The collective Britannic nations have often been styled GreaterBritain, or the Britannic Empire. The word empire, thoughconstantly used for lack of a better term, is a misnomer. AsSeeley says: "Greater Britain is not in the ordinary sense anEmpire at all."[88-1] Another authority says: "The BritishEmpire is not an Empire in the ordinary meaning of the word. Itis a system of government."[88-2] "There is no ImperialGovernment."[88-3]
Men speak of an Imperial Parliament, but in reality no such thing exists. It is an ambitious name applied sometimes to the Parliament of the British Isles which has no members from the other nations, and whose power to enforce its legislation in the other Britannic nations is denied. "By a fine tradition it has the full dignity of sovereignty; but in reality it is as impotent as the Continental Congress, and only less ridiculous because it has learned from experience the timid wisdom not to court rebuffs."[88-4]
Downing Street is often referred to. Downing Street is a term used to sum up the six administrative departments of the British Isles government: the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the India Office, {89} the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Board of Trade. Of these the India Office, does not enter into the matters here discussed, and the Colonial Office "in its present relations with the Dominions, . . . is in reality little more than a clearing house of information and correspondence."[89-1] The remaining four,i.e.the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, the War Office, and the Board of Trade have their normal administrative functions in the government of the British Isles. They are filled by the ministry of the day, and hence are responsible to the majority of the House of Commons and ultimately to the British people. They are in no way representative of, nor responsible to, the other five self-governing nations. Through the theoretical veto of the governors sent out from the British Isles, Downing Street is supposed to wield its power and to prevent legislation in the five younger nations that in matters touching foreign affairs is contrary to the will of the British Parliament. As a matter of fact, this veto is rarely exercised. Its exercise would be, "in plain words, the tyranny of one Parliament over another—of one democracy over another."[89-2] "The theory of the British Constitution is, as it stands, clearly intolerable except in disuse. The powers which are imagined to exist in it would never stand the strain of being put in force."[89-2] What does happen when a veto appears called for by Britannic safety is that the Parliament of the younger nation is induced to reconsider matters in the light of whatever {90} argument Downing Street has at hand. Here, obviously, are not officials who as executives and legislators are part of any common government. They are part of only one government, viz. that of the British Isles. Certain matters in government must proceed from a single source. In the United States the federal government, which represents all the people and each state, has this in its charge and has machinery by which to enforce its power. Among the Britannic nations, the government of one of them controls these matters with no other machinery than persuasion to enforce its often debated authority.
A member of the British Ministry of 1913 is quoted as saying that "the only political organisations common to the whole Empire, . . . are the Crown, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and the Committee of Imperial Defence, but not one of them has any executive or legislative power."[90-1] By "the Crown" is meant the power of Downing Street just discussed. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the British Isles is the supreme appellate court for courts under the British flag outside the British Isles. A like function is performed for British Isles courts by the House of Lords. There is no single court of appeal for the six Britannic nations.[90-2] Consequently, the Judicial {91} Committee of the Privy Council can hardly be called an institution common to all these nations, even were its activity not so limited as to be negligible. As to the Committee of Imperial Defence, in it "the Dominion representatives are guests and not constituents."[91-1]
All this is to say that through certain makeshifts and survivals, whose forms and functions are nowhere clearly defined, the governments of the six Britannic nations come in occasional contact with each other.
Such is the complexity of the English-speaking world control, and such is its lack of uniformity of classification and naming, that it is not safe to say the five new nations and the British Isles and the United States are the only English-speaking autonomous groups. "The British Empire exhibits forms and methods of Government in almost exuberantvariety." [91-2] For example, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands and such outposts of Pan-Angle civilization as Pitcairn and Tristan da Cunha might well be considered self-governing. These areas are omitted from enumeration in this discussion, not by reason of any lack of appreciation of their worth, but because the inclusion of these many assets and liabilities of the Pan-Angle concern would unduly expand this discussion. These groups have their respective positions with the several Pan-Angle nations to which they are to a greater or less degree connected. On the continued career of the seven Pan-Angle nations {92} depend the political existences of a multitude of these smaller Pan-Angle localities.
Moreover, no direct discussion of the politics of any of the many dependencies is here made. Their needs are not for their own solving. Our control we try to make materially beneficial to their inhabitants by "giving them only what is good for them, not always what they want."[92-1] Our control of ourselves is based on the entirely opposite theorem of taking what we want, not necessarily what someone else thinks is good for us. In short, we govern our dependencies in one way, ourselves in quite another. The dependent countries which "belong to" the several nations may present many problems to the Pan-Angles, but these form no "part of" the Pan-Angle problem. This is no place to question whether Seeley was justified in his doubt as to the value of India to the British Isles.[92-2] Enough here to acknowledge that our present economic policy leads many of our seven nations to believe that the holding of dependencies, especially in the tropics, is of value. To enumerate all these dependencies would be tedious and needless. It is only to distinguish the dependent from the independent that space is here given to the subject.
A united government over and between these seven Pan-Angle nations would be unaffected by the existence of these possessions. At the present {93} time New Zealand and Australia hold dependencies. This in no way interferes with their being somehow, as they believe, parts of a political entity with the British Isles. Similarly, in case of the uniting of the seven Pan-Angle nations, New Zealand and Australia could each retain its dependencies, and the United States could retain its dependencies, without impairing the success of a Pan-Angle government. The history of our civilization shows that such a complicated procedure is the way of natural growth among Pan-Angle peoples.
"Empire," from its long association with states builded of conquered peoples, is no fit word to use for a voluntary combination of Pan-Angles. Nor would any form of government be acceptable that blotted out the individuality that each of the seven nations has established. They are members of a great civilization, each to-day practically self-supreme. Whatever arrangement they may choose to enter upon to protect themselves and their civilization, they will wish to continue always nations.
[79-1] Richard Jebb,Studies in Colonial Nationalism, London, 1905, p. 187.
[80-1] Sir Wilfrid Laurier at the Dominion Day Banquet, 1902; quoted Richard Jebb,Studies in Colonial Nationalism, London, 1905, p. 1.
[80-2] General Botha at South African Nationalist Congress, November 24, 1913; quoted inThe TimesWeekly Edition, London, November 28, 1913.
[81-1] Area in Per cent White Per cent sq. miles of total population of total area 1911 population New Zealand 103,658 .92 1,008,468 .71 Australia 2,974,581 26.59 4,455,005 3.15 South Africa 473,954 4.23 1,276,242 .81 Newfoundland 162,750 1.45 242,966 .17 Canada 3,729,665 33.34 7,204,838 5.10 British Isles 121,089 1.08 45,211,888 32.03 United States 3,617,949 32.35 81,735,623 57.91 Total 11,183,646 141,135,030
In comparison with the above figures, England contains 50,890 square miles and 34,045,290 population. United States and South Africa contain 9,828,294 and 4,697,152 respectively of negroes, which together with other non-whites are excluded from the figures in the above table, These figures are based onWhitaker's Almanack, London, 1913, pp. 584, 603, 660-667; andBritannica Year Book, London, 1913, pp. 680, 682,663, 678,699, 703, 714, 557.
