FOOTNOTES:

No progress, however, was made with the Siyins, who promised to surrender if the Tashons made peace. The best months for active operations were passing. But it was thought inexpedient to adopt rough methods against them until a settlement had been made with the Tashons.[59]After some negotiations with the chief of Mwebingyi (an important village), who promised to surrender and invited a visit, Mr. Carey, with Colonel Skene and a small force, guided by Sagyilain men, marched to Mwebingyi. Three miles from the village they were fired on by Chins from all sides. A sharp skirmish followed. The Chins, driven back to their village, set it on fire and took to the hillsides. We lost two men severely wounded owing to this treacherous attack.

The time had now come when the much-delayed advance of the Southern Column made the combined movements of the Northern and Southern Columns upon the Tashon Ywama possible. The reduction of this tribe was the main object of the campaign, to which all the other operations were leading. It was important to avoid a hostile collision with it. It would have been easy enough to harass and punish the tribe village by village, but at the cost of life, destruction of property, and misery. General Symons's instructions were to accept no surrender and to conclude no negotiations except at Falam, the Tashon head village; and his purpose was to make resistance hopeless by placing the forces from Haka and Fort White simultaneously on the north and south of the Ywama. Accordingly, on the 8th of March a force 350 strong, with one gun, under Colonel Skene, left Fort White. On the 9th General Symons, with 290 rifles and two mountain-guns, marched from Haka. The Southern Column had suffered so much from sickness that its strength in fighting-men and transport coolies had been seriously reduced. Without the aid of the Northern Column, it could not have given enough men to garrison Haka and at the same time to deal with the Tashons. It was a matter of moment, therefore, that the two columns should operate in concert. A successful and rapid reconnaissance to within eight miles of the Ywama was affected, and the two forces arrived on the opposite banks of the Manipur, or Nankathe River, within an hour of each other on the 11th of March.

The Tashons had not intended to yield without a fight.

"Innumerable stockades, breastworks, and obstructions, extending over some nine miles of country, but chiefly intended against an enemy advancing from the north, had been freshly erected at every commanding point. Large numbers of armed men watched both columns as they advanced, but there was no collision. It is difficult to estimate their numbers; but on the south of Manipur River near the Ywama there were not less than 5,000 men, of whom two-thirds were armed with guns, the rest with spears."[60]

Disregarding the protests of some of the chiefs who came out to meet him, General Symons marched his men to a spot within one thousand yards of the Ywama, and fixed his camp there. The chiefs were assembled and asked if they agreed to our terms. With the inconsequence of savages, after allowing us to advance unopposed, they rejected our conditions, refusing firmly to pay tribute and demurring even to the fine. General Symons warned them of the risk they were incurring and dismissed them.

The scene on this occasion was dramatic, and is thus described by Mr. Bertram Carey, who was present:—

"The whole valley, in which formerly lay the original village of Falam, was full of armed Chins, numbering not less than 3,000 men, gathered from all sides; the host seemed to settle itself in groups of from 10 to 100 men. They were quiet in demeanour, but held their heads high and seemed quite prepared for whatever might be the result of the negotiations. The crowd was a motley one, the Tashon chiefs dressed in the gaudy tartan of the tribe, well armed with bright guns, vermilion and black parti-coloured dah scabbards, and beautifully inlaid powder-horns. The Whenohs were conspicuous by their chignons, which contrasted with the lofty head-dress of their neighbours, the Yahows, who were present carrying the strangeshendu, chopper-shaped dahs in basketwork scabbards. Scattered around in bunches were the scowling Siyins, the half-breeds from Tawyan and Mintèdaung, the semi-independent clique of Kwungli, and the trans-Nankathè tribesmen of Sokte and 'Poi' origin. The congregation was armed with a variety of weapons; spears and flint-lock guns predominated, but bows and quivers of barbed arrows were carried by not a few. Each man bore his food-supply for a few days on his back."[61]

The next two days were spent in wearisome negotiations which might have driven a less patient man to the use of force. His forbearance was rewarded, and the chiefs gave way. The tribute for 1889 was delivered, and five thousand rupees, the amount to which he had thought right to reduce the fine, was paid.

The Tashons admitted that until a few days before the forces reached Falam they had intended to fight. Their position as head of the Chin tribes and the fear of losing prestige impelled them to resist. When they found their enemies coming from two sides, they began to lose heart. All their outlying villages, who knew they must suffer first and most, prayed them to make peace.

It is evident that the rough handling of the Siyins by General Faunce had given a salutary lesson to these people. The event proved also the wisdom of marching to the headquarters of the tribe, and there compelling the public submission of their leaders.

The object of the combined march having been attained, the columns separated, the Southern returning to Haka and the Northern to Fort White. During the remaining months of open weather General Symons was occupied in gathering in the captives, improving his relations with the Chins, and in exploring the country. In April, accompanied by the Haka chief, he visited many villages to the South and was everywhere well received. On the 15th of April General Tregear met him at Haka, now linked up with Fort Tregear by a mule-track, which was brought into Haka, a distance of eighty-one miles, on the 13th of April. The Chittagong Column had met with no opposition. Their work was mainly road-making, reconnoitring, and surveying—work of the first importance in securing permanent peace. The Lushai country was as difficult as any on the Burma side.

