Honored Sir:I deemed it my duty to bring to your attention through my letter of the 26th of May the fact that I gave to the editor of the journal “Retsch” the copy of the report of the chief of the special division of the police department to the minister of the interior, concerning the organization of the pogrom against the Jews in Alexandrovsk (government of Yekaterinoslaff), and touching the participation therein of the authorities of the police department. I did this in the firm conviction that it was only through the imperial Duma, when well informed by the public press, we could hope, once for all, to destroy the great danger menacing the State because of the systematic preparation by government officials of Jewish and other pogroms. I informed you of my action lest some subordinate of Your Excellency might be held responsible for having furnished that journal with the report.I deemed it unnecessary in my communication to impart to you the facts detailed in the report of Markaroff, and with which I was familiar; I refrained from doing so because it was furthest from my thoughts that it could be possible that Your Excellency would conceal the truth that was revealedby the investigation called forth at the request of the Duma, in connection with the report of Markaroff.But yet must I be convinced from the newspaper reports of the Duma session of June 21st, that in your answer to the inquiry of the Duma, the material that was put into your hands for the proper preparation thereof, the real facts in the case, were substantially set aside. I, therefore, conceived it to be my bounden duty to impart to you, in this communication, facts that are well known to me.In January of this year several persons informed me that there were indications of the preparation in different sections of Russia of a Jewish pogrom, and they appealed for my help to prevent such misfortune. Investigations that were made established the truth of their statements, and satisfied me of the participation by public officials in the preparations for a pogrom. They brought me on the trail of a printing-office in the police department.On January 20, Count Witte, the president of the Council of Ministers, invited me to his office and asked me to give him my views on the Jewish question, and as to the reason for the participation of the Jewish proletariat in the revolutionary movement. After I had clearly presented to him my main point of view on the question, I told him that, aside from the judicial aspect of the question, there was another of great importance, namely, anti-Semitism, that not only existed because of the long-continued period in which the Jews were without rights, but because, as well, of the direct provocations against them on the part of persons in public authority. As a special indication of such provocation, I pointed to the incident of the printing-office in the police department, of whose output, however, I had no sufficient evidence in my hands, and Count Witte assigned to me, as an officer of the Minister of the Interior, the duty of making a close investigation into the matter.I proved the following conclusively:After the manifesto of the 17th October, 1905, thanks to the disturbances that broke out in many places after this actof the government, evidence of a reaction appeared in circumscribed sections of society. Ratschkowski, chief of the political division of the police department, an officer assigned to special duty by the Minister of the Interior, undertook to maintain and strengthen this reaction by the issuing of effective proclamations. They were printed by an officer of the gendarmerie, in the building of the gendarmerie in St. Petersburg, upon a printing-press that was taken from revolutionaries when a house search was made. I had in my hand one of these proclamations; it was addressed to the working people, bore the signature “Group of Russian Factory Workers of St. Petersburg,” and sought to destroy the faith of working-men in their radical leaders by maintaining that these leaders had misappropriated funds that had been collected for the political campaign. This proclamation was not the only one that was printed in the headquarters of the gendarmerie; but at the time of investigation I could not get others because they had all been distributed.As the printing-press that served the purpose of the revolutionaries failed to satisfy the present needs, a complete one was purchased at the expense of the police department that was capable of printing one thousand per hour. This was set up in the secret service section of the police department.Captain Comisaroff was given its supervision, and two compositors were employed upon the work. On this machine there were printed in December, 1905, and in January, 1906, not one but a vast number of proclamations, all composed variously, but all of the same general tenor.In all these proclamations, alongside of a condemnation of the revolutionary movement, the information was offered that non-believers, mainly the Jews, were responsible therefor, and their purpose was to provoke an uprising against these people.I had in my hands three proclamations that were printed in the printing-office of the police department. As I positively proved, they were not the only ones; the fourth one was just set up at that moment (February 3). It contained the mostridiculous complaints against the Jews, and urged that they be boycotted in the Duma elections. But of the printed proclamations that I had in my hand one appears especially as law violating; the author, addressing himself to the soldiers, calls upon the army for a campaign against “the Poles, Armenians, and Jews.” Thousands of copies were printed, of every proclamation. Of the proclamation addressed to the soldiers, 5,000 copies were sent to Vilna by the officers on special duty to Mr. Schkott, the governor-general, for distribution in that city. Schkott distributed a portion of them himself in the evening in the streets of the city, and gave the rest of them to the chief of police of Vilna, who, on January 28, telegraphed to the police department that in view of the great success that attended the distribution of the proclamation addressed to the soldiers, to send him a new lot. Several thousand copies more were printed and sent on to the Vilna chief of police. The same proclamation was sent in thousands of copies to Kursk, being taken by Surgeon Michailoff, assigned there to duty, who, at the request of M. Ratschkowski, was appointed secret agent of the police department. Michailoff also telegraphed (February 1 or 2) for a new lot of these proclamations in view of their great success among the soldiers. Aside from these, the appeals printed by the police department were distributed in St. Petersburg through M. Dubrovin, and the League of the Russian People, over which he presided; in Moscow through the publisher of the “Viedomosti,” Gringmut, who was given a large number of these appeals in December, 1905, by Ratschkowski personally.The provocative appeals