[81-2] Auckland to Sydney, 1264; Wellington to Sydney, 1233; Bluff to Hobart, 940; and St. John's to Glasgow, 1859 miles.
[82-1]Round Table, London, September 1912, p. 753, quotingNew Zealand Herald, Auckland.
[83-1] The British Isles is here used in preference to United Kingdom. None of the other Pan-Angle nations are "kingdoms "; and the term is applicable only historically to that democratic group of people of which England contains the largest portion. For a modern Pan-Angle attitude, see W. H. Moore,The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2nd ed., Melbourne, 1910, p. 66, where he says concerning the naming of a nation: '"Kingdom of Australia' would be acceptable to none."
[83-2]Ency. Brit., vol. xxvii. p. 612: "The United States, the short title usually given to the great federal republic which had its origin in the revolt of the British colonies in North America, when, in the Declaration of Independence, they described themselves as 'The Thirteen United States of America.' Officially the name is 'The United States of America,' but 'The United States' (used as a singular and not as a plural) has become accepted as the name of the country; and pre-eminent usage has now made its citizens 'Americans,' in distinction from the other inhabitants of North and South America."
[84-1] C.P. Lucas,Historical Geography of the British Colonies, vol. iv.,South Africa, Oxford, 1913, pt. i., pp. 146-147.
[85-1]An Analysis of the System of Government throughout the British Empire, London, 1912, p. 58: "It should be remembered that in theory there is nothing to prevent the Parliament of the United Kingdom legislating for the internal affairs of a self-governing colony or even imposing taxation on such a colony."
[85-2]Round Table, London, September 1913, pp. 588-589.
[86-1] Sir Wilfrid Laurier at Sorel, September 28, 1904, quoted in Richard Jebb,Studies in Colonial Nationalism, London, 1905, p.151.
[86-2] F. S. Oliver,Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American Union, London, 1906, p. 448.
[86-3] Lord Milner, November 3, 1908, at Canadian Club, Montreal, in Lord Milner,The Nation and the Empire, London, 1913, p. 362.
[87-1] Alfred Caldecott,English Colonization and Empire, London, 1891, p. 134.
[87-2] Richard Jebb,Studies in Colonial Nationalism, London, 1905, p.272.
[88-1] J.R. Seeley,The Expansion of England, London, 1883, p.296.
[88-2]Round Table, London, May 1911, p. 232.
[88-3]Ibid., February 1911, p. 167.
[88-4] F. S. Oliver,Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American Union, London, 1906, p. 449.
[89-1]Round Table, London, September 1913, p. 590.
[89-2] F. S. Oliver,Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American Union, London, 1906, p. 449.
[90-1]United Empire, London, January 1914, p. 1.
[90-2]United Empire, London, October 1913, p.767: ". . . there is no ultimate court of appeal for the Empire as a whole. A proposal to create one, by fusing the judicial functions of the House of Lords, which hears United Kingdom appeals, and the Privy Council, which hears appeals from oversea, has long been favoured by Australian statesmen." Cf.The TimesWeekly Edition, London, August 22, 1913, "An Imperial Court of Appeals."
[91-1]United Empire, London, January 1914, p. 1.
[91-2] Alfred Caldecott,English Colonization and Empire, London, 1891, p. 121.
[92-1] W. C. Forbes, lately Civil Governor of the PhilippineIslands, Address concerning the Philippines, before Boston CityClub, November 20, 1913, quoted inBoston City Club Bulletin,Boston, January 1, 1914, p. 40.
[92-2] J.R. Seeley,The Expansion of England, London, 1883, p. 11.
{94}
THE seven Pan-Angle nations are similar in their forms of government. This similarity is often obvious, but even where differences of procedure seem to exist the foundations of government are still the same.
In each of the nations the people rule. In each they follow in governing three practices: ultimate control on all questions is in the voters; immediate legislative control is in legislatures composed of representatives who act on behalf of the voters, and subject to restrictions, if any, by the voters only; and executive or administrative control is in charge of elected persons. If "a country where a large portion of the people has some considerable share in the supreme power would be a constitutional country,"[94-1] then these seven nations are more than constitutional countries, for in them the people not only have "some considerable share," but are the final judges on any matters which they desire to adjudicate. As such these nations meet Burke's definition of a free government: "If any man asks me what a free government is, I answer, that, for any practical purpose, it is what the people think {95} so,—and that they, and not I, are the natural, lawful, and competent judges of the matter."[95-1]
Ultimate control in all these nations is secured to the voters by elections and referenda. By these two means the voters choose their representatives and sometimes actively participate in legislation. Often, too, they state the forms under which their representatives shall work and limit the work they shall be allowed to perform. In the British Isles there is no formal limitation on the power of the representatives elected to the House of Commons. In the other six nations the elected representatives are empowered to act only in certain fields. Their power is conveyed to them through written instruments or constitutions which are beyond their control. All power in either case lies ultimately in the voters, whether through the ballot and their ability to defeat at the polls alone, or through this plus a written constitution. Accordingly, as already stated, all seven of our nations have constitutional governments. Outside the British Isles they are, in a sense, doubly constitutional, because not only is this power of election in the voters, but the framework, or written constitution, of each government under which the representatives must act is likewise in the control of the voters.
The word constitution[95-2] is variously used in Pan-Angle {96} parlance, and it may be well here to discuss some of its meanings.
The Constitution of the British Isles consists partly of laws, determining the form of government, which have been passed at various times and are still in force. To this extent it is written. The bulk of the Constitution, however, lies in a mass of tradition, and depends for its force upon the respect in which Parliament holds that tradition. For this reason the British Constitution is frequently called "unwritten." "In one important respect England differs conspicuously from most other countries. Her constitution is to a large extentunwritten, using the word in much the same sense as when we speak of unwritten law. Its rules can be found in no written document, but depend, as so much of English law does, on precedent modified by a constant process of interpretation {97}. Many rules of the constitution have in fact a purely legal history, that is to say, they have been developed by the law courts, as part of the general body of the common law. Others have in a similar way been developed by the practice of parliament. Both Houses, in fact, have exhibited the same spirit of adherence to precedent, coupled with a power of modifying precedent to suit circumstances, which distinguishes the judicial tribunals. In a constitutional crisis the House of Commons appoints a committee to 'search its journals for precedents,' just as the court of king's bench would examine the records of its own decisions. And just as the law, while professing to remain the same, is in process of constant change, so, too, the unwritten constitution is, without any acknowledgment of the fact, constantly taking up new ground."[97-1] "'Constitutional law,' as the expression is used in England, both by the public and by authoritative writers, consists of two elements. The one element, which I have called the 'law of the constitution' is a body of undoubted law; the other element, which I have called the 'conventions of the constitution,' consists of maxims and practices which, though they regulate the ordinary conduct of the Crown and of Ministers and of others under the constitution, are not in strictness laws at all."[97-2] It must be borne in mind that Parliament, and Parliament alone, can change these laws of the Constitution, and that the change can occur whenever a majority of Parliament so decides. {98} What these traditions are changes from year to year and even from day to day—in fact, it is difficult to find two Britishers who will agree on what is the Constitution at a given date, so greatly are these traditions a matter of personal, not national, conviction.