"There is the dense jungle, which prevents one seeing a dozen yards ahead; rocks extending over large portions of the hillside are constantly met with, and when it was found impossible to avoid them much time was taken up in blasting operations. Range upon range of precipitous hills, running at right angles to the line of advance, had to be crossed, and the question of a sufficient supply of water at the different camps had to be considered in determining the trace of the road."[62]

Two large rivers had to be bridged.

It is not within the scope of the present narrative to describe the work done by the Chittagong Column. Its approach from the west had beyond doubt made General Symons's task easier, and success more certain.

On returning to Fort White, Mr. Carey resumed his immediate duty of bringing the Siyins within the fold. They had promised to submit if the Tashons made peace. He called upon them now to keep their word. Only one chief came in, and, as he brought no captives, Mr. Carey sent him away. So far from submitting, they cut the telegraph wires daily and annoyed our people. A policy of waiting and conciliation had failed. Several of the worst villages were therefore singled out and destroyed, not without some fighting, in which several sepoys were killed. Unfortunately, in two cases, in which some troops from Kalemyo were engaged, the bodies were allowed to fall into the enemies' hands. The Chin braves were able to return with two heads, more expressive of victory than guns or standards, and no doubt published in their fashion jubilant bulletins. The triumph was short-lived. A month afterwards a detachment of the 42nd Gurkhas, marching down on their way to India, destroyed the villages concerned. Before the end of April all the Siyins had made outward submission and had accepted our terms, which were that a yearly tribute should be paid and that the captives should be surrendered. Each clan was to be allowed to rebuild its villages when the captives held by it had been released, and not before. The cut telegraph wire and the two heads were brought in, and the captives were being gradually surrendered.

The results of the campaign were good and permanent. The foundation was laid for an effective control over these troublesome hill-men, and peace with security was given to the Burmans in the plains and to the Chins themselves. Raiding and slavery as institutions were condemned, and were soon to disappear altogether. Before the troops left the field one hundred and thirty-eight captives were liberated. There were a few raids made after General Symons finished his task, but they were promptly punished. There were some disturbances among the Chin tribes. They were easily checked, and systematic disarmament here, as in Burma proper, changed the temper and habits of the people.

This success had been achieved almost without bloodshed, but at a great cost to our men of suffering and loss of life from disease. The sickness among troops and followers was appalling, and the transport animals perished by hundreds. Nine men, of whom two were officers, were killed in action; two hundred and seven, of whom seventy-two were fighting-men, perished of disease. And two thousand one hundred and twenty-two were invalided, of whose seven hundred and nine were fighting-men—one-fifth of the whole force.

A permanent post was built at Haka, which was found to be a healthy place; and the headquarters of a civil officer, with control over the Baungshès and Tashons, was established there.

Fort White continued for some time to be the headquarters of the civil and military staff in the north. But the garrison was reduced, and as the site was always sickly, the fort was moved back to the Letha Range, retaining the name which it had received from Sir George White. Falam, the chief village of the Tashons, is now the headquarters of the civil administration of the Chin Hills.

Burmese ladies making a call.

It is worth while, perhaps, to give some account of the Chins in these the first years of British rule.

At the time of General Symons's expedition the Chins were a savage race. They had arms in abundance, flint-lock guns of English make, and spears. They were armed not so much against strangers as against each other. In former times, when they were ill-provided with fire-arms, the Burmans used to oppress them; but for a long time the position had been reversed. Intertribal feuds, however, and feuds between villages and families of the same tribe, were very common and made it unsafe to move without arms. No man who owned a gun ever left his house without it. While the fields were worked by women and slaves, armed men stood guard. So it was even less than a century ago in parts of India. What caused the feuds was a matter for speculation. Apparently disputes about debts were the most frequent; commerce, in fact, as among Western peoples, led to quarrels. As for government, even the most primitive form of tribal or village organization appears to have been imperfect. There were many chiefs, and if any one of them, as Jahoota,[63]for instance, was pre-eminent, he could not count on the obedience or support of the others. Their jealousies interfered with everything. Of their manners and customs not much was put on record in the earlier reports, which were necessarily more concerned with military matters. They made forays on the Burmans for heads and slaves. They were much given to sacrifices, and sometimes to human sacrifices. For example, it was usual to sacrifice slaves at the funerals of persons accidentally killed. Of their marriage-customs nothing is said in the early reports.

