“Our actions in the basin of the Ya-lu, and our behaviour in Manchuria, have excited in Japan a feeling of hostility which, upon our taking any incautious step, may lead to war…. State Secretary Bezobrazoff’s plan of operations, if carried out, will inevitably lead to a violation of the agreement that we made with China on April 8, 1902, and will also, as inevitably, cause complications with Japan…. The actions ofState Secretary Bezobrazoff toward the end of last, and at the beginning of this, year have already practically caused a violation of the treaty with China and a breach with Japan…. At the request of Bezobrazoff, Admiral Alexeieff sent a force of mounted rifles to Sha-ho-tzu (on the Ya-lu), and kept a body of troops in Feng-huang-cheng. These measures put a stop to the evacuation of the province of Mukden…. Among other participants in the Ya-lu enterprise who have given trouble to Admiral Alexeieff is Acting State Councillor Balasheff, who has a disposition quite as warlike as that of Bezobrazoff. If Admiral Alexeieff had not succeeded in stopping a despatch from Balasheff to Captain Bodisco with regard to ‘catching all the Japanese,’ ‘punishing them publicly,’ and ‘taking action with volleys,’ there would have been a bloody episode on the Ya-lu before this. Unfortunately, it is liable to happen even now any day…. During my stay in Japan, I had opportunities of seeing with what nervous apprehension the people regarded our activity on the Ya-lu, how they exaggerated our intentions, and how they were preparing to defend by force their Korean interests. Our active operations there have convinced them that Russia is now about to proceed to the second part of her Far Eastern programme—that, having swallowed Manchuria, she is preparing to gulp down Korea. The excitement in Japan is such that if Admiral Alexeieff had not shown wise caution—if he had allowed all the proposals of Bezobrazoff to be put in train—we should probably be at war with Japan now. There is no reason whatever to suppose that a few officers and reservists, cutting timber on the Ya-lu, will be of any use in a war with Japan.Their value is trifling in comparison with the danger that the timber enterprise creates by keeping up the excitement among the Japanese people…. Suffice it to say that, in the opinion of Admiral Alexeieff, and of our Ministers in Peking, Seoul, and Tokio, the timber concession may be the cause of hostilities, and in this opinion I fully concur.”
“Our actions in the basin of the Ya-lu, and our behaviour in Manchuria, have excited in Japan a feeling of hostility which, upon our taking any incautious step, may lead to war…. State Secretary Bezobrazoff’s plan of operations, if carried out, will inevitably lead to a violation of the agreement that we made with China on April 8, 1902, and will also, as inevitably, cause complications with Japan…. The actions ofState Secretary Bezobrazoff toward the end of last, and at the beginning of this, year have already practically caused a violation of the treaty with China and a breach with Japan…. At the request of Bezobrazoff, Admiral Alexeieff sent a force of mounted rifles to Sha-ho-tzu (on the Ya-lu), and kept a body of troops in Feng-huang-cheng. These measures put a stop to the evacuation of the province of Mukden…. Among other participants in the Ya-lu enterprise who have given trouble to Admiral Alexeieff is Acting State Councillor Balasheff, who has a disposition quite as warlike as that of Bezobrazoff. If Admiral Alexeieff had not succeeded in stopping a despatch from Balasheff to Captain Bodisco with regard to ‘catching all the Japanese,’ ‘punishing them publicly,’ and ‘taking action with volleys,’ there would have been a bloody episode on the Ya-lu before this. Unfortunately, it is liable to happen even now any day…. During my stay in Japan, I had opportunities of seeing with what nervous apprehension the people regarded our activity on the Ya-lu, how they exaggerated our intentions, and how they were preparing to defend by force their Korean interests. Our active operations there have convinced them that Russia is now about to proceed to the second part of her Far Eastern programme—that, having swallowed Manchuria, she is preparing to gulp down Korea. The excitement in Japan is such that if Admiral Alexeieff had not shown wise caution—if he had allowed all the proposals of Bezobrazoff to be put in train—we should probably be at war with Japan now. There is no reason whatever to suppose that a few officers and reservists, cutting timber on the Ya-lu, will be of any use in a war with Japan.Their value is trifling in comparison with the danger that the timber enterprise creates by keeping up the excitement among the Japanese people…. Suffice it to say that, in the opinion of Admiral Alexeieff, and of our Ministers in Peking, Seoul, and Tokio, the timber concession may be the cause of hostilities, and in this opinion I fully concur.”
After quoting the above extracts from my report, M. Roslavleff says:
“Thus warmly, eloquently, and shrewdly did Kuropatkin condemn the Ya-lu adventure, and thus clearly did he see on the political horizon the ruinous consequences that it would have for Russia. But why did this bold and clear-sighted censor not protest against the decision of the Port Arthur council? Why, after making a few caustic remarks about Bezobrazoff, did he sign the paper which put the Ya-lu adventure under the protection of Russian troops, and thus stop the evacuation of Manchuria? Why did not the other members, who shared Kuropatkin’s opinion as to the great danger of Bezobrazoff’s adventurous schemes, and expected a rupture with Japan to be imminent, prevent, on the authority of those July councils at Port Arthur, Bezobrazoff’s political and economic escapades? Why did they, on the contrary, with Kuropatkin, put their signatures to a document which admitted Bezobrazoff’s enterprises as useful Government undertakings, ratify a treacherous policy in China, Korea, and Japan, and so lay the first stone in the monument of indelible shame erected by the war? Why? Simply because at that time everybody was afraid of Bezobrazoff.”
“Thus warmly, eloquently, and shrewdly did Kuropatkin condemn the Ya-lu adventure, and thus clearly did he see on the political horizon the ruinous consequences that it would have for Russia. But why did this bold and clear-sighted censor not protest against the decision of the Port Arthur council? Why, after making a few caustic remarks about Bezobrazoff, did he sign the paper which put the Ya-lu adventure under the protection of Russian troops, and thus stop the evacuation of Manchuria? Why did not the other members, who shared Kuropatkin’s opinion as to the great danger of Bezobrazoff’s adventurous schemes, and expected a rupture with Japan to be imminent, prevent, on the authority of those July councils at Port Arthur, Bezobrazoff’s political and economic escapades? Why did they, on the contrary, with Kuropatkin, put their signatures to a document which admitted Bezobrazoff’s enterprises as useful Government undertakings, ratify a treacherous policy in China, Korea, and Japan, and so lay the first stone in the monument of indelible shame erected by the war? Why? Simply because at that time everybody was afraid of Bezobrazoff.”
