I. German pretensions in the West.II. German pretensions in the East.III. German pretensions in the South and South-East.IV. General view of the execution of the Pangerman plan from 1911 to the beginning of 1916.
I. German pretensions in the West.II. German pretensions in the East.III. German pretensions in the South and South-East.IV. General view of the execution of the Pangerman plan from 1911 to the beginning of 1916.
I. German pretensions in the West.
II. German pretensions in the East.
III. German pretensions in the South and South-East.
IV. General view of the execution of the Pangerman plan from 1911 to the beginning of 1916.
In this chapter we shall inquire what relation existed between the actual gains and the pretensions of the Pangermans at the beginning of 1916, and those which were foreseen in the 1911 plan. In order to be quite explicit we shall analyse successively those gains and pretensions in the west, east, south, and south-west. This analysis will enable us finally to present a general view of the execution of the Pangerman plan at the period under consideration.
The map (p. 46) sums up Prussianized Germany’s pretensions which she still expected to carry out west of the Rhine at the beginning of 1916.
The best way to prove this intention is by means of extracts from the memorial sent by the most powerful German associations on May 20th, 1915, to the Imperial Chancellor (quoted byLe Temps, 12th August, 1915). I have mentioned (see page 18) why this document must be looked upon as of extremely exceptional importance.
THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE WEST (Beginning of 1916).
THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE WEST (Beginning of 1916).
As to what concerns Belgium the memorial says:
“Because it is needful to insure our credit on sea and our military and economic situation for the future in face of England, because the Belgian territory, which is of the greatest economic importance, is closely linked to our principal industrial territory, Belgium must be subjected to the legislation of the Empire in monetary, financial and postal matters. Her railways and her water courses must be closely connected with our communications. By constituting a Walloon territory and a Flemish territory with a preponderance of the Flemish, and by putting into German hands the properties and the economic undertakings which are of vital importance for dominating the country, we shall organize the government and the administration in such a manner that the inhabitants will not be able to acquire any influence over the political destiny of the German Empire.”
In a word, it is slavery that is promised to the Belgians. In order to prove clearly that this means exactly the achievement of the plan Berlin had elaborated for twenty-five years, it is important to notice that the fate of the annexed populations, meted out in the above memorial, is exactly the same fate mentioned in the pamphlet published under the auspices of theAlldeutscher Verband, the Pangerman Union, wherein the Pangerman plan of 1895 is set forth (see the text already quoted, p. 4).
The only difference to be noticed in the evolution of the Pangerman ideas between 1895 and 1916 is that after their experience with the Slavs and Latins of Austria-Hungary, the Germans deem it possible and advantageous, by an application of Prussian methods of terrorism, to compel non-Germans to fight for the benefit of Pangermany; true, these people shudder with horror at the notion, but stiffened by a strong infusion of Germans, they are forced to march to the shambles in order to secure slavery and bread for their families under the German yoke.
“As to France,” continues the memorial of the 20th May, 1915, to the Imperial Chancellor,“always in consideration of our position towards England, it is of vital interest for us, in respect of our future on the seas, that we should own the coast which borders on Belgium more or less up to the Somme, which would give us an outlet on the Atlantic Ocean. TheHinterland, which it is necessary to annex at the same time, must be of such an extent that economically and strategically the ports, where the canals terminate, can be utilized to the utmost. Any other territorial conquest in France, beyond the necessary annexation of the mining basins of Briey, should only be made in virtue of considerations of military strategy. In this connection, after the experience of this war, it is only natural that we should not expose our frontiers to fresh enemy invasions by leaving to the adversary fortresses which threaten us, especially Verdun and Belfort and the Western buttresses of the Vosges, which are situated between those two fortresses. By the conquest of the line of the Meuse and of the French coast, with the mouths of the canals, we should acquire, besides the iron districts of Briey already mentioned, the coal districts of the departments of theNordand of thePas de Calais. This expansion of territory, quite an obvious matter after the experience obtained in Alsace-Lorraine, presupposes that the populations of the annexed districts shall not be able to obtain a political influence on the destiny of the German Empire, and that all means of economic power which exist on these territories, including landed property, both large and middling, will pass into German hands; France will receive and compensate the landowners.”