The country was not rich. There were no forests that it would pay to work, and no minerals had been discovered. The cultivation was of the primitive kind—"Taungya," or "Jhoom"—that is to say, felling the trees, burning them when dry, and sowing hill-rice and other crops in the ash. In the forests they had plenty of game, and much fish—Mahseer and other kinds—in the rivers; and the jungles were rich in fruits and roots that would support life if the grain failed. Metal of all kinds was very scarce. The hills produced none, and the Burmese Government had forbidden the export of metals from the plains. The trouble the Chins gave by cutting the telegraph wire was caused by their desire to procure metal, rather than to cause annoyance. Mr. Carey compared the attraction felt by the Chin for the unprotected wire to that felt by an English boy for an unfenced apple-orchard. The insulator spikes were beaten into hoes and the wire melted to make bullets, or bangles for the damsels. Their wants were blankets, cottons and other cloths, iron and steel for tools, lead for bullets, needles and thread and salt. In exchange they were able to offer honey, beeswax, chillies, mats, and a little lac.

The reports of 1889 were more concerned with the measures carried out for their subjugation than with descriptions of the people and their manners. In the main, what is written in theBurma Gazetteerpublished in 1908 is true of the Chins of twenty years ago:—

"They are a sturdy, warlike, hospitable people, slow of speech, grave of habit, paying great regard to rank and to the ties of clan, but spoilt by their intemperance, their vindictiveness, their treachery, their greed, their lack of persistence,[64]and their personal uncleanliness."

There is a quaint humour about this description which is refreshing in a Gazetteer. A race would have to be good indeed if, with such an array of vices, there was anything left to spoil.

Their villages are described as built on the hill-slopes, some of them fortified; and their houses are often solid, elaborate structures. Their dress is the reverse—a loin-cloth, none too ample, and a blanket for the men; a short skirt and jacket for the women. Home-woven check plaids are seen in a good many costumes, and some tribes have distinctive plaids, as in Scotland. The people are mainly vegetarians, but they will eat anything, from a dog to an elephant. They smoke tobacco in pipes, and they make a liquor from fermented grain, presumably rice, which is calledzu. They suck up this, in the most approved fashion, through a hollow reed, out of the original still-pot. Enormous quantities ofzuare consumed at Chin entertainments, which usually end in disgusting orgies.

The Chinbôks and Chinbons.

Tribes called the Chinbôks, claiming to be of the same stock as the Hakas but speaking a different language, are found at the head-waters of the Maw and Yaw Rivers. Farther south, at the sources of the Saw and Salin and on the eastern slopes of the Môn Valley, live the Yendus. Below them, and southernmost of all the Chins, are the Chinbons, who from the Môn on the east extend along the border of the Mimbu district into the Akyab and Kyaukpyu districts of Lower Burma.

These three tribes were less fierce than their kindred to the north, and possessed only the arms of savage warfare—the bow and arrow and spear. Some of them, those on the borders of the Tilin township at the headquarters of the Maw River, were noted for cattle-lifting. But the Chinbôks on the Yaw and the Yendus on the Saw and Salin Rivers rivalled the Siyins as slave-raiders. At the commencement of the winter of 1889 there were twenty-one captives in the possession of these tribes. They had made twelve raids since December, 1888, in which five villagers had been killed and sixteen carried off. Many had been wounded in resisting or escaping, and large sums had been extracted as ransom.

It was decided, in making up the account against these savages, not to go back behind December, 1888. In that month a notable raid had been committed on Taunggyo in the Pauk township, in which thirty-two persons were carried off and held to ransom at nine pounds sterling each, which appears to have settled down as the sum beyond which the ability or affection of the Burman would not go (see p. 318). After this crime trade with the plains had been prohibited to the Chinbôks, so far as lay in our power.

The difficulty in dealing with them lay in their want of cohesion and the absence of any sort of tribal bond. With the Shans there were the Sawbwas; with the Chins to the north there were the tribal divisions, more or less marked, with chiefs who could speak, or at any rate profess to speak, for their people. But with the people with whomwe were now to come in contact there was an absence of political organization beyond the village, which was usually very small. It was necessary to visit as many as possible of the villages concerned in the raids, to receive the submission of each, and to impose fines for misconduct; and as an obligatory condition to insist on the surrender of captives, and the repayment of ransoms, not going back farther than December, 1888. Substantial guarantees for the future were also to be exacted.

It had been intended to make the dealings with these three tribes part of the operations under General Symons's control, and to give to Mr. Ross, under his orders, the immediate conduct of the negotiations. When the full proportions of the task assigned to General Symons were seen, it became plain that he could not undertake the Chinbôks; and in consequence of Major Raikes's illness, Mr. Ross had to remain with the Southern Column. Fortunately the Chin Frontier Levy had now been raised, and had had a little time to fit itself for service. Their posts at Kalemyo, Kan, and Gangaw were wanted by the regular troops of the Southern Column. This freed the Levy opportunely, and gave the Chief Commissioner a sufficient force for the expedition into the Chinbok country. An admirable officer was at hand to conduct it, in Lieutenant R. M. Rainey (now Colonel Rainey-Robinson), the Commandant of the Levy. To him was entrusted the conduct of the business.

