FOOTNOTES:

"However often they go away, the planets return, the sun, moon, and the rest;"But never to this day have returned any who have gone to Álokákáśa."

"However often they go away, the planets return, the sun, moon, and the rest;

"But never to this day have returned any who have gone to Álokákáśa."

Others holdmokshato be the abiding in the highest regions, the soul being absorbed in bliss, with its knowledge unhindered and itself untainted by any pain or impression thereof.

Others hold ninetattwas, adding "merit" and "demerit" to the foregoing seven,—these two being the causes of pleasure and pain. This has been declared in theSiddhánta, "Jíva,ajíva,puṇya,pápa,ásrava,saṃvara,nirjaraṇa,bandha, andmoksha, are the ninetattwas." As our object is only a summary, we desist here.

Here the Jainas everywhere introduce their favourite logic called thesapta-bhaṅgí-naya,[94]or the system of the seven paralogisms, "may be, it is," "may be, it is not," "may be, it is and it is not," "may be, it is not predicable," "may be, it is, and yet not predicable," "may be, it is not, and not predicable," "may be, it is and it is not, and not predicable." All this Anantavírya has thus laid down:—

1. "When you wish to establish a thing, the proper course is to say 'may be, it is;' when you wish to deny it, 'may be, it is not.'

2. "When you desire to establish each in turn, let yourprocedure likewise embrace both; when you wish to establish both at once, let it be declared 'indescribable' from the impossibility to describe it.

3. "The fifth process is enjoined when you wish to establish the first as well as its indescribableness; when the second as well as its indescribableness, the occasion for the sixth process arises.

4. "The seventh is required when all three characters are to be employed simultaneously."

Syát, "may be," is here an indeclinable particle in the form of a part of a verb, used to convey the idea of indeterminateness; as it has been said—

"This particlesyátis in the form of a verb, but, from its being connected with the sense, it denotes indeterminateness in sentences, and has a qualifying effect on the implied meaning."

If, again, the wordsyátdenoted determinateness, then it would be needless in the phrase, "may be, it is;" but since it really denotes indeterminateness, "may be, it is," means "it is somehow;"syát, "may be," conveys the meaning of "somehow,"kathaṃchit; and so it is not really useless. As one has said—

"The doctrine of thesyád-vádaarises from our everywhere rejecting the idea of the absolute;[95]it depends on thesapta-bhaṅgí-naya, and it lays down the distinction between what is to be avoided and to be accepted."

If a thing absolutely exists, it exists altogether, always, everywhere, and with everybody, and no one at any time or place would ever make an effort to obtain or avoid it, as it would be absurd to treat what is already present as an object to be obtained or avoided. But if it be relative (or indefinite), the wise will concede that at certain times and in certain places any one may seek or avoid it. Moreover, suppose that the question to be asked is this: "Isbeingornon-beingthe real nature of the thing?" Thereal nature of the thing cannot bebeing, for then you could not properly use the phrase, "It is a pot" (ghaṭósti), as the two words "is" and "pot" would be tautological; nor ought you to say, "It is not a pot," as the words thus used would imply a direct contradiction; and the same argument is to be used in other questions.[96]As it has been declared—

"It must not be said 'It is a pot,' since the word 'pot' implies 'is;'"Nor may you say 'it is not a pot,' for existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive," &c.

"It must not be said 'It is a pot,' since the word 'pot' implies 'is;'

"Nor may you say 'it is not a pot,' for existence and non-existence are mutually exclusive," &c.

The whole is thus to be summed up. Four classes of our opponents severally hold the doctrine of existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence successively, and the doctrine that everything is inexplicable (anirvachaníyatá);[97]three other classes hold one or other of the three first theories combined with the fourth.[98]Now, when they meet us with the scornful questions, "Does the thing exist?" &c., we have an answer always possible, "It exists in a certain way," &c., and our opponents are all abashed to silence, and victory accrues to the holder of theSyád-váda, which ascertains the entire meaning of all things. Thus said the teacher in theSyádváda-mañjarí—

"A thing of an entirely indeterminate nature is the object only of the omniscient; a thing partly determined is held to be the true object of scientific investigation.[99]When our reasonings based on one point proceed in the revealed way, it is called the revealedSyád-váda, which ascertains the entire meaning of all things."

"All other systems are full of jealousy from their mutual propositions and counter-propositions; it is only the doctrine of the Arhat which with no partiality equally favours all sects."

The Jaina doctrine has thus been summed up by Jinadatta-súri—

"The hindrances belonging to vigour, enjoyment, sensual pleasure, giving and receiving,—sleep, fear, ignorance, aversion, laughter, liking, disliking, love, hatred, want of indifference, desire, sorrow, deceit, these are the eighteen 'faults' (dosha) according to our system.[100]The divine Jina is our Guru, who declares the true knowledge of thetattwas. The path[101]of emancipation consists of knowledge, intuition, and conduct. There are two means of proof (pramáṇa) in theSyád-vádadoctrine,—sense-perception and inference. All consists of the eternal and the non-eternal; there are nine or seventattwas. Thejíva, theajíva, merit and demerit,ásrava,saṃvara,bandha,nirjará,mukti,—we will now explain each.Jívais defined as intelligence;ajívais all other than it; merit means bodies which arise from good actions, demerit the opposite;ásravais the bondage of actions,[102]nirjaráis the unloosing thereof;mokshaarises from the destruction of the eight forms ofkarmanor "action". But by some teachers "merit" is included insaṃvara,[103]and "demerit" inásrava.