In order to justify these formidable annexations the memorial of the 20th May, in harmony with the frank cynicism of the Pangerman doctrine, adduces no argument but the convenience of Prussia and the profitableness of the booty to be got.
“If the fortress of Longwy, with the numerous blast furnaces of the region, were returned to the French, and if a new war broke out, with a few long range guns the German furnaces of Luxemburg (list of which is given) would be paralyzed in a few hours.... Thus about 20% of the production of crude iron and of German steel would be lost....
“Let us say, bye the bye, that the high production of steel derived from the iron-ore gives to German agriculture the only chance of obtainingthe phosphoric acid needed when the importation of phosphates is blockaded.
“The security of the German Empire, in a future war, requires therefore imperatively the ownership of all mines of iron-ore including the fortresses of Longwy and of Verdun, which are necessary to defend the region.”
These various declarations, made on high authority enable us to affirm, that on the whole the annexations which the Pangermans intended to make in the West would have extended in France more or less to a line drawn from the South of Belfort to the mouth of the Somme, that is, so far as concerns France, they would comprise a total area of 50,271 square kilometres, which, before the war, held 5,768,000 inhabitants.
Further, as regards France, the intended annexations were, according to Pangerman conceptions, to have had a double effect.
1º. By taking over the richest industrial and mining French regions, Germany would secure an enormous booty.
2º. Deprived of her most productive departments, which bear the main burden of taxes, and which hold mining elements indispensable to economic life, France would have been maimed and reduced to a state from which it would have been a sheer impossibility for her to recover or ever again to become a power capable of thwarting in any shape whatsoever the future determinations of Germany.
A few figures will enable us to verify this forecast. At the beginning of 1916 the Germans were holding 138,000 hectares of the coal basin of the department of theNord, being 41% of the total superficies worked in France (337,000 hectares), or about three-fourths of the total French production. The Germans also occupied 63,000 hectares of the iron-orebasin of Lorraine which represents 75% of the superficies of all the iron beds worked in France (83,000 hectares), and nine-tenths of the total production. It is clear, that were such a state of things to continue, economic and therefore national life would be made radically impossible in France, shorn of her vital organs. In reality France would be in a position of entire dependence on Germany in accordance with the Pangerman schemes for the future.
It is still necessary to mention that in the territories occupied by Germany in the West, as well as everywhere else, the measures already taken by the Germans in 1916 were not merely measures of military defence, but measures for the organization and permanent possession of the said territories. These measures to ensure permanent possession may be classed in the following categories:
Measures of terrorismapplied in Prussian fashion so as to bring into subjection all refractory elements.
Measures of division, such as in Belgium, the Germans take in order to rouse, by all possible means, opposition between the Flemish and the Walloons for the purpose of neutralizing the one by the other.
Measures of strict and regular administrationin order, by the bait of some external or economic advantages, to accustom to the German yoke those elements of the population whose moral resistance, in the opinion of Berlin, can be most easily broken.
Measures tending to prepare the German colonization of the new territories.These have mostly consisted in applying the Pangerman theory ofEvacuation, that is, by systematically transporting the unfortunate women or old people whom Germany considers absolutely useless in her future possessions. She found it, for instance, very convenient to rid herself without delay of these poor creatures especiallywhen the question of feeding them cropped up; so these “useless mouths” were promptly transferred to the shoulders of the enemy, whom Germany already looked upon as vanquished. That is the theory ofEvacuation, which explains to a large extent why the German authorities have sent back to France that part of the populations of the occupied territories in France and Belgium whom, on exact inquiry, they regarded as human wastage.