Such accusations, which have had wide publicity, require an explanation.
The council held at Port Arthur, in June, 1903, was called for the purpose of finding, if possible, some means of settling the Manchurian question without lowering the dignity of Russia. There were present at this council, in addition to Admiral Alexeieff and myself, Acting State Councillor Lessar, Russian Minister in China; Chamberlain Pavloff, Russian Minister in Seoul; Major-General Vogak; State Councillor Bezobrazoff; and M. Plancon, an officer of the diplomatic service. We were all acquainted with the wish of the Emperor, that our enterprises in the Far East should not lead to war, and we had to devise means of carrying the Imperial will into effect. With regard to these means there were differences of opinion, but upon fundamental questions there was complete agreement. Among these were—
1.The Manchurian Question.—On July 3 the council expressed its judgment with regard to this question as follows: “In view of the extraordinary difficulties and enormous administrative expenses that the annexation of Manchuria would involve, all the members of the council agree that it is, in principle, undesirable; and this conclusion applies not only to Manchuria as a whole, but also to its northern part.”
2.The Korean Question.—On July 2 the council decided that the occupation of the wholeof Korea, or even of the northern part, would be unprofitable to Russia, and therefore undesirable. Our activity in the basin of the Ya-lu, moreover, might give Japan reason to fear a seizure by us of the northern part of the Peninsula. On July 7 the council called upon Acting State Councillor Balasheff, and Lieutenant-Colonel Madritoff of the General Staff, to appear before it, and explain the status of the Ya-lu enterprise. From their testimony it appeared that the concern was legally organized, the company holding permits from the Chinese authorities to cut timber on the northern side, and a concession from the Korean Government covering the southern side of the Ya-lu. Although the enterprise had lost, to a great extent, its provocative character after the conclusions of the St. Petersburg council of April 18, 1903, became known in the province of Kuan-tung, its operations could not yet be regarded as purely commercial. On July 7 the company had in its employ 9 senior agents, of whom one was an officer of the army; 97 or 98 reservists, who went down the river in charge of rafts from Sha-ho-tzu to its mouth; some 200 Chinamen (from Chifu), and about 900 Koreans. Its affairs were managed by Lieutenant-Colonel Madritoff, although that officer was not officially in the company’s service.
After consideration of all the facts put forward, the members of the council came to the unanimous conclusion that, “although the Ya-lu Timber Company really appears to be a commercial organization, its employment of military officers of the active list to do work that has military importance undoubtedly gives to it a politico-military aspect.” The council, therefore, in order to deprive Japan of a pretext for looking upon the Timber Company as an enterprise of a military-political character, acknowledged the necessity of “at once taking measures to give the affair an exclusively commercial character, to exclude from it officers of the regular army, and to commit the management of the timber business to persons not employed in the service of the Empire.” On July 7 these conclusions were signed by all the members of the council, including State Councillor Bezobrazoff. I declined to go personally into any of the economic questions concerning Manchuria, and said that the proper person to do this was the Minister of Finance. State Secretary Bezobrazoff was asked to work out the following points with the assistance of experts selected by him:
1. “What action should be taken and what economic policy should be followed in Manchuria in order to reduce the deficit on the Eastern Chinese Railway.”
2. “To what extent the measures for increasing the revenue of the line and the economic policy in Manchuria, recommended by the experts, would affect the economic situation of the Pri-Amur region.”
Another duty entrusted to this sub-committee was the compilation of a list of all the private enterprises which were being carried on in Manchuria. At the last meeting of the council on July 11 the sub-committee’s report on the economic question was read out, and it was decided “to take note of its conclusions without discussion, and to attach them to the council’s proceedings.” Admiral Alexeieff suggested that to this should be added the words, “so that when considering the question of the further economic development in Manchuria, we should endeavour not to invest more State moneys in it.” This addition was supported by all the members of the council, excepting State Councillor Bezobrazoff, who did not feel himself able to offer an opinion on the subject.[64]No other conclusions on economic questions generally or any other enterprises in Manchuria were signed by the members of the council at Port Arthur, and matters of an economic nature were not looked into.
It is evident, from the facts above set forth,that the statement in which M. Roslavleff charges the members of the council with signing minutes of proceedings that gave the Bezobrazoff adventure a place among useful Imperial enterprises is fiction. Upon what it was based we do not know. The duty of immediately carrying into effect the conclusions of the council—to put an end immediately to the military-political activity of the timber enterprise on the Ya-lu—rested upon Admiral Alexeieff, by virtue of the authority given to him. The thing that he had to do, first of all, and that he was fully empowered to do, was to recall our force from Feng-huang-cheng, and the mounted rifles from the Ya-lu. Why this was not done I do not know. Personally, I did not allow Lieutenant-Colonel Madritoff, of the General Staff, to continue his connection with the Timber Company, and I may add that he and other officers who had associated themselves with the enterprise did so without my knowledge. But no matter how effective might be the measures taken by Admiral Alexeieff to give the Ya-lu enterprise a purely commercial character, I still feared that this undertaking, which had obtained world-wide notoriety, would continue to have important political significance. In my report of August 6, 1903, which was presented to the Emperor upon my return from Japan, I therefore expressed the opinion that an immediateend must be put to the operations of the Timber Company, and that the whole business should be sold to foreigners. The thought that our interests in Korea, which were of trifling importance, might bring us into conflict with Japan caused me incessant anxiety during my stay in the latter country. On June 26, 1903, when I was passing through the Sea of Japan on my way to Nagasaki, I made the following note in my diary:
“If I were asked to express an opinion, from a military point of view, upon the comparative importance of Russian interests in different parts of the Empire, and on different frontiers, I should put my judgment into the form of a pyramidal diagram, placing the least important of our interests at the top and the most important at the bottom, as follows:Pyramid of interests“This diagram shows clearly where the principal energies of the Ministry of War should hereafter be concentrated, and in what direction in future Russia’s main powers and resources should be turned. The interests that lie at the foundation of our position as a nation are: (1) The defence of the territorial integrity of the Empire against the Powers of the Triple Alliance; and (2) the employment of the forces of all our military districts for the preservation of internal peace and order. In comparison with these tasks all the others have secondary importance. The diagram shows, furthermore, that our interests in the Pri-Amur region must be regarded as more important than our interests in Manchuria, and that the latter must take precedence of our interests in Korea. I am afraid, however, that, for a time at least, our national activity will be based on affairs in the Far East, and, if so, the pyramid will then be turned bottom upwards, and made to stand on its narrow Korean top. But such a structure on such a foundation will fall. Columbus solved the problem of making an egg stand on its end by breaking the egg. Must we, in order to make our pyramid stand on its narrow Korean end, break the Russian Empire?”