of the police department were also distributed in other states, by the police and gendarmerie.All that is narrated above I imparted in January of this year to Count Witte, president of the committee of ministers, and I gave him specimens of all the proclamations above referred to (for that reason I have none at hand for present use). Count Witte at once called before him Captain Comisaroff, who acknowledged the truth of all this information. To me, also, he confirmed all these statements withoutexception. At the same time he declared that he acted under orders of Herr Ratschkowski; that he then presented the text of the proclamation to Wuitsch, the director of the police department, and did not at any time put them in type until the director stated in writing that he had read the proclamation.Express orders were issued by Secretary of State Witte that the printing-office of the police department should be wiped out of existence. However Captain Comisaroff merely took apart the printing-press as a precaution against the printing of further proclamations, by order of Ratschkowski, in spite of Witte’s orders; and to make that altogether impossible the press was taken from the police department to the residence of Captain Comisaroff.Aside from this and altogether without regard thereto, Your Excellency was confidentially informed that the proclamations which called for the extermination of the Jews in the city of Alexandrovsk (Yekaterinoslaff government) were circulated even after all the uprisings ceased, even after December 27, 1905; I consider it my duty to attach herewith a specimen of a proclamation that was distributed in the city of Alexandrovsk February 7 and 8, and that called for the extermination of the Jews on the 9th of February, the anniversary of the breaking out of the war with Japan.Your Excellency was confidentially informed that the officer for special duty, Ratschkowski, remained at the head of the political division of the police department until the end of April; that although this office was wiped out by the highest authority, he remained at the head of the entire secret and protective police; that the right was given him to supervise, so far as he deemed it necessary, the course of all political occurrences and trials that affected the police department, and he was further authorized to utilize the social organizations in the interest of the government.* * * * * * * *Permit me, sir, to regard it as my moral duty, aside from imparting to you this information, to convey to you, as aformer director of the police department, the reasons, incomprehensible at a first glance, why it is not only impossible for the central government to suppress the pogrom politics of the local authorities when the organization of a pogrom originates with them, but not even to be well informed as to the organization of the pogrom itself. One of these reasonsis the freedom from punishment of the officers of the government who are responsible for the pogroms—no proof need be given of this. But there are other reasons of a general character; at the time I was director of the police department a pogrom occurred; that of Kishineff. The foreign and our own illegal press that then had the privilege to speak out on our internal conditions as well as several circles of society, put upon the police department the responsibility for the organization of this pogrom. There was no responsibility that could be attached to the police department; yet the charge was not groundless in so far as they started out with the supposition that the police department and the ministry of the interior were possessed of all possible power. In spite of the closest investigation as to the participation of officers of the government in the organization of the Kishineff pogrom, it was impossible for me; as director of the police department, to absolutely prove the fact, and yet there could be no doubt whatever of their participation. And what is especially characteristic, the secret working of the pogrom organization became clear to me only after I ceased to hold an official position in the ministry of the interior.And in such a position does every official of the central government find himself if he yields no sympathy to pogrom politics. That is to be accounted for by the fact that the minister of the interior and the central political organization are altogether powerless—the police and the gendarmerie are not in his hands, but precisely the reverse: he is in the hands of the superiors of these officials. The fact is that, through the organization of the secret political police, because of the exceptional law providing for extraordinary military protection, and I the long continuance of that condition in thecountry, the whole power has been transferred from above to below.Aside from the continued causes that have been uncovered, the weakness of the governmental authority, there are existing at present other causes.I met no one among the political or general police officials who was not absolutely and thoroughly convinced that in reality there were two governments in existence, each of which drove its own politics to the other, one embodied in the person of Secretary of State Witte, the other in the person of Trepoff, who, according to general conviction, brought to the Czar reports of the condition of affairs in the empire, different than those that Count Witte brought to him, and in this wise developed a different political position. This point of view finds its foundation in the fact that General Trepoff, after his appointment as commander of the palace, succeeded in having special funds put at his command for the engagement of a separate force of secret agents, and he, therefore, became possessed of tools in hand that should only be in control of the minister of the interior.This point of view finds further foundation in the fact that General Trepoff, even after he gave up the post he held in the ministry of the interior, in October, 1905, succeeded without the knowledge of the minister of the interior, in getting out of the police department all the documents, except those of no moment, for the purpose of looking through them; not only current documents, but those of no present use—even though all these had nothing whatever to do with the commander of the palace.As to what purpose General Trepoff had in mind with reference to the secret funds, and the documents of the police department, in what direction he was inclined to utilize his position in regard to these, there exists, Your Excellency, in the mind of the undersigned, a firm conviction—rightly or wrongly—that General Trepoff sought to influence the politics of the government.This conviction, indeed, is as firm as the conviction that General Trepoff sympathized with the pogroms politics. And whatever power the ministry may set to work in opposition to pogroms, they will be valueless so long as the local police are convinced of the lack of power of the ministry and the possession of power of other authorities.
