Bibliographical DataThe documents in this volume are obtained from the following sources:1.Jesuit letters.—From Ventura del Arco MSS. (Ayer library), iv, pp. 1–3, 69–72.2.Discovery of Palaos.—FromLettres édifiantes(1st Paris ed.) i (1717), pp. 112–136, from a copy in the library of the Wisconsin Historical Society.3.Recollect missions.—From Pedro de San Francisco de Assis’sHistoria general de los religiosos descalzos de San Agustin(Zargoza, 1756), all that relates to Philippine missions; from a copy in the Library of Congress. Also Juan de la Concepción’sHistoria de Philipinas, viii, pp. 3–16, 135–144, and ix, pp. 123–150; from a copy in possession of the Editors.4.Appendix: Moro pirates.—From Combés’sHistoria de Mindanao, Iolo, etc.; Murillo Velarde’sHistoria de Philipinas; Diaz’sConquistas; and other works, as is fully indicated in the text.Appendix: Moro PiratesMoro pirates and their raids in the seventeenth century.Sources: This account is compiled from various historians—Combés, Murillo Velarde, Diaz, Concepción, and Montero y Vidalas is fully indicated in the text.Translation: This is made by Emma Helen Blair.Moro Pirates and their Raids in the Seventeenth CenturyI[In previous volumes have appeared various accounts of the piratical raids made, down to 1640, by the Mahometan Malays of Mindanao and other southern islands against the Spaniards and the native tribes whom they had subjected in the northern islands. A very brief outline of that information is here presented, with citations of volumes where it appears, as a preliminary to some further account which shall summarize this subject for the remainder of the seventeenth century.][When Legazpi first explored the Philippines, he sent some of his officers to open up trade with Mindanao, then reputed to be rich in gold and cinnamon (Vol. II, pp. 116–118, 147, 154, 209, 210). At the outset, much jealousy arose among the Spaniards against the Mahometan Malays (whom they called Moros) of that and other islands in the southern part of the Eastern archipelago, for two reasons—the Moros were “infidels,” and they far excelled the Spaniards as traders (Vol. II, pp. 156, 159, 186, 187;IV, pp. 66, 151, 174). Moreover, the natives were everywhere hostile to the Spaniards because the Portuguese representing themselves to be Castilians,had previously made cruel raids on some of those islands, notably Bohol (Vol. II, pp. 117, 184, 207, 208, 229;III, p. 46). In that first year, 1565, a Bornean vessel was captured by the Spaniards, after a desperate fight; but hostilities then went no further (Vol. II, pp. 116, 206). The Moros of the Rio Grande of Mindanao proffered (1574) their submission to the Spanish power, apparently being in some awe of it (Vol. III, p. 275). Governor Sande had expansive ideas of Spanish dominion, and in 1578–79 undertook an expedition for the subjugation of Borneo, Mindanao, and Joló; he obtained a temporary success, but the Moros again asserted their independence as soon as the Spaniards departed (Vol. IV, pp. 125, 130, 148–303; XV, pp. 54, 132). This expedition was partly caused by piratical raids made by the Borneans (Vol. IV, pp. 151, 153, 154, 159;VI, p. 183), and the Joloans (Vol. IV, pp. 176, 236) against the northern islands. Apparently this punishment intimidated the Moros for a time; the next important raid by them was in 1595 (Vol. IX, p. 196;XI, p. 266). In 1591 Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa had made a contract with Gomez P. Dasmariñas for the conquest of Mindanao (Vol. VIII, pp. 73–77). The island had then been partly explored and much of it assigned to Spaniards in repartimiento; some of these allotments are mentioned inVol. VIII, pp. 127, 128, 132 (a list of those bestowed in 1571 is found in the Pastells edition of Colin’sLabor evangélica, i, p. 157, note 1). Instructions were given to Figueroa on November 13, 1595 (Vol. IX, pp. 181–188), and in the following spring he set out with an armed force; but hardly had he begun the campaign when he was slain bya Moro (Vol. IX, pp. 195, 196, 263–265, 276, 277; XV, pp. 89–93;XVI, pp. 270–272). Juan de Ronquillo succeeded him, and for the time “pacified” the hostile Moros (Vol. IX, pp. 281–298;X, pp. 41, 42, 49, 168, 169, 214, 215;XI, p. 236;XV, pp. 95–100;XVI, pp. 273, 274); see his own report of the campaign (Vol. X, pp. 53–74) and Tello’s (Vol. X, pp. 219–226; cf.Vol. XI, pp. 135–139). In 1599 the Spanish fort at La Caldera was dismantled (Vol. XI, pp. 138, 139, 237;XV, pp. 190, 191); this emboldened the Moros to renew their piracies, and from 1600 on they harassed the Visayan Islands and even Luzón—not only the Mindanaos but their allies the Ternatans, and the Joloans (Vol. XI, pp. 238, 239, 292–301, 303;XII, pp. 32, 39–41, 134–137;XIII, pp. 49, 146, 147;XV, pp. 192–196, 209, 265–267;XVIII, pp. 185–187, 331, 333;XIX, pp. 67, 68, 215–218, 223–225;XXII, pp. 89, 90, 203–206;XXIII, p. 259;XXIV, pp. 35–37, 102–104, 139, 142, 143, 329;XXV, pp. 86, 105, 152–154, 199;XXVI, p. 285;XXVII, pp. 215–226, 316). Similar raids were made by the Camucones, Moros from some small islands near Borneo (Vol. XVIII, p. 79;XXII, pp. 89, 132, 133, 202, 296–298, 303;XXIV, pp. 97, 138;XXV, pp. 154–156;XXVII, pp. 314–316;XXIX, pp. 31, 200). These attacks kept the peaceful natives in constant fear; their villages were burned and plundered, and their fields ravaged; and thousands were carried away to be sold as slaves, being thus dispersed among the Malay Islands. In 1621 Hernando de los Rios Coronel stated that ten thousand Christians were held captive in Mindanao (Vol. XIX, p. 264). At times the Spaniards sent armed fleets in pursuit of these pirates, but the latter would escape, on account of the superior lightness andswiftness of their vessels. Punitive expeditions were sent to their villages, some of which were futile, but others inflicted on them severe punishment—Jolo: 1602 (Vol. XV, pp. 240–243, 264, 265), 1626 (XXII, pp. 207–210), 1628 (XXII, pp. 293–295;XXIV, pp. 143–145), 1630 (XXIII, pp. 87, 88, 98;XXIV, pp. 163–165); and Mindanao: 1625 (XXII, pp. 116–119, 218, 224). It was proposed to enslave any Moro pirates who might be captured (Vol. XVII, pp. 187, 296, 331;XXIX, p. 269), and this was sometimes done (Vol. XXII, p. 134). Finally, Corcuera undertook to chastise them effectually; and in 1637 he led a large and well-equipped expedition to Mindanao, which captured Corralat’s stronghold and devastated nearly all the coast of that island, driving out Corralat as a fugitive and intimidating other chiefs who had intrigued with him against the Spaniards (Vol. XXVII, pp. 253–305, 319–325, 346–357;XXIX, pp. 28–30, 60, 86–101, 116–134). Corcuera followed up this success by another in Joló, in 1638 (Vol. XXVII, p. 325;XXVIII, pp. 41–63;XXIX, pp. 32, 36, 43, 44, 135, 136), and in the following year a Spanish expedition severely chastised the Moros around Lake Lanao, in Mindanao (XXIX, pp. 159, 161–163, 273–275); further military operations in Joló and Mindanao, on a smaller scale, occurred during 1638–39 (Vol. XXIX, pp. 141–166, 198–200). It may be noted, further, that the Jesuits established missions there at an early date, evangelists of that order going with Figueroa in 1596 (Vol. XII, pp. 313–321;XIII, pp. 47–49, 86–89;XXII, p. 117;XXVIII, pp. 94–99, 151, 171); and others were founded by Augustinian Recollects (XXI, pp. 196–247, 298–303;XXIV, p. 115;XXVIII, pp. 152, 175, 340–345).]II[The second reduction of Joló—by Almonte, in 1639 (Vol. XXIX, p. 143)—subdued all of that archipelago, save the Guimbanos, a fierce Moro people inhabiting the mountains of Sulu (Joló) Island, who were hostile to the Joloans of the coast. When Almonte ordered them to cease disturbing the pacified Joloans, the Guimbanos made an insolent reply, telling the Spaniards to come to their country and learn the difference between them and the Joloans. Almonte therefore sent (July, 1639) troops, under Luis de Guzman and Agustin de Cepeda, to subdue these proud mountaineers; and after a fierce battle the Guimbanos retreated, leaving four hundred dead on the field, and three hundred captives in the hands of the Spaniards—of whom eight died, including Guzman, besides twenty Indian auxiliaries. (Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 96 b, 97.) After the departure of Almonte from Joló, affairs went ill, Morales being unfit for his post as governor of those islands, although he was valiant in battle. Having abducted a beautiful girl, daughter of a chief named Salibanza, a conspiracy against him was formed by the enraged father; this was discovered, and the leaders seized. This, with several arbitrary and hostile measures of Morales, stirred up the Joloans to revolt, and an affray occurred between them and the Spaniards, in which Morales was wounded. Juan Ruiz Maroto was sent to relieve him from office, and tried to pacify the natives, but in vain; he then sent Pedro de la Mata Vergara to harry all the coast of Joló, who burned many villages and carried away three thousand captives. Mata, being obliged to return to Mindanao, was succeededby Morales, who rashly attacked (near Párang, Sulu Island) a force of Moros with troops exhausted by forced marches; the Spaniards, although in numbers far superior to the Moros, were ignominiously put to flight, thirty-nine of their number being slain, including Morales and another officer. At this time Cepeda was governor of Joló, and he soon found it necessary to chastise the natives, who were encouraged to rebellion by their recent victory. (Combés,Hist. de Mindanao, col. 402–412; Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 121–122; Montero y Vidal,Hist. piratería, i, pp. 175–181, 199–211.) An account of his exploits in this direction is furnished by letters of the Jesuit Miguel Paterio to Father Juan Lopez, regarding the expeditions of Cepeda (to whom Combés dedicated his book), written in 1643–44 (ut supra, col. cix–cxv); we present them here as a specimen of the proceedings in these punitive expeditions.]Relation of the exploit which was accomplished in the villages of Paran by Captain and Sargento-mayor Don Agustin de Zepeda, warden of the forts in Jolo.After the disaster to Admiral Morales, the Guimbanos of the villages of Paran were very arrogant and haughty, so that, however much they were invited, with assurance of peace and pardon, to lay down their arms before those of our king, and to restore the Spanish weapons that they were keeping, they paid no heed to it. Seeing this, Sargento-mayor Don Augustin de Çepeda, the better to justify the expedition that he intended to make against them, sent word to them through other Guimbanos who wereour friends, that they must restore the arms that they had taken from the Spaniards, and that if they did not restore these he would wage war against them. To this they replied that those arms were converted into lances, and that nothing would be given up to the Spaniards, whether Don Agustin marched against them or not. The captain and sargento-mayor received this reply on Tuesday, December 29, and on Wednesday, the thirtieth of the same month, he determined to make a daylight attack on them with the utmost secrecy. Accordingly, at four in the afternoon, almost all the soldiers made their confessions, and the sargento-mayor exhorted them to rouse all their courage, as brave soldiers, since they were fighting for both the majesties [i.e., the divine and the royal], and they had the sure protection of the mother of God, our Lady of Good Success. Then they set out from the hill of Jolo with only twenty-five Spaniards and three officers, [Cepeda’s lieutenants being] Adjutant Diego de los Reyes and Alférez Gaspar de Chaves; and twenty-two Pampangos and Cagaians, with their officers, also ten or fifteen servants with their pikes and shields. Of this infantry the captain formed three divisions, giving to each one its own watchword—to the first one, “Jesus be with all;” to the second, “Our Lady of Good Success;” to the third, “Saint Ignatius”—and each division was ordered to render aid according to its watchword, and as the enemy should sound the call to arms. With this order, they began their march, and proceeded until nightfall, when they marched in single file, since the road and the darkness gave no opportunity for doing otherwise. They passed rivers, ravines, marshes, and miry places, untilthey arrived at a village of a Guimbano chief named Ulisten, near which they heard coughing in the houses; and [they moved] so cautiously that they were not perceived. The sargento-mayor did not choose to enter this village, not only because the chief had showed his friendship for the Spaniards, but because his only intention was to punish the people of Paran, who had merited this by their acts in the past and by the haughty spirit that they showed. For the same reason, he would not enter another village near this one, belonging to another chief, named Sambali—who, if it were not for the purpose that the commander had in mind, deserved to lose his head for his rebellious disposition in not being friendly to the Spaniards. From the hill to these two villages may be a journey of about two leguas and a half; the road is very bad, and of the sort that has been described, [passing through] marshes and rough places; and, with the darkness of a moonlight night, to go among trees, thickets, and tangled briers was intolerable and full of difficulty. Not less wearisome was the road which they still must take to reach the people and village of Paran, and even more difficult: but neither the one nor the other could weaken or diminish the tenacity, spirit, and valor which not only the captain but his soldiers displayed. They traveled all night in this way until a little before daybreak, when they mistook the road, and took another, which did not lead to the village where they meant to go; but God chose that the people of that very village should serve as guides [to the Spaniards], by furnishing them light—for on account of quieting some infants who were crying, they kindled lights in the houses. The sargento-mayorordered them to march toward that place, where they arrived at daybreak; and there they remained about half an hour, waiting for the dawn to brighten so that they might break the countersign1and make the daylight attack [dar el albasso] on the said village, which they did. For when it became light, and the day was brightening, they broke the watchword, which was “St. Ignatius;” and the division to which that belonged made the first attack on the houses, jointly with the vanguard, which went ahead to reconnoiter. All the forces united to make this assault on the houses, and to break through the defenses of the village and enter, all in order, with lighted matches and to sound of drums, as they did. In their houses this occasioned a great tumult; some were slain by musket-balls, some by lance-thrusts; others escaped naked, fleeing without thought of their kindred or their possessions, abandoning their weapons and whatever they had; others, finally, were burned to death in their houses, to which our men set fire—the natives remaining in them either through fear, or that they might not fall into our hands and be slain by our lances. They hid themselves, therefore, for the greater protection—only to have their houses, and their granaries of rice, and their bodies burned [here], and finally their souls in hell. Besides this, their cultivated fields were laid waste, set out with all the plants that they rear—bananas, sugar-cane, and other plants which furnish them with food; and our men did thesame with these, destroying and burning everything. This done they looked about, scanning the country in all directions, and saw an impregnable height; and when the commander understood that this was (as it proved to be) the citadel of the enemies, he gave the order to march thither. They proceeded by a path or trail so narrow that they were obliged to ascend in single file; and when they reached the top of the said hill they found a plateau, more spacious than that of our hill of Jolo, on which were houses, some fortified and some small ones. The former were full of provisions and contained some Guimbanos. These, seeing our men and recognizing them as enemies, immediately abandoned the houses and took to flight, throwing themselves headlong from the heights. Our men entered the place, and burned the houses with the rice and other things contained in them; and they laid waste the fields and destroyed what had been planted in them, as they had done in the villages before ascending the hill. Our men were occasioned no little anxiety by their failure, after this exploit, to find the road by which to leave the hill; for, as it had in every direction precipices and rugged heights, they had great difficulty and hardship in getting away from the hill, on account of not being able to strike the path by which they had entered. But finally the Blessed Virgin who hitherto had been our Lady of Success, chose to show also that she was our Lady of Good Success—which she did by enabling our men to depart in safety from the hill. For the alférez, going to make a hasty reconnoissance with four arquebusiers, and some servants armed with pikes and shields, saw [traces of men’s] work amongthe trees that covered the hill; and, upon reaching the place, ascertained that there was a path by which he could descend. Notifying the troops of this, they went down the hill by this path, and thus returned to the houses that they had burned, all marching in regular order. They approached the seashore through a level field, passing near the harbor where the natives had slain Admiral Morales; and, as they advanced through the open country, they encountered four Guimbano Indians, shouting [or grimacing?—haciendo carracheo], who came from a grove that was growing on the said seashore. When our men tried to get near them, these Indians took to their heels, retreating toward the grove—where, it was understood, they had an ambuscade; and as it was now eleven o’clock, the sargento-mayor did not think it best to delay [his return] longer. Accordingly, they marched in the same order, and to the sound of drums, toward the fortification that stood on the seashore, going through fields and mangrove thickets, and along beaches and pools of water, another two leguas and a half, until they reached the harbor where they had provided some boats. In these the sargento-mayor and all his troops embarked, and returned to these forts, with great satisfaction and rejoicing at so complete a success, without losing one of our men, or encountering any danger. Many salvos were fired from the boats in which they came, and from the forts, in honor of their protectors, Jesus, Mary, and Ignatius.From this expedition and victory I have learned some things about Guimba which are worth mentioning here. The first is, that two days afterwardthe people of Paran made war on the chiefs Ulis and Sambali whom we mentioned above, complaining that these chiefs had not warned them that the Spanish troops had passed close to their villages, and even because they had allowed the Spaniards to pass them. May God establish them in peace, and grant them light and a knowledge of the truth. And after this expedition, as I have said, one of the chiefs in the villages to the east named Suil, complained that the sargento-mayor had not informed him of it, so that Suil with all his men might have accompanied the Spaniards. Although he may not be sincere, thanks are returned to him, and probably his offer was prompted by the admiration and high opinion that he entertains for our men since this exploit; or because he feared lest the like fate might befall him. He and other chiefs beyond Guimba to the east have sent to tell me that, although those who killed the sargento-mayor are their brothers, they will not for that reason fail to be the friends of the Spaniards; and that they will come to the village of the Lutaos who are in this fort [i.e., at Joló] to talk with the father and treat of peace. And it cannot be denied that there has been a great disturbance among them since this expedition, and it has caused among them all not only fear, but astonishment also, to see that so few Spaniards could dare to traverse almost all of Guimba, marching almost all the way among the settlements, without being seen. In this affair not only the caution of the Spaniards, but their courage in penetrating among so many barbarians, the most valiant in all these islands, is causing great admiration—which is increased at seeing how so few Spaniards made so great a number of enemies take toflight; for in all the villages there are nearly a thousand barbarians who carry arms. It is certain that, considering the circumstances of this exploit, it adds prestige to several others that have been performed; and I even venture to say that it is astonishing, if we consider what occurred in one night, the perils that they went through, the daring of so few soldiers among so many enemies, and, finally, their accomplishing what they did in destroying and burning the villages and their people, without injury to any one of our men. All this causes the Moros who see these occurrences close to them to wonder and fear, and apparently they are talking in earnest of becoming friends and vassals of his Majesty. [Marginal note: “For Father Juan Lopez, rector of Cavite.”][Another letter by Father Paterio, written from Jolo, February 28, 1644, relates the particulars of another expedition by Zepeda into Guimba, six days previous to that date. The native chiefs on the east side of the island are intimidated by the punishment inflicted on Paran, and are inclined to submit to the victorious Spanish arms; but those on the west desire to take revenge for the massacre of their tribesmen. A conference of the latter chiefs is accordingly held at the village of Ulis, where they talk of making an attack on the Spanish forts at Jolo. They invite Suil, one of the friendly chiefs, to join them; but he sends word to the Spaniards (February 9) of the plot against them. Zepeda is then absent in Zamboanga, but returns soon afterward; and another warning from Suil being received ten days later, Zepeda decides to inflict summary punishmenton the plotters. He therefore leads an expedition against the village of Ulis, on February 21, and, as before, attacks the village at daylight. This time, the natives have had warning of the intended assault, and attempt resistance; but they are defeated with considerable loss—among the slain being Ulis, “who was the idol of that island, and whom all obeyed,” and three other chiefs. In this fight the Spaniards lose but four lives—a soldier, an officer, and two servants. This causes even more fear and awe than even the former expedition, and brings the recalcitrants quickly to terms—Suil and other chiefs proposing to leave their homes and go to dwell near the Spanish forts. Later, the Spaniards complete this castigation by ravaging the country, burning and destroying all before them, “by which the Spanish arms have acquired greater reputation and glory than that which they had lost on former adverse occasions.” Then other islands adjacent to Jolo are intimidated, and two battles are fought with their natives, who lose many men therein. As a reward for his services, Zepeda is honored by Corcuera with the governorship of Zamboanga.]The Joloans remained at peace, as thoroughly chastised as were the Mindanaos, curbing their haughty arrogance, and repressing their hatred in consideration of the advantages of the time. Among the agreements for the peace, they accepted one that a fort for the Spaniards should be erected at their harbor-bar; this was maintained with many difficulties and little advantage, unless from the pearl-fishery, which yielded many and valuable pearls.2The island of Joló abounds in these, so that on the Dutch hydrographical maps they have given it the name “Island of Pearls,” on account of the many fine pearls which the Joloans sent in those years to Nueva Batavia by ambassadors from their king, asking their alliance, and aid against the Spaniards. The Dutch granted them protection, those valuable gifts arousing in them greater desires for profit—although afterward the first aid that they furnished the Joloans cost them very dear. But in this year of 1641 the Joloans had a fortunate opportunity for recouping themselves for past expenses, with a mass of amber3as large as an ox’s body, which the sea cast up on their shores, which yielded them great profits, and increased the reputation of their island. This sort of find is usually very frequent in those islands, since they are beaten by many currents which flow from the archipelago; and thus goes drifting on the waves what the sea hurls from its abysses, along with other debris, under the fury of the wind—this so precious substance, whether it be the excrement or vomit of whales, or a reaba which the sea produces in its depths. But in Joló it is apt to be more often found, because those islands are scattered and their coasts prolonged for many leguas opposite many currents and channel-mouths. And for this reasonsome amber is usually found in Capul, an island beaten by so many currents—as the ships which come on the return from Nueva España know by experience—and also in Guiguan and on the beaches of Antique. Near Punta de Naso the sea cast up, in the year 1650, an enormous piece of amber, although it had not the fine quality and excellence of that which comes from Japón. (Diaz’sConquistas, p. 447.)[For several years after Corcuera’s expedition against the Mindanaos (1637), various military operations were conducted in that island by the Spanish forces, notably under Pedro de Almonte. Corralat and other Moro chiefs were sufficiently reduced to render them nominally peaceful; but they formed various plots and conspiracies against the Spaniards, and, on the other hand, these availed themselves of the jealousies and personal interests of the Mindanao chiefs to separate them and neutralize their efforts. The foolish arrogance of a Spanish officer, Matías de Marmolejo, caused an attack on his detachment by Corralat and Manaquior; all the Spaniards save Marmolejo and six others were slain (June 1, 1642), including the Jesuit Bartolomé Sánchez, and the survivors were captured by Corralat. But when Corcuera heard of this encounter he was so angry that he ordered Marmolejo to be ransomed and afterwards to be beheaded in the plaza at Zamboanga, for disobedience to his orders. He also ordered that the fort at La Sabanilla be demolished, and the men there be sent to punish Corralat, which was done. That chief, to revenge himself, intrigued with the people of Basilan to secure possession of the Spanish fort there; but its little garrison defended it against the Moro fleet until aid couldbe sent them from Zamboanga. As soon as Diego Fajardo became governor of the Philippines in Corcuera’s place, he endeavored to secure peace in Mindanao, and finally (June 24, 1645) a treaty of peace was signed by Corralat and his leading chiefs, and Francisco de Atienza and the Jesuit Alejandro López. This treaty settled questions of mutual alliance, of boundaries of possessions, of trade, of ransom of captives, and of freedom for the ministrations of Jesuit missionaries. Christian captives in Corralat’s domain should be ransomed at the following rates; “for men and women, in the prime of life, and in good health, each forty pesos; for those who were more youthful, thirty pesos; for aged and sick persons, twenty pesos; for children at the breast, ten pesos.” In this very year Salicala, son of the king of Joló, had gone to Batavia to seek aid from the Dutch; the latter sent some armed vessels, which cannonaded the Spanish fort at Joló for three days, but finally were obliged to depart without having accomplished anything. This occurrence increased Fajardo’s anxiety in regard to the cost and danger incurred in attempting to maintain three forts in Joló; and he sent orders to Atienza, commandant at Zamboanga, to withdraw the garrisons from Joló and demolish those forts—an embarrassing command, since both Joloans and Dutch were then making raids among the northern islands. Both Fajardo and Atienza relied on the Jesuit Alejandro Lopez to bring about the pacification of both the Mindanaos and the Joloans, a task which he accomplished so successfully that on April 14, 1646, a treaty was signed, by Atienza and Lopez,4withRaya Bongso of Joló (the same who, with his wife Tuambaloca, was conquered by Corcuera’s troops in 1638) and the envoys of Corralat. Combés gives the full text of both this and the former treaty. A Dutch fleet attempted to make a landing near Zamboanga, but were repulsed by the Spaniards with much loss. Corralat and Moncay came to hostilities, and the former implored the aid of the Spaniards; Atienza sent an armed force to succor Corralat, and Moncay fled. Salicala of Joló and Panguian Cachilo of Guimba undertook (1648) to raid the Visayan Islands; but the latter was attacked and slain by a Spanish squadron, which so intimidated Salicala that he hastened back to Joló. Meanwhile, a notable event occurred in Mindanao, the conversion of Corralat’s military commander, Ugbu, to the Christian faith—which of course tended to strengthen the ties between Corralat and the Spaniards; and Ugbu afterward rendered them efficient service in the Palapag insurrection, which caused his death. Salicala died (1649) and his parents, Bongso and Tuambaloca, were thus able to maintain the peace which they had established with the Spaniards; that queen afterward left Joló, retiring to Basilan. Moncay also died, soon afterward, and was succeeded in Buhayen by Balatamay, a Manobo chief who had married Moncay’s daughter; he joined Corralat in alliance with the Spaniards. In January, 1649, Pedro Duran de Monforte went with an armed fleet to northeastern Borneo, to punish its people for aidingthe Joloans in their raids; the Spaniards plundered several villages, burned three hundred caracoas, and carried away two hundred captives. The expedition was accompanied by Jesuits, who afterward opened successful missions in Borneo. The insurrection of 1649–50 spread to Joló and Mindanao, but was quelled by the Spaniards (seeVol. XXXVIII). (Combés,Hist. Mindanao, col. 269–348, 425–498; Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 149–153. Cf. Concepción,Hist. de Philipinas, vi, pp. 205–281; Montero y Vidal,Hist. piratería, i, pp. 182–189, 212–231.)][In 1653 Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara succeeded to the government of the Philippines.] One of his first undertakings was to establish peace with the ruler of Mindanao, Cachil Corralat, whom it was expedient to assure for the sake of the tranquillity of the Pintados Islands—which were more exposed than the others to the incursions of their armed fleets, since Manila had not enough soldiers and vessels with which our people could go forth to hinder the operations of the Moros. The governor sent as his ambassador Captain Don Diego de Lemus, and Father Francisco Lado of the Society of Jesus, who were very kindly received by the Moros; and he gave them to understand that no one desired peace more than he did, since the warning was still fresh that had been given him by the war which was waged against him by Governor Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera in person—which had obliged Corralat to wander as a fugitive through the lands of his enemy the king of Buhayen, exposed to many perils. It seems as if the desire which Corralat showed to maintain the peace might be regarded assincere; for if he had chosen to avail himself of the opportunity afforded by the past years, when all our forces and power were fully occupied in resisting the cruel invasions of the Dutch, without doubt he could have made great ravages in the villages of the Pintados Islands; and therefore this must be attributed to an especial providence of the divine mercy. All [these dealings with the envoys] were cunning measures of the shrewd Moro to lull5our vigilance with feigned appearances of peace, for never was he further from pursuing it—partly through greed for the booty of slaves, a great part of which belonged to him; partly because his captains and other persons interested in these piratical raids persuaded him to avail himself of the opportunity furnished by the weakness of our forces. Corralat determined to renew his former hostile acts, and began by preparing vessels and supplies; and in order to cover up better his damnable intention, he sent to the governor of Manila an ambassador to confirm the peace. This man was called Banua, and was no less fraudulent than Simon the Greek. On the route he left many tokens of this; for in the village of Tunganan, among the Subanos, he treated very contemptuously6the father minister, Miguel Pareja of the Society of Jesus—who, as the pious religious that he was, turned the other cheek, as the gospel commands. Banua arrived at Manila in the year of 1655, where he discharged very well his office as ambassador, and even better that of spy—andwell he knew his double trade; for among other things he demanded that restitution be made to Corralat of some Mindanao slaves, and of the pieces of artillery which Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera had taken from him in war; but this and other petitions of the ambassador had no satisfactory issue. Banua returned [to Mindanao], and Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara despatched to accompany him Captain Don Claudio de Rivera, and Father Alejandro Lopez of the Society of Jesus, who went with holy zeal for establishing in Mindanao the preaching of the true faith. They arrived at Zamboanga, where they had sufficient warnings of the danger to which they were going; but with fearless courage they continued their journey until they reached Corralat. He received them without any of the ostentation usual for an embassy, but rather with frowns and displeasure; and when he read the letters from the governor of Manila—which were excellent for an occasion in which our strength might be greater, but the present time demanded shrewder dissimulation—the Moro king was much disturbed, and displayed extreme anger. The end of this embassy (of which an excellent account is given by Father Francisco Combés in hisHistoria de Mindanao, book viii, chap. 3) was that Corralat ordered his nephew Balatamay to slay Father Alejandro Lopez and his associate, Father Juan de Montiel, and Captain Claudio de Rivera.7Corralat sent the letters of the governor to the kings of Joló and of Ternate, to incite them to make common cause in defense of their profession as Mahometans, but they did not choose torisk breaking the peace; on the contrary, the king of Ternate handed over the letters to the governor of our forts there, Francisco de Esteybar, who restored them to the governor of Manila. (Diaz,Conquistas, pp. 549–551.)Corralat, fearing the vengeance of the Spaniards, wrote to the governor of Zamboanga throwing the responsibility for what had occurred on his nephew Balatamay, whom he could not chastise on account of the latter being so powerful. He also wrote to Manrique de Lara, attributing the deaths of the Jesuits and other Spaniards to imprudent acts committed by Father López, and entreated the governor that, mutually forgiving injuries, affairs might remain as they had previously been. But his complicity in the event came to be discovered, through another letter directed in June, 1656, to the sultan of Joló, exhorting the latter to unite with him for defending the religion which both professed. The Joloan monarch sent his letter to the governor of Zamboanga in order to demonstrate his loyalty. Similar assistance was solicited by Corralat from the Dutch and from the sovereigns of Macasar and Ternate; and to the latter, in order to stimulate him more, he sent the original letter of Manrique de Lara, presenting the question under the religious aspect only—a letter which the Spanish governor of Ternate was able to recover, and he sent it to its author. The captain-general of Filipinas, not considering his forces sufficient for waging war on the powerful sultan of Mindanao, notified the governor of Zamboanga8to accept Corralat’s excuses as sufficientuntil he could ascertain whether reënforcements were arriving from Nueva España and they could avenge so many injuries.The sultan, seeing that his insolent conduct did not receive the energetic and effectual punishment that it deserved, gained new courage, and sent out his people to make raids through the coasts of Zamboanga and Basilan—terminating the campaign by looting Tanganan, where they took captive the headman of that village, named Ampi, and twenty-three persons besides. In the Calamianes Islands also the Mindanaos committed horrible ravages. The governor of the Moluccas, Don Francisco de Esteybar, received orders to go to Zamboanga, conferring upon him, besides the command of the said post, the office of governor and captain-general of all the southern provinces of Filipinas. On the second of December of the said year 1656 he arrived at Zamboanga. When this valiant chief was informed of what had occurred, and learned that the pirates were equipping at Simuay [River] a squadron to invade the Visayas, he declared war on Corralat, without stopping to consider whether his forces were inferior or not to those of the enemy, trusting to the courage of his followers and the justice of his cause for the issue of the undertaking. In this document he ordered that ten caracoas should set out, under command of Don Fernando de Bobadilla; and these vessels went to sea on December 30. This commander detached Admiral Don Pedro de Viruega at the village of Sosocon, and Sargento-mayor Don Félix de Herrera at Point Taguima. Through his spies, Corralat knew of the departure of the squadron, and declined to send his boats against the Spanish armada; andduring twenty days Bobadilla waited in vain for the pirate vessels. During this time the dato of Sibuguey, Mintun, went to Zamboanga, offering the aid of his people against Corralat, perhaps in order not to be the leader in paying for the losses of the war. It was reported that the sultan had sent four vessels to the village of that chief for rice, and Bobadilla set out to intercept this convoy (January 2, 1657). On arriving at La Silanga,9two small caracoas went ahead to reconnoiter the place; these boats conquered a large vessel; but their crews intimidated the Lutaos who were in the Spanish ship, telling them that they would soon be destroyed by Corralat, who was expected in Mintun with fifteen vessels. As the Lutaos of Bobadilla’s