"Of the soul which has attained the four infinite things[104]and is hidden from the world, and whose eight actions are abolished, absolute liberation is declared by Jina. The Śwetámbaras are the destroyers of all defilement, they live by alms,[105]they pluck out their hair, they practise patience, they avoid all association, and are called the JainaSádhus. The Digambaras pluck out their hair, theycarry peacocks' tails in their hands, they drink from their hands, and they eat upright in the giver's house,—these are the second class of the Jaina Ṛishis.

"A woman attains not the highest knowledge, she enters not Mukti,—so say the Digambaras; but there is a great division on this point between them and the Śwetámbaras."[106]

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:[40]Vivasanas, "without garments."[41]"The Buddhists are also calledMuktakachchhas, alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the hem of the lower garment untucked."—Colebrooke.[42]In p. 26, line 3, readSyád-vádinám.[43]I propose to read in p. 26, line 5,infra,gráhyasyaforagráhyasya.[44]As these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver.[45]I correct the readingtasyágrahaṇaṃtotasyá grahaṇaṃ(tasyábeingjaḍatáyáḥ).[46]I.e., if you say that theavayavamay be not seen though theavayavinis seen, then I may say that the post is theavayavin, and the unperceived three worlds itsavayava![47]I readarhatsvarúpam arhachchandrain p. 27, line 3,infra.[48]The following passage occurs in some part of Kumárila's writings in an argument against the Jainas. It is curious that in the Sáṅkara-digvijaya, chap. lv., it is mentioned that Kumárila had a little relenting towards the Jainas at the end of his life. He repented of having so cruelly persecuted them, and acknowledged that there was some truth in their teaching.Jainagurumukhát kaśchid vidyáleśo játaḥ.[49]Kumárila tries to prove that no such being can exist, as his existence is not established by any one of the five recognised proofs,—the sixth,abháva, being negative, is, of course, not applicable. I understand the last śloka as showing the inapplicability of "presumption" orarthá-patti. A Jaina would say, "If the Arhat were not omniscient, his words would not be true and authoritative, but we see that they are, therefore he is omniscient." He answers by retorting that the same argument might be used of Buddha by a Buddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow it in that case, it cannot be convincing in his own.[50]In p. 29, line 2, readtatsadbhávávedakasyafortatsadbhávádekasya.[51]In p. 29, line 9, fornikhilárthajñanát notpatty, I propose to readnikhilárthajñánotpatty.[52]Janyais included inKáryaand equally disputed.[53]Thus "I am possessed of a body" (aham Śarírí), "my hand," &c., are all sentences in which a predicate involving the notion of parts is applied to the soul "I."[54]Reasoning in a circle. I suppose the &c. includes theAnavasthádoshaor reasoningad infinitum. He accepts the supposed fault, and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before everybody's eyes.[55]In p. 31, line 5,infra, readtattvárthefortattvártham.[56]I read in p. 32, line 9,Samyagdarśanádiforasamyagdarśanádi; but the old text may mean "caused by the abolition of hindrances produced by the qualities, wrong intuition," &c.[57]Cf. the fiveyamasin theYoga-sútras, ii. 30. Hemachandra (Abhidh81) calls themyamas.[58]I readkámánámforkámáṇámin p. 33, line 7 (2 × 3 × 3 = 18).[59]Forabháshaṇa, see Hemach. 16.[60]I propose in p. 33, line 17,raśayanajñánaśraddhávacháraṇániforrasáyaṇajñanaṃ śraddhánávaraṇáni. Foravacháraṇa, seeSuśruta, vol. ii. p. 157, &c. Ifanávaraṇabe the true reading, I suppose it must mean "the absence of obstructions."[61]This is a hard passage, but some light is thrown on it by the scholiast to Hemachandra,Abhidh. 79.[62]Or this may mean "by the influence ofupaśamakshayaorkshayopaśama, it appears characterised by one or the other."[63]I read in p. 34, line 7,kalushádyákáreṇaforkalushányákáreṇa. Theupaśamakshayaandkshayopaśamaseem to correspond to theaupaśamikaandksháyikastates about to be described.[64]Strychnos potatorum.[65]Just as in the Sánkhya philosophy, the soul is not really bound though it seems to itself to be so.[66]A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen, and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as the eye, light, &c.[67]I read in p. 35, line 5,'stítiforsthiti.[68]Hence the term here used for "category"—astikáya.[69]These (by Hemach.Abhidh.21), possess only one sense—touch. In p. 35, line 10, I readśaṅkhagaṇḍolakaprabhṛitayas trasáś chaturvidháḥ pṛithivyaptejo.