Lieutenant Rainey began, on the 16th of December, 1889, by dealing with twenty-one Chinbok villages, consisting of two hundred and eighty-three houses, situated on the Maw Chaung, the southernmost affluent of the Myittha, on which Tilin, the headquarters of the Tilin township, is situated. The claim against them was for cattle stolen. But cattle thefts and slaves were mere questions of accounts. They set up and proved a counterclaim for the price of slaves sold to the plaintiffs before the British occupation. Lieutenant Rainey thought it best to admit the counterclaim and let bygones be bygones, but to provide for the future. He induced the twenty-one villages to appoint a chief as their spokesman and agent in dealing with us, and to agree to pay a smalltribute in kind leviable from each village as an acknowledgment of fealty to the British Government.

So far there had been no opposition. Lieutenant Rainey then moved his headquarters from Tilin to Chaungu or Yawdwin, some twenty miles south. This village is situated on an affluent of the Yaw River, and made a good base for the next part of the business. The Chins in the valley of the Yaw and its tributaries were raiders. They attempted to harass the force, and Captain Willcocks (now Lieutenant-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O.), the Intelligence Officer, who was surveying and reconnoitring for a further move to the south, was attacked. This compelled a resort to punitive measures, and several offending villages were destroyed. A defensible advanced post was established at Chaungzon, in the heart of their hills. These methods brought the hostile Chins to reason. From this until the close of the operations the work progressed, bloodless and unopposed. The villages submitted, captives were delivered up, headmen were appointed, and fines exacted from all villages which had raided since December, 1888.

Lieutenant Rainey then returned to Chaungu; and moving his base still farther south to Laungshe, came into contact with the Yindus and Chinbons. By the exercise of tact and patience he succeeded in bringing these sections to submit to the British Government and to release their captives. As before, headmen were appointed, the payment of tribute was promised, and guarantees for good conduct given. The work was thoroughly well done. General Symons, in his despatch on the Chin-Lushai Campaign, wrote:—

"The Chinbok operations, though in no way under my direction or command, but ably, even brilliantly, conducted by Lieutenant Rainey, Commandant of the Chin Levy Military Police Battalion, have squared well with our work and settled an adjoining belt of country beyond our capability to touch."

Lieutenant Rainey was another of the young soldiers who aided the civil administration in difficult times and showed their fitness for affairs. The country which submitted to him was made a separate civil charge, knownas "The Pakokku Hill Tracts," the headquarters of which were for some years at Yawdwin and are now at Kanpetlet on Mount Victoria.

It is noticeable that the Chinbôks and their confrères had been excluded from trading and from all intercourse with the plains since the beginning of 1889. On making their submission they begged that the blockade might be raised. It was evidently a useful weapon. If it had failed in the case of the Tashons and the more northern tribes, it was because it had not been effective.

We had now made ourselves felt by most of the tribes. There remained unvisited a stretch of hills separating the Minbu district of Upper Burma from Arakan. The Chins dwelling in this tract preyed on the peasantry in the neighbouring districts. During the preceding two years sixteen villages had been raided in Minbu, twenty-one persons killed and thirty-nine carried into slavery. Of these captives sixteen had been ransomed by their friends at a very heavy price. In the adjoining township of the Pakokku district there had been several forays, and seventeen persons had been captured and carried off. It was not possible at this time to find men for a comprehensive expedition against these Chins. Civil officers from the three districts of Akyab, Kyaukpyu, and Minbu were deputed, with small bodies of police, to meet at a central point. They assembled the chiefs and village headmen. The Chins were peaceful and submissive, but very few of the captives were restored. These clans belonged to the Akyab district geographically, and had not yet realized that their eastern borders had come under the British Government and were no longer to afford a happy hunting-ground for the pursuit of human game. They were found to be by no means formidable, badly armed, and little inclined to fight.

The following year (1890-1) saw the beginning of the systematic control of the Chin tribes. For administrative purposes they were roughly divided into three parts. The northern tribes were governed from Fort White, the central tribes from Haka, and the southern from Yawdwin. Captain F. M. Rundall commanded the garrison at Fort White, and also held charge of our relations with theChins when Mr. Carey had to take leave. Our knowledge of these people was at first far from accurate, and the then recognized divisions of the tribes controlled from Port White were roughly as follows:—[65]

1. The Siyins and Sagyilains who lived in five villages, of which Koset, Sagyilain, and Tôklaing were the chief. The first Port White was built on the site of Tôklaing, which was afterwards given back to them when the fort was moved.

2. The Kanhows, inhabiting between thirty and forty villages north of Fort White, of which Tunzan, on the left bank of the Manipur River, is the capital.

3. The Mobingyis, as they were called from the Burmese name for their chief village, Molbem, which lies on a spur overlooking the Manipur River on the left bank, and was a very large village.

4. The Nwi-tes and other minor tribes akin to the Kukis of Manipur.

It is now known that the right name of the Mobingyis is Sok-te, a very large tribe, of whom the Kanhows are only a powerful clan.