“If I were asked to express an opinion, from a military point of view, upon the comparative importance of Russian interests in different parts of the Empire, and on different frontiers, I should put my judgment into the form of a pyramidal diagram, placing the least important of our interests at the top and the most important at the bottom, as follows:
Pyramid of interests
“This diagram shows clearly where the principal energies of the Ministry of War should hereafter be concentrated, and in what direction in future Russia’s main powers and resources should be turned. The interests that lie at the foundation of our position as a nation are: (1) The defence of the territorial integrity of the Empire against the Powers of the Triple Alliance; and (2) the employment of the forces of all our military districts for the preservation of internal peace and order. In comparison with these tasks all the others have secondary importance. The diagram shows, furthermore, that our interests in the Pri-Amur region must be regarded as more important than our interests in Manchuria, and that the latter must take precedence of our interests in Korea. I am afraid, however, that, for a time at least, our national activity will be based on affairs in the Far East, and, if so, the pyramid will then be turned bottom upwards, and made to stand on its narrow Korean top. But such a structure on such a foundation will fall. Columbus solved the problem of making an egg stand on its end by breaking the egg. Must we, in order to make our pyramid stand on its narrow Korean end, break the Russian Empire?”
Upon my return from Japan I showed the above diagram to M. de Witte, who agreed that it was correct. Notwithstanding the disastrous conclusion to the recent war, we did not adopt Columbus’s method. Russia is not yet broken; but undoubtedly, now that the war is over, the above diagram must be considerably altered.
The establishment of the Viceroyalty in the Far East was for me a complete surprise. On August 15, 1903, I asked the Emperor to relieve me of my duty as Minister of War, and after the great manœuvres I was granted long leave of absence, of which I availed myself, expecting that my place would be filled by the appointment of some other person. In September, 1903, the state of affairs in the Far East began to be alarming, and Admiral Alexeieff was definitely ordered to take all necessary measures to avoid war. The Emperor expressed his wish to this effect with firmness, and did not, in any way, limit or restrict the concessions that should be made in order to avoid a rupture with Japan. All that had to be done was to find a method of making these concessions as little injurious as possible to Russian interests. During my stay in Japan, I became satisfied that the Japanese Government was disposed to consider Japanese and Korean affairs calmly, with a view to arriving at an agreement upon the basis of mutual concessions. The Emperor’s definitely expressed desire that war should not be allowed to take place had, for a short time, a tranquillizing effect on Far Eastern affairs. In view of the disturbing situation in the Far East, I cut short my leave of absence, and, in reporting to the Emperor for duty, I gave this threatening state of affairs as my reason for returning. OnOctober 23, 1903, the Emperor made the following marginal note upon my letter: “The alarm in the Far East is apparently beginning to subside.” In October I recommended that the garrison at Vladivostok should be strengthened, but permission to reinforce it was not given. Meanwhile there was really no re-establishment of tranquillity in the Far East, and our relations with Japan and China were becoming more and more involved. On October 28, 1903, I presented to the Emperor a special report on the Manchurian question, in which I showed that, in order to avoid complications with China and a rupture with Japan, we must put an end to our military occupation of Southern Manchuria, and confine our activity and our administrative supervision to the northern part of that territory.
At the time when this report was presented, and later—in November—the negotiations that Admiral Alexeieff was carrying on with Japan not only made no progress, but became more critical, the Admiral still believing that to show a yielding disposition would only make matters worse.
Bearing in mind the clearly expressed will of the Emperor that all necessary measures should be taken to avoid war, and not expecting favourable results from Alexeieff’s negotiations, I submitted to His Majesty, on December 6, 1903, a second memorandum on the Manchurian question,in which I proposed that we should restore Port Arthur and the province of Kuan-tung to China, and sell the southern branch of the Eastern Chinese Railway, securing, in lieu thereof, certain special rights in the northern part of Manchuria. In substance, this proposition was that we should admit the untimeliness of our attempt to get an outlet on the Pacific, and abandon it altogether. The sacrifice might seem a heavy one to make, but I showed the necessity for it by emphasizing two important considerations. In the first place, by surrendering Port Arthur (which had been taken away from the Japanese), and by giving up Southern Manchuria (with the Ya-lu enterprise), we should escape the danger of a rupture with Japan and China; in the second place, we should avoid the possibility of internal disturbances in European Russia. A war with Japan would be extremely unpopular, and would increase the feeling of dissatisfaction with the ruling authorities.