Honored Sir:
I deemed it my duty to bring to your attention through my letter of the 26th of May the fact that I gave to the editor of the journal “Retsch” the copy of the report of the chief of the special division of the police department to the minister of the interior, concerning the organization of the pogrom against the Jews in Alexandrovsk (government of Yekaterinoslaff), and touching the participation therein of the authorities of the police department. I did this in the firm conviction that it was only through the imperial Duma, when well informed by the public press, we could hope, once for all, to destroy the great danger menacing the State because of the systematic preparation by government officials of Jewish and other pogroms. I informed you of my action lest some subordinate of Your Excellency might be held responsible for having furnished that journal with the report.
I deemed it unnecessary in my communication to impart to you the facts detailed in the report of Markaroff, and with which I was familiar; I refrained from doing so because it was furthest from my thoughts that it could be possible that Your Excellency would conceal the truth that was revealedby the investigation called forth at the request of the Duma, in connection with the report of Markaroff.
But yet must I be convinced from the newspaper reports of the Duma session of June 21st, that in your answer to the inquiry of the Duma, the material that was put into your hands for the proper preparation thereof, the real facts in the case, were substantially set aside. I, therefore, conceived it to be my bounden duty to impart to you, in this communication, facts that are well known to me.
In January of this year several persons informed me that there were indications of the preparation in different sections of Russia of a Jewish pogrom, and they appealed for my help to prevent such misfortune. Investigations that were made established the truth of their statements, and satisfied me of the participation by public officials in the preparations for a pogrom. They brought me on the trail of a printing-office in the police department.
On January 20, Count Witte, the president of the Council of Ministers, invited me to his office and asked me to give him my views on the Jewish question, and as to the reason for the participation of the Jewish proletariat in the revolutionary movement. After I had clearly presented to him my main point of view on the question, I told him that, aside from the judicial aspect of the question, there was another of great importance, namely, anti-Semitism, that not only existed because of the long-continued period in which the Jews were without rights, but because, as well, of the direct provocations against them on the part of persons in public authority. As a special indication of such provocation, I pointed to the incident of the printing-office in the police department, of whose output, however, I had no sufficient evidence in my hands, and Count Witte assigned to me, as an officer of the Minister of the Interior, the duty of making a close investigation into the matter.
I proved the following conclusively:
After the manifesto of the 17th October, 1905, thanks to the disturbances that broke out in many places after this actof the government, evidence of a reaction appeared in circumscribed sections of society. Ratschkowski, chief of the political division of the police department, an officer assigned to special duty by the Minister of the Interior, undertook to maintain and strengthen this reaction by the issuing of effective proclamations. They were printed by an officer of the gendarmerie, in the building of the gendarmerie in St. Petersburg, upon a printing-press that was taken from revolutionaries when a house search was made. I had in my hand one of these proclamations; it was addressed to the working people, bore the signature “Group of Russian Factory Workers of St. Petersburg,” and sought to destroy the faith of working-men in their radical leaders by maintaining that these leaders had misappropriated funds that had been collected for the political campaign. This proclamation was not the only one that was printed in the headquarters of the gendarmerie; but at the time of investigation I could not get others because they had all been distributed.
As the printing-press that served the purpose of the revolutionaries failed to satisfy the present needs, a complete one was purchased at the expense of the police department that was capable of printing one thousand per hour. This was set up in the secret service section of the police department.
Captain Comisaroff was given its supervision, and two compositors were employed upon the work. On this machine there were printed in December, 1905, and in January, 1906, not one but a vast number of proclamations, all composed variously, but all of the same general tenor.
In all these proclamations, alongside of a condemnation of the revolutionary movement, the information was offered that non-believers, mainly the Jews, were responsible therefor, and their purpose was to provoke an uprising against these people.
I had in my hands three proclamations that were printed in the printing-office of the police department. As I positively proved, they were not the only ones; the fourth one was just set up at that moment (February 3). It contained the mostridiculous complaints against the Jews, and urged that they be boycotted in the Duma elections. But of the printed proclamations that I had in my hand one appears especially as law violating; the author, addressing himself to the soldiers, calls upon the army for a campaign against “the Poles, Armenians, and Jews.” Thousands of copies were printed, of every proclamation. Of the proclamation addressed to the soldiers, 5,000 copies were sent to Vilna by the officers on special duty to Mr. Schkott, the governor-general, for distribution in that city. Schkott distributed a portion of them himself in the evening in the streets of the city, and gave the rest of them to the chief of police of Vilna, who, on January 28, telegraphed to the police department that in view of the great success that attended the distribution of the proclamation addressed to the soldiers, to send him a new lot. Several thousand copies more were printed and sent on to the Vilna chief of police. The same proclamation was sent in thousands of copies to Kursk, being taken by Surgeon Michailoff, assigned there to duty, who, at the request of M. Ratschkowski, was appointed secret agent of the police department. Michailoff also telegraphed (February 1 or 2) for a new lot of these proclamations in view of their great success among the soldiers. Aside from these, the appeals printed by the police department were distributed in St. Petersburg through M. Dubrovin, and the League of the Russian People, over which he presided; in Moscow through the publisher of the “Viedomosti,” Gringmut, who was given a large number of these appeals in December, 1905, by Ratschkowski personally.