squadron were inclined toward the sultan, or were afraid of falling into his power, they threatened the commandant that they would abandon the field when the battle was at its height, if the Spaniards compelled them to fight against Corralat. In view of this, Bobadilla was obliged to return to Zamboanga, losing so propitious an opportunity to avenge the wicked perfidy of the old sultan. Nevertheless, he seized a considerable number of small boats, full of rice, and forty captives. The sultan, now a declared enemy, and attributing to our weakness the failure to punish the murder of the ambassadors, commanded his squadrons to commit piracies, under the command of Prince Balatamay. That deceitful Moro, after committing the most outrageous acts of violence in Marinduque and Mindoro, returned to Mindanao with a multitude of captives and very rich spoils.While Balatamay was raiding the above-mentioned islands, a splendid squadron sailed from Cavite by order of the governor-general, in command of an officer whose name is not told in the histories, from whom brilliant conduct was expected, to judge from the valor of which he boasted in drawing-rooms; but, far from fulfilling his duty, he lingered in Balayan under pretext of securing supplies of rice, and then in Mindoro, carrying out his cowardly purpose of not encountering the Moros, notwithstanding that the forces under his command were more than sufficient to destroy the pirates. To the end that he might operate in conjunction with the said squadron, Esteybar ordered Alférez Luis de Vargas to scour the coasts of Mindanao; but as the commander of the squadron failed to carry out the instructions that he had received, Vargas, as he could not find him, confined his efforts to burning a village on the bay of Simuay, where he seized several captives. Bobadilla reduced to ashes the old capital of Corralat, Lamitan, its inhabitants having fled to the woods. Also in the said year of 1657 the dato Salicala of Mindanao scoured the seas with his squadron; the natives in consternation abandoned their villages without daring to resist him, and he carried away as captives more than a thousand Indians—his audacity going so far that he sailed into the bay of Manila.Esteybar then equipped a small squadron of caracoas and vintas, which departed from Zamboanga on January 1, 1658, resolved to chastise the pirate severely. He spread the report that they were going to Sibuguey. He reached that river in seven days and, placing part of his forces in charge of Sargento-mayor Itamarren, he destroyed the village of Namucan, and at Luraya burned many boats. Four pilanscaptured the joanga which had carried Father López to Simuay, manned by Moros from Mintun. Suddenly changing his course, he took the route to Punta de Flechas, in order to go to the capital of Corralat, but sent beforehand thirty Spaniards, with Captain Don Pedro de Viruega, to the district of Butig. Its chief Matundin, at the head of five hundred men, was defeated, the grain-fields ravaged, and the village reduced to ashes. The tilled land of this district was exceedingly rich, since it is the principal source of supply for rice in Mindanao. Great damage was also done in La Sabanilla by Captain Don Juan González Carlete. On the nineteenth of January the squadron encountered a large Dutch ship surrounded by some pirate vessels. Esteybar attempted to secure a free passage without bringing on a contest, to which end he hoisted a white flag; but the commander of the Dutch ship displayed a red flag, firing all his cannon against the Spanish vessels. Then, without heeding the superiority of the enemy, Bobadilla came against the ship, all his men rowing as hard as they could; and Esteybar attacked it at the stern. The Spaniards then were going to board the ship with a rush, when a ball fired from the vessel of Esteybar set on fire the Santa Barbara [i.e., powder-magazine] of the Dutch ship, thus blowing it into pieces. Only twenty-four of its crew survived, and these were drawn out of the sea and made prisoners. Esteybar continued his voyage to Simuay, the bar of which was fortified with heavy stockades; moreover, at its ends were two forts, garrisoned by Malays, Macassars, and Dutchmen. This did not frighten Esteybar, and he made preparations to capture the posts of the enemy, in spite of adviceto the contrary from his captains. While he was deciding the best method of accomplishing this, he passed with his squadron to the river of Buhayen, sending in by one of its entrances the valiant Bobadilla with some vessels, and by the other Sargento-mayor Itamarren. The former sacked the villages and ravaged the grain-fields of Tannil and Tabiran, the latter those of Lumapuc and Buhayen; they destroyed a powerful armada which had been prepared for raiding the islands, and carried away as spoil many versos, muskets, campilans, crises, and all kinds of weapons.In the village of Buhayen resided Prince Hamo, son of Moncay, from whom the kingdom had been usurped; he mounted a white flag and a cross above his house, being desirous of forming an alliance with the Spaniards, but they, being warned by experience with the treasons of the Moros, continued the hostilities, without attaching any importance to that signal. While they constructed rafts with which to attack the fortress of Corralat, Captain Antonio de Palacios went to destroy the village of Tampacan and its environs; and Adjutant Antonio Vázquez disembarked with orders to cut off the retreat of the enemy’s spies. These were twenty in number, thoroughly armed; Vázquez rushed upon them, and at the first encounter killed five and wounded six of them, and the rest were shot to death in the woods. Esteybar returned to the bar of Buhayen; he knew that at a day’s journey from there was a village of Lutaos, called Maolo, and, desirous to chastise that settlement and obtain information about that coast, he sent Sargento-mayor Itamarren—who, finding it deserted, set fire to the village, killed four Moros,and captured two others, the only ones who waited for the attack.Notwithstanding these provocations, and others that were directly offered to Corralat in the environs of his fortifications, it was impossible to draw him out into the open country. Having constructed a number of rafts, on which were placed pieces of artillery, the governor went aboard the largest of them, and with the aid of the vessels cannonaded the fort of Corralat for the space of four hours, but he defended it well. It was evident that the difficulties of assaulting it were insuperable, and that the artillery was operating with but little result, on account of the condition of the sea; accordingly it was decided to retire to the bar of Buhayen. The squadron went to La Sabanilla on the seventeenth of February; here Esteybar received orders to return to Molucas, and he proceeded to Zamboanga. Notwithstanding the well-known valor of this chief, and the injuries inflicted on the Moros during the two months of the campaign, this retreat gave much satisfaction to Corralat, since it freed him from [the danger of] going as a wanderer through the hills, as on previous occasions.The valiant Esteybar had been replaced as governor of the military post of Zamboanga by Don Fernando de Bobadilla—a chief no less courageous and resolute—with the same titles and preeminences as the former. Corralat, in order better to secure his dominions against the aggressions of the Spaniards, made Namu, king of Buhayen, establish a fort at the mouth of the river, the opposite shore of which was likewise fortified by Corralat; he entrusted to Marundin the defense of the bar of Simuay, and to the Basilan chiefs Ondol and Boto the construction of afortification at the entrance of the estuary of Zamboanga. Don Diego Zarria Lazcano took the place of Bobadilla, the former remaining at the head of the armada.The datos Linao and Libot of Joló, and Sacahati of Tawi-Tawi, with thirteen vessels, scoured the coasts of Bohol, Leyte, and Masbate. Near Luban they put to death father Fray Antonio de San Agustin, who on account of his ailments could not retreat to the interior of that island as did the rest who were going with him in their vessel. A squadron sailed from Manila in command of Don Pedro Duran de Monforte; they went to Luban, Mindoro, Panay, and Gigantes without discovering the pirates, and returned to the capital. The Moros were able to return to Joló with many spoils and eighty captives; but the sultan of that island sent back the said captives, in order to prove that he desired peace with the Spaniards. (Montero y Vidal.Hist. piratería, i, pp. 236–244. Cf. Combés,Hist. Mindanao, col. 533–549, 570–587.)Great were the calamities suffered by the Filipinas Islands in these years of 1657 and 58, which might have occasioned their entire ruin, if divine Providence had not manifestly preserved them, at the expense of miracles and prodigies. Even the arrogance of the Dutch recognized this, when they saw their proud forces humiliated by the unequal strength of ours; and it was acknowledged by the inhabitants of these islands, recognizing the divine clemency. In the former of those years the scourge of divine justice was the great armada of Mindanao corsairs, which, commanded by Salicala, a Moro of much valor, infested the Pintados Islands; and their insolence wentso far that they came in sight of the great bay of Manila. The poor natives who groaned under the yoke of captivity to these pirates amounted to more than a thousand; and as it was impossible for most of them to furnish ransom for their persons, they usually died as slaves of the Moros. I have not been able to learn the reason why no assistance was given to deliver them by going out to find those pirates—although I do not believe that it was the absence of compassion in Governor Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara, but rather his lack of means, and his being engrossed with more pressing affairs. This was followed by the plagues of innumerable locusts, which, laying waste the fields, made general havoc, occasioning the famine which was the worst enemy of the poor; this was followed by its inseparable companion, pestilence, which made great ravages with a general epidemic of smallpox. (Diaz,Conquistas, p. 556.)General Don Agustin de Cepeda went to Zamboanga as governor (June 16, 1659), without any events worthy of mention occurring during the time while he exercised that office; afterward he went to assume the government of Molucas. He who took his place10experienced great annoyances with the Jesuits, who in their histories relate in great detail how much he tried to injure their interests; but Don Fernando Bobadilla was again charged with the government of Zamboanga (February 15, 1662).The authorities and citizens of Manila were the victims in May, 1662, of a fearful panic, on account of the claim by the powerful Chinese pirate Kue-Singthat the little realm of Filipinas should render him homage and be declared his tributary, under penalty of his going with his squadrons to destroy the Spaniards—as he had done with the Dutch, expelling them from Formosa. This embassy, which was brought to Manila by the Dominican father Fray Victorio Ricci, and the consequent indignation against the Chinese, were the origin of an insurrection by those who resided in Manila, which was subdued; and the conference of authorities resolved to expel them from the country and repel by force of arms the aggression of Kue-Sing—the governor-general making ready great armaments, and whatever preparations for defense seemed to him necessary that he might come out victorious from the tremendous danger that threatened the island.But the most important and most far-reaching of the measures adopted by the council at which Manrique de Lara presided was the abandonment of the advantageous post of Zamboanga—the advanced sentinel of our domination over the coasts inhabited by the fierce Malay Mahometans—and those of La Sabanilla, Calamianes, and Iligan (which were also important in the highest degree), with the intention of concentrating in Manila all the forces which garrisoned those posts (May 6). This notification caused, among the Spanish subjects of those lands, or it may be among the Lutaos, profound sorrow and the utmost fear. They complained bitterly of the unprotected state in which they were left, remaining exposed to the vengeance of the Moros—who no longer could consider them as belonging to their race, and bore a mortal hatred to them for havingbecome Christians.11These just complaints, and the knowledge of the damages which would result from the withdrawal of the Spanish forces, impelled the governor of the fort, Don Fernando Bobadilla, and the learned Father Combés to entreat the governor-general to revoke his mandate, both explaining to him the very cogent and strong reasons which prompted their advice. The news that the Spaniards were involved in so tremendous a conflict encouragedthe Joloans to repeat once more their terrible incursions. The datos of Joló, Tawi-Tawi, Lacay-Lacay, and Tuptup, equipped sixty vessels, and, dividing their forces into several small squadrons, sacked and burned the villages of Poro, Baybay, Sogor, Cabalian, Basey, Dangajon, Guinobatan, and Capul. They killed Captain Gabriel de la Peña; they captured an official of the same class, Ignacio de la Cueva, and the Jesuit father Buenaventura Barcena; they went even to the mountains in pursuit of the religious; and all the Indians whom they caught they carried away as captives to their own country, killing many of all ages and classes.The governor-general of the islands sent a squadron to pursue the pirates, but they accomplishednothing. From Zamboanga Adjutant Francisco Alvarez went out alone to encounter them; he captured the caracoa of the pirate Gani, a relative of Salé, and of thirty captives whom the latter was carrying away. Alvarez freed twenty-two—afterward going to an island of Joló, where he captured twelve Moros. Bobadilla, in answer to his message, on November 8 received pressing orders to return to Manila without loss of time, the governor yielding so far as to allow that he might leave in the fortress of Zamboanga at most fifty Spaniards. This was equivalent to condemning those unfortunates to a sure death, and the Jesuit fathers protested against it, saying that necessarily they would incur the same fate; but finally the supreme authority of the islands decided upon the total abandonment of the postsabove mentioned. Nevertheless Bobadilla, with the object of encouraging the Lutaos and leading the Moros to believe that he was not abandoning the post, sent in pursuit of them Don Juan de Morales Valenzuela, with two caracoas, to the islands called “Orejas de Liebre,” on January 2, 1663; but on the fourth of the same month he received a new and more positive order from the captain-general, dated October 11, that without delay or any excuse he must abandon Zamboanga. At sight of this, Bobadilla warned Morales that the withdrawal must be made, as was done on the seventh—as promptly as possible fulfilling the said imperious mandate, convinced that it was now altogether impossible to oppose so plain a decision.The governor of Zamboanga made a solemn surrender of the fort to the master-of-camp of the Lutao natives, Don Alonso Macombon, receiving from him an oath of fidelity to hold it for the king of España and defend it from his enemies; but Don Alonso refused to include among these the sultan of Mindanao, on the pretext that he had not sufficient strength to oppose the dreaded Corralat. The governor, fearing his defection, did not leave him any artillery. The Jesuits also surrendered to Macombon their houses and churches, carrying away the images, ornaments, chalices, and books; and six thousand Christians remained in Zamboanga exposed to the rage of the Mahometans. Some Lutaos, although not many, decided to go to the province of Cebú, or to that of Dapitan; others scattered through Joló or Mindanao in search of safety, returning to their former religion.The abandonment of our military posts in Mindanaowas, although it is excused by the embarrassed condition of the capital of the islands, an exceedingly imprudent measure, since, in order to provide for an uncertain danger, the Visayan Islands were left exposed to another which was more immediate and real—to say nothing of the retrogression that must necessarily result to our domination among the natives of Mindanao, where at that time over seventy thousand Christians lived. The pirate who could cause such a panic in the authorities of Manila, and occasioned so great losses to the undertaking of subduing the Mahometan Malay pirates, died without carrying out his threats.During the government of Don Juan de Vargas (1679), the sultan of Borneo sent an embassy to ask that mercantile dealings might be established with Filipinas; and Vargas in his turn sent another and a very distinguished one, headed by Sargento-mayor Don Juan Morales de Valenzuela. In 1701 occurred in the south of Filipinas an event as tragic as unusual. The sultan of Joló went to visit the ruler of Mindanao, for greater ostentation taking with him as escort a squadron composed of sixty-seven vessels. At sight of such a retinue the sultan of Mindanao, Cutay12(the successor of the noted Corralat), feared that the other had designs that were not peaceable, and commanded that the mouth of the river should be closed; but the sultan of Joló, offended thereat, dared the other to a personal combat. This challenge was accepted, and the two sultans engaged in a hand-to-hand contest, so fierce that each slew the other; and immediately war was kindled between the two peoples. The Joloans, breaking down the stakes which closed theriver, retired to their own island with many weapons and spoils. The new ruler of Mindanao asked aid from the governor of Manila, Don Domingo Zubálburu; but the latter advised that they should lay aside their dissensions, and for that purpose sent the Jesuit Father Antonio de Borja, who was able to attain his object. (Montero y Vidal,Hist. piratería, i, pp. 244–252. Cf. Combés,Hist. Mindanao, col. 610–640.)The king of Joló, on the contrary, had for many years maintained peace and friendly relations with the Spaniards, much to the resentment of his chiefs and captains, who derived much more profit from hostile raids than from trade and peace; therefore by means of their confidential agents they spread the report that the king of Joló was talking of sending an armed fleet of twenty joangas to plunder these islands. The principal author of this was a Joloan named Linao, who was on intimate terms with the Spaniards, and a Guimbano named Palía. But the king of Joló was very far from thinking of such changes, and it would have been better for us if we had not so readily believed it. At this information Don Fernando de Bobadilla despatched his armada against Joló, under General Don Pedro de Viruega; but when he reached that island he found that the story that they had spread abroad against the king was false, and Don Pedro, having talked with him, went back to Zamboanga well satisfied of his peaceable attitude. But it was not long before the former rumors against the king of Joló were again current; the author of them was Linao, who desired a rupture [with the Spaniards], so that he with other pirates might go out on raids against these islands—in which enterprise he was more interested than in the peace ofhis king. This plan he carried out in company with two others, Libot and Sacahati, who went cruising with several vessels and did much damage in the islands of Pintados and Masbate, until they reached the Limbones;13from that place they chased the corregidor of Mariveles, and captured the provincial of our discalced Augustinian religious and those who were accompanying him, on his return from visiting the Christian villages of Bolinao—although these persons escaped by jumping ashore. But there was one who could not do this, father Fray Antonio de las Misas (also a discalced Augustinian), who was coming from Cuyo and Calamianes to visit those convents. This religious might with good reason be regarded as a martyr; for with his blood only were the hands of the renegade Linao stained, as he spared the lives of all the rest in his greed for ransom. Although the pirates knew that the ransom of this religious promised them more profit [than that of an ordinary captive], their hatred to the faith prevailed over their greed, which in these barbarians is great. This opinion is confirmed by the cruelty with which they treated an image of Our Lady of the People, which this religious was wearing, on which they used their crises with furious rage. This religious was an old man, and greatly esteemed for his virtue; and in the order he had held positions of honor—prior of the convent at Manila, vicar-provincial of Cebú, and other posts in Caraga. He had a brother, a lay member of the Society of Jesus in these islands, who also suffered the same kind of death at the hands of the barbarous pirates called Camucones—a nationas cruel as cowardly, two qualities which always go together.Great was the injury which these pirates inflicted on the islands, and although the alcalde-mayor of Balayan went out against them with some armed vessels they could not be found, either by him or by some other vessels which went from Manila for this purpose with a considerable force of men, on account of the adroitness with which the Moros concealed themselves, avoiding an encounter—to such an extent that the belief was current in Manila that these were not outside enemies, but insurgent Indians of the country, until a Spaniard who had been seized by the enemy at the shoals of Mindoro made his escape from them, and his account undeceived the people of Manila. The governor despatched an armed fleet in command of Admiral Pedro Durán de Monforte, a soldier of long experience, but this remedy came too late; for the pirates, satiated with burning villages, plundering, and taking captives, had returned to their own country. Accordingly the armada, having vainly scouted along Lubán, Mindoro, and Panay, returned to Manila, having accomplished nothing save the expenses which were caused for the royal exchequer, which is the paymaster for these and other cases of negligence.The distrust which was felt regarding the maintenance of the peace by the king of Joló perhaps occasioned anger that he had not prevented these injuries; but he, knowing that if he did not make amends it would be a cause for justifiable hostilities, sent an embassy to the governor (who was Don Diego Sarria Lazcano), exonerating himself and promising to chastise Linao, Libot, and Sacahati;this he did, and many captives were restored, which was no slight [amends]. King Corralat raised his false alarms, as he was wont to do when that suited him, and also made some trifling raids through the agency of the people of Sibuguey, and threatened the Zebuans at Dapitán. But all became quiet when the office of governor of those coasts was assumed (June 16, 1659) by Don Agustín de Cepeda, a great soldier—who died in decrepit old age as master-of-camp of these Filipinas. Corralat knew, much to his sorrow, the valor of this able officer, and therefore did not dare to anger him, content that the Spaniards should leave him in peace. Don Agustín, as a prudent man, determined to try measures to secure peace; and, conferences having been held, those measures were carried out, with very advantageous arrangements for our forces.The frequent raids of these Moro pirates, both Mindanaos and Joloans, were one of the greatest hardships which these Filipinas Islands suffered through many continuous years; they were the scourge of the natives of the islands of Pintados and Camarines, Tayabas, and Mindoro, as being nearest to the danger and most weak for defense. These people paid with their beloved liberty for our neglect to defend them—not always deserving of blame, on account of the mutations of the times. Few Spaniards have been the prey of these vile thieves, except some who were very incautious; but amends have been made for these by many religious and some secular priests, ministers in the Indian villages, who have suffered rigorous captivities and cruel deaths. No small amount of expenditure has fallen on the royal exchequer; for those pirates have caused innumerableexpenses in armed fleets, most of them useless because the news of the loss did not reach us until the pirates were returning unhurt to their own lands. At times it has given even the governors and captains-general of these islands plenty to do in defending them from these pilfering thieves, as we saw in the first part of this history, in the case of Don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera and others. All the life of Cachil Corralat—which was a very long one, for it exceeded ninety years—and that of his father Bahisan kept our vigilance continually on the alert, and caused us to found and maintain the fortified posts of Zamboanga, Sabanilla, Malanao, and others—which caused so much expense and no profits; for the forts defend only a small space, and the sea has many roads, and thus they did not hinder the Moro fleets from sallying forth whenever they chose. Moreover, Corralat had all the Lutaos for spies, on account of their great reverence for him, and because they were in secret as much Mahometans as himself; for never is a Lutao found who has not been circumcised, or one who eats pork—and it is this which constitutes their Mahometanism, as also having many wives and being enemies of Christians; for in other respects they are atheists, and do not know what the Koran is or what it contains. And, as I have heard from military men who have experience in these wars, the only restraint upon these Joloan and Mindanao enemies is in armed fleets, which go to search for them in their homes and inflict on them all the damage they can, without going inland; for the Spaniards will not find any one there on whom to avenge themselves, since the inhabitants are safe in their thick forests and on impregnable heights.After so many years of misfortunes the divine mercy took pity on these poor natives, on whom the cruelty and greed of the Moros had so long fattened, selecting as an agent the very Corralat who had been the cause of the past havoc. With old age and experience he came to see the injury which was resulting to his people (and most of all to the kings of Mindanao) from having enemies so valiant as the Spaniards had proved to be; and therefore while he lived he maintained peace with Manila, with friendly relations and the benefit of commerce on both sides. And when his death arrived, which was at the end of the year 1671, he left his nephew and heir, Balatamay, strictly charged to keep the peace, with heavy curses and imprecations, according to their custom; and his people obeyed him so well that for a long time no raid was heard of; nor was there any by the Camucones, who are subject to Borney. The king of Joló, Paguián, has preserved the same peace and friendship; for all the Moro tribes of these regions reverenced Corralat as if he were Mahoma himself. For he was a Moro of great courage, intelligence, and sagacity, besides being exceedingly zealous for his accursed sect, and a great sorcerer—for all of which he probably has met condign punishment. (Diaz,Conquistas, pp. 564–567.)The governor [i.e., Manuel de León, in 1674] commanded Juan Canosa Raguses, a skilful builder of lateen-rigged vessels, to construct two galleys; these sailed very straight and light, and did good service in frightening away the Camucones, pilfering and troublesome pirates, who in most years infested the Pintados Islands with pillaging and seizure of captives. These are a barbarous, cruel, and cowardlypeople, and they cannot have one of these traits without the others. They inhabit a chain of small islands, which extend from Paragua to Borney; some of them are Mahometans and others heathens. They have done much harm to the islands of Bisayas, which they ravaged quite at their ease—so much so that in the year 1672 they carried away the alcalde-mayor, Don José de San Miguel, as we have mentioned elsewhere. They have a great advantage in the extreme swiftness of their vessels, which enables them to find their defense in flight. Their confidence and boldness went so far that they ventured to infest the coasts of Manila. The provincial, Fray José Duque, while going to visit the convents in the islands of Pintados, came very near being captured with his companion, Fray Alvaro de Benavente; for they were attacked by a squadron of these pirates near the island of Marinduque, where they would have been a prey to Moro cruelty, if they had not been favored by the divine kindness. [This acted] through the agency of Captain Francisco Ponce, a veteran soldier, who killed the captain and another of the pirates; and also of a sudden wind, which gave wings to the champan for placing itself in safety. With the building of these galleys the Camucones were inspired with such terror that for many years they did not venture to sally out for their usual raids, so much in safety as before. The first time, Sargento-mayor Pedro Lozano went out to scour the seas through which the Camucones might come to make their raids. In the following year, Captain Don José de Novoa went out—a brave Galician, the encomendero of Gapang—and as commander of the second galley Captain Simón de Torres, an able soldier from Maluco; and theyscoured the coasts of Mindanao, committing some acts of hostility, their sole object therein being to cause more terror than harm. And thus it was, that with the fear which those piratical tribes had conceived of the galleys neither Joloans, Mindanaos, nor Camucones dared, so long as these lasted, to commit their former ravages. The same thing occurs whenever there are galleys, even though they do not go out to sea and are shut up in the port of Cavite. It is therefore very expedient to keep vessels of this sort, in order to be free from the invasions of those pirates. In view of this, Governor Don Domingo de Zabálburu built two other galleys, which was the cause of the Joloans, Mindanaos, and Camucones remaining, throughout his term of office, within their own boundaries, although they had been in previous years, as we have seen, a continual plague to these islands. (Diaz,Conquistas, p. 711.)141Spanish,romper el nombre; “to cease using the countersign of recognition, when daybreak comes, for which purpose the drums, cornets, trumpets, or other musical instruments give the signal with the call nameddiana” (Dominguez); cf. Frenchreveille.2In Sulu roadstead; anchorage is north of the town. In channel between Sulu roadstead and Marongas is a pearl-oysterbed, which employs many boats. This is an important industry, pearls and pearl-shells being the chief articles in the export trade of the island. (U. S. Philippine Gazetteer.)3Colin (who was at that time in Joló) says of this (Labor evangélica, ed. 1663, p. 49): “There was found near the island of Joló a piece [of amber] which weighed more than eight arrobas, of the best kind that exists, which is the gray [el gris].” Retana and Pastells regard Combés’sambaras meaning amber, the vegetable fossil; but it is possible that all these writers mean rather ambergris, which is supposed to be a morbid secretion of the sperm whale, and has been used as a perfume.4It was Lopez who soon afterward, having gone to Manila to report results to Governor Fajardo, secured (largely throughthe influence of Venegas, who was very friendly to Lopez) permission for six Jesuits to labor in the islands of the south, the rebuilding of their residence at Zamboanga, and the exemption of the Lutaos from tribute, and the appointment of Rafael Omen de Azevedo as governor. (Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 151 b.)5In the text,desvelar, “to keep awake”—but from the context, apparently an error of some sort.6Spanish,dió una bofetada, literally, “gave a blow in the face”—in the Spanish a play on words which it is difficult to retain in English.7This order was carried out by Balatamay, on December 13, 1655. See Combés’s detailed account of this tragedy, as cited by Diaz.8Pedro Durán de Monforte; his term of office began in 1649, and lasted until Esteybar’s arrival at Zamboanga (Dec. 2, 1656).9“La Silanga, which is a strait that is formed by the island of Tulaya with the land of Mindanao” (Diaz, p. 561). Retana and Pastells, in their edition ofCombés, make Tulaya the modern Tulayan, near Sulu—an evident error, from Diaz’s statement.10Referring to the governorad interimfrom November, 1661 to February, 1662; Combés describes at length his “persecution” of the Jesuits at Zamboanga (col. 591–609), but does not mention his name.11“Hardly had Morales reached the islands, when a new despatch arrived from Manila, repeating the same orders. The silence of the Spaniards [i.e., regarding their first order to leave the fort], and the hurried preparations that were made that very night for the withdrawal of Morales, inflamed the injured feelings of the Lutaos, nor could any argument repress them. The governor did not attempt to do more than console them, in order that they might prudently decide what they should do; he told them that the Spaniards would never forsake them, and that if the Lutaos would follow them there were places in the islands, with equal and even greater advantages, where they could live; that Corralat was friendly, and the Spaniards would charge him to maintain friendly relations with them, which they could with good reason expect, as he was of the same nation as themselves; that if he should not fulfil this obligation, occasion would not fail the Spaniards to avenge them. He also said that they could, with the forts which he left to them, easily defend themselves from their enemies; and finally, that they should await the ultimate decision which would be brought by General Don Francisco de Atienza on his way to Maluco, since it might improve the condition of affairs.“Little impression did these arguments, which the Spaniards offered by way of consolation, make on the Lutaos. The tyrannies that they would experience when left to their own government had no respect for kinship, nor was there any law save that of might. To leave their homes was most difficult, and to transplant their villages was to ruin them. To defend the fort supplies of ammunition and food were required, and they had no fund to meet these costs. They gave way to lamentations and complaints that, as they had served the Spaniards with their lives, they had roused in their neighbors a mortal hatred; that, notwithstanding they had become Christians, they were left abandoned, in the power of the Moros, without instruction, or defense, or honor. They recounted their services, and their sighs grew heavier, while they declared as false the promises made to themin the beginning, which drew them away from obedience to their natural king; and that with such an example [as this of the Lutaos before them] the peoples [of Mindanao] would not change sides in order to please a nation so unreliable [as the Spaniards]. The Subanos also presented their piteous remonstrances that as a people of the hill-country, and of timid disposition, they were exposed to greater misfortunes. They went to the fort and renewed their importunities, saying that the Spaniards were deserting and abandoning them [notwithstanding] their humble submission, and leaving them to be slaves of their enemies; that although they had maintained the Spaniards with their tributes, provided their houses with their products, and embraced their faith, contented with the freedom which followed Spanish protection, yet now their liberty remained at the mercy of greed, the Spaniards profiting by their lives for the sake of keeping up intercourse with the Macassars and Malayos; and that it was too much to be endured, to leave in such infamous subjection vassals so obedient as they. The governor, his heart pierced by their pathetic expostulations, could give no other satisfaction than his own anxious hopes. In the midst of these limited and sad consolations, with the arrival of the succors for Terrenate came anew the severe orders [for abandoning the forts]; the governor was now unable to give them courage, for lack of means, and all were disconsolate; but it was necessary to execute the rigorous order—those who remained being as sorrowful at it as were those who were going away, and each one endeavoring to make hisdecision and to suit it to this emergency. Some went to Mindanao, others to Joló, and others to Basilan; many dispersed in the coasts of Zamboangan, the people of Don Alonso Macombon remaining here with him; and a few determined to follow the fortunes of those who retreated thence, going to settle at Dapitan and Zebù.... In the vessels had to be placed more than a thousand souls, and the military supplies. It was a grievous abandonment, by which more than a thousand Christians were left exposed to the cruelty of the Moros.... In great part it was due to the obstinacy of the Jesuits, who, regarding the allowance of fifty men as insufficient, compelled its total abandonment. Such garrisons have been and are sufficient to oppose the Moros in the remaining presidios; and the same would be enough in Zamboangan if the great extent which must be guarded, on account of the size of the fort, were reduced to a little, demolishing the less important part [of the fortifications]. But their profound thoughts feared lest that fort would afterward remain thus scantily garrisoned, and that it would not make so much show or its administration be so conspicuous; nor would there be expended in the allowances [for it] so large sums, which they converted to their own advantage.... Soon there were representations made at the court of injury resulting from its desertion, and consequent royal decrees for its reconstruction, which did not take effect until long afterward.” (Concepción,Hist. de Philipinas, vii, pp. 93–97.)12This name is Curay in Concepción’sHistoria.13An island and point at the entrance to Patungan Bay, in Batangas, Luzón.14It is evident, from the above statements by Diaz, that Barrantes is incorrect in saying (Guerras piráticas, p. 17): “In this manner, so melancholy for Filipinas, ended the seventeenth century.” He has made this hasty and unfounded conclusion through failure to search for material to supply the gap which occurs at this point in the narrative which he has used as the basis of the work above cited. This is a MS. narrative of the Moro wars, for an account of which see ourVol. XXIX, p. 174, note 40.