No doubt, as is shown on map (p. 46), Germany did not at the beginning of 1916 occupy quite all the territories she coveted. She missed Calais, Belfort, and Verdun, but it is easy to see that she did so only by a hair’s breadth.
The Western territories which were to enter into the Germanic Confederation of the 1911 plan include:
Now Luxemburg and Belgium were entirely occupied (excepting a patch of Belgium). If Germany was to hold Belgium, Holland, which is not occupied, but which is geographically invested, would inevitably be forced to enter into the Germanic Confederation. We must, therefore, consider Holland as being virtually under Germany’s thumb. As, on the other hand, out of 50,271 square kilometres which she wished to annex at the expense of France, Germany, at the beginning of 1916, occupied 20,300, we conclude that the German enterprises in the West, which, according to programme, ought to have comprised 120,449 squarekilometres, in point of fact extended directly or indirectly over 90,478 square kilometres.
Germany therefore, early in 1916, had achieved in the West an occupation foreseen by the plan of 1911 and at the expense of non-Germans in the proportion of 76% or three-fourths.
The Pangerman plan of 1911 had provided for the permanent exclusion of Russia as a great power by means of two measures:
1º. To carve out of the Empire of the Tsars and annex to the German Confederation a slice of territory large enough to cut off Russia entirely from the West.
2º. To constitute at the expense of Russia, thus reduced, new States which should bow the knee to Berlin.
Mr. Dietrich Schaefer, the well-known historian, in the ReviewPanther, affirmed, early in February, 1915: “It is absolutely necessary for us to expand the sphere of our power, especially eastward ... the immense Russian force must recede behind the Dnieper” (quoted byL’Information, 5th February, 1915).
A Swedish pamphlet, ascribed to the Germanophile, Adrian Molin, explained, also early in 1915, that Germany, with the help of Sweden, was to have given the finishing stroke in separating Russia from Europe by means of a barrier formed of Buffer-States, to wit, Finland and the Ukraine. Now, for the last twenty-five years in particular, the Pangerman agents have endeavoured to sow the seeds of rebellion among the 20 millions of Small-Russians who live in the Russian Governments grouped around Kieff. Finally, the Moslem regions of Russia (Caucasus, Central Asia, etc.)were to form special States under the sway of Turkish suzerainty, and, through that channel, to bear the yoke of German influence.
THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE EAST.
THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE EAST.
Such were the means elaborated at Berlin to bring about the annihilation of Russia as a great power, when once her armies had been destroyed; and this might have happened perhaps, if the English intervention, by enabling France to make a stand, had not prevented Germany from first smashingFrance and then concentrating all her forces against the Empire of the Tsar, in accordance with the plan of the General Staff of Berlin.
We can form an estimate of the annexations which Germany, as late as the beginning of 1916, still hoped to effect at the cost of Russia by examining the memorial of May 20th, 1915, addressed to the Imperial Chancellor; although the phraseology in which it is drawn up aims at concealing the full extent of the Pangerman demands, it yet tallies, in its tendencies, with the programme published by Tannenberg in 1911:
“With regard to the East,” says that memorial, “the following consideration must guide us: For the great increase of industrial power which we expect in the West we must secure a counterpoise by the annexation of an agricultural territory of equal value in the East. It is necessary to strengthen the agricultural basis of our national economy; to secure room for the expansion of a great German agricultural settlement; to restore to our Empire the German peasants living in a foreign land, particularly in Russia, who are now actually without the protection of the law; finally, we must increase considerably the number of our fellow countrymen able to bear arms; all these matters require an important extension of the frontiers of the Empire and of Prussia towards the East through the annexation of at least some parts of the Baltic provinces and of territories to the South of them, while keeping in view the necessity of a military defence of the Eastern German frontier.
“As to what political rights to give to the inhabitants of the new territories and as to what guarantees are necessary to further German influence and economics, we will merely refer to what we have said about France. The war indemnity to be exacted from Russia should to a large extent consist in the surrender of territory” (seeLe Temps, 12th August, 1915).
