Tactical versus Strategical Envelopment

*****

Now I think that these extracts sufficiently defend Clausewitz from the imputation of too great a belief in frontal attacks, and considering the frequentsuccess of such Napoleonic attacks in his day, he gives a very fair summing up of the relative advantages and disadvantages thereof, and indeed such as might be written in the present day. Indeed the quite abnormal conditions of the Boer war produced such a feeling against frontal attacks, and so much loose talk of their being extinct, that it is very useful to turn to Clausewitz for a reminder that breaking the centre, whenever the condition he postulates, namelyover-extension of fronton the enemy's part, is present, will always remain one of the two great forms of decisive attack open to a commander.

And as in our day the forces are so enormous that to reach the hostile flank becomes more difficult, and the extension of front becomes so gigantic (a front of several armies on a line of forty to seventy miles perhaps), it is well to considerwhether breaking the enemy's centre will not again offer the most advantageous form for the final decisive act, coupled of course, as Clausewitz says itALWAYS MUSTbe, with a strong flank attack. And in these gigantic battles of the future, such as Liao-yang and Mukden, which we must consider typical of the future, battles which must take several days, during which the troops in the first line become utterly exhausted and used up,—a decisive attack on the centre can well be imagined after the hostile reserves have been decoyed away over a day's march by a strong flank attack. As, for example, Nogi's flank attack round Mukden followed by Nodzu's decisive breaking the centre and capture of Mukden itself.

So that far from thinking Clausewitz's remarks about frontal attacks and breaking the line to be obsolete, it ratherappears from the great Russo-Japanese battles that they are worthy of close study in view of the future.

A fourth disputed point is the preference of Clausewitz, owing to his insistence on the greatest concentration possible with proper regard for the circumstances, for the tactical envelopment arranged on or near the field to strategical envelopment with divided forces arranged beforehand. In this matter I will again quote General v. Caemmerer, who disagrees with him, and says: "Clausewitz proclaims the oblique front as the most effective strategic form of attack, ... that is to say, when the whole army with one united front falls upon the strategicflankof the enemy, and, if victorious,cuts him from his line of retreat. But where such a situation cannot be brought about, where our advance has brought us before the strategicfrontof the enemy, then he sees in the tactical envelopment, in the formation of an offensive flank, the proper means of effectively preparing to push the enemy from his line of retreat, and he distinctly explains that tactical envelopment need not at all be theconsequenceof strategical envelopment, and need not at all be prepared long beforehand by a corresponding advance of divided forces."

Clausewitz says, "The consequence of this is that battles fought with enveloping lines, or even with an oblique front, which should properly result from an advantageous relation of the lines of communication, are commonly the result of a moral and physicalpreponderance."74Also "he should therefore only advance with his columns on such a width of front as will admit of their all coming into action together." "Such separation into several columns should be made use of for the disposition of the tactical attack in the enveloping form" (i.e.by troops within a day's march of each other). "But it must be only of a tactical nature, for a strategic envelopment, when a great blow is to be struck, is a complete waste of power."

General v. Caemmerer comments: "He is thus of opinion that the lateral movement of part of the army against the flank of the enemy could without any difficulty still be carried out as initiated by the plan of battle; and in order to understand this idea we must again bear in mind the difference between the fire-effect of then and now. In those days a comparatively short movement made itstill possible for a considerable portion of the army to gain the defenders' flank; to-day a lengthy and troublesome operation would be necessary for the same object, and its successful execution would only be counted upon if the defender remained entirely passive, and would neither think of a counter-stroke nor of a corresponding movement of his forces to the threatened flank."

Without going into this controversy I will, however, quote the excellent reason given by Clausewitz for his preference for tactical as opposed to strategical envelopment: "One peculiarity of the offensive battle is the uncertainty, in most cases, as to the position (note, and strength) of the enemy; it is a complete groping about amongst things that are unknown (Austerlitz, Wagram, Hohenlinden, Jena, Katzbach). The more this is the case the more concentration of forces becomesparamount, and turning a flank to be preferred tosurrounding."75

It is also well to recollect how many famous generals had been ruined in Clausewitz's experience through over-extension or dispersion of their forces. The crushing defeats of Napoleon's marshals in the winter of 1813, Macdonald at the Katzbach, Oudinot at Gros Beeren, Ney at Dennewitz, which neutralized Napoleon's great victory at Dresden and began his ruin, were all chiefly owing to this cause.