[70]In p. 35, line 16, I readteshám ajívatvátfortesháṃ jívatvát. If we keep the old reading we must translate it, "because the former only are animate."[71]In p. 35, line 3 from bottom, I readsarvatrávasthiteforsarvatrávasthiti. In the preceding line I readálokenávachchhinneforálokenávichchhinne.[72]Cf. Siddhánta-muktávali, p. 27. Thevishayaisupabhoga-sádhanam, but it begins with thedvyaṇuka. This category takes up the forms ofsthávarawhich were excluded fromjíva.[73]It is an interesting illustration how thoroughly Mádhava for the time throws himself into the Jaina system which he is analysing, when we see that he gives the Jaina terminology for this definition ofdravya,—cf.Vaiśesh. Sútra, i. 1, 15.Paryáyais explained askarmanin Hemach.Anek.Paryáya, in p. 36, line 11 (infra, p. 53, line 9), seems used in a different sense from that which it bears elsewhere. I have taken it doubtingly as in Hemach.Abhidh. 1503,paryáyo 'nukramaḥ kramaḥ.[74]Yogaseems to be here the natural impulse of the soul to act.[75]In line 18, readásravaṇakáraṇatvád.[76]Thejnánais one, but it becomes apparently manifold by its connection with the senses and external objects.[77]These are also called the eightkarmansin Govindánanda's gloss,Ved. Sút., ii. 2, 33.[78]The Calcutta MS. readsádaraṇíyasyaforávaraṇíyasya, in p. 37, last line. Butávaraṇíyamay be used forávarana(Páṇ.iii. 4, 68). Cf.Yoga Sút., ii. 52, where Vyása's Comm. hasávaraṇíya.[79]Jálavat? The printed text hasjalavat.[80]Umásvámi-?[81]For theságaropama, see Wilson'sEssays, vol. i. p. 309. In p. 38, line 16, I readityádyuktakálád úrdhvam apifor the obscureityádyuktaṃ káladurddhánavat. I also read at the end of the lineprachyutiḥ sthitiḥforprachyutisthitiḥ.[82]In p. 38, line 18, readsvakáryakaraṇe.[83]In p. 39, line 2 and line 5, forírshyáreadíryá,—a bad misreading.[84]In p. 39, line 6, I readápadyetáforápadyatá.[85]In p. 39, line 9, forseshaṇáreadsaishaṇá.[86]In p. 39, line 12, joinnirjantuandjagatítale.[87]Mádhava omits the remaining divisions ofsaṃvara. Wilson,Essays, vol. i. p. 311, gives them asparishahá, "endurance," as of a vow;yatidharma, "the ten duties of an ascetic, patience, gentleness," &c.;bhávaná, "conviction," such as that worldly existences are not eternal, &c.;cháritra, "virtuous observance."[88]In p. 39, line 14, readásravasrotaso.[89]Formoha, in line 16, readmoksha.[90]In p. 39, line 2infra, I readyathákála-foryathá kála-.[91]This passage is very difficult and not improbably corrupt, and my interpretation of it is only conjectural. The ordinarynirjaráis when an action attains its end (like the lulling of a passion by the gratification), this lull is temporary. Thatnirjaráis "ancillary" which is rendered by asceticism a means to the attainment of the highest good. The former isakámá, "desireless," because at the moment the desire is satisfied and so dormant; the latter issakámá, because the ascetic conquers the lower desire under the overpowering influence of the higher desire for liberation.[92]I readnirodhefornirodhahin p. 40, line 6; cf. p. 37, line 13. The causes of bondage produce the assumption of bodies in which future actions are to be performed.[93]Literally "absence ofsanga."[94]In p. 41, line 7, readsapta-bhaṅgí-naya, see Ved. S. Gloss., ii. 2, 23.[95]I cannot understand the words at the end of the first line,kim vṛitatadvidheḥ, and therefore leave them untranslated.[96]Thus Govindánanda applies it (Ved. Sút., ii. 2, 33) to "may be it is one," "may be it is many," &c.[97]'Ακαταληψἱα This is Śriharsha's tenet in theKhaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khádya.[98]In p. 42, line 17, formatenámiśritánireadmatena miśritáni.[99]In p. 43, line 2, forna yasyareadnayasya.[100]This list is badly printed in the Calcutta edition. It is really identical with that given in Hemachandra'sAbhidhána-chintámaṇi, 72, 73; but we must correct the readings toantaráyás,rágadwesháv aviratiḥ smaraḥ, andhásoforhimsá. The order of the eighteendoshasin the Calcutta edition is given by Hemachandra as 4, 5, 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 7, 9, 17, 16, 18, 8, 6, 15, 13, 14.[101]In p. 43, line 13, forvartinireadvartiniḥ.[102]This seems corrupt,—a line is probably lost.[103]In last line, forsaṃsravereadsaṃvare.[104]Does this mean the knowledge of the world, the soul, the liberated and liberation? These are calledananta. See Weber'sBhagavatí, pp. 250, 261-266.[105]Sarajoharaṇáhis explained by therajoharaṇadhárin(=vratin) of Haláyudha, ii. 189.[106]Cf. Wilson,Essays, i. 340. Forstrímreadstrí.