The provocative appeals of the police department were also distributed in other states, by the police and gendarmerie.
All that is narrated above I imparted in January of this year to Count Witte, president of the committee of ministers, and I gave him specimens of all the proclamations above referred to (for that reason I have none at hand for present use). Count Witte at once called before him Captain Comisaroff, who acknowledged the truth of all this information. To me, also, he confirmed all these statements withoutexception. At the same time he declared that he acted under orders of Herr Ratschkowski; that he then presented the text of the proclamation to Wuitsch, the director of the police department, and did not at any time put them in type until the director stated in writing that he had read the proclamation.
Express orders were issued by Secretary of State Witte that the printing-office of the police department should be wiped out of existence. However Captain Comisaroff merely took apart the printing-press as a precaution against the printing of further proclamations, by order of Ratschkowski, in spite of Witte’s orders; and to make that altogether impossible the press was taken from the police department to the residence of Captain Comisaroff.
Aside from this and altogether without regard thereto, Your Excellency was confidentially informed that the proclamations which called for the extermination of the Jews in the city of Alexandrovsk (Yekaterinoslaff government) were circulated even after all the uprisings ceased, even after December 27, 1905; I consider it my duty to attach herewith a specimen of a proclamation that was distributed in the city of Alexandrovsk February 7 and 8, and that called for the extermination of the Jews on the 9th of February, the anniversary of the breaking out of the war with Japan.
Your Excellency was confidentially informed that the officer for special duty, Ratschkowski, remained at the head of the political division of the police department until the end of April; that although this office was wiped out by the highest authority, he remained at the head of the entire secret and protective police; that the right was given him to supervise, so far as he deemed it necessary, the course of all political occurrences and trials that affected the police department, and he was further authorized to utilize the social organizations in the interest of the government.
* * * * * * * *
Permit me, sir, to regard it as my moral duty, aside from imparting to you this information, to convey to you, as aformer director of the police department, the reasons, incomprehensible at a first glance, why it is not only impossible for the central government to suppress the pogrom politics of the local authorities when the organization of a pogrom originates with them, but not even to be well informed as to the organization of the pogrom itself. One of these reasonsis the freedom from punishment of the officers of the government who are responsible for the pogroms—no proof need be given of this. But there are other reasons of a general character; at the time I was director of the police department a pogrom occurred; that of Kishineff. The foreign and our own illegal press that then had the privilege to speak out on our internal conditions as well as several circles of society, put upon the police department the responsibility for the organization of this pogrom. There was no responsibility that could be attached to the police department; yet the charge was not groundless in so far as they started out with the supposition that the police department and the ministry of the interior were possessed of all possible power. In spite of the closest investigation as to the participation of officers of the government in the organization of the Kishineff pogrom, it was impossible for me; as director of the police department, to absolutely prove the fact, and yet there could be no doubt whatever of their participation. And what is especially characteristic, the secret working of the pogrom organization became clear to me only after I ceased to hold an official position in the ministry of the interior.
And in such a position does every official of the central government find himself if he yields no sympathy to pogrom politics. That is to be accounted for by the fact that the minister of the interior and the central political organization are altogether powerless—the police and the gendarmerie are not in his hands, but precisely the reverse: he is in the hands of the superiors of these officials. The fact is that, through the organization of the secret political police, because of the exceptional law providing for extraordinary military protection, and I the long continuance of that condition in thecountry, the whole power has been transferred from above to below.
Aside from the continued causes that have been uncovered, the weakness of the governmental authority, there are existing at present other causes.
I met no one among the political or general police officials who was not absolutely and thoroughly convinced that in reality there were two governments in existence, each of which drove its own politics to the other, one embodied in the person of Secretary of State Witte, the other in the person of Trepoff, who, according to general conviction, brought to the Czar reports of the condition of affairs in the empire, different than those that Count Witte brought to him, and in this wise developed a different political position. This point of view finds its foundation in the fact that General Trepoff, after his appointment as commander of the palace, succeeded in having special funds put at his command for the engagement of a separate force of secret agents, and he, therefore, became possessed of tools in hand that should only be in control of the minister of the interior.
This point of view finds further foundation in the fact that General Trepoff, even after he gave up the post he held in the ministry of the interior, in October, 1905, succeeded without the knowledge of the minister of the interior, in getting out of the police department all the documents, except those of no moment, for the purpose of looking through them; not only current documents, but those of no present use—even though all these had nothing whatever to do with the commander of the palace.
As to what purpose General Trepoff had in mind with reference to the secret funds, and the documents of the police department, in what direction he was inclined to utilize his position in regard to these, there exists, Your Excellency, in the mind of the undersigned, a firm conviction—rightly or wrongly—that General Trepoff sought to influence the politics of the government.
This conviction, indeed, is as firm as the conviction that General Trepoff sympathized with the pogroms politics. And whatever power the ministry may set to work in opposition to pogroms, they will be valueless so long as the local police are convinced of the lack of power of the ministry and the possession of power of other authorities.