In each of the other Pan-Angle countries the Constitution consists of laws and traditions similar to those in the British Isles, plus a written document (or documents) which is a power of attorney limiting in certain ways the power of the national representatives-be they executive, judicial, or legislative. These written documents are either enactments of the Parliament of the British Isles, or successors to such enactments. The Canadian Constitution was drafted in London by delegates from the Canadian colonies and various British officials,[98-1] and was passed by the British Isles Parliament, March 29, 1867, to take effect July 1. It was never submitted to the people,[98-2] although it was pleaded that the general election which ensued was "virtual ratification." The Australian Constitution, drafted by Australians in a national constitutional convention, ratified by referenda in each colony,[98-3] now to become a "state," was altered by the British Isles Parliament only in reference to the clause which prohibited appeals to the King in Council, and was passed by that Parliament July 9, 1900, to take effect January 1, 1901. The South {99} African Constitution was drafted in South Africa by South Africans in a national constitutional convention, ratified by the legislatures in three of the South African provinces, and in Natal by a referendum of the voters, was altered by the British Isles Parliament only in reference to matters affecting "natives" and "Asiatics," and was passed by that Parliament September 20, 1909, to take effect May 31,1910.[99-1] The Constitutions of New Zealand and Newfoundland are to be found in the charters and enactments framed in London for their government, and are historically similar in composition to the constitutions of the thirteen American colonies. The American Constitution was based on the previous experience of the race, especially as acquired under various colonial charters. It was drafted at a national convention, and was subsequently ratified by state representative conventions successively. The work of the National Convention "was a work of selection, not a work of creation, . . . the success of their work was not a success of invention, always most dangerous in government, but a success of judgment, of selective wisdom, of practical sagacity,—the only sort of success in politics which can ever be made permanent."[99-2] The American people changed governmental responsibility from the British Isles to themselves, but did not and could not change the source of their ideas.
Such written documents are so often referred to as "The Constitution" that citizens of some of the {100} six younger nations often assume that "The Constitution" is the whole Constitution of their respective governments. The first such written power of attorney to the legislators, and as such an expression of the views then held by a certain body politic, was signed aboard theMayflowerin 1620.[100-1] This Constitution by which the forty-one signers "solemnly and mutually . . . covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil body politic, for our better ordering and preservation and furtherance of the ends aforesaid; and by virtue hereof to enact, constitute and frame-[laws]—unto which we promise all due submission and obedience,"[100-2] did not, however, supersede all other, including unwritten, governmental traditions of that body politic. Constitutions written later have similarly left for their respective groups much continuing tradition, that has been respected and has been enlarged upon. We have written down that which we felt strongly about, but we have also continued other customs. Written "constitutions" have been expressions of public belief as to the form of framework of any given body politic, but for interpretation they have had to rely on unwritten or previously written tradition, as developed to meet arising needs. The mere writing has not arrested our constitutional growth nor rendered inflexible our governmental forms.
The American Constitution consists really of {101} two portions, the written and the unwritten. The tenacity with which the nation clings to certain traditions never put in writing or even at variance with the spirit of the writing, makes it advisable, if not absolutely necessary, so to consider it. Lord Bryce, familiar with the nature of the British Constitution, calls the usages that have grown up apart from the written Constitution "parts of the actual or (so to speak) 'working' Constitution"[101-1] of America. As illustrative of the latter he mentions certain American customs: "The president practically is limited to two continuous terms of office. The presidential electors are expected to vote for the candidate of the party which has chosen them, exercising no free will of their own. The Senate always confirms the nominations to a cabinet office made by the President."[101-2] These instances, of what he calls the American working Constitution, are supported by the same force that maintains the entire British Constitution—public opinion.
To the Britisher, this point of view is thoroughly natural. He has at home a Constitution which is also compounded of written and unwritten parts. To the American this phraseology may sound strange, for he has long been accustomed to think the "Constitution" refers to a particular written document and the judicial decisions thereunder. For the unwritten or working basis of his government he has had no word.
The real difference in the two Constitutions must be sought in the amending power. To the amending of the unwritten portions of either there is no check on Parliament or on Congress, other than public {102} opinion. To the amending of the written portion of the British Constitution, there is likewise no check other than public opinion. Parliament amends the written and unwritten portions of the Constitution,—at the will of a majority of the House of Commons. Congress cannot so amend the written portions of the American Constitution; that is a prerogative of the voters alone. Therein lies the mystery of the alleged respective "flexity" and "rigidity" of the two. But the mystery is less, and the distinctions of flexity and rigidity grow of uncertain value when it is realized that both Constitutions are being constantly changed by the genius of our race. As in the case of our laws, our Constitutions are being steadily interpreted in accord with the will of the voters. That we do not change more suddenly is due to the conservative, yet discreet, action of our representatives, sanctioned by the voters.
An enactment of Parliament at variance with the British Constitution changes that Constitution. An enactment of Congress at variance with the written portion of the American Constitution does not change the Constitution but remains at variance with it. To uphold the written Constitution in such a case and to insist on the priority of its terms over the acts performed by representatives acting under it, early became the self-imposed duty of the American courts. "But this, although, as we may well think, a sound conclusion, was not a necessary one; and it was long denied by able statesmen, judges, and lawyers."[102-1] This function of the courts was for years a unique feature of the United {103} States government. "The right to deal thus with their legislatures had already been asserted in the States, and once or twice it had really been exercised. Had the question related to a conflict, between that [federal written] Constitution and the enactment of a State, it would have been a simpler matter. These two questions, under European written constitutions, are regarded as different ones. It is almost necessary to the working of a federal system that the general government, and each of its departments, should be free to disregard acts of any departments of the local states which may be inconsistent with the federal constitution. And so in Switzerland and Germany the federal courts thus treat local enactments. But there is not under any written constitution in Europe a country where a court deals in this way with the acts of its coördinate legislature."[103-1]
Because the power to amend the written Constitution is not in Congress, it has come about that courts see to it that the will of the popular power so expressed shall not be ignored or vitiated by those who are the servants of that popular power. Because the power to amend the written portions of the British Constitution is in Parliament, there can be no clash between the wishes of Parliament and its Constitution. What Parliamentdoesis the final test of what the Constitutionis.
From the different powers of Parliament and Congress in regard to their respective national Constitutions comes the ambiguity of Pan-Angle usage of the word "unconstitutional."