[40]Vivasanas, "without garments."

[41]"The Buddhists are also calledMuktakachchhas, alluding to a peculiarity of dress, apparently a habit of wearing the hem of the lower garment untucked."—Colebrooke.

[42]In p. 26, line 3, readSyád-vádinám.

[43]I propose to read in p. 26, line 5,infra,gráhyasyaforagráhyasya.

[44]As these terms necessarily relate to the perceiver.

[45]I correct the readingtasyágrahaṇaṃtotasyá grahaṇaṃ(tasyábeingjaḍatáyáḥ).

[46]I.e., if you say that theavayavamay be not seen though theavayavinis seen, then I may say that the post is theavayavin, and the unperceived three worlds itsavayava!

[47]I readarhatsvarúpam arhachchandrain p. 27, line 3,infra.

[48]The following passage occurs in some part of Kumárila's writings in an argument against the Jainas. It is curious that in the Sáṅkara-digvijaya, chap. lv., it is mentioned that Kumárila had a little relenting towards the Jainas at the end of his life. He repented of having so cruelly persecuted them, and acknowledged that there was some truth in their teaching.Jainagurumukhát kaśchid vidyáleśo játaḥ.

[49]Kumárila tries to prove that no such being can exist, as his existence is not established by any one of the five recognised proofs,—the sixth,abháva, being negative, is, of course, not applicable. I understand the last śloka as showing the inapplicability of "presumption" orarthá-patti. A Jaina would say, "If the Arhat were not omniscient, his words would not be true and authoritative, but we see that they are, therefore he is omniscient." He answers by retorting that the same argument might be used of Buddha by a Buddhist; and as the Jaina himself would disallow it in that case, it cannot be convincing in his own.

[50]In p. 29, line 2, readtatsadbhávávedakasyafortatsadbhávádekasya.

[51]In p. 29, line 9, fornikhilárthajñanát notpatty, I propose to readnikhilárthajñánotpatty.

[52]Janyais included inKáryaand equally disputed.

[53]Thus "I am possessed of a body" (aham Śarírí), "my hand," &c., are all sentences in which a predicate involving the notion of parts is applied to the soul "I."

[54]Reasoning in a circle. I suppose the &c. includes theAnavasthádoshaor reasoningad infinitum. He accepts the supposed fault, and holds that it is actually borne out in a case before everybody's eyes.

[55]In p. 31, line 5,infra, readtattvárthefortattvártham.

[56]I read in p. 32, line 9,Samyagdarśanádiforasamyagdarśanádi; but the old text may mean "caused by the abolition of hindrances produced by the qualities, wrong intuition," &c.

[57]Cf. the fiveyamasin theYoga-sútras, ii. 30. Hemachandra (Abhidh81) calls themyamas.

[58]I readkámánámforkámáṇámin p. 33, line 7 (2 × 3 × 3 = 18).

[59]Forabháshaṇa, see Hemach. 16.

[60]I propose in p. 33, line 17,raśayanajñánaśraddhávacháraṇániforrasáyaṇajñanaṃ śraddhánávaraṇáni. Foravacháraṇa, seeSuśruta, vol. ii. p. 157, &c. Ifanávaraṇabe the true reading, I suppose it must mean "the absence of obstructions."

[61]This is a hard passage, but some light is thrown on it by the scholiast to Hemachandra,Abhidh. 79.

[62]Or this may mean "by the influence ofupaśamakshayaorkshayopaśama, it appears characterised by one or the other."

[63]I read in p. 34, line 7,kalushádyákáreṇaforkalushányákáreṇa. Theupaśamakshayaandkshayopaśamaseem to correspond to theaupaśamikaandksháyikastates about to be described.

[64]Strychnos potatorum.

[65]Just as in the Sánkhya philosophy, the soul is not really bound though it seems to itself to be so.

[66]A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen, and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as the eye, light, &c.

[67]I read in p. 35, line 5,'stítiforsthiti.

[68]Hence the term here used for "category"—astikáya.

[69]These (by Hemach.Abhidh.21), possess only one sense—touch. In p. 35, line 10, I readśaṅkhagaṇḍolakaprabhṛitayas trasáś chaturvidháḥ pṛithivyaptejo.

[70]In p. 35, line 16, I readteshám ajívatvátfortesháṃ jívatvát. If we keep the old reading we must translate it, "because the former only are animate."

[71]In p. 35, line 3 from bottom, I readsarvatrávasthiteforsarvatrávasthiti. In the preceding line I readálokenávachchhinneforálokenávichchhinne.

[72]Cf. Siddhánta-muktávali, p. 27. Thevishayaisupabhoga-sádhanam, but it begins with thedvyaṇuka. This category takes up the forms ofsthávarawhich were excluded fromjíva.