In his speech of 11th December, 1915, William II.’s Chancellor, in a sentence full of significance, gave his hearers to understand that such were indeed the pretensions of Germany:
“Our troops,” said he, “in conjunction with the Austro-Hungarian, are taking up strongly fortified positions of defence far within the Russian territory. They are ready to resume their forward march.”
Just as in the West, all the measures taken by the Germans in the East have been not only for defence, but for organization in view of keeping the occupied territories. These measures come under the various heads I indicated. (Seep. 50.)
With the Poles, the Germans used the same tactics as with the Flemish people of Belgium. After having terrorized the Poles, the Prussian authorities granted them, in the use of their own language for scholastic purposes, certain privileges which compare advantageously with the former state of things resulting from that detestable bureaucratic régime of Russia, which, with a complete lack of foresight, had by its vexatious measures seriously imperilled in Poland the true interests of the empire of the Tsars. Again, in the East the Germans promoted husbandry. They constructed railroads and coach roads. No doubt all these steps were taken mainly in the interest of Germany. It is quite clear that the advantages conceded to the Poles can only be considered as temporary. This is proved sufficiently by the Prussian system so long pursued in Posen. However, the Germans flatter themselves that by these measures they favourably impress some portion of the Poles, who are simple enough to imagine thatGermany will reconstitute a Polish State of 20 millions of inhabitants in order to give this State to the Poles at the expense of Russia. It was with such an end in view that Berlin thought of proclaiming the autonomy of Poland. At the same time Germany reckons on establishing in Poland a system of conscription so as to utilize, by force if necessary, the Polish recruits, just as she has done with the Slavs of Austria-Hungary, in the interest of Pangermany.
From the territorial standpoint the Pangerman pretensions of the 1911 plan in the East are summarized in the following table:
Now at the beginning of 1916, out of these 343,724 square kilometres, as the map will show, the Germans occupied about 260,000. They therefore had carried out in the East the plan of 1911 at the cost of non-German populations to the extent of 75% or three-fourths.
The zones of absolute influence, whether direct or indirect, which Germany, in accordance with the 1911 plan, has tried to secure for herself in the South and South-East of her present frontiers,comprise three totally distinct groups of territory: Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and Turkey. It is therefore advisable to examine separately how at the beginning of 1916 Germany stood in respect of each of these three groups.
THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST.
THE GERMAN CLAIMS IN THE SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST.
1º. Austria-Hungary.
Let us make no mistake, Austria-Hungary is actually as much under William II.’s domination as is Belgium. The European conflict has enabled Germany artfully to occupy the Empire of the Hapsburgs under the pretence of defending it, in fact to seize it as provided for by the plan of 1911. Since the beginning of 1915 all the troops of Francis Joseph have been entirely under the orders of the Berlin General Staff. Even if Austria-Hungary wished to make a separate peace, she could not do so, for all her motive power, diplomatic and military, is exclusively controlled by the Kaiser’s agents. TheAustro-German alliance is merely a piece of stage scenery. The much-talked of device of smuggling the Hapsburg Empire into Germany by a back door, that is, by her entrance into theZollvereinor Customs Union, is a broad farce. It can merely deceive those, alas still too numerous, who are insufficiently informed of the true facts in Austria-Hungary. The Austro-German fusion in the shape of a Customs Union is besides no novelty. The process of absorbing Austria-Hungary was foreseen and described in detail in the Pangerman pamphlet of 1895, showing the fundamental lines of the plan of that date. All the fuss made at the beginning of 1916 by the German Press about the so-called wishes of the Austro-Hungarians to enter into theZollvereinhas been the most “Kolossal” and the most dishonest of bluffs. In truth, nearly three-fourths of the populations at present subject to Francis Joseph do not want to be absorbed into Germany at any price, neither in a political, nor in an economic fashion. All the stir made in the Central Empires about the entrance of the Hapsburg Monarchy into theZollverein, has been the doing of Pangerman bear leaders at Berlin or Vienna and of the Magyar aristocracy, and not at all of the Magyar people, which is not the same thing. Let us therefore not be duped by the bluff of the German press on theZollvereinquestion. The microscopic minority who wish it in Austria-Hungary plays the Berlin game. What is undeniable is that at present Austria-Hungary is entirely under the Prussian thumb.
