FOOTNOTES:

FOOTNOTES:[55]See Vol. III. of "The Story of Africa," by Robert Brown. London, 1894.[56]"The Germans and Africa," by Evans Lewin, Librarian of the Royal Colonial Institute. London, 1915.[57]Under the terms of the treaty of July 1, 1900, Germany was to have "free access" from her South-West Africa Protectorate to the Zambezi River "by a strip which shall at no point be less than twenty English miles in width."[58]The Hereros (Damaras) are not a warlike people, and although, at the time of the rising, many of them were armed with Mausers and Lee-Enfields, it has been said of them that they were not of much account with the rifle, their "natural weapon" being the assegai. A German White Book on the rebellion stated that the cause of the outbreak was the spirit of independence which characterised the Hereros, "to whom the increasing domination of the Germans had become insupportable, and who believed themselves stronger than the whites." According to Mr. H. A. Bryden ("The Conquest of German South-West Africa,"Fortnightly Review, July, 1915) the real causes were the abuses of the white trader, the brutal methods of certain officials, and the seizure and occupation of tribal lands. The war developed into one of practical extermination for the natives concerned. Of the Hereros between 20,000 and 30,000 were either killed outright or driven into the Kalahari desert to die of starvation. The Hottentots also lost heavily.[59]The Commerce Defence League, as explained by the writer of the article, is an organisation of German traders which gives subsidies to German clerks so that they can take up appointments at nominal salaries in foreign countries, on the understanding that they are to report to the League as to the business methods, etc., of those countries and on openings for German trade or industry therein, the League acting on such information and dividing among its subscribers the profits derived from the agencies opened or the competitive businesses started.[60]SeeSouth Africa, November 14, 1914.[61]"Memorandum on the Country known as German South-West Africa. Compiled from such information as is at present available to the Government of the Union of South Africa." Pretoria, 1915.[62]The colony was also in wireless-telegraphic communication, via Togoland, with Berlin.[63]For details of so-called "invasions" of Portuguese territory by German political agents, posing as engineers and prospectors, see an article on "The Invasion of Angola," by Mr. George Bailey, in the issue of "United Empire: The Royal Colonial Institute Journal," for October, 1915.[64]"Le Chemin de Fer du Tanganyika et les progrès de l'Afrique orientale allemande." Par Camille Martin. Renseignements coloniaux, No. 3. Supplément del'Afrique française, Mars, 1914. Paris.[65]A region on the Belgian Congo about 115,000 square miles in extent and one of the best watered districts in Africa, lying nearly in the centre of the African continent, and equidistant, therefore, from the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.[66]"Adventures in Africa under the British, Belgian and Portuguese Flags." London, 1915.[67]"Welches Interesse hat Deutschland an der Erschliessung des Congo?" Von Emil Zimmermann.Koloniale Rundschau, Mai, 1911. Berlin.[68]"Die Eroberung des Tanganyika-Verkehrs." Von Emil Zimmermann.Koloniale Rundschau, Jan., 1911. Berlin.[69]"Kamerun und die Deutsche Tsâdsee-Eisenbahn." Von Carl René, Director des Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Syndikats. 251 pp. Mit 37 Textbildern und 22 Tafeln nach Original-Aufnahmen der Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Expediton, 1902-3. Berlin, 1905.[70]"Bulletin de la Société de Geographie et d'Etudes coloniales de Marseilles." Tome XXXVI, No. 1. Ie Trimestre, 1912.[71]"Neu-Kamerun; Reiseerlebnisse und wirtschaftspolitische Untersuchungen." Von Emil Zimmermann. 135 pp. Map. Berlin, 1913.[72]"Was ist uns Zentralafrika?" Von Emil Zimmermann. 57 pp. Berlin, 1914.[73]How Egypt was to be invaded and captured by the Germans and Turks, in combination, with the help of the railways in Asia Minor, will be told in the following Chapter.[74]Should there still be any doubt on this point, it will be removed by the frank admission ofDie Neue Zeit, even whilst the Great War is still in progress, that Germany undertook the war with "the main object of extending her colonial possessions." As quoted in theDaily Expressof October 8, 1915,Die Neue Zeitfurther said:—"Herr Paul Rohrbach favours the acquisition of the whole of Central Africa, but opines that this territory, vast as it is, will not be adequate to furnish Germany with all the elbow room she may require within the next half-century. Professor Delbrück, while agreeing with Herr Rohrbach, as to the importance of Central Africa, as well as of Angola and the whole of British East Africa, further emphasises the necessity for the acquisition of the Sudan and the southern part of the Sahara, now in the possession of France. We are quite in agreement with these eminent leaders that we must found an "India" of our own, and that the greater part of the African continent must furnish the requisite territory. Once well established in this new empire, we shall link ourselves with Asiatic Turkey, and also with China, reconstructing the political and economic foundations of both on a scientific German basis."

[55]See Vol. III. of "The Story of Africa," by Robert Brown. London, 1894.

[56]"The Germans and Africa," by Evans Lewin, Librarian of the Royal Colonial Institute. London, 1915.

[57]Under the terms of the treaty of July 1, 1900, Germany was to have "free access" from her South-West Africa Protectorate to the Zambezi River "by a strip which shall at no point be less than twenty English miles in width."

[58]The Hereros (Damaras) are not a warlike people, and although, at the time of the rising, many of them were armed with Mausers and Lee-Enfields, it has been said of them that they were not of much account with the rifle, their "natural weapon" being the assegai. A German White Book on the rebellion stated that the cause of the outbreak was the spirit of independence which characterised the Hereros, "to whom the increasing domination of the Germans had become insupportable, and who believed themselves stronger than the whites." According to Mr. H. A. Bryden ("The Conquest of German South-West Africa,"Fortnightly Review, July, 1915) the real causes were the abuses of the white trader, the brutal methods of certain officials, and the seizure and occupation of tribal lands. The war developed into one of practical extermination for the natives concerned. Of the Hereros between 20,000 and 30,000 were either killed outright or driven into the Kalahari desert to die of starvation. The Hottentots also lost heavily.

[59]The Commerce Defence League, as explained by the writer of the article, is an organisation of German traders which gives subsidies to German clerks so that they can take up appointments at nominal salaries in foreign countries, on the understanding that they are to report to the League as to the business methods, etc., of those countries and on openings for German trade or industry therein, the League acting on such information and dividing among its subscribers the profits derived from the agencies opened or the competitive businesses started.

[60]SeeSouth Africa, November 14, 1914.

[61]"Memorandum on the Country known as German South-West Africa. Compiled from such information as is at present available to the Government of the Union of South Africa." Pretoria, 1915.

[62]The colony was also in wireless-telegraphic communication, via Togoland, with Berlin.

[63]For details of so-called "invasions" of Portuguese territory by German political agents, posing as engineers and prospectors, see an article on "The Invasion of Angola," by Mr. George Bailey, in the issue of "United Empire: The Royal Colonial Institute Journal," for October, 1915.

[64]"Le Chemin de Fer du Tanganyika et les progrès de l'Afrique orientale allemande." Par Camille Martin. Renseignements coloniaux, No. 3. Supplément del'Afrique française, Mars, 1914. Paris.

[65]A region on the Belgian Congo about 115,000 square miles in extent and one of the best watered districts in Africa, lying nearly in the centre of the African continent, and equidistant, therefore, from the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

[66]"Adventures in Africa under the British, Belgian and Portuguese Flags." London, 1915.

[67]"Welches Interesse hat Deutschland an der Erschliessung des Congo?" Von Emil Zimmermann.Koloniale Rundschau, Mai, 1911. Berlin.

[68]"Die Eroberung des Tanganyika-Verkehrs." Von Emil Zimmermann.Koloniale Rundschau, Jan., 1911. Berlin.

[69]"Kamerun und die Deutsche Tsâdsee-Eisenbahn." Von Carl René, Director des Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Syndikats. 251 pp. Mit 37 Textbildern und 22 Tafeln nach Original-Aufnahmen der Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Expediton, 1902-3. Berlin, 1905.

[70]"Bulletin de la Société de Geographie et d'Etudes coloniales de Marseilles." Tome XXXVI, No. 1. Ie Trimestre, 1912.

[71]"Neu-Kamerun; Reiseerlebnisse und wirtschaftspolitische Untersuchungen." Von Emil Zimmermann. 135 pp. Map. Berlin, 1913.

[72]"Was ist uns Zentralafrika?" Von Emil Zimmermann. 57 pp. Berlin, 1914.

[73]How Egypt was to be invaded and captured by the Germans and Turks, in combination, with the help of the railways in Asia Minor, will be told in the following Chapter.

[74]Should there still be any doubt on this point, it will be removed by the frank admission ofDie Neue Zeit, even whilst the Great War is still in progress, that Germany undertook the war with "the main object of extending her colonial possessions." As quoted in theDaily Expressof October 8, 1915,Die Neue Zeitfurther said:—"Herr Paul Rohrbach favours the acquisition of the whole of Central Africa, but opines that this territory, vast as it is, will not be adequate to furnish Germany with all the elbow room she may require within the next half-century. Professor Delbrück, while agreeing with Herr Rohrbach, as to the importance of Central Africa, as well as of Angola and the whole of British East Africa, further emphasises the necessity for the acquisition of the Sudan and the southern part of the Sahara, now in the possession of France. We are quite in agreement with these eminent leaders that we must found an "India" of our own, and that the greater part of the African continent must furnish the requisite territory. Once well established in this new empire, we shall link ourselves with Asiatic Turkey, and also with China, reconstructing the political and economic foundations of both on a scientific German basis."

Just as avowedly strategical lines in Africa were to lead the way to the creation of a German African Empire, so, in turn, was that system of economic-political-strategical lines comprised within the scheme of what is known as the "Baghdad Railway" designed to ensure the establishment of a German Middle-Asian Empire, bringing under German control the entire region from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, and providing convenient stepping-off places from which an advance might be made on Egypt in the one direction and India in the other.

The conception of this further programme was spread over (1) the period during which Germany's aspirations were limited to the inheritance of Turkey's possessions in Asia; and (2) the period when such inheritance began to be regarded as a means to the realisation of still greater aims in the domain ofWeltpolitik.

For more than half a century Asiatic Turkey has been looked upon as Germany's Land of Promise. Anatolia was thought a most desirable territory for her surplus population. The development, under German influence, of that territory as a whole—especially with a revival of the Babylonian system of irrigation—was considered to offer vast possibilities of commercial prosperity. Wheat, cotton and tobacco, especially, might be raised in prodigious quantities, and there was the prospect, also, of a petroleum industry rivalling that of Baku itself. Turkey was a decadent nation, and as soon as "the Sick Man" succumbed to his apparently inevitable fate—or even before, should circumstances permit—Germany was ready to step into his shoes.

That these aspirations had, indeed, long been cherished is a fact capable of ready proof.

In 1848 Wilhelm Roscher, the leading expounder of the historical school of political economy in Germany, selected Asia Minor as Germany's share in the Turkish spoils, whenever the division thereof should take place; and Johann Karl Robertus (1805-1875), the founder of the so-called scientific socialism in Germany, expressed the hope that he would live long enough to see Turkey fall into the hands of Germany, and, also, to see German soldiers on the shores of the Bosporus.

Coming to a more recent period, we find that Dr. Aloys Sprenger, the German orientalist, published, in 1886, a pamphlet on "Babylonia, the richest land in the past, and the most promising field for colonisation in the present,"[75]in which, after dealing with the history, physical conditions and resources of Babylonia, he predicted that, before the end of the century, not only Babylonia but Assyria, which was inseparable from it, would, if not formally annexed, at least come under the control of some European Power. Assyria and Syria, he declared, were even better adapted for colonisation than Babylonia. He continued:—

The Orient is the only territory on earth which has not yet been taken possession of by some aspiring nation. It offers the finest opportunities for colonisation, and if Germany, taking care not to let the opportunity slip, should act before the Cossacks come along, she would, in the division of the world, get the best share.... The German Kaiser, as soon as a few hundred thousand armed German colonists bring these promising fields into cultivation, will have in his hand the fate of Asia Minor, and he can—and will—then become the Protector of Peace for the whole of Asia.