[73]It is an interesting illustration how thoroughly Mádhava for the time throws himself into the Jaina system which he is analysing, when we see that he gives the Jaina terminology for this definition ofdravya,—cf.Vaiśesh. Sútra, i. 1, 15.Paryáyais explained askarmanin Hemach.Anek.Paryáya, in p. 36, line 11 (infra, p. 53, line 9), seems used in a different sense from that which it bears elsewhere. I have taken it doubtingly as in Hemach.Abhidh. 1503,paryáyo 'nukramaḥ kramaḥ.

[74]Yogaseems to be here the natural impulse of the soul to act.

[75]In line 18, readásravaṇakáraṇatvád.

[76]Thejnánais one, but it becomes apparently manifold by its connection with the senses and external objects.

[77]These are also called the eightkarmansin Govindánanda's gloss,Ved. Sút., ii. 2, 33.

[78]The Calcutta MS. readsádaraṇíyasyaforávaraṇíyasya, in p. 37, last line. Butávaraṇíyamay be used forávarana(Páṇ.iii. 4, 68). Cf.Yoga Sút., ii. 52, where Vyása's Comm. hasávaraṇíya.

[79]Jálavat? The printed text hasjalavat.

[80]Umásvámi-?

[81]For theságaropama, see Wilson'sEssays, vol. i. p. 309. In p. 38, line 16, I readityádyuktakálád úrdhvam apifor the obscureityádyuktaṃ káladurddhánavat. I also read at the end of the lineprachyutiḥ sthitiḥforprachyutisthitiḥ.

[82]In p. 38, line 18, readsvakáryakaraṇe.

[83]In p. 39, line 2 and line 5, forírshyáreadíryá,—a bad misreading.

[84]In p. 39, line 6, I readápadyetáforápadyatá.

[85]In p. 39, line 9, forseshaṇáreadsaishaṇá.

[86]In p. 39, line 12, joinnirjantuandjagatítale.

[87]Mádhava omits the remaining divisions ofsaṃvara. Wilson,Essays, vol. i. p. 311, gives them asparishahá, "endurance," as of a vow;yatidharma, "the ten duties of an ascetic, patience, gentleness," &c.;bhávaná, "conviction," such as that worldly existences are not eternal, &c.;cháritra, "virtuous observance."

[88]In p. 39, line 14, readásravasrotaso.

[89]Formoha, in line 16, readmoksha.

[90]In p. 39, line 2infra, I readyathákála-foryathá kála-.

[91]This passage is very difficult and not improbably corrupt, and my interpretation of it is only conjectural. The ordinarynirjaráis when an action attains its end (like the lulling of a passion by the gratification), this lull is temporary. Thatnirjaráis "ancillary" which is rendered by asceticism a means to the attainment of the highest good. The former isakámá, "desireless," because at the moment the desire is satisfied and so dormant; the latter issakámá, because the ascetic conquers the lower desire under the overpowering influence of the higher desire for liberation.

[92]I readnirodhefornirodhahin p. 40, line 6; cf. p. 37, line 13. The causes of bondage produce the assumption of bodies in which future actions are to be performed.

[93]Literally "absence ofsanga."

[94]In p. 41, line 7, readsapta-bhaṅgí-naya, see Ved. S. Gloss., ii. 2, 23.

[95]I cannot understand the words at the end of the first line,kim vṛitatadvidheḥ, and therefore leave them untranslated.

[96]Thus Govindánanda applies it (Ved. Sút., ii. 2, 33) to "may be it is one," "may be it is many," &c.

[97]'Ακαταληψἱα This is Śriharsha's tenet in theKhaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khádya.

[98]In p. 42, line 17, formatenámiśritánireadmatena miśritáni.

[99]In p. 43, line 2, forna yasyareadnayasya.

[100]This list is badly printed in the Calcutta edition. It is really identical with that given in Hemachandra'sAbhidhána-chintámaṇi, 72, 73; but we must correct the readings toantaráyás,rágadwesháv aviratiḥ smaraḥ, andhásoforhimsá. The order of the eighteendoshasin the Calcutta edition is given by Hemachandra as 4, 5, 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 7, 9, 17, 16, 18, 8, 6, 15, 13, 14.

[101]In p. 43, line 13, forvartinireadvartiniḥ.

[102]This seems corrupt,—a line is probably lost.

[103]In last line, forsaṃsravereadsaṃvare.

[104]Does this mean the knowledge of the world, the soul, the liberated and liberation? These are calledananta. See Weber'sBhagavatí, pp. 250, 261-266.

[105]Sarajoharaṇáhis explained by therajoharaṇadhárin(=vratin) of Haláyudha, ii. 189.

[106]Cf. Wilson,Essays, i. 340. Forstrímreadstrí.