5. The Ngwite and Late, who occupy the hills between Mwelpi and Manipur.

6. The Haitsi Lope, who live on the eastern slope of the Letha Range bordering the Kabaw Valley.

At the end of the last season's operations Mr. Carey had reported the submission of the Siyins and the acceptance of our terms. At the same time he had little trust in their good faith, and when Captain Rundall succeeded him at Fort White their attitude was more or less hostile. They continued to cut the telegraph wire and to give petty annoyance to the troops. The capture of some of the wire cutters gave some help to diplomacy. The Siyins submitted in order to get their brethren released. They surrendered their captives and agreed to pay tribute and keep the peace. The Kanhows proved more difficult. Captain Rundall took advantage of a dispute about the succession to the leadership of the tribe to open communication with one of the claimants.

But before anything came of it the Kanhows raided a Burman village, killing eight persons and carrying off twelve. They were ordered to restore all captives, to give up the heads taken in the raid, to pay a fine of Rs. 4,000, to submit to the Government, and to bind themselves to pay an annual tribute of Rs. 300. These terms were not complied with. Captain Rundall, therefore, marched with three hundred rifles and two guns against the village of Tungzang. The Chins fought, and lost twelve men killed and twenty-one prisoners, including some of their chief men. They had now tried conclusions and were satisfied. Thirty-nine captives were surrendered and the fine and tribute paid in full. Some of the chiefs were sent to Rangoon, and shown over some large steamers, mills, and the like, and, it is said, were impressed by the sight. However that may be, they have not given much trouble since. Some useful road work was done during this year by the Madras Pioneers. A road from Fort White to Falam, the Tashon mother-village, was constructed. As the old site of Fort White still continued to be very unhealthy, the garrison and headquarters of the civil officer were moved back to a post hitherto known as No. 5 Stockade on the Letha Range.

The Chins to be controlled from Haka were found to be divisible into five tribes:—

1. The Tashons, a large tribe having their headquarters at Falam, half-way between Haka and Fort White.

2. The Hakas, lying south of the Tashon country and round about Haka.

3. The Klanklangs, to the west of the Haka tribe and between them and Fort Tregear, on the Chittagong side.

4. The Yokwas, who lie to the south and east of the Hakas; and lastly,

5. The independent tribes, known generally by the nickname of Baungshè, in the hills south of the Yokwas.

Mr. D. Ross,[66]the Assistant Commissioner who had accompanied General Symons's expedition, held Haka until March, 1891, when he had to leave on account of his health. He was succeeded by Mr. D. J. C. Macnabb,[67]Assistant Commissioner, a young soldier of a well-known stock. Friendly relations with the Chins were maintained. The road from Kan, in the Myittha Valley, to Haka, was kept open by Chin labour, and the regular postal service was performed by Chins. The Myittha Valley was not raided, and generally the Haka Yokwa tribes were well behaved. Trouble, however, came from the independent Baungshès, with whom, owing to their want of cohesion, it was difficult to deal.

General Symons had left one weak spot in his work. There was a powerful village called Thetta, eight miles south of Yokwa. Of it he wrote:—

"It has resisted all our efforts to bring it to complete submission, although some captives have been given up and a fine paid.... It is a blot on our work to have left this village unsettled, but it commands the Kan to Yokwa road, and I considered it better to leave it to stew in its obstinacy and isolation rather than resort to drastic measures which would have had the effect of driving the inhabitants into the jungles and making the road unsafe. The boon of convoys and traders and others being able to use safely and freely the road between Kan and Haka without escorts was too great to risk the loss of it for the satisfaction of an exercise of our power which, at the best in my opinion, would have had but little effect in bringing about the desired result."

At the same time he recorded his opinion that unless the Thetta people gave in, the political officer would have to visit and compel them.

It was the old story. The Thettas thought forbearance was the sign of weakness and fear. In November, 1890, they became openly hostile. They committed a series of outrages, and at last brought matters to a head by killing Mr. Wetherell, a young police officer, and attempting the life of the political officer, Mr. Macnabb. In January, 1891, a force of one hundred and forty rifles started from Haka to punish the village. They had no guns. The village was strongly stockaded. Lieutenant James, R.E., and two Gurkha sepoys were killed, and the officer commandingdecided that he could not storm the defences without heavy loss. The Chins were invited to a parley, and they agreed to pay a small fine for their misconduct and to yield an annual tribute in future.

Such an arrangement was for us equivalent to a defeat. It was decided to take up the coercion of the Baungshès in a businesslike manner. Two strong columns, with guns, were despatched, one from Haka with Mr. Ross as political officer, the other from Gungaw with Mr. Macnabb. They met at Thetta without opposition, and recovered the fine which the Thetta villagers had promised to pay, and traversed the Baungshè country, receiving the submission of the villagers.

Thetta, however, was not yet subdued. They had defied us, killed our men, and escaped with a small fine. In 1894 they began to rob and murder, and when they were called to account they behaved themselves proudly. On the 1st of January, 1895, a force under Major Keary, D.S.O., of the 6th Burma Rifles, with Mr. H. N. Tuck as political officer, occupied the village, arrested the chiefs, and disarmed the villagers. The chiefs were afterwards degraded in open Durbar.