2º. The Balkans.
The whole of Serbia has been overrun by the Germans. The predicament of the Serbian population is extremely cruel. Either they have been massacred, or systematically famished or deported to Germany to work in the factories or on theGerman land. These appalling measures of coercion have not prevented the Kaiser from addressing a manifesto: “Tomynoble and heroic Serbian People.” The aim was, by fine words, to disarm morally the remainder of the Serbian population, terrorized by a series of sufferings unsurpassed in history. As to Serbia, the Kaiser offered part of it to Austria, always in accordance with the plan of 1895 which provided for this solution; for to give a fraction of Serbia to Austria as a member of theZollverein, is practically to put it under the direct domination of Germany.
As to Bulgaria, the ally of Germany, she is entirely absorbed, and the Germans there behave as rulers so far as they possibly can. Heroic Montenegro has suffered exactly the same fate as Serbia, one part of Albania is also occupied. If the Allies had been fatuous enough not to understand, at the eleventh hour, the importance of Salonika, Greece and Roumania, where Germanophile elements are not numerous but very influential, would already have obeyed to the letter the orders of Berlin.
Supposing, for argument’s sake, that there were a German victory, we would immediately see Germany constituting a Balkan Confederation under the headship of Austria, considered as a Balkan power, simply because, under the name of Austria, it would really be Germany who would impose her will on the future confederation.
3º. Turkey.
At the beginning of 1916, before the Russian advance in Armenia, the Ottoman Empire throughout its entire length was subjected to the influence of Germany; that influence had even spread to Persia. We have here an event which would have had an extreme importance for the development of the Panislamic movement directed simultaneously against Russia, France and England, if the Anglo-Russianattitude had not recently put a stopper on German intrigues in the Shah’s Empire.
“The establishment of direct relations with Turkey is of inestimable military value,” said the German Chancellor in his speech of December 11th, 1915, “while on the economic side the possibility of importing goods from the Balkan States and from Turkey will increase our supplies in a most satisfactory way” (seeLe Temps, 11th December, 1915). It would be a mistake to see in these words the result of a mere bluff, of which the Germans are so often lavish. If the Allies left Germany time to draw from Turkey all the military and economic resources expected from her at Berlin, future events would evidently prove that the Imperial Chancellor’s words deserve to be taken seriously.
To sum up, the Pangerman plan of 1911 provided in the South and South-East for:
Now, at the beginning of 1916, the plan of 1911 was carried out in the following proportions:
Austria-Hungary had her 676,616 square kilometres occupied (minus the small area in the hands of the Italians), being more or less 100%.
In the Balkans, at the same date, under direct German influence, we have:
equalling 43% of the total of the Balkan States’ territory.
In Turkey the German influence was exerted over almost the entire territory, therefore in the proportion of 100%.
If we now add the figures belonging to the three territorial groups aimed at by the 1911 plan in the South and South-East we shall see that Germany has carried out her programme on
As the total plan aimed at the German direct or indirect seizure of 2,968,791 square kilometres, we see that, considered in that light, the goal of the 1911 plan has been reached in the South and South-East in the proportion of 89%, being roughly nine-tenths.
Now I have shown (pp. 52 and 56) that Germany occupied or controlled early in 1916:
In the West over 90,478 square kilometres.In the East over 260,000 square kilometres.
In the West over 90,478 square kilometres.
In the East over 260,000 square kilometres.
We have just seen that in the South and South-East the German plan has been achieved over 2,685,101 square kilometres.