Dr. Karl Kaerger, traveller and economist, lamented, in his "Kleinasien; ein deutsches Kolonisationsfeld" (Berlin, 1892), the enormous loss sustained by Germany in the migration of so many of her people and of so much capital to Anglo-Saxon lands; but there were, he affirmed, only two countries to which German settlers could go with any hope of retaining alike their nationality and their commercial relations with theMutterland. Those countries were—Africa and Asia Minor. He had been especially impressed, during the course of his travels, by the prospects and possibilities of Anatolia, and he recommended the establishment there of large German companies which would organise schemes of colonisation and land cultivation on a large scale. The colonies so established should be self-governing, free from all taxation for ten years, have the right of duty-free importation of necessaries, and enjoy various other privileges, while Turkey, in return for the concessions she thus made to the settlers, would be assured "the protection of Germany against attack." Not only hundreds of thousands, but millions, of colonists could find a second home on those wide expanses. Germany herself would gain a dual advantage—an economical one, and a political one. Concerning the latter, Dr. Kaerger observed:—

If the German Empire, while maintaining her friendship with Austria and Italy—which, under all circumstances, the political situation in Europe undoubtedly requires—can direct the stream of her emigration to the fertile territories of Turkey, and if she can conclude with that country a closer customs convention, then the entire economic, and with it, also, the political future of Germany will rest on a broader and a firmer basis than if the present streams of hundreds of thousands of her people, and millions of capital, continue to pass in increasing proportions, year by year, to countries which are economically hostile to us.

Dr. Kaerger was especially concerned lest Germany might be anticipated by Russia or England in the realisation of her own designs on Asia Minor. Should, he declared, either of those countries acquire any further territory from Turkey, or increase in any way Turkey's dependence upon them, the result would be the most serious disturbance of the prevailing situation in Europe that had occurred since 1870.

The development of all these ideas went so far that in 1895 theAlldeutscher Blätterrecommended that Germany should establish a Protectorate over the Turkish possessions in Asia Minor; and in the following year theAlldeutscherVerbandpublished a manifesto on "German claims to the Inheritance of Turkey" ("Deutschlands Anspruch an das türkische Erbe"), making a formal statement of Germany's alleged rights to the Turkish succession.

Germany had by this time already secured a footing on the soil of Asiatic Turkey by virtue of theAnatolian Railway. The first section—a length of about seventy miles, extending from Haidar Pacha (situate on the north-eastern coast of the Sea of Marmara, and opposite Constantinople) to Ismidt—was built in 1875 by German engineers to the order of the Turkish Government. It was transferred in 1888 to a German syndicate, nominees of the Deutsche Bank. Under the powers then conferred upon them, the syndicate opened an extension, on the east, to Angora, in 1892, and another, on the south, to Konia, in 1896, the total length of line being thus increased to 633 miles.

As the result of the visit of the German Emperor to Constantinople in 1898, followed by negotiations between the Porte and the director of the Deutsche Bank, authority was given to a new German Company—the Imperial Ottoman Baghdad Railway Company—under conventions of 1889, 1902 and 1903, to continue the existing Anatolian Railway from Konia to the Persian Gulf, via Adana, Nisibin, Mosul and Baghdad. This extension was to constitute the main line of theBaghdad Railwayproper; but the Company also acquired control over most of the branch railways already in operation. One of these was the French Smyrna—Afium Karahissar line, which constitutes the direct trade route between Smyrna and places served by the Anatolian railway, and has, also, a branch to Panderma, on the southern shores of the Sea of Marmara. Another was the short line from Adana to Mersina, giving access to the Mediterranean. This meant the substitution of German for French interests, while the course taken by the Anatolia-Baghdad Railway from the Bosporus to Adana shut off the possibility of an extension of the British line from Smyrna via Aidin to Egerdir (west of Konia) into the interior.

Then in 1911 the Company acquired the right to build anew port at Alexandretta, with quays, docks, bonded warehouses,etc., and to construct thence a short line of railway connecting with the Baghdad main line at Osmanieh, east of Adana. By these means the Germans acquired the control over, if not an actual monopoly of, the traffic between one of the most important ports on the eastern sea-board of the Mediterranean—a port where a trade valued at three and a half million sterling is already being done—and the vast extent of territory in Asia Minor designed to be served by the Baghdad Railway.

From Muslimiyeh, a little town on the north of Aleppo, there is a short branch connecting the Baghdad Railway with theHedjaz linefrom Damascus to Medina, which is eventually to be carried on to Mecca; while from Rayak, north of Damascus, a branch built in a south-westerly direction was to be carried to within a short distance of the Egyptian frontier.

From the junction for the Aleppo branch, the main line was to continue across the Mesopotamian plain to Baghdad (whence a branch to Khanikin, on the Persian frontier was projected) and so on to Basra, for the Persian Gulf.

Thus the scheme for what passes under the title of the Baghdad Railway embraces three separate and distinct regions of Asiatic Turkey—(1) Anatolia, (2) Syria and (3) Mesopotamia. In other words, whereas in their first phase, German aspirations for Turkish territory were based on the economic advantages of settlement in Anatolia—a region in itself large enough to accommodate all the Germans who were likely to want to settle there—in the second phase those aspirations were based on an extension of the Baghdad Railway towards Egypt in the one direction and the Persian Gulf in the other. This dual extension became the more noticeable, also, inasmuch as for the passage of the Taurus range of mountains a total of nearly 100 miles of blasting and tunnelling would have to be carried out, the cost of construction on certain sections of the line rising to between £35,000 and £40,000 a mile. The extension, therefore, was likely to be a costly business, the total length of the Baghdad Railway proper, apart from the Anatolian system, being, as projected, about 1,350 miles, ofwhich, however, only about 600 miles were, in June, 1915, available for traffic.[76]Admitting the desirability of opening up Mesopotamia to commercial and agricultural development, it may, nevertheless, be asked, were there other motives—and motives to which still greater weight might have been attached—for this expansion of the earlier designs?

Abdul Hamid's reason for granting the concession is said to have been that the extension of the line to the Persian Gulf would greatly strengthen the military position of Turkey, since it would enable her to effect a speedy transfer of troops between the Bosporus and the Gulf, or intermediate places, as against the many months that might be occupied by marching on foot across plains and mountains.

Germany's reasons for seeking to construct the Baghdad Railway, its branches and connections, to the full extent of the programme laid down, were, not simply the development of new trade routes, as certain inspired representations have sought to make the world believe, and not simply the gain of various other economic advantages, but (1) a desire to increase German influence over Turkey; to strengthen her military and other resources with a view to employing them eventually in the advancement of Germany's own interests; and to ensure the realisation of that eventual Protectorate over Turkey which would convert the country into practically a German province; and (2) the furthering of Germany's aims against Great Britain in the belief that she, too, was a decadent country whose possessions, when we could no longer defend them effectively, Germany would be the more likely to secure for herself if, with a concentration of Turkish forces to assist her, she were established within striking distance of some of the most vulnerable points of the British Empire, ready to take instant advantage of any favourable opportunity that might present itself, whether in a prospective break-up of that Empire or otherwise.

Of evidence concerning Germany's efforts to obtain increasing influence over Turkey there is no lack.

We have, in the first place, the fact that in 1882 a German military mission, of which General the Baron Colmar von der Goltz was the principal member, undertook the training of the Turkish Army according to the principles of German military science, with the result that the Turkish Army became a more efficient instrument for the attainment, not only of her own aims or purposes, but those, also, of Germany herself.

The Kaiser, although the supreme head of the Lutheran Church, and although having no Mohammedan subjects of his own, sought to pose as the champion of Mohammedans in general and the Defender oftheirFaith. During his visit to Damascus in November, 1898, he declared—"May the Sultan, may the three hundred million Mohammedans living who, scattered throughout the earth, honour in his person their Caliph, rest assured that at all times the German Kaiser will be their friend."[77]

Whenever political trouble threatened to fall upon Turkey, as the result of such occurrences as the Armenian and Macedonian atrocities or the insurrection in Crete, it was Germany who became her champion as against the other Powers of Europe.

Everything possible was done to push German trade in Turkey and to establish closer commercial relations with her. There came a time when every city of importance in the Turkish Empire was declared to be "overrun with German bankers, German clerks and German bagmen."

Not only, too, were German engineers active in seeking to get concessions for new railways, and not only were German financiers equally active in endeavouring to control existing ones, but, as Dr. Charles Sarolea points out, in his book on "The Anglo-German Problem," there are, in the agreements between the Baghdad Railway Company and the Porte, financial clauses which must ultimately place Turkey entirely at the mercy of her professed champion. "In Turkey Germany alone would rule supreme"; and the aspirations for a German Protectorate over Turkey, with the Sultan as a vassal of Germany, would then be realised.

Writing on the position as he found it in 1903, M. André Chéradame said in "La Question d'Orient":—

More and more the Germans seem to regard the land of the Turks as their personal property. All the recent German literature relating to Turkey affords proof of the tendency. An ordinary book of travels is entitled, "In Asia Minor, by German Railways." In his "Pan-Germanic Atlas" Paul Langhams gives a map of "German Railways in Asia Minor." So it is, indeed, a matter of the organised conquest of Turkey. Everywhere and in everything, Turkey is being encircled by the tentacles of the German octopus.

Coming, next, to the nature ofGermany's aims against Englandand the part which the Baghdad Railway was to play in their attainment, we have the frank confessions of Dr. Paul Rohrbach, an authority on the subject of Germany'sWeltpolitik, and a traveller who has paid four visits to Asia Minor. In "Die Baghdadbahn" (2nd. edition, 1911) he tells us that Ludwig Ross, a professor at Halle who was well acquainted with Anatolia, was the first to point to Asia Minor as a desirable place for German settlement. At the outset economic considerations were alone concerned, and in Bismarck's day Germany's relations to England played only a minor rôle in her foreign politics; but in proportion as Germany's interests were developed and her soil no longer provided sufficient food for her people or sufficient raw products for her manufactures, she had to look abroad for the supply of her surplus needs. In so doing, however, her interests abroad might be endangered by the British Fleet. Hence the necessity for a German Fleet; and, although the German sea-power might not be strong enough, by itself, to attack and conquer England, it could bring certain considerations home to English policy. Dr. Rohrbach continues:—

If it came to a matter of war with England, it would be for Germany simply a question of life and death. The possibility of a successful issue for Germany depends exclusively on one consideration, namely, on whether or not we can succeed in bringing England herself into a dangerous position. That end can in no way be obtained by means of a direct attack acrossthe North Sea; any idea of a German invasion of England being possible is a mere phantasy. One must seek, therefore, another combination in order to assail England at some vulnerable spot; and here we come to the point where the relations of Germany to Turkey, and the conditions prevailing in Turkey, are found to be of decisive importance for German foreign policy. There is, in fact, only one means possible by which Germany can resist a war of aggression by England, and that is the strengthening of Turkey.England can, from Europe, be attacked by land and mortally wounded only in one place—Egypt. If England were to lose Egypt she would lose, not only her control over the Suez Canal and her connexions with India and the Far East, but, presumably, also, her possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan Power, such as Turkey, might, in addition, have a dangerous effect on her 60,000,000 Mohammedan subjects in India, besides being to her prejudice in Afghanistan and Persia.Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until she controls a fully-developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria; until, by the extension of the Anatolian Railway to Baghdad, she can resist an attack by England on Mesopotamia; until her army has been increased and improved; and until progress has been made in her general economic and financial conditions.... The stronger Turkey becomes, the greater will be the danger for England if, in a German-English conflict, Turkey should be on the side of Germany; and, with Egypt for a prize, it certainly would be worth the while of Turkey to run the risk of fighting with Germany against England. On the other hand the mere fact that Turkey had increased in military strength, had improved her economic position, and had an adequate railway system, would make England hesitate to attack Germany; and this is the point at which Germany must aim. The policy of supporting Turkey which is now being followed by Germany has no other purpose than that of effecting a strong measure against the danger of war with England.

England can, from Europe, be attacked by land and mortally wounded only in one place—Egypt. If England were to lose Egypt she would lose, not only her control over the Suez Canal and her connexions with India and the Far East, but, presumably, also, her possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan Power, such as Turkey, might, in addition, have a dangerous effect on her 60,000,000 Mohammedan subjects in India, besides being to her prejudice in Afghanistan and Persia.

Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until she controls a fully-developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria; until, by the extension of the Anatolian Railway to Baghdad, she can resist an attack by England on Mesopotamia; until her army has been increased and improved; and until progress has been made in her general economic and financial conditions.... The stronger Turkey becomes, the greater will be the danger for England if, in a German-English conflict, Turkey should be on the side of Germany; and, with Egypt for a prize, it certainly would be worth the while of Turkey to run the risk of fighting with Germany against England. On the other hand the mere fact that Turkey had increased in military strength, had improved her economic position, and had an adequate railway system, would make England hesitate to attack Germany; and this is the point at which Germany must aim. The policy of supporting Turkey which is now being followed by Germany has no other purpose than that of effecting a strong measure against the danger of war with England.

From other directions, besides, similar testimony was forthcoming.

The SocialistLiepziger Volkszeitungdeclared in March, 1911, that "the new situation shortly to be created in Asia Minor would hasten the break-up of the British Empire, which was already beginning to totter (schwanken)."

InDie Neue Zeitfor June 2, 1911, Herr Karl Radek said:—

The strengthening of German Imperialism, the first success of which, attained with so much effort, is the Baghdad Railway; the victory of the revolutionary party in Turkey; the prospect of a modern revolutionary movement in India, which, of course, must be regarded as a very different thing from the earlier scattered risings of individual tribes; the movement towards nationalisation in Egypt; the beginning of reform in Egypt—all this has raised to an extraordinary degree the political significance of the Baghdad Railway question.The Baghdad Railway being a blow at the interests of English Imperialism, Turkey could only entrust its construction to the German Company because she knew that Germany's army and navy stood behind her, which fact makes it appear to England and Russia inadvisable to exert too sensitive a pressure upon Turkey.

The Baghdad Railway being a blow at the interests of English Imperialism, Turkey could only entrust its construction to the German Company because she knew that Germany's army and navy stood behind her, which fact makes it appear to England and Russia inadvisable to exert too sensitive a pressure upon Turkey.

In theAkademische Blätterof June 1, 1911, Professor R. Mangelsdorf, another recognised authority on German policy and politics, wrote:—

The political and military power an organised railway system will confer upon Turkey is altogether in the interest of Germany, which can only obtain a share in actual economic developments if Turkey is independent; and, besides, any attempt to increase the power and ambition of England, in any case oppressively great, is thereby effectively thwarted. To some extent, indeed, Turkey's construction of a railway system is a threat to England, for it means that an attack on the most vulnerable part of the body of England's world-empire, namely Egypt, comes well within the bounds of possibility.

These declarations and admissions render perfectly clear the reasons for Germany's professions of friendship for Turkey and for her desire that that country should become stronger and more powerful. They also leave no doubt as to the real purpose the south-western branch of the Baghdad Railway was designed to effect. Theconquest of Egyptby a combined German and Turkish force was the first object to be accomplished with the help of the railway extension to the Egyptian frontier in one direction and to Mecca in another; but Dr. Rohrbach's suggestion that the loss of Egypt by England would entail the loss, also, of her possessions in Central and East Africa has a further bearing on what has been told in the previous chapter concerning Germany's designs on Africa as a whole. The strategicalrailways in German South-West Africa; the projected extensions thereof—when circumstances permitted; the German East African lines,andthe south-western branch of the Baghdad Railway in the direction of Egypt were all to play their part in the eventual creation of a Cape-to-Cairo German-African Empire.

If we now direct our attention to the south-eastern branch of the Baghdad Railway, we are met by the repeated protests made by Germany that in desiring the construction of a railway to thePersian Gulfshe was influenced solely by commercial considerations. Against these protests, however, there are to be put various material facts which leave no room for doubt that Germany's aims in this direction were otherwise than exclusively economic, while even the economic purposes which the Baghdad Railway would, undoubtedly, have served must have eventually led to a strengthening of Germany's political position, this, in turn, helping her military and strategical purposes.

As originally planned, the port of Basra (the commercial centre of trade in Mesopotamia, situate, sixty miles from the sea, on the Shat-el-Arab—the great river formed by the junction of the Tigris and the Euphrates—and open to the shipping of the world) was to have been the terminus of the Baghdad Railway; and if commercial considerations had, indeed, been exclusively aimed at, this terminus would have answered all requirements.

No objection was, or could be, raised by the British Government to the construction of the Baghdad Railway, on Turkish territory, as far as Basra. In the later developments of the scheme, however, Germany and her Turkish partner sought to ensure the continuation of the line from its natural commercial terminus, at Basra, to a political and strategical terminus, at Koweit, on the shores of the Persian Gulf. TheAbendpost(Berlin) voiced the German view when it spoke of Koweit as "the only possible outlet to the Baghdad Railway."

But the extension of an avowedly German line of railway to Koweit would have been a direct challenge to the paramountcy which Great Britain claimed over the PersianGulf. It would have come into collision with British policy, interests and prestige in the East. It would have given the German and Turkish allies an excuse for creating at Koweit a harbour, with wharves, docks, warehouses, etc., which might be converted into a naval and military base capable of serving far different purposes than those of trade and commerce—those, namely, of a new line of advance onIndia. It would, in combination with the control already exercised by the Deutsche Bank over the railways in European Turkey, have assured to Germany the means of sending her Naval forces or her troops, together with supplies and ammunition, direct to the Persian Gulf, either to strengthen her fleet or to carry out any further designs she might cherish in the domain ofWeltpolitikas affecting the Far East. It would have meant that, as far as the head of the Persian Gulf, at least, rail-power would have rendered her less dependent on the exercise of sea-power, on her own account, and would have enabled her to neutralise, also, as far as the said Gulf, the sea-power of England.

What so fundamental a change in the strategical position might imply was well expressed by so eminent and impartial an authority as A. T. Mahan, when he said, in his "Retrospect and Prospect" (1902):—

The control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign State of considerable naval potentiality, a "fleet in being" there, based upon a strong military port, would reproduce the relations of Cadiz, Gibraltar and Malta to the Mediterranean. It would flank all the routes to the Farther East, to India and to Australia, the last two actually internal to the Empire, regarded as a political system; and, although at present Great Britain unquestionably could check such a fleet, it might well require a detachment large enough to affect seriously the general strength of her naval position.... Concession in the Persian Gulf, whether by positive formal arrangement, or by simple neglect of the local commercial interests which now underlie political and military control, will imperil Great Britain's naval situation in the Farther East, her political position in India, her commercial interests in both, and the Imperial tie between herself and Australia.

One is thus led to the conclusion that Koweit, as theterminus of the south-eastern branch of the Baghdad Railway, and within four days of Bombay, would have been as vital a point for British interests as the terminus of the south-western branch within about twelve hours of Egypt; while the possession of this further advantage by Germany would have been in full accord with the proposition laid down by Rohrbach and others as to the line of policy Germany should adopt for "bringing England herself into a dangerous position."

With a view to safeguarding British interests from any possible drifting into this position, as regards the Persian Gulf, the claim was raised, some years ago, that England should have entire control of the railway from Baghdad to Koweit. Germany did not see her way to assent to this proposal; but in 1911 she announced that she would forgo her right to construct the section from Baghdad to Basra on the understanding that this final section would be completed by Turkey. By way of compensation for the concession thus made by her to British views, she secured certain financial advantages and the right both to build the Alexandretta extension and to convert Alexandretta itself into practically a German port on the shores of the Mediterranean.

The precise value of the "concession" thus made by Germany was, however, open to considerable doubt. If she could succeed in her long-cherished aim of establishing a virtual protectorate over Turkey, then the fact that the final section of the Baghdad Railway had been built by Turkey, and not by Germany, would have become a matter of detail not likely to affect the reality of Germany's control. The line to Basra might have been nominally Turkish but the directing policy would have been German; and like conditions would have arisen had Great Britain agreed to allow Turkey—though not Germany—to continue the railway from Basra to Koweit.

In the wide scope of their aggressive purpose, the Baghdad Railway and its associated lines can best be compared with those roads which the Romans, in the days of their pride—the pride that came before their fall—built for thebetter achievement of their own aims as world-conquerors. Apart from the fact that the roads now in question are iron roads, and that the locomotive has superseded the chariot, the main difference between Roman and German is to be found in the fact that the world which the former sought to conquer was far smaller than the one coveted by the latter.

The programme ofWeltpolitikcomprised in the German schemes embraced not only countries but continents. In addition to the aspirations cherished as regards Europe, that programme aimed at the eventual annexation to the German Empire of three other Empires—the Turkish, the Indian, and a new one to be known as the German-African. It was further to secure the means of sending troops direct from Germany via Constantinople and the Baghdad Railway to the frontiers of Persia for possible operations against that country in combination with the Turkish military forces, these having first been brought under German control. The Baghdad Railway itself was, in the same way, and with like support, to afford to Germany the means of threatening Russian interests both in Persia and in Trans-Caucasia. It was to nullify England's sea power in the Mediterranean, if not, to a certain extent—through the establishment of a new Power at the gate of India—in the Far East, as well. It would, as Mahan showed, have flanked our communications with Australia, giving Germany an advantage in this direction, also, had Asia and Africa failed to satisfy her aspirations.

Regarded from the point of view of its designed effect on the destinies of nations, on the balance of political power, and on the reconstruction of the world's forces—all for the aggrandisement of a single people—the full programme must be looked upon as the most ambitious and the most unscrupulous project of world-conquest that has yet been placed on record in the history of mankind.

For its attainment, however, it clearly depended no less upon rail-transport than upon force of arms; and in this respect it represented Germany's greatest attempt to apply, in practice, that principle of rail-power to which she had devoted eight decades of inquiry, trial and organisation.

FOOTNOTES:[75]"Babylonien, das reichste Land in der Vorzeit und das lohnendste Kolonisationsfeld für die Gegenwart." 128 pp. Heidelberg, 1886.[76]Important extensions have been carried out since.[77]Dr. Dillon, inThe Contemporary Review, April, 1906.

[75]"Babylonien, das reichste Land in der Vorzeit und das lohnendste Kolonisationsfeld für die Gegenwart." 128 pp. Heidelberg, 1886.

[76]Important extensions have been carried out since.

[77]Dr. Dillon, inThe Contemporary Review, April, 1906.

As will have been gathered from the preceding chapters, a prolonged period of consideration, preparation and application in many different countries throughout the world, prior to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, had established certain definite facts and fundamental principles in regard to the relations of railways to warfare in general. These may now be brought together and summarised in four groups or divisions, namely, (A) Advantages; (B) Conditions Essential to Efficiency; (C) Limitations in Usefulness; and (D) Drawbacks and Disadvantages.

Assuming (1) the provision, in advance, of a system or systems of railways capable of meeting all the requirements of the military situation on the outbreak of war, or (2) the possibility of constructing military railways during the progress of hostilities, such railways should permit of—

A mobilisation of troops and their concentration at the frontier, or at the seat of war, with a speed that was impossible under earlier conditions.

Simultaneous use of different routes across the national territory for concentration either on the frontier or at a point some distance therefrom where the concentration can be completed without fear of interruption by the enemy.

Sudden invasion of neighbouring territory by troops sent in a succession of rapidly-following trains direct from various points in the interior of the country where they might have been concentrated without the knowledge of the enemy, this procedure being adopted in preference tocollecting at the frontier in advance a force on such a scale as would disclose prematurely the intentions entertained.

The possibility of using promptly, for these purposes, the full strength of the country's available resources—the railway lines in the interior having already been adapted thereto, as well as those on or directly connecting with the frontier—with a proportionate increase of the offensive and defensive power of the State.

The supplementing of increased mobility and celerity by decreased strain on the physical powers of the troops and the avoidance of such inevitable reduction in their numbers as would result from the trials and fatigues of prolonged marches by road (in combination with the carrying of kits, etc.), should railway lines not be available.

A further consequent increase in the fighting strength of the army.

The possible attainment of the power of initiative through an early concentration of large forces at points of strategic importance either on national or on enemy's territory.[78]

The carrying out of strategical combinations on a scale or of a character which would formerly have been impracticable.

Employment of railways for tactical purposes during the progress of a war, including therein (a) movement of troops from one part of the theatre of war to another, whether with a view to effecting big changes of front or otherwise; (b) employment of the same Army Corps on different fronts in succession, their transfer being effected in the briefest possible interval of time; (c) the rapid bringing up of reinforcements at a critical moment to some position exposed to overpowering attack which might otherwise be lost; (d) surprise attacks on the enemy; (e) the throwing of great masses of troops on distant points; (f) strengthening weak places in the fighting line; (g) strengthening threatened forts by means of troops, guns, munitions or supplies; (h) relief of invested fortresses, and (i) retirement by rail—when circumstances permit—of troops after defeat.

Control of a line of rail communication between the base and the strategic centre of operations, facilitating the enormous amount of transport in both directions which must be kept up in the rear of the army, and for which the elements of speed, safety and regularity may be of vital importance.

The possibility, thanks to railways, of regarding the whole interior of the national territory as a base for the supply of requirements at the front, dependence having no longer to be placed on a base established in one particular district with its restricted range of possible supplies and its collection of magazines, stores, workshops, transport parks, etc., protected by fortresses, entrenched camps, or other means of defence.

The establishment of supplementary, sectional or advanced bases along the line of communication, with railway services so arranged that supplies can be dispatched daily in such regulated quantities, and to such points, as will serve the immediate needs of the army in the field, without risk either of shortage or of excess.

Avoidance, under these conditions, of congestion of the railway lines in the immediate rear of the army by trains or loaded wagons containing a redundancy of supplies which (a) cannot be unloaded, (b) restrict the use of the lines for other purposes, and (c) might have to be abandoned to the enemy in the event of a sudden retreat.

Material benefits from the substitution of rail for road transport of food, etc., by reason of (a) greater speed and regularity; (b) less risk of deterioration from exposure to weather, and other causes; (c) decreased cost of transport as compared with earlier conditions involving the employment of a greater number of drivers, escort, guards, horses and road vehicles; and (d) the arrival at destination of the full quantities dispatched, the need for the consumptionof an appreciable proportionen routeby men and animals in a convoying wagon train, carrying supplies for long distances by road, being non-existent.

Reduction in the need for field ovens and other paraphernalia of the army cook, since much of the food required—bread, for example—can be prepared in cities or elsewhere at a distant base and forwarded regularly by rail.

Freedom, more or less complete, from the once prevalent obligation on the part of an advancing army that it should "live upon the country"—a condition which the enormous increase in the size of armies to-day would render impossible of fulfilment, even assuming that the people of the country invaded had not withdrawn live stock, vehicles and food supplies on their retirement before the invader.

In addition to this provision for the wants of an army in its advance into hostile country, the safeguarding of the troops against the risk of their becoming a band of demoralized marauders, wandering over a wide area to seek and appropriate food whenever they can find it—as was the case, for instance, in the Napoleonic wars—the maintenance of discipline and the continued usefulness of the troops as a concentrated body for the military purposes in view being further assured when both men and leaders are relieved of anxiety as to the continuance of their supplies.

The conduct of war at a great distance from the base by reason of the facilities offered for the forwarding alike of troops, reinforcements, supplies and military materials, the value of even a single line of railway in the achievement of this purpose having been incontestably established.

Defence of frontiers by strategical railways which may, also, become available for general use.

Investment of cities or fortresses in occupied territory when, owing to the lack or the deficiency of food supplies in the surrounding country, the troops engaged are mainly if not entirely dependent on those brought to them by rail from their own base.[79]

Victualling of cities before, and their revictualling after, investment.[80]

Extension of lines of communication by means of quickly-constructed narrow-gauge siege railways to be operated by motor traction, animal power, or otherwise, including therein trench tramways for (a) removal of wounded men from the trenches; (b) transport of siege guns to trenches; and (c) supplying ammunition to battery.

Transport of heavy siege guns, mortars, ammunition and other materials of a size or weight that would render impracticable their conveyance, whether singly or in the aggregate, along ordinary roads, the railway offering, in this respect, facilities for ponderous transport comparable to those of the steamship, with the further advantage of being able, in most instances, to take the guns, etc., to the spot or to the locality where they are wanted.

Material aid given to expeditions to countries otherwise devoid of means of communication, by the construction of military railways.

Employment of armoured trains which, apart from their usefulness in defending railways against attack, may, as movable fortresses, render important service in the operations against the enemy.

Removal of sick and wounded from the theatre of war, and the ensuring of their distribution among hospitals in the rear or throughout the interior, thus (a) avoiding alike the embarrassment to the army and the many dangers and evils that would result from their remaining in overcrowded hospitals on or near the battle-field; (b) giving the men a better chance of effecting a speedy recovery and returning soon to the ranks; and (c) adding to the fighting strength of the army by the combination of these two advantages.

Facilities for giving a short leave to officers and men who, though neither sick nor wounded, have been so far affected by their strenuous exertions that they stand in need of a rest, or change, for which they will fight all the better subsequently.

Dispatch of prisoners of war into the interior by trains which have brought reinforcements or supplies, the army thus being speedily relieved of what might otherwise be a hindrance to its operations.

Return of material no longer wanted at the front and constituting impedimenta of which it is desirable to get rid as soon as possible.

Conveyance into the interior of "trophies of war"—including plunder—taken from captured towns or cities.

Retirement of troops from occupied territory on the declaration of peace.

In the matter of railway construction there should be—

i. Uniformity of gauge, together with physical connections between the different systems or sections, in order (a) that the locomotives and rolling stock on any one line can be used for military transport on any other; (b) that mobilisation, concentration and the forwarding of supplies and military material can be facilitated by the running of through trains from any probable or possible point of dispatch; and (c) that troops can readily be transferred from one front, or from one part of the coast, to another for the purpose either of attack or of defence.

ii. Lines linking up the interior of the country with the frontier, with the coast, or with principal ports by different routes, transverse lines connecting them, in turn, one with another.

iii. Double track for all lines leading direct to the frontier.

iv. In the case of single-track lines crossing continents or otherwise, a liberal provision of passing places each capableof accommodating the longest troop train likely to be run.

v. On all lines, and at all important stations, a sufficiency of sidings, with provision of, or the possibility of providing speedily, all such facilities as may be needed for the prompt and efficient handling of military transports whenever the occasion should arise.

Preparations in advance should include—

i. The carrying out of a scheme of organisation based on recognition of the following principles:—(a) That, while the railway is an instrument capable of rendering great and even incalculable services in the conduct of war, the working of it is a highly-skilled business only to be entrusted to those possessed of the necessary experience; (b) that interference with such working on the part of military officers not possessing the requisite technical knowledge of the details and limitations of railway operation may result in chaos and disaster; (c) that railwaymen, in turn, are not likely to be fully acquainted with the technicalities of military conditions and requirements, and should not, in any case, be left with the responsibility of having to decide between the possibly conflicting demands of various military authorities; (d) that, for these reasons, there should be co-ordination of the military and the technical railway elements, operating throughout the whole scheme of organisation in its manifold details, avoiding conflict of authority, ensuring harmony of working, and offering the fullest guarantee that all military requirements will be met so far as the capacity of the railway, together with a due regard for safe and efficient operation, will allow; and (e) that effect can best be given to these various conditions by the appointment of intermediary bodies which, representing the dual elements, shall alone have power to give directions, or to make demands, in respect to military rail-transport during the continuance of war.

ii. Collection of data concerning the physical character, resources and transport capabilities of the railways both in the national territory and in any other country to which the war operations may extend.

iii. Study of all movements of troops, etc., likely to benecessary on the outbreak of war; the preparation of special time-tables for the running of troop trains, etc., and the working out of all essential details respecting military transport in general.

iv. Creation and training of bodies of Railway Troops qualified to undertake the construction, destruction, repair and operation of railways in time of war.

The usefulness of railways in war is limited by the following considerations, among others:—

Railways are "inferior to ships in power of simultaneously transporting heavy loads" (Von der Goltz). For this reason an overland route to India could never compete, in respect to military transport, with the sea route via the Suez Canal. Such overland route, also, passing through foreign countries, would be especially liable to attack and interruption. Where, however, the overland route goes entirely through national territory (as in the case of the Trans-Siberian Railway), and when the questions of time and safety, in regard to an alternative sea route, suggest possible disadvantages, railways will be preferred to ships in spite of the said inferiority.

Railways are inferior to roads in so far as, like rivers and canals, they are on fixed spots. Troops depending on them are thus able to move only in the direction in which lines have been or can quickly be laid, whereas if they went by road they might have a greater choice of alternative routes.

For these reasons the choice of the zone of concentration or of the "decisive points" may depend less to-day on political, military or geographical reasons (as in the Napoleonic wars) than on the direction, extent and capacity of the available railways.

Great masses of troops can be entrained only at stations where facilities for their so doing have been prepared in advance. The provision of these facilities is even more necessary in the case of Cavalry or Artillery than in that of Infantry. Hence the movement of considerable bodies of troops may be restricted to certain lines, and their entrainmentor detrainment even to certain large stations. In the case of road marching these restrictions would not apply.

Vehicles specially constructed for the purpose can alone be used on railways. Any deficiency in their supply must needs cause delay.

During the time the troops are travelling by railway their power of resisting attack is much more restricted than it would be if they were marching by road, they can do little or nothing to protect the railway lines, while if the enemy can only get to the railway he may be in a position to prevent the train from continuing its journey, and take the troops in it at a disadvantage.

For these reasons, among others, troop movements by rail at the theatre of war, and especially in the enemy's country, are attended by a degree of risk which may render it desirable to abandon the use of the railway for the time being.

Railways are especially liable to destruction by the enemy, and, although the arrangements made in advance may permit of speedy repairs or reconstruction, the interruption of traffic for even a day or half a day may be a matter of grave importance during the concentration of the army or at some critical moment.

Destructions of line carried out by a retreating force, in order to delay pursuit by the enemy, will be to the disadvantage of that force when, after having driven back the enemy, it would itself make use of the line it had rendered unserviceable.

Dependence on the railway for the transport of considerable bodies of troops on short journeys—say for twenty, twenty-five or thirty miles—is rendered inexpedient by the fact that, when allowance is made for the time likely to be taken, not only on the journey, but in the assembling at the station, in the entraining and detraining (perhaps at some place devoid of adequate platform or siding accommodation), and in the march from the arrival station to destination, it may well be found that the troops could cover the distance in less time by road, apart from the consideration, suggested above, as to their being in a better position, when marching,to resist attack. Experts in all countries have studied this question with a view to deciding, on the basis of their national conditions, within what limit it would be better for troops to march by road in preference to going by rail.

For reasons akin to those here stated, supplemented by the recent great expansion of motor transport, less has been heard of late concerning the proposed construction in this country of strategical railways along a coast-line remarkable for its sinuosities, and presenting, therefore, an exceptional position from the point of view of coast railways for purely defensive purposes.

As regards long-distance journeys, whilst armies marching by road have often been materially reduced in proportions by the number of men falling out owing to lameness, exhaustion, or other causes, those who reached the theatre of war, representing "the survival of the fittest," were better able to endure the trials and fatigues of the subsequent campaign than if they could have made the journey by rail under conditions involving no strain, but affording them no such exercise and strengthening of their physical powers.[81]

Experience has further shown that exceptionally long railway journeys may have a prejudicial effect upon troops from the point of view, also, of maintenance of discipline.[82]

The services rendered by railways in war relate much more to strategy than to tactics. Great masses of troops and munitions, brought from all parts of the interior, may be conveyed readily and safely by rail to particular points in the theatre of war; but the possibility of effecting their transport by rail from one point to another on the battle-field when the opposing forces are in actual contact is subject to many restrictions and constitutes a much more difficult undertaking.

The imperative need for guarding a long line of railway communications, more especially in occupied territory, may lead to the withdrawal of a considerable number of men from the main army, weakening the strength of the available fighting force proportionately.

While, notwithstanding the conditions to be observed and the limitations to be experienced, the balance of advantage conferred by railways on the conduct of war may appear so pronounced, from a military and a political point of view, there is a darker side to the story, as regards the world at large, which must also be taken into account.

If railways have increased the power of defending a country against invasion they have, also, increased enormously the power of aggression at the command of an invader.

They offer vastly greater facilities to military Powers for the making of sudden attacks on neighbouring countries—themselves, it may be, in a state of more or less unpreparedness.

They afford the opportunity for overwhelming weaker Powers by means of armies mobilised and concentrated in the interior and poured on to or across the frontier in an endless succession of trains following one another with such rapidity that the initial movement may, in some instances, be carried out within the short space of twenty-four hours.

They permit of the prosecution of war at distances which, but for the means offered for military transport by rail, would render war impracticable.

They allow of war being carried on between a number of nations at one and the same time, thus spreading the area over which the conflicts of to-day may extend.

They encourage the cherishing of designs of world-power and dreams of universal conquest.

They have added to the horrors of war by facilitating the transport and the employment of the most terrible engines of war.

They have rendered possible the carrying off of plunder from an occupied territory to an extent which would be impossible if the invaders had to depend on ordinary road vehicles for their means of transport.

They have brought fresh risks and dangers upon civil populations, the maintenance of lines of rail communication being a matter of such paramount importance to an invader that the severest measures may be adopted by him towards the community in general as a means of terrorising them and ensuring the security of the railway lines.

What, in effect, count as "advantages" in one direction may be the gravest of disadvantages in another.

Such, for attack or for defence, for good or for evil, is the nature, and such are the possibilities, of that rail-power in warfare which, after eighty years of continuous evolution, was, in the War of the Nations imposed on mankind in 1914, to undergo a development and an application on a wider, more impressive, and more terrible scale than the world had ever seen before.

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