FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[21]In "Der Kriegs-Train des deutschen Heeres," by E. Schäffer, (Berlin, 1883), the author, dealing with the subject of transport in the war of 1870-71, and its effect on the feeding of the German Army, says of the situation in August-September, 1870: "Immerhin wurden den Truppen damals nicht unerhebliche Entbehrungen auferlegt"; while concerning the position of the army of occupation in France he writes: "Immerhin erforderte es umfassender Massregeln seitens der Intendantur, die Truppen vor wirklichem Mangel zu schützen, namentlich da die Requisitionen wenig ergiebig ausfielen, und anfänglich auch der freihändige Ankauf keinen rechten Erfolg hatte."[22]"Revue militaire de l'Étranger," 27 Novembre, 1872.[23]"Field Service Regulations (Felddienst Ordnung, 1908) of the German Army." Translated by the General Staff, War Office. London, 1908.

[21]In "Der Kriegs-Train des deutschen Heeres," by E. Schäffer, (Berlin, 1883), the author, dealing with the subject of transport in the war of 1870-71, and its effect on the feeding of the German Army, says of the situation in August-September, 1870: "Immerhin wurden den Truppen damals nicht unerhebliche Entbehrungen auferlegt"; while concerning the position of the army of occupation in France he writes: "Immerhin erforderte es umfassender Massregeln seitens der Intendantur, die Truppen vor wirklichem Mangel zu schützen, namentlich da die Requisitionen wenig ergiebig ausfielen, und anfänglich auch der freihändige Ankauf keinen rechten Erfolg hatte."

[22]"Revue militaire de l'Étranger," 27 Novembre, 1872.

[23]"Field Service Regulations (Felddienst Ordnung, 1908) of the German Army." Translated by the General Staff, War Office. London, 1908.

The innovation introduced into modern warfare by the Federal Government of the United States, in the organisation on a comprehensive scale of a Construction Corps for the combined purposes of repairing, destroying and operating the railways on which so much might depend in the conduct of war, attracted great attention in Europe, and more especially so in Germany, which was the first country on this side of the Atlantic to follow the American precedent, since adopted more or less completely by all nations possessed alike of railways and a standing army.

Down to the time of the War of Secession the need for such a corps had not been realised in Europe; but the advantages which might be gained therefrom had been shown in so unmistakable a form that when, in 1866, there was the certainty of an early conflict between Prussia and Austria, one of the first steps taken by the former country was to provide, under a decree of May 6, 1866, for aField Railway Section, ("Feldeisenbahnabteilung,") to be formed, and designed to operate, on a basis closely approximating to that which had applied to the corresponding American corps. The special purposes to be served were defined as those of rapidly repairing lines of railway destroyed by the enemy and of destroying railways it might be thought expedient to prevent the enemy from using. The section was to be under the orders of the General Staff either of the Army or of an Army Corps. It was, however, not to come into being until its services were really required, and it was then to act for the duration of the war only.

On the outbreak of hostilities three divisions of the corpswere mobilised, under Cabinet Orders of May 25 and June 1, one division being allotted to each of the three Prussian armies operating in different parts of the theatre of war. The composition of the corps was partly military and partly civil. The military element was supplied by officers of the Engineers (one of whom acted as chief), non-commissioned officers, and a detachment of Pioneers, the last-mentioned being either carpenters or smiths. The civil element comprised railway engineers, thoroughly acquainted with the construction and repair of permanent way, bridges, etc.; assistant railway engineers, performing the duties of clerks of the works; head platelayers, foremen, locomotive drivers, machinists (for the repair of engines, rolling-stock, water pumps and water tanks), and others. The members of the civil section were chosen from the staff of the Prussian State railways by the Minister of Commerce, their services being placed by him at the disposal of the War Minister. Each of the three divisions constituted a complete unit.

On the side of the Austrians there was at that time no similar force available. Three years before there had been published in Vienna a book, byOberst. von Panz, entitled "Das Eisenbahnwesen, vom militärischen Standpuncte," in which the author expressed the view that details on the following points, among others, concerning railways should be collected in time of peace and classified for reference in case of need:—Permanent way: system and construction; gauge and number of lines; whether lines single or double. Stations: size and construction; which of them best fitted to serve as depôts. Bridges: underground works, etc.; which of these could be the most easily destroyed, or soonest repaired if destroyed, and if prepared beforehand for destruction. Embankments: size; how made; slope; if provided with culverts and size of these. Cuttings: length and depth; slopes; nature of ground; whether much or little water, and whether danger of landslips. Tunnels: dimensions and construction; if lined or cut in rock; nature of cuttings at end and whether they can be blocked. Large bridges and viaducts: system of construction; span of arches; whether or not the piers aremined.[24]Where men, tools, stores and materials can be obtained, and to what extent.

These recommendations attracted much attention at the time. They were quoted byH. L. Westphalenin his book on "Die Kriegführung unter Benutzung der Eisenbahnen" (Leipzig, 1868), of which a French translation was published under the title of "De l'Emploi des Chemins de Fer en Temps de Guerre" (Paris, 1869); yet when, just before the outbreak of war with Prussia, the Commander-in-Chief of the Austrian Northern Army recommended that a Construction Corps should be formed, the Minister of War replied that "the repair of railways was work which should be done by the railway companies concerned."

All the same, the retarding of the Prussian advance by interrupting the rail communications became an important phase of Austrian tactics and was followed up with great activity. Bridges and viaducts were destroyed, rails torn up, sleepers burned, points and turntables carried away, tunnels obstructed and water cranes and pumps rendered useless. At one place (between Libenau and Sichrau), where the railway passed through a deep cutting, the explosion of mines along the top of each bank detached great masses of rock which, falling on the lines, filled up the cutting to a height of six or eight feet for a distance of about 250 ft., and could not be removed until, by means of blasting, they had been broken up into pieces sufficiently small to be carried away in ballast trucks.

The arrangements made by the Prussians were, however, so complete as to permit, in most instances, of a speedy restoration. Even in the instance just mentioned, fifty Pioneers, aided by twenty labourers, had the line clear for traffic again before midnight of the day the destruction was caused.

Each division of the Construction Corps had at its disposal two locomotives and thirty closed wagons or open trucks, provision thus being made for the transport of, among other things, six light covered carts (for use on the roads in the country to be invaded, horses being requisitioned therein as necessary); tools; supplies of blasting powder or gun-cotton; and rails, sleepers, bolts, etc., for 250 yards of railway, reserve materials for a further quarter of a mile of track being left at intermediate depôts, supplemented by an unlimited supply at the base of operations. The construction trains also carried timber, ropes, nails, scaffolding, clamps, etc., for the prompt repair of small bridges. Materials for larger bridges or viaducts were stored at convenient centres.