At the end of this memorandum occurred the following passage:
“The economic interests of Russia in the Far East are negligible. We have as yet, thank God, no overproduction in manufactures, because our domestic markets are not yet glutted. There may be some export of articles from our factories and foundries, but it is largely bounty-fed,and will cease—or nearly cease—when such artificial encouragement is withheld. Russia, therefore, has not yet arrived at the pitiable necessity of waging war in order to obtain markets for her products. As for our other interests in that quarter, the success or failure of a few coal or timber enterprises in Manchuria and Korea is not a matter of sufficient importance to justify the risk of war. The railway-lines built through Manchuria cannot change the situation quickly, and the hope that these lines will have world-wide importance as arteries of international commerce is not likely to be soon realized. Travellers, mails, tea and possibly some other merchandise will go over them, but the great masses of heavy international freight, which alone can give such importance to a railway, must still go by sea, on account of the heavy railway rates. Such is not the case, however, with local freight to supply local needs. This the railroad—and especially the southern branch—will carry in increasing amount, thus deriving most of its revenue, and, at the same time, stimulating the growth of the country, and, in Southern Manchuria particularly, benefiting the Chinese population. But if we do not take special measures to direct even local freight to Dalny, that port is likely to suffer from the competition of Newchuang. Port Arthur has no value for Russia as the defence and terminus of a railway, unless that railway is part of an international transit route. The southern branch of the Eastern Chinese road has commercially only—or chiefly—local importance, and Russia does not need to protect it by means so costly as the fortifications of Port Arthur, a fleet of warships, and a garrison of 30,000 men. It thusappears that the retention of a forward position in Kuan-tung is no more supported by economic than it is by political and military considerations. What, then, are the interests that may involve us in war with Japan and China? Are such interests important enough to justify the great sacrifices that war will demand?* * * * *“The Russian people are powerful, and their faith in Divine Providence, as well as their devotion to their Tsar and country, is unshaken. We may trust, therefore, that if Russia is destined to undergo the trial of war at the beginning of the twentieth century, she will come out of it with victory and glory. But she will have to make terrible sacrifices—sacrifices that may long retard the natural growth of the Empire. In the wars that we waged in the early years of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the enemy invaded our territory, and we fought for our very existence—marched forth in defence of our country and died for faith, Tsar, and Fatherland. If, in the early years of the twentieth century, war breaks out as the result of Far Eastern complications, the Russian people and the Russian army will execute the will of their monarch with as much devotion and self-sacrifice as ever, and will give up their lives and property for the sake of attaining complete victory; but they will have no intelligent comprehension of the objects for which the war is waged. For that reason there will be no such exaltation of spirit, no such outburst of patriotism, as that which accompanied the wars that we fought either in self-defence or for objects dear to the hearts of the people.“We are now passing through a critical period.Internal enemies, aiming at the destruction of the dearest and most sacred foundations of life, are invading even the ranks of our army. Large groups of the population have become dissatisfied, or mentally unsettled, and disorders of various sorts—mostly created by revolutionary propaganda—are increasing in frequency. Cases in which troops have to be called out to deal with such disorders are much more common than they were even a short time ago. Secret revolutionary publications directed against the Government are being more frequently found, even in the barracks. … We must hope, however, that this evil has not yet taken deep root in Russian soil, and that by strict and wise measures it may be eradicated. If Russia were attacked from without, the people, with patriotic fervour, would undoubtedly repudiate the false teaching of the revolutionary propaganda, and show themselves as ready to answer the call of their revered monarch, and to defend their Tsar and country, as they were in the early years of the eighteenth and particularly in the nineteenth century. If, however, they are asked to make great sacrifices in order to carry on a war whose objects are not clearly understood by them, the leaders of the anti-Government party will take advantage of the opportunity to spread sedition. Thus there will be introduced a new factor which, if we decide on war in the Far East, we must take into account. The sacrifices and dangers that we have experienced, or that we anticipate, as results of the position we have taken in the Far East, ought to be a warning to us when we dream of getting an outlet on the warm waters of the Indian Ocean at Chahbar.[65]It is already evidentthat the British are preparing to meet us there. The building of a railroad across Persia, the construction of a defended port and the maintenance of a fleet, etc., will simply be a repetition of our experience with the Eastern Chinese Railway and Port Arthur. In the place of Port Arthur we shall have Chahbar, and instead of war with Japan, we shall have a still more unnecessary and still more terrible war with Great Britain.“In view of the considerations above set forth, the questions arise: Ought we not to avoid the present danger at Port Arthur, as well as the future danger in Persia? Ought we not to restore Kuan-tung, Port Arthur, and Dalny to China, give up the southern branch of the Eastern Chinese Railway, and get from China, in place of it, certain rights in Northern Manchuria and a sum of, say, £25,000,000 as compensation for expenses incurred by us in connection with the railway and Port Arthur?”
“The economic interests of Russia in the Far East are negligible. We have as yet, thank God, no overproduction in manufactures, because our domestic markets are not yet glutted. There may be some export of articles from our factories and foundries, but it is largely bounty-fed,and will cease—or nearly cease—when such artificial encouragement is withheld. Russia, therefore, has not yet arrived at the pitiable necessity of waging war in order to obtain markets for her products. As for our other interests in that quarter, the success or failure of a few coal or timber enterprises in Manchuria and Korea is not a matter of sufficient importance to justify the risk of war. The railway-lines built through Manchuria cannot change the situation quickly, and the hope that these lines will have world-wide importance as arteries of international commerce is not likely to be soon realized. Travellers, mails, tea and possibly some other merchandise will go over them, but the great masses of heavy international freight, which alone can give such importance to a railway, must still go by sea, on account of the heavy railway rates. Such is not the case, however, with local freight to supply local needs. This the railroad—and especially the southern branch—will carry in increasing amount, thus deriving most of its revenue, and, at the same time, stimulating the growth of the country, and, in Southern Manchuria particularly, benefiting the Chinese population. But if we do not take special measures to direct even local freight to Dalny, that port is likely to suffer from the competition of Newchuang. Port Arthur has no value for Russia as the defence and terminus of a railway, unless that railway is part of an international transit route. The southern branch of the Eastern Chinese road has commercially only—or chiefly—local importance, and Russia does not need to protect it by means so costly as the fortifications of Port Arthur, a fleet of warships, and a garrison of 30,000 men. It thusappears that the retention of a forward position in Kuan-tung is no more supported by economic than it is by political and military considerations. What, then, are the interests that may involve us in war with Japan and China? Are such interests important enough to justify the great sacrifices that war will demand?