In the British Isles "unconstitutional" referring {104} to parliamentary action means that someone considers it not consistent with established British political customs. Yet, if the British Parliament enacts any legislation it must be constitutional, because the legislation by its mere enactment is proved not inconsistent with the views of the temporary majority in Parliament. Various British kings have been elected by the Witan and by Parliament; one king was beheaded by the same popular authority; at various dates the duties of kingship have been altered. All these acts were constitutional the day they were voted. It was therefore correct to say in 1910 that the British Constitution "can be torn up by the mere vote of a temporary majority in the two houses of Parliament."[104-1] Since 1911 it would be equally correct to say that such power is now in one House—the House of Commons. It is evident that, "This arrangement, while it makes for flexibility, may be a source of grave danger in the hands of an unscrupulous majority."[104-2]
That forces other than parliamentary majorities may come to exercise more direct control over the British Constitution is not impossible. In the excitement of discussing the place of the House of Lords in the government of the British Isles, the party leaders in 1910, after the death of Edward VII., held a conference. Although they failed to find a consensus of opinion on the best framework for the British Isles government, "The significance of the Conference lies in the precedent it creates for the alteration of the national {105} constitution by the expedient of conference and compromise, instead of by the steam-rolling of a party machine."[105-1] Concerning this same conference another writer observes, "whether in itself it be a development of our Constitution, as some people affirm, or an encroachment on our Constitution, which is the complaint of others, it has at any rate affected our Constitution very materially, simply by its existence."[105-2] If such a conference after deliberating were to lay its conclusions before the people for ratification, it would be analogous to the national constitutional conventions which since the early American experiments have been familiar to the Pan-Angle world. From this the British Isles might come to have a "written constitution" in the same sense that the Constitutions of the United States, Canada, and Australia are written.
For the present, the plan of parliamentary government control which is the British Constitution while successful is, as the above quotations evidence, hazy. And in the British Isles it is fair to consider that "unconstitutional" means "unusual."[105-3]
With Americans the word "unconstitutional" never in popular practice has the comprehensive and indefinite British meaning. As Americans have no term in common use to denote the unwritten part of their Constitution, so they have none at all with which to refer to an infraction of it. The {106} expression has yet to be coined for the American public to employ should the Electoral College act as it did in Washington's day, viz. each elector exercise his individual discretion in voting for a president, or should a president be elected for a third term, whether or not consecutive. In either of these instances the change could not be unconstitutional in the American sense, though it would be unconstitutional in the British sense. In the former case, the procedure would be a return to what was once entirely usual in the American practice, and called for by the one-time working interpretation of the written Constitution. In the latter case, it would be a change to what has never been forbidden by the American written Constitution, but to what is now forbidden by the un-written Constitution. In either of these cases, what would the American courts decide? They would find no violation of the written Constitution, but only of the present unwritten or working Constitution. The American can console himself in his ignorance by the oft-quoted remark: "The Supreme Court has the last guess." The word "unconstitutional" refers to an enactment in such conflict with the written Constitution and decisions thereunder, that American courts will not consider it legal. When legislation beyond the powers conferred by the written Constitution is attempted and a case, for whose decision it is necessary to decide the power of Congress so to enact, is brought to the courts, they will declare the attempted legislation void. The courts, and they alone, have this power. Hence the word "unconstitutional" in America meansillegal.
{107}
In 1913 occurred a modification of the American unwritten or working Constitution which may or may not pass into a permanent change. George Washington and John Adams addressed Congress orally on public affairs. Thomas Jefferson, the third president, being a poor speaker, changed this part of the working Constitution by addressing Congress through written messages. This custom remained as a revision of the working Constitution until 1913. Of this tradition Wilson wrote in 1898: "Hence a sacred rule of constitutional action!"[107-1] In 1913 he, as president, reverted from this "sacred rule" to the oral custom of Washington, and the country's comment was largely commendatory. In this instance it is likely that the Supreme Court may not guess at all!
Illustrative of the British significance of "unconstitutional" is quoted the following, written in 1910: "It is an undoubted rule of the English constitution that the king shall not refuse his assent to a bill which has passed both Houses of Parliament, but it is certainly not a law. Should the king veto such a bill his action would be unconstitutional, but not illegal."[107-2] A corresponding American example might be furnished by the action of an American president in issuing an order, without being authorized thereto by Congress, temporarily repealing part of a tariff bill. Such an act being outside of the scope of a president's authority would, if reviewed by a court as part of theratio decidendiof a case, be held unconstitutional and therefore illegal.
{108}
These British and American usages of "constitution" and "unconstitutional" are reflected in the five other Pan-Angle nations. It consequently behoves one to use either of these words with careful attention to the meaning desired. But of each of the seven nations it may be said: that it is governed under a constitution; that some part of its constitution is written; and that through its constitution, however amendable, ultimate control of all questions is in the voters.
Immediate legislative control of these seven nations is in legislatures composed of representatives who act on behalf of the voters, and subject to restrictions, if any, by the voters only. Until 1911, one nation, the British Isles afforded an exception to this as its legislative power was shared by persons who owed their position to their birth. This instance of presentation in a national legislature which was composed otherwise of elected representatives expired before 1911. Since that date the House of Lords exists not as a part of the legislature but as a consultative body subservient to the will of the House of Commons. To-day the legislatures of the Pan-Angle nations are in all cases representative and the representatives, however elected or appointed act on behalf of the voters.[108-1] Those that are considered appointed are {109} in reality chosen by a method of indirect election. For example, in Canada and in New Zealand the representatives who form the upper houses are chosen by the majority in the lower houses at the time of their election. The fact that these "legislators may, in the Canadian case, hold office for life does not affect the fact that they are elected, but concerns only their terms of office. In New Zealand the terms of office of some members of the upper house is for life, whereas more recent members have been chosen for a period of years. In the United States, according to the provisions of the Federal Constitution, the members of the upper house were formerly chosen by the state legislatures. They are now, by the provisions of the Constitution, elected directly.[109-1] In Australia the upper house members are chosen by the voters organized in voting districts larger than those electing representatives. This last is the method toward which the choice of upper house members seems in Pan-Angle nations to be approaching. The discontent in New Zealand and {110} Canada at their present methods and the recent change in America indicate this trend. This tendency emphasizes the insistence of the voters that representatives are responsible only to the voters.
That such representatives are subject to restrictions, if any, by the voters only, is a statement qualified solely by the technical exception that some of the Britannic nations act under Constitutions enacted for them by another nation, viz. the British Isles. This exception is more true in theory than in reality. If in some of the Britannic nations, such as New Zealand and Newfoundland, there have been no ratifications of their respective frameworks of government, nevertheless the whole spirit of the people in these countries, as well as in Canada, where a like state of affairs exists, and in Australia and South Africa where ratifications have occurred on what is in each case substantially their present Constitution, makes evident the tendency of each one of these nations to regard its Constitution as its own act.[110-1] Consequently, it is fair to say that acting under authority of the voters, representatives carry out the national will in each of the seven Pan-Angle nations.