REPORT OF CAPTAIN PIETUCHOW, OF THE GENDARMERIE ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE OF SIEDLCE, TO THE ASSISTANT GOVERNOR-GENERAL AT WARSAW.
REPORT OF CAPTAIN PIETUCHOW, OF THE GENDARMERIE ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE OF SIEDLCE, TO THE ASSISTANT GOVERNOR-GENERAL AT WARSAW.
Theprovisional governor-general of the government of Siedlce, Major-general Engelke, by virtue of order No. 12, of August 10, this year, named Colonel Tichanowsky of the 39th regiment of dragoons as chief of the garrison of defense of the city of Siedlce.
On August 11, at 12 o’clock in the morning, I was called to the gendarmerie office, where there were already gathered Colonel Wyrgolitsch, Captains Potosky and Grigoriew, the acting police chief of the city of Siedlce, Staff Captain Protopopow, and Colonel Tichanowsky, chief of the garrison of defense. There was advised an adequate blockade of the city and the undertaking of a general search of the houses in Siedlce. The last measure was dictated in a telegram of the governor-general. Colonel Tichanowsky demanded immediately that there be named to him several prominent citizens of the city of Siedlce, who, although they had not personally taken part in the revolutionary movement, yet favored it in any possible way. Colonel Tichanowsky expressed the view that he would put these people in prison and hold them as hostages. He would tell them that in case of an attack on the life of any officer of the government, they would all be murdered. Colonel Tichanowsky said that he would take upon himself all the responsibility for the matter. As Colonel Tichanowsky was asked in what manner these hostages were to be killed, he turned to the chief of the police with the question whether he could not put at his service a policeman whowould be prepared to simulate insanity, and shoot the hostages in prison, or put arsenic into their food. “We must set against the terrorism of the revolution a still more frightful terrorism,” rejoined Colonel Tichanowsky, and he stuck to his point of view, always reiterating that he would assume full responsibility.
At six o’clock in the evening of the same day all were again assembled in the office of the gendarmerie, and considered the plan of a blockade of the city for the purpose of a general house searching. But it appeared very clear that it was impossible to undertake a general house searching with the help of only two battalions of the Libau infantry regiments, and a single cavalry regiment that were stationed in Siedlce. Such a house searching would cripple the life of the city for more than twenty-four hours, and then would lead to no positive result. Colonel Tichanowsky, however, stood for a general house searching, and demanded, among other things, that the chief of the police should hold in readiness during the house searching the fire engines, and that at the same time all the doctors in the hospitals should be assembled. As for himself, Colonel Tichanowsky promised to hold in readiness the military ambulances. As Colonel Tichanowsky was asked for what purpose all these preparations were required, he answered: “That there might be some dead and wounded ones, as they would proceed pitilessly and firearms would be used. It might happen that conflagrations would ensue in that way.” The officers of the dragoons, as it became known the self-same day, rubbed their hands in glee as they came together, and said publicly, with a pleased laugh: “We will make for them a decent pogrom; we will deal with them pitilessly.” The soldiers also carried on the same kind of a conversation. On the 13th of August, at three o’clock in the afternoon, there was another conference held with Colonel Tichanowsky, in the office of the gendarmerie, which declared that the general house searching would be taken up that night. At his command I gave him a list of the persons who were known because of their criminal deeds and also their addresses.As we learned the decision of Colonel Tichanowsky, as well as some of the other officers and soldiers of regiments of dragoons, we determined to protest against the plan of Colonel Tichanowsky for the house searching, calling attention to the inadequacy of the means at hand. Colonel Tichanowsky would not allow himself to be swerved. Colonel Wyrgolitsch, therefore, wrote at once to the governor, acquainted him with the general side of approaching house searching, that is, of the time that was necessary for such an undertaking; acquainted him with the determination of the military and advised the postponement of the house searching until the arrival of more troops. To get more troops to help the temporary governor-general went, on the 13th of August, to Warsaw. The request for troops was denied, however, and on principle the idea of a general house searching was given up.
On August 18 Colonel Wyrgolitsch became sick and had to take to his bed. During my visit to the governor I reiterated to him the determination of Colonel Tichanowsky and the military, emphasizing the matter, and advised that they be held in check. I said to him bluntly, that such a decision would lead only to plunder and a needless spilling of blood, just as happened on the 8th of August after the murder of Police Chief Delzer. The governor, it seemed to me, gave favorable attention to my views, made several notes, and promised to take the necessary steps in the matter. Up to August 26 I saw Tichanowsky a couple of times. He was then engaged in working out instructions for the military concerning the defense of the city. Among other things it was provided that in case of any alarm in the city the telegraph office would be compelled to refuse to accept private telegrams. I asked the purpose of this regulation. Colonel Tichanowsky answered, that he made this regulation so that the residents of the city could not, through the telegraph, ask for the cessation of the pogroms.