This doctrine of the Árhatas deserves a rational condemnation, for whereas there is only one thing really existent, the simultaneous co-existence of existence, non-existence and other modes in a plurality of really existing things is an impossibility. Nor should any one say: Granting the impossibility of the co-existence of existence and non-existence, which are reciprocally contradictory, why should there not be an alternation between existence and non-existence? there being the rule that it is action, notEns, that alternates. Nor let it be supposed that the whole universe is multiform, in reliance upon the examples of the elephant-headed Gaṇeśa and of the incarnation of Vishṇu as half man, half lion; for the elephantine and the leonine nature existing in one part, and the human in another, and consequently there being no contradiction, those parts being different, these examples are inapplicable to the maintenance of a nature multiform as both existent and non-existent in one and the same part (or place). Again, if any one urge: Let there be existence in one form, and non-existence in another, and thus both will be compatible; we rejoin: Not so, for if you had said that at different times existence and non-existence may be the nature of anything, then indeed there would have been no vice in your procedure. Nor is it to be contended: Let the multiformity of the universe be like the length and shortness which pertainto the same thing (in different relations); for in these (in this length and shortness) there is no contrariety, inasmuch as they are contrasted with different objects. Therefore, for want of evidence, existence and non-existence as reciprocally contradictory cannot reside at the same time in the same thing. In a like manner may be understood the refutation of the otherbhaṅgas(Árhata tenets).

Again, we ask, is this doctrine of the sevenbhaṅgas, which lies at the base of all this, itself uniform (as excluding one contradictory), or multiform (as conciliating contradictories). If it is uniform, there will emerge a contradiction to your thesis that all things are multiform; if it is multiform, you have not proved what you wished to prove, a multiform statement (as both existent and non-existent) proving nothing.[107]In either case, there is rope for a noose for the neck of the Syád-Vádin.

An admirable author of institutes has the founder of the Árhata system, dear to the gods (uninquiring pietist), proved himself to be, when he has not ascertained whether his result is the settling of nine or of seven principles, nor the investigator who settles them, nor his organon, the modes of evidence, nor the matter to be evidenced, whether it be ninefold or not!

In like manner if it be admitted that the soul has (as the Árhatas say), an extension equal to that of the body, it will follow that in the case of the souls of ascetics, who by the efficacy of asceticism assume a plurality of bodies,there is a differentiation of the soul for each of those bodies. A soul of the size of a human body would not (in the course of its transmigrations) be able to occupy the whole body of an elephant; and again, when it laid aside its elephantine body to enter into that of an ant, it would lose its capacity of filling its former frame. And it cannot be supposed that the soul resides successively in the human, elephantine, and other bodies, like the light of a lamp which is capable of contraction and expansion, according as it occupies the interior of a little station on the road-side in which travellers are supplied with water, or the interior of a stately mansion; for it would follow (from such a supposition) that the soul being susceptible of modifications and consequently non-eternal, there would be a loss of merits and a fruition of good and evil unmerited.

As if then we had thrown their best wrestler, the redargution of the rest of their categories may be anticipated from this exposition of the manner in which their treatment of the soul has been vitiated.

Their doctrine, therefore, as repugnant to the eternal, infallible revelation, cannot be adopted. The venerated Vyása accordingly propounded the aphorism (ii. 2, 33), "Nay, because it is impossible in one;" and this same aphorism has been analysed by Rámánuja with the express purpose of shutting out the doctrine of the Jainas. The tenets of Rámánuja are as follows:—Three categories are established, as soul, not-soul, and Lord; or as subject, object, and supreme disposer. Thus it has been said—

"Lord, soul, and not-soul are the triad of principles: Hari (Vishṇu)"Is Lord; individual spirits are souls; and the visible world is not-soul."

"Lord, soul, and not-soul are the triad of principles: Hari (Vishṇu)

"Is Lord; individual spirits are souls; and the visible world is not-soul."

Others, again (the followers of Śaṅkaráchárya), maintain that pure intelligence, exempt from all differences, the absolute, alone is really existent; and that this absolutewhose essence is eternal, pure, intelligent, and free, the identity of which with the individuated spirit is learnt from the "reference to the same object" (predication), "That art thou," undergoes bondage and emancipation. The universe of differences (or conditions) such as that of subject and object, is all illusorily imagined by illusion as in that (one reality), as is attested by a number of texts: Existent only, fair sir, was this in the beginning, One only without a second, and so forth. Maintaining this, and acknowledging a suppression of this beginningless illusion by knowledge of the unity (and identity) of individuated spirits and the undifferenced absolute, in conformity with hundreds of texts from the Upanishads, such as He that knows spirit passes beyond sorrow; rejecting also any real plurality of things, in conformity with the text condemnatory of duality, viz., Death after death he undergoes who looks upon this as manifold; and thinking themselves very wise, the Śáṅkaras will not tolerate this division (viz., the distribution of things into soul, not-soul, and Lord). To all this the following counterposition is laid down:—This might be all well enough if there were any proof of such illusion. But there is no such ignorance (or illusion), an unbeginning entity, suppressible by knowledge, testified in the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know not myself and other things. Thus it has been said (to explain the views of the Śáṅkara)—

"Entitative from everlasting, which is dissolved by knowledge,"Such is illusion. This definition the wise enunciate."

"Entitative from everlasting, which is dissolved by knowledge,

"Such is illusion. This definition the wise enunciate."