That executive or administrative control is in charge of elected persons is true without exception {111} in these seven nations. The methods of choosing who shall so administer, may be designated respectively as the British and the American. Under both plans the executive is chosen by indirect popular election. The British system produces a prime minister elected by a majority of the more popular (in the British Isles the sole) chamber of the legislature. This prime minister associates about himself certain other men from the same chamber to carry on the government for a certain time, which may be a shorter and therefore an uncertain time. In the American system the people elect representatives, called the electors, to carry out the election of a president. This forlorn novelty, the Electoral College, shows the futility among Pan-Angles of new-fangled institutions. In all other ideas, the framers of the American Constitution of 1787 followed the evolved and known usages of the race. "It was only when they came to construct the machinery for the election of the President that they left the field of American experience and English example and devised an arrangement which was so original that it was destined to break down almost as soon as it was put in operation."[111-1] The true election is no longer by the electors, but by the people of each state using their allotted number of electors as so many counts in favour of one candidate.[111-2] The president associates about himself a group of men chosen from the nation at large. These men act as {112} secretaries to administer departments in behalf of the president, and have no seat in the legislative branch of the government. These two systems are the types used as models throughout the Pan-Angle self-governing areas.
In the two plans we have popular election with virtual similarity. This is remarked in the following comment on the choice, in 1841, of a British national executive: "But the Reform Act of 1832 introduced a new order of things. In 1835 the result of a general election was for the first time the direct cause of a change of ministry, and in 1841 a House of Commons was elected, for the express purpose of bringing a particular statesman into power. The electorate voted for Sir Robert Peel, and it would have been as impossible for the house then elected to deny him their support as it would be for the college of electors in the United States to exercise their private judgment in the selection of a president."[112-1] The results of parliamentary general elections in the British Isles are announced on newspaper bulletin boards in terms of votes for the leaders of the opposing parties, just as in America the state vote is credited directly to the presidential candidates.
Adherence to either the American or British type of executive does not connote a corresponding similarity in other governmental respects. Australia has a British style executive in connection with an American style legislature. Moreover, Australia's written Constitution has been left unfixed in certain matters, so that, if after trial the British system of executive is found wanting, and some modification {113} shall seem better, a change may be made without the need of constitutional amendment.[113-1]
While representatives are elected to carry out the executive will of the voters under both the British and the American systems, the methods of discharging that duty present differences. These may be summed up in the statement that the British executives take the form of a responsible cabinet; and the American executives, both federal and state, take the form of a cabinet which is not in the same sense responsible. An explanation lies in the race's experience with executives.
The Teuton executive was in the form of an elected king who carried out the wishes of the majority which elected him. He could be and was deposed at the will of his constituents. In short, he was a spokesman. As the nationality of the British Isles crystallized, this spokesman assumed his powers were not subject to recall by his {114} fellow-citizens; considered his office hereditary; and undertook to extend his functions in his own right, not by right of being the spokesman of a majority to whom he was responsible.
At the time of the American Revolution the executive office in the British Isles was held in a way quite unlike the Teuton ideal, and local self-government had, owing to economic changes, sunk to a low level. The king and a few of the landed gentry controlled Parliament and the election of a large proportion of its members.[114-1] When, therefore, the Americans framed their system of government, they had before them an executive example on which they wished to improve. They accordingly created a king who could not initiate or prevent legislation; who was automatically recalled every four years; and who, in common with all other citizens, held no title that could be inherited. Most of the state governments, affected by the same ideas, have gone further. They have even taken from the executive the appointment of judges, making them also elective, though a few states and the national government continue the system of appointing the judiciary through the executive. Further checks to the president's power were devised in making his appointments to the executive and judicial services as well as his negotiations of treaties subject to confirmation by the Senate. Thus the American president is a modified eighteenth-century British king.
After America had become independent and had {115} framed its federal government, the British Isles electorate gradually reasserted its power, and took back into the keeping of its elected representatives the control of executive affairs.[115-1] That return to earlier ideas has produced a spokesman who is elected for five years but may be, and usually is, recalled before the expiration of this term,—by the shifting opinion of the voters manifested in the votes of their representatives in Parliament. This spokesman is no longer called a king but a prime minister. "The imperial sovereignty which is exercised in the name of the King actually resides in the British Prime Minister, a gentleman who holds his office at the pleasure of the majority of the British House of Commons."[115-2] He and his associates, chosen from the members of Parliament, constitute a ministry, of which a portion is called the cabinet. It is this cabinet, this managing committee, that both executes the laws of the British Isles and takes charge of the legislation desired, supposedly, by a majority of the British voters. As the voters elect the members of Parliament and the latter elect the ministry, and as the ministry cannot continue in office in the face of an opposing majority in Parliament, this cabinet executive control is called a "responsible government,"i.e.responsible directly to the people.
{116}
In re-attaining the ideal of the Teuton spokesman, America has made slight progress in theory, however much the American president has stood ready to take such position and however much he may have tried, despite the conservative form of constitution he works under, to perform the duties of such an office. Consequently, the American executive stands apart from the legislative power as the British executive stands near, and is part of, the legislative power. To the American executive and his cabinet, chosen not from Congress but from the country at large, is the explicit duty of administering, not of making, laws, except in so far as the veto power gives the president some share in checking legislation. But the instinct of the race still calls on the president, as though he were the spokesman of his nation, to assist the other representatives in making as well as executing the laws. Signs are not wanting that this same insistence of the voters may bring the American executive back to the executive-legislative functions of the race's early spokesmen. At present the president can interpret the manner in which laws shall be administered, but if his interpretation conflicts with the wishes of Congress, it can pass new enactments not susceptible to such interpretation. Hence, practically the president can influence legislation only by his personal force working on Congress, or by his use of the patronage to induce congressmen to take action in accord with his opinion of the national will. There results a possibility of the use of patronage disastrous to the administrative efficiency of the nation. To meet this disastrous use of the patronage, American {117} public opinion has demanded the "merit system" of appointment of all administrative officials of less station than those political agents who must be in sympathy with the political ideas from time to time in the ascendant, as expressed by political parties. Recognizing this need for efficiency in administrative subordinates, American presidents find it difficult to utilize the merit system of appointment and at the same time forward desired legislation. The personal power of the president backed by popular opinion is, however, still a force to be reckoned with by Congress. Through this power he is able to carry out in part at least the demand made by these political descendants of the Teutons that their spokesman, and all other representatives, shall carry out the legislation the voters require.
