomed to stand alone, and they were to be schooled and trained to police duties. The military police force was to be organized as one regiment under a military officer. Their headquarters were to be in Rangoon, and they were to furnish such detachments for outdistricts as might be wanted from time to time. This scheme, with little alteration, was carried out in 1891, and I believe is still in force.

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