How the reconnaissance of a line which might have been subjected to the enemy's destructive tactics was carried out is thus told by Captain C. E. Webber, R.E., in his "Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in 1866":—

The reconnaissance starts with, and, until interrupted, keeps up with, the advance guard, the movement being covered by cavalry scouts on each side of the line.The greater portion of the train in charge of the department, with one engine in front and another behind, advances slowly, preceded at a distance of about 500 paces by a trolley carrying one of the officers, four men to work it, and a bugler. On arriving at any obstruction the trolley signals to the train by bugle and extra caution is used in advancing towards it. If in presence of the enemy, the scouts give warning to the officer in the trolley, who returns to the train and the whole retires. The second engine can be detached from the rear to send messages or bring up fresh supplies.

The reconnaissance starts with, and, until interrupted, keeps up with, the advance guard, the movement being covered by cavalry scouts on each side of the line.

The greater portion of the train in charge of the department, with one engine in front and another behind, advances slowly, preceded at a distance of about 500 paces by a trolley carrying one of the officers, four men to work it, and a bugler. On arriving at any obstruction the trolley signals to the train by bugle and extra caution is used in advancing towards it. If in presence of the enemy, the scouts give warning to the officer in the trolley, who returns to the train and the whole retires. The second engine can be detached from the rear to send messages or bring up fresh supplies.

But for the successes already gained in the same direction by the Federals in the United States, the speed with which repairs were carried out by the Prussian Construction Corps—then so recently organised—would have been regarded as remarkable. In various instances communication was restored within from one and a half to three days after the destruction even of important bridges.

As it happened, however, whilst the Austrians had shown an excess of zeal in some directions by destroying bridges when the tearing up of the rails would have answered the same purpose, the hesitation of the responsible Austrianofficer to fire the mines which had already been laid to the bridge over the Elbe at Lobkowitz was of great advantage to the Prussians, leaving them the use of the line from Turnau to Prague, Pardubitz and Brünn between July 18 and July 27, on which latter date the bridge was at last destroyed by order of the governor of Theresienstadt. This particular bridge was one of exceptional strategical importance, and, according to Captain Webber, the construction even of a temporary substitute—had the Austrians blown up the bridge before the Prussians could cross it—would have taken no less than six weeks. The omission, also, of the Austrians to remove or to destroy the railway rolling stock they left behind at Prague, on their retirement from that city, conferred a further benefit on the Prussians. These examples would seem to show that promptness in carrying out destruction at a critical moment may be no less important on the one side than efficient organisation on the other for accomplishing the work of restoration in the shortest possible time.

While the Construction Corps had thus fully justified its existence, the sudden creation of such a corps for the purposes of a particular war, and for the period of the war only, was considered inadequate for a country where a large standing Army had to be maintained in readiness for action at any moment, in case of need. Hence it was thought desirable that Prussia should have a Field Railway Section established on a permanent and well-organised footing. There was the further reason for adopting this course because the Pioneers, composed almost exclusively of reservists, had received no special training in railway work, while the railway men themselves, accustomed to building lines in a solid way for public use, were at a disadvantage when called on to carry out, with great rapidity, and in a rough and ready manner, work that was wanted only to serve the temporary purposes of the Army with which they were associated.

It was found, also, that the corps, comprising so large a civil element, had escaped the supervision and control of the Executive Commission at Berlin which had for its functionthe regulation of all matters concerning military rail-transport. Nor did the ConstructionandDestruction Corps constitute, as well, an Operation Corps, providing for the working of railways at the theatre of war, and especially of railways taken from the enemy. The Prussians had, indeed, been able to command the services of Austrian railwaymen in working the railways seized in that country; but there was no certainty that the adoption of a like expedient would be possible in any future war.

By this time the whole subject of the destruction and restoration of railway lines as an important element in modern warfare was attracting attention among military authorities and writers in Germany. A translation of McCallum's report was published, and the issue was begun of what was to develop into a long series of technical papers, pamphlets or books—such as, for example, Wilhelm Basson's "Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege, nach den Erfahrungen des letzten Feldzuges" (Ratibor, 1867)—dealing with the art of rapidly destroying and restoring railways in time of war and the most effective measures to be adopted in the attainment of either end.

These various considerations and developments were, no doubt, the reason for the issuing, on August 10, 1869, of a Prussian Royal Decree which created a permanent cadre ofRailway Troopsto be constituted of Pioneers who were to undergo regular instruction in everything relating to the construction, destruction and operation of railways. A new Battalion of Pioneers was to be raised for the purpose, and the whole scheme was to be carried into effect in the course of 1871.

When, in 1870, the war with France broke out, the preparations for the creation of this permanent corps were still proceeding; but the Prussians were, nevertheless, able to enter on the campaign with four sections of Railway Troops, subsequently increased to six, including one Bavarian section. Each section comprised Engineers, Pioneers, railwaymen and auxiliary helpers, all of whom wore a uniform having the letter "E" ("Eisenbahntruppen") on the shoulder, and carried rifles. Prussia, in fact, once morestarted, as in 1866, with such advantage over her enemy as might result from her control of a Railway Construction Corps. At the outset France had no similar body, and though, during the progress of the war, she hurriedly set about the creation of a Construction Corps of her own, that corps did not do very much beyond collecting at Metz and Strasburg a great store of railway materials which was afterwards to fall into the hands of the Prussians, and assist them in their own operations.

Notwithstanding the advantage thus gained, the practical benefits secured by the Germans, although important in their effect on the final issue, were far from being as great as the Army leaders may have anticipated or desired. The destruction work carried out by the French on their own railways, on their retirement, was much more serious than anything experienced in the Prussian campaign in Austria. Thus the works for the re-establishment of the Paris-Strasburg line (of primary importance to the Germans for the siege of Paris) extended from September 17 to November 22. The French had blocked the tunnel of Nanteuil by the explosion therein of six mines which brought down the walls and filled the western end of the tunnel with about 4,000 square yards of sand. Attempts to clear away the obstruction were a failure, owing to the occurrence of fresh slips due to the wet weather, and eventually the Construction Corps built a loop line which avoided the tunnel, and so restored communication. The defence of some of the principal lines by fortresses also contributed to the difficulties of the invaders; though, on the other hand, these difficulties would have been greater still if the French had always adopted the best and most scientific methods of interrupting rail communications, as, presumably, they would have done if they had had the advantage of a well-organised corps prepared in advance for the work that required to be done.

At Fontenoy-sur-Moselle, between Nancy and Toul, there was, for example, a bridge of seven arches, effective destruction of which would have made a very serious check in the communications along the principal line between Germany and Paris; but, instead of blowing up the bridge in themiddle, the men entrusted with the work (in January, 1871) brought down two arches at the side of the bridge, causing a break which the Germans were able to fill in with stones and earth, restoring communication in about seventeen days. Then, although several of the tunnels in the Vosges mountains were mined, the mines had not been charged, and before instructions to blow up the tunnels had been received by those awaiting them, the Germans were on the spot and took possession.

On the other hand the absence on the side of the French of an organised corps for destruction as well as construction did not prevent the carrying out of some very bold and highly successful work by parties offranc tireurs, who showed alike their appreciation of the importance of rail communications and their skill in impeding them.

One especially striking feat in this direction was accomplished by a company known as the "Franc Tireursof the Meuse."

Learning that a Prussian troop train was to pass through Lanois (on the line between Reims and Mons) on October 26, 1870, they resolved to effect its destruction. How they operated is told by Lieutenant Fraser, R. E.,[25]who arrived on the spot shortly afterwards, and heard the story from some of the men engaged on the work.

Any obstruction placed on the line would have been seen. Hence a different course had to be adopted. Selecting a spot where the line ran along a 12-ft. high embankment, to which a well-wooded slope came down on one side, thefranc tireurstook up a pair of rails, removed the sleepers, cut a deep trench across the line, laid some pieces of iron at the bottom of the trench, placed on the iron a box containing thirty kilos (2 qrs. 10 lbs.) of powder, and fixed into the lid of the box a French field shell in such a way that, when the rail was replaced over the box, the head of the fuse would be just below the lower flange of the rail. In restoring the line again in order that there should be nothing to attract attention, thefranc tireursomitted one sleeper so that the weight of the locomotive should in passing press the rail down on to the head of the fuse. The party—some seventy-five strong—then withdrew to the shelter of the woods to await developments.

In due time the train of forty coaches approached at the ordinary speed, the driver not suspecting any danger. When the engine reached the spot where the "torpedo" had been placed, an explosion occurred which tore up a mass of earth, rails and sleepers, threw the engine and several carriages down the embankment, and wrecked the train. Those of the Prussian troops who got clear from the wreckage were shot down by thefranc tireursunder the protection of their cover. The number of the enemy thus disposed of was said to be about 400.

Altogether the French, in their efforts to impede the rail movements of the invader, destroyed many miles of line, together with no fewer than seventy-eight large bridges and tunnels, apart from minor interruptions. The repairs and reconstruction thus rendered necessary threw a great amount of labour on the Prussian Railway Troops, and much trouble arose from time to time on account, not only of the inadequate supply of materials even for temporary constructions, but, also, by reason of the shortcomings of the workers themselves. The sections of Railway Troops had been so recently formed that the men were still without adequate training. In 1870-71, as in 1866, military members and civilian members of the Construction Corps were alike unfamiliar with the special class of work called for in the repair or the rebuilding of railways under the emergency conditions of actual warfare. This instruction had, in fact, to be completed at the theatre of war at a time when the Corps should have been prepared to show the greatest efficiency.

Difficulties arose, also, on the side of the Germans in operating the 2,500 miles of French railway lines of which they took possession.

There was, in the first place, a deficiency both of locomotives and of rolling stock. So far as circumstances wouldpermit, the French, as they retreated, either took their railway rolling stock with them or destroyed it, in order that it should not be used by the enemy. Attempts were made to meet the difficulty by obtaining constant reinforcements of engines and wagons from Germany; but even then the organisation for controlling the use of rolling stock, among other transport details, was still so defective that commanders who wanted to ensure the movement of their own troops by rail did not hesitate to take possession of engines and carriages set aside for the regular services of the line. There were, in fact, occasions when, for this reason, the regular services had to be stopped altogether.

In the next place troubles with thepersonnelwere no less acute than those with thematériel. In proportion as the Germans advanced towards Paris the bulk of the French population retired, while threats and offers of liberal pay alike failed to secure from those who remained assistance either in repairing or in operating the lines of which the invaders had taken possession. In these circumstances not only engines, carriages and wagons, but no fewer than 3,500 railwaymen—in addition to the German Railway Troops already in France—had to be brought from Germany. Yet even the resort to this expedient started a fresh lot of troubles. The railwaymen so imported had been in the service of different German railway companies whose equipment and methods of operation varied considerably; so that when the men were required to work together—and that, also, on the lines of a foreign country, with the accompaniment of much laxity in discipline as well as of much mutual misunderstanding—a vast amount of friction arose.

All these experiences emphasised and strengthened the conclusion arrived at even before the campaign of 1870-71—that the real efficiency of Railway Troops can only be obtained by organising them in time of peace in readiness for times of war. Such conclusion being now beyond all possible dispute, action was taken by Prussia with characteristic promptness.

In accordance with a Royal Order of May 19, 1871, there was added to the Prussian Army, on October 1 of the sameyear, aRailway Battalion("Eisenbahnbataillon"), the special purposes of which were (1) to afford to those constituting it the means of obtaining, in time of peace, such technical training as would enable them to construct any railway works necessary in time of war, to repair promptly any damage done to railways, and to undertake the entire railway traffic along lines of communication; (2) to procure, or prepare, in time of peace, all plant, materials, tools, etc., likely to be required in time of war; and (3) to constitute the nucleus of all necessary railway formations in war. The Battalion was formed of non-commissioned officers and men of the now disbanded sections of Railway Troops who were still liable to military service, supplemented by three-year volunteers and recruits from all parts of the territory subject to the Prussian Minister of War, only those being accepted, however, whose previous occupations fitted them for one or other of the various grades of railway work. The officers were obtained mainly, though not exclusively, from the Engineers. Members of that corps, together with others who were mechanical engineers by profession, were accepted as one-year volunteers.

On a peace footing the Battalion was composed of a Staff and four Companies, each of 100 or 125 men, with a depôt, and provided with its own means of transport. One of the Companies consisted exclusively of platelayers and watchmen. On mobilisation each Company was to be enlarged into two Construction Companies and one Traffic Company, giving a total, on a war footing, of eight Construction and four Traffic Companies. The Corps also had a reserve division consisting of a Staff, two Companies and a section of railway employés. All officers having railway experience who had served in the war of 1870-71 were included in the reserve.

The training of the Battalion was under the direction of the Inspector-General of the Engineers Corps. It comprised (1) theoretical and scientific instruction of the officers in all branches of railway construction, repair and destruction, coupled with the study of every branch of railway science likely to be of advantage in military transport, while specialimportance was attached to a close and constant intercourse with the staffs of the various railways, and (2) practical experience of railway construction and operation. This experience was afforded (a) on the Battalion's practice grounds, where instruction was more especially given in the art of rapidly destroying railway track; (b) through the employment of the men—subject to the continued maintenance among them of the principle of a military organisation—on many of the private as well as on the State railways in Germany, such employment including the repair of bridges, the laying of track, the enlargement of stations, etc., and (c) by the construction, operation and management of a short line of railway which, on completion, was devoted to the public service. The period of training was for either one or three years and the Battalion was kept up to a normal standard of about 500 men by a succession of recruits. These recruits were generally men of a good type, admission to the Battalion being regarded with the greater favour inasmuch as the experience gained was found to be of advantage to the men in obtaining railway employment on their return to civil life.

In the giving of this practical instruction the purpose specially kept in view was that of anticipating as far as possible actual war conditions, and providing for them accordingly. Thus in the laying of rails for any new line built by the Railway Troops great importance was attached to the speed with which the work could be done, the records of the time taken being very closely watched.

To one group of officers was allocated the duty of studying all developments in railway science and operation at home or abroad and conveying information thereon to those under instruction. A further important feature of the scheme included the publication of a series of textbooks on railway subjects regarded from a military standpoint. A beginning was also made with the collection of large supplies of rails, bridge materials, etc., for use as required.

In December, 1872, Bavaria created a similar Battalion, comprising a single Company attached to the 1st Bavarian Corps. The constitution and the operations of this Battalionfollowed closely the precedents established by Prussia.

Such was the importance attached by the highest military authorities in Germany to the formation of these Railway Troops that the Chief of the Great General Staff was their Inspector-General from the time of the first Prussian Battalion being created down to the year 1899.

In December 30, 1875, came the conversion of the Railway Battalion into aRailway Regiment. It was felt that the cadres of the former did not respond sufficiently to the needs of the military rail-transport situation, and they were accordingly enlarged into a Regiment of two Battalions, with a regimental Staff of forty-eight, and 502 men in each Battalion. In 1887 the Prussian Regiment was increased from two Battalions to four, and the Bavarian Battalion expanded to the extent of two companies in place of one. In 1890 the Prussian Regiment further became aBrigadeof two Regiments, each of two Battalions, the number of units thus remaining the same as before; though in 1893 the Prussian Brigade was augmented by two more Battalions, increasing its force to three Regiments, each of two Battalions with four Companies in each Battalion, or a total of twenty-four Companies, of which one was a Würtemberg Company and two were Saxon Companies, while the Bavarian Battalion acquired three Companies in the place of two.

In 1899 Prussia took a further new departure by grouping together, asCommunication Troops("Verkerstrüppen"), all the technical units concerned in the railway, the telegraphic and the air-craft services. This new arm was put under the control of an officer holding the rank of a General of Division and receiving his orders direct from the Emperor. A change was also effected in regard to the Berlin-Juterbog railway—a single-track line, 70 km. (44 miles) in length, which, originally constructed mainly by the Railway Troops, was operated by them as a means of acquiring experience in railway working. Prior to the passing of the law of March 25, 1899, troops for the working staff were supplied by the Brigade, and the frequent changes were a cause of some inconvenience. Under the new law a section constituted of three Prussian Companies and a Saxon detachment,with a Lieutenant-Colonel as director, was specially created for the operation of the line.

Altogether the Railway Troops comprised a total of thirty-one Companies, having 180 officers and 4,500 non-commissioned officers and men; but these figures were irrespective of carefully-compiled lists (subjected to frequent revision) of all reservists possessing railway experience and still liable for military service. Brigade, Battalions and Companies thus formed only the cadres of a small army of men considered qualified to undertake railway work of one kind or another in time of war.

Even in Germany itself the need for having so large a body of Railway Troops was called into question some years ago, on the ground, partly, that it was desirable to keep to the lowest practicable minimum the number of non-combatants closely associated with the Army; and, partly, because of the view—favoured by Von der Goltz, in his "Kriegführung"—that much of the construction work which the Railway Troops would carry out might be left to contractors, without hampering the Army with further bodies of new troops for special purposes.

To these suggestions it was replied, in effect, (1) that in any future war the movement of large bodies of troops would be directly associated with the provision and the maintenance of adequate railway facilities; (2) that Railway Troops, constituted in time of peace, would alone be capable of ensuring the rapid renovation of damaged lines, or the construction of new ones, in time of war; (3) that works of this kind, done under great pressure, and serving temporary purposes only, would differ essentially from railway works undertaken in peace by ordinary contractors; and (4) that Germany required a large body of Railway Troops on account of her geographical position, inasmuch as she might have to face an enemy on either, or both, of two fronts—France and Russia; while if, in the event of a war with Russia, she should want to send her forces into that country by rail, she would require to have a large body of Railway Troops available either for the conversion of the Russian 5 ft. gauge into the 4 ft. 8½ in. gauge of the German lines (in order thatthe engines and rolling stock of the latter could be utilised on Russian territory), or for the construction of special military railways as substitutes for the Russian lines.

Whatever the merits of these respective arguments, the fact remains that the Railway Troops of Germany, created under the circumstances and conditions here detailed, have been maintained in steadily increasing numbers, and, also, in constantly expanding efficiency thanks to what is, in effect, their School of Railway Instruction and to the great amount of practical work they have been called upon to do, whether in the building of strategical lines or in other departments of railway construction, destruction or working in which they could gain experience likely to be of advantage in time of war.

There was, also, according to M. Paul Lanoir, as related by him in his book on "The German Spy System," a still further purpose that these Army railwaymen might be called on to serve. He tells how in 1880, the chief of the system, the notorious Stieber, conceived the idea of securing the appointment in every portion of the national railway system of France (and more especially at important junctions or strategical centres) of German spies who, competent to act as railway workers, would, in the event of any future war between Germany and France, and on receiving the necessary instructions, destroy or block the railway lines at those points in such a manner—as planned, of course, in advance—that great delay would occur in the mobilisation of the French troops owing to the traffic being paralysed for the time being; the Germans, in the meantime, rushing their own forces to the frontier. "The extremely important rôle which would devolve on our railwaymen," adds M. Lanoir, "at the moment of the declaration of war, in fulfilling their functions as indispensable auxiliaries to the combatant army, was already thoroughly appreciated at this period."

Submitted to Prince Bismarck, Stieber's scheme was approved by him, and, so far as the obtaining of appointments on the French railways by Stieber's agents was concerned, the plan had been quietly carried into effect by the end of 1883; but a casual incident then led to thediscovery of the conspiracy by M. Lanoir himself. Within a week, as the result of his communications with General Campenau, Minister of War, the railway companies received a confidential circular requiring that they should call upon every foreigner employed by them in any capacity whatever to become naturalised without delay. Those who would not adopt this course were to be immediately dismissed. The number of foreigners then in the employ of the railway companies was 1,641, and, although 1,459 of them agreed to become naturalised, there were 182 Germans who refused so to do. These 182 were at once discharged—the assumption being that they were the spies, qualified to act as railway workers, by whom the dislocation of traffic was to have been ensured whenever they might receive word to that effect.

FOOTNOTES:[24]CaptainA. de Formanoirstates in his book, "Des Chemins de Fer en Temps de Guerre" (Conférences militaires belges.Bruxelles, 1870), that in France and Austria all the railway bridges have mine-chambers so that they can be readily destroyed when the occasion arises.[25]"Account of a Torpedo used for the Destruction of a Railway Train on the 26th of October, 1870." By Lieut. Fraser, R.E. Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol. XX. Woolwich, 1872.

[24]CaptainA. de Formanoirstates in his book, "Des Chemins de Fer en Temps de Guerre" (Conférences militaires belges.Bruxelles, 1870), that in France and Austria all the railway bridges have mine-chambers so that they can be readily destroyed when the occasion arises.

[25]"Account of a Torpedo used for the Destruction of a Railway Train on the 26th of October, 1870." By Lieut. Fraser, R.E. Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol. XX. Woolwich, 1872.

When France went to war with Germany in 1870-71, her military rail-transport was still governed by regulations which, adopted as far back as 1851 and 1855, related only to such matters of detail as the financial arrangements between the Army and the railway companies, the length of troop trains, etc., without making any provision for an organisation controlling the transport of large bodies of men in time of war. It certainly had been under these regulations that the French troops were conveyed to Italy when they took part in the campaign of 1859; but the defects then developed, coupled with the further lessons taught by the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, had shown the need for bringing these early French regulations into harmony with the conditions and requirements of modern warfare.

Impressed by these considerations, and realising the disadvantages and dangers of the position into which his country had drifted, the French Minister of War, Marshal Niel, appointed in March, 1869, a "Commission Centrale des Chemins de Fer," composed of representatives of the Army, the Ministry of Public Works, and the principal railway companies, for the purpose not only of revising the existing regulations on military transports but of preparing a new one to take their place. The Commission held twenty-nine sittings and it drew up a provisional scheme on lines closely following those already adopted in Germany and Austria and based, especially, on the same principle of a co-ordination of the military with the railway technical element. This provisional scheme was subjected to various tests and trials with a view to perfecting it before it wasplaced on a permanent basis. But Marshal Niel died; no new regulation was adopted; the projected scheme was more or less forgotten; time was against the early completion of the proposed experiments, while political and military developments succeeded one another with such rapidity that, on the outbreak of war in 1870, it was no longer possible to carry out the proposed plans. So the studies of the Commission came to naught, and France embarked on her tremendous conflict with no organisation for military transport apart from the out-of-date and wholly defective regulations under which her troops had already suffered in the Italian war of 1859.

There was an impression that the talent of the French soldier would enable him to "se débrouiller"—to "pull," if not (in the English sense) to "muddle," through. But the conditions were hopeless, and the results speedily brought about were little short of chaos.

So far as the actual conveyance of troops was concerned, the railway companies themselves did marvels. "The numerical superiority of Germany," as Von der Goltz says in his "Nation in Arms," "was known in Paris, and it was thought to neutralise this superiority by boldness and rapidity. The idea was a good one ... but ... it was needful that the Germans should be outdone in the rapidity with which the armies were massed." That the railway managements and staffs did their best to secure this result is beyond any possibility of doubt.

On July 15, 1870, the Minister of Public Works directed the Est, Nord and Paris-Lyon Companies to place all their means of transport at the disposal of the War Minister, suspending as far as necessary their ordinary passenger and goods services; and the Ouest and Orléans Companies were asked to put their rolling stock at the disposal of the three other companies. The Est, to which the heaviest part in the work involved was to fall, had already taken various measures in anticipation of an outbreak of war; and such was the energy shown by the companies, as a whole, that the first troop train was started from Paris at 5.45 p.m. on July 16, within, that is to say, twenty-fourhours of the receipt of the notice from the Minister of Public Works. Between July 16 and July 26 there were despatched 594 troop trains, conveying 186,620 men, 32,410 horses, 3,162 guns and road vehicles, and 995 wagon-loads of ammunition and supplies. In the nineteen days of the whole concentration period (July 16-August 4) the companies carried 300,000 men, 64,700 horses, 6,600 guns and road vehicles, and 4,400 wagon-loads of ammunition and supplies.

All this activity on the part of the railway companies was, however, neutralised more or less by the absence of any adequate organisation for regulating and otherwise dealing with the traffic, so far as concerned the military authorities themselves.

The first regiment to leave Paris, on July 16, arrived at the station at 2 p.m. for the train due to start at 5.45 p.m. The men had been accompanied through the streets by an immense crowd shouting "À Berlin!" and, with so much time to spare, they either blocked up the station or were taken off by their friends to the neighbouring taverns, where the consumption of liquor was such that, by the time the train started, most of the men were excessively drunk. In addition to this, many had been relieved of their ammunition—taken from them, perhaps, as "souvenirs" of an historic occasion, though destined to reappear and to be put to bad use in the days of the Commune, later on.

If, however, at the beginning, the troops got to the station three hours before there was any need, other occasions were to arise when they kept trains waiting three or four hours before they themselves were ready to start.

Then, in Germany the concentration of the troops at some safe point in the interior, and their transport thence by rail to the frontier in complete units, took place as separate and distinct operations. In France the two movements were conducted simultaneously; and this, in itself, was a prolific source of confusion and disorganisation on the railways. The troops came to the stations on a peace footing and in various strengths. One regiment might have only one-third the strength of another despatchedearlier the same day or on the previous day, although the railway company would have provided the same number of vehicles for both. There was thus a choice of evils as between removing two-thirds of the carriages (a procedure which time or the station arrangements did not always permit); sending the train away only partially loaded; or filling up the available space either with men belonging to other corps or with such supplies as might be available at the moment. Some trains did leave nearly empty, but it was the last mentioned of the three courses that was generally adopted. Men of different arms—Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery; mobilised troops, reservists, and individuals, separated, it might be, from their own officers and not willing to show themselves amenable to the discipline of other officers—were thus transported at the same time as, possibly, a miscellaneous collection of horses, material and commissariat supplies. Other trains, again, went away so overcrowded that they could not accommodate all the men who should have gone by them, many being left behind in consequence.

Confusion and delays at the railway stations during the entraining of the troops were rendered the more complete because the railway staffs failed to get an adequate degree of support from the military authorities. According to one of the articles in those regulations of 1855 which were still in force, "officers were responsible for the prescribed movements in connection with the entraining, and should personally co-operate in ensuring observance of the regulations referring thereto"; but, according to Baron Ernouf, ("Histoire des Chemins de Fer Français pendant la Guerre Franco-Prussienne,") there were officers who refused absolutely to concern themselves with the entraining of their men at the Est station in Paris, declaring that this was a matter to be looked after by the railway officials with the help of subordinate officers, if they wanted it.

Under such conditions as these, officers in charge of troops got hopelessly separated from their men, who themselves might have been sent off with no knowledge of their proper destination. One General telegraphed to Paris onJuly 21:—"Have arrived at Belfort. Not found my Brigade. Not found General of Division. What should I do? Don't know where my Regiments are." As for the men, it was not many days before the stationsen routeto the front were occupied by a floating mass of "lost" soldiers, who pretended to be looking for their corps but too often found it much pleasanter to remain in the station buffets, and there enjoy the hospitality of local patriots. Such proportions did this evil assume that in August, 1870, the railway station at Reims had to be protected against a mob of from 4,000 to 5,000 "lost" ones, who wanted to plunder the wagons containing supplies for the front.

Confusion, again, was made still worse confounded by the multiplicity of orders—too often contradictory or impossible to carry out—which bombarded the railway officials, and must have driven them at times almost to distraction. Orders came direct from anybody and everybody possessed of the slightest degree of military authority. They came from the Ministry of War, the General Staff, and the Administrative Staff; from the Quartermaster-General's Department and the Commissariat; from officers and non-commissioned officers of Infantry, Artillery and Engineers; while each individual invariably gave his orders based on the range of his own particular sphere, or the convenience of his own particular troops, without any regard for the situation as a whole, for what might be wanted in other spheres, or for whether or not it was physically possible for the railway staffs to do at all what was asked of them, even if they were not being overwhelmed with those other orders, besides. Commanding officers of different corps especially distinguished themselves by presenting to the railway managements claims for priority in the despatch of Infantry, Artillery or supplies, as the case might be, threatening them with grave consequences if, in each instance, they did not yield such priority at once, though leaving them to meet an obviously impracticable position as best they could. Then it might happen that when all the necessary arrangements—involving much interference with other traffic—had been made, another order would come countermandingthe first one, or postponing the execution of it until a later occasion.

As though, again, the orders from all these independent military authorities were not sufficient, the railways were further worried by local authorities who wanted special trains for some such service as the conveyance of detachments of garde mobile a distance of ten or twelve miles to an instruction camp so that the men would not have to march by road. There were even demands from certain of the local authorities that they should be allowed to use railway wagons as barracks for troops.

M. Jacqmin, general manager of theChemin de Fer de l'Est, relates in his book, "Les Chemins de Fer Pendant la Guerre de 1870-71," that at the moment when theCompagnie de l'Estwas providing for the transport of Bourbacki's forces, and preparing for the revictualling of Paris, thepréfetof the Rhone demanded the use of railway wagons in which to house thegarde nationalemobilised on the plain of Vénissieux, on the left bank of the Rhone, there having been a delay in the delivery of the material for barracks. The company refused the request, and they had with the departmental authorities a lively controversy which was only settled by the decision of the Bordeaux Government that those authorities were in the wrong.

Typical of the general conditions, as they prevailed not only in Paris but elsewhere in France, were the circumstances under which the Nineteenth Army Corps, of 32,000 men, 3,000 horses and 300 guns, was sent from Cherbourg to Alençon. The troops were late in arriving at the station; the officers neglected to look after the men; the men refused to travel in goods trucks; orders and counter-orders succeeded one another in rapid succession; two or three hours were required for the despatch of each train, and delays occurred which must have disorganised the traffic all along the line.

Great as the confusion undoubtedly was at the points of despatch, it was far surpassed by that which prevailed at stations to which trains were sent regardless of any consideration as to whether or not they could be unloaded therewith such despatch as to avoid congestion. No transfer stations—constituting the points beyond which only the supplies wanted for immediate or early use at the extreme front should be taken, the remainder being forwarded as wanted—had been arranged, and the consignors, military or civil, had assumed that all supplies should be sent in bulk to places as near to the troops as possible. There were, consequently, many stations close to the frontier where the rails leading to them were occupied for miles together by loaded wagons, the number of which was being constantly added to by fresh arrivals. Many of these wagons were, in fact, used as magazines or storehouses on wheels. The same was, also, being done to a certain extent on the German lines, though with this difference—that whereas in Germany there were at the railway stations route commandants whose duty it was to enforce the prompt unloading of wagons, in France there was no corresponding authority. It suited the officers or the military department concerned to keep the supplies in the wagons until they were wanted; and this arrangement may have appeared an especially desirable one from their point of view because if the army moved forward—or backward—the supplies could be more readily moved with it if they were still in the wagons.

For these various reasons, there were officers who gave the most stringent orders that the wagons were not to be unloaded until their contents were actually required. It was evidently a matter of no concern to them that the wagons they were detaining might be wanted elsewhere, and that, for lack of them, other troops might be experiencing a shortage in their own supplies.

When the wagons were not deliberately kept loaded, it might still be impossible for the unloading to be done because of there being no military in attendance to do the work. As for the picking out, from among the large number in waiting, of some one wagon the contents of which were specially wanted, the trouble involved in this operation must often have been far greater than if the wagon had been unloaded and the supplies stored in the first instance.

Even the stations themselves got congested, under like conditions. The Commissariat wanted to convert them into depôts, and the Artillery sought to change them into arsenals. There were stations at which no platform was any longer available and troops arriving by any further train had to descend some distance away, several days elapsing before their train could be moved from the place where it had pulled up. At stations not thus blocked trains might be hours late in arriving, or they might bring a squadron of cavalry when arrangements had been made for receiving a battalion of infantry.

In one instance a General refused to allow his men to detrain on arrival at their destination at night, saying they would be more comfortable in the carriages than in the snow. This was, indeed, the case; but so long as the train remained where it was standing no other traffic could pass. Sometimes it was necessary for troop trains to wait on the lines for hours because no camp had been assigned to the men, and there was at least one occasion when a Colonel had to ask the stationmaster where it was his troops were to go.

Most of the traffic had been directed to Metz and Strasburg, and the state of chaos speedily developed at the former station has become historic.

The station at Metz was a large one; it had eight good depôts and four miles of sidings, and it was equal to the unloading of 930 wagons in twenty-four hours under well-organised conditions. But when the first infantry trains arrived the men were kept at the station four or five hours owing to the absence of orders as to their further destination. The men detrained, and the wagons containing road vehicles, officers' luggage, etc., were left unloaded and sent into the sidings. Other trains followed in rapid succession, bringing troops and supplies, and the block began to assume serious proportions.

The railway officials appealed to the local Commissariat force to unload the wagons so that they could be got out of the way. They were told that this could not be done because no orders had been received. The Commissariatforce for the division also declined to unload the wagons, saying it was uncertain whether the troops for whom the supplies were intended would remain at Metz or go further on.

Any unloading at all for several days was next rendered impossible by the higher military authorities. They asked the railway officers to prepare for the transport of an army corps of 30,000 men. This was done, and forty trains were located at various points along the line. An order was then given that the trains should be brought to Metz, to allow of the troops leaving at once. Within four hours every train was ready, and its locomotive was standing with the steam up; but no troops appeared. The order was countermanded. Then it was repeated, and then it was countermanded over again.

All this time fresh train-loads of supplies and ammunition had been arriving at Metz, adding to the collection of unloaded wagons which, having filled up all the sidings began to overflow and block up, first the lines leading to the locomotive sheds and next the main lines themselves. Everything was in inextricable confusion. Nobody knew where any particular commodity was to be found or, if they did, how to get the truck containing it from the consolidated mass of some thousands of vehicles. "In Metz," telegraphed the Commissary-General to Paris, "there is neither coffee, nor sugar; no rice, no brandy, no salt, only a little bacon and biscuit. Send me at least a million rations to Thionville." Yet it was quite possible that the articles specified were already in some or other of the trucks on hand, had the Commissary-General only known where they were and how to get them.

The railway people did what they could. They unloaded some of the consignments and removed them a considerable distance by road—only to have them sent back again to Metz station for re-loading and conveyance elsewhere. Hay unloaded at the station was sent into Metz to some magazines which, in turn, and at the same time, were sending hay to the railway for another destination. Finally, as a last resource, and in order both to reduce the blockand to get further use out of the wagons, the railway officials began to unload them and put their contents on the ground alongside. A big capture alike of wagons and of supplies was made by the enemy on his occupation of Metz.

Analogous conditions prevailed in many other places. At Dôle (Dep. Jura) an accumulated stock of loaded wagons not only filled up all the sidings but blocked up a large portion of the main line. When the evacuation was decided on a great waste of time occurred in selecting the wagons to be moved. Orders given one hour were countermanded the next; trains which had been made up were moved forward and backward, instead of being got out of the way at once; and, eventually, a considerable quantity of rolling stock, which might and should have been removed, had to be left behind.

On the Paris-Lyon railway a collection of 7,500 loaded trucks had accumulated at a time when a great truck shortage began to be felt, and the whole of these, together with the provisions and the materials they contained, fell into the hands of the Germans, whose total haul of wagons, including those captured at Metz and other places, numbered no fewer than 16,000. The wagons thus taken were first used by them for their own military transport during the remainder of the war; were then utilised for ordinary traffic on lines in Germany, and were eventually returned to France. Not only, therefore, had the French failed to get from these 16,000 railway wagons the benefit they should have derived from their use but, in blocking their lines with them under such conditions that it was impossible to save them from capture, they conferred a material advantage on the enemy, providing him with supplies, and increasing his own means both of transport and of attack on themselves.

The proportions of the German haul of wagons would, probably, have been larger still had not some of the French railway companies, on seeing the advance the enemy was making, assumed the responsibility of stopping traffic on certain of their lines and sending off their rolling stock to a place of safety. In taking this action they adopted acourse based alike on precedent and prudence, and one fully warranted by the principle of keeping railway rolling stock designed for purposes of defence from being utilised by the enemy for his own purposes of attack.

While, on the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian war, Germany began, as we have seen in Chapter X., to improve her own system of military rail-transport, with a view to remedying the faults developed therein, France applied herself with equal, if not with even greater, determination and perseverance to the task of creating for herself a system which, in her case, had been entirely lacking.

Recognising alike her own shortcomings, the imperative need to prepare for future contingencies, and the still more important part that railways would inevitably play in the next great war in which she might be engaged, France resolved to create, in time of peace, and as an indispensable factor in her scheme of national defence, a system of military transport comprehensive in its scope, complete in its working details, and leaving nothing to chance. Everything was to be foreseen, provided for, and, as far as circumstances would permit, tested in advance.

The Prussian organisation of 1870-71 was, admittedly, and as recommended by Jacqmin, taken as a starting point for what was to be done. From that time, also, every new regulation adopted by Prussia in regard to military transport, and every important alteration made in the Prussian system, was promptly recorded and commended or criticised in the ably-conducted French military papers; though in the actual creation of her own system there was no mere following by France of Prussian examples. What was considered worth adopting certainly was adopted; but the organisation eventually built up, as the result of many years of pertinacious efforts, was, in reality, based on Frenchconditions, French requirements, and the most progressive ideas of French military science. The French were, also, to show that, when they applied themselves to the task, they had a genius for organisation in no way inferior to that of the Germans themselves.

In his review of the events of 1870-71, Jacqmin declared that, while the education of France in the use of railways in time of war had still to be completed, the basis for such education had already been laid down by Marshal Niel's "Commission Centrale" of 1869. The two essential conditions were (1) unification of control in the use of railways for military purposes, whether for the transport of men or of supplies; and (2) association of the military element and the technical element,—an association which should be permanent in its nature and apply to every phase of the railway service, so that before any order was given there should be a guarantee that it was one possible of achievement, and this, also, without prejudice to other transport orders already given or likely to become necessary.

It was these essential conditions that formed the basis of the organisation which France created.

As early as November, 1872, there was called into existence aCommission Militaire Superieure des Chemins de Ferconsisting of twelve members, who represented the Ministry of Public Works, the Army, the Navy, and the great railway companies. Attached to the Ministry of War, and charged with the task of studying all questions relating to the use of railways by the Army, the Commission had for its first duty a revision of the proposals made by Marshal Niel's Commission of 1869. Following on this came a succession of laws, decrees and instructions dealing with various aspects of the situation in regard to military transport and the military organization of the railways, the number issued between 1872 and 1883 being no fewer than seventeen. These, however, represented more or less tentative or sectional efforts made in combination with the railway companies, who gave to the Chambers and to the administrative authorities their most earnest support and the full benefit of all their technical knowledge and experiencein regard to the many problems which had to be solved.

In 1884 there were issued two decrees (July 7 and October 29) which codified, modified or further developed the various legislative or administrative measures already taken, and laid down both the fundamental principles and the leading details of a comprehensive scheme which, after additional modifications or amendments, based on later experiences, was to develop into the system of organised military rail-transport as it exists in France to-day.

These later modifications were more especially effected by three decrees which, based on the law of December 28, 1888, dealt with (1) the composition and powers of theCommission Militaire Superieure des Chemins de Fer; (2) the creation of Field Railway Sections and Railway Troops; and (3) the organisation of the military service of railways.

Since its original formation in 1872, theSuperior Military Commissionhad already undergone reconstruction in 1886, and still further changes, in addition to those made by the decree of February 5, 1889, were to follow. In its final form the Commission still retains the principle of representation thereon alike of the military and the technical (railway) element. Presided over by the Chief of the General Staff—who, with the help of a special department of that Staff, exercises the supreme direction of the military transport services, subject to the authority of the War Minister—the Commission is composed of six Generals or other military officers of high rank, three representatives of the Ministry of Public Works, and the members of the Line Commission appointed for each of the great railway systems and, also, for theChemin de Fer d'État.

All the members of the Commission are nominated by the Minister of War. The function they discharge is a purely consultative one. Their business it is to give to the Minister their views on all such questions as he may submit to them for consideration in regard to the use of the railways by the Army, and more especially in regard to—

1. Preparations for military transports.

2. Examination of all projects for new lines or junctions and alterations of existing lines, as well as all projects whichconcern railway facilities (stations, platforms, water supply, locomotive sheds, etc.)

3. The fixing of the conditions to be fulfilled by railway rolling stock in view of military requirements, and the alterations which may be necessary to adapt it thereto.

4. Special instructions to be given to troops of all arms as to their travelling by rail.

5. Agreements to be made between railway companies and the War Department in respect to transport of troops, provisions, etc.

6. Organisation, instruction and employment of special corps of railwaymen (for repairs, etc.).

7. Measures to be taken for ensuring the supervision and protection of railways and their approaches.

8. The means of destroying and of rapidly repairing lines of railway.

Heads of the different services at the Ministry of War can attend meetings of the Commission, in a consultative capacity, in respect to matters coming within their jurisdiction, and the Commission can, in turn, apply to the Minister for the attendance of any person it may desire to hear.

As far as possible, all plans and arrangements concerning the transport of troops and supplies in time of war, from the moment of mobilisation onward, are thus prepared, examined or provided for in advance. In article 8 of the Regulation of December 8, 1913, on Military Transports by Railway ("Réglement sur les transports stratégiques par chemin de fer") it is, in fact, stated that—

All the arrangements relating to the organisation and carrying out of transport for mobilisation, concentration, revictualling and evacuation are studied and prepared in time of peace. The Minister gives, to this effect, all the necessary instructions to the General Staff, to the commanders of Army Corps, and to the different services. A like course is adopted, in time of peace, with regard to the study of the conditions under which the railways will be operated on the lines of communication.

The creation, under the law of March 13, 1875, of Field Railway Sections and Railway Troops was the outcome of the obvious need of having an organised force able totake up the duties of constructing, repairing, destroying or operating railways at the theatre of war, such force being established in time of peace and assured all the experience needed to qualify them for the discharge of those various duties. France, in fact, was now, in this respect, to follow the example of Germany, just as Germany had already been inspired by the example of the United States.

Under a decree of February 5, 1889,Field Railway Sections("Sections de chemins de fer de campagne") were defined as permanent military corps charged, in time of war, and concurrently with the Railway Troops, with the construction, renovation and operation of those railways of which the working could not be assured by the national companies. Their personnel was to be recruited from among the engineers, officials and men employed by the railway companies and by the State Railways Administration, such recruiting being carried out either voluntarily or by reason of liability to render military service; and they were to form a distinct corps, having its own governing body with, as its head, a commandant exercising the functions of a Chef de Corps. In time of peace there were to be nine sections, each designated by a distinctive number according to the particular railway system or systems from which it was formed; though authority was given to the Minister of War to call further sections into being in case of war. The number in peace was increased, in 1906, by the formation of a tenth section from among the staffs of railways in the "secondary" group, including local lines and tramways, in order to assure, or to assist in, the operation of these railways or tramways for military transport in time of war.

In time of peace the sections were to be subject to inspections, musters, reviews and assemblies, as ordered by the Minister of War. A further provision in the decree of 1889 says:—"All the arrangements relative to the mobilisation of each section shall be studied and planned in time of peace. Each section should always be ready, in the most complete manner, to render its services to the Minister of War."

Subsequent decrees or instructions constituted each of the sections a complete unit on the following basis: (1) A central body; (2) three distinct divisions, namely, (a) "movement," (b) "voie," and (c) "traction"; (3) a central depôt common to the three divisions and the central body; and (4) complementary territorial subdivisions in the same three classes, and attached to the central depôt of the section. The territorial subdivisions are designed to provide a reserve force of men who can complete or strengthen the existing sections, or, alternatively, be constituted into additional sections, if so desired by the Minister of War. The total strength of each section (including 141 allotted to the central depôt) was fixed as 1,466.

The administration of a section rests with an Administrative Council formed by the president and the heads of the several departments, and meeting at least once in every three months in time of peace, and once a week in time of war. Authority is exercised over the sections by the Field Railway Commissions to which they are attached.[26]

Men in the active divisions of the sections who are liable to military service are excused from taking part in the ordinary military exercises, but may be assembled for inspections, etc., or to undergo courses of instruction in railway work. Men in the territorial subdivisions can be summoned by the Minister of War for "a period of exercises" in railway work in time of peace; and the fact may be recalled that advantage of this power was taken during the French railway troubles of 1910, when the strikers were required to assume the rôle of soldiers doing railway work under military authority and control.

TheRailway Troops("Troupes de chemin de fer") now constitute a Railway Regiment ("5erégiment du génie") organised under the decree of July 11, 1899, and comprising on a peace footing, three Battalions, each of four Companies.

Recruits for the Railway Regiment come from one or other of the following classes: (1) Young soldiers who were in the railway service before they joined the Army; (2) an annual contingent of railway employés selected by the Minister of War from lists supplied for this purpose by the administrations of the five great railway companies and of the State railways, the number so selected not to exceed 240, distributed as follows:Compagnie du Nord, 42; Est, 18; P. L. M., 54; Orléans, 42; Midi, 15; État, 69;and (3) soldiers belonging to Infantry Regiments who, after one year of training therein, are sent to the Railway Regiment, those chosen for this purpose being, by preference, men whose previous occupation in life has adapted them for railway work.

The railway administrations are also required to provide from among their officials a certain number of officers and non-commissioned officers to form a reserve for the Regiment.

A most complete and systematic course of instruction is arranged.[27]It is divided into (1) military instruction and (2) technical instruction, the purpose of the latter being defined as that of qualifying the Railway Troops to undertake at the theatre of war, subject to the authority of the Director-General of Railways and Communications, works of repair or destruction of railway lines, or, in case of need, the provisional working of the railways. In time of peace it is the duty of the Superior Military Commission for Railways to advise on all questions concerning the organisation, instruction and employment of the special troops for railway work. To enable it to discharge this function the Commission receives, through the Chief of the General Staff, all programmes, proposals or reports that may be issued in regard to the technical instruction of the troops, giving its views thereon, and making such recommendations as it may consider desirable.

Such technical instruction comprises (a) that which is given to the whole of the troops; (b) instruction in particular branches of railway work given to a limited number of individuals; (c) instruction to groups of men operating in companies or otherwise, and (d) instruction obtained on the ordinary railways. It is further divided into (i) theoretical and (ii) practical.

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