Although Alexander Hamilton was unable to obtain a realization of his desires to see the cabinet officers entitled to seats in Congress, the president is called on by the written Constitution to report to Congress on "the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient."[117-1] In reality he does more, and in accordance with the working Constitution actually furthers the legislative programme called for by his party's majority. He may, if the instincts of American public opinion demand it, easily evolve into a responsible spokesman with other administrative officers about him, much after the similitude of a British responsible cabinet ministry. How this may occur by change in either the working or the written Constitution, {118} or both, it is unnecessary here to elaborate. Enough to show that this present difference in the American and British executives is a result of historical conditions working in both branches of the race.
The representatives who carry out the political will of a Pan-Angle nation are called in America the Administration and in the other six nations the Government. This diversity of terminology may produce misunderstanding, as in the case of "constitution"—the more so as "government" has another meaning common to all Pan-Angles, viz. control of peoples.[118-1] A proverbial Irishman landed in America is asked with which party he sympathizes, and retorts that he is "against the Government." He means probably that he is opposed to the ministry of the day in the British Isles—in short, sympathizes with some Opposition ideas. The American hearer, unaccustomed to the word in this specialized sense, may be astonished at what seems an outburst of anarchy. Later our Irishman, become an American, would reply to the same question about his politics, that he was, or was not, in favour of the Administration. But whichever term is used, Administration or Government, it refers alike to those elected representatives who, by the use of their own discretion, or following the instruction of their voters, or by a combination {119} of both methods, conduct the executive business of their nation.
Because the seven Pan-Angle nations are similar in their forms of government they are in a position to establish a common government. All take for granted the same theories and practically the same procedures. Because these theories and procedures work successfully as they are applied to the government of each nation, Pan-Angles will be predisposed to believe that they will work when applied to a government of the whole race.
[94-1]Ency. Brit., vol. vii. p. 15.
[95-1] Quoted in Woodrow Wilson,Mere Literature, Boston, 1900, p. 105.
[95-2]Ency. Brit., vol. vii. p. 15: "The ideas associated with constitution and constitutionalism are thus, it will be seen, mainly of modern and European origin. They are wholly inapplicable to the primitive and simple societies of the present or of the former times. The discussion of forms of government occupies a large space in the writings of the Greek philosophers,—a fact which is to be explained by the existence among the Greeks of many independent political communities, variously organized, and more or less democratic in character. Between the political problems of the smaller societies and those of the great European nations there is no useful parallel to be drawn, although the predominance of classical learning made it the fashion for a long time to apply Greek speculations on the nature of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy to public questions in modern Europe. Representation . . . the characteristic principle of European constitutions, has, of course, no place in societies which were not too large to admit of every free citizen participating personally in the business of government. Nor is there much in the politics or the political literature of the Romans to compare with the constitutions of modern states. Their political system, almost from the beginning of the empire, was ruled absolutely by a small assembly or by one man."
[97-1]Ency. Brit., vol. vii. p. 15.
[97-2] A. V. Dicey,The Law of the Constitution, London, 1885, p.25.
[98-1] H. E. Egerton,Federations and Unions within the British Empire, Oxford, 1911, p. 33.
[98-2] Goldwin Smith, "Canada, England, and the States," inContemporary Review, London, March 1907, p. 851.
[98-3]Ency. Brit., vol. ii. p. 966.
[99-1] W.B. Worsfold,The Union of South Africa, London, 1912, p. 128.
[99-2] Woodrow Wilson,The State, 1897, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, p.462.
[100-1]Ency. Brit., vol. xvii. p. 858: "Finding themselves without warrant in a region beyond their patent, . . . they drew up and signed before landing a democratic compact of government which is accounted the earliest written constitution in history."
[100-2]Ibid., vol. xvii. p. 858.
[101-1]Ency. Brit., vol. xxvii. p. 658.
[101-2]Ibid.
[102-1] J.B. Thayer,John Marshall, Boston, 1901, p. 63
[103-1] J.B. Thayer,John Marshall, Boston, 1901, p. 61.
[104-1]Round Table, London, November 1910, p. 62.
[104-2]Ibid., p. 62.
[105-1]Round Table, London, November 1910, p. 62.
[105-2] "Pacificus,"Federalism and Home Rule, London, 1910, p. 2.
[105-3]Ency. Brit., vol. vii. p. 15: "Again, as a term of party politics, constitutional has come to mean, in England, not obedience to constitutional rules . . . but adherence to the existing type of the constitution or to some conspicuous portions thereof,—in other words, conservative."
[107-1] Woodrow Wilson,The State, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, p. 378.
[107-2]Ency. Brit., vol. vii. p. 14.
[108-1] The fact that so-called "governors" are sent out from the British Isles to the five newer Britannic nations does not affect the statements in this paragraph. Such "governors" do not share in legislation, but acquiesce in legislation formulated by others. Such "governors" are best considered as ambassadors with peculiar local recognition, who act under orders from and in behalf of the government of the British Isles, and act also wherever possible in behalf of all six of the Britannic nations and their dependencies.Cf. ante, p. 89.
[109-1] The Seventeenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, initiated by Congress in 1912, requiring the direct election of senators by the voters of each state, came into force May 31, 1913. The practical effects of direct election were, however, previously obtained in some states, the legislatures electing as senators candidates already designated by the voters. This instance, in which the working Constitution violated the spirit of the written Constitution, is interesting as evidence of the flexity of the American Constitution and of the strength of the spirit of local self-government. Cf.Britannica Year Book, London, 1913, pp. 744-745.
[110-1] That Australia may change its Constitution regardless of the wishes of the British Isles,cf.Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, chapter viii. paragraph 128, and comments thereon in C.P. Lucas,A Historical Geography of the British Colonies,vol. vi.,Australasia, by A. D. Rogers, Oxford, 1907, pt. i., p. 289.
[111-1] Woodrow Wilson,The State, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, p.462.
[111-2] Concerning the alteration in procedure of the American Electoral College whereby presidential electors are pledged before their election, cf.Ency. Brit., vol. xxvii. p. 655.
[112-1]Ency. Brit., vol. xx. p. 845.
[113-1]Cf.W.H. Moore,The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia, 2nd ed., Melbourne, 1910, p. 297: "Further, the Constitution recognizes, if it does not establish, the Cabinet system in the Commonwealth, and the responsibilities of the Executive extend to the consideration of the subjects committed to Parliament, and, if need be, to the initiation of legislation upon them," Also B, R. Wise,The Commonwealth of Australia, London, 1909, pp. 193-194: "At the same time, the provisions which enable its [responsible government] continuance are sufficiently wide to allow of other systems, should this one prove unsuited to a Federation. Except that Ministers must sit in Parliament, there seems no limit to the changes which might be made with the acquiescence of the Governor-General, in the method of appointment, tenure of office, or function,"Cf.Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, chapter i., part i., paragraph 5.
[114-1] Woodrow Wilson,The State, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, p. 889, gives this lack of local self-government as one of the causes of the American Revolution.
[115-1] Cf.Ency. Brit., vol. xx. pp. 845-849; andBritannica Year Book, London, 1913, pp. 491-497 and 480-482.
[115-2] F. S. Oliver,Alexander Hamilton: An Essay on American Union, London, 1906, p. 447. Students who are mystified by allusions to the "Crown," the "King in Council," and the "King has graciously consented," etc., should find the sentence above quoted a valuable explanation.
[117-1] Constitution of the United States, art. ii. sec. 3.
[118-1] Woodrow Wilson,The State, 1898, Boston, rev. ed., 1911, p. 572: "Government, in its last analysis, is organized force. . . . The machinery of government necessary to such an organization consists of instrumentalities fitted to enforce in the conduct of the common affairs of the community the will of the sovereign men: the sovereign minority, or the sovereign majority."
{120}
DANGER may arise to menace the Pan-Angle civilization from three sources: from within any of the seven groups; from between any of the groups; or from outside civilizations.
The first of these sources exists in every body politic. Civil discord whenever it becomes active must be cured as it develops—from within. The soundness of a nation lies in its ability to cope with internal disorder and still maintain its integrity before the world. Any interference, however kindly meant, only exasperates those on the spot. No Britisher, for example, can improve the situation in South Africa by sympathizing with "Hindus" that South Africa does not want.[120-1] And especially is it true among Pan-Angles to whom local self-government is instinctive, that {121} each political entity must look to the order of its own household.
The second source of danger is more grave. As long as the seven nations remain in real or hazily defined independence of each other frictions are bound to arise. These frictions may grow from the competitions of commerce. They may cause reprisals of commerce. Commerce affords the quickest attack on a nation's standard of living. Those who abhor war often overlook the fact that trade reprisal may also produce similar inexpressible suffering. The frictions of commerce in the thirteen American nations in the eighteenth century, the similar discords in Australia before 1900, and in South Africa before 1910, point the same lesson—an adequate central government to adjust such differences. While lacking such an adequate central government for the seven Pan-Angle nations, our only recourse when interests conflict is to our mutual forbearance.
Within a nation a government hales offenders before a court empowered to enforce its decisions. Between nations there is no such tribunal. A court is "a body in the government to which the public administration of justice is delegated."[121-1] This presupposes in the court power to bring parties before it; a law governing the case; and power to enforce a decision. The Hague Tribunal or any other existing so-called "international {122} arbitration court" has no one of these three attributes. It is no court at all. Any body of presumably well-intentioned persons anywhere can listen to a dispute and give advice. This is all the Hague Tribunal, for all its name, can do. The contending parties can take the advice or not as they like. No parties can be compelled to appear before this non-governmental body; no one can know beforehand, except by frangible mutual agreement with his opponents and with the "court," what rules are to govern the decision; and on no party can a decision be enforced. "In international affairs the primitive rule, that 'might is right' still holds good, for either side to a quarrel can insist on a resort to force. In the outer void of world politics there is no reign of law, for there is no law-maker; there is no assured justice, for there is no judge; there is no safety for the weak, for there are no police to whom they can appeal.
"Why is this? It is because no nation is willing to submit its destinies to a tribunal over which it has no control, or to surrender its armaments to a world authority which will use them to enforce some international code of its own creation."[122-1]
Inter-Pan-Angle frictions in the past have been numerous, the American Revolution being merely the most disastrous. Troubles that have arisen {123} between the British Isles and Canada and between the British Isles and the United States since the peace of 1814 may be passed over because more happily terminated.[123-1] Other of the nations have likewise had their family quarrels with the British Isles. Three years before the Boer War, a South African wrote: "The most powerful factor which makes for disunion at present is the interference of the British Government in the internal affairs of South Africa. . . . England's periods of active interference in South Africa have always been disastrous to herself and to South Africa—indeed the present troubles may all be traced directly to Lord Carnarvon's attempt to force his policy on South Africa."[123-2] Twelve years later, the Boer War being over, and the union of the four South African provinces being not yet accomplished, another South African wrote: "Directly after [after the Chinese indentured labourers in the Transvaal were 'freed' by the British Isles Government][123-3] came the Zulu rebellion in Natal, and so enraged were the South African colonies, so bitter and so angry with the Home Government, that, had it been possible, they would have broken away. Given another crisis of the kind in more prosperous times, and the British will go solid with the Dutch for independence and a Republic."[123-4] The same dangers lurked in the recent suggestion that the British {124} Isles should interfere in South Africa in reference to Asiatic Indians in Natal.
Nor is it alone in the realms of legislation and administration where partisan politics may be factors that such frictions arise. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of the British Isles is still, however rarely used, the supreme appellate court for the five over-seas Britannic nations. Against its fitness for the position, the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in 1903 passed formal and deliberate resolutions—reading, in part, as follows: "That the decisions of this Court should continue to be subject to review by a higher Court is of the utmost importance. The knowledge that a decision can be reviewed is good alike for Judges and litigants. Whether, however, they should be reviewed by the Judicial Committee, as at present constituted is a question worthy of consideration. That Court, by its imputations in the present case, by the ignorance it has shown in this and other cases of our history, of our legislation and of our practice, and by its long-delayed judgments, has displayed every characteristic of an alien tribunal. If we have spoken strongly it is because we feel deeply. And we speak under grievous and unexampled provocation."[124-1] It is inevitable that different political groups without {125} more adequate cohesion than sentiment and shifting political desires should have had such family quarrels. It is unnecessary here to quote other instances from the past.
To-day's inter-Pan-Angle frictions are the inevitable results of the international conflicts of local national policies. Some of them are trivial; others, vital. And from even trivial questions improperly handled grow wars. "A White Australia," "No Indians for the Transvaal," "No Hindus for British Columbia,"[125-1] are familiar slogans suggesting all sorts of possible disagreements for the settlement of which there is no court in existence. The questions of Asiatic migrations are not trivial to the six nations exasperated thereby. Yet even if all these questions were removed, there would remain many opportunities for discord still unadjusted. For the six Britannic nations Downing Street is the only medium for adjusting such discords. And the lack of power behind the decrees of Downing Street results in an accumulation of makeshifts that is provocative of future troubles.
Between the United States and the British Isles the Monroe Doctrine has at times bulked large as a possible source of disagreement. The question of Panama Canal tolls has recently rasped these nations' amiability. It is worth while to examine into these trouble breeders and to see how the situations would be altered if the two countries were {126} treating not as independent units but as parties to a huge federation.