Characteristic of the personality of Colonel Tichanowsky are other deeds. For example, he said to the chief of police,as he again discussed the plans for the general house searching: “Perhaps Captain Pietuchow doesn’t believe that we will arrest people. Those that appear on the list that he gave us will certainly not be found among those who are arrested.” That served at once for a declaration of the purpose of having in readiness the ambulance wagons and the medical staff in preparation for the house search. During the first night of the shooting in Siedlce, about three o’clock on the 27th of August, Colonel Tichanowsky wanted to have the military orchestra of the regiment of dragoons come to him from the armory, which was, however, denied him. Then he gathered together a chorus of soldiers, and their singing resounded in the midst of the noise of the rifles, the spilling of blood, the plundering, and the conflagration. Colonel Tichanowsky declared later that he wanted thereby to raise the spirit of the soldiers.
As it seems, he made it appear that he was upon the field of battle surrounded by a superior foe; finally, several days after the rioting, as there was a report in circulation that Colonel Tichanowsky was murdered, he came to the squadron whose commander he formerly was, told them of this report, and bade them in case he should be really killed, they would honor his memory decently and bathe themselves to the ears in blood. The officers of dragoons told me this later at breakfast and cited this as an example of the bravery of Colonel Tichanowsky.
On August 26, at half-past six in the evening, as I have already reported, several revolver shots resounded in the city, to which the troops replied at once by a bombardment of the city, during which absolutely no consideration was shown whether or not shots were fired from the houses attacked. So, for example, on the first night window-panes were destroyed by bullets in a girls’ boarding-school, whence surely no shots were fired. The window-panes in the gendarmerie office were also destroyed. The troops dealt without mercy toward the unoffending people. I, myself, was present when several persons, including elderly Jews, were draggedinto the police station, and saw how eagerly the soldiers abused them in the presence of Colonel Tichanowsky. I also saw how a dragoon fired shots in the vicinity of the police station at the residence of Circuit Judge Herr Mudrew. I also witnessed that a dragoon came to Colonel Tichanowsky and asked him for cartridges, whereupon the latter remarked: “There are too few dead.” As I saw all this, I begged Colonel Tichanowsky to put an end to the senseless shooting and clubbing, and rather to busy himself with a systematic plan for discovering the revolutionaries who really did fire off the revolvers. At the same time, I drew his attention to the fact that the soldiers were without nourishment, would be tired out early, and that toward evening the revolutionaries might undertake something serious. For reply I was told that the slaughter at Liao-yang lasted twelve days and that if it became necessary he was prepared to occupy the chair of the police for two weeks; and, further, that there were in the city enough stores with supplies of provisions to reach around. This was all said in the presence of soldiers.
Not being in the mood to witness such scenes, and in no position to make an end of them, I went home at nine o’clock in the morning (August 27). Toward ten o’clock the same morning, Colonel Tichanowsky sent for me, but I did not go, because I deemed my presence superfluous, especially as during the whole time I knew either Captain Potosky or Grigoriew was there.
The deputy police chief, Captain of the Staff Captain Protopopow, also sought to mollify Colonel Tichanowsky, but all to no purpose. To all arguments he replied: “It is none of your concern.”
The sub-officers of my gendarmerie office, who lived on the Chaussée, were prevented from entering the city until the morning dawned of August 27, by the military guards, who declared to them that it was forbidden to allow any one to enter the city. After dawn, the under officers of the gendarmerie took part in the house searching, but later theywere informed that the troops, in the absence of their officers, would not undertake any house searches, but would merely plunder, and, without any cause at all, kill them. One of the dragoons, whom Gendarmerie Corporal Efinow wanted to hinder in his work, drew his sword against him. The policemen were chased away in one place by the soldiers.
As early as the first night the dragoons turned to Gendarme Corporals Anvrejnk and Sajaz and asked them for petroleum for setting the houses on fire. When asked by the latter how they dare do such a thing, the soldiers replied: “We are commanded to do it.” Plundering took place already on the first night.
In the dusk of evening on August 27 the troops became completely unbridled. They invaded the beer-halls and wine-cellars and everything was either drunk or plundered.
On the second night the troops almost all were drunk. On September 5 there came from St. Petersburg Herr Gubonim, officer for special affairs of the minister of the interior, and bade me to be of service to him to get the truth of the Siedlce occurrences from August 27 to 28. I did not consider myself justified to conceal anything from an officer who came by direction of the minister to investigate the condition of things. I, therefore, told him fully about the personality of Colonel Tichanowsky, of the tone that reigned among the troops and especially about the Siedlce occurrences. Then, in answer to his request, I called into the gendarmerie office those persons who had suffered most loss and helped at the investigation, helped out much of them as did not speak or understand Russian. About forty private persons, and all the gendarmerie corporals were heard by Herr Gubonim.
House-owner Ksentepolsky proved by the testimony of a witness, his servant, that dragoons set fire to his barn. A similar statement, substantiated by witnesses, was to the effect that two or three other houses were similarly destroyed, and that to aid in their purpose the soldiers took the kerosene oil out of the street lamps.
Dr. Stein and an employee of the Jewish Hospital told howwounded Jews brought into the courtyard of the hospital were beaten to death there by the soldiers.
The Jewess, Wolf, told how, on August 27, at three o’clock in the afternoon, dragoons, with an officer at their head, came to her home. Her husband and sons were in their praying vestments and saying their prayers. The officer cursed the husband and battered his head against the doorposts. Then a dragoon dragged him into the courtyard and killed him with a club, in the presence of his wife and in spite of her entreaties.