But the year 1891 was not to close without further difficulty. General Symons, reporting to the Chief Commissioner from Haka, dated the 1st of May, 1890, wrote (para. 9):—

"The Klanklangs are almost a separate tribe, but they are Baungshès and live on fairly good terms with the Hakas. The Yokwas do not march with the Klanklangs, neither are they friendly with them. (10) The Klanklangs, finding themselves at the beginning of the year between the Burma and Chittagong Columns, made haste to submit to the troops entering their country, and readily agreed to easy terms imposed. (11) The settlement with the Klanklangs and their chief, Ya Hnit—whom, to suit the convenience of the Chittagong officials, we are now agreed to call 'Jahoota'—was very rightly left to me as the representative of the local Government of Burma. The Klanklang Ywama (chief village) is only sixteen miles from Haka, and Jahoota and other head chiefs live there.... I do not think this tribe will give us any more trouble. The meeting of theEastern and Western Columns in their territory, and the continual passing of troops backwards and forwards without committal of harm or excess, has had the best effect."

In March, 1891, Mr. Macnabb, with Lieutenant Mocatta and one hundred rifles, set out to visit the Klanklangs and to meet an official from Port Tregear at Tao. The tribe, which had surrendered to General Symons, was held to be friendly. The road passed through their hills, and there was no thought of interfering with them. They had, however, been raiding on the Lushai side, and it was intended to warn them to abstain from this. On the outward march to Tao the Klanklang chiefs did not appear. They were said to be occupied in propitiating theirNats, or guardian spirits, and to be very drunk. Mr. Macnabb, therefore, postponed his interview until he came back from Tao. On the return march a large body of Chins, said to have been seven or eight hundred, suddenly fell upon the small column, which fought its way on to Klanklang with some difficulty, losing five men killed and ten wounded, and one British officer (Lieutenant Forbes) wounded. Reinforcements from Haka, under Colonel Mainwaring, met the returning column at Klanklang and saved them from further loss. Officers and men had behaved admirably. A fine of guns and money was imposed on the tribe, and preparations were made for enforcing it.

Before the preparations were complete Jahoota came suing for peace. He proved that he had been away and had had no concern in the treacherous attack, which had been organized by two subordinate chiefs in his absence. He brought in guns and other valuables in part payment of the fine, and was ordered to produce the two offenders and to raze their houses to the ground. As the culprits were not surrendered, the political officer, with three hundred rifles, visited Klanklang in May. He found that the houses had been destroyed, but the two men had fled. Some of the villages paid their shares of the fines; but others held out, and owing to the lateness of the season and want of transport, it was impossible to coerce them. Jahoota, in proof of his good faith, gave up his eldest son as a hostage, and he was left to re-establish his authority. There has been no difficulty since in managing these Baungshè tribes, and inthe years 1894-5 they, as well as all the southern tribes, were disarmed.

The control of the rude southernmost Chins, known as Chinbôks, Chinbons, and Yendus, was exercised at first by a subdivisional officer stationed at Yawdwin. From Lieutenant Rainey's expedition up to January, 1891, no disturbance occurred. In that month a very daring raid was made on Yawdwin itself, and the place looted under the eyes of the police garrison. Further raids followed, and a strong force of regular troops had to be sent to restore order. A military post was established within the hills. In 1896 this post also was attacked. The country was then placed under efficient administrative control. Posts were established in suitable places. A civil officer with sufficient powers was appointed to live in the hills and govern the people. His headquarters are now at Kanpetlet, on the slopes of Mount Victoria, some 6,000 feet above the sea-level. And a small force of Gurkha military police under a British officer is maintained there. Raiding has ceased, and the people have been disarmed. In other respects twenty years have not changed them much. In theBurma Gazetteer(of 1908, vol. ii. p. 393) it is recorded:—

"The inhabitants of the tract are practically all animists. The Chinbok men wear a very scanty loin-cloth, and are seldom seen without their bows and arrows. The women's dress consists of a smock and a short skirt. The females have their faces tattooed."

It may be doubted whether Western civilization will make them happier. Tattooing is more lasting and more conducive to domestic peace than paint and powder. It is cheaper in the long run.