* * * * *
“The Russian people are powerful, and their faith in Divine Providence, as well as their devotion to their Tsar and country, is unshaken. We may trust, therefore, that if Russia is destined to undergo the trial of war at the beginning of the twentieth century, she will come out of it with victory and glory. But she will have to make terrible sacrifices—sacrifices that may long retard the natural growth of the Empire. In the wars that we waged in the early years of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the enemy invaded our territory, and we fought for our very existence—marched forth in defence of our country and died for faith, Tsar, and Fatherland. If, in the early years of the twentieth century, war breaks out as the result of Far Eastern complications, the Russian people and the Russian army will execute the will of their monarch with as much devotion and self-sacrifice as ever, and will give up their lives and property for the sake of attaining complete victory; but they will have no intelligent comprehension of the objects for which the war is waged. For that reason there will be no such exaltation of spirit, no such outburst of patriotism, as that which accompanied the wars that we fought either in self-defence or for objects dear to the hearts of the people.
“We are now passing through a critical period.Internal enemies, aiming at the destruction of the dearest and most sacred foundations of life, are invading even the ranks of our army. Large groups of the population have become dissatisfied, or mentally unsettled, and disorders of various sorts—mostly created by revolutionary propaganda—are increasing in frequency. Cases in which troops have to be called out to deal with such disorders are much more common than they were even a short time ago. Secret revolutionary publications directed against the Government are being more frequently found, even in the barracks. … We must hope, however, that this evil has not yet taken deep root in Russian soil, and that by strict and wise measures it may be eradicated. If Russia were attacked from without, the people, with patriotic fervour, would undoubtedly repudiate the false teaching of the revolutionary propaganda, and show themselves as ready to answer the call of their revered monarch, and to defend their Tsar and country, as they were in the early years of the eighteenth and particularly in the nineteenth century. If, however, they are asked to make great sacrifices in order to carry on a war whose objects are not clearly understood by them, the leaders of the anti-Government party will take advantage of the opportunity to spread sedition. Thus there will be introduced a new factor which, if we decide on war in the Far East, we must take into account. The sacrifices and dangers that we have experienced, or that we anticipate, as results of the position we have taken in the Far East, ought to be a warning to us when we dream of getting an outlet on the warm waters of the Indian Ocean at Chahbar.[65]It is already evidentthat the British are preparing to meet us there. The building of a railroad across Persia, the construction of a defended port and the maintenance of a fleet, etc., will simply be a repetition of our experience with the Eastern Chinese Railway and Port Arthur. In the place of Port Arthur we shall have Chahbar, and instead of war with Japan, we shall have a still more unnecessary and still more terrible war with Great Britain.
“In view of the considerations above set forth, the questions arise: Ought we not to avoid the present danger at Port Arthur, as well as the future danger in Persia? Ought we not to restore Kuan-tung, Port Arthur, and Dalny to China, give up the southern branch of the Eastern Chinese Railway, and get from China, in place of it, certain rights in Northern Manchuria and a sum of, say, £25,000,000 as compensation for expenses incurred by us in connection with the railway and Port Arthur?”
Copies of this report were sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Finance, and Admiral Alexeieff. Unfortunately, my views were not approved, and meanwhile the negotiations with Japan had been dragging along and becoming more and more involved. The future historian, who will have access to all the documents, may be able, from a study of them, to determine why the will of the Russian monarch to avoid war with Japan was not carried into effect by his principal subordinates. At present it is only possible to state definitely that, although neither the Emperor nor Russia desired war, wedid not succeed in escaping it. The reason for the failure of the negotiations is evidently to be found in our ignorance of Japan’s readiness for war, and her determination to support her contentions with armed force. We ourselves were not ready to fight, and resolved that it should not come to fighting. We made demands, but we had no intention of using weapons to enforce them—and, it may be added, they were not worth going to war about. We always thought, moreover, that the question whether there should be war or peace depended upon us, and we wholly overlooked Japan’s stubborn determination to enforce demands that had for her such vital importance, and also her reliance upon our military unreadiness. Thus the negotiations were not carried on by the respective parties under equal conditions.
Again, our position at this period was made worse by the form that Admiral Alexeieff gave to the negotiations entrusted to him. Japanese pride was offended, and the whole correspondence became strained and difficult as a result of the Admiral’s unfamiliarity with diplomatic procedure and his lack of competent staff assistance. He proceeded, moreover, upon the mistaken assumption that it was necessary to display inflexibility and tenacity. His idea was that one concession would inevitably lead to another, and that a yielding policy would be more likely tobring about a rupture in the end than a policy of firmness.
The paperNasha Jizn, on July 4, 1905, published an article entitled “The Viceroy Alexeieff’s Firm Policy,” which was circulated all over the world. It ran as follows:
“Now, when the disasters which have befallen our operations by land and sea, together with all the terrible, incredible sufferings of our soldiers and sailors, are turning our thoughts to the persons responsible for the wretched war, we must remember, in deciding the extent to which different departments and persons were responsible for the ‘preliminary events,’ that Russian interests in the Far East were represented by the Viceroy, who was intimately acquainted with all the political circumstances, and who must be considered an authority on Far Eastern affairs.“Admiral Alexeieff’s policy was ‘firm,’ and all his endeavours were directed to prevent Russia’s political position in those regions being weakened, and it was on this account that he did not feel able to recommend the evacuation of Manchuria after it had been occupied for three years. Notwithstanding the absolute necessity for making concessions, he reported in September, 1903, that the Japanese proposal was ‘quite an impossible pretension,’ that it must be definitely laid down as a preliminary to any negotiations with Japan that we should continue in occupation of Manchuria, and that he ‘was firmly convinced’ that this was the only settlement in accordance with our position in the Far East.“The opinion of the late Viceroy, ‘based’ on the general political situation, was such that asuccessful issue to the negotiations could only be ‘expected’ if the Japanese Government were clearly given to understand that Russia was determined to support her rights and interests in Manchuria by force of arms. With this idea, and owing to the ‘provocative action of the Japanese,’ Alexeieff proposed a whole series of measures, amongst which was one that we should at once attack them on the sea in the event of a landing at Chemulpo, Chinampo, or the mouth of the Ya-lu. He was ‘deeply convinced’ that, in order to arrive at an agreement with Japan, the most important thing was ‘an inflexible resolution and timely action, which alone can prevent Japan realizing her extraordinarily ambitious intentions.’