The head of one firm, Girard Rubinstein, stated that the soldiers had robbed him of a considerable sum of money, drafts for three thousand rubles, and other property. He called in as witness the staff captain of the 129th infantry regiment, Stojanew; a Jewish shoe-dealer named a dragoon, Akimew, whom she knew as one who, with other soldiers, had entered her store and plundered it. There were also statements made to the effect that women were outraged, but as yet these deeds were not sufficiently proven.
Many stated that the soldiers forced themselves into their homes, looked for nothing and simply demanded money. In those cases where their demands were not met, the people were either killed or taken to jail. According to the testimony, the Jews gave all that they had, and then as there was nothing left for the next group of soldiers that came along, the men were arrested and taken away.
There was also testimony as to provocative shots on the part of policemen. So, for instance, Behrenstein, the owner of a store for arms and bicycles, saw a policeman, whom he can identify, fire a shot in the air, and then point out to the soldiers whence the alleged shot came. Thereupon the soldiers bombarded the house.
The fact that the soldiers plundered is by all means fully established. The plundered goods were taken back by a portion of the troops to the police station. During the disturbances it was a common sight to see upon the streets the soldiers carrying various articles. The soldiers took only what theycould carry away. The other things, as furniture, they smashed on the spot.
The population of Siedlce unto the last man is satisfied that the occurrences in Siedlce are in consequence of provocation on the side of the dragoons, and partly also on the side of the police. They are convinced that the initiative of this provocation is to be written down to Colonel Tichanowsky. It was remarked that the dragoons, who otherwise carried their arms upon their backs, as early as August 26 carried them already in their right hands. Toward evening the dragoons explained to the merchants that it would be permitted to keep business open till half-past ten o’clock, while previously eight o’clock was the compulsory hour for closing. Inexplicable to the people, also, was the fact that of the soldiery but one was injured, which was the full extent of the injury done to the soldiers. One horse was wounded at the ear by a sword cut and another by a rifle shot through the nostrils. The residents remarked very rightly that if the revolutionaries wanted to do any damage whatever to the policemen and guardsmen, there would have been at least some loss among the troops during the early part of the trouble; for it would have been no easy matter for the revolutionaries to have placed two or three men armed with Brownings opposite every place where the soldiers were stationed, and, protected by the fences, shoot them and then escape under cover of the darkness. Even if we admit that at first the shots of the revolutionaries missed their mark, there remained for them after unsuccessful efforts nothing but to flee, and they surely would not thus waste the cartridges that had cost them so much pains to procure.
It becomes difficult to charge the troops themselves with provocation. So far as they are concerned, it would be easier, perhaps, to look for provocation on the side of the revolutionaries. These knew full well the temper of the troops and they wished, perhaps, to call forth what happened in order to discredit in this wise the government and the troops in the eyes of the whole public, and wring its sympathy for the people of Siedlce, who were greatly irritated over the recent murder of two persons who were of service in the city, President Mirowitsch and Police Captain Golzew. If we take it that this was really the case, then the revolutionaries certainly attained their purpose. The most peaceful and loyal residents say now: “The governor promised that so long as he was in Siedlce there would be no pogroms, and what do we behold? We need no investigation on the part of the authorities. We will undertake our own investigation right on the ground and get at the truth.”
The Russian people no longer look upon the soldiers as their defenders, and their appearance upon the street of horse-dragoons fills all with the feeling of unrest. The recall of Colonel Tichanowsky had a quieting effect upon the whole population.
The whole blame for the occurrences at Siedlce does not rest alone upon Colonel Tichanowsky, who was not even legally authorized to serve as commander-in-chief of the city. The blame rests also on the temporary governor-general, Major-general Engelke, who turned over to Colonel Tichanowsky absolutely entire power; and also upon the governor, who, as the permanent chief of the government of Siedlce, permitted the authority to pass out of his hands at so critical a moment and did not again take this authority into his own hands when the conditions so urgently demanded that he do so. The illness of the governor, so far as I knew, was not at all so serious as to justify a leave of absence.
Furthermore, during his illness, he yielded to Dolgowo-Saburow, a member of the agricultural office, only the authority to sign documents and the right to preside at various meetings. All other functions he retained for himself.
In this report I have sought to set down not only my views but also the impressions carried away by Herr Gubonim, officer for special duty.
Capt. Pietuchow.
Siedlce, September 27, 1906.
NOTES ON WAGES AND COST OF LIVING OF RUSSIAN WORKMEN
Thewages of boys in Russian coal-mines amount to about twenty cents per day. Boys and women are employed to pick the slate and refuse stone from the coal as in coal-mines in other countries. In Pennsylvania, the boys who do such work are called “breaker boys”; their pay is from sixty to seventy-five cents a day. In Russia, the women receive not more than five cents a day more than the boys. Pony drivers in the pits earn from forty to fifty cents a day.
The colliers, that is to say, the men who actually hew the coal, are paid according to the amount of work they do. The iniquitous contract system is generally in vogue in Russia. A contractor agrees to take out the coal for a definite sum. He then engages his own workmen and pays them what he must. Few coal-miners make more than eighty cents a day. They receive about twelve and a half cents for every thirty-five poods they take out—one pood being thirty-six pounds; the amount of labor required to earn a day’s wages is plain.
In addition to the work entailed in getting out the coal the colliers must do their own timbering, putting up props and supports as they go along to make themselves secure. For this they are not paid. It is customary among the foreign companies, and also among some of the Russian companies, to give their workmen as much coal as they require for their personal needs free.
Managers, foremen, overmen, and checkers who are paid by the month often receive their house rent free. Thus an overman receives fifty rubles a month (twenty-five dollars) andhis house rent. A checker receives thirty-five rubles. As checkers are very often dishonest men who aid in robbing the men of their proper number of cars sent to the surface, it has come to be the practice in some districts for the men themselves to hire a checker of their own, whom they pay one hundred rubles a month. He is not officially recognized by the companies, but he is trusted by the men to protect their interests. One of the points of dispute in the great anthracite coal-strike in Pennsylvania in 1902 was the right of the men to employ such a man—some of the companies objected. It is significant that the companies pay their men only thirty-five rubles a month, while the men pay theirs one hundred.
For purposes of comparison it may be of interest to add that while the men receive twelve and one half cents for taking out thirty-five poods of coal, that coal retails for five cents per pood. There is, therefore, a margin of approximately one dollar and sixty-three cents on every thirty-five poods, or, of about eleven dollars on a single day’s labor of one man! This must amply cover other expenses and still leave an adequate profit for contractors and capitalist!
The best hewers in the Russian coal-mines average forty rubles, or twenty dollars a mouth. It must be remembered, however, that there are fewer working-days in a Russian month than in England or America. Usually not above twenty or twenty-two. Indeed, in the entire year there are but two hundred and twenty working-days. All of the others are church, state, or crown holidays. During these working-days, therefore, the miner, in common with other workmen, must earn enough to carry him through the holidays.
A schedule of the scale of wages in a given country, or district, like the above, is valueless if unaccompanied by a parallel schedule of the approximate cost of living.
Russian coal-miners follow the system of Russian workmen in general in dividing into three classes: First, the poorest men, who live in free houses owned by the companies. These houses would rent for about one dollar a month. Then there are the average men who live in snug little stone housesof two and three rooms, the rent of which may be from two dollars and a half to four dollars a month. And, finally, there are the unmarried men who live in “artels,” which are lodging establishments. From a dozen to sixteen men live in one of these houses. They all sleep in a common room, for which privilege they pay about six dollars a month, including their meals. And fifty cents additional to a woman-of-all-work, who looks after the place and does the cooking.
The principal articles of diet with the prices current at the time of my observations are included in the following table:
Meat—10 copecks (five cents) per pound. Equally good meat in England would cost from fifteen to twenty cents a pound, and in America probably twenty-two to twenty-four cents.Black bread—2 copecks a pound.White bread—3 copecks a pound.Potatoes—1-1/2 copecks a pound.Sugar—16 copecks (eight cents) per pound.Tea—1 ruble, 80 copecks (eighty cents) per pound. (Very cheapest.)Coffee—40 copecks (twenty cents) a pound for unburned coffee.Milk—10 copecks a “jug.” (About five cents a quart.)Cabbage and carrots—2-7 copecks per pound.
Meat—10 copecks (five cents) per pound. Equally good meat in England would cost from fifteen to twenty cents a pound, and in America probably twenty-two to twenty-four cents.
Black bread—2 copecks a pound.
White bread—3 copecks a pound.
Potatoes—1-1/2 copecks a pound.
Sugar—16 copecks (eight cents) per pound.
Tea—1 ruble, 80 copecks (eighty cents) per pound. (Very cheapest.)
Coffee—40 copecks (twenty cents) a pound for unburned coffee.
Milk—10 copecks a “jug.” (About five cents a quart.)
Cabbage and carrots—2-7 copecks per pound.
Taken the year through this is almost a complete diet-list of the Russian coal-miners and industrial workers in general in the vicinity of Yusofka. During the church fasts hemp and rape-seed oil is consumed a good deal. And vodka should be added, for every workman drinks much of it. The revenue from the vodka monopoly, indeed, is one of the stablest sources of income to the government. The more the people drink the better Russia’s financial balance-sheet appears to the world. Truly Russian economy this! Five hundred and fifty million rubles a year is a substantial income even for a government, and this from a liquor containing forty odd percent. alcohol. Vodka costs about three copecks per bottle to manufacture and sells for forty copecks.
From this list it will be seen that the articles which are most necessary, and most used, are the highest in price—tea, sugar, coffee, vodka. Meat is cheap, but there are frequent church fasts, when meat is forbidden.
The clothing worn by the Russian coal-miner is frequently home-made, like the clothing of peasants. If of cloth, cloth made from hand looms. Coats are of sheepskin. In the mines of South Russia, especially in the deeper pits, next to no clothing is worn by the men at the face.
A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H,I,J,K,L,M,N,O,P,R,S,T,U,V,W,X,Y,Z