FOOTNOTES:[56]1st Battalion King's Own, Scottish Borderers500riflesNo. 7 Mountain Battery84"No. 6 Company Queen's Own, Sappers and Miners151"2nd Battalion 4th Gurkhas410"2nd Madras Infantry630"Burma Company Queen's Own, Sappers and Miners94"—————Total1,869rifles[57]1st Battalion Cheshire Regiment300rifles42nd Gurkha Light Infantry477"No. 5 Company Queen's Own, Sappers and Miners95"10th Bengal Infantry460"28th Bengal Infantry290"—————Total1,622rifles[58]Now Major-General Sir Vincent William Tregear, K.C.B., Indian Army, retired.[59]It was understood at this time that the Siyins were quite subordinate to the Tashons, whose control, however, proved to be limited.[60]Brigadier-General Symons's Despatch, dated the 1st of May, 1890, from Haka.[61]"The Chin Hills," vol. i., p. 89. Government Press, Rangoon, 1896.[62]Brigadier-General Tregear's Despatch, May 31, 1890.[63]Regarding Jahoota, or Ya Hnit, see pp. 334-335infra.[64]It may be questioned whether, in view of the obstinate resistance shown by some tribes, they can be fairly charged with lack of persistence.[65]For accurate and most interesting information regarding the Chins, their manners, customs, and history, I must refer the reader to the "Chin Hills," by Bertram S. Carey, C.I.E., and H. N. Tuck (2 vols., Rangoon Government Press, 1896.), which can be seen at the India Office Library.[66]Mr. Ross, after excellent service, died at Rangoon in 1910.[67]Mr. Macnabb is now Major Macnabb, Commissioner of the Sagaing (formerly called Central) Division of Upper Burma.

[56]1st Battalion King's Own, Scottish Borderers500riflesNo. 7 Mountain Battery84"No. 6 Company Queen's Own, Sappers and Miners151"2nd Battalion 4th Gurkhas410"2nd Madras Infantry630"Burma Company Queen's Own, Sappers and Miners94"—————Total1,869rifles

[57]1st Battalion Cheshire Regiment300rifles42nd Gurkha Light Infantry477"No. 5 Company Queen's Own, Sappers and Miners95"10th Bengal Infantry460"28th Bengal Infantry290"—————Total1,622rifles

[58]Now Major-General Sir Vincent William Tregear, K.C.B., Indian Army, retired.

[59]It was understood at this time that the Siyins were quite subordinate to the Tashons, whose control, however, proved to be limited.

[60]Brigadier-General Symons's Despatch, dated the 1st of May, 1890, from Haka.

[61]"The Chin Hills," vol. i., p. 89. Government Press, Rangoon, 1896.

[62]Brigadier-General Tregear's Despatch, May 31, 1890.

[63]Regarding Jahoota, or Ya Hnit, see pp. 334-335infra.

[64]It may be questioned whether, in view of the obstinate resistance shown by some tribes, they can be fairly charged with lack of persistence.

[65]For accurate and most interesting information regarding the Chins, their manners, customs, and history, I must refer the reader to the "Chin Hills," by Bertram S. Carey, C.I.E., and H. N. Tuck (2 vols., Rangoon Government Press, 1896.), which can be seen at the India Office Library.

[66]Mr. Ross, after excellent service, died at Rangoon in 1910.

[67]Mr. Macnabb is now Major Macnabb, Commissioner of the Sagaing (formerly called Central) Division of Upper Burma.

Of the many other parts which go to make up the working machinery of a great province nothing has been said, as the object of this account is to show how peace and order were restored, or rather given, to Burma. Along and step by step with this rough work, however, every part of an advanced administration began to take shape. There was none which was not, at the very least, called into existence.

The revenue of Upper Burma increased from £222,000 in 1886-7 to £1,120,000 in the year 1889-90. No new taxes were imposed. The revenue grew by careful administration. From the year 1888 I had the assistance of Mr. Fryer as Financial Commissioner in dealing with this branch of the work, and the subject of the land revenue of the Upper Province was examined more minutely than had been possible before. In 1889 a regulation declaring the law relating to rights of land and formulating a complete system of revenue law for Upper Burma was framed in Burma, and passed by the Governor-General in Council. In it provision was made for the gradual survey and assessment of the land; and before the end of 1890 the cadastral survey had broken ground in two districts in which the cultivated area was largest.

The Forest Department had been busy from the first, and progress had been made in ascertaining the condition and resources of the great teak forests of Upper Burma.

The Government of India had treated Burma with generosity in the matter of money for public works. The extent of our undertakings was limited by the difficulty of obtaining a competent staff, rather than by a deficiencyof funds. The expenditure on barracks and other accommodation for troops at stations where garrisons were to be permanently kept was necessarily large. At district headquarters in civil stations, court-houses, and (where necessary) jails had been built, and court-houses had also been provided in many subdivisions. The irrigation works in Kyauksè were not neglected, and the Mu Canal scheme in the Shwèbo district had been taken in hand. The railway to Mandalay was opened in March, 1889, and the surveys for the Mu Valley line, which was to take the rails up the right bank of the river and through all the difficult country traversed by Major Adamson's expedition in 1887-8, had been completed and construction had begun.

Great attention had been paid to the improvement of communications, including several difficult hill-roads. A good cart-road had been made from the river to the ruby mines. Another from Mandalay to Maymyo was being taken on to Lashio; and, from Meiktila to Kalaw on the Shan plateau, seventy-six miles, a road was well advanced. The land-locked Yaw country had been opened up, and a mule-track from Kalewa on the Chindwin to Fort White in the Chin Hills had been finished. Roads over the Yomas, which had sheltered the Magwè dacoits, had been completed.