“When, in December, 1903, the Japanese Government presented their proposals in reply to the draft agreement drawn up by Alexeieff, and described by him as ‘an honourable retreat for her from a position which she has herself created by her arrogant behaviour,’ he characterized these as being ‘equivalent to a demand that the Russian Government should formally acknowledge Japan’s protectorate over Korea.’ Indeed, he considered the requests made by her ‘so presumptuous that we should at once reject them.’ In presenting such requests, he said, ‘Japan exceeds the limit of all reason,’ and he consequently felt that no concession was possible, and that it would be better to break off negotiations, after clearly explaining that in her proposals Russia ‘had reached the extreme limit of concession.’ Then, when the Japanese began to occupy Korea at the end of December, 1903, Alexeieff represented most strongly that ‘for self-defence correspondingsteps should be taken to maintain the balance of power upset by the occupation of Korea’—i.e., that the lower reaches of the Ya-lu should be occupied, and the mobilization of the Far Eastern districts and the province of Siberia should be carried out. He was of opinion that Japan’s final proposals, received in the middle of January, 1904, were ‘in tone and substance still more pretentious and bold than before,’ and he insisted on the negotiations being broken off, asserting that their continuation ‘could not lead to a settlement of mutual interests,’ and that ‘any display of yielding on our part would lead to a great loss of dignity to Russia and to a corresponding augmentation of the prestige of Japan in the eyes of the whole East.’“This was three weeks before the diplomatic negotiations were broken off. Has Russia’s dignity not yet suffered in full measure?“Finally, our last answer to Japan—despatched only a few days before the declaration of war—which contained a refusal to consider a neutral zone, and admitted Japan’s right to predominate in Korea, was stated to be ‘an exhibition of generosity beyond which Russia could scarcely go.’“After three or four days—i.e., on February 6, 1904—diplomatic relations were broken off by Japan, and so began that awful war which might have been prevented without loss of dignity to us if the Viceroy’s policy had been a little less ‘firm,’ and—it must be added—a little less eccentric.”
“Now, when the disasters which have befallen our operations by land and sea, together with all the terrible, incredible sufferings of our soldiers and sailors, are turning our thoughts to the persons responsible for the wretched war, we must remember, in deciding the extent to which different departments and persons were responsible for the ‘preliminary events,’ that Russian interests in the Far East were represented by the Viceroy, who was intimately acquainted with all the political circumstances, and who must be considered an authority on Far Eastern affairs.
“Admiral Alexeieff’s policy was ‘firm,’ and all his endeavours were directed to prevent Russia’s political position in those regions being weakened, and it was on this account that he did not feel able to recommend the evacuation of Manchuria after it had been occupied for three years. Notwithstanding the absolute necessity for making concessions, he reported in September, 1903, that the Japanese proposal was ‘quite an impossible pretension,’ that it must be definitely laid down as a preliminary to any negotiations with Japan that we should continue in occupation of Manchuria, and that he ‘was firmly convinced’ that this was the only settlement in accordance with our position in the Far East.
“The opinion of the late Viceroy, ‘based’ on the general political situation, was such that asuccessful issue to the negotiations could only be ‘expected’ if the Japanese Government were clearly given to understand that Russia was determined to support her rights and interests in Manchuria by force of arms. With this idea, and owing to the ‘provocative action of the Japanese,’ Alexeieff proposed a whole series of measures, amongst which was one that we should at once attack them on the sea in the event of a landing at Chemulpo, Chinampo, or the mouth of the Ya-lu. He was ‘deeply convinced’ that, in order to arrive at an agreement with Japan, the most important thing was ‘an inflexible resolution and timely action, which alone can prevent Japan realizing her extraordinarily ambitious intentions.’
“When, in December, 1903, the Japanese Government presented their proposals in reply to the draft agreement drawn up by Alexeieff, and described by him as ‘an honourable retreat for her from a position which she has herself created by her arrogant behaviour,’ he characterized these as being ‘equivalent to a demand that the Russian Government should formally acknowledge Japan’s protectorate over Korea.’ Indeed, he considered the requests made by her ‘so presumptuous that we should at once reject them.’ In presenting such requests, he said, ‘Japan exceeds the limit of all reason,’ and he consequently felt that no concession was possible, and that it would be better to break off negotiations, after clearly explaining that in her proposals Russia ‘had reached the extreme limit of concession.’ Then, when the Japanese began to occupy Korea at the end of December, 1903, Alexeieff represented most strongly that ‘for self-defence correspondingsteps should be taken to maintain the balance of power upset by the occupation of Korea’—i.e., that the lower reaches of the Ya-lu should be occupied, and the mobilization of the Far Eastern districts and the province of Siberia should be carried out. He was of opinion that Japan’s final proposals, received in the middle of January, 1904, were ‘in tone and substance still more pretentious and bold than before,’ and he insisted on the negotiations being broken off, asserting that their continuation ‘could not lead to a settlement of mutual interests,’ and that ‘any display of yielding on our part would lead to a great loss of dignity to Russia and to a corresponding augmentation of the prestige of Japan in the eyes of the whole East.’
“This was three weeks before the diplomatic negotiations were broken off. Has Russia’s dignity not yet suffered in full measure?
“Finally, our last answer to Japan—despatched only a few days before the declaration of war—which contained a refusal to consider a neutral zone, and admitted Japan’s right to predominate in Korea, was stated to be ‘an exhibition of generosity beyond which Russia could scarcely go.’
“After three or four days—i.e., on February 6, 1904—diplomatic relations were broken off by Japan, and so began that awful war which might have been prevented without loss of dignity to us if the Viceroy’s policy had been a little less ‘firm,’ and—it must be added—a little less eccentric.”
My opinions with regard to the relative importance of the tasks which confronted our War Department made me a convinced opponent of an active Asiatic policy.
Realizing our military unreadiness on our western frontier, and taking into account the urgent need of devoting our resources to the work of internal reorganization and reform, I thought that a rupture with Japan would be a national calamity, and did everything in my power to prevent it. Throughout my long service in Asia I had not only been an advocate of an agreement with Great Britain on that continent, but I was also certain that a peaceable delimitation of spheres of influence between us and Japan was possible.