And the weather may, again, have as great influence in shortening resistance and allowing troops to be overwhelmed before the too-distant reinforcements arrive, as it had in those battles. If the weather then prevented the old muskets going off, and enabled the attack to rush the defence, so now a fog, rain, mist, orsnow, by restricting the field of view and fire, may produce the same results. When one thinks of the number of great battles fought in such weather, as they may well be again, one sees an additional reason for carefully considering Clausewitz's warning. Far from relegating his preference for the tactical as opposed to the strategical envelopment to the region of the obsolete, because of our improved armament, it seems right to give it full weight as a corrective to a perceivable tendency to elevate strategical envelopment (after Königgrätz) into a formula for victory. If in the past many great generals have been ruined by over-extension, so may they be again. Against this tendency Clausewitz will for ever lift his voice.

Also it remains to be considered, with the huge armies of to-day and the future, such armies as at Liao-yang and Mukden,such armies as may possibly one day join issue in Afghanistan, whether strategical envelopment will be practicable, or whether tactical envelopment, such as General Kuroki's tactical enveloping movement on Yentai, and the Russian line of retreat at Liao-yang, or General Nogi's tactical enveloping dash northward on Hsinminting and the railway at Mukden, will not be preferable.

Perhaps, as a compromise, one might call such a movement strategical-tactical, and so avoid the dispute by jugglery of words.

I have not attempted to do more than roughly indicate that the solution of these four disputed tactical questions in Clausewitz is to be sought in a study of the latest campaign, as he would have said himself; that is, the campaign in Manchuria. For, as theTimescorrespondent in the XLVth Chapter, "Clausewitzin Manchuria," of his book "The War in the Far East," observes, "It will be abundantly clear to any one who has followed the great battles in Manchuria that the spirit of Clausewitz has presided over Japanese victories and wept over Russian defeats."

In reading Clausewitz it is, first, the great principles of the nature of war founded on human nature, which alter not; and, secondly, it is his spirit and practical way of looking at things that we want to assimilate and apply toTHE PROBLEMS OF TO-DAY, to which end it is necessary to read him always with the changed conditions of to-day in our minds, and think what he would have said under the circumstances. These changes arechiefly:—

The improved net-work of roads in Europe (not, of course, in Manchuria, or in Afghanistan where we have to consider our future strategy, but in Europe), as General v. Caemmerer puts it, "now offers to the movements of armies everywhere a whole series of useful roads where formerly one or two only were available," easier gradients, good bridges instead of unreliable ones, etc. So that the march-discipline of that day when concentrated for battle, artillery and trainonthe roads, infantry and cavalryby the sideof the roads, has disappeared. Such close concentration is therefore now not possible, as we move all armsonthe road,and an army corps with train, or two without, is the most that we can now calculate on bringing into action in one day on one road.

"Railways have, above all, completely altered the term 'base,'" remarks V. Caemmerer. "Railways carry in a few days men, horses, vehicles, and materials of all kinds from the remotest district to any desired point of our country, and nobody would any longer think of accumulating enormous supplies of all kinds at certain fortified points on his own frontier with the object of basing himself on those points. One does not base one's self any longer on a distinct district which is specially prepared for that object, but upon the whole country, which has become one single magazine,with separate store-rooms. So the term 'base' has now to be considered in this light."

It is only when operating in savage or semi-savage countries, where there are no railways, that the old idea of a base applies.

As we penetrate deeper and further from our own country into the enemy's, and as a small raiding party can demolish the railway line so as to stop all traffic for days or weeks, it becomes far more necessary than it ever was in Clausewitz's day to guard our communications. And armies become more and more sensitive to any attack upon their communications.

Also "such a line cannot easily be changed, and consequently those celebrated changes of the line of communication in an enemy's country which Napoleon himself, on some occasion, declared to be the ablest manœuvre inthe art of war, could scarcely be carried out any more" (V. Caemmerer).

Also concentration by means of several railways demands a broad strategic front, which produces that separation of corps or armies which prepares the way for strategical envelopment, and so on.