The Monroe Doctrine was dictated to American statesmen by the fear of Europe. To the people of the United States its maintenance has meant safety from aggression. It has lived by their sanction alone. "It would have been forgotten within 60 days after President Monroe first formulated it in a presidential message if it had not met with a response in popular feeling. . . . the popular feeling existed long before Monroe was president, for Jefferson stated principles of foreign policy which embodied the ideas associated now for 90 years with Monroe's name. . . . And thus America has always, down to the present crisis with Mexico, followed the national instinct concerning entanglements on its own part in Europe's affairs, and interferences on Europe's part in the affairs of this hemisphere." ". . . Whenever a specific issue arises in our relations with Latin-America, a practical test of what the public feeling in this country amounts to is offered. Our history for the past dozen years abounds in 'incidents' that revealed the public temper. It is certain that whenever such a test has been made in the Latin-American states around the Caribbean Sea, the fear of the jealousy of European encroachment manifests itself instantly and warns the administration of the day what the people expect the government to do. The Monroe doctrine, or the idea, feeling or instinct upon which it is based, thus is repeatedly referred to the people for a fresh expression of their sentiment, and there is no prospect that it will become an obsolete feature of our foreign policy so long as these re current {127} tests find the people vitally interested in its preservation."[127-1]
The maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, whatever it may mean, is to the American voter what the maintenance of a Big Fleet, whatever the size may be, is to the British voter. A Britannic authority thus expresses the feelings of the average Britisher: "Our 'man on the omnibus' has never failed as yet to respond to an agitation on behalf of the Fleet. He did so instantly in 1909, and he will always do so again. Given a serious division between the parties on the naval question, there can be no doubt which will win. . . . Whenever the controversy is taken to the country, the country decides for the larger Fleet."[127-2] The American Monroe Doctrine and the British Big Fleet are the outcome of the instinctive fears Pan-Angles hold towards Europe.
The Monroe Doctrine was not designed as a weapon against the British Isles any more than the Big Fleet is built to fight American ships. The older country was in hearty agreement with President Monroe's original pronouncement. "Indeed it was Canning's policy, summed up three years later by his famous reference to the necessity of calling the New World into existence to restore the balance of the Old."[127-3] As long, however, as the British Isles remains an outsider it falls within the definition of "any European power" of the message, just as there is nothing to prevent the {128} United States, as long as it remains an outsider, from suffering from the strength of the Big Fleet.
The two countries are independent now and must in the last resort each protect itself from the other, however much they may prefer friendship. As members of a federation each would be spared the necessity of self-protection against the other. In such event the Monroe Doctrine would apply to non-Pan-Angles only and the Fleet would be the instrument by which it was enforced.
The question of Canal tolls to many Americans to-day is a matter of only national, not international, politics. They believe tolls should be paid for Canal privileges. They also, however, seek a means of lowering transcontinental freight rates. As only American ships are allowed by law to engage in American coastwise trade, these are the only competitors of the railroads. To free such ships from Canal tolls might be a means toward lowering transcontinental freight rates. Those Americans who so believe are pleased if the Hay-Pauncefoote treaty seems to allow an interpretation favourable to their purpose. Other Americans believe no such interpretation possible, whatever the problems of national economics. To both, however, outside criticism of "violation of treaty" may induce merely the exasperation that leads to refusal to discuss the question.
The difficulty, as our nations are now organized, is that a question of mutual interest is decided by the majority in power in one of the nations. In the present instance it was the United States that {129} controlled the situation. The United States decided. Afterwards the British Isles might, if it wished, protest in terms of whatever mildness or vigour its public policy dictated. The British Government has shown itself forbearing. It protested but did not press its claims in terms incompatible with peaceful relations. The American government, unantagonized, was left in a mood to review the matter and, as seems probable, to alter its previous decision. In some other matter the tables may be reversed. The British Isles may hold in its power the solution of some question of interest to the United States. And the United States may have only the opportunity to remonstrate in its turn against what it considers an "unfair" interpretation of a treaty. Such remonstrance is apt to be tinged with hostility, the thing we wish most of all to avoid. Having no common government, the two nations have no court to decide the case. Were they members of a federation, such machinery would be established and in constant working order.
Separate political existences of seven Pan-Angle nations do not make for peace. If for us is coming the great millennium, so sweetly dreamed of by so many, it will not come the sooner by perpetuating opportunities for discord. A common government over Pan-Angles would be copying what we have already done successfully in smaller "closer unions." Before the formation of one of these, it was stated: "Three choices therefore lie before the people of South Africa. The make-shift regime of the High Commissioner, the jarring separation of the States of South America, the noble union of the States of {130} North America."[130-1] This might be paraphrased. Three choices lie before the Pan-Angles: the make-shift regime of Downing Street and the gambling uncertainties of arbitration boards, the jarring separation we have known in our past, the noble method of union which our race has evolved, tested, and in four separate nations adopted. By solving our international differences of opinion in a federal government we can husband our strength for self-defence as a united power against other civilizations.
Despite our self-esteem we are not the only civilization in the world. There are others who need land for their children, as much or more than we do. These others wish to see the world "bettered" by their ideas. If we are wise we shall recognize these foreign aspirations to be as normal as our own. As we have progressed other civilizations have progressed, even though differently. And difference does not mean inferiority. Once we could believe that our rivals, personal, national, or racial, were bad because different; but nowadays we cannot call it wrong when others, less favourably situated than we in the sunshine of this world, strive like ourselves for comfort. "The tragedy of history is not the conflict between right and wrong, but the conflict between right and right." Each civilization knows it is right. Each is right {131} till another civilization is proved to be not only right, but better. A civilization is better than ours if it shall prove its people able to conquer our people—through cutting off our food by more resourceful trading, thriftier living, or war. As it has always been since the Pan-Angles were a people, the world is now an inter-civilization competition selecting the fittest to survive.
Four nations of men, white like ourselves and holding some of the same ideals, have been in the past our life and death rivals. Spain, Portugal, Holland, and France all were great before we were. They discovered and pre-empted a large part of the world. To the shores of almost everyone of the seven Pan-Angle nations their keels have come with intent to seize land. Our rivals often succeeded and held the land for a time until we grew strong enough to take it from them. Our struggles against these out-run powers make thrilling stories, for they tested the courage, the resources, and the tenacity of the Pan-Angle victors.
Portugal and Spain once shared between them the seas of the world—according to a Pope's decree. They raced in opposite directions to see which first should reach the Antipodes. Macao and Manila, lying opposite each other, show where the two routes terminated. To-day Spain holds no land outside of Europe except the Canaries and odd inconsequential bits of Africa. From before the days of the Armada to the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, Pan-Angles have been plundering Spain. Some of the spoils they kept for themselves, some they gave away. The Ladrones in a recent division were allotted to {132} Germany. Portugal holds more extensive reminders of its former empire. The Azores, the Cape Verdes, Timor and Goa, and strips of East and West Africa show where that nation was once supreme. Both the African areas are bordered by Pan-Angle and German holdings, and it requires no shrewd forecasting to predict their future.[132-1]
Holland holds the Dutch East Indies—a dependency huge in extent and population as compared to the tiny European state,[132-2] but small "compared to the lands adapted for true colonization, long ago relinquished. Holland holds also certain remnants in the Western Hemisphere, as Spain and Portugal do not. But like Spain and Portugal, Holland holds these dependencies not by virtue of its own strength, but by virtue of the matched strength of others, the balance of power leaving Holland for the present undisturbed.