The money, poured into the country for roads and buildings, apart from the railway expenditure, was nearly all spent on native labour and on material produced in the country. In the aggregate it was more than the sums received as revenue. That it, along with the railway expenditure on labour, helped largely in settling the country directly and indirectly, is certain. If Indian and Chinese Shan coolies were employed, it was because Burman labour was not forthcoming.

Nor had some of the refinements of administration been neglected. In the larger towns a simple system of municipal government was introduced, care being taken not to hurry a somewhat primitive people accustomed to corrupt methods and with little sense of responsibility along the slippery paths of local self-government.

In the middle of 1890 a Judicial Commissioner was appointed for Upper Burma. I accepted this refinementmore reluctantly than I would have welcomed a reduction of the garrison. But the character of the man appointed to the post (the late Mr. Hodgkinson) was an assurance that there would be no display of judicial pyrotechnics, such as lawyers sometimes indulge in, and that some regard would be paid to the conditions under which our officers were working.

The provision of medical aid for the people was taken in hand energetically, under the guidance of Dr. Sinclair, who administered the medical department of the whole of Burma. It was not possible to provide substantial public hospitals, and at first only temporary buildings were erected. Excellent permanent hospitals had been built for the military police, and on their withdrawal it was intended that these buildings should be converted into civil hospitals.

Vaccination was introduced also, and every district was furnished with the means of protection against smallpox. The people came readily to be vaccinated, and no Burman, so far as I know, expressed an objection, conscientious or other, to being protected from the ravages of a loathsome disease. But they are comparatively a backward race and still have much to learn.

In the matter of education, it was not the time to do much, and I was inclined to walk very warily in Upper Burma. The Director of Public Instruction was sent round the province in 1889 to examine the condition of the existing schools; and on his report a beginning was made by appointing an inspector and some assistant inspectors, more to ascertain and collate facts than with a view to active interference. Later on the grant-in-aid rules in force in the lower province were introduced. The author of theBurma Gazetteer(vol. i., p. 132) writes: "Missionary schools are now plentiful, and lay schools, both public and private, abound; but the bed-rock of vernacular education in Burma is still monastery teaching, and with it is intimately bound up the educational welfare of the people."

I am inclined to agree with this statement. The system of monastic schools has, I think, been an immense boon to the people of Burma, and if only the monks could be roused to educate themselves more and to cast off some of their old ideas I should like to see it maintained.

The danger is that the contact with Western knowledge and ascertained fact may destroy the belief of the young Burmans in the monastic teaching, and this danger is increased, if it is not caused, by the superstitious ignorance of the monks and their inability to disentangle the moral teaching of their great founder from the cobwebs of fairy tales, about the form and nature of the earth and the like. With this in mind, a beginning was made towards inducing the Pongyis to employ certificated assistant teachers in the monastic schools.

Western teaching may, however, have less effect on Eastern faiths than we think. I was visiting a lay school in Burma one day, I forget where, but I was talking to one of the pupils, a very intelligent boy. I asked him about the shape of the earth, and so on. He had it all pat, the conventional proofs included. I said: "Now, you know what the Pongyis teach, which do you believe—what you have learnt here, or in the monastery?" He replied unhesitatingly, "What the Pongyis tell me, of course." "Why then," I asked, "did you say the earth was round and went round the sun?" "Oh," he said, "I must say that or I should not pass the examinations; but I believe the other." There may be more intelligent students, even at a riper age, of the same mind as this boy. Sometimes, perhaps, in the West, it is the other way about.

On the 10th of December, 1890, I surrendered my charge to Sir Alexander Mackenzie,[68]one of the ablest men of his time in India.

In his summary of the Administration Report of Burma, for the year 1890-1, dated December 21, 1891, is written: "Upper Burma being now perfectly tranquil, it is not necessary to describe separately the progress made in the pacification of each district. The fact that there were fewer crimes in Upper than in Lower Burma during the year is sufficient proof that except in certain frontier tracts the work is complete."

It is pleasant to most of us to know that our work is appreciated by others. It pleased me the other day, and it may please those for whom I have put together this rough account of the pacification of Burma to read this passage from the "Shans at Home," by Mrs. Leslie Milne and the Rev. Wilbur Willis Cochrane (p. 29):—

"At the time of the annexation, every part of the Shan highlands west of the Salween was ravaged with war, Shans against Shans and Burmans against them all. To bring peace and an era of prosperity, put an end to feuds, settle the disputes of princes, re-establish the people in their homes, and organize out of chaos a helpful and strong government was no easy task. That it was accomplished with so small a force, so quickly and with so little opposition, was due to the energy, ability, and tact of the British officials upon whom the Government had placed responsibility.

"Immediately after the annexation, began the era of improvement. Twenty-four years have passed since then. The British peace officers have retired, or are retiring, but they leave behind them a prosperous and peaceful people. The towns are growing towards their former dimensions; wealth and trade are increasing beyond all expectations. Population is rapidly increasing. A mother with her little child can travel alone from Mogaung to the border of Siam, and from Kengtung to Rangoon, with comfort and perfect safety."

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