This perception (they would further contend) is not conversant about the absence of knowledge. For who can maintain this, and to whom? One who leans on the arm of Prabhákara, or one to whom Kumárila-bhaṭṭa gives his hand? Not the former, for in the words—

"By means of its own and of another's form, eternal in the existent and non-existent,"Thing is recognised something by some at certain times."Non-entity is but another entity by some kind of relation. Non-entity is but another entity, naught else, for naught else is observed."

"By means of its own and of another's form, eternal in the existent and non-existent,

"Thing is recognised something by some at certain times.

"Non-entity is but another entity by some kind of relation. Non-entity is but another entity, naught else, for naught else is observed."

They deny any non-entity ulterior to entity. Non-entity being cognisable by the sixth instrument of knowledge (anupalabdhi), and knowledge being always an object of inference, the absence of knowledge cannot be an object of perception. If, again, any one who maintains non-entity to be perceptible should employ the above argument (from the perceptions, I am ignorant, I know not myself, and other things); it may be replied: "Is there, or is there not, in the consciousness, I am ignorant, an apprehension of self as characterised by an absence, and of knowledge as the thing absent or non-existent? If there is such apprehension, consciousness of the absence of knowledge will be impossible, as involving a contradiction. If there is not, consciousness of the absence of knowledge, which consciousness presupposes a knowledge of the subject and of the thing absent, will not readily become possible." Inasmuch (the Śáṅkaras continue) as the foregoing difficulties do not occur if ignorance (or illusion) be entitative, this consciousness (I am ignorant, I know not myself, and other things) must be admitted to be conversant about an entitative ignorance.

All this (the Rámánuja replies) is about as profitable as it would be for a ruminant animal to ruminate upon ether; for an entitative ignorance is not more supposable than an absence of knowledge. For (we would ask), is any self-conscious principle presented as an object and as a subject (of ignorance) as distinct from cognition? If it is presented, how, since ignorance of a thing is terminable by knowledge of its essence, can the ignorance continue? If none such is presented, how can we be conscious of an ignorance which has no subject and no object? If you say: A pure manifestation of the spiritual essence is revealed only by the cognition opposed to ignorance (or illusion), and thus there is no absurdity in the consciousness of ignoranceaccompanied with a consciousness of its subject and object; then we rejoin:—Unfortunately for you, this (consciousness of subject) must arise equally in the absence of knowledge (for such we define illusion to be), notwithstanding your assertion to the contrary. It must, therefore, be acknowledged that the cognition, I am ignorant, I know not myself and other things, is conversant about an absence of cognition allowed by us both.

Well, then (the Śáṅkaras may contend), let the form of cognition evidentiary of illusion, which is under disputation, be inference, as follows:—Right knowledge must have had for its antecedent another entity (sc.illusion), an entity different from mere prior non-existence of knowledge, which envelops the objects of knowledge, which is terminable by knowledge, which occupies the place of knowledge, inasmuch as it (the right knowledge) illuminates an object not before illuminated, like the light of a lamp springing up for the first time in the darkness. This argument (we reply) will not stand grinding (in the dialectic mill); for to prove the (antecedent) illusion, you will require an ulterior illusion which you do not admit, and a violation of your own tenets will ensue, while if you do not so prove it, it may or may not exist; and, moreover, the example is incompatible with the argument, for it cannot be the lamp that illumines the hitherto unillumined object, since it is knowledge only that illumines; and an illumination of objects may be effected by knowledge even without the lamp, while the light of the lamp is only ancillary to the visual organ which effectuates the cognition, ancillary mediately through the dispulsion of the obstruent darkness. We dismiss further prolixity.

The counterposition (of the Rámánujas) is as follows:—The illusion under dispute does not reside in Brahman, who is pure knowledge, because it is an illusion, like the illusion about nacre, &c. If any one ask: Has not the self-conscious entity that underlies the illusion about nacre, &c., knowledge only for its nature? they reply:Do not start such difficulties; for we suppose that consciousness by its bare existence has the nature of creating conformity to the usage about (i.e., the name and notion of) some object; and such consciousness, also called knowledge, apprehension, comprehension, intelligence, &c., constitutes the soul, or knowledge, of that which acts and knows. If any one ask: How can the soul, if it consists of cognition, have cognition as a quality? they reply: This question is futile; for as a gem, the sun, and other luminous things, existing in the form of light, are substances in which light as a quality inheres—for light, as existing elsewhere than in its usual receptacle, and as being a mode of things though a substance, is still styled and accounted a quality derived from determination by that substance,—so this soul, while it exists as a self-luminous intelligence, has also intelligence as its quality. Accordingly the Vedic texts: A lump of salt is always within and without one entire mass of taste, so also this soul is within and without an entire mass of knowledge; Herein this person is itself a light; Of the knowledge of that which knows there is no suspension; He who knows, smells this; and so also, This is the soul which, consisting of knowledge, is the light within the heart; For this person is the seer, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the thinker, the understander, the doer; The person is knowledge, and the like texts.

It is not to be supposed that the Veda also affords evidence of the existence of the cosmical illusion, in the text, Enveloped in untruth (anṛita); for the word untruth (anṛita) denotes that which is other than truth (ṛita). The wordṛitahas a passive sense, as appears from the words, Drinkingṛita.Ṛitameans works done without desire of fruit; having as its reward the attainment of the bliss of the Supreme Spirit through his propitiation. In the text in question, untruth (anṛita) designates the scanty fruit enjoyed during transmigratory existence as opposed to that (which results from propitiation of the Supreme Spirit),which temporal fruit is obstructive to the attainment of supreme existence (brahman); the entire text (when the context is supplied) being: They who find not this supreme sphere (brahma-loka) are enveloped in untruth. In such texts, again, as Let him know illusion (máyá) to be the primary emanative cause (prakṛiti), the term (máyá) designates the emanative cause, consisting of the three "cords" (guṇa), and creative of the diversified universe. It does not designate the inexplicable illusion (for which the Śáṅkaras contend).

In such passages as, By him the defender of the body of the child, moving rapidly, the thousand illusions (máyá) of the barbarian were swooped upon as by a hawk, we observe that the word "illusion" (máyá) designates the really existent weapon of a Titan, capable of projective diversified creation. The Veda, then, never sets out an inexplicable illusion. Nor (is the cosmical illusion to be inferred from the "grand text," That art thou), inasmuch as the words, That art thou, being incompetent to teach unity, and indicating a conditionate Supreme Spirit, we cannot understand by them the essential unity of the mutually exclusive supreme and individual spirits; for such a supposition (as that they are identical) would violate the law of excluded middle. To explain this. The term That denotes the Supreme Spirit exempt from all imperfections, of illimitable excellence, a repository of innumerable auspicious attributes, to whom the emanation, sustentation, retractation of the universe is a pastime;[108]such being the Supreme Spirit, spoken of in such texts as, That desired, let me be many, let me bring forth. Perhaps the word Thou, referring to the same object (as the word That), denotes the Supreme Spirit characterised by consciousness, having all individual spirits as his body; for a "reference to the same object" designates one thing determined by two modes. Here, perhaps, an Advaita-vádin may reply: Whymay not the purport of the reference to the same object in the words, That art thou, be undifferenced essence, the unity of souls, these words (That and thou) having a (reciprocally) implicate power by abandonment of opposite portions of their meaning; as is the case in the phrase, This is that Devadatta. In the words, This is that Devadatta, we understand by the word That, a person in relation to a different time and place, and by the word This, a person in relation to the present time and place. That both are one and the same is understood by the form of predication ("reference to the same object"). Now as one and the same thing cannot at the same time be known as in different times and places, the two words (This and That) must refer to the essence (and not to the accidents of time and place), and unity of essence can be understood. Similarly in the text, That art thou, there is implicated an indivisible essence by abandonment of the contradictory portions (of the denotation), viz., finite cognition (which belongs to the individual soul or Thou), and infinite cognition (which belongs to the real or unindividual soul). This suggestion (the Rámánujas reply) is unsatisfactory, for there is no opposition (between This and That) in the example (This is that Devadatta), and consequently not the smallest particle of "implication" (lakshaṇá, both This and That being used in their denotative capacity). The connection of one object with two times past and present involves no contradiction. And any contradiction supposed to arise from relation to different places may be avoided by a supposed difference of time, the existence in the distant place being past, and the existence in the near being present. Even if we concede to you the "implication," the (supposed) contradiction being avoidable by supposing one term (either That or Thou) to be implicative, it is unnecessary to admit that both words are implicative. Otherwise (if we admit that both words are implicative), if it be granted that the one thing may be recognised, with the concomitant assurance that it differs as this andas that, permanence in things will be inadmissible, and the Buddhist assertor of a momentary flux of things will be triumphant.

We have, therefore (the Rámánujas continue), laid it down in this question that there is no contradiction in the identity of the individual and the Supreme Spirit, the individual spirits being the body and the Supreme Spirit the soul. For the individual spirit as the body, and therefore a form, of the Supreme Spirit, is identical with the Supreme Spirit, according to another text, Who abiding in the soul, is the controller of the soul, who knows the soul, of whom soul is the body.

Your statement of the matter, therefore, is too narrow.Allwords are designatory of the Supreme Spirit. They are not all synonymous, a variety of media being possible; thus as all organised bodies, divine, human, &c., are forms of individual spirits, so all things (are the body of Supreme Spirit), all things are identical with Supreme Spirit. Hence—

God, Man, Yaksha, Piśácha, serpent, Rákshasa, bird, tree, creeper, wood, stone, grass, jar, cloth,—these and all other words, be they what they may, which are current among mankind as denotative by means of their base and its suffixes, as denoting those things, in denoting things of this or that apparent constitution, really denote the individual souls which assumed to them such body, and the whole complexus of things terminating in the Supreme Spirit ruling within. That God and all other words whatsoever ultimately denote the Supreme Spirit is stated in the Tattva-muktávalí and in the Chaturantara—

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