Of course all the territories included in that last figure are far from having the same value, especially those of part of Turkey, but in that figure Austria-Hungary alone claims 676,616 squarekilometres, that is, she alone represents a seizure, disguised it may be, yet not less real, which is infinitely more considerable than the German occupations in the West and East.
From these calculations it clearly follows that the part of the Pangerman plan which concerns Austria-Hungary, the Balkans and Turkey, that is, Central Europe and the East, forms by far the main part of the Pangerman scheme. That is an observation of extreme importance for the Allies and for Neutrals, because of the world-wide consequences which flow from the scheme summed up in the formula, “From Hamburg to the Persian Gulf.” These consequences will be stated in Chapter V.
The Pangerman plan of 1911 (see map, p. 12) included:
1º. The formation of a great German Confederation which was to put under the absolute supremacy of the present German Empire (540,858 square kilometres and 68 million inhabitants) foreign territories situated around Germany, which form a superficies of 1,182,113 square kilometres and hold 94 million inhabitants.
The figures given (pp. 52, 56 and 61) suffice to prove that the German seizure of these territories extended at the beginning of 1916:
Germany has therefore, so far as concerns the territories to be absorbed into the Germanic Confederation, achieved her programme in the proportion of 86%, or about nine-tenths.
2º. The absolute subordination to Germany of all the Balkan States, whose superficies is 499,275 square kilometres, holding 22 million inhabitants. We have seen above (p. 61), that the German seizure actually extends over 215,585 square kilometres. The German programme, therefore, as regards the Balkans, has been achieved in the proportion of 43%.
3º. The more or less veiled seizure by Germany of the Ottoman Empire, being 1,792,900 square kilometres, holding 20 million inhabitants. Now, early in 1916 the exclusive German influence was felt over the whole of Turkey. As regards her the German plan had therefore been achieved in the proportion of 100%.
Let us now group the figures which will enable us to show in what proportion the whole Pangerman plan of 1911 has been actually achieved by Germany:
These figures prove to demonstration that early in 1916 Germany had achieved the Pangerman plan of 1911 in the enormous proportion of 87%, or about nine-tenths.
This figure is graphically confirmed by the annexed map; we can see at a glance the geographical as well as superficial relations which exist between the boundaries of the plan of 1911and the fronts occupied early in 1916 by armies exclusively subordinate to Berlin.
THE PLAN OF 1911 AND THE EXTENT OF ITS EXECUTION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916.
THE PLAN OF 1911 AND THE EXTENT OF ITS EXECUTION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1916.
These geographical and mathematical considerations, the importance of which cannot escape us, explain why and under what conditions Germany wished to make peace. She wished it simply because, as theFrankfurter Zeitungowned, without mincing matters, in December, 1915, the goal of the war had been reached.
Nine-tenths of the whole of the Pangerman plan of 1911 having been practically achieved, in spite of England’s intervention, which, however, had upset the German Staff’s plan, it is absolutely clear that the results obtained by Germany have been considerable in the extreme. Nothing could therefore be more to her advantage now than to succeed in putting an end to the war at a time when Germaninfluence extends unchecked over almost the whole of the invaded territories.
These statements again explain why Berlin has for such a long time been occupied with the most subtle and most complex manœuvres for the opening of peace negotiations—attempts at a separate agreement with Russia, efforts to obtain the Pope’s intervention, advances made by the pseudo-socialists of the Kaiser towards their former comrades of belligerent countries, incitements to pacificists of all neutral countries, etc. Germany would have concluded peace at the moment which was most favourable to her, so as to be able to impose on the territories which she has either conquered or controls the special status provided for each of them by the Pangerman plan. But of course Germany would only have made such treaties as were compatible with her retention of all the regions she occupied at the time. As Major Moraht said very clearly in theBerliner Tageblatt: “Our military chiefs are not in the habit of giving back what we have acquired at the price of blood and of sacrifice” (Le Matin, 27th December, 1915).
Lastly, the chief reason why Berlin wanted peace is that the prolongation of the war can only compromise and finally ruin all the results obtained by Germany.