In my opinion, the carrying of the main line of the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria was a mistake. I had nothing to do with the adoption of that route, as I was then Commander of the Trans-Caspian Military District; it was also contrary to the opinion of General Dukhovski, representative of the War Department in the Far East.
WHY THE JAPANESE WERE SUCCESSFUL
The army we put in the field was unable to defeat the Japanese in the time allotted to it. Many historians will probably essay to solve the riddle of how a Power, which we regarded as belonging to the second class, and one which not long ago possessed no army, was able to crush us absolutely on the sea, and to defeat a strong force on land, and doubtless we shall eventually be furnished with the reasons in full. For the present I propose to mention only some general causes which contributed to Japan’s success. Broadly speaking, we underestimated her power, particularly her moral strength, and entered upon the war far too lightly.
The Japanese first became our neighbours when we occupied Kamchatka in the reign of Peter the Great. In 1860, after the peaceful occupation of the extensive Ussuri region—by virtue of the Treaty of Peking—we moved down to the frontier of Korea and the Sea of Japan. This sea, which is almost completely enclosed by Korea and the Japanese Islands, is of immenseimportance to the whole of the adjacent coasts, and as the outlets from it into the ocean were in her hands, Japan might have easily prevented our obtaining free access to the Pacific. But, by our acquisition of Saghalien, we gained an outlet through Tartar Strait.[66]This, however, was frequently and for long periods icebound, and for about forty years the only spot developed on the Ussuri coast was Vladivostok. Our new neighbour did not attract any attention from us for a long time—so long, in fact, as her life did not come into contact with ours—and we remained confident of her military weakness. We knew the Japanese as skilful and patient artisans; we were fond of their productions, of which the delicate workmanship and brilliant colouring charmed us; our sailors spoke with appreciation of the country and its inhabitants, and were full of pleasant reminiscences of their visits, especially of Nagasaki, where they appeared to be popular with the inhabitants; but as a military factor Japan did not exist. Our sailors, travellers, and diplomats, had entirely overlooked the awakening of an energetic, independent people.
H.I.M. THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN.
H.I.M. THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN.
In 1867 the armed forces of Japan consisted of 10,000 men, organized in nine battalions, two squadrons, and eight batteries. This force, which constituted the cadre of the standing army, was trained by French instructors, from whom, also,the troops obtained the pattern of their uniform. In 1872, as a result of the Franco-German War, Japan was subjected to the law of universal service; the French instructors were replaced by Germans, who organized the army according to German ideas, and officers were sent every year to Europe to study their profession. At the time of the Chino-Japanese War the army consisted of seven infantry divisions; but, being prevented from enjoying the fruits of her victories in this war by reason of her weakness both on land and sea, the nation strained every nerve to create an army and navy capable of protecting its interests. On April 1, 1896, the Mikado issued a decree for the reorganization of the military forces, by which the strength of the army would be doubled in seven years. In 1903 this reorganization was completed. Statistically the creation and growth of this great naval and military force were not overlooked by us; the construction of every warship and the formation of every new division of infantry was mentioned in the reports of our Navy and War Departments. But we did not properly appreciate the meaning of these beginnings, and were unable to gauge the fighting value of the mere numbers by any European standard. Detailed information as to the organization and strength of the army, with an appreciation of its technical preparedness and capability of mobilization, was compiled ina handbook by the Headquarter Staff and revised annually. This book contained the following figures as to the strength of the Japanese troops which took part in the Chinese War of 1894–95, and in the expedition in 1900 to the province of Pei-chih-li:
1.War with China, 1894–95.—In this war Japan was forced to put forward the whole of her military strength. Each of the seven divisions which then existed were mobilized and despatched from Hiroshima to the theatre of war as operations developed. Half of the 5th Division was sent to Korea in the middle of June before war had actually been declared, followed in August, after hostilities had commenced, by the other half and the whole of the 3rd Division. These two divisions constituted the 1st Army, which defeated the Chinese forces at Pingyang in September, forced the passage of the Ya-lu in October, and moved on Mukden through South-East Manchuria. After a naval engagement at the mouth of the River Ya-lu, the 2nd Army, consisting of the 1st Division and half of the 6th, was, by September 30, concentrated at Hiroshima. This army landed north of Pi-tzu-wo, and fought its way into Port Arthur. Towards the end of 1894, three and a half divisions, of a total strength of 52,600 men, were in Southern Manchuria. In the beginning of 1895, the 2nd Division andthe other half of the 6th Division were landed on the Shan-tung Peninsula; these troops composed the 3rd Army, numbering about 24,000 men. Thus, by the beginning of 1895, more than 75,000 men had been landed in China. Thirty vessels of a steamship company, subsidized by the Japanese Government, were chartered for the conveyance of these troops. On account of the roughness of the country in the theatre of war the land transport consisted mostly of carriers organized into corps, the majority of whom were recruited in Japan; the remainder were coolies collected in Korea and Manchuria. For the preliminary expenses of the war the Japanese Treasury allotted £4,500,000; later, an internal loan of £15,000,000 was raised. When the whole of the extraordinary expenditure was totalled, it was estimated that the war cost Japan about £20,000,000, of which £16,420,000 was chargeable to the War Department and £3,580,000 to the Navy Department.
2.The Expedition to China in 1900.—At first, a force of three battalions, one squadron, and one company of sappers—total 3,000 men—of the 5th and 11th Divisions was mobilized in July, followed about a month later by the mobilization of the 5th Division. The troops were conveyed to Ta-ku in twenty-one transports, chartered from the Nippon-Yusen-Kaisha.[67]Excluding the firstforce, 19,000 men in all were taken (the whole of the 5th Division, the Zopoleff batteries, part of the railway battalion from Tokio, and 6,000 to 7,000 hired coolies wearing uniform). Altogether, 22,000 men were transported—the 5th Division with its units and coolies—and all the supplies were sent from Japan. During the whole time, about 6,000 sick and wounded were returned to the base, while one-half of the cavalry and artillery and three-quarters of the transport horses died. The cost of the expedition, estimated at £3,800,000 to £4,000,000, was taken from the fund of some £5,000,000 set aside for the construction of warships and emergency expenditure. Within seven years of the war of 1894–95 Japan had almost doubled her armed forces, and was very largely enabled to do this by the war indemnity received from China, the payment of which was made through our mediation.