General von der Goltz, in his "Conduct of War," says: "The more recent treatises on the conduct of war on a large scale are principally taken up with the mobilization and strategical concentration of armies, a department of strategy which only began to play an important part in modern times. It is the result of a dense net-work of railways in Western Europe which has rendered it possible to mass large bodies of troops in a surprisingly brief time. Each Power tries to outdo its neighbours in this respect, ... which gives an opportunity to the strategical specialist to show offhis brilliant qualities.... Consequently it is now frequently assumed that the whole conduct of war is comprised in this one section of it." This over-estimate is of course an error, which, however, requires to be pointed out.

The telegraph has very greatly reduced the danger of separation. The great advantage of the inner line in the day of Napoleon and of Clausewitz was that separated forces could only communicate by mounted messengers, so if the enemy got between them they could not communicate at all, nor act in concert. This the telegraph has completely altered, for as the field telegraph can now be laid as quickly as an army can advance, the most widely separated bodies of troops can every day arrange combined operationsby telegraph through, if necessary, a point one hundred or four hundred miles in rear. So that to-day the chief advantage of the inner line has gone, while its chief disadvantage, the possibility of being surrounded, remains.

We now possess complete detailed Ordnance maps of every country in Europe, kept up to date by the latest alterations, whereas in the days of Clausewitz maps were of the very roughest character, and quite unreliable in comparison.

Smokeless powder, quick-firing and long-ranging artillery and rifles, the infantry field of effective fire being ten times, the artillery five times what it was in Clausewitz's time, have all to beborne in mind when reading the tactical part of his writings. In consequence, also, cover and the tactical use of ground are of far greater importance now than then, etc., etc., etc.

The recent wonderful developments in aviation will obviously almost revolutionize "Information in War." To what extent, it is as yet impossible to say. Each year will teach us more.

The nation-in-arms as the common foundation of all armies (except our own), brought up by railways, vastly increases the numbers in a modern battle from what they were in Clausewitz's day. Compare Austerlitz, Dresden, Leipzig and Waterloo, with Liao-yang and Mukden.It should be so with us also, for as General von der Goltz says in "The Conduct of War": "TheBESTmilitary organization is that which renders availableALLthe intellectual and material resources of the country in event of war.A State is not justified in trying to defend itself with only a portion of its strength, when the existence of the whole is at stake."

In Great Britain the difference which the introduction of this nation-in-arms principle has made in our military strength compared with that of our future opponents, a difference relativelyFAR GREATER AGAINST USthan it was in Napoleon's and Clausewitz's day, is as yet hardly realized by the people, or by our statesmen. People forget the wastage of war, and the necessity for a constant flow of troops to repair that wastage. As Von der Goltz puts it: "It is characteristicof the strategical offensive that the foremost body of troops of an army, the portion which fights the battles, amounts to only a comparatively small fraction, frequently onlya quarter or even one-eighth, of the total fighting strength employed, whilst the fate of the whole army throughout depends upon the success or failure of this fraction.Attacking armies melt away like snow in the spring." To condense his remarks: "In spite of the most admirable discipline, the Prussian Guard Corps lost 5000 to 6000 men in the marches between the attack on St. Privat and the battle of Sedan." "Napoleon crossed the Niemen in 1812 with 442,000 men, but reached Moscow only three months later with only 95,000." In the spring of 1810, the French crossed the Pyrenees with 400,000 men, but still Marshal Massena in the end only brought 45,000 men up to the lines ofTorres Vedras, near Lisbon, where the decision lay. Again, in 1829, the Russians put 160,000 men in the field, but had barely 20,000 left when, at Adrianople, a skilfully concluded peace saved them before their weakness became apparent and a reaction set in. In 1878 the Russians led 460,000 across the Danube, but they only brought 100,000 men—of whom only 43,000 were effective, the rest being sick—to the gates of Constantinople. In 1870 the Germans crossed the French frontier with 372,000 men, but after only a six weeks' campaign brought but 171,000 men to Paris. And so on. The result of it all is simple—that a people which is not based on the modern principle of the nation-in-arms cannot for long rival or contend with one that is, for it can neither put an equal (still less a superior) army into the field at the outset (videClausewitz's firstprinciple), nor even maintain in the field theinferiorarmy it does place there, because it cannot send the ever-required fresh supplies of trained troops. Sooner or later this must tell. Sooner or later a situation must arise in which the nation based on the obsolete voluntary systemmustgo down before a nation based on the nation-in-arms principle. Circumstances change with time, and, as wise Lord Bacon said long ago, "He that will not adopt new remedies must expect new evils." May we adopt the remedy before we experience the evil!

But though these changed conditions must, of course,modifyClausewitz's details in many important particulars, still (to complete our circle and leave off where we started) I repeat that, ashuman nature never changes, and as the moral is to the physical as three to one in war, Clausewitz, as the great realistic and practical philosopher on the actual nature of war, asthe chief exponent of the moral and spiritual forces in war, will ever remain invaluable in the study of war.

Consider what unsurpassed opportunities he had for observing and reflecting on the influence of enthusiasm and passion, of resolution and boldness, of vacillation and weakness, of coolness and caution, of endurance and hardship, of patriotism and freedom, of ambition and of glory—on war, either by his own experience or by conversation with other equally experienced soldiers, during that long period of almost endless wars between 1793 and 1815.

The fervour and enthusiasm and boundless energy of the Revolution, whichdrove the French forward, smashing everything before them, at the beginning; the ambition, military glory, plunder and greed, which animated them later on; the patriotism, religious and loyal devotion, and stern endurance, which nerved the Russian hosts then as now; that awful Moscow winter campaign, when human nature rose to its highest and sank to its lowest, when the extremes of heroic endurance and selfish callousness were visible side by side; the magnificent uprising of the spirit of liberty and freedom from intolerable oppression in Germany, which gave to the Prussian recruits and Landwehr the same driving force that revolutionary enthusiasm had formerly given to the French; the passing, therefore, in 1813 of the moral superiority, the greater driving force, from the French to the allies. Clausewitz saw all this; he conversedintimately with such men as Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, who saw and guided it, too. All his friends had seen it also. No wonder, then, that such an unexampled series of warlike phenomena deeply impressed his reflective mind with the supreme importance of the moral and spiritual factors in war.

His opportunities for long-continued observation of warlike phenomena were far greater than those of any writer since his day, and it is to be hoped they will remain so. For we have no desire to see another series of wars such as the Napoleonic. It is fortunate for us that there was then such a man as Clausewitz to sum up for us so simply and so clearly the accumulated experiences of those long, long years of carnage and devastation.

Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld., London and Aylesbury.

FOOTNOTES1Book IV. Chap. 10.2Book IV. Chap. 3.3Book IV. Chap. 3.4Book I. Chap. 8.5Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.6Summary of Instruction, p. 120.7Book II. Chap. 6.8Book II. Chap. 2.9Prefatory "Notice" by Clausewitz.10Book II. Chap. 4.11Book II. Chap. 2.12Book II. Chap. 2.13Book II. Chap. 3.14Book I. Chap. 1.15By gaining Public Opinion, Clausewitz means, to force the enemy's population into a state of mind favourable to submission.16Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.17Book I. Chap. 1.18Author's "Introduction."19Book I. Chap. 1.20Book VII. Chap. 5.21Book VII. Chap. 21.22Book VII. Chap. 21.23Book VIII. Chaps. 7, 8 and 9.24Book I. Chap. 1.25Book VIII. Chap. 9.26Book I. Chap. 7.27Book I. Chap. 8.28Book I. Chap. 8.29Book IV. Chap. 1.30Book IV. Chap. 3.31Book I. Chap. 1.32Book IV. Chap. 3.33Book III. Chap. 15.34Book VII. Chap. 13.35Book I. Chap. 4.36Book I. Chap. 5.37Book I. Chap. 7.38Book III. Chap. 3.39Book III. Chaps. 16–18.40Book II. Chap. 1.41Book III. Chap. 11.42Book III. Chap. 8.43Book V. Chap. 3.44Book III. Chap. 8.45Book VIII. Chap. 4.46Book III. Chap. 12.47Book III. Chap. 13.48Book III. Chap. 12.49Book III. Chap. 13.50Book III. Chap. 8.51Book III. Chap. 11.52Book VI. Chap. 28.53Book V. Chap. 10.54Book I. Chap. 1.55Book III. Chap. 13.56Book I. Chap. 3.57Book VIII. Chap. 9.58Book VIII. Chap. 9.59Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.60Book I. Chap. 3.61This warning as to the consequences of allowing information to be published freely which would be helpful to an enemy was written five years ago. In the present war the prudent reticence of our Press, and its loyal co-operation with the Government in depriving the enemy of any helpful information, show that the lesson here insisted on has been learned.—Editor's Note.62Book IV. Chap. 4.63Book IV. Chap. 4.64"Guide to Tactics," Vol. III. pp. 136–146.65Book IV. Chap. 4.66Book VI. Chap. 1.67Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.68Book VI. Chap. 5.69Book VIII. Chap. 9.70Book VII. Chap. 15.71Summary of Instruction, "Guide to Tactics," par. 500.72Book VI. Chap. 9.73Book VII. Chap. 9.74Book VII. Chap. 7.75Book VII. Chap. 7.

1Book IV. Chap. 10.

2Book IV. Chap. 3.

3Book IV. Chap. 3.

4Book I. Chap. 8.

5Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.

6Summary of Instruction, p. 120.

7Book II. Chap. 6.

8Book II. Chap. 2.

9Prefatory "Notice" by Clausewitz.

10Book II. Chap. 4.

11Book II. Chap. 2.

12Book II. Chap. 2.

13Book II. Chap. 3.

14Book I. Chap. 1.

15By gaining Public Opinion, Clausewitz means, to force the enemy's population into a state of mind favourable to submission.

16Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.

17Book I. Chap. 1.

18Author's "Introduction."

19Book I. Chap. 1.

20Book VII. Chap. 5.

21Book VII. Chap. 21.

22Book VII. Chap. 21.

23Book VIII. Chaps. 7, 8 and 9.

24Book I. Chap. 1.

25Book VIII. Chap. 9.

26Book I. Chap. 7.

27Book I. Chap. 8.

28Book I. Chap. 8.

29Book IV. Chap. 1.

30Book IV. Chap. 3.

31Book I. Chap. 1.

32Book IV. Chap. 3.

33Book III. Chap. 15.

34Book VII. Chap. 13.

35Book I. Chap. 4.

36Book I. Chap. 5.

37Book I. Chap. 7.

38Book III. Chap. 3.

39Book III. Chaps. 16–18.

40Book II. Chap. 1.

41Book III. Chap. 11.

42Book III. Chap. 8.

43Book V. Chap. 3.

44Book III. Chap. 8.

45Book VIII. Chap. 4.

46Book III. Chap. 12.

47Book III. Chap. 13.

48Book III. Chap. 12.

49Book III. Chap. 13.

50Book III. Chap. 8.

51Book III. Chap. 11.

52Book VI. Chap. 28.

53Book V. Chap. 10.

54Book I. Chap. 1.

55Book III. Chap. 13.

56Book I. Chap. 3.

57Book VIII. Chap. 9.

58Book VIII. Chap. 9.

59Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.

60Book I. Chap. 3.

61This warning as to the consequences of allowing information to be published freely which would be helpful to an enemy was written five years ago. In the present war the prudent reticence of our Press, and its loyal co-operation with the Government in depriving the enemy of any helpful information, show that the lesson here insisted on has been learned.—Editor's Note.

62Book IV. Chap. 4.

63Book IV. Chap. 4.

64"Guide to Tactics," Vol. III. pp. 136–146.

65Book IV. Chap. 4.

66Book VI. Chap. 1.

67Summary of Instruction to H.R.H. the Crown Prince.

68Book VI. Chap. 5.

69Book VIII. Chap. 9.

70Book VII. Chap. 15.

71Summary of Instruction, "Guide to Tactics," par. 500.

72Book VI. Chap. 9.

73Book VII. Chap. 9.

74Book VII. Chap. 7.

75Book VII. Chap. 7.

Transcriber's NotesPunctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced quotation marks retained.Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.Page133: Paragraph ends with: "Otherwise," rather than with a period.

Punctuation and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced quotation marks retained.

Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.

Page133: Paragraph ends with: "Otherwise," rather than with a period.

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