Bibliographical DataThe documents in this volume are obtained from the following sources:1.Jesuit letters.—From Ventura del Arco MSS. (Ayer library), iv, pp. 1–3, 69–72.2.Discovery of Palaos.—FromLettres édifiantes(1st Paris ed.) i (1717), pp. 112–136, from a copy in the library of the Wisconsin Historical Society.3.Recollect missions.—From Pedro de San Francisco de Assis’sHistoria general de los religiosos descalzos de San Agustin(Zargoza, 1756), all that relates to Philippine missions; from a copy in the Library of Congress. Also Juan de la Concepción’sHistoria de Philipinas, viii, pp. 3–16, 135–144, and ix, pp. 123–150; from a copy in possession of the Editors.4.Appendix: Moro pirates.—From Combés’sHistoria de Mindanao, Iolo, etc.; Murillo Velarde’sHistoria de Philipinas; Diaz’sConquistas; and other works, as is fully indicated in the text.
The documents in this volume are obtained from the following sources:
1.Jesuit letters.—From Ventura del Arco MSS. (Ayer library), iv, pp. 1–3, 69–72.
2.Discovery of Palaos.—FromLettres édifiantes(1st Paris ed.) i (1717), pp. 112–136, from a copy in the library of the Wisconsin Historical Society.
3.Recollect missions.—From Pedro de San Francisco de Assis’sHistoria general de los religiosos descalzos de San Agustin(Zargoza, 1756), all that relates to Philippine missions; from a copy in the Library of Congress. Also Juan de la Concepción’sHistoria de Philipinas, viii, pp. 3–16, 135–144, and ix, pp. 123–150; from a copy in possession of the Editors.
4.Appendix: Moro pirates.—From Combés’sHistoria de Mindanao, Iolo, etc.; Murillo Velarde’sHistoria de Philipinas; Diaz’sConquistas; and other works, as is fully indicated in the text.
Appendix: Moro PiratesMoro pirates and their raids in the seventeenth century.Sources: This account is compiled from various historians—Combés, Murillo Velarde, Diaz, Concepción, and Montero y Vidalas is fully indicated in the text.Translation: This is made by Emma Helen Blair.
Sources: This account is compiled from various historians—Combés, Murillo Velarde, Diaz, Concepción, and Montero y Vidalas is fully indicated in the text.
Translation: This is made by Emma Helen Blair.
Moro Pirates and their Raids in the Seventeenth CenturyI[In previous volumes have appeared various accounts of the piratical raids made, down to 1640, by the Mahometan Malays of Mindanao and other southern islands against the Spaniards and the native tribes whom they had subjected in the northern islands. A very brief outline of that information is here presented, with citations of volumes where it appears, as a preliminary to some further account which shall summarize this subject for the remainder of the seventeenth century.][When Legazpi first explored the Philippines, he sent some of his officers to open up trade with Mindanao, then reputed to be rich in gold and cinnamon (Vol. II, pp. 116–118, 147, 154, 209, 210). At the outset, much jealousy arose among the Spaniards against the Mahometan Malays (whom they called Moros) of that and other islands in the southern part of the Eastern archipelago, for two reasons—the Moros were “infidels,” and they far excelled the Spaniards as traders (Vol. II, pp. 156, 159, 186, 187;IV, pp. 66, 151, 174). Moreover, the natives were everywhere hostile to the Spaniards because the Portuguese representing themselves to be Castilians,had previously made cruel raids on some of those islands, notably Bohol (Vol. II, pp. 117, 184, 207, 208, 229;III, p. 46). In that first year, 1565, a Bornean vessel was captured by the Spaniards, after a desperate fight; but hostilities then went no further (Vol. II, pp. 116, 206). The Moros of the Rio Grande of Mindanao proffered (1574) their submission to the Spanish power, apparently being in some awe of it (Vol. III, p. 275). Governor Sande had expansive ideas of Spanish dominion, and in 1578–79 undertook an expedition for the subjugation of Borneo, Mindanao, and Joló; he obtained a temporary success, but the Moros again asserted their independence as soon as the Spaniards departed (Vol. IV, pp. 125, 130, 148–303; XV, pp. 54, 132). This expedition was partly caused by piratical raids made by the Borneans (Vol. IV, pp. 151, 153, 154, 159;VI, p. 183), and the Joloans (Vol. IV, pp. 176, 236) against the northern islands. Apparently this punishment intimidated the Moros for a time; the next important raid by them was in 1595 (Vol. IX, p. 196;XI, p. 266). In 1591 Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa had made a contract with Gomez P. Dasmariñas for the conquest of Mindanao (Vol. VIII, pp. 73–77). The island had then been partly explored and much of it assigned to Spaniards in repartimiento; some of these allotments are mentioned inVol. VIII, pp. 127, 128, 132 (a list of those bestowed in 1571 is found in the Pastells edition of Colin’sLabor evangélica, i, p. 157, note 1). Instructions were given to Figueroa on November 13, 1595 (Vol. IX, pp. 181–188), and in the following spring he set out with an armed force; but hardly had he begun the campaign when he was slain bya Moro (Vol. IX, pp. 195, 196, 263–265, 276, 277; XV, pp. 89–93;XVI, pp. 270–272). Juan de Ronquillo succeeded him, and for the time “pacified” the hostile Moros (Vol. IX, pp. 281–298;X, pp. 41, 42, 49, 168, 169, 214, 215;XI, p. 236;XV, pp. 95–100;XVI, pp. 273, 274); see his own report of the campaign (Vol. X, pp. 53–74) and Tello’s (Vol. X, pp. 219–226; cf.Vol. XI, pp. 135–139). In 1599 the Spanish fort at La Caldera was dismantled (Vol. XI, pp. 138, 139, 237;XV, pp. 190, 191); this emboldened the Moros to renew their piracies, and from 1600 on they harassed the Visayan Islands and even Luzón—not only the Mindanaos but their allies the Ternatans, and the Joloans (Vol. XI, pp. 238, 239, 292–301, 303;XII, pp. 32, 39–41, 134–137;XIII, pp. 49, 146, 147;XV, pp. 192–196, 209, 265–267;XVIII, pp. 185–187, 331, 333;XIX, pp. 67, 68, 215–218, 223–225;XXII, pp. 89, 90, 203–206;XXIII, p. 259;XXIV, pp. 35–37, 102–104, 139, 142, 143, 329;XXV, pp. 86, 105, 152–154, 199;XXVI, p. 285;XXVII, pp. 215–226, 316). Similar raids were made by the Camucones, Moros from some small islands near Borneo (Vol. XVIII, p. 79;XXII, pp. 89, 132, 133, 202, 296–298, 303;XXIV, pp. 97, 138;XXV, pp. 154–156;XXVII, pp. 314–316;XXIX, pp. 31, 200). These attacks kept the peaceful natives in constant fear; their villages were burned and plundered, and their fields ravaged; and thousands were carried away to be sold as slaves, being thus dispersed among the Malay Islands. In 1621 Hernando de los Rios Coronel stated that ten thousand Christians were held captive in Mindanao (Vol. XIX, p. 264). At times the Spaniards sent armed fleets in pursuit of these pirates, but the latter would escape, on account of the superior lightness andswiftness of their vessels. Punitive expeditions were sent to their villages, some of which were futile, but others inflicted on them severe punishment—Jolo: 1602 (Vol. XV, pp. 240–243, 264, 265), 1626 (XXII, pp. 207–210), 1628 (XXII, pp. 293–295;XXIV, pp. 143–145), 1630 (XXIII, pp. 87, 88, 98;XXIV, pp. 163–165); and Mindanao: 1625 (XXII, pp. 116–119, 218, 224). It was proposed to enslave any Moro pirates who might be captured (Vol. XVII, pp. 187, 296, 331;XXIX, p. 269), and this was sometimes done (Vol. XXII, p. 134). Finally, Corcuera undertook to chastise them effectually; and in 1637 he led a large and well-equipped expedition to Mindanao, which captured Corralat’s stronghold and devastated nearly all the coast of that island, driving out Corralat as a fugitive and intimidating other chiefs who had intrigued with him against the Spaniards (Vol. XXVII, pp. 253–305, 319–325, 346–357;XXIX, pp. 28–30, 60, 86–101, 116–134). Corcuera followed up this success by another in Joló, in 1638 (Vol. XXVII, p. 325;XXVIII, pp. 41–63;XXIX, pp. 32, 36, 43, 44, 135, 136), and in the following year a Spanish expedition severely chastised the Moros around Lake Lanao, in Mindanao (XXIX, pp. 159, 161–163, 273–275); further military operations in Joló and Mindanao, on a smaller scale, occurred during 1638–39 (Vol. XXIX, pp. 141–166, 198–200). It may be noted, further, that the Jesuits established missions there at an early date, evangelists of that order going with Figueroa in 1596 (Vol. XII, pp. 313–321;XIII, pp. 47–49, 86–89;XXII, p. 117;XXVIII, pp. 94–99, 151, 171); and others were founded by Augustinian Recollects (XXI, pp. 196–247, 298–303;XXIV, p. 115;XXVIII, pp. 152, 175, 340–345).]II[The second reduction of Joló—by Almonte, in 1639 (Vol. XXIX, p. 143)—subdued all of that archipelago, save the Guimbanos, a fierce Moro people inhabiting the mountains of Sulu (Joló) Island, who were hostile to the Joloans of the coast. When Almonte ordered them to cease disturbing the pacified Joloans, the Guimbanos made an insolent reply, telling the Spaniards to come to their country and learn the difference between them and the Joloans. Almonte therefore sent (July, 1639) troops, under Luis de Guzman and Agustin de Cepeda, to subdue these proud mountaineers; and after a fierce battle the Guimbanos retreated, leaving four hundred dead on the field, and three hundred captives in the hands of the Spaniards—of whom eight died, including Guzman, besides twenty Indian auxiliaries. (Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 96 b, 97.) After the departure of Almonte from Joló, affairs went ill, Morales being unfit for his post as governor of those islands, although he was valiant in battle. Having abducted a beautiful girl, daughter of a chief named Salibanza, a conspiracy against him was formed by the enraged father; this was discovered, and the leaders seized. This, with several arbitrary and hostile measures of Morales, stirred up the Joloans to revolt, and an affray occurred between them and the Spaniards, in which Morales was wounded. Juan Ruiz Maroto was sent to relieve him from office, and tried to pacify the natives, but in vain; he then sent Pedro de la Mata Vergara to harry all the coast of Joló, who burned many villages and carried away three thousand captives. Mata, being obliged to return to Mindanao, was succeededby Morales, who rashly attacked (near Párang, Sulu Island) a force of Moros with troops exhausted by forced marches; the Spaniards, although in numbers far superior to the Moros, were ignominiously put to flight, thirty-nine of their number being slain, including Morales and another officer. At this time Cepeda was governor of Joló, and he soon found it necessary to chastise the natives, who were encouraged to rebellion by their recent victory. (Combés,Hist. de Mindanao, col. 402–412; Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 121–122; Montero y Vidal,Hist. piratería, i, pp. 175–181, 199–211.) An account of his exploits in this direction is furnished by letters of the Jesuit Miguel Paterio to Father Juan Lopez, regarding the expeditions of Cepeda (to whom Combés dedicated his book), written in 1643–44 (ut supra, col. cix–cxv); we present them here as a specimen of the proceedings in these punitive expeditions.]Relation of the exploit which was accomplished in the villages of Paran by Captain and Sargento-mayor Don Agustin de Zepeda, warden of the forts in Jolo.After the disaster to Admiral Morales, the Guimbanos of the villages of Paran were very arrogant and haughty, so that, however much they were invited, with assurance of peace and pardon, to lay down their arms before those of our king, and to restore the Spanish weapons that they were keeping, they paid no heed to it. Seeing this, Sargento-mayor Don Augustin de Çepeda, the better to justify the expedition that he intended to make against them, sent word to them through other Guimbanos who wereour friends, that they must restore the arms that they had taken from the Spaniards, and that if they did not restore these he would wage war against them. To this they replied that those arms were converted into lances, and that nothing would be given up to the Spaniards, whether Don Agustin marched against them or not. The captain and sargento-mayor received this reply on Tuesday, December 29, and on Wednesday, the thirtieth of the same month, he determined to make a daylight attack on them with the utmost secrecy. Accordingly, at four in the afternoon, almost all the soldiers made their confessions, and the sargento-mayor exhorted them to rouse all their courage, as brave soldiers, since they were fighting for both the majesties [i.e., the divine and the royal], and they had the sure protection of the mother of God, our Lady of Good Success. Then they set out from the hill of Jolo with only twenty-five Spaniards and three officers, [Cepeda’s lieutenants being] Adjutant Diego de los Reyes and Alférez Gaspar de Chaves; and twenty-two Pampangos and Cagaians, with their officers, also ten or fifteen servants with their pikes and shields. Of this infantry the captain formed three divisions, giving to each one its own watchword—to the first one, “Jesus be with all;” to the second, “Our Lady of Good Success;” to the third, “Saint Ignatius”—and each division was ordered to render aid according to its watchword, and as the enemy should sound the call to arms. With this order, they began their march, and proceeded until nightfall, when they marched in single file, since the road and the darkness gave no opportunity for doing otherwise. They passed rivers, ravines, marshes, and miry places, untilthey arrived at a village of a Guimbano chief named Ulisten, near which they heard coughing in the houses; and [they moved] so cautiously that they were not perceived. The sargento-mayor did not choose to enter this village, not only because the chief had showed his friendship for the Spaniards, but because his only intention was to punish the people of Paran, who had merited this by their acts in the past and by the haughty spirit that they showed. For the same reason, he would not enter another village near this one, belonging to another chief, named Sambali—who, if it were not for the purpose that the commander had in mind, deserved to lose his head for his rebellious disposition in not being friendly to the Spaniards. From the hill to these two villages may be a journey of about two leguas and a half; the road is very bad, and of the sort that has been described, [passing through] marshes and rough places; and, with the darkness of a moonlight night, to go among trees, thickets, and tangled briers was intolerable and full of difficulty. Not less wearisome was the road which they still must take to reach the people and village of Paran, and even more difficult: but neither the one nor the other could weaken or diminish the tenacity, spirit, and valor which not only the captain but his soldiers displayed. They traveled all night in this way until a little before daybreak, when they mistook the road, and took another, which did not lead to the village where they meant to go; but God chose that the people of that very village should serve as guides [to the Spaniards], by furnishing them light—for on account of quieting some infants who were crying, they kindled lights in the houses. The sargento-mayorordered them to march toward that place, where they arrived at daybreak; and there they remained about half an hour, waiting for the dawn to brighten so that they might break the countersign1and make the daylight attack [dar el albasso] on the said village, which they did. For when it became light, and the day was brightening, they broke the watchword, which was “St. Ignatius;” and the division to which that belonged made the first attack on the houses, jointly with the vanguard, which went ahead to reconnoiter. All the forces united to make this assault on the houses, and to break through the defenses of the village and enter, all in order, with lighted matches and to sound of drums, as they did. In their houses this occasioned a great tumult; some were slain by musket-balls, some by lance-thrusts; others escaped naked, fleeing without thought of their kindred or their possessions, abandoning their weapons and whatever they had; others, finally, were burned to death in their houses, to which our men set fire—the natives remaining in them either through fear, or that they might not fall into our hands and be slain by our lances. They hid themselves, therefore, for the greater protection—only to have their houses, and their granaries of rice, and their bodies burned [here], and finally their souls in hell. Besides this, their cultivated fields were laid waste, set out with all the plants that they rear—bananas, sugar-cane, and other plants which furnish them with food; and our men did thesame with these, destroying and burning everything. This done they looked about, scanning the country in all directions, and saw an impregnable height; and when the commander understood that this was (as it proved to be) the citadel of the enemies, he gave the order to march thither. They proceeded by a path or trail so narrow that they were obliged to ascend in single file; and when they reached the top of the said hill they found a plateau, more spacious than that of our hill of Jolo, on which were houses, some fortified and some small ones. The former were full of provisions and contained some Guimbanos. These, seeing our men and recognizing them as enemies, immediately abandoned the houses and took to flight, throwing themselves headlong from the heights. Our men entered the place, and burned the houses with the rice and other things contained in them; and they laid waste the fields and destroyed what had been planted in them, as they had done in the villages before ascending the hill. Our men were occasioned no little anxiety by their failure, after this exploit, to find the road by which to leave the hill; for, as it had in every direction precipices and rugged heights, they had great difficulty and hardship in getting away from the hill, on account of not being able to strike the path by which they had entered. But finally the Blessed Virgin who hitherto had been our Lady of Success, chose to show also that she was our Lady of Good Success—which she did by enabling our men to depart in safety from the hill. For the alférez, going to make a hasty reconnoissance with four arquebusiers, and some servants armed with pikes and shields, saw [traces of men’s] work amongthe trees that covered the hill; and, upon reaching the place, ascertained that there was a path by which he could descend. Notifying the troops of this, they went down the hill by this path, and thus returned to the houses that they had burned, all marching in regular order. They approached the seashore through a level field, passing near the harbor where the natives had slain Admiral Morales; and, as they advanced through the open country, they encountered four Guimbano Indians, shouting [or grimacing?—haciendo carracheo], who came from a grove that was growing on the said seashore. When our men tried to get near them, these Indians took to their heels, retreating toward the grove—where, it was understood, they had an ambuscade; and as it was now eleven o’clock, the sargento-mayor did not think it best to delay [his return] longer. Accordingly, they marched in the same order, and to the sound of drums, toward the fortification that stood on the seashore, going through fields and mangrove thickets, and along beaches and pools of water, another two leguas and a half, until they reached the harbor where they had provided some boats. In these the sargento-mayor and all his troops embarked, and returned to these forts, with great satisfaction and rejoicing at so complete a success, without losing one of our men, or encountering any danger. Many salvos were fired from the boats in which they came, and from the forts, in honor of their protectors, Jesus, Mary, and Ignatius.From this expedition and victory I have learned some things about Guimba which are worth mentioning here. The first is, that two days afterwardthe people of Paran made war on the chiefs Ulis and Sambali whom we mentioned above, complaining that these chiefs had not warned them that the Spanish troops had passed close to their villages, and even because they had allowed the Spaniards to pass them. May God establish them in peace, and grant them light and a knowledge of the truth. And after this expedition, as I have said, one of the chiefs in the villages to the east named Suil, complained that the sargento-mayor had not informed him of it, so that Suil with all his men might have accompanied the Spaniards. Although he may not be sincere, thanks are returned to him, and probably his offer was prompted by the admiration and high opinion that he entertains for our men since this exploit; or because he feared lest the like fate might befall him. He and other chiefs beyond Guimba to the east have sent to tell me that, although those who killed the sargento-mayor are their brothers, they will not for that reason fail to be the friends of the Spaniards; and that they will come to the village of the Lutaos who are in this fort [i.e., at Joló] to talk with the father and treat of peace. And it cannot be denied that there has been a great disturbance among them since this expedition, and it has caused among them all not only fear, but astonishment also, to see that so few Spaniards could dare to traverse almost all of Guimba, marching almost all the way among the settlements, without being seen. In this affair not only the caution of the Spaniards, but their courage in penetrating among so many barbarians, the most valiant in all these islands, is causing great admiration—which is increased at seeing how so few Spaniards made so great a number of enemies take toflight; for in all the villages there are nearly a thousand barbarians who carry arms. It is certain that, considering the circumstances of this exploit, it adds prestige to several others that have been performed; and I even venture to say that it is astonishing, if we consider what occurred in one night, the perils that they went through, the daring of so few soldiers among so many enemies, and, finally, their accomplishing what they did in destroying and burning the villages and their people, without injury to any one of our men. All this causes the Moros who see these occurrences close to them to wonder and fear, and apparently they are talking in earnest of becoming friends and vassals of his Majesty. [Marginal note: “For Father Juan Lopez, rector of Cavite.”][Another letter by Father Paterio, written from Jolo, February 28, 1644, relates the particulars of another expedition by Zepeda into Guimba, six days previous to that date. The native chiefs on the east side of the island are intimidated by the punishment inflicted on Paran, and are inclined to submit to the victorious Spanish arms; but those on the west desire to take revenge for the massacre of their tribesmen. A conference of the latter chiefs is accordingly held at the village of Ulis, where they talk of making an attack on the Spanish forts at Jolo. They invite Suil, one of the friendly chiefs, to join them; but he sends word to the Spaniards (February 9) of the plot against them. Zepeda is then absent in Zamboanga, but returns soon afterward; and another warning from Suil being received ten days later, Zepeda decides to inflict summary punishmenton the plotters. He therefore leads an expedition against the village of Ulis, on February 21, and, as before, attacks the village at daylight. This time, the natives have had warning of the intended assault, and attempt resistance; but they are defeated with considerable loss—among the slain being Ulis, “who was the idol of that island, and whom all obeyed,” and three other chiefs. In this fight the Spaniards lose but four lives—a soldier, an officer, and two servants. This causes even more fear and awe than even the former expedition, and brings the recalcitrants quickly to terms—Suil and other chiefs proposing to leave their homes and go to dwell near the Spanish forts. Later, the Spaniards complete this castigation by ravaging the country, burning and destroying all before them, “by which the Spanish arms have acquired greater reputation and glory than that which they had lost on former adverse occasions.” Then other islands adjacent to Jolo are intimidated, and two battles are fought with their natives, who lose many men therein. As a reward for his services, Zepeda is honored by Corcuera with the governorship of Zamboanga.]The Joloans remained at peace, as thoroughly chastised as were the Mindanaos, curbing their haughty arrogance, and repressing their hatred in consideration of the advantages of the time. Among the agreements for the peace, they accepted one that a fort for the Spaniards should be erected at their harbor-bar; this was maintained with many difficulties and little advantage, unless from the pearl-fishery, which yielded many and valuable pearls.2The island of Joló abounds in these, so that on the Dutch hydrographical maps they have given it the name “Island of Pearls,” on account of the many fine pearls which the Joloans sent in those years to Nueva Batavia by ambassadors from their king, asking their alliance, and aid against the Spaniards. The Dutch granted them protection, those valuable gifts arousing in them greater desires for profit—although afterward the first aid that they furnished the Joloans cost them very dear. But in this year of 1641 the Joloans had a fortunate opportunity for recouping themselves for past expenses, with a mass of amber3as large as an ox’s body, which the sea cast up on their shores, which yielded them great profits, and increased the reputation of their island. This sort of find is usually very frequent in those islands, since they are beaten by many currents which flow from the archipelago; and thus goes drifting on the waves what the sea hurls from its abysses, along with other debris, under the fury of the wind—this so precious substance, whether it be the excrement or vomit of whales, or a reaba which the sea produces in its depths. But in Joló it is apt to be more often found, because those islands are scattered and their coasts prolonged for many leguas opposite many currents and channel-mouths. And for this reasonsome amber is usually found in Capul, an island beaten by so many currents—as the ships which come on the return from Nueva España know by experience—and also in Guiguan and on the beaches of Antique. Near Punta de Naso the sea cast up, in the year 1650, an enormous piece of amber, although it had not the fine quality and excellence of that which comes from Japón. (Diaz’sConquistas, p. 447.)[For several years after Corcuera’s expedition against the Mindanaos (1637), various military operations were conducted in that island by the Spanish forces, notably under Pedro de Almonte. Corralat and other Moro chiefs were sufficiently reduced to render them nominally peaceful; but they formed various plots and conspiracies against the Spaniards, and, on the other hand, these availed themselves of the jealousies and personal interests of the Mindanao chiefs to separate them and neutralize their efforts. The foolish arrogance of a Spanish officer, Matías de Marmolejo, caused an attack on his detachment by Corralat and Manaquior; all the Spaniards save Marmolejo and six others were slain (June 1, 1642), including the Jesuit Bartolomé Sánchez, and the survivors were captured by Corralat. But when Corcuera heard of this encounter he was so angry that he ordered Marmolejo to be ransomed and afterwards to be beheaded in the plaza at Zamboanga, for disobedience to his orders. He also ordered that the fort at La Sabanilla be demolished, and the men there be sent to punish Corralat, which was done. That chief, to revenge himself, intrigued with the people of Basilan to secure possession of the Spanish fort there; but its little garrison defended it against the Moro fleet until aid couldbe sent them from Zamboanga. As soon as Diego Fajardo became governor of the Philippines in Corcuera’s place, he endeavored to secure peace in Mindanao, and finally (June 24, 1645) a treaty of peace was signed by Corralat and his leading chiefs, and Francisco de Atienza and the Jesuit Alejandro López. This treaty settled questions of mutual alliance, of boundaries of possessions, of trade, of ransom of captives, and of freedom for the ministrations of Jesuit missionaries. Christian captives in Corralat’s domain should be ransomed at the following rates; “for men and women, in the prime of life, and in good health, each forty pesos; for those who were more youthful, thirty pesos; for aged and sick persons, twenty pesos; for children at the breast, ten pesos.” In this very year Salicala, son of the king of Joló, had gone to Batavia to seek aid from the Dutch; the latter sent some armed vessels, which cannonaded the Spanish fort at Joló for three days, but finally were obliged to depart without having accomplished anything. This occurrence increased Fajardo’s anxiety in regard to the cost and danger incurred in attempting to maintain three forts in Joló; and he sent orders to Atienza, commandant at Zamboanga, to withdraw the garrisons from Joló and demolish those forts—an embarrassing command, since both Joloans and Dutch were then making raids among the northern islands. Both Fajardo and Atienza relied on the Jesuit Alejandro Lopez to bring about the pacification of both the Mindanaos and the Joloans, a task which he accomplished so successfully that on April 14, 1646, a treaty was signed, by Atienza and Lopez,4withRaya Bongso of Joló (the same who, with his wife Tuambaloca, was conquered by Corcuera’s troops in 1638) and the envoys of Corralat. Combés gives the full text of both this and the former treaty. A Dutch fleet attempted to make a landing near Zamboanga, but were repulsed by the Spaniards with much loss. Corralat and Moncay came to hostilities, and the former implored the aid of the Spaniards; Atienza sent an armed force to succor Corralat, and Moncay fled. Salicala of Joló and Panguian Cachilo of Guimba undertook (1648) to raid the Visayan Islands; but the latter was attacked and slain by a Spanish squadron, which so intimidated Salicala that he hastened back to Joló. Meanwhile, a notable event occurred in Mindanao, the conversion of Corralat’s military commander, Ugbu, to the Christian faith—which of course tended to strengthen the ties between Corralat and the Spaniards; and Ugbu afterward rendered them efficient service in the Palapag insurrection, which caused his death. Salicala died (1649) and his parents, Bongso and Tuambaloca, were thus able to maintain the peace which they had established with the Spaniards; that queen afterward left Joló, retiring to Basilan. Moncay also died, soon afterward, and was succeeded in Buhayen by Balatamay, a Manobo chief who had married Moncay’s daughter; he joined Corralat in alliance with the Spaniards. In January, 1649, Pedro Duran de Monforte went with an armed fleet to northeastern Borneo, to punish its people for aidingthe Joloans in their raids; the Spaniards plundered several villages, burned three hundred caracoas, and carried away two hundred captives. The expedition was accompanied by Jesuits, who afterward opened successful missions in Borneo. The insurrection of 1649–50 spread to Joló and Mindanao, but was quelled by the Spaniards (seeVol. XXXVIII). (Combés,Hist. Mindanao, col. 269–348, 425–498; Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 149–153. Cf. Concepción,Hist. de Philipinas, vi, pp. 205–281; Montero y Vidal,Hist. piratería, i, pp. 182–189, 212–231.)][In 1653 Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara succeeded to the government of the Philippines.] One of his first undertakings was to establish peace with the ruler of Mindanao, Cachil Corralat, whom it was expedient to assure for the sake of the tranquillity of the Pintados Islands—which were more exposed than the others to the incursions of their armed fleets, since Manila had not enough soldiers and vessels with which our people could go forth to hinder the operations of the Moros. The governor sent as his ambassador Captain Don Diego de Lemus, and Father Francisco Lado of the Society of Jesus, who were very kindly received by the Moros; and he gave them to understand that no one desired peace more than he did, since the warning was still fresh that had been given him by the war which was waged against him by Governor Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera in person—which had obliged Corralat to wander as a fugitive through the lands of his enemy the king of Buhayen, exposed to many perils. It seems as if the desire which Corralat showed to maintain the peace might be regarded assincere; for if he had chosen to avail himself of the opportunity afforded by the past years, when all our forces and power were fully occupied in resisting the cruel invasions of the Dutch, without doubt he could have made great ravages in the villages of the Pintados Islands; and therefore this must be attributed to an especial providence of the divine mercy. All [these dealings with the envoys] were cunning measures of the shrewd Moro to lull5our vigilance with feigned appearances of peace, for never was he further from pursuing it—partly through greed for the booty of slaves, a great part of which belonged to him; partly because his captains and other persons interested in these piratical raids persuaded him to avail himself of the opportunity furnished by the weakness of our forces. Corralat determined to renew his former hostile acts, and began by preparing vessels and supplies; and in order to cover up better his damnable intention, he sent to the governor of Manila an ambassador to confirm the peace. This man was called Banua, and was no less fraudulent than Simon the Greek. On the route he left many tokens of this; for in the village of Tunganan, among the Subanos, he treated very contemptuously6the father minister, Miguel Pareja of the Society of Jesus—who, as the pious religious that he was, turned the other cheek, as the gospel commands. Banua arrived at Manila in the year of 1655, where he discharged very well his office as ambassador, and even better that of spy—andwell he knew his double trade; for among other things he demanded that restitution be made to Corralat of some Mindanao slaves, and of the pieces of artillery which Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera had taken from him in war; but this and other petitions of the ambassador had no satisfactory issue. Banua returned [to Mindanao], and Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara despatched to accompany him Captain Don Claudio de Rivera, and Father Alejandro Lopez of the Society of Jesus, who went with holy zeal for establishing in Mindanao the preaching of the true faith. They arrived at Zamboanga, where they had sufficient warnings of the danger to which they were going; but with fearless courage they continued their journey until they reached Corralat. He received them without any of the ostentation usual for an embassy, but rather with frowns and displeasure; and when he read the letters from the governor of Manila—which were excellent for an occasion in which our strength might be greater, but the present time demanded shrewder dissimulation—the Moro king was much disturbed, and displayed extreme anger. The end of this embassy (of which an excellent account is given by Father Francisco Combés in hisHistoria de Mindanao, book viii, chap. 3) was that Corralat ordered his nephew Balatamay to slay Father Alejandro Lopez and his associate, Father Juan de Montiel, and Captain Claudio de Rivera.7Corralat sent the letters of the governor to the kings of Joló and of Ternate, to incite them to make common cause in defense of their profession as Mahometans, but they did not choose torisk breaking the peace; on the contrary, the king of Ternate handed over the letters to the governor of our forts there, Francisco de Esteybar, who restored them to the governor of Manila. (Diaz,Conquistas, pp. 549–551.)Corralat, fearing the vengeance of the Spaniards, wrote to the governor of Zamboanga throwing the responsibility for what had occurred on his nephew Balatamay, whom he could not chastise on account of the latter being so powerful. He also wrote to Manrique de Lara, attributing the deaths of the Jesuits and other Spaniards to imprudent acts committed by Father López, and entreated the governor that, mutually forgiving injuries, affairs might remain as they had previously been. But his complicity in the event came to be discovered, through another letter directed in June, 1656, to the sultan of Joló, exhorting the latter to unite with him for defending the religion which both professed. The Joloan monarch sent his letter to the governor of Zamboanga in order to demonstrate his loyalty. Similar assistance was solicited by Corralat from the Dutch and from the sovereigns of Macasar and Ternate; and to the latter, in order to stimulate him more, he sent the original letter of Manrique de Lara, presenting the question under the religious aspect only—a letter which the Spanish governor of Ternate was able to recover, and he sent it to its author. The captain-general of Filipinas, not considering his forces sufficient for waging war on the powerful sultan of Mindanao, notified the governor of Zamboanga8to accept Corralat’s excuses as sufficientuntil he could ascertain whether reënforcements were arriving from Nueva España and they could avenge so many injuries.The sultan, seeing that his insolent conduct did not receive the energetic and effectual punishment that it deserved, gained new courage, and sent out his people to make raids through the coasts of Zamboanga and Basilan—terminating the campaign by looting Tanganan, where they took captive the headman of that village, named Ampi, and twenty-three persons besides. In the Calamianes Islands also the Mindanaos committed horrible ravages. The governor of the Moluccas, Don Francisco de Esteybar, received orders to go to Zamboanga, conferring upon him, besides the command of the said post, the office of governor and captain-general of all the southern provinces of Filipinas. On the second of December of the said year 1656 he arrived at Zamboanga. When this valiant chief was informed of what had occurred, and learned that the pirates were equipping at Simuay [River] a squadron to invade the Visayas, he declared war on Corralat, without stopping to consider whether his forces were inferior or not to those of the enemy, trusting to the courage of his followers and the justice of his cause for the issue of the undertaking. In this document he ordered that ten caracoas should set out, under command of Don Fernando de Bobadilla; and these vessels went to sea on December 30. This commander detached Admiral Don Pedro de Viruega at the village of Sosocon, and Sargento-mayor Don Félix de Herrera at Point Taguima. Through his spies, Corralat knew of the departure of the squadron, and declined to send his boats against the Spanish armada; andduring twenty days Bobadilla waited in vain for the pirate vessels. During this time the dato of Sibuguey, Mintun, went to Zamboanga, offering the aid of his people against Corralat, perhaps in order not to be the leader in paying for the losses of the war. It was reported that the sultan had sent four vessels to the village of that chief for rice, and Bobadilla set out to intercept this convoy (January 2, 1657). On arriving at La Silanga,9two small caracoas went ahead to reconnoiter the place; these boats conquered a large vessel; but their crews intimidated the Lutaos who were in the Spanish ship, telling them that they would soon be destroyed by Corralat, who was expected in Mintun with fifteen vessels. As the Lutaos of Bobadilla’s squadron were inclined toward the sultan, or were afraid of falling into his power, they threatened the commandant that they would abandon the field when the battle was at its height, if the Spaniards compelled them to fight against Corralat. In view of this, Bobadilla was obliged to return to Zamboanga, losing so propitious an opportunity to avenge the wicked perfidy of the old sultan. Nevertheless, he seized a considerable number of small boats, full of rice, and forty captives. The sultan, now a declared enemy, and attributing to our weakness the failure to punish the murder of the ambassadors, commanded his squadrons to commit piracies, under the command of Prince Balatamay. That deceitful Moro, after committing the most outrageous acts of violence in Marinduque and Mindoro, returned to Mindanao with a multitude of captives and very rich spoils.While Balatamay was raiding the above-mentioned islands, a splendid squadron sailed from Cavite by order of the governor-general, in command of an officer whose name is not told in the histories, from whom brilliant conduct was expected, to judge from the valor of which he boasted in drawing-rooms; but, far from fulfilling his duty, he lingered in Balayan under pretext of securing supplies of rice, and then in Mindoro, carrying out his cowardly purpose of not encountering the Moros, notwithstanding that the forces under his command were more than sufficient to destroy the pirates. To the end that he might operate in conjunction with the said squadron, Esteybar ordered Alférez Luis de Vargas to scour the coasts of Mindanao; but as the commander of the squadron failed to carry out the instructions that he had received, Vargas, as he could not find him, confined his efforts to burning a village on the bay of Simuay, where he seized several captives. Bobadilla reduced to ashes the old capital of Corralat, Lamitan, its inhabitants having fled to the woods. Also in the said year of 1657 the dato Salicala of Mindanao scoured the seas with his squadron; the natives in consternation abandoned their villages without daring to resist him, and he carried away as captives more than a thousand Indians—his audacity going so far that he sailed into the bay of Manila.Esteybar then equipped a small squadron of caracoas and vintas, which departed from Zamboanga on January 1, 1658, resolved to chastise the pirate severely. He spread the report that they were going to Sibuguey. He reached that river in seven days and, placing part of his forces in charge of Sargento-mayor Itamarren, he destroyed the village of Namucan, and at Luraya burned many boats. Four pilanscaptured the joanga which had carried Father López to Simuay, manned by Moros from Mintun. Suddenly changing his course, he took the route to Punta de Flechas, in order to go to the capital of Corralat, but sent beforehand thirty Spaniards, with Captain Don Pedro de Viruega, to the district of Butig. Its chief Matundin, at the head of five hundred men, was defeated, the grain-fields ravaged, and the village reduced to ashes. The tilled land of this district was exceedingly rich, since it is the principal source of supply for rice in Mindanao. Great damage was also done in La Sabanilla by Captain Don Juan González Carlete. On the nineteenth of January the squadron encountered a large Dutch ship surrounded by some pirate vessels. Esteybar attempted to secure a free passage without bringing on a contest, to which end he hoisted a white flag; but the commander of the Dutch ship displayed a red flag, firing all his cannon against the Spanish vessels. Then, without heeding the superiority of the enemy, Bobadilla came against the ship, all his men rowing as hard as they could; and Esteybar attacked it at the stern. The Spaniards then were going to board the ship with a rush, when a ball fired from the vessel of Esteybar set on fire the Santa Barbara [i.e., powder-magazine] of the Dutch ship, thus blowing it into pieces. Only twenty-four of its crew survived, and these were drawn out of the sea and made prisoners. Esteybar continued his voyage to Simuay, the bar of which was fortified with heavy stockades; moreover, at its ends were two forts, garrisoned by Malays, Macassars, and Dutchmen. This did not frighten Esteybar, and he made preparations to capture the posts of the enemy, in spite of adviceto the contrary from his captains. While he was deciding the best method of accomplishing this, he passed with his squadron to the river of Buhayen, sending in by one of its entrances the valiant Bobadilla with some vessels, and by the other Sargento-mayor Itamarren. The former sacked the villages and ravaged the grain-fields of Tannil and Tabiran, the latter those of Lumapuc and Buhayen; they destroyed a powerful armada which had been prepared for raiding the islands, and carried away as spoil many versos, muskets, campilans, crises, and all kinds of weapons.In the village of Buhayen resided Prince Hamo, son of Moncay, from whom the kingdom had been usurped; he mounted a white flag and a cross above his house, being desirous of forming an alliance with the Spaniards, but they, being warned by experience with the treasons of the Moros, continued the hostilities, without attaching any importance to that signal. While they constructed rafts with which to attack the fortress of Corralat, Captain Antonio de Palacios went to destroy the village of Tampacan and its environs; and Adjutant Antonio Vázquez disembarked with orders to cut off the retreat of the enemy’s spies. These were twenty in number, thoroughly armed; Vázquez rushed upon them, and at the first encounter killed five and wounded six of them, and the rest were shot to death in the woods. Esteybar returned to the bar of Buhayen; he knew that at a day’s journey from there was a village of Lutaos, called Maolo, and, desirous to chastise that settlement and obtain information about that coast, he sent Sargento-mayor Itamarren—who, finding it deserted, set fire to the village, killed four Moros,and captured two others, the only ones who waited for the attack.Notwithstanding these provocations, and others that were directly offered to Corralat in the environs of his fortifications, it was impossible to draw him out into the open country. Having constructed a number of rafts, on which were placed pieces of artillery, the governor went aboard the largest of them, and with the aid of the vessels cannonaded the fort of Corralat for the space of four hours, but he defended it well. It was evident that the difficulties of assaulting it were insuperable, and that the artillery was operating with but little result, on account of the condition of the sea; accordingly it was decided to retire to the bar of Buhayen. The squadron went to La Sabanilla on the seventeenth of February; here Esteybar received orders to return to Molucas, and he proceeded to Zamboanga. Notwithstanding the well-known valor of this chief, and the injuries inflicted on the Moros during the two months of the campaign, this retreat gave much satisfaction to Corralat, since it freed him from [the danger of] going as a wanderer through the hills, as on previous occasions.The valiant Esteybar had been replaced as governor of the military post of Zamboanga by Don Fernando de Bobadilla—a chief no less courageous and resolute—with the same titles and preeminences as the former. Corralat, in order better to secure his dominions against the aggressions of the Spaniards, made Namu, king of Buhayen, establish a fort at the mouth of the river, the opposite shore of which was likewise fortified by Corralat; he entrusted to Marundin the defense of the bar of Simuay, and to the Basilan chiefs Ondol and Boto the construction of afortification at the entrance of the estuary of Zamboanga. Don Diego Zarria Lazcano took the place of Bobadilla, the former remaining at the head of the armada.The datos Linao and Libot of Joló, and Sacahati of Tawi-Tawi, with thirteen vessels, scoured the coasts of Bohol, Leyte, and Masbate. Near Luban they put to death father Fray Antonio de San Agustin, who on account of his ailments could not retreat to the interior of that island as did the rest who were going with him in their vessel. A squadron sailed from Manila in command of Don Pedro Duran de Monforte; they went to Luban, Mindoro, Panay, and Gigantes without discovering the pirates, and returned to the capital. The Moros were able to return to Joló with many spoils and eighty captives; but the sultan of that island sent back the said captives, in order to prove that he desired peace with the Spaniards. (Montero y Vidal.Hist. piratería, i, pp. 236–244. Cf. Combés,Hist. Mindanao, col. 533–549, 570–587.)Great were the calamities suffered by the Filipinas Islands in these years of 1657 and 58, which might have occasioned their entire ruin, if divine Providence had not manifestly preserved them, at the expense of miracles and prodigies. Even the arrogance of the Dutch recognized this, when they saw their proud forces humiliated by the unequal strength of ours; and it was acknowledged by the inhabitants of these islands, recognizing the divine clemency. In the former of those years the scourge of divine justice was the great armada of Mindanao corsairs, which, commanded by Salicala, a Moro of much valor, infested the Pintados Islands; and their insolence wentso far that they came in sight of the great bay of Manila. The poor natives who groaned under the yoke of captivity to these pirates amounted to more than a thousand; and as it was impossible for most of them to furnish ransom for their persons, they usually died as slaves of the Moros. I have not been able to learn the reason why no assistance was given to deliver them by going out to find those pirates—although I do not believe that it was the absence of compassion in Governor Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara, but rather his lack of means, and his being engrossed with more pressing affairs. This was followed by the plagues of innumerable locusts, which, laying waste the fields, made general havoc, occasioning the famine which was the worst enemy of the poor; this was followed by its inseparable companion, pestilence, which made great ravages with a general epidemic of smallpox. (Diaz,Conquistas, p. 556.)General Don Agustin de Cepeda went to Zamboanga as governor (June 16, 1659), without any events worthy of mention occurring during the time while he exercised that office; afterward he went to assume the government of Molucas. He who took his place10experienced great annoyances with the Jesuits, who in their histories relate in great detail how much he tried to injure their interests; but Don Fernando Bobadilla was again charged with the government of Zamboanga (February 15, 1662).The authorities and citizens of Manila were the victims in May, 1662, of a fearful panic, on account of the claim by the powerful Chinese pirate Kue-Singthat the little realm of Filipinas should render him homage and be declared his tributary, under penalty of his going with his squadrons to destroy the Spaniards—as he had done with the Dutch, expelling them from Formosa. This embassy, which was brought to Manila by the Dominican father Fray Victorio Ricci, and the consequent indignation against the Chinese, were the origin of an insurrection by those who resided in Manila, which was subdued; and the conference of authorities resolved to expel them from the country and repel by force of arms the aggression of Kue-Sing—the governor-general making ready great armaments, and whatever preparations for defense seemed to him necessary that he might come out victorious from the tremendous danger that threatened the island.But the most important and most far-reaching of the measures adopted by the council at which Manrique de Lara presided was the abandonment of the advantageous post of Zamboanga—the advanced sentinel of our domination over the coasts inhabited by the fierce Malay Mahometans—and those of La Sabanilla, Calamianes, and Iligan (which were also important in the highest degree), with the intention of concentrating in Manila all the forces which garrisoned those posts (May 6). This notification caused, among the Spanish subjects of those lands, or it may be among the Lutaos, profound sorrow and the utmost fear. They complained bitterly of the unprotected state in which they were left, remaining exposed to the vengeance of the Moros—who no longer could consider them as belonging to their race, and bore a mortal hatred to them for havingbecome Christians.11These just complaints, and the knowledge of the damages which would result from the withdrawal of the Spanish forces, impelled the governor of the fort, Don Fernando Bobadilla, and the learned Father Combés to entreat the governor-general to revoke his mandate, both explaining to him the very cogent and strong reasons which prompted their advice. The news that the Spaniards were involved in so tremendous a conflict encouragedthe Joloans to repeat once more their terrible incursions. The datos of Joló, Tawi-Tawi, Lacay-Lacay, and Tuptup, equipped sixty vessels, and, dividing their forces into several small squadrons, sacked and burned the villages of Poro, Baybay, Sogor, Cabalian, Basey, Dangajon, Guinobatan, and Capul. They killed Captain Gabriel de la Peña; they captured an official of the same class, Ignacio de la Cueva, and the Jesuit father Buenaventura Barcena; they went even to the mountains in pursuit of the religious; and all the Indians whom they caught they carried away as captives to their own country, killing many of all ages and classes.The governor-general of the islands sent a squadron to pursue the pirates, but they accomplishednothing. From Zamboanga Adjutant Francisco Alvarez went out alone to encounter them; he captured the caracoa of the pirate Gani, a relative of Salé, and of thirty captives whom the latter was carrying away. Alvarez freed twenty-two—afterward going to an island of Joló, where he captured twelve Moros. Bobadilla, in answer to his message, on November 8 received pressing orders to return to Manila without loss of time, the governor yielding so far as to allow that he might leave in the fortress of Zamboanga at most fifty Spaniards. This was equivalent to condemning those unfortunates to a sure death, and the Jesuit fathers protested against it, saying that necessarily they would incur the same fate; but finally the supreme authority of the islands decided upon the total abandonment of the postsabove mentioned. Nevertheless Bobadilla, with the object of encouraging the Lutaos and leading the Moros to believe that he was not abandoning the post, sent in pursuit of them Don Juan de Morales Valenzuela, with two caracoas, to the islands called “Orejas de Liebre,” on January 2, 1663; but on the fourth of the same month he received a new and more positive order from the captain-general, dated October 11, that without delay or any excuse he must abandon Zamboanga. At sight of this, Bobadilla warned Morales that the withdrawal must be made, as was done on the seventh—as promptly as possible fulfilling the said imperious mandate, convinced that it was now altogether impossible to oppose so plain a decision.The governor of Zamboanga made a solemn surrender of the fort to the master-of-camp of the Lutao natives, Don Alonso Macombon, receiving from him an oath of fidelity to hold it for the king of España and defend it from his enemies; but Don Alonso refused to include among these the sultan of Mindanao, on the pretext that he had not sufficient strength to oppose the dreaded Corralat. The governor, fearing his defection, did not leave him any artillery. The Jesuits also surrendered to Macombon their houses and churches, carrying away the images, ornaments, chalices, and books; and six thousand Christians remained in Zamboanga exposed to the rage of the Mahometans. Some Lutaos, although not many, decided to go to the province of Cebú, or to that of Dapitan; others scattered through Joló or Mindanao in search of safety, returning to their former religion.The abandonment of our military posts in Mindanaowas, although it is excused by the embarrassed condition of the capital of the islands, an exceedingly imprudent measure, since, in order to provide for an uncertain danger, the Visayan Islands were left exposed to another which was more immediate and real—to say nothing of the retrogression that must necessarily result to our domination among the natives of Mindanao, where at that time over seventy thousand Christians lived. The pirate who could cause such a panic in the authorities of Manila, and occasioned so great losses to the undertaking of subduing the Mahometan Malay pirates, died without carrying out his threats.During the government of Don Juan de Vargas (1679), the sultan of Borneo sent an embassy to ask that mercantile dealings might be established with Filipinas; and Vargas in his turn sent another and a very distinguished one, headed by Sargento-mayor Don Juan Morales de Valenzuela. In 1701 occurred in the south of Filipinas an event as tragic as unusual. The sultan of Joló went to visit the ruler of Mindanao, for greater ostentation taking with him as escort a squadron composed of sixty-seven vessels. At sight of such a retinue the sultan of Mindanao, Cutay12(the successor of the noted Corralat), feared that the other had designs that were not peaceable, and commanded that the mouth of the river should be closed; but the sultan of Joló, offended thereat, dared the other to a personal combat. This challenge was accepted, and the two sultans engaged in a hand-to-hand contest, so fierce that each slew the other; and immediately war was kindled between the two peoples. The Joloans, breaking down the stakes which closed theriver, retired to their own island with many weapons and spoils. The new ruler of Mindanao asked aid from the governor of Manila, Don Domingo Zubálburu; but the latter advised that they should lay aside their dissensions, and for that purpose sent the Jesuit Father Antonio de Borja, who was able to attain his object. (Montero y Vidal,Hist. piratería, i, pp. 244–252. Cf. Combés,Hist. Mindanao, col. 610–640.)The king of Joló, on the contrary, had for many years maintained peace and friendly relations with the Spaniards, much to the resentment of his chiefs and captains, who derived much more profit from hostile raids than from trade and peace; therefore by means of their confidential agents they spread the report that the king of Joló was talking of sending an armed fleet of twenty joangas to plunder these islands. The principal author of this was a Joloan named Linao, who was on intimate terms with the Spaniards, and a Guimbano named Palía. But the king of Joló was very far from thinking of such changes, and it would have been better for us if we had not so readily believed it. At this information Don Fernando de Bobadilla despatched his armada against Joló, under General Don Pedro de Viruega; but when he reached that island he found that the story that they had spread abroad against the king was false, and Don Pedro, having talked with him, went back to Zamboanga well satisfied of his peaceable attitude. But it was not long before the former rumors against the king of Joló were again current; the author of them was Linao, who desired a rupture [with the Spaniards], so that he with other pirates might go out on raids against these islands—in which enterprise he was more interested than in the peace ofhis king. This plan he carried out in company with two others, Libot and Sacahati, who went cruising with several vessels and did much damage in the islands of Pintados and Masbate, until they reached the Limbones;13from that place they chased the corregidor of Mariveles, and captured the provincial of our discalced Augustinian religious and those who were accompanying him, on his return from visiting the Christian villages of Bolinao—although these persons escaped by jumping ashore. But there was one who could not do this, father Fray Antonio de las Misas (also a discalced Augustinian), who was coming from Cuyo and Calamianes to visit those convents. This religious might with good reason be regarded as a martyr; for with his blood only were the hands of the renegade Linao stained, as he spared the lives of all the rest in his greed for ransom. Although the pirates knew that the ransom of this religious promised them more profit [than that of an ordinary captive], their hatred to the faith prevailed over their greed, which in these barbarians is great. This opinion is confirmed by the cruelty with which they treated an image of Our Lady of the People, which this religious was wearing, on which they used their crises with furious rage. This religious was an old man, and greatly esteemed for his virtue; and in the order he had held positions of honor—prior of the convent at Manila, vicar-provincial of Cebú, and other posts in Caraga. He had a brother, a lay member of the Society of Jesus in these islands, who also suffered the same kind of death at the hands of the barbarous pirates called Camucones—a nationas cruel as cowardly, two qualities which always go together.Great was the injury which these pirates inflicted on the islands, and although the alcalde-mayor of Balayan went out against them with some armed vessels they could not be found, either by him or by some other vessels which went from Manila for this purpose with a considerable force of men, on account of the adroitness with which the Moros concealed themselves, avoiding an encounter—to such an extent that the belief was current in Manila that these were not outside enemies, but insurgent Indians of the country, until a Spaniard who had been seized by the enemy at the shoals of Mindoro made his escape from them, and his account undeceived the people of Manila. The governor despatched an armed fleet in command of Admiral Pedro Durán de Monforte, a soldier of long experience, but this remedy came too late; for the pirates, satiated with burning villages, plundering, and taking captives, had returned to their own country. Accordingly the armada, having vainly scouted along Lubán, Mindoro, and Panay, returned to Manila, having accomplished nothing save the expenses which were caused for the royal exchequer, which is the paymaster for these and other cases of negligence.The distrust which was felt regarding the maintenance of the peace by the king of Joló perhaps occasioned anger that he had not prevented these injuries; but he, knowing that if he did not make amends it would be a cause for justifiable hostilities, sent an embassy to the governor (who was Don Diego Sarria Lazcano), exonerating himself and promising to chastise Linao, Libot, and Sacahati;this he did, and many captives were restored, which was no slight [amends]. King Corralat raised his false alarms, as he was wont to do when that suited him, and also made some trifling raids through the agency of the people of Sibuguey, and threatened the Zebuans at Dapitán. But all became quiet when the office of governor of those coasts was assumed (June 16, 1659) by Don Agustín de Cepeda, a great soldier—who died in decrepit old age as master-of-camp of these Filipinas. Corralat knew, much to his sorrow, the valor of this able officer, and therefore did not dare to anger him, content that the Spaniards should leave him in peace. Don Agustín, as a prudent man, determined to try measures to secure peace; and, conferences having been held, those measures were carried out, with very advantageous arrangements for our forces.The frequent raids of these Moro pirates, both Mindanaos and Joloans, were one of the greatest hardships which these Filipinas Islands suffered through many continuous years; they were the scourge of the natives of the islands of Pintados and Camarines, Tayabas, and Mindoro, as being nearest to the danger and most weak for defense. These people paid with their beloved liberty for our neglect to defend them—not always deserving of blame, on account of the mutations of the times. Few Spaniards have been the prey of these vile thieves, except some who were very incautious; but amends have been made for these by many religious and some secular priests, ministers in the Indian villages, who have suffered rigorous captivities and cruel deaths. No small amount of expenditure has fallen on the royal exchequer; for those pirates have caused innumerableexpenses in armed fleets, most of them useless because the news of the loss did not reach us until the pirates were returning unhurt to their own lands. At times it has given even the governors and captains-general of these islands plenty to do in defending them from these pilfering thieves, as we saw in the first part of this history, in the case of Don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera and others. All the life of Cachil Corralat—which was a very long one, for it exceeded ninety years—and that of his father Bahisan kept our vigilance continually on the alert, and caused us to found and maintain the fortified posts of Zamboanga, Sabanilla, Malanao, and others—which caused so much expense and no profits; for the forts defend only a small space, and the sea has many roads, and thus they did not hinder the Moro fleets from sallying forth whenever they chose. Moreover, Corralat had all the Lutaos for spies, on account of their great reverence for him, and because they were in secret as much Mahometans as himself; for never is a Lutao found who has not been circumcised, or one who eats pork—and it is this which constitutes their Mahometanism, as also having many wives and being enemies of Christians; for in other respects they are atheists, and do not know what the Koran is or what it contains. And, as I have heard from military men who have experience in these wars, the only restraint upon these Joloan and Mindanao enemies is in armed fleets, which go to search for them in their homes and inflict on them all the damage they can, without going inland; for the Spaniards will not find any one there on whom to avenge themselves, since the inhabitants are safe in their thick forests and on impregnable heights.After so many years of misfortunes the divine mercy took pity on these poor natives, on whom the cruelty and greed of the Moros had so long fattened, selecting as an agent the very Corralat who had been the cause of the past havoc. With old age and experience he came to see the injury which was resulting to his people (and most of all to the kings of Mindanao) from having enemies so valiant as the Spaniards had proved to be; and therefore while he lived he maintained peace with Manila, with friendly relations and the benefit of commerce on both sides. And when his death arrived, which was at the end of the year 1671, he left his nephew and heir, Balatamay, strictly charged to keep the peace, with heavy curses and imprecations, according to their custom; and his people obeyed him so well that for a long time no raid was heard of; nor was there any by the Camucones, who are subject to Borney. The king of Joló, Paguián, has preserved the same peace and friendship; for all the Moro tribes of these regions reverenced Corralat as if he were Mahoma himself. For he was a Moro of great courage, intelligence, and sagacity, besides being exceedingly zealous for his accursed sect, and a great sorcerer—for all of which he probably has met condign punishment. (Diaz,Conquistas, pp. 564–567.)The governor [i.e., Manuel de León, in 1674] commanded Juan Canosa Raguses, a skilful builder of lateen-rigged vessels, to construct two galleys; these sailed very straight and light, and did good service in frightening away the Camucones, pilfering and troublesome pirates, who in most years infested the Pintados Islands with pillaging and seizure of captives. These are a barbarous, cruel, and cowardlypeople, and they cannot have one of these traits without the others. They inhabit a chain of small islands, which extend from Paragua to Borney; some of them are Mahometans and others heathens. They have done much harm to the islands of Bisayas, which they ravaged quite at their ease—so much so that in the year 1672 they carried away the alcalde-mayor, Don José de San Miguel, as we have mentioned elsewhere. They have a great advantage in the extreme swiftness of their vessels, which enables them to find their defense in flight. Their confidence and boldness went so far that they ventured to infest the coasts of Manila. The provincial, Fray José Duque, while going to visit the convents in the islands of Pintados, came very near being captured with his companion, Fray Alvaro de Benavente; for they were attacked by a squadron of these pirates near the island of Marinduque, where they would have been a prey to Moro cruelty, if they had not been favored by the divine kindness. [This acted] through the agency of Captain Francisco Ponce, a veteran soldier, who killed the captain and another of the pirates; and also of a sudden wind, which gave wings to the champan for placing itself in safety. With the building of these galleys the Camucones were inspired with such terror that for many years they did not venture to sally out for their usual raids, so much in safety as before. The first time, Sargento-mayor Pedro Lozano went out to scour the seas through which the Camucones might come to make their raids. In the following year, Captain Don José de Novoa went out—a brave Galician, the encomendero of Gapang—and as commander of the second galley Captain Simón de Torres, an able soldier from Maluco; and theyscoured the coasts of Mindanao, committing some acts of hostility, their sole object therein being to cause more terror than harm. And thus it was, that with the fear which those piratical tribes had conceived of the galleys neither Joloans, Mindanaos, nor Camucones dared, so long as these lasted, to commit their former ravages. The same thing occurs whenever there are galleys, even though they do not go out to sea and are shut up in the port of Cavite. It is therefore very expedient to keep vessels of this sort, in order to be free from the invasions of those pirates. In view of this, Governor Don Domingo de Zabálburu built two other galleys, which was the cause of the Joloans, Mindanaos, and Camucones remaining, throughout his term of office, within their own boundaries, although they had been in previous years, as we have seen, a continual plague to these islands. (Diaz,Conquistas, p. 711.)141Spanish,romper el nombre; “to cease using the countersign of recognition, when daybreak comes, for which purpose the drums, cornets, trumpets, or other musical instruments give the signal with the call nameddiana” (Dominguez); cf. Frenchreveille.2In Sulu roadstead; anchorage is north of the town. In channel between Sulu roadstead and Marongas is a pearl-oysterbed, which employs many boats. This is an important industry, pearls and pearl-shells being the chief articles in the export trade of the island. (U. S. Philippine Gazetteer.)3Colin (who was at that time in Joló) says of this (Labor evangélica, ed. 1663, p. 49): “There was found near the island of Joló a piece [of amber] which weighed more than eight arrobas, of the best kind that exists, which is the gray [el gris].” Retana and Pastells regard Combés’sambaras meaning amber, the vegetable fossil; but it is possible that all these writers mean rather ambergris, which is supposed to be a morbid secretion of the sperm whale, and has been used as a perfume.4It was Lopez who soon afterward, having gone to Manila to report results to Governor Fajardo, secured (largely throughthe influence of Venegas, who was very friendly to Lopez) permission for six Jesuits to labor in the islands of the south, the rebuilding of their residence at Zamboanga, and the exemption of the Lutaos from tribute, and the appointment of Rafael Omen de Azevedo as governor. (Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 151 b.)5In the text,desvelar, “to keep awake”—but from the context, apparently an error of some sort.6Spanish,dió una bofetada, literally, “gave a blow in the face”—in the Spanish a play on words which it is difficult to retain in English.7This order was carried out by Balatamay, on December 13, 1655. See Combés’s detailed account of this tragedy, as cited by Diaz.8Pedro Durán de Monforte; his term of office began in 1649, and lasted until Esteybar’s arrival at Zamboanga (Dec. 2, 1656).9“La Silanga, which is a strait that is formed by the island of Tulaya with the land of Mindanao” (Diaz, p. 561). Retana and Pastells, in their edition ofCombés, make Tulaya the modern Tulayan, near Sulu—an evident error, from Diaz’s statement.10Referring to the governorad interimfrom November, 1661 to February, 1662; Combés describes at length his “persecution” of the Jesuits at Zamboanga (col. 591–609), but does not mention his name.11“Hardly had Morales reached the islands, when a new despatch arrived from Manila, repeating the same orders. The silence of the Spaniards [i.e., regarding their first order to leave the fort], and the hurried preparations that were made that very night for the withdrawal of Morales, inflamed the injured feelings of the Lutaos, nor could any argument repress them. The governor did not attempt to do more than console them, in order that they might prudently decide what they should do; he told them that the Spaniards would never forsake them, and that if the Lutaos would follow them there were places in the islands, with equal and even greater advantages, where they could live; that Corralat was friendly, and the Spaniards would charge him to maintain friendly relations with them, which they could with good reason expect, as he was of the same nation as themselves; that if he should not fulfil this obligation, occasion would not fail the Spaniards to avenge them. He also said that they could, with the forts which he left to them, easily defend themselves from their enemies; and finally, that they should await the ultimate decision which would be brought by General Don Francisco de Atienza on his way to Maluco, since it might improve the condition of affairs.“Little impression did these arguments, which the Spaniards offered by way of consolation, make on the Lutaos. The tyrannies that they would experience when left to their own government had no respect for kinship, nor was there any law save that of might. To leave their homes was most difficult, and to transplant their villages was to ruin them. To defend the fort supplies of ammunition and food were required, and they had no fund to meet these costs. They gave way to lamentations and complaints that, as they had served the Spaniards with their lives, they had roused in their neighbors a mortal hatred; that, notwithstanding they had become Christians, they were left abandoned, in the power of the Moros, without instruction, or defense, or honor. They recounted their services, and their sighs grew heavier, while they declared as false the promises made to themin the beginning, which drew them away from obedience to their natural king; and that with such an example [as this of the Lutaos before them] the peoples [of Mindanao] would not change sides in order to please a nation so unreliable [as the Spaniards]. The Subanos also presented their piteous remonstrances that as a people of the hill-country, and of timid disposition, they were exposed to greater misfortunes. They went to the fort and renewed their importunities, saying that the Spaniards were deserting and abandoning them [notwithstanding] their humble submission, and leaving them to be slaves of their enemies; that although they had maintained the Spaniards with their tributes, provided their houses with their products, and embraced their faith, contented with the freedom which followed Spanish protection, yet now their liberty remained at the mercy of greed, the Spaniards profiting by their lives for the sake of keeping up intercourse with the Macassars and Malayos; and that it was too much to be endured, to leave in such infamous subjection vassals so obedient as they. The governor, his heart pierced by their pathetic expostulations, could give no other satisfaction than his own anxious hopes. In the midst of these limited and sad consolations, with the arrival of the succors for Terrenate came anew the severe orders [for abandoning the forts]; the governor was now unable to give them courage, for lack of means, and all were disconsolate; but it was necessary to execute the rigorous order—those who remained being as sorrowful at it as were those who were going away, and each one endeavoring to make hisdecision and to suit it to this emergency. Some went to Mindanao, others to Joló, and others to Basilan; many dispersed in the coasts of Zamboangan, the people of Don Alonso Macombon remaining here with him; and a few determined to follow the fortunes of those who retreated thence, going to settle at Dapitan and Zebù.... In the vessels had to be placed more than a thousand souls, and the military supplies. It was a grievous abandonment, by which more than a thousand Christians were left exposed to the cruelty of the Moros.... In great part it was due to the obstinacy of the Jesuits, who, regarding the allowance of fifty men as insufficient, compelled its total abandonment. Such garrisons have been and are sufficient to oppose the Moros in the remaining presidios; and the same would be enough in Zamboangan if the great extent which must be guarded, on account of the size of the fort, were reduced to a little, demolishing the less important part [of the fortifications]. But their profound thoughts feared lest that fort would afterward remain thus scantily garrisoned, and that it would not make so much show or its administration be so conspicuous; nor would there be expended in the allowances [for it] so large sums, which they converted to their own advantage.... Soon there were representations made at the court of injury resulting from its desertion, and consequent royal decrees for its reconstruction, which did not take effect until long afterward.” (Concepción,Hist. de Philipinas, vii, pp. 93–97.)12This name is Curay in Concepción’sHistoria.13An island and point at the entrance to Patungan Bay, in Batangas, Luzón.14It is evident, from the above statements by Diaz, that Barrantes is incorrect in saying (Guerras piráticas, p. 17): “In this manner, so melancholy for Filipinas, ended the seventeenth century.” He has made this hasty and unfounded conclusion through failure to search for material to supply the gap which occurs at this point in the narrative which he has used as the basis of the work above cited. This is a MS. narrative of the Moro wars, for an account of which see ourVol. XXIX, p. 174, note 40.
I[In previous volumes have appeared various accounts of the piratical raids made, down to 1640, by the Mahometan Malays of Mindanao and other southern islands against the Spaniards and the native tribes whom they had subjected in the northern islands. A very brief outline of that information is here presented, with citations of volumes where it appears, as a preliminary to some further account which shall summarize this subject for the remainder of the seventeenth century.][When Legazpi first explored the Philippines, he sent some of his officers to open up trade with Mindanao, then reputed to be rich in gold and cinnamon (Vol. II, pp. 116–118, 147, 154, 209, 210). At the outset, much jealousy arose among the Spaniards against the Mahometan Malays (whom they called Moros) of that and other islands in the southern part of the Eastern archipelago, for two reasons—the Moros were “infidels,” and they far excelled the Spaniards as traders (Vol. II, pp. 156, 159, 186, 187;IV, pp. 66, 151, 174). Moreover, the natives were everywhere hostile to the Spaniards because the Portuguese representing themselves to be Castilians,had previously made cruel raids on some of those islands, notably Bohol (Vol. II, pp. 117, 184, 207, 208, 229;III, p. 46). In that first year, 1565, a Bornean vessel was captured by the Spaniards, after a desperate fight; but hostilities then went no further (Vol. II, pp. 116, 206). The Moros of the Rio Grande of Mindanao proffered (1574) their submission to the Spanish power, apparently being in some awe of it (Vol. III, p. 275). Governor Sande had expansive ideas of Spanish dominion, and in 1578–79 undertook an expedition for the subjugation of Borneo, Mindanao, and Joló; he obtained a temporary success, but the Moros again asserted their independence as soon as the Spaniards departed (Vol. IV, pp. 125, 130, 148–303; XV, pp. 54, 132). This expedition was partly caused by piratical raids made by the Borneans (Vol. IV, pp. 151, 153, 154, 159;VI, p. 183), and the Joloans (Vol. IV, pp. 176, 236) against the northern islands. Apparently this punishment intimidated the Moros for a time; the next important raid by them was in 1595 (Vol. IX, p. 196;XI, p. 266). In 1591 Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa had made a contract with Gomez P. Dasmariñas for the conquest of Mindanao (Vol. VIII, pp. 73–77). The island had then been partly explored and much of it assigned to Spaniards in repartimiento; some of these allotments are mentioned inVol. VIII, pp. 127, 128, 132 (a list of those bestowed in 1571 is found in the Pastells edition of Colin’sLabor evangélica, i, p. 157, note 1). Instructions were given to Figueroa on November 13, 1595 (Vol. IX, pp. 181–188), and in the following spring he set out with an armed force; but hardly had he begun the campaign when he was slain bya Moro (Vol. IX, pp. 195, 196, 263–265, 276, 277; XV, pp. 89–93;XVI, pp. 270–272). Juan de Ronquillo succeeded him, and for the time “pacified” the hostile Moros (Vol. IX, pp. 281–298;X, pp. 41, 42, 49, 168, 169, 214, 215;XI, p. 236;XV, pp. 95–100;XVI, pp. 273, 274); see his own report of the campaign (Vol. X, pp. 53–74) and Tello’s (Vol. X, pp. 219–226; cf.Vol. XI, pp. 135–139). In 1599 the Spanish fort at La Caldera was dismantled (Vol. XI, pp. 138, 139, 237;XV, pp. 190, 191); this emboldened the Moros to renew their piracies, and from 1600 on they harassed the Visayan Islands and even Luzón—not only the Mindanaos but their allies the Ternatans, and the Joloans (Vol. XI, pp. 238, 239, 292–301, 303;XII, pp. 32, 39–41, 134–137;XIII, pp. 49, 146, 147;XV, pp. 192–196, 209, 265–267;XVIII, pp. 185–187, 331, 333;XIX, pp. 67, 68, 215–218, 223–225;XXII, pp. 89, 90, 203–206;XXIII, p. 259;XXIV, pp. 35–37, 102–104, 139, 142, 143, 329;XXV, pp. 86, 105, 152–154, 199;XXVI, p. 285;XXVII, pp. 215–226, 316). Similar raids were made by the Camucones, Moros from some small islands near Borneo (Vol. XVIII, p. 79;XXII, pp. 89, 132, 133, 202, 296–298, 303;XXIV, pp. 97, 138;XXV, pp. 154–156;XXVII, pp. 314–316;XXIX, pp. 31, 200). These attacks kept the peaceful natives in constant fear; their villages were burned and plundered, and their fields ravaged; and thousands were carried away to be sold as slaves, being thus dispersed among the Malay Islands. In 1621 Hernando de los Rios Coronel stated that ten thousand Christians were held captive in Mindanao (Vol. XIX, p. 264). At times the Spaniards sent armed fleets in pursuit of these pirates, but the latter would escape, on account of the superior lightness andswiftness of their vessels. Punitive expeditions were sent to their villages, some of which were futile, but others inflicted on them severe punishment—Jolo: 1602 (Vol. XV, pp. 240–243, 264, 265), 1626 (XXII, pp. 207–210), 1628 (XXII, pp. 293–295;XXIV, pp. 143–145), 1630 (XXIII, pp. 87, 88, 98;XXIV, pp. 163–165); and Mindanao: 1625 (XXII, pp. 116–119, 218, 224). It was proposed to enslave any Moro pirates who might be captured (Vol. XVII, pp. 187, 296, 331;XXIX, p. 269), and this was sometimes done (Vol. XXII, p. 134). Finally, Corcuera undertook to chastise them effectually; and in 1637 he led a large and well-equipped expedition to Mindanao, which captured Corralat’s stronghold and devastated nearly all the coast of that island, driving out Corralat as a fugitive and intimidating other chiefs who had intrigued with him against the Spaniards (Vol. XXVII, pp. 253–305, 319–325, 346–357;XXIX, pp. 28–30, 60, 86–101, 116–134). Corcuera followed up this success by another in Joló, in 1638 (Vol. XXVII, p. 325;XXVIII, pp. 41–63;XXIX, pp. 32, 36, 43, 44, 135, 136), and in the following year a Spanish expedition severely chastised the Moros around Lake Lanao, in Mindanao (XXIX, pp. 159, 161–163, 273–275); further military operations in Joló and Mindanao, on a smaller scale, occurred during 1638–39 (Vol. XXIX, pp. 141–166, 198–200). It may be noted, further, that the Jesuits established missions there at an early date, evangelists of that order going with Figueroa in 1596 (Vol. XII, pp. 313–321;XIII, pp. 47–49, 86–89;XXII, p. 117;XXVIII, pp. 94–99, 151, 171); and others were founded by Augustinian Recollects (XXI, pp. 196–247, 298–303;XXIV, p. 115;XXVIII, pp. 152, 175, 340–345).]
[In previous volumes have appeared various accounts of the piratical raids made, down to 1640, by the Mahometan Malays of Mindanao and other southern islands against the Spaniards and the native tribes whom they had subjected in the northern islands. A very brief outline of that information is here presented, with citations of volumes where it appears, as a preliminary to some further account which shall summarize this subject for the remainder of the seventeenth century.]
[When Legazpi first explored the Philippines, he sent some of his officers to open up trade with Mindanao, then reputed to be rich in gold and cinnamon (Vol. II, pp. 116–118, 147, 154, 209, 210). At the outset, much jealousy arose among the Spaniards against the Mahometan Malays (whom they called Moros) of that and other islands in the southern part of the Eastern archipelago, for two reasons—the Moros were “infidels,” and they far excelled the Spaniards as traders (Vol. II, pp. 156, 159, 186, 187;IV, pp. 66, 151, 174). Moreover, the natives were everywhere hostile to the Spaniards because the Portuguese representing themselves to be Castilians,had previously made cruel raids on some of those islands, notably Bohol (Vol. II, pp. 117, 184, 207, 208, 229;III, p. 46). In that first year, 1565, a Bornean vessel was captured by the Spaniards, after a desperate fight; but hostilities then went no further (Vol. II, pp. 116, 206). The Moros of the Rio Grande of Mindanao proffered (1574) their submission to the Spanish power, apparently being in some awe of it (Vol. III, p. 275). Governor Sande had expansive ideas of Spanish dominion, and in 1578–79 undertook an expedition for the subjugation of Borneo, Mindanao, and Joló; he obtained a temporary success, but the Moros again asserted their independence as soon as the Spaniards departed (Vol. IV, pp. 125, 130, 148–303; XV, pp. 54, 132). This expedition was partly caused by piratical raids made by the Borneans (Vol. IV, pp. 151, 153, 154, 159;VI, p. 183), and the Joloans (Vol. IV, pp. 176, 236) against the northern islands. Apparently this punishment intimidated the Moros for a time; the next important raid by them was in 1595 (Vol. IX, p. 196;XI, p. 266). In 1591 Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa had made a contract with Gomez P. Dasmariñas for the conquest of Mindanao (Vol. VIII, pp. 73–77). The island had then been partly explored and much of it assigned to Spaniards in repartimiento; some of these allotments are mentioned inVol. VIII, pp. 127, 128, 132 (a list of those bestowed in 1571 is found in the Pastells edition of Colin’sLabor evangélica, i, p. 157, note 1). Instructions were given to Figueroa on November 13, 1595 (Vol. IX, pp. 181–188), and in the following spring he set out with an armed force; but hardly had he begun the campaign when he was slain bya Moro (Vol. IX, pp. 195, 196, 263–265, 276, 277; XV, pp. 89–93;XVI, pp. 270–272). Juan de Ronquillo succeeded him, and for the time “pacified” the hostile Moros (Vol. IX, pp. 281–298;X, pp. 41, 42, 49, 168, 169, 214, 215;XI, p. 236;XV, pp. 95–100;XVI, pp. 273, 274); see his own report of the campaign (Vol. X, pp. 53–74) and Tello’s (Vol. X, pp. 219–226; cf.Vol. XI, pp. 135–139). In 1599 the Spanish fort at La Caldera was dismantled (Vol. XI, pp. 138, 139, 237;XV, pp. 190, 191); this emboldened the Moros to renew their piracies, and from 1600 on they harassed the Visayan Islands and even Luzón—not only the Mindanaos but their allies the Ternatans, and the Joloans (Vol. XI, pp. 238, 239, 292–301, 303;XII, pp. 32, 39–41, 134–137;XIII, pp. 49, 146, 147;XV, pp. 192–196, 209, 265–267;XVIII, pp. 185–187, 331, 333;XIX, pp. 67, 68, 215–218, 223–225;XXII, pp. 89, 90, 203–206;XXIII, p. 259;XXIV, pp. 35–37, 102–104, 139, 142, 143, 329;XXV, pp. 86, 105, 152–154, 199;XXVI, p. 285;XXVII, pp. 215–226, 316). Similar raids were made by the Camucones, Moros from some small islands near Borneo (Vol. XVIII, p. 79;XXII, pp. 89, 132, 133, 202, 296–298, 303;XXIV, pp. 97, 138;XXV, pp. 154–156;XXVII, pp. 314–316;XXIX, pp. 31, 200). These attacks kept the peaceful natives in constant fear; their villages were burned and plundered, and their fields ravaged; and thousands were carried away to be sold as slaves, being thus dispersed among the Malay Islands. In 1621 Hernando de los Rios Coronel stated that ten thousand Christians were held captive in Mindanao (Vol. XIX, p. 264). At times the Spaniards sent armed fleets in pursuit of these pirates, but the latter would escape, on account of the superior lightness andswiftness of their vessels. Punitive expeditions were sent to their villages, some of which were futile, but others inflicted on them severe punishment—Jolo: 1602 (Vol. XV, pp. 240–243, 264, 265), 1626 (XXII, pp. 207–210), 1628 (XXII, pp. 293–295;XXIV, pp. 143–145), 1630 (XXIII, pp. 87, 88, 98;XXIV, pp. 163–165); and Mindanao: 1625 (XXII, pp. 116–119, 218, 224). It was proposed to enslave any Moro pirates who might be captured (Vol. XVII, pp. 187, 296, 331;XXIX, p. 269), and this was sometimes done (Vol. XXII, p. 134). Finally, Corcuera undertook to chastise them effectually; and in 1637 he led a large and well-equipped expedition to Mindanao, which captured Corralat’s stronghold and devastated nearly all the coast of that island, driving out Corralat as a fugitive and intimidating other chiefs who had intrigued with him against the Spaniards (Vol. XXVII, pp. 253–305, 319–325, 346–357;XXIX, pp. 28–30, 60, 86–101, 116–134). Corcuera followed up this success by another in Joló, in 1638 (Vol. XXVII, p. 325;XXVIII, pp. 41–63;XXIX, pp. 32, 36, 43, 44, 135, 136), and in the following year a Spanish expedition severely chastised the Moros around Lake Lanao, in Mindanao (XXIX, pp. 159, 161–163, 273–275); further military operations in Joló and Mindanao, on a smaller scale, occurred during 1638–39 (Vol. XXIX, pp. 141–166, 198–200). It may be noted, further, that the Jesuits established missions there at an early date, evangelists of that order going with Figueroa in 1596 (Vol. XII, pp. 313–321;XIII, pp. 47–49, 86–89;XXII, p. 117;XXVIII, pp. 94–99, 151, 171); and others were founded by Augustinian Recollects (XXI, pp. 196–247, 298–303;XXIV, p. 115;XXVIII, pp. 152, 175, 340–345).]
II[The second reduction of Joló—by Almonte, in 1639 (Vol. XXIX, p. 143)—subdued all of that archipelago, save the Guimbanos, a fierce Moro people inhabiting the mountains of Sulu (Joló) Island, who were hostile to the Joloans of the coast. When Almonte ordered them to cease disturbing the pacified Joloans, the Guimbanos made an insolent reply, telling the Spaniards to come to their country and learn the difference between them and the Joloans. Almonte therefore sent (July, 1639) troops, under Luis de Guzman and Agustin de Cepeda, to subdue these proud mountaineers; and after a fierce battle the Guimbanos retreated, leaving four hundred dead on the field, and three hundred captives in the hands of the Spaniards—of whom eight died, including Guzman, besides twenty Indian auxiliaries. (Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 96 b, 97.) After the departure of Almonte from Joló, affairs went ill, Morales being unfit for his post as governor of those islands, although he was valiant in battle. Having abducted a beautiful girl, daughter of a chief named Salibanza, a conspiracy against him was formed by the enraged father; this was discovered, and the leaders seized. This, with several arbitrary and hostile measures of Morales, stirred up the Joloans to revolt, and an affray occurred between them and the Spaniards, in which Morales was wounded. Juan Ruiz Maroto was sent to relieve him from office, and tried to pacify the natives, but in vain; he then sent Pedro de la Mata Vergara to harry all the coast of Joló, who burned many villages and carried away three thousand captives. Mata, being obliged to return to Mindanao, was succeededby Morales, who rashly attacked (near Párang, Sulu Island) a force of Moros with troops exhausted by forced marches; the Spaniards, although in numbers far superior to the Moros, were ignominiously put to flight, thirty-nine of their number being slain, including Morales and another officer. At this time Cepeda was governor of Joló, and he soon found it necessary to chastise the natives, who were encouraged to rebellion by their recent victory. (Combés,Hist. de Mindanao, col. 402–412; Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 121–122; Montero y Vidal,Hist. piratería, i, pp. 175–181, 199–211.) An account of his exploits in this direction is furnished by letters of the Jesuit Miguel Paterio to Father Juan Lopez, regarding the expeditions of Cepeda (to whom Combés dedicated his book), written in 1643–44 (ut supra, col. cix–cxv); we present them here as a specimen of the proceedings in these punitive expeditions.]Relation of the exploit which was accomplished in the villages of Paran by Captain and Sargento-mayor Don Agustin de Zepeda, warden of the forts in Jolo.After the disaster to Admiral Morales, the Guimbanos of the villages of Paran were very arrogant and haughty, so that, however much they were invited, with assurance of peace and pardon, to lay down their arms before those of our king, and to restore the Spanish weapons that they were keeping, they paid no heed to it. Seeing this, Sargento-mayor Don Augustin de Çepeda, the better to justify the expedition that he intended to make against them, sent word to them through other Guimbanos who wereour friends, that they must restore the arms that they had taken from the Spaniards, and that if they did not restore these he would wage war against them. To this they replied that those arms were converted into lances, and that nothing would be given up to the Spaniards, whether Don Agustin marched against them or not. The captain and sargento-mayor received this reply on Tuesday, December 29, and on Wednesday, the thirtieth of the same month, he determined to make a daylight attack on them with the utmost secrecy. Accordingly, at four in the afternoon, almost all the soldiers made their confessions, and the sargento-mayor exhorted them to rouse all their courage, as brave soldiers, since they were fighting for both the majesties [i.e., the divine and the royal], and they had the sure protection of the mother of God, our Lady of Good Success. Then they set out from the hill of Jolo with only twenty-five Spaniards and three officers, [Cepeda’s lieutenants being] Adjutant Diego de los Reyes and Alférez Gaspar de Chaves; and twenty-two Pampangos and Cagaians, with their officers, also ten or fifteen servants with their pikes and shields. Of this infantry the captain formed three divisions, giving to each one its own watchword—to the first one, “Jesus be with all;” to the second, “Our Lady of Good Success;” to the third, “Saint Ignatius”—and each division was ordered to render aid according to its watchword, and as the enemy should sound the call to arms. With this order, they began their march, and proceeded until nightfall, when they marched in single file, since the road and the darkness gave no opportunity for doing otherwise. They passed rivers, ravines, marshes, and miry places, untilthey arrived at a village of a Guimbano chief named Ulisten, near which they heard coughing in the houses; and [they moved] so cautiously that they were not perceived. The sargento-mayor did not choose to enter this village, not only because the chief had showed his friendship for the Spaniards, but because his only intention was to punish the people of Paran, who had merited this by their acts in the past and by the haughty spirit that they showed. For the same reason, he would not enter another village near this one, belonging to another chief, named Sambali—who, if it were not for the purpose that the commander had in mind, deserved to lose his head for his rebellious disposition in not being friendly to the Spaniards. From the hill to these two villages may be a journey of about two leguas and a half; the road is very bad, and of the sort that has been described, [passing through] marshes and rough places; and, with the darkness of a moonlight night, to go among trees, thickets, and tangled briers was intolerable and full of difficulty. Not less wearisome was the road which they still must take to reach the people and village of Paran, and even more difficult: but neither the one nor the other could weaken or diminish the tenacity, spirit, and valor which not only the captain but his soldiers displayed. They traveled all night in this way until a little before daybreak, when they mistook the road, and took another, which did not lead to the village where they meant to go; but God chose that the people of that very village should serve as guides [to the Spaniards], by furnishing them light—for on account of quieting some infants who were crying, they kindled lights in the houses. The sargento-mayorordered them to march toward that place, where they arrived at daybreak; and there they remained about half an hour, waiting for the dawn to brighten so that they might break the countersign1and make the daylight attack [dar el albasso] on the said village, which they did. For when it became light, and the day was brightening, they broke the watchword, which was “St. Ignatius;” and the division to which that belonged made the first attack on the houses, jointly with the vanguard, which went ahead to reconnoiter. All the forces united to make this assault on the houses, and to break through the defenses of the village and enter, all in order, with lighted matches and to sound of drums, as they did. In their houses this occasioned a great tumult; some were slain by musket-balls, some by lance-thrusts; others escaped naked, fleeing without thought of their kindred or their possessions, abandoning their weapons and whatever they had; others, finally, were burned to death in their houses, to which our men set fire—the natives remaining in them either through fear, or that they might not fall into our hands and be slain by our lances. They hid themselves, therefore, for the greater protection—only to have their houses, and their granaries of rice, and their bodies burned [here], and finally their souls in hell. Besides this, their cultivated fields were laid waste, set out with all the plants that they rear—bananas, sugar-cane, and other plants which furnish them with food; and our men did thesame with these, destroying and burning everything. This done they looked about, scanning the country in all directions, and saw an impregnable height; and when the commander understood that this was (as it proved to be) the citadel of the enemies, he gave the order to march thither. They proceeded by a path or trail so narrow that they were obliged to ascend in single file; and when they reached the top of the said hill they found a plateau, more spacious than that of our hill of Jolo, on which were houses, some fortified and some small ones. The former were full of provisions and contained some Guimbanos. These, seeing our men and recognizing them as enemies, immediately abandoned the houses and took to flight, throwing themselves headlong from the heights. Our men entered the place, and burned the houses with the rice and other things contained in them; and they laid waste the fields and destroyed what had been planted in them, as they had done in the villages before ascending the hill. Our men were occasioned no little anxiety by their failure, after this exploit, to find the road by which to leave the hill; for, as it had in every direction precipices and rugged heights, they had great difficulty and hardship in getting away from the hill, on account of not being able to strike the path by which they had entered. But finally the Blessed Virgin who hitherto had been our Lady of Success, chose to show also that she was our Lady of Good Success—which she did by enabling our men to depart in safety from the hill. For the alférez, going to make a hasty reconnoissance with four arquebusiers, and some servants armed with pikes and shields, saw [traces of men’s] work amongthe trees that covered the hill; and, upon reaching the place, ascertained that there was a path by which he could descend. Notifying the troops of this, they went down the hill by this path, and thus returned to the houses that they had burned, all marching in regular order. They approached the seashore through a level field, passing near the harbor where the natives had slain Admiral Morales; and, as they advanced through the open country, they encountered four Guimbano Indians, shouting [or grimacing?—haciendo carracheo], who came from a grove that was growing on the said seashore. When our men tried to get near them, these Indians took to their heels, retreating toward the grove—where, it was understood, they had an ambuscade; and as it was now eleven o’clock, the sargento-mayor did not think it best to delay [his return] longer. Accordingly, they marched in the same order, and to the sound of drums, toward the fortification that stood on the seashore, going through fields and mangrove thickets, and along beaches and pools of water, another two leguas and a half, until they reached the harbor where they had provided some boats. In these the sargento-mayor and all his troops embarked, and returned to these forts, with great satisfaction and rejoicing at so complete a success, without losing one of our men, or encountering any danger. Many salvos were fired from the boats in which they came, and from the forts, in honor of their protectors, Jesus, Mary, and Ignatius.From this expedition and victory I have learned some things about Guimba which are worth mentioning here. The first is, that two days afterwardthe people of Paran made war on the chiefs Ulis and Sambali whom we mentioned above, complaining that these chiefs had not warned them that the Spanish troops had passed close to their villages, and even because they had allowed the Spaniards to pass them. May God establish them in peace, and grant them light and a knowledge of the truth. And after this expedition, as I have said, one of the chiefs in the villages to the east named Suil, complained that the sargento-mayor had not informed him of it, so that Suil with all his men might have accompanied the Spaniards. Although he may not be sincere, thanks are returned to him, and probably his offer was prompted by the admiration and high opinion that he entertains for our men since this exploit; or because he feared lest the like fate might befall him. He and other chiefs beyond Guimba to the east have sent to tell me that, although those who killed the sargento-mayor are their brothers, they will not for that reason fail to be the friends of the Spaniards; and that they will come to the village of the Lutaos who are in this fort [i.e., at Joló] to talk with the father and treat of peace. And it cannot be denied that there has been a great disturbance among them since this expedition, and it has caused among them all not only fear, but astonishment also, to see that so few Spaniards could dare to traverse almost all of Guimba, marching almost all the way among the settlements, without being seen. In this affair not only the caution of the Spaniards, but their courage in penetrating among so many barbarians, the most valiant in all these islands, is causing great admiration—which is increased at seeing how so few Spaniards made so great a number of enemies take toflight; for in all the villages there are nearly a thousand barbarians who carry arms. It is certain that, considering the circumstances of this exploit, it adds prestige to several others that have been performed; and I even venture to say that it is astonishing, if we consider what occurred in one night, the perils that they went through, the daring of so few soldiers among so many enemies, and, finally, their accomplishing what they did in destroying and burning the villages and their people, without injury to any one of our men. All this causes the Moros who see these occurrences close to them to wonder and fear, and apparently they are talking in earnest of becoming friends and vassals of his Majesty. [Marginal note: “For Father Juan Lopez, rector of Cavite.”][Another letter by Father Paterio, written from Jolo, February 28, 1644, relates the particulars of another expedition by Zepeda into Guimba, six days previous to that date. The native chiefs on the east side of the island are intimidated by the punishment inflicted on Paran, and are inclined to submit to the victorious Spanish arms; but those on the west desire to take revenge for the massacre of their tribesmen. A conference of the latter chiefs is accordingly held at the village of Ulis, where they talk of making an attack on the Spanish forts at Jolo. They invite Suil, one of the friendly chiefs, to join them; but he sends word to the Spaniards (February 9) of the plot against them. Zepeda is then absent in Zamboanga, but returns soon afterward; and another warning from Suil being received ten days later, Zepeda decides to inflict summary punishmenton the plotters. He therefore leads an expedition against the village of Ulis, on February 21, and, as before, attacks the village at daylight. This time, the natives have had warning of the intended assault, and attempt resistance; but they are defeated with considerable loss—among the slain being Ulis, “who was the idol of that island, and whom all obeyed,” and three other chiefs. In this fight the Spaniards lose but four lives—a soldier, an officer, and two servants. This causes even more fear and awe than even the former expedition, and brings the recalcitrants quickly to terms—Suil and other chiefs proposing to leave their homes and go to dwell near the Spanish forts. Later, the Spaniards complete this castigation by ravaging the country, burning and destroying all before them, “by which the Spanish arms have acquired greater reputation and glory than that which they had lost on former adverse occasions.” Then other islands adjacent to Jolo are intimidated, and two battles are fought with their natives, who lose many men therein. As a reward for his services, Zepeda is honored by Corcuera with the governorship of Zamboanga.]The Joloans remained at peace, as thoroughly chastised as were the Mindanaos, curbing their haughty arrogance, and repressing their hatred in consideration of the advantages of the time. Among the agreements for the peace, they accepted one that a fort for the Spaniards should be erected at their harbor-bar; this was maintained with many difficulties and little advantage, unless from the pearl-fishery, which yielded many and valuable pearls.2The island of Joló abounds in these, so that on the Dutch hydrographical maps they have given it the name “Island of Pearls,” on account of the many fine pearls which the Joloans sent in those years to Nueva Batavia by ambassadors from their king, asking their alliance, and aid against the Spaniards. The Dutch granted them protection, those valuable gifts arousing in them greater desires for profit—although afterward the first aid that they furnished the Joloans cost them very dear. But in this year of 1641 the Joloans had a fortunate opportunity for recouping themselves for past expenses, with a mass of amber3as large as an ox’s body, which the sea cast up on their shores, which yielded them great profits, and increased the reputation of their island. This sort of find is usually very frequent in those islands, since they are beaten by many currents which flow from the archipelago; and thus goes drifting on the waves what the sea hurls from its abysses, along with other debris, under the fury of the wind—this so precious substance, whether it be the excrement or vomit of whales, or a reaba which the sea produces in its depths. But in Joló it is apt to be more often found, because those islands are scattered and their coasts prolonged for many leguas opposite many currents and channel-mouths. And for this reasonsome amber is usually found in Capul, an island beaten by so many currents—as the ships which come on the return from Nueva España know by experience—and also in Guiguan and on the beaches of Antique. Near Punta de Naso the sea cast up, in the year 1650, an enormous piece of amber, although it had not the fine quality and excellence of that which comes from Japón. (Diaz’sConquistas, p. 447.)[For several years after Corcuera’s expedition against the Mindanaos (1637), various military operations were conducted in that island by the Spanish forces, notably under Pedro de Almonte. Corralat and other Moro chiefs were sufficiently reduced to render them nominally peaceful; but they formed various plots and conspiracies against the Spaniards, and, on the other hand, these availed themselves of the jealousies and personal interests of the Mindanao chiefs to separate them and neutralize their efforts. The foolish arrogance of a Spanish officer, Matías de Marmolejo, caused an attack on his detachment by Corralat and Manaquior; all the Spaniards save Marmolejo and six others were slain (June 1, 1642), including the Jesuit Bartolomé Sánchez, and the survivors were captured by Corralat. But when Corcuera heard of this encounter he was so angry that he ordered Marmolejo to be ransomed and afterwards to be beheaded in the plaza at Zamboanga, for disobedience to his orders. He also ordered that the fort at La Sabanilla be demolished, and the men there be sent to punish Corralat, which was done. That chief, to revenge himself, intrigued with the people of Basilan to secure possession of the Spanish fort there; but its little garrison defended it against the Moro fleet until aid couldbe sent them from Zamboanga. As soon as Diego Fajardo became governor of the Philippines in Corcuera’s place, he endeavored to secure peace in Mindanao, and finally (June 24, 1645) a treaty of peace was signed by Corralat and his leading chiefs, and Francisco de Atienza and the Jesuit Alejandro López. This treaty settled questions of mutual alliance, of boundaries of possessions, of trade, of ransom of captives, and of freedom for the ministrations of Jesuit missionaries. Christian captives in Corralat’s domain should be ransomed at the following rates; “for men and women, in the prime of life, and in good health, each forty pesos; for those who were more youthful, thirty pesos; for aged and sick persons, twenty pesos; for children at the breast, ten pesos.” In this very year Salicala, son of the king of Joló, had gone to Batavia to seek aid from the Dutch; the latter sent some armed vessels, which cannonaded the Spanish fort at Joló for three days, but finally were obliged to depart without having accomplished anything. This occurrence increased Fajardo’s anxiety in regard to the cost and danger incurred in attempting to maintain three forts in Joló; and he sent orders to Atienza, commandant at Zamboanga, to withdraw the garrisons from Joló and demolish those forts—an embarrassing command, since both Joloans and Dutch were then making raids among the northern islands. Both Fajardo and Atienza relied on the Jesuit Alejandro Lopez to bring about the pacification of both the Mindanaos and the Joloans, a task which he accomplished so successfully that on April 14, 1646, a treaty was signed, by Atienza and Lopez,4withRaya Bongso of Joló (the same who, with his wife Tuambaloca, was conquered by Corcuera’s troops in 1638) and the envoys of Corralat. Combés gives the full text of both this and the former treaty. A Dutch fleet attempted to make a landing near Zamboanga, but were repulsed by the Spaniards with much loss. Corralat and Moncay came to hostilities, and the former implored the aid of the Spaniards; Atienza sent an armed force to succor Corralat, and Moncay fled. Salicala of Joló and Panguian Cachilo of Guimba undertook (1648) to raid the Visayan Islands; but the latter was attacked and slain by a Spanish squadron, which so intimidated Salicala that he hastened back to Joló. Meanwhile, a notable event occurred in Mindanao, the conversion of Corralat’s military commander, Ugbu, to the Christian faith—which of course tended to strengthen the ties between Corralat and the Spaniards; and Ugbu afterward rendered them efficient service in the Palapag insurrection, which caused his death. Salicala died (1649) and his parents, Bongso and Tuambaloca, were thus able to maintain the peace which they had established with the Spaniards; that queen afterward left Joló, retiring to Basilan. Moncay also died, soon afterward, and was succeeded in Buhayen by Balatamay, a Manobo chief who had married Moncay’s daughter; he joined Corralat in alliance with the Spaniards. In January, 1649, Pedro Duran de Monforte went with an armed fleet to northeastern Borneo, to punish its people for aidingthe Joloans in their raids; the Spaniards plundered several villages, burned three hundred caracoas, and carried away two hundred captives. The expedition was accompanied by Jesuits, who afterward opened successful missions in Borneo. The insurrection of 1649–50 spread to Joló and Mindanao, but was quelled by the Spaniards (seeVol. XXXVIII). (Combés,Hist. Mindanao, col. 269–348, 425–498; Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 149–153. Cf. Concepción,Hist. de Philipinas, vi, pp. 205–281; Montero y Vidal,Hist. piratería, i, pp. 182–189, 212–231.)][In 1653 Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara succeeded to the government of the Philippines.] One of his first undertakings was to establish peace with the ruler of Mindanao, Cachil Corralat, whom it was expedient to assure for the sake of the tranquillity of the Pintados Islands—which were more exposed than the others to the incursions of their armed fleets, since Manila had not enough soldiers and vessels with which our people could go forth to hinder the operations of the Moros. The governor sent as his ambassador Captain Don Diego de Lemus, and Father Francisco Lado of the Society of Jesus, who were very kindly received by the Moros; and he gave them to understand that no one desired peace more than he did, since the warning was still fresh that had been given him by the war which was waged against him by Governor Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera in person—which had obliged Corralat to wander as a fugitive through the lands of his enemy the king of Buhayen, exposed to many perils. It seems as if the desire which Corralat showed to maintain the peace might be regarded assincere; for if he had chosen to avail himself of the opportunity afforded by the past years, when all our forces and power were fully occupied in resisting the cruel invasions of the Dutch, without doubt he could have made great ravages in the villages of the Pintados Islands; and therefore this must be attributed to an especial providence of the divine mercy. All [these dealings with the envoys] were cunning measures of the shrewd Moro to lull5our vigilance with feigned appearances of peace, for never was he further from pursuing it—partly through greed for the booty of slaves, a great part of which belonged to him; partly because his captains and other persons interested in these piratical raids persuaded him to avail himself of the opportunity furnished by the weakness of our forces. Corralat determined to renew his former hostile acts, and began by preparing vessels and supplies; and in order to cover up better his damnable intention, he sent to the governor of Manila an ambassador to confirm the peace. This man was called Banua, and was no less fraudulent than Simon the Greek. On the route he left many tokens of this; for in the village of Tunganan, among the Subanos, he treated very contemptuously6the father minister, Miguel Pareja of the Society of Jesus—who, as the pious religious that he was, turned the other cheek, as the gospel commands. Banua arrived at Manila in the year of 1655, where he discharged very well his office as ambassador, and even better that of spy—andwell he knew his double trade; for among other things he demanded that restitution be made to Corralat of some Mindanao slaves, and of the pieces of artillery which Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera had taken from him in war; but this and other petitions of the ambassador had no satisfactory issue. Banua returned [to Mindanao], and Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara despatched to accompany him Captain Don Claudio de Rivera, and Father Alejandro Lopez of the Society of Jesus, who went with holy zeal for establishing in Mindanao the preaching of the true faith. They arrived at Zamboanga, where they had sufficient warnings of the danger to which they were going; but with fearless courage they continued their journey until they reached Corralat. He received them without any of the ostentation usual for an embassy, but rather with frowns and displeasure; and when he read the letters from the governor of Manila—which were excellent for an occasion in which our strength might be greater, but the present time demanded shrewder dissimulation—the Moro king was much disturbed, and displayed extreme anger. The end of this embassy (of which an excellent account is given by Father Francisco Combés in hisHistoria de Mindanao, book viii, chap. 3) was that Corralat ordered his nephew Balatamay to slay Father Alejandro Lopez and his associate, Father Juan de Montiel, and Captain Claudio de Rivera.7Corralat sent the letters of the governor to the kings of Joló and of Ternate, to incite them to make common cause in defense of their profession as Mahometans, but they did not choose torisk breaking the peace; on the contrary, the king of Ternate handed over the letters to the governor of our forts there, Francisco de Esteybar, who restored them to the governor of Manila. (Diaz,Conquistas, pp. 549–551.)Corralat, fearing the vengeance of the Spaniards, wrote to the governor of Zamboanga throwing the responsibility for what had occurred on his nephew Balatamay, whom he could not chastise on account of the latter being so powerful. He also wrote to Manrique de Lara, attributing the deaths of the Jesuits and other Spaniards to imprudent acts committed by Father López, and entreated the governor that, mutually forgiving injuries, affairs might remain as they had previously been. But his complicity in the event came to be discovered, through another letter directed in June, 1656, to the sultan of Joló, exhorting the latter to unite with him for defending the religion which both professed. The Joloan monarch sent his letter to the governor of Zamboanga in order to demonstrate his loyalty. Similar assistance was solicited by Corralat from the Dutch and from the sovereigns of Macasar and Ternate; and to the latter, in order to stimulate him more, he sent the original letter of Manrique de Lara, presenting the question under the religious aspect only—a letter which the Spanish governor of Ternate was able to recover, and he sent it to its author. The captain-general of Filipinas, not considering his forces sufficient for waging war on the powerful sultan of Mindanao, notified the governor of Zamboanga8to accept Corralat’s excuses as sufficientuntil he could ascertain whether reënforcements were arriving from Nueva España and they could avenge so many injuries.The sultan, seeing that his insolent conduct did not receive the energetic and effectual punishment that it deserved, gained new courage, and sent out his people to make raids through the coasts of Zamboanga and Basilan—terminating the campaign by looting Tanganan, where they took captive the headman of that village, named Ampi, and twenty-three persons besides. In the Calamianes Islands also the Mindanaos committed horrible ravages. The governor of the Moluccas, Don Francisco de Esteybar, received orders to go to Zamboanga, conferring upon him, besides the command of the said post, the office of governor and captain-general of all the southern provinces of Filipinas. On the second of December of the said year 1656 he arrived at Zamboanga. When this valiant chief was informed of what had occurred, and learned that the pirates were equipping at Simuay [River] a squadron to invade the Visayas, he declared war on Corralat, without stopping to consider whether his forces were inferior or not to those of the enemy, trusting to the courage of his followers and the justice of his cause for the issue of the undertaking. In this document he ordered that ten caracoas should set out, under command of Don Fernando de Bobadilla; and these vessels went to sea on December 30. This commander detached Admiral Don Pedro de Viruega at the village of Sosocon, and Sargento-mayor Don Félix de Herrera at Point Taguima. Through his spies, Corralat knew of the departure of the squadron, and declined to send his boats against the Spanish armada; andduring twenty days Bobadilla waited in vain for the pirate vessels. During this time the dato of Sibuguey, Mintun, went to Zamboanga, offering the aid of his people against Corralat, perhaps in order not to be the leader in paying for the losses of the war. It was reported that the sultan had sent four vessels to the village of that chief for rice, and Bobadilla set out to intercept this convoy (January 2, 1657). On arriving at La Silanga,9two small caracoas went ahead to reconnoiter the place; these boats conquered a large vessel; but their crews intimidated the Lutaos who were in the Spanish ship, telling them that they would soon be destroyed by Corralat, who was expected in Mintun with fifteen vessels. As the Lutaos of Bobadilla’s squadron were inclined toward the sultan, or were afraid of falling into his power, they threatened the commandant that they would abandon the field when the battle was at its height, if the Spaniards compelled them to fight against Corralat. In view of this, Bobadilla was obliged to return to Zamboanga, losing so propitious an opportunity to avenge the wicked perfidy of the old sultan. Nevertheless, he seized a considerable number of small boats, full of rice, and forty captives. The sultan, now a declared enemy, and attributing to our weakness the failure to punish the murder of the ambassadors, commanded his squadrons to commit piracies, under the command of Prince Balatamay. That deceitful Moro, after committing the most outrageous acts of violence in Marinduque and Mindoro, returned to Mindanao with a multitude of captives and very rich spoils.While Balatamay was raiding the above-mentioned islands, a splendid squadron sailed from Cavite by order of the governor-general, in command of an officer whose name is not told in the histories, from whom brilliant conduct was expected, to judge from the valor of which he boasted in drawing-rooms; but, far from fulfilling his duty, he lingered in Balayan under pretext of securing supplies of rice, and then in Mindoro, carrying out his cowardly purpose of not encountering the Moros, notwithstanding that the forces under his command were more than sufficient to destroy the pirates. To the end that he might operate in conjunction with the said squadron, Esteybar ordered Alférez Luis de Vargas to scour the coasts of Mindanao; but as the commander of the squadron failed to carry out the instructions that he had received, Vargas, as he could not find him, confined his efforts to burning a village on the bay of Simuay, where he seized several captives. Bobadilla reduced to ashes the old capital of Corralat, Lamitan, its inhabitants having fled to the woods. Also in the said year of 1657 the dato Salicala of Mindanao scoured the seas with his squadron; the natives in consternation abandoned their villages without daring to resist him, and he carried away as captives more than a thousand Indians—his audacity going so far that he sailed into the bay of Manila.Esteybar then equipped a small squadron of caracoas and vintas, which departed from Zamboanga on January 1, 1658, resolved to chastise the pirate severely. He spread the report that they were going to Sibuguey. He reached that river in seven days and, placing part of his forces in charge of Sargento-mayor Itamarren, he destroyed the village of Namucan, and at Luraya burned many boats. Four pilanscaptured the joanga which had carried Father López to Simuay, manned by Moros from Mintun. Suddenly changing his course, he took the route to Punta de Flechas, in order to go to the capital of Corralat, but sent beforehand thirty Spaniards, with Captain Don Pedro de Viruega, to the district of Butig. Its chief Matundin, at the head of five hundred men, was defeated, the grain-fields ravaged, and the village reduced to ashes. The tilled land of this district was exceedingly rich, since it is the principal source of supply for rice in Mindanao. Great damage was also done in La Sabanilla by Captain Don Juan González Carlete. On the nineteenth of January the squadron encountered a large Dutch ship surrounded by some pirate vessels. Esteybar attempted to secure a free passage without bringing on a contest, to which end he hoisted a white flag; but the commander of the Dutch ship displayed a red flag, firing all his cannon against the Spanish vessels. Then, without heeding the superiority of the enemy, Bobadilla came against the ship, all his men rowing as hard as they could; and Esteybar attacked it at the stern. The Spaniards then were going to board the ship with a rush, when a ball fired from the vessel of Esteybar set on fire the Santa Barbara [i.e., powder-magazine] of the Dutch ship, thus blowing it into pieces. Only twenty-four of its crew survived, and these were drawn out of the sea and made prisoners. Esteybar continued his voyage to Simuay, the bar of which was fortified with heavy stockades; moreover, at its ends were two forts, garrisoned by Malays, Macassars, and Dutchmen. This did not frighten Esteybar, and he made preparations to capture the posts of the enemy, in spite of adviceto the contrary from his captains. While he was deciding the best method of accomplishing this, he passed with his squadron to the river of Buhayen, sending in by one of its entrances the valiant Bobadilla with some vessels, and by the other Sargento-mayor Itamarren. The former sacked the villages and ravaged the grain-fields of Tannil and Tabiran, the latter those of Lumapuc and Buhayen; they destroyed a powerful armada which had been prepared for raiding the islands, and carried away as spoil many versos, muskets, campilans, crises, and all kinds of weapons.In the village of Buhayen resided Prince Hamo, son of Moncay, from whom the kingdom had been usurped; he mounted a white flag and a cross above his house, being desirous of forming an alliance with the Spaniards, but they, being warned by experience with the treasons of the Moros, continued the hostilities, without attaching any importance to that signal. While they constructed rafts with which to attack the fortress of Corralat, Captain Antonio de Palacios went to destroy the village of Tampacan and its environs; and Adjutant Antonio Vázquez disembarked with orders to cut off the retreat of the enemy’s spies. These were twenty in number, thoroughly armed; Vázquez rushed upon them, and at the first encounter killed five and wounded six of them, and the rest were shot to death in the woods. Esteybar returned to the bar of Buhayen; he knew that at a day’s journey from there was a village of Lutaos, called Maolo, and, desirous to chastise that settlement and obtain information about that coast, he sent Sargento-mayor Itamarren—who, finding it deserted, set fire to the village, killed four Moros,and captured two others, the only ones who waited for the attack.Notwithstanding these provocations, and others that were directly offered to Corralat in the environs of his fortifications, it was impossible to draw him out into the open country. Having constructed a number of rafts, on which were placed pieces of artillery, the governor went aboard the largest of them, and with the aid of the vessels cannonaded the fort of Corralat for the space of four hours, but he defended it well. It was evident that the difficulties of assaulting it were insuperable, and that the artillery was operating with but little result, on account of the condition of the sea; accordingly it was decided to retire to the bar of Buhayen. The squadron went to La Sabanilla on the seventeenth of February; here Esteybar received orders to return to Molucas, and he proceeded to Zamboanga. Notwithstanding the well-known valor of this chief, and the injuries inflicted on the Moros during the two months of the campaign, this retreat gave much satisfaction to Corralat, since it freed him from [the danger of] going as a wanderer through the hills, as on previous occasions.The valiant Esteybar had been replaced as governor of the military post of Zamboanga by Don Fernando de Bobadilla—a chief no less courageous and resolute—with the same titles and preeminences as the former. Corralat, in order better to secure his dominions against the aggressions of the Spaniards, made Namu, king of Buhayen, establish a fort at the mouth of the river, the opposite shore of which was likewise fortified by Corralat; he entrusted to Marundin the defense of the bar of Simuay, and to the Basilan chiefs Ondol and Boto the construction of afortification at the entrance of the estuary of Zamboanga. Don Diego Zarria Lazcano took the place of Bobadilla, the former remaining at the head of the armada.The datos Linao and Libot of Joló, and Sacahati of Tawi-Tawi, with thirteen vessels, scoured the coasts of Bohol, Leyte, and Masbate. Near Luban they put to death father Fray Antonio de San Agustin, who on account of his ailments could not retreat to the interior of that island as did the rest who were going with him in their vessel. A squadron sailed from Manila in command of Don Pedro Duran de Monforte; they went to Luban, Mindoro, Panay, and Gigantes without discovering the pirates, and returned to the capital. The Moros were able to return to Joló with many spoils and eighty captives; but the sultan of that island sent back the said captives, in order to prove that he desired peace with the Spaniards. (Montero y Vidal.Hist. piratería, i, pp. 236–244. Cf. Combés,Hist. Mindanao, col. 533–549, 570–587.)Great were the calamities suffered by the Filipinas Islands in these years of 1657 and 58, which might have occasioned their entire ruin, if divine Providence had not manifestly preserved them, at the expense of miracles and prodigies. Even the arrogance of the Dutch recognized this, when they saw their proud forces humiliated by the unequal strength of ours; and it was acknowledged by the inhabitants of these islands, recognizing the divine clemency. In the former of those years the scourge of divine justice was the great armada of Mindanao corsairs, which, commanded by Salicala, a Moro of much valor, infested the Pintados Islands; and their insolence wentso far that they came in sight of the great bay of Manila. The poor natives who groaned under the yoke of captivity to these pirates amounted to more than a thousand; and as it was impossible for most of them to furnish ransom for their persons, they usually died as slaves of the Moros. I have not been able to learn the reason why no assistance was given to deliver them by going out to find those pirates—although I do not believe that it was the absence of compassion in Governor Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara, but rather his lack of means, and his being engrossed with more pressing affairs. This was followed by the plagues of innumerable locusts, which, laying waste the fields, made general havoc, occasioning the famine which was the worst enemy of the poor; this was followed by its inseparable companion, pestilence, which made great ravages with a general epidemic of smallpox. (Diaz,Conquistas, p. 556.)General Don Agustin de Cepeda went to Zamboanga as governor (June 16, 1659), without any events worthy of mention occurring during the time while he exercised that office; afterward he went to assume the government of Molucas. He who took his place10experienced great annoyances with the Jesuits, who in their histories relate in great detail how much he tried to injure their interests; but Don Fernando Bobadilla was again charged with the government of Zamboanga (February 15, 1662).The authorities and citizens of Manila were the victims in May, 1662, of a fearful panic, on account of the claim by the powerful Chinese pirate Kue-Singthat the little realm of Filipinas should render him homage and be declared his tributary, under penalty of his going with his squadrons to destroy the Spaniards—as he had done with the Dutch, expelling them from Formosa. This embassy, which was brought to Manila by the Dominican father Fray Victorio Ricci, and the consequent indignation against the Chinese, were the origin of an insurrection by those who resided in Manila, which was subdued; and the conference of authorities resolved to expel them from the country and repel by force of arms the aggression of Kue-Sing—the governor-general making ready great armaments, and whatever preparations for defense seemed to him necessary that he might come out victorious from the tremendous danger that threatened the island.But the most important and most far-reaching of the measures adopted by the council at which Manrique de Lara presided was the abandonment of the advantageous post of Zamboanga—the advanced sentinel of our domination over the coasts inhabited by the fierce Malay Mahometans—and those of La Sabanilla, Calamianes, and Iligan (which were also important in the highest degree), with the intention of concentrating in Manila all the forces which garrisoned those posts (May 6). This notification caused, among the Spanish subjects of those lands, or it may be among the Lutaos, profound sorrow and the utmost fear. They complained bitterly of the unprotected state in which they were left, remaining exposed to the vengeance of the Moros—who no longer could consider them as belonging to their race, and bore a mortal hatred to them for havingbecome Christians.11These just complaints, and the knowledge of the damages which would result from the withdrawal of the Spanish forces, impelled the governor of the fort, Don Fernando Bobadilla, and the learned Father Combés to entreat the governor-general to revoke his mandate, both explaining to him the very cogent and strong reasons which prompted their advice. The news that the Spaniards were involved in so tremendous a conflict encouragedthe Joloans to repeat once more their terrible incursions. The datos of Joló, Tawi-Tawi, Lacay-Lacay, and Tuptup, equipped sixty vessels, and, dividing their forces into several small squadrons, sacked and burned the villages of Poro, Baybay, Sogor, Cabalian, Basey, Dangajon, Guinobatan, and Capul. They killed Captain Gabriel de la Peña; they captured an official of the same class, Ignacio de la Cueva, and the Jesuit father Buenaventura Barcena; they went even to the mountains in pursuit of the religious; and all the Indians whom they caught they carried away as captives to their own country, killing many of all ages and classes.The governor-general of the islands sent a squadron to pursue the pirates, but they accomplishednothing. From Zamboanga Adjutant Francisco Alvarez went out alone to encounter them; he captured the caracoa of the pirate Gani, a relative of Salé, and of thirty captives whom the latter was carrying away. Alvarez freed twenty-two—afterward going to an island of Joló, where he captured twelve Moros. Bobadilla, in answer to his message, on November 8 received pressing orders to return to Manila without loss of time, the governor yielding so far as to allow that he might leave in the fortress of Zamboanga at most fifty Spaniards. This was equivalent to condemning those unfortunates to a sure death, and the Jesuit fathers protested against it, saying that necessarily they would incur the same fate; but finally the supreme authority of the islands decided upon the total abandonment of the postsabove mentioned. Nevertheless Bobadilla, with the object of encouraging the Lutaos and leading the Moros to believe that he was not abandoning the post, sent in pursuit of them Don Juan de Morales Valenzuela, with two caracoas, to the islands called “Orejas de Liebre,” on January 2, 1663; but on the fourth of the same month he received a new and more positive order from the captain-general, dated October 11, that without delay or any excuse he must abandon Zamboanga. At sight of this, Bobadilla warned Morales that the withdrawal must be made, as was done on the seventh—as promptly as possible fulfilling the said imperious mandate, convinced that it was now altogether impossible to oppose so plain a decision.The governor of Zamboanga made a solemn surrender of the fort to the master-of-camp of the Lutao natives, Don Alonso Macombon, receiving from him an oath of fidelity to hold it for the king of España and defend it from his enemies; but Don Alonso refused to include among these the sultan of Mindanao, on the pretext that he had not sufficient strength to oppose the dreaded Corralat. The governor, fearing his defection, did not leave him any artillery. The Jesuits also surrendered to Macombon their houses and churches, carrying away the images, ornaments, chalices, and books; and six thousand Christians remained in Zamboanga exposed to the rage of the Mahometans. Some Lutaos, although not many, decided to go to the province of Cebú, or to that of Dapitan; others scattered through Joló or Mindanao in search of safety, returning to their former religion.The abandonment of our military posts in Mindanaowas, although it is excused by the embarrassed condition of the capital of the islands, an exceedingly imprudent measure, since, in order to provide for an uncertain danger, the Visayan Islands were left exposed to another which was more immediate and real—to say nothing of the retrogression that must necessarily result to our domination among the natives of Mindanao, where at that time over seventy thousand Christians lived. The pirate who could cause such a panic in the authorities of Manila, and occasioned so great losses to the undertaking of subduing the Mahometan Malay pirates, died without carrying out his threats.During the government of Don Juan de Vargas (1679), the sultan of Borneo sent an embassy to ask that mercantile dealings might be established with Filipinas; and Vargas in his turn sent another and a very distinguished one, headed by Sargento-mayor Don Juan Morales de Valenzuela. In 1701 occurred in the south of Filipinas an event as tragic as unusual. The sultan of Joló went to visit the ruler of Mindanao, for greater ostentation taking with him as escort a squadron composed of sixty-seven vessels. At sight of such a retinue the sultan of Mindanao, Cutay12(the successor of the noted Corralat), feared that the other had designs that were not peaceable, and commanded that the mouth of the river should be closed; but the sultan of Joló, offended thereat, dared the other to a personal combat. This challenge was accepted, and the two sultans engaged in a hand-to-hand contest, so fierce that each slew the other; and immediately war was kindled between the two peoples. The Joloans, breaking down the stakes which closed theriver, retired to their own island with many weapons and spoils. The new ruler of Mindanao asked aid from the governor of Manila, Don Domingo Zubálburu; but the latter advised that they should lay aside their dissensions, and for that purpose sent the Jesuit Father Antonio de Borja, who was able to attain his object. (Montero y Vidal,Hist. piratería, i, pp. 244–252. Cf. Combés,Hist. Mindanao, col. 610–640.)The king of Joló, on the contrary, had for many years maintained peace and friendly relations with the Spaniards, much to the resentment of his chiefs and captains, who derived much more profit from hostile raids than from trade and peace; therefore by means of their confidential agents they spread the report that the king of Joló was talking of sending an armed fleet of twenty joangas to plunder these islands. The principal author of this was a Joloan named Linao, who was on intimate terms with the Spaniards, and a Guimbano named Palía. But the king of Joló was very far from thinking of such changes, and it would have been better for us if we had not so readily believed it. At this information Don Fernando de Bobadilla despatched his armada against Joló, under General Don Pedro de Viruega; but when he reached that island he found that the story that they had spread abroad against the king was false, and Don Pedro, having talked with him, went back to Zamboanga well satisfied of his peaceable attitude. But it was not long before the former rumors against the king of Joló were again current; the author of them was Linao, who desired a rupture [with the Spaniards], so that he with other pirates might go out on raids against these islands—in which enterprise he was more interested than in the peace ofhis king. This plan he carried out in company with two others, Libot and Sacahati, who went cruising with several vessels and did much damage in the islands of Pintados and Masbate, until they reached the Limbones;13from that place they chased the corregidor of Mariveles, and captured the provincial of our discalced Augustinian religious and those who were accompanying him, on his return from visiting the Christian villages of Bolinao—although these persons escaped by jumping ashore. But there was one who could not do this, father Fray Antonio de las Misas (also a discalced Augustinian), who was coming from Cuyo and Calamianes to visit those convents. This religious might with good reason be regarded as a martyr; for with his blood only were the hands of the renegade Linao stained, as he spared the lives of all the rest in his greed for ransom. Although the pirates knew that the ransom of this religious promised them more profit [than that of an ordinary captive], their hatred to the faith prevailed over their greed, which in these barbarians is great. This opinion is confirmed by the cruelty with which they treated an image of Our Lady of the People, which this religious was wearing, on which they used their crises with furious rage. This religious was an old man, and greatly esteemed for his virtue; and in the order he had held positions of honor—prior of the convent at Manila, vicar-provincial of Cebú, and other posts in Caraga. He had a brother, a lay member of the Society of Jesus in these islands, who also suffered the same kind of death at the hands of the barbarous pirates called Camucones—a nationas cruel as cowardly, two qualities which always go together.Great was the injury which these pirates inflicted on the islands, and although the alcalde-mayor of Balayan went out against them with some armed vessels they could not be found, either by him or by some other vessels which went from Manila for this purpose with a considerable force of men, on account of the adroitness with which the Moros concealed themselves, avoiding an encounter—to such an extent that the belief was current in Manila that these were not outside enemies, but insurgent Indians of the country, until a Spaniard who had been seized by the enemy at the shoals of Mindoro made his escape from them, and his account undeceived the people of Manila. The governor despatched an armed fleet in command of Admiral Pedro Durán de Monforte, a soldier of long experience, but this remedy came too late; for the pirates, satiated with burning villages, plundering, and taking captives, had returned to their own country. Accordingly the armada, having vainly scouted along Lubán, Mindoro, and Panay, returned to Manila, having accomplished nothing save the expenses which were caused for the royal exchequer, which is the paymaster for these and other cases of negligence.The distrust which was felt regarding the maintenance of the peace by the king of Joló perhaps occasioned anger that he had not prevented these injuries; but he, knowing that if he did not make amends it would be a cause for justifiable hostilities, sent an embassy to the governor (who was Don Diego Sarria Lazcano), exonerating himself and promising to chastise Linao, Libot, and Sacahati;this he did, and many captives were restored, which was no slight [amends]. King Corralat raised his false alarms, as he was wont to do when that suited him, and also made some trifling raids through the agency of the people of Sibuguey, and threatened the Zebuans at Dapitán. But all became quiet when the office of governor of those coasts was assumed (June 16, 1659) by Don Agustín de Cepeda, a great soldier—who died in decrepit old age as master-of-camp of these Filipinas. Corralat knew, much to his sorrow, the valor of this able officer, and therefore did not dare to anger him, content that the Spaniards should leave him in peace. Don Agustín, as a prudent man, determined to try measures to secure peace; and, conferences having been held, those measures were carried out, with very advantageous arrangements for our forces.The frequent raids of these Moro pirates, both Mindanaos and Joloans, were one of the greatest hardships which these Filipinas Islands suffered through many continuous years; they were the scourge of the natives of the islands of Pintados and Camarines, Tayabas, and Mindoro, as being nearest to the danger and most weak for defense. These people paid with their beloved liberty for our neglect to defend them—not always deserving of blame, on account of the mutations of the times. Few Spaniards have been the prey of these vile thieves, except some who were very incautious; but amends have been made for these by many religious and some secular priests, ministers in the Indian villages, who have suffered rigorous captivities and cruel deaths. No small amount of expenditure has fallen on the royal exchequer; for those pirates have caused innumerableexpenses in armed fleets, most of them useless because the news of the loss did not reach us until the pirates were returning unhurt to their own lands. At times it has given even the governors and captains-general of these islands plenty to do in defending them from these pilfering thieves, as we saw in the first part of this history, in the case of Don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera and others. All the life of Cachil Corralat—which was a very long one, for it exceeded ninety years—and that of his father Bahisan kept our vigilance continually on the alert, and caused us to found and maintain the fortified posts of Zamboanga, Sabanilla, Malanao, and others—which caused so much expense and no profits; for the forts defend only a small space, and the sea has many roads, and thus they did not hinder the Moro fleets from sallying forth whenever they chose. Moreover, Corralat had all the Lutaos for spies, on account of their great reverence for him, and because they were in secret as much Mahometans as himself; for never is a Lutao found who has not been circumcised, or one who eats pork—and it is this which constitutes their Mahometanism, as also having many wives and being enemies of Christians; for in other respects they are atheists, and do not know what the Koran is or what it contains. And, as I have heard from military men who have experience in these wars, the only restraint upon these Joloan and Mindanao enemies is in armed fleets, which go to search for them in their homes and inflict on them all the damage they can, without going inland; for the Spaniards will not find any one there on whom to avenge themselves, since the inhabitants are safe in their thick forests and on impregnable heights.After so many years of misfortunes the divine mercy took pity on these poor natives, on whom the cruelty and greed of the Moros had so long fattened, selecting as an agent the very Corralat who had been the cause of the past havoc. With old age and experience he came to see the injury which was resulting to his people (and most of all to the kings of Mindanao) from having enemies so valiant as the Spaniards had proved to be; and therefore while he lived he maintained peace with Manila, with friendly relations and the benefit of commerce on both sides. And when his death arrived, which was at the end of the year 1671, he left his nephew and heir, Balatamay, strictly charged to keep the peace, with heavy curses and imprecations, according to their custom; and his people obeyed him so well that for a long time no raid was heard of; nor was there any by the Camucones, who are subject to Borney. The king of Joló, Paguián, has preserved the same peace and friendship; for all the Moro tribes of these regions reverenced Corralat as if he were Mahoma himself. For he was a Moro of great courage, intelligence, and sagacity, besides being exceedingly zealous for his accursed sect, and a great sorcerer—for all of which he probably has met condign punishment. (Diaz,Conquistas, pp. 564–567.)The governor [i.e., Manuel de León, in 1674] commanded Juan Canosa Raguses, a skilful builder of lateen-rigged vessels, to construct two galleys; these sailed very straight and light, and did good service in frightening away the Camucones, pilfering and troublesome pirates, who in most years infested the Pintados Islands with pillaging and seizure of captives. These are a barbarous, cruel, and cowardlypeople, and they cannot have one of these traits without the others. They inhabit a chain of small islands, which extend from Paragua to Borney; some of them are Mahometans and others heathens. They have done much harm to the islands of Bisayas, which they ravaged quite at their ease—so much so that in the year 1672 they carried away the alcalde-mayor, Don José de San Miguel, as we have mentioned elsewhere. They have a great advantage in the extreme swiftness of their vessels, which enables them to find their defense in flight. Their confidence and boldness went so far that they ventured to infest the coasts of Manila. The provincial, Fray José Duque, while going to visit the convents in the islands of Pintados, came very near being captured with his companion, Fray Alvaro de Benavente; for they were attacked by a squadron of these pirates near the island of Marinduque, where they would have been a prey to Moro cruelty, if they had not been favored by the divine kindness. [This acted] through the agency of Captain Francisco Ponce, a veteran soldier, who killed the captain and another of the pirates; and also of a sudden wind, which gave wings to the champan for placing itself in safety. With the building of these galleys the Camucones were inspired with such terror that for many years they did not venture to sally out for their usual raids, so much in safety as before. The first time, Sargento-mayor Pedro Lozano went out to scour the seas through which the Camucones might come to make their raids. In the following year, Captain Don José de Novoa went out—a brave Galician, the encomendero of Gapang—and as commander of the second galley Captain Simón de Torres, an able soldier from Maluco; and theyscoured the coasts of Mindanao, committing some acts of hostility, their sole object therein being to cause more terror than harm. And thus it was, that with the fear which those piratical tribes had conceived of the galleys neither Joloans, Mindanaos, nor Camucones dared, so long as these lasted, to commit their former ravages. The same thing occurs whenever there are galleys, even though they do not go out to sea and are shut up in the port of Cavite. It is therefore very expedient to keep vessels of this sort, in order to be free from the invasions of those pirates. In view of this, Governor Don Domingo de Zabálburu built two other galleys, which was the cause of the Joloans, Mindanaos, and Camucones remaining, throughout his term of office, within their own boundaries, although they had been in previous years, as we have seen, a continual plague to these islands. (Diaz,Conquistas, p. 711.)14
[The second reduction of Joló—by Almonte, in 1639 (Vol. XXIX, p. 143)—subdued all of that archipelago, save the Guimbanos, a fierce Moro people inhabiting the mountains of Sulu (Joló) Island, who were hostile to the Joloans of the coast. When Almonte ordered them to cease disturbing the pacified Joloans, the Guimbanos made an insolent reply, telling the Spaniards to come to their country and learn the difference between them and the Joloans. Almonte therefore sent (July, 1639) troops, under Luis de Guzman and Agustin de Cepeda, to subdue these proud mountaineers; and after a fierce battle the Guimbanos retreated, leaving four hundred dead on the field, and three hundred captives in the hands of the Spaniards—of whom eight died, including Guzman, besides twenty Indian auxiliaries. (Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 96 b, 97.) After the departure of Almonte from Joló, affairs went ill, Morales being unfit for his post as governor of those islands, although he was valiant in battle. Having abducted a beautiful girl, daughter of a chief named Salibanza, a conspiracy against him was formed by the enraged father; this was discovered, and the leaders seized. This, with several arbitrary and hostile measures of Morales, stirred up the Joloans to revolt, and an affray occurred between them and the Spaniards, in which Morales was wounded. Juan Ruiz Maroto was sent to relieve him from office, and tried to pacify the natives, but in vain; he then sent Pedro de la Mata Vergara to harry all the coast of Joló, who burned many villages and carried away three thousand captives. Mata, being obliged to return to Mindanao, was succeededby Morales, who rashly attacked (near Párang, Sulu Island) a force of Moros with troops exhausted by forced marches; the Spaniards, although in numbers far superior to the Moros, were ignominiously put to flight, thirty-nine of their number being slain, including Morales and another officer. At this time Cepeda was governor of Joló, and he soon found it necessary to chastise the natives, who were encouraged to rebellion by their recent victory. (Combés,Hist. de Mindanao, col. 402–412; Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 121–122; Montero y Vidal,Hist. piratería, i, pp. 175–181, 199–211.) An account of his exploits in this direction is furnished by letters of the Jesuit Miguel Paterio to Father Juan Lopez, regarding the expeditions of Cepeda (to whom Combés dedicated his book), written in 1643–44 (ut supra, col. cix–cxv); we present them here as a specimen of the proceedings in these punitive expeditions.]
Relation of the exploit which was accomplished in the villages of Paran by Captain and Sargento-mayor Don Agustin de Zepeda, warden of the forts in Jolo.
After the disaster to Admiral Morales, the Guimbanos of the villages of Paran were very arrogant and haughty, so that, however much they were invited, with assurance of peace and pardon, to lay down their arms before those of our king, and to restore the Spanish weapons that they were keeping, they paid no heed to it. Seeing this, Sargento-mayor Don Augustin de Çepeda, the better to justify the expedition that he intended to make against them, sent word to them through other Guimbanos who wereour friends, that they must restore the arms that they had taken from the Spaniards, and that if they did not restore these he would wage war against them. To this they replied that those arms were converted into lances, and that nothing would be given up to the Spaniards, whether Don Agustin marched against them or not. The captain and sargento-mayor received this reply on Tuesday, December 29, and on Wednesday, the thirtieth of the same month, he determined to make a daylight attack on them with the utmost secrecy. Accordingly, at four in the afternoon, almost all the soldiers made their confessions, and the sargento-mayor exhorted them to rouse all their courage, as brave soldiers, since they were fighting for both the majesties [i.e., the divine and the royal], and they had the sure protection of the mother of God, our Lady of Good Success. Then they set out from the hill of Jolo with only twenty-five Spaniards and three officers, [Cepeda’s lieutenants being] Adjutant Diego de los Reyes and Alférez Gaspar de Chaves; and twenty-two Pampangos and Cagaians, with their officers, also ten or fifteen servants with their pikes and shields. Of this infantry the captain formed three divisions, giving to each one its own watchword—to the first one, “Jesus be with all;” to the second, “Our Lady of Good Success;” to the third, “Saint Ignatius”—and each division was ordered to render aid according to its watchword, and as the enemy should sound the call to arms. With this order, they began their march, and proceeded until nightfall, when they marched in single file, since the road and the darkness gave no opportunity for doing otherwise. They passed rivers, ravines, marshes, and miry places, untilthey arrived at a village of a Guimbano chief named Ulisten, near which they heard coughing in the houses; and [they moved] so cautiously that they were not perceived. The sargento-mayor did not choose to enter this village, not only because the chief had showed his friendship for the Spaniards, but because his only intention was to punish the people of Paran, who had merited this by their acts in the past and by the haughty spirit that they showed. For the same reason, he would not enter another village near this one, belonging to another chief, named Sambali—who, if it were not for the purpose that the commander had in mind, deserved to lose his head for his rebellious disposition in not being friendly to the Spaniards. From the hill to these two villages may be a journey of about two leguas and a half; the road is very bad, and of the sort that has been described, [passing through] marshes and rough places; and, with the darkness of a moonlight night, to go among trees, thickets, and tangled briers was intolerable and full of difficulty. Not less wearisome was the road which they still must take to reach the people and village of Paran, and even more difficult: but neither the one nor the other could weaken or diminish the tenacity, spirit, and valor which not only the captain but his soldiers displayed. They traveled all night in this way until a little before daybreak, when they mistook the road, and took another, which did not lead to the village where they meant to go; but God chose that the people of that very village should serve as guides [to the Spaniards], by furnishing them light—for on account of quieting some infants who were crying, they kindled lights in the houses. The sargento-mayorordered them to march toward that place, where they arrived at daybreak; and there they remained about half an hour, waiting for the dawn to brighten so that they might break the countersign1and make the daylight attack [dar el albasso] on the said village, which they did. For when it became light, and the day was brightening, they broke the watchword, which was “St. Ignatius;” and the division to which that belonged made the first attack on the houses, jointly with the vanguard, which went ahead to reconnoiter. All the forces united to make this assault on the houses, and to break through the defenses of the village and enter, all in order, with lighted matches and to sound of drums, as they did. In their houses this occasioned a great tumult; some were slain by musket-balls, some by lance-thrusts; others escaped naked, fleeing without thought of their kindred or their possessions, abandoning their weapons and whatever they had; others, finally, were burned to death in their houses, to which our men set fire—the natives remaining in them either through fear, or that they might not fall into our hands and be slain by our lances. They hid themselves, therefore, for the greater protection—only to have their houses, and their granaries of rice, and their bodies burned [here], and finally their souls in hell. Besides this, their cultivated fields were laid waste, set out with all the plants that they rear—bananas, sugar-cane, and other plants which furnish them with food; and our men did thesame with these, destroying and burning everything. This done they looked about, scanning the country in all directions, and saw an impregnable height; and when the commander understood that this was (as it proved to be) the citadel of the enemies, he gave the order to march thither. They proceeded by a path or trail so narrow that they were obliged to ascend in single file; and when they reached the top of the said hill they found a plateau, more spacious than that of our hill of Jolo, on which were houses, some fortified and some small ones. The former were full of provisions and contained some Guimbanos. These, seeing our men and recognizing them as enemies, immediately abandoned the houses and took to flight, throwing themselves headlong from the heights. Our men entered the place, and burned the houses with the rice and other things contained in them; and they laid waste the fields and destroyed what had been planted in them, as they had done in the villages before ascending the hill. Our men were occasioned no little anxiety by their failure, after this exploit, to find the road by which to leave the hill; for, as it had in every direction precipices and rugged heights, they had great difficulty and hardship in getting away from the hill, on account of not being able to strike the path by which they had entered. But finally the Blessed Virgin who hitherto had been our Lady of Success, chose to show also that she was our Lady of Good Success—which she did by enabling our men to depart in safety from the hill. For the alférez, going to make a hasty reconnoissance with four arquebusiers, and some servants armed with pikes and shields, saw [traces of men’s] work amongthe trees that covered the hill; and, upon reaching the place, ascertained that there was a path by which he could descend. Notifying the troops of this, they went down the hill by this path, and thus returned to the houses that they had burned, all marching in regular order. They approached the seashore through a level field, passing near the harbor where the natives had slain Admiral Morales; and, as they advanced through the open country, they encountered four Guimbano Indians, shouting [or grimacing?—haciendo carracheo], who came from a grove that was growing on the said seashore. When our men tried to get near them, these Indians took to their heels, retreating toward the grove—where, it was understood, they had an ambuscade; and as it was now eleven o’clock, the sargento-mayor did not think it best to delay [his return] longer. Accordingly, they marched in the same order, and to the sound of drums, toward the fortification that stood on the seashore, going through fields and mangrove thickets, and along beaches and pools of water, another two leguas and a half, until they reached the harbor where they had provided some boats. In these the sargento-mayor and all his troops embarked, and returned to these forts, with great satisfaction and rejoicing at so complete a success, without losing one of our men, or encountering any danger. Many salvos were fired from the boats in which they came, and from the forts, in honor of their protectors, Jesus, Mary, and Ignatius.
From this expedition and victory I have learned some things about Guimba which are worth mentioning here. The first is, that two days afterwardthe people of Paran made war on the chiefs Ulis and Sambali whom we mentioned above, complaining that these chiefs had not warned them that the Spanish troops had passed close to their villages, and even because they had allowed the Spaniards to pass them. May God establish them in peace, and grant them light and a knowledge of the truth. And after this expedition, as I have said, one of the chiefs in the villages to the east named Suil, complained that the sargento-mayor had not informed him of it, so that Suil with all his men might have accompanied the Spaniards. Although he may not be sincere, thanks are returned to him, and probably his offer was prompted by the admiration and high opinion that he entertains for our men since this exploit; or because he feared lest the like fate might befall him. He and other chiefs beyond Guimba to the east have sent to tell me that, although those who killed the sargento-mayor are their brothers, they will not for that reason fail to be the friends of the Spaniards; and that they will come to the village of the Lutaos who are in this fort [i.e., at Joló] to talk with the father and treat of peace. And it cannot be denied that there has been a great disturbance among them since this expedition, and it has caused among them all not only fear, but astonishment also, to see that so few Spaniards could dare to traverse almost all of Guimba, marching almost all the way among the settlements, without being seen. In this affair not only the caution of the Spaniards, but their courage in penetrating among so many barbarians, the most valiant in all these islands, is causing great admiration—which is increased at seeing how so few Spaniards made so great a number of enemies take toflight; for in all the villages there are nearly a thousand barbarians who carry arms. It is certain that, considering the circumstances of this exploit, it adds prestige to several others that have been performed; and I even venture to say that it is astonishing, if we consider what occurred in one night, the perils that they went through, the daring of so few soldiers among so many enemies, and, finally, their accomplishing what they did in destroying and burning the villages and their people, without injury to any one of our men. All this causes the Moros who see these occurrences close to them to wonder and fear, and apparently they are talking in earnest of becoming friends and vassals of his Majesty. [Marginal note: “For Father Juan Lopez, rector of Cavite.”]
[Another letter by Father Paterio, written from Jolo, February 28, 1644, relates the particulars of another expedition by Zepeda into Guimba, six days previous to that date. The native chiefs on the east side of the island are intimidated by the punishment inflicted on Paran, and are inclined to submit to the victorious Spanish arms; but those on the west desire to take revenge for the massacre of their tribesmen. A conference of the latter chiefs is accordingly held at the village of Ulis, where they talk of making an attack on the Spanish forts at Jolo. They invite Suil, one of the friendly chiefs, to join them; but he sends word to the Spaniards (February 9) of the plot against them. Zepeda is then absent in Zamboanga, but returns soon afterward; and another warning from Suil being received ten days later, Zepeda decides to inflict summary punishmenton the plotters. He therefore leads an expedition against the village of Ulis, on February 21, and, as before, attacks the village at daylight. This time, the natives have had warning of the intended assault, and attempt resistance; but they are defeated with considerable loss—among the slain being Ulis, “who was the idol of that island, and whom all obeyed,” and three other chiefs. In this fight the Spaniards lose but four lives—a soldier, an officer, and two servants. This causes even more fear and awe than even the former expedition, and brings the recalcitrants quickly to terms—Suil and other chiefs proposing to leave their homes and go to dwell near the Spanish forts. Later, the Spaniards complete this castigation by ravaging the country, burning and destroying all before them, “by which the Spanish arms have acquired greater reputation and glory than that which they had lost on former adverse occasions.” Then other islands adjacent to Jolo are intimidated, and two battles are fought with their natives, who lose many men therein. As a reward for his services, Zepeda is honored by Corcuera with the governorship of Zamboanga.]
The Joloans remained at peace, as thoroughly chastised as were the Mindanaos, curbing their haughty arrogance, and repressing their hatred in consideration of the advantages of the time. Among the agreements for the peace, they accepted one that a fort for the Spaniards should be erected at their harbor-bar; this was maintained with many difficulties and little advantage, unless from the pearl-fishery, which yielded many and valuable pearls.2The island of Joló abounds in these, so that on the Dutch hydrographical maps they have given it the name “Island of Pearls,” on account of the many fine pearls which the Joloans sent in those years to Nueva Batavia by ambassadors from their king, asking their alliance, and aid against the Spaniards. The Dutch granted them protection, those valuable gifts arousing in them greater desires for profit—although afterward the first aid that they furnished the Joloans cost them very dear. But in this year of 1641 the Joloans had a fortunate opportunity for recouping themselves for past expenses, with a mass of amber3as large as an ox’s body, which the sea cast up on their shores, which yielded them great profits, and increased the reputation of their island. This sort of find is usually very frequent in those islands, since they are beaten by many currents which flow from the archipelago; and thus goes drifting on the waves what the sea hurls from its abysses, along with other debris, under the fury of the wind—this so precious substance, whether it be the excrement or vomit of whales, or a reaba which the sea produces in its depths. But in Joló it is apt to be more often found, because those islands are scattered and their coasts prolonged for many leguas opposite many currents and channel-mouths. And for this reasonsome amber is usually found in Capul, an island beaten by so many currents—as the ships which come on the return from Nueva España know by experience—and also in Guiguan and on the beaches of Antique. Near Punta de Naso the sea cast up, in the year 1650, an enormous piece of amber, although it had not the fine quality and excellence of that which comes from Japón. (Diaz’sConquistas, p. 447.)
[For several years after Corcuera’s expedition against the Mindanaos (1637), various military operations were conducted in that island by the Spanish forces, notably under Pedro de Almonte. Corralat and other Moro chiefs were sufficiently reduced to render them nominally peaceful; but they formed various plots and conspiracies against the Spaniards, and, on the other hand, these availed themselves of the jealousies and personal interests of the Mindanao chiefs to separate them and neutralize their efforts. The foolish arrogance of a Spanish officer, Matías de Marmolejo, caused an attack on his detachment by Corralat and Manaquior; all the Spaniards save Marmolejo and six others were slain (June 1, 1642), including the Jesuit Bartolomé Sánchez, and the survivors were captured by Corralat. But when Corcuera heard of this encounter he was so angry that he ordered Marmolejo to be ransomed and afterwards to be beheaded in the plaza at Zamboanga, for disobedience to his orders. He also ordered that the fort at La Sabanilla be demolished, and the men there be sent to punish Corralat, which was done. That chief, to revenge himself, intrigued with the people of Basilan to secure possession of the Spanish fort there; but its little garrison defended it against the Moro fleet until aid couldbe sent them from Zamboanga. As soon as Diego Fajardo became governor of the Philippines in Corcuera’s place, he endeavored to secure peace in Mindanao, and finally (June 24, 1645) a treaty of peace was signed by Corralat and his leading chiefs, and Francisco de Atienza and the Jesuit Alejandro López. This treaty settled questions of mutual alliance, of boundaries of possessions, of trade, of ransom of captives, and of freedom for the ministrations of Jesuit missionaries. Christian captives in Corralat’s domain should be ransomed at the following rates; “for men and women, in the prime of life, and in good health, each forty pesos; for those who were more youthful, thirty pesos; for aged and sick persons, twenty pesos; for children at the breast, ten pesos.” In this very year Salicala, son of the king of Joló, had gone to Batavia to seek aid from the Dutch; the latter sent some armed vessels, which cannonaded the Spanish fort at Joló for three days, but finally were obliged to depart without having accomplished anything. This occurrence increased Fajardo’s anxiety in regard to the cost and danger incurred in attempting to maintain three forts in Joló; and he sent orders to Atienza, commandant at Zamboanga, to withdraw the garrisons from Joló and demolish those forts—an embarrassing command, since both Joloans and Dutch were then making raids among the northern islands. Both Fajardo and Atienza relied on the Jesuit Alejandro Lopez to bring about the pacification of both the Mindanaos and the Joloans, a task which he accomplished so successfully that on April 14, 1646, a treaty was signed, by Atienza and Lopez,4withRaya Bongso of Joló (the same who, with his wife Tuambaloca, was conquered by Corcuera’s troops in 1638) and the envoys of Corralat. Combés gives the full text of both this and the former treaty. A Dutch fleet attempted to make a landing near Zamboanga, but were repulsed by the Spaniards with much loss. Corralat and Moncay came to hostilities, and the former implored the aid of the Spaniards; Atienza sent an armed force to succor Corralat, and Moncay fled. Salicala of Joló and Panguian Cachilo of Guimba undertook (1648) to raid the Visayan Islands; but the latter was attacked and slain by a Spanish squadron, which so intimidated Salicala that he hastened back to Joló. Meanwhile, a notable event occurred in Mindanao, the conversion of Corralat’s military commander, Ugbu, to the Christian faith—which of course tended to strengthen the ties between Corralat and the Spaniards; and Ugbu afterward rendered them efficient service in the Palapag insurrection, which caused his death. Salicala died (1649) and his parents, Bongso and Tuambaloca, were thus able to maintain the peace which they had established with the Spaniards; that queen afterward left Joló, retiring to Basilan. Moncay also died, soon afterward, and was succeeded in Buhayen by Balatamay, a Manobo chief who had married Moncay’s daughter; he joined Corralat in alliance with the Spaniards. In January, 1649, Pedro Duran de Monforte went with an armed fleet to northeastern Borneo, to punish its people for aidingthe Joloans in their raids; the Spaniards plundered several villages, burned three hundred caracoas, and carried away two hundred captives. The expedition was accompanied by Jesuits, who afterward opened successful missions in Borneo. The insurrection of 1649–50 spread to Joló and Mindanao, but was quelled by the Spaniards (seeVol. XXXVIII). (Combés,Hist. Mindanao, col. 269–348, 425–498; Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 149–153. Cf. Concepción,Hist. de Philipinas, vi, pp. 205–281; Montero y Vidal,Hist. piratería, i, pp. 182–189, 212–231.)]
[In 1653 Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara succeeded to the government of the Philippines.] One of his first undertakings was to establish peace with the ruler of Mindanao, Cachil Corralat, whom it was expedient to assure for the sake of the tranquillity of the Pintados Islands—which were more exposed than the others to the incursions of their armed fleets, since Manila had not enough soldiers and vessels with which our people could go forth to hinder the operations of the Moros. The governor sent as his ambassador Captain Don Diego de Lemus, and Father Francisco Lado of the Society of Jesus, who were very kindly received by the Moros; and he gave them to understand that no one desired peace more than he did, since the warning was still fresh that had been given him by the war which was waged against him by Governor Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera in person—which had obliged Corralat to wander as a fugitive through the lands of his enemy the king of Buhayen, exposed to many perils. It seems as if the desire which Corralat showed to maintain the peace might be regarded assincere; for if he had chosen to avail himself of the opportunity afforded by the past years, when all our forces and power were fully occupied in resisting the cruel invasions of the Dutch, without doubt he could have made great ravages in the villages of the Pintados Islands; and therefore this must be attributed to an especial providence of the divine mercy. All [these dealings with the envoys] were cunning measures of the shrewd Moro to lull5our vigilance with feigned appearances of peace, for never was he further from pursuing it—partly through greed for the booty of slaves, a great part of which belonged to him; partly because his captains and other persons interested in these piratical raids persuaded him to avail himself of the opportunity furnished by the weakness of our forces. Corralat determined to renew his former hostile acts, and began by preparing vessels and supplies; and in order to cover up better his damnable intention, he sent to the governor of Manila an ambassador to confirm the peace. This man was called Banua, and was no less fraudulent than Simon the Greek. On the route he left many tokens of this; for in the village of Tunganan, among the Subanos, he treated very contemptuously6the father minister, Miguel Pareja of the Society of Jesus—who, as the pious religious that he was, turned the other cheek, as the gospel commands. Banua arrived at Manila in the year of 1655, where he discharged very well his office as ambassador, and even better that of spy—andwell he knew his double trade; for among other things he demanded that restitution be made to Corralat of some Mindanao slaves, and of the pieces of artillery which Don Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera had taken from him in war; but this and other petitions of the ambassador had no satisfactory issue. Banua returned [to Mindanao], and Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara despatched to accompany him Captain Don Claudio de Rivera, and Father Alejandro Lopez of the Society of Jesus, who went with holy zeal for establishing in Mindanao the preaching of the true faith. They arrived at Zamboanga, where they had sufficient warnings of the danger to which they were going; but with fearless courage they continued their journey until they reached Corralat. He received them without any of the ostentation usual for an embassy, but rather with frowns and displeasure; and when he read the letters from the governor of Manila—which were excellent for an occasion in which our strength might be greater, but the present time demanded shrewder dissimulation—the Moro king was much disturbed, and displayed extreme anger. The end of this embassy (of which an excellent account is given by Father Francisco Combés in hisHistoria de Mindanao, book viii, chap. 3) was that Corralat ordered his nephew Balatamay to slay Father Alejandro Lopez and his associate, Father Juan de Montiel, and Captain Claudio de Rivera.7Corralat sent the letters of the governor to the kings of Joló and of Ternate, to incite them to make common cause in defense of their profession as Mahometans, but they did not choose torisk breaking the peace; on the contrary, the king of Ternate handed over the letters to the governor of our forts there, Francisco de Esteybar, who restored them to the governor of Manila. (Diaz,Conquistas, pp. 549–551.)
Corralat, fearing the vengeance of the Spaniards, wrote to the governor of Zamboanga throwing the responsibility for what had occurred on his nephew Balatamay, whom he could not chastise on account of the latter being so powerful. He also wrote to Manrique de Lara, attributing the deaths of the Jesuits and other Spaniards to imprudent acts committed by Father López, and entreated the governor that, mutually forgiving injuries, affairs might remain as they had previously been. But his complicity in the event came to be discovered, through another letter directed in June, 1656, to the sultan of Joló, exhorting the latter to unite with him for defending the religion which both professed. The Joloan monarch sent his letter to the governor of Zamboanga in order to demonstrate his loyalty. Similar assistance was solicited by Corralat from the Dutch and from the sovereigns of Macasar and Ternate; and to the latter, in order to stimulate him more, he sent the original letter of Manrique de Lara, presenting the question under the religious aspect only—a letter which the Spanish governor of Ternate was able to recover, and he sent it to its author. The captain-general of Filipinas, not considering his forces sufficient for waging war on the powerful sultan of Mindanao, notified the governor of Zamboanga8to accept Corralat’s excuses as sufficientuntil he could ascertain whether reënforcements were arriving from Nueva España and they could avenge so many injuries.
The sultan, seeing that his insolent conduct did not receive the energetic and effectual punishment that it deserved, gained new courage, and sent out his people to make raids through the coasts of Zamboanga and Basilan—terminating the campaign by looting Tanganan, where they took captive the headman of that village, named Ampi, and twenty-three persons besides. In the Calamianes Islands also the Mindanaos committed horrible ravages. The governor of the Moluccas, Don Francisco de Esteybar, received orders to go to Zamboanga, conferring upon him, besides the command of the said post, the office of governor and captain-general of all the southern provinces of Filipinas. On the second of December of the said year 1656 he arrived at Zamboanga. When this valiant chief was informed of what had occurred, and learned that the pirates were equipping at Simuay [River] a squadron to invade the Visayas, he declared war on Corralat, without stopping to consider whether his forces were inferior or not to those of the enemy, trusting to the courage of his followers and the justice of his cause for the issue of the undertaking. In this document he ordered that ten caracoas should set out, under command of Don Fernando de Bobadilla; and these vessels went to sea on December 30. This commander detached Admiral Don Pedro de Viruega at the village of Sosocon, and Sargento-mayor Don Félix de Herrera at Point Taguima. Through his spies, Corralat knew of the departure of the squadron, and declined to send his boats against the Spanish armada; andduring twenty days Bobadilla waited in vain for the pirate vessels. During this time the dato of Sibuguey, Mintun, went to Zamboanga, offering the aid of his people against Corralat, perhaps in order not to be the leader in paying for the losses of the war. It was reported that the sultan had sent four vessels to the village of that chief for rice, and Bobadilla set out to intercept this convoy (January 2, 1657). On arriving at La Silanga,9two small caracoas went ahead to reconnoiter the place; these boats conquered a large vessel; but their crews intimidated the Lutaos who were in the Spanish ship, telling them that they would soon be destroyed by Corralat, who was expected in Mintun with fifteen vessels. As the Lutaos of Bobadilla’s squadron were inclined toward the sultan, or were afraid of falling into his power, they threatened the commandant that they would abandon the field when the battle was at its height, if the Spaniards compelled them to fight against Corralat. In view of this, Bobadilla was obliged to return to Zamboanga, losing so propitious an opportunity to avenge the wicked perfidy of the old sultan. Nevertheless, he seized a considerable number of small boats, full of rice, and forty captives. The sultan, now a declared enemy, and attributing to our weakness the failure to punish the murder of the ambassadors, commanded his squadrons to commit piracies, under the command of Prince Balatamay. That deceitful Moro, after committing the most outrageous acts of violence in Marinduque and Mindoro, returned to Mindanao with a multitude of captives and very rich spoils.
While Balatamay was raiding the above-mentioned islands, a splendid squadron sailed from Cavite by order of the governor-general, in command of an officer whose name is not told in the histories, from whom brilliant conduct was expected, to judge from the valor of which he boasted in drawing-rooms; but, far from fulfilling his duty, he lingered in Balayan under pretext of securing supplies of rice, and then in Mindoro, carrying out his cowardly purpose of not encountering the Moros, notwithstanding that the forces under his command were more than sufficient to destroy the pirates. To the end that he might operate in conjunction with the said squadron, Esteybar ordered Alférez Luis de Vargas to scour the coasts of Mindanao; but as the commander of the squadron failed to carry out the instructions that he had received, Vargas, as he could not find him, confined his efforts to burning a village on the bay of Simuay, where he seized several captives. Bobadilla reduced to ashes the old capital of Corralat, Lamitan, its inhabitants having fled to the woods. Also in the said year of 1657 the dato Salicala of Mindanao scoured the seas with his squadron; the natives in consternation abandoned their villages without daring to resist him, and he carried away as captives more than a thousand Indians—his audacity going so far that he sailed into the bay of Manila.
Esteybar then equipped a small squadron of caracoas and vintas, which departed from Zamboanga on January 1, 1658, resolved to chastise the pirate severely. He spread the report that they were going to Sibuguey. He reached that river in seven days and, placing part of his forces in charge of Sargento-mayor Itamarren, he destroyed the village of Namucan, and at Luraya burned many boats. Four pilanscaptured the joanga which had carried Father López to Simuay, manned by Moros from Mintun. Suddenly changing his course, he took the route to Punta de Flechas, in order to go to the capital of Corralat, but sent beforehand thirty Spaniards, with Captain Don Pedro de Viruega, to the district of Butig. Its chief Matundin, at the head of five hundred men, was defeated, the grain-fields ravaged, and the village reduced to ashes. The tilled land of this district was exceedingly rich, since it is the principal source of supply for rice in Mindanao. Great damage was also done in La Sabanilla by Captain Don Juan González Carlete. On the nineteenth of January the squadron encountered a large Dutch ship surrounded by some pirate vessels. Esteybar attempted to secure a free passage without bringing on a contest, to which end he hoisted a white flag; but the commander of the Dutch ship displayed a red flag, firing all his cannon against the Spanish vessels. Then, without heeding the superiority of the enemy, Bobadilla came against the ship, all his men rowing as hard as they could; and Esteybar attacked it at the stern. The Spaniards then were going to board the ship with a rush, when a ball fired from the vessel of Esteybar set on fire the Santa Barbara [i.e., powder-magazine] of the Dutch ship, thus blowing it into pieces. Only twenty-four of its crew survived, and these were drawn out of the sea and made prisoners. Esteybar continued his voyage to Simuay, the bar of which was fortified with heavy stockades; moreover, at its ends were two forts, garrisoned by Malays, Macassars, and Dutchmen. This did not frighten Esteybar, and he made preparations to capture the posts of the enemy, in spite of adviceto the contrary from his captains. While he was deciding the best method of accomplishing this, he passed with his squadron to the river of Buhayen, sending in by one of its entrances the valiant Bobadilla with some vessels, and by the other Sargento-mayor Itamarren. The former sacked the villages and ravaged the grain-fields of Tannil and Tabiran, the latter those of Lumapuc and Buhayen; they destroyed a powerful armada which had been prepared for raiding the islands, and carried away as spoil many versos, muskets, campilans, crises, and all kinds of weapons.
In the village of Buhayen resided Prince Hamo, son of Moncay, from whom the kingdom had been usurped; he mounted a white flag and a cross above his house, being desirous of forming an alliance with the Spaniards, but they, being warned by experience with the treasons of the Moros, continued the hostilities, without attaching any importance to that signal. While they constructed rafts with which to attack the fortress of Corralat, Captain Antonio de Palacios went to destroy the village of Tampacan and its environs; and Adjutant Antonio Vázquez disembarked with orders to cut off the retreat of the enemy’s spies. These were twenty in number, thoroughly armed; Vázquez rushed upon them, and at the first encounter killed five and wounded six of them, and the rest were shot to death in the woods. Esteybar returned to the bar of Buhayen; he knew that at a day’s journey from there was a village of Lutaos, called Maolo, and, desirous to chastise that settlement and obtain information about that coast, he sent Sargento-mayor Itamarren—who, finding it deserted, set fire to the village, killed four Moros,and captured two others, the only ones who waited for the attack.
Notwithstanding these provocations, and others that were directly offered to Corralat in the environs of his fortifications, it was impossible to draw him out into the open country. Having constructed a number of rafts, on which were placed pieces of artillery, the governor went aboard the largest of them, and with the aid of the vessels cannonaded the fort of Corralat for the space of four hours, but he defended it well. It was evident that the difficulties of assaulting it were insuperable, and that the artillery was operating with but little result, on account of the condition of the sea; accordingly it was decided to retire to the bar of Buhayen. The squadron went to La Sabanilla on the seventeenth of February; here Esteybar received orders to return to Molucas, and he proceeded to Zamboanga. Notwithstanding the well-known valor of this chief, and the injuries inflicted on the Moros during the two months of the campaign, this retreat gave much satisfaction to Corralat, since it freed him from [the danger of] going as a wanderer through the hills, as on previous occasions.
The valiant Esteybar had been replaced as governor of the military post of Zamboanga by Don Fernando de Bobadilla—a chief no less courageous and resolute—with the same titles and preeminences as the former. Corralat, in order better to secure his dominions against the aggressions of the Spaniards, made Namu, king of Buhayen, establish a fort at the mouth of the river, the opposite shore of which was likewise fortified by Corralat; he entrusted to Marundin the defense of the bar of Simuay, and to the Basilan chiefs Ondol and Boto the construction of afortification at the entrance of the estuary of Zamboanga. Don Diego Zarria Lazcano took the place of Bobadilla, the former remaining at the head of the armada.
The datos Linao and Libot of Joló, and Sacahati of Tawi-Tawi, with thirteen vessels, scoured the coasts of Bohol, Leyte, and Masbate. Near Luban they put to death father Fray Antonio de San Agustin, who on account of his ailments could not retreat to the interior of that island as did the rest who were going with him in their vessel. A squadron sailed from Manila in command of Don Pedro Duran de Monforte; they went to Luban, Mindoro, Panay, and Gigantes without discovering the pirates, and returned to the capital. The Moros were able to return to Joló with many spoils and eighty captives; but the sultan of that island sent back the said captives, in order to prove that he desired peace with the Spaniards. (Montero y Vidal.Hist. piratería, i, pp. 236–244. Cf. Combés,Hist. Mindanao, col. 533–549, 570–587.)
Great were the calamities suffered by the Filipinas Islands in these years of 1657 and 58, which might have occasioned their entire ruin, if divine Providence had not manifestly preserved them, at the expense of miracles and prodigies. Even the arrogance of the Dutch recognized this, when they saw their proud forces humiliated by the unequal strength of ours; and it was acknowledged by the inhabitants of these islands, recognizing the divine clemency. In the former of those years the scourge of divine justice was the great armada of Mindanao corsairs, which, commanded by Salicala, a Moro of much valor, infested the Pintados Islands; and their insolence wentso far that they came in sight of the great bay of Manila. The poor natives who groaned under the yoke of captivity to these pirates amounted to more than a thousand; and as it was impossible for most of them to furnish ransom for their persons, they usually died as slaves of the Moros. I have not been able to learn the reason why no assistance was given to deliver them by going out to find those pirates—although I do not believe that it was the absence of compassion in Governor Don Sabiniano Manrique de Lara, but rather his lack of means, and his being engrossed with more pressing affairs. This was followed by the plagues of innumerable locusts, which, laying waste the fields, made general havoc, occasioning the famine which was the worst enemy of the poor; this was followed by its inseparable companion, pestilence, which made great ravages with a general epidemic of smallpox. (Diaz,Conquistas, p. 556.)
General Don Agustin de Cepeda went to Zamboanga as governor (June 16, 1659), without any events worthy of mention occurring during the time while he exercised that office; afterward he went to assume the government of Molucas. He who took his place10experienced great annoyances with the Jesuits, who in their histories relate in great detail how much he tried to injure their interests; but Don Fernando Bobadilla was again charged with the government of Zamboanga (February 15, 1662).
The authorities and citizens of Manila were the victims in May, 1662, of a fearful panic, on account of the claim by the powerful Chinese pirate Kue-Singthat the little realm of Filipinas should render him homage and be declared his tributary, under penalty of his going with his squadrons to destroy the Spaniards—as he had done with the Dutch, expelling them from Formosa. This embassy, which was brought to Manila by the Dominican father Fray Victorio Ricci, and the consequent indignation against the Chinese, were the origin of an insurrection by those who resided in Manila, which was subdued; and the conference of authorities resolved to expel them from the country and repel by force of arms the aggression of Kue-Sing—the governor-general making ready great armaments, and whatever preparations for defense seemed to him necessary that he might come out victorious from the tremendous danger that threatened the island.
But the most important and most far-reaching of the measures adopted by the council at which Manrique de Lara presided was the abandonment of the advantageous post of Zamboanga—the advanced sentinel of our domination over the coasts inhabited by the fierce Malay Mahometans—and those of La Sabanilla, Calamianes, and Iligan (which were also important in the highest degree), with the intention of concentrating in Manila all the forces which garrisoned those posts (May 6). This notification caused, among the Spanish subjects of those lands, or it may be among the Lutaos, profound sorrow and the utmost fear. They complained bitterly of the unprotected state in which they were left, remaining exposed to the vengeance of the Moros—who no longer could consider them as belonging to their race, and bore a mortal hatred to them for havingbecome Christians.11These just complaints, and the knowledge of the damages which would result from the withdrawal of the Spanish forces, impelled the governor of the fort, Don Fernando Bobadilla, and the learned Father Combés to entreat the governor-general to revoke his mandate, both explaining to him the very cogent and strong reasons which prompted their advice. The news that the Spaniards were involved in so tremendous a conflict encouragedthe Joloans to repeat once more their terrible incursions. The datos of Joló, Tawi-Tawi, Lacay-Lacay, and Tuptup, equipped sixty vessels, and, dividing their forces into several small squadrons, sacked and burned the villages of Poro, Baybay, Sogor, Cabalian, Basey, Dangajon, Guinobatan, and Capul. They killed Captain Gabriel de la Peña; they captured an official of the same class, Ignacio de la Cueva, and the Jesuit father Buenaventura Barcena; they went even to the mountains in pursuit of the religious; and all the Indians whom they caught they carried away as captives to their own country, killing many of all ages and classes.
The governor-general of the islands sent a squadron to pursue the pirates, but they accomplishednothing. From Zamboanga Adjutant Francisco Alvarez went out alone to encounter them; he captured the caracoa of the pirate Gani, a relative of Salé, and of thirty captives whom the latter was carrying away. Alvarez freed twenty-two—afterward going to an island of Joló, where he captured twelve Moros. Bobadilla, in answer to his message, on November 8 received pressing orders to return to Manila without loss of time, the governor yielding so far as to allow that he might leave in the fortress of Zamboanga at most fifty Spaniards. This was equivalent to condemning those unfortunates to a sure death, and the Jesuit fathers protested against it, saying that necessarily they would incur the same fate; but finally the supreme authority of the islands decided upon the total abandonment of the postsabove mentioned. Nevertheless Bobadilla, with the object of encouraging the Lutaos and leading the Moros to believe that he was not abandoning the post, sent in pursuit of them Don Juan de Morales Valenzuela, with two caracoas, to the islands called “Orejas de Liebre,” on January 2, 1663; but on the fourth of the same month he received a new and more positive order from the captain-general, dated October 11, that without delay or any excuse he must abandon Zamboanga. At sight of this, Bobadilla warned Morales that the withdrawal must be made, as was done on the seventh—as promptly as possible fulfilling the said imperious mandate, convinced that it was now altogether impossible to oppose so plain a decision.
The governor of Zamboanga made a solemn surrender of the fort to the master-of-camp of the Lutao natives, Don Alonso Macombon, receiving from him an oath of fidelity to hold it for the king of España and defend it from his enemies; but Don Alonso refused to include among these the sultan of Mindanao, on the pretext that he had not sufficient strength to oppose the dreaded Corralat. The governor, fearing his defection, did not leave him any artillery. The Jesuits also surrendered to Macombon their houses and churches, carrying away the images, ornaments, chalices, and books; and six thousand Christians remained in Zamboanga exposed to the rage of the Mahometans. Some Lutaos, although not many, decided to go to the province of Cebú, or to that of Dapitan; others scattered through Joló or Mindanao in search of safety, returning to their former religion.
The abandonment of our military posts in Mindanaowas, although it is excused by the embarrassed condition of the capital of the islands, an exceedingly imprudent measure, since, in order to provide for an uncertain danger, the Visayan Islands were left exposed to another which was more immediate and real—to say nothing of the retrogression that must necessarily result to our domination among the natives of Mindanao, where at that time over seventy thousand Christians lived. The pirate who could cause such a panic in the authorities of Manila, and occasioned so great losses to the undertaking of subduing the Mahometan Malay pirates, died without carrying out his threats.
During the government of Don Juan de Vargas (1679), the sultan of Borneo sent an embassy to ask that mercantile dealings might be established with Filipinas; and Vargas in his turn sent another and a very distinguished one, headed by Sargento-mayor Don Juan Morales de Valenzuela. In 1701 occurred in the south of Filipinas an event as tragic as unusual. The sultan of Joló went to visit the ruler of Mindanao, for greater ostentation taking with him as escort a squadron composed of sixty-seven vessels. At sight of such a retinue the sultan of Mindanao, Cutay12(the successor of the noted Corralat), feared that the other had designs that were not peaceable, and commanded that the mouth of the river should be closed; but the sultan of Joló, offended thereat, dared the other to a personal combat. This challenge was accepted, and the two sultans engaged in a hand-to-hand contest, so fierce that each slew the other; and immediately war was kindled between the two peoples. The Joloans, breaking down the stakes which closed theriver, retired to their own island with many weapons and spoils. The new ruler of Mindanao asked aid from the governor of Manila, Don Domingo Zubálburu; but the latter advised that they should lay aside their dissensions, and for that purpose sent the Jesuit Father Antonio de Borja, who was able to attain his object. (Montero y Vidal,Hist. piratería, i, pp. 244–252. Cf. Combés,Hist. Mindanao, col. 610–640.)
The king of Joló, on the contrary, had for many years maintained peace and friendly relations with the Spaniards, much to the resentment of his chiefs and captains, who derived much more profit from hostile raids than from trade and peace; therefore by means of their confidential agents they spread the report that the king of Joló was talking of sending an armed fleet of twenty joangas to plunder these islands. The principal author of this was a Joloan named Linao, who was on intimate terms with the Spaniards, and a Guimbano named Palía. But the king of Joló was very far from thinking of such changes, and it would have been better for us if we had not so readily believed it. At this information Don Fernando de Bobadilla despatched his armada against Joló, under General Don Pedro de Viruega; but when he reached that island he found that the story that they had spread abroad against the king was false, and Don Pedro, having talked with him, went back to Zamboanga well satisfied of his peaceable attitude. But it was not long before the former rumors against the king of Joló were again current; the author of them was Linao, who desired a rupture [with the Spaniards], so that he with other pirates might go out on raids against these islands—in which enterprise he was more interested than in the peace ofhis king. This plan he carried out in company with two others, Libot and Sacahati, who went cruising with several vessels and did much damage in the islands of Pintados and Masbate, until they reached the Limbones;13from that place they chased the corregidor of Mariveles, and captured the provincial of our discalced Augustinian religious and those who were accompanying him, on his return from visiting the Christian villages of Bolinao—although these persons escaped by jumping ashore. But there was one who could not do this, father Fray Antonio de las Misas (also a discalced Augustinian), who was coming from Cuyo and Calamianes to visit those convents. This religious might with good reason be regarded as a martyr; for with his blood only were the hands of the renegade Linao stained, as he spared the lives of all the rest in his greed for ransom. Although the pirates knew that the ransom of this religious promised them more profit [than that of an ordinary captive], their hatred to the faith prevailed over their greed, which in these barbarians is great. This opinion is confirmed by the cruelty with which they treated an image of Our Lady of the People, which this religious was wearing, on which they used their crises with furious rage. This religious was an old man, and greatly esteemed for his virtue; and in the order he had held positions of honor—prior of the convent at Manila, vicar-provincial of Cebú, and other posts in Caraga. He had a brother, a lay member of the Society of Jesus in these islands, who also suffered the same kind of death at the hands of the barbarous pirates called Camucones—a nationas cruel as cowardly, two qualities which always go together.
Great was the injury which these pirates inflicted on the islands, and although the alcalde-mayor of Balayan went out against them with some armed vessels they could not be found, either by him or by some other vessels which went from Manila for this purpose with a considerable force of men, on account of the adroitness with which the Moros concealed themselves, avoiding an encounter—to such an extent that the belief was current in Manila that these were not outside enemies, but insurgent Indians of the country, until a Spaniard who had been seized by the enemy at the shoals of Mindoro made his escape from them, and his account undeceived the people of Manila. The governor despatched an armed fleet in command of Admiral Pedro Durán de Monforte, a soldier of long experience, but this remedy came too late; for the pirates, satiated with burning villages, plundering, and taking captives, had returned to their own country. Accordingly the armada, having vainly scouted along Lubán, Mindoro, and Panay, returned to Manila, having accomplished nothing save the expenses which were caused for the royal exchequer, which is the paymaster for these and other cases of negligence.
The distrust which was felt regarding the maintenance of the peace by the king of Joló perhaps occasioned anger that he had not prevented these injuries; but he, knowing that if he did not make amends it would be a cause for justifiable hostilities, sent an embassy to the governor (who was Don Diego Sarria Lazcano), exonerating himself and promising to chastise Linao, Libot, and Sacahati;this he did, and many captives were restored, which was no slight [amends]. King Corralat raised his false alarms, as he was wont to do when that suited him, and also made some trifling raids through the agency of the people of Sibuguey, and threatened the Zebuans at Dapitán. But all became quiet when the office of governor of those coasts was assumed (June 16, 1659) by Don Agustín de Cepeda, a great soldier—who died in decrepit old age as master-of-camp of these Filipinas. Corralat knew, much to his sorrow, the valor of this able officer, and therefore did not dare to anger him, content that the Spaniards should leave him in peace. Don Agustín, as a prudent man, determined to try measures to secure peace; and, conferences having been held, those measures were carried out, with very advantageous arrangements for our forces.
The frequent raids of these Moro pirates, both Mindanaos and Joloans, were one of the greatest hardships which these Filipinas Islands suffered through many continuous years; they were the scourge of the natives of the islands of Pintados and Camarines, Tayabas, and Mindoro, as being nearest to the danger and most weak for defense. These people paid with their beloved liberty for our neglect to defend them—not always deserving of blame, on account of the mutations of the times. Few Spaniards have been the prey of these vile thieves, except some who were very incautious; but amends have been made for these by many religious and some secular priests, ministers in the Indian villages, who have suffered rigorous captivities and cruel deaths. No small amount of expenditure has fallen on the royal exchequer; for those pirates have caused innumerableexpenses in armed fleets, most of them useless because the news of the loss did not reach us until the pirates were returning unhurt to their own lands. At times it has given even the governors and captains-general of these islands plenty to do in defending them from these pilfering thieves, as we saw in the first part of this history, in the case of Don Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera and others. All the life of Cachil Corralat—which was a very long one, for it exceeded ninety years—and that of his father Bahisan kept our vigilance continually on the alert, and caused us to found and maintain the fortified posts of Zamboanga, Sabanilla, Malanao, and others—which caused so much expense and no profits; for the forts defend only a small space, and the sea has many roads, and thus they did not hinder the Moro fleets from sallying forth whenever they chose. Moreover, Corralat had all the Lutaos for spies, on account of their great reverence for him, and because they were in secret as much Mahometans as himself; for never is a Lutao found who has not been circumcised, or one who eats pork—and it is this which constitutes their Mahometanism, as also having many wives and being enemies of Christians; for in other respects they are atheists, and do not know what the Koran is or what it contains. And, as I have heard from military men who have experience in these wars, the only restraint upon these Joloan and Mindanao enemies is in armed fleets, which go to search for them in their homes and inflict on them all the damage they can, without going inland; for the Spaniards will not find any one there on whom to avenge themselves, since the inhabitants are safe in their thick forests and on impregnable heights.
After so many years of misfortunes the divine mercy took pity on these poor natives, on whom the cruelty and greed of the Moros had so long fattened, selecting as an agent the very Corralat who had been the cause of the past havoc. With old age and experience he came to see the injury which was resulting to his people (and most of all to the kings of Mindanao) from having enemies so valiant as the Spaniards had proved to be; and therefore while he lived he maintained peace with Manila, with friendly relations and the benefit of commerce on both sides. And when his death arrived, which was at the end of the year 1671, he left his nephew and heir, Balatamay, strictly charged to keep the peace, with heavy curses and imprecations, according to their custom; and his people obeyed him so well that for a long time no raid was heard of; nor was there any by the Camucones, who are subject to Borney. The king of Joló, Paguián, has preserved the same peace and friendship; for all the Moro tribes of these regions reverenced Corralat as if he were Mahoma himself. For he was a Moro of great courage, intelligence, and sagacity, besides being exceedingly zealous for his accursed sect, and a great sorcerer—for all of which he probably has met condign punishment. (Diaz,Conquistas, pp. 564–567.)
The governor [i.e., Manuel de León, in 1674] commanded Juan Canosa Raguses, a skilful builder of lateen-rigged vessels, to construct two galleys; these sailed very straight and light, and did good service in frightening away the Camucones, pilfering and troublesome pirates, who in most years infested the Pintados Islands with pillaging and seizure of captives. These are a barbarous, cruel, and cowardlypeople, and they cannot have one of these traits without the others. They inhabit a chain of small islands, which extend from Paragua to Borney; some of them are Mahometans and others heathens. They have done much harm to the islands of Bisayas, which they ravaged quite at their ease—so much so that in the year 1672 they carried away the alcalde-mayor, Don José de San Miguel, as we have mentioned elsewhere. They have a great advantage in the extreme swiftness of their vessels, which enables them to find their defense in flight. Their confidence and boldness went so far that they ventured to infest the coasts of Manila. The provincial, Fray José Duque, while going to visit the convents in the islands of Pintados, came very near being captured with his companion, Fray Alvaro de Benavente; for they were attacked by a squadron of these pirates near the island of Marinduque, where they would have been a prey to Moro cruelty, if they had not been favored by the divine kindness. [This acted] through the agency of Captain Francisco Ponce, a veteran soldier, who killed the captain and another of the pirates; and also of a sudden wind, which gave wings to the champan for placing itself in safety. With the building of these galleys the Camucones were inspired with such terror that for many years they did not venture to sally out for their usual raids, so much in safety as before. The first time, Sargento-mayor Pedro Lozano went out to scour the seas through which the Camucones might come to make their raids. In the following year, Captain Don José de Novoa went out—a brave Galician, the encomendero of Gapang—and as commander of the second galley Captain Simón de Torres, an able soldier from Maluco; and theyscoured the coasts of Mindanao, committing some acts of hostility, their sole object therein being to cause more terror than harm. And thus it was, that with the fear which those piratical tribes had conceived of the galleys neither Joloans, Mindanaos, nor Camucones dared, so long as these lasted, to commit their former ravages. The same thing occurs whenever there are galleys, even though they do not go out to sea and are shut up in the port of Cavite. It is therefore very expedient to keep vessels of this sort, in order to be free from the invasions of those pirates. In view of this, Governor Don Domingo de Zabálburu built two other galleys, which was the cause of the Joloans, Mindanaos, and Camucones remaining, throughout his term of office, within their own boundaries, although they had been in previous years, as we have seen, a continual plague to these islands. (Diaz,Conquistas, p. 711.)14
1Spanish,romper el nombre; “to cease using the countersign of recognition, when daybreak comes, for which purpose the drums, cornets, trumpets, or other musical instruments give the signal with the call nameddiana” (Dominguez); cf. Frenchreveille.2In Sulu roadstead; anchorage is north of the town. In channel between Sulu roadstead and Marongas is a pearl-oysterbed, which employs many boats. This is an important industry, pearls and pearl-shells being the chief articles in the export trade of the island. (U. S. Philippine Gazetteer.)3Colin (who was at that time in Joló) says of this (Labor evangélica, ed. 1663, p. 49): “There was found near the island of Joló a piece [of amber] which weighed more than eight arrobas, of the best kind that exists, which is the gray [el gris].” Retana and Pastells regard Combés’sambaras meaning amber, the vegetable fossil; but it is possible that all these writers mean rather ambergris, which is supposed to be a morbid secretion of the sperm whale, and has been used as a perfume.4It was Lopez who soon afterward, having gone to Manila to report results to Governor Fajardo, secured (largely throughthe influence of Venegas, who was very friendly to Lopez) permission for six Jesuits to labor in the islands of the south, the rebuilding of their residence at Zamboanga, and the exemption of the Lutaos from tribute, and the appointment of Rafael Omen de Azevedo as governor. (Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 151 b.)5In the text,desvelar, “to keep awake”—but from the context, apparently an error of some sort.6Spanish,dió una bofetada, literally, “gave a blow in the face”—in the Spanish a play on words which it is difficult to retain in English.7This order was carried out by Balatamay, on December 13, 1655. See Combés’s detailed account of this tragedy, as cited by Diaz.8Pedro Durán de Monforte; his term of office began in 1649, and lasted until Esteybar’s arrival at Zamboanga (Dec. 2, 1656).9“La Silanga, which is a strait that is formed by the island of Tulaya with the land of Mindanao” (Diaz, p. 561). Retana and Pastells, in their edition ofCombés, make Tulaya the modern Tulayan, near Sulu—an evident error, from Diaz’s statement.10Referring to the governorad interimfrom November, 1661 to February, 1662; Combés describes at length his “persecution” of the Jesuits at Zamboanga (col. 591–609), but does not mention his name.11“Hardly had Morales reached the islands, when a new despatch arrived from Manila, repeating the same orders. The silence of the Spaniards [i.e., regarding their first order to leave the fort], and the hurried preparations that were made that very night for the withdrawal of Morales, inflamed the injured feelings of the Lutaos, nor could any argument repress them. The governor did not attempt to do more than console them, in order that they might prudently decide what they should do; he told them that the Spaniards would never forsake them, and that if the Lutaos would follow them there were places in the islands, with equal and even greater advantages, where they could live; that Corralat was friendly, and the Spaniards would charge him to maintain friendly relations with them, which they could with good reason expect, as he was of the same nation as themselves; that if he should not fulfil this obligation, occasion would not fail the Spaniards to avenge them. He also said that they could, with the forts which he left to them, easily defend themselves from their enemies; and finally, that they should await the ultimate decision which would be brought by General Don Francisco de Atienza on his way to Maluco, since it might improve the condition of affairs.“Little impression did these arguments, which the Spaniards offered by way of consolation, make on the Lutaos. The tyrannies that they would experience when left to their own government had no respect for kinship, nor was there any law save that of might. To leave their homes was most difficult, and to transplant their villages was to ruin them. To defend the fort supplies of ammunition and food were required, and they had no fund to meet these costs. They gave way to lamentations and complaints that, as they had served the Spaniards with their lives, they had roused in their neighbors a mortal hatred; that, notwithstanding they had become Christians, they were left abandoned, in the power of the Moros, without instruction, or defense, or honor. They recounted their services, and their sighs grew heavier, while they declared as false the promises made to themin the beginning, which drew them away from obedience to their natural king; and that with such an example [as this of the Lutaos before them] the peoples [of Mindanao] would not change sides in order to please a nation so unreliable [as the Spaniards]. The Subanos also presented their piteous remonstrances that as a people of the hill-country, and of timid disposition, they were exposed to greater misfortunes. They went to the fort and renewed their importunities, saying that the Spaniards were deserting and abandoning them [notwithstanding] their humble submission, and leaving them to be slaves of their enemies; that although they had maintained the Spaniards with their tributes, provided their houses with their products, and embraced their faith, contented with the freedom which followed Spanish protection, yet now their liberty remained at the mercy of greed, the Spaniards profiting by their lives for the sake of keeping up intercourse with the Macassars and Malayos; and that it was too much to be endured, to leave in such infamous subjection vassals so obedient as they. The governor, his heart pierced by their pathetic expostulations, could give no other satisfaction than his own anxious hopes. In the midst of these limited and sad consolations, with the arrival of the succors for Terrenate came anew the severe orders [for abandoning the forts]; the governor was now unable to give them courage, for lack of means, and all were disconsolate; but it was necessary to execute the rigorous order—those who remained being as sorrowful at it as were those who were going away, and each one endeavoring to make hisdecision and to suit it to this emergency. Some went to Mindanao, others to Joló, and others to Basilan; many dispersed in the coasts of Zamboangan, the people of Don Alonso Macombon remaining here with him; and a few determined to follow the fortunes of those who retreated thence, going to settle at Dapitan and Zebù.... In the vessels had to be placed more than a thousand souls, and the military supplies. It was a grievous abandonment, by which more than a thousand Christians were left exposed to the cruelty of the Moros.... In great part it was due to the obstinacy of the Jesuits, who, regarding the allowance of fifty men as insufficient, compelled its total abandonment. Such garrisons have been and are sufficient to oppose the Moros in the remaining presidios; and the same would be enough in Zamboangan if the great extent which must be guarded, on account of the size of the fort, were reduced to a little, demolishing the less important part [of the fortifications]. But their profound thoughts feared lest that fort would afterward remain thus scantily garrisoned, and that it would not make so much show or its administration be so conspicuous; nor would there be expended in the allowances [for it] so large sums, which they converted to their own advantage.... Soon there were representations made at the court of injury resulting from its desertion, and consequent royal decrees for its reconstruction, which did not take effect until long afterward.” (Concepción,Hist. de Philipinas, vii, pp. 93–97.)12This name is Curay in Concepción’sHistoria.13An island and point at the entrance to Patungan Bay, in Batangas, Luzón.14It is evident, from the above statements by Diaz, that Barrantes is incorrect in saying (Guerras piráticas, p. 17): “In this manner, so melancholy for Filipinas, ended the seventeenth century.” He has made this hasty and unfounded conclusion through failure to search for material to supply the gap which occurs at this point in the narrative which he has used as the basis of the work above cited. This is a MS. narrative of the Moro wars, for an account of which see ourVol. XXIX, p. 174, note 40.
1Spanish,romper el nombre; “to cease using the countersign of recognition, when daybreak comes, for which purpose the drums, cornets, trumpets, or other musical instruments give the signal with the call nameddiana” (Dominguez); cf. Frenchreveille.
2In Sulu roadstead; anchorage is north of the town. In channel between Sulu roadstead and Marongas is a pearl-oysterbed, which employs many boats. This is an important industry, pearls and pearl-shells being the chief articles in the export trade of the island. (U. S. Philippine Gazetteer.)
3Colin (who was at that time in Joló) says of this (Labor evangélica, ed. 1663, p. 49): “There was found near the island of Joló a piece [of amber] which weighed more than eight arrobas, of the best kind that exists, which is the gray [el gris].” Retana and Pastells regard Combés’sambaras meaning amber, the vegetable fossil; but it is possible that all these writers mean rather ambergris, which is supposed to be a morbid secretion of the sperm whale, and has been used as a perfume.
4It was Lopez who soon afterward, having gone to Manila to report results to Governor Fajardo, secured (largely throughthe influence of Venegas, who was very friendly to Lopez) permission for six Jesuits to labor in the islands of the south, the rebuilding of their residence at Zamboanga, and the exemption of the Lutaos from tribute, and the appointment of Rafael Omen de Azevedo as governor. (Murillo Velarde,Hist. de Philipinas, fol. 151 b.)
5In the text,desvelar, “to keep awake”—but from the context, apparently an error of some sort.
6Spanish,dió una bofetada, literally, “gave a blow in the face”—in the Spanish a play on words which it is difficult to retain in English.
7This order was carried out by Balatamay, on December 13, 1655. See Combés’s detailed account of this tragedy, as cited by Diaz.
8Pedro Durán de Monforte; his term of office began in 1649, and lasted until Esteybar’s arrival at Zamboanga (Dec. 2, 1656).
9“La Silanga, which is a strait that is formed by the island of Tulaya with the land of Mindanao” (Diaz, p. 561). Retana and Pastells, in their edition ofCombés, make Tulaya the modern Tulayan, near Sulu—an evident error, from Diaz’s statement.
10Referring to the governorad interimfrom November, 1661 to February, 1662; Combés describes at length his “persecution” of the Jesuits at Zamboanga (col. 591–609), but does not mention his name.
11“Hardly had Morales reached the islands, when a new despatch arrived from Manila, repeating the same orders. The silence of the Spaniards [i.e., regarding their first order to leave the fort], and the hurried preparations that were made that very night for the withdrawal of Morales, inflamed the injured feelings of the Lutaos, nor could any argument repress them. The governor did not attempt to do more than console them, in order that they might prudently decide what they should do; he told them that the Spaniards would never forsake them, and that if the Lutaos would follow them there were places in the islands, with equal and even greater advantages, where they could live; that Corralat was friendly, and the Spaniards would charge him to maintain friendly relations with them, which they could with good reason expect, as he was of the same nation as themselves; that if he should not fulfil this obligation, occasion would not fail the Spaniards to avenge them. He also said that they could, with the forts which he left to them, easily defend themselves from their enemies; and finally, that they should await the ultimate decision which would be brought by General Don Francisco de Atienza on his way to Maluco, since it might improve the condition of affairs.
“Little impression did these arguments, which the Spaniards offered by way of consolation, make on the Lutaos. The tyrannies that they would experience when left to their own government had no respect for kinship, nor was there any law save that of might. To leave their homes was most difficult, and to transplant their villages was to ruin them. To defend the fort supplies of ammunition and food were required, and they had no fund to meet these costs. They gave way to lamentations and complaints that, as they had served the Spaniards with their lives, they had roused in their neighbors a mortal hatred; that, notwithstanding they had become Christians, they were left abandoned, in the power of the Moros, without instruction, or defense, or honor. They recounted their services, and their sighs grew heavier, while they declared as false the promises made to themin the beginning, which drew them away from obedience to their natural king; and that with such an example [as this of the Lutaos before them] the peoples [of Mindanao] would not change sides in order to please a nation so unreliable [as the Spaniards]. The Subanos also presented their piteous remonstrances that as a people of the hill-country, and of timid disposition, they were exposed to greater misfortunes. They went to the fort and renewed their importunities, saying that the Spaniards were deserting and abandoning them [notwithstanding] their humble submission, and leaving them to be slaves of their enemies; that although they had maintained the Spaniards with their tributes, provided their houses with their products, and embraced their faith, contented with the freedom which followed Spanish protection, yet now their liberty remained at the mercy of greed, the Spaniards profiting by their lives for the sake of keeping up intercourse with the Macassars and Malayos; and that it was too much to be endured, to leave in such infamous subjection vassals so obedient as they. The governor, his heart pierced by their pathetic expostulations, could give no other satisfaction than his own anxious hopes. In the midst of these limited and sad consolations, with the arrival of the succors for Terrenate came anew the severe orders [for abandoning the forts]; the governor was now unable to give them courage, for lack of means, and all were disconsolate; but it was necessary to execute the rigorous order—those who remained being as sorrowful at it as were those who were going away, and each one endeavoring to make hisdecision and to suit it to this emergency. Some went to Mindanao, others to Joló, and others to Basilan; many dispersed in the coasts of Zamboangan, the people of Don Alonso Macombon remaining here with him; and a few determined to follow the fortunes of those who retreated thence, going to settle at Dapitan and Zebù.... In the vessels had to be placed more than a thousand souls, and the military supplies. It was a grievous abandonment, by which more than a thousand Christians were left exposed to the cruelty of the Moros.... In great part it was due to the obstinacy of the Jesuits, who, regarding the allowance of fifty men as insufficient, compelled its total abandonment. Such garrisons have been and are sufficient to oppose the Moros in the remaining presidios; and the same would be enough in Zamboangan if the great extent which must be guarded, on account of the size of the fort, were reduced to a little, demolishing the less important part [of the fortifications]. But their profound thoughts feared lest that fort would afterward remain thus scantily garrisoned, and that it would not make so much show or its administration be so conspicuous; nor would there be expended in the allowances [for it] so large sums, which they converted to their own advantage.... Soon there were representations made at the court of injury resulting from its desertion, and consequent royal decrees for its reconstruction, which did not take effect until long afterward.” (Concepción,Hist. de Philipinas, vii, pp. 93–97.)
12This name is Curay in Concepción’sHistoria.
13An island and point at the entrance to Patungan Bay, in Batangas, Luzón.
14It is evident, from the above statements by Diaz, that Barrantes is incorrect in saying (Guerras piráticas, p. 17): “In this manner, so melancholy for Filipinas, ended the seventeenth century.” He has made this hasty and unfounded conclusion through failure to search for material to supply the gap which occurs at this point in the narrative which he has used as the basis of the work above cited. This is a MS. narrative of the Moro wars, for an account of which see ourVol. XXIX, p. 174, note 40.