The strength of the Japanese army, before the war with us, was calculated by our Headquarter Staff to be as follows:
The peace strength of the standing army (excluding the garrison of Formosa) was estimated at 8,116 officers and 133,457 men. For economy, however, only 6,822 officers and 110,000 men were actually with the colours in peace, and of these, about 13,500 were continually on furlough. The war strength was fixed at 10,735 officers (without depôt troops) and 348,074 men. Thus, to bringthe peace numbers up to the war establishment, about 3,900 officers and 240,000 more men were required. On January 1, 1901, there were in the standing army, reserve, and territorial forces a total of 2,098 staff and general officers, 8,755 regimental and warrant officers, 35,248 non-commissioned officers, 6,964 second-lieutenants andyunkers, and 273,476 men, a total of 10,853 officers and 315,688 men.[68]Taking the peace establishment of the standing army at 8,116 officers and about 110,000 men, it is evident that on January 1, 1901, there were 2,737 officers and about 205,000 men in the reserve and territorial forces. Comparing these numbers with those required to bring the peace establishment up to war strength, we find that on January 1, 1901, the numbers could not have been obtained; that there was a shortage of officers equal to those required for the reserve troops,[69]and a shortage of some 35,000 men. Taking into consideration the probable yearly contingent of recruits (45,000 men), and also the periods of service inthe different classes of troops, it may be said that by January 1, 1903, the number of men in the reserve and territorial forces was approximately 265,000.[70]Finally, to complete the army in an emergency, some 50,000 men were obtainable from the reserve of recruits, the majority of whom were quite untrained. No mention has been yet made of reserve troops, but preparations were made for their formation, and, according to the number of battalions, they must have increased the standing army by two-thirds of its establishment. The latest information prior to the war which we had of the strength, organization, and training of the Japanese army was based on the reports of our military attaché in Japan, Colonel Vannovski, of the General Staff. Colonel Adabash, who visited Japan in 1903, forwarded to General Jilinski, of the Headquarter Staff, very important information as to the reserve units, towards whose formation steps were then being taken; but as this information differed completely from that sent by Colonel Vannovski, Major-General Jilinski unfortunately did not consider it reliable. Some months later, Captain Rusin, our naval attaché in that country, an extremely able officer, forwarded to the Headquarter Staff of the navy very much the same information as that furnished by Adabash. Hisreport was transmitted by the Navy Department to General Sakharoff, Chief of the Headquarter Staff. It was ascertained later that both these reports were quite accurate, but that they had been pigeon-holed because neither General Jilinski nor General Sakharoff believed them. Consequently, the information in the printed handbooks as to the Japanese armed forces in 1903–04 did not include a single word as to reserves. Similarly, we did not attach a proper value to their numerous depôt troops. According to our calculations, based on information sent in by our military attachés in Japan, the available supply of men for the permanent and territorial armies and for the depôt troops amounted only to a little over 400,000.
The official figures as to the Japanese War casualties have now been published by the principal medical officer of the Japanese army, Surgeon-General Kipke. From these it appears that their losses amounted to: killed, 47,387; wounded, 172,425—total, 219,812. The total killed, wounded, and sick amounted to 554,885 [a considerably greater number than the total we thought they could put in the field against us], and 320,000 sick and wounded were sent back to Japan. From other sources we now know that they buried 60,624 killed in the Cemetery of Honour in Tokio, and that 74,545 besides died from wounds and sickness. They mustadmit, therefore, to 135,000 killed and dead. As Surgeon-General Kipke states that the killed and wounded amounted to 14·58 per cent. of their total strength, it would appear that the total number of troops put in the field against us was over 1,500,000, or was more than three times the number anticipated by our Headquarter Staff. In view of these facts, it is evident that our information as to their fighting strength was incorrect. As an instance of the neglect, referred to in the preceding paragraph, to take any account of the formation of reserve units, a scheme drawn up in Port Arthur in November, 1903, for the strategical distribution of our troops in the Far East in the event of complications, estimated the numbers that Japan could place against us as follows:
“At the beginning of hostilities, when her territorial army is not completely organized, out of her 13 field divisions, she will only be able to put 9 divisions of a strength of 120 infantry battalions, 46 squadrons of cavalry, 10 engineer battalions, and 1 siege battalion—a total of 125,000 combatants—in the field.”
“At the beginning of hostilities, when her territorial army is not completely organized, out of her 13 field divisions, she will only be able to put 9 divisions of a strength of 120 infantry battalions, 46 squadrons of cavalry, 10 engineer battalions, and 1 siege battalion—a total of 125,000 combatants—in the field.”
This calculation agrees with the reports furnished in 1903 by our military attaché in Japan, Lieutenant-Colonel Samoiloff, of the General Staff, who informed me, when I was in Japan, that they could only put in the field 10 divisions out of 13; of the reserve troops he knew nothing.Again, in a memorandum written in the Operations Branch of the Headquarter Staff, and submitted to me by the Chief of the General Staff on February 12, 1904, it was stated that, according to available information, the Japanese could put 11 of their 13 divisions in the field, leaving 2 in Japan. In this memorandum, again, no mention was made of the reserve units.
The readiness of their army for mobilization, owing to their adoption of a territorial system, and the consequent short distances the depôt troops had to travel, was known to be very complete. We knew that the troops could complete their mobilization in three or four days, while the supply and other departments would require seven to ten. Information as to transports available showed that even in 1902 they could have collected in seven days 86 ships with an aggregate displacement of 224,000 tons, and in fourteen days 97 ships with a displacement of 268,000. For a mobilized division about 40,000 tons are required for a journey of more than forty-eight hours, while 20,000 tons would suffice for a journey of less than forty-eight hours. Thus the tonnage available was sufficient to allow embarkation to be commenced at once on completion of mobilization of six divisions for a journey of not more than forty-eight hours, or of almost the whole army for a lesser distance.
As regards the tactical readiness of theJapanese before the war, our people in Manchuria did receive certain information. The operations of large bodies of their troops of all arms had been commented upon by our Headquarter Staff as follows: