FOOTNOTES:

"From nature springs the great one, from this egoism, from this the set of sixteen, and from five among the sixteen proceed the five gross elements."

(d.) The soul is neither,—as is said in the Káriká, "The soul is neither evolvent nor evolute." That is, the soul, being absolute, eternal, and subject to no development, is itself neither the evolvent nor the evolute of aught beside. Three kinds of proof are accepted as establishing these twenty-five principles; and thus the Káriká (§ 4).

"Perception, inference, and the testimony of worthy persons are acknowledged to be the threefold proof, forthey comprise every mode of demonstration. It is from proof that there results belief of that which is to be proven."

Here a fourfold discussion arises as to the true nature of cause and effect. The Saugatas[355]maintain that the existent is produced from the non-existent; the Naiyáyikas, &c., that the (as yet) non-existent is produced from the existent; the Vedántins, that all effects are an illusory emanation from the existent and not themselves really existent; while the Sáṅkhyas hold that the existent is produced from the existent.

(a.) Now the first opinion is clearly untenable, since that which is itself non-existent and unsubstantial can never be a cause any more than the hare's horn; and, again, the real and unreal can never be identical.

(b.) Nor can the non-existent be produced from the existent; since it is impossible that that which, previous to the operation of the originating cause, was as non-existent as a hare's horn should ever be produced,i.e., become connected with existence; for not even the cleverest man living can make blue yellow.[356]If you say, "But are not existence and non-existence attributes of the same jar?" this is incorrect, since we cannot use such an expression as "its quality" in regard to a non-existent subject, for it would certainly imply that the subject itself did exist. Hence we conclude that the effect is existent even previously to the operation of the cause, which only produces the manifestation of this already existent thing, just like the manifestation of the oil in sesame seed by pressing, or of the milk in cows by milking. Again, there is no example whatever to prove the production of a thing previously non-existent.

Moreover, the cause must produce its effect as being either connected with it or not connected; in the formeralternative the effect's existence is settled by the rule that connection can only be between two existent things; in the latter, any and every effect might arise from any and every cause, as there is nothing to determine the action of an unconnected thing. This has been thus put by the Sáṅkhya teacher:—"From the supposed non-existence of the effect, it can have no connection with causes which always accompany existence; and to him who holds the production of a non-connected thing there arises an utter want of determinateness." If you rejoin that "the cause, though not connected with its effect, can yet produce it, where it has a capacity of so doing, and this capacity of producing is to be inferred from seeing the effect actually produced," still this cannot be allowed, since in such a case as "there is a capacity for producing oil in sesame seeds," you cannot determine, while the oil is non-existent, that there is this capacity in the sesame seeds, whichever alternative you may accept as to their being connected or not with the oil [since our before-mentioned dilemma will equally apply here].

From our tenet that the cause and effect are identical, it follows that the effect does not exist distinct from the cause; thus the cloth is not something distinct from the threads, as it abides in the latter [as its material cause]; but where this identity is not found, there we do not find the relation of cause and effect; thus a horse and a cow are distinct from each other [for one is not produced from the other, and therefore their qualities are not the same]; but the cloth is an acknowledged effect, and therefore not anything different from its cause.[357]If you object that, if this were true, the separate threads ought to fulfil the office of clothing, we reply, that the office of clothing is fulfilled by the threads manifesting the nature of cloth when they are placed in a particular arrangement. As the limbs of a tortoise when they retire within its shell are concealed,and, when they come forth, are revealed, so the particular effects, as cloth, &c., of a cause, as threads, &c., when they come forth and are revealed, are said to be produced; and when they retire and are concealed, they are said to be destroyed; but there is no such thing as the production of the non-existent or the destruction of the existent. As has been said in the Bhagavad Gítá (ii. 16)—

"There is no existence for the non-existent, nor non-existence for the existent."

And, in fact, it is by inference from its effects that we establish the existence of the great evolvent, Nature (prakṛiti). This has been said [in the Káriká, § 9]—

"Effect exists, for what exists not can by no operation of cause be brought into existence; materials, too, are selected which are fit for the purpose; everything is not by every means possible; what is capable does that to which it is competent; and like is produced from like."[358]

Nor can we say [with the Vedántin] that the world is an illusory emanation from the one existent Brahman, because we have no contradictory evidence to preclude by its superior validity theprimâ faciebelief that the external world is real [as we have in the case of mistaking a rope for a snake, where a closer inspection will discover the error]; and again, where the subject and the attributed nature are so dissimilar as the pure intelligent Brahman and the unintelligent creation, we can no more allow the supposed attribution to be possible than in the case of gold and silver [which no one mistakes for each other]. Hence we conclude that an effect which is composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, must imply a cause similarly composed; and our argument is as follows:—The subject of the argument, viz., the external world, must have a material cause composed of happiness, misery, and stupidity, because it is itself endued therewith; whatever is endued with certain attributes must have a cause enduedwith the same,—thus a ring has gold for its material cause, because it has the attributes of gold; our subject is a similar case, therefore we may draw a similar conclusion. What we call "being composed of happiness" in the external world is the quality of goodness; the "being composed of misery" is the quality of activity;[359]the "being composed of stupidity" is the quality of darkness; hence we establish our cause composed of the three qualities (i.e.,prakṛiti, Nature). And we see that individual objects are found by experience to have these three qualities; thus Maitra's happiness is found in his wife Satyavatí, because the quality of "goodness" in her is manifested towards him; but she is the misery of her fellow-wives, because the quality of "activity" is manifested towards them; while she causes indifference to Chaitra who does not possess her, because towards him the quality of "darkness" is manifested. So, too, in other cases also; thus a jar, when obtained, causes us pleasure; when seized by others it causes us pain; but it is viewed with indifference by one who has no interest in it. Now this being regarded with no interest is what we mean by "stupidity," since the wordmohais derived from the rootmuh, "to be confused," since no direct action of the mind arises towards those objects to which it is indifferent. Therefore we hold that all things, being composed of pleasure, pain, and stupidity, must have as their cause Nature, which consists of the three qualities. And so it is declared in the Śvetáśvatara Upanishad (iv. 5)—

"The one unborn, for his enjoyment, approaches the one unborn (Nature) which is red, white, and black, and produces a manifold and similar offspring; the other unborn abandons her when once she has been enjoyed."

Here the words "red," "white," and "black," express the qualities "activity," "goodness," and "darkness," fromtheir severally possessing the same attributes of colouring, manifesting, and concealing.

Here, however, it may be objected, "But will not your unintelligent Nature, without the superintendence of something intelligent, fail to produce these effects, intellect, &c.? therefore there must be some intelligent superintendent; and hence we must assume an all-seeing, supreme Lord." We reply that this does not follow, since even unintelligent Nature will act under the force of an impulse; and experience shows us that an unintelligent thing, without any intelligent superintendent, does act for the good of the soul, just as the unintelligent milk acts for the growth of the calf, or just as the unintelligent rain acts for the welfare of living creatures; and so unintelligent Nature will act for the liberation of the soul. As it has been said in the Káriká (§ 57)—

"As the unintelligent milk acts for the nourishment of the calf, so Nature acts for the liberation of soul."

But as for the doctrine of "a Supreme Being who acts from compassion," which has been proclaimed by beat of drum by the advocates of his existence, this has well-nigh passed away out of hearing, since the hypothesis fails to meet either of the two alternatives. For does he act thusbeforeoraftercreation? If you say "before," we reply that as pain cannot arise in the absence of bodies, &c., there will be no need, as long as there is no creation, for his desire to free living beings from pain [which is the main characteristic of compassion]; and if you adopt the second alternative, you will be reasoning in a circle, as on the one hand you will hold that God created the world through compassion [as this is His motive in acting at all], and on the other hand[360]that He compassionated after He had created. Therefore we hold that the development of unintelligent Nature [even without any intelligentsuperintendent]—in the order of the series intellect, self-consciousness, &c.,—is caused by the union of Nature and Soul, and the moving impulse is the good of Soul. Just as there takes place a movement in the iron in the proximity of the unmoved magnet, so there takes place a movement in Nature in the proximity of the unmoved Soul; and this union of Nature and Soul is caused by mutual dependence, like the union of the lame man and the blind man. Nature, as the thing to be experienced, depends on Soul the experiencer; and Soul looks to final bliss, as it seeks to throw off the three kinds of pain, which, though really apart from it, have fallen upon it by its coming under the shadow of intellect through not recognising its own distinction therefrom.[361]This final bliss [or absolute isolation] is produced by the discrimination of Nature and Soul, nor is this end possible without it; therefore Soul depends on Nature for its final bliss. Just as a lame man and a blind man,[362]travelling along with a caravan, by some accident having become separated from their companions, wandered slowly about in great dismay, till by good luck they met each other, and then the lame man mounted on the blind man's back, and the blind man, following the path indicated by the lame man, reached his desired goal, as did the lame man also, mounted on the other's shoulders; so, too, creation is effected by Nature and the soul, which are likewise mutually dependent. This has been said in the Káriká (§ 21)—

"For the soul's contemplation of Nature and for its final separation the union of both takes place, as of the lame man and the blind man. By that union a creation is formed."

"Well, I grant that Nature's activity may take place for the good of the soul, but how do you account for itsceasing to act?" I reply, that as a wilful woman whose faults have once been seen by her husband does not return to him, or as an actress, having performed her part, retires from the stage, so too does Nature desist. Thus it is said in the Káriká (§ 59)—

"As an actress, having exhibited herself to the spectators, desists from the dance, so does Nature desist, having manifested herself to Soul."

For this end has the doctrine of those who follow Kapila, the founder of the atheistic Sáṅkhya School, been propounded.

E. B. C.

FOOTNOTES:[348]I borrow this term from Dr. Hall.[349]Compare Kusumáñjali, i. 4.[350]One great defect in the Sáṅkhya nomenclature is the ambiguity between the terms for intellect (buddhí) and those for mind (manas). Mádhava here applies to the former the termantaḥkaraṇaor "internal organ," the proper term for the latter. I have ventured to alter it in the translation.[351]It is singular that this is Mádhava's principal Sáṅkhya authority, and not the Sáṅkhya Sútras.[352]Vaikṛitais here a technical term meaning that goodness predominates over darkness and activity. On this Káriká, comp. Dr. Hall's preface to the Sáṅkhya-sára, pp. 30-35.[353]As produced, like them, from modified egoism. The readingsaṃkalpavikalpátmakammust be corrected by the Sáṅkhya Káriká.[354]Cf. Colebrooke Essays, vol. i. p. 256. Thetanmátraswill reproduce themselves as the respective qualities of the gross elements.[355]A name of the Buddhists.[356]I.e., the nature of a thing (Svabháva) cannot be altered—a man cannot be made a cow, nor a woman a man.[357]I takearthántaramhere as simplybhinnam(cf. Táránátha Tarkaváchaspati's note,Tattva Kaumudí, p. 47).[358]Colebrooke's translation.[359]Or "passion,"rajas.[360]In other words—on the one hand the existing misery of beings induced God to create a world in order to relieve their misery, and on the other hand it was the existence of a created world which caused their misery at all.[361]Bondage, &c., reside in the intellect, and are onlyreflectedupon soul through its proximity (cf.Sáṅkhyapravachanabháshya, i. 58).[362]This apologue is a widely spread piece of folk-lore. It is found in the Babylonian Talmud,Sanhedrim, fol. 91,b, and in the Gesta Romanorum.

[348]I borrow this term from Dr. Hall.

[349]Compare Kusumáñjali, i. 4.

[350]One great defect in the Sáṅkhya nomenclature is the ambiguity between the terms for intellect (buddhí) and those for mind (manas). Mádhava here applies to the former the termantaḥkaraṇaor "internal organ," the proper term for the latter. I have ventured to alter it in the translation.

[351]It is singular that this is Mádhava's principal Sáṅkhya authority, and not the Sáṅkhya Sútras.

[352]Vaikṛitais here a technical term meaning that goodness predominates over darkness and activity. On this Káriká, comp. Dr. Hall's preface to the Sáṅkhya-sára, pp. 30-35.

[353]As produced, like them, from modified egoism. The readingsaṃkalpavikalpátmakammust be corrected by the Sáṅkhya Káriká.

[354]Cf. Colebrooke Essays, vol. i. p. 256. Thetanmátraswill reproduce themselves as the respective qualities of the gross elements.

[355]A name of the Buddhists.

[356]I.e., the nature of a thing (Svabháva) cannot be altered—a man cannot be made a cow, nor a woman a man.

[357]I takearthántaramhere as simplybhinnam(cf. Táránátha Tarkaváchaspati's note,Tattva Kaumudí, p. 47).

[358]Colebrooke's translation.

[359]Or "passion,"rajas.

[360]In other words—on the one hand the existing misery of beings induced God to create a world in order to relieve their misery, and on the other hand it was the existence of a created world which caused their misery at all.

[361]Bondage, &c., reside in the intellect, and are onlyreflectedupon soul through its proximity (cf.Sáṅkhyapravachanabháshya, i. 58).

[362]This apologue is a widely spread piece of folk-lore. It is found in the Babylonian Talmud,Sanhedrim, fol. 91,b, and in the Gesta Romanorum.

We now set forth the doctrine of that school which professes the opinions of such Munis as Patañjali and others, who originated the system of the Theistic Sáṅkhya philosophy. This school follows the so-called Yoga Śástra promulgated by Patañjali, and consisting of four chapters, which also bears the name of the "Sáṅkhya Pravachana," or detailed explanation of the Sáṅkhya.[363]In the first chapter thereof the venerable Patañjali, having in the opening aphorism, "Now is the exposition of Concentration" (yoga), avowed his commencement of the Yoga Śástra, proceeds in the second aphorism to give a definition of his subject, "Concentration is the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle," and then he expounds at length the nature of Meditation (samádhi). In the second chapter, in the series of aphorisms commencing, "The practical part of Concentration is mortification, muttering, and resignation to the Supreme," he expounds the practical part ofyogaproper to him whose mind is not yet thoroughly abstracted (iii. 9), viz., the five external subservients or means, "forbearance," and the rest. In the third chapter, in the series commencing "Attention is the fastening [of the mind] on some spot," he expounds the three internal subservients—attention, contemplation, and meditation, collectively called by the name "subjugation" (saṃyama), and also the various superhuman powers whichare their subordinate fruit. In the fourth chapter, in the series commencing, "Perfections spring from birth, plants, spells, mortification, and meditation," he expounds the highest end, Emancipation, together with a detailed account of the five so-called "perfections" (siddhis). This school accepts the old twenty-five principles [of the Sáṅkhya], "Nature," &c.; only adding the Supreme Being as the twenty-sixth—a Soul untouched by affliction, action, fruit, or stock of desert, who of His own will assumed a body in order to create, and originated all secular or Vaidic traditions,[364]and is gracious towards those living beings who are burned in the charcoal of mundane existence.

"But how can such an essence as soul, undefiled as the [glossy] leaf of a lotus, be said to be burned, that we should need to accept any Supreme Being as gracious to it?" To this we reply, that the quality Goodness develops itself as the understanding, and it is this which is, as it were, burned by the quality Activity; and the soul, by the influence of Darkness, blindly identifying itself with this suffering quality, is also said itself to suffer. Thus the teachers have declared—

"It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the understanding and the substances belonging to Activity which torment,[365]And it is through the modification of Darkness, as wrongly identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as suffering."

"It is Goodness which suffers under the form of the understanding and the substances belonging to Activity which torment,[365]

And it is through the modification of Darkness, as wrongly identifying, that the Soul is spoken of as suffering."

It has been also said by Patañjali,[366]"The power of the enjoyer, which is itself incapable of development or of transference, in an object which is developed and transferred experiences the modifications thereof."

Now the "power of the enjoyer" is the power of intelligence, and this is the soul; and in an object which is"developed" and "transferred," or reflected,—i.e., in the thinking principle or the understanding,—it experiences the modifications thereof,i.e., the power of intelligence, being reflected in the understanding, receives itself the shadow of the understanding, and imitates the modifications of it. Thus the soul, though in itself pure, sees according to the idea produced by the understanding; and, while thus seeing at second-hand, though really it is different from the understanding, it appears identical therewith. It is while the soul is thus suffering, that, by the practice of the eight subservient means, forbearance, religious observance, &c., earnestly, uninterruptedly, and for a long period, and by continued resignation to the Supreme Being, at length there is produced an unclouded recognition of the distinction between the quality Goodness and the Soul; and the five "afflictions," ignorance, &c., are radically destroyed, and the various "stocks of desert," fortunate or unfortunate, are utterly abolished, and, the undefiled soul abiding emancipated, perfect Emancipation is accomplished.

The words of the first aphorism, "Now is the exposition of concentration," establish the four preliminaries which lead to the intelligent reader's carrying the doctrine into practice, viz., the object-matter, the end proposed, the connection [between the treatise and the object], and the person properly qualified to study it. The word "now" (atha) is accepted as having here an inceptive meaning, [as intimating that a distinct topic is now commenced]. "But," it may be objected, "there are several possible significations of this wordatha; why, then, should you show an unwarranted partiality for this particular 'inceptive' meaning? The great Canon for nouns and their gender [the Amara Kosha Dictionary] gives many such meanings. 'Athais used in the sense of an auspicious particle,—after,—now (inceptive),—what? (interrogatively),—and all (comprehensively).' Now we willingly surrender such senses as interrogation or comprehensiveness;but since there are four senses certainly suitable,i.e., 'after,' 'an auspicious particle,' 'reference to a previous topic,' and 'the inceptive now,' there is no reason for singling out thelast." This objection, however, will not stand, for it cannot bear the following alternative. If you maintain the sense of "after," then do you hold that it implies following after anything whatever, or only after some definite cause as comprehended under the general definition of causation,[367]i.e., "previous existence [relatively to the effect]"? It cannot be the former, for, in accordance with the proverb that "No one stands for a single moment inactive," everybody must always do everything after previously doing something else; and since this is at once understood without any direct mention at all, there could be no use in employing the particleathato convey this meaning. Nor can it be the latter alternative; because, although we fully grant that the practice of concentration does in point of fact follow after previous tranquillity, &c., yet these are rather the necessary preliminaries to the work of exposition, and consequently cannot have that avowed predominance [which the presumedcauseshould have]. "But why should we not hold that the wordathaimplies that this very exposition is avowedly the predominant object, and does follow after previous tranquillity of mind, &c.?" We reply, that the aphorism uses the term "exposition" (anuśásana), and this word, etymologically analysed, implies that by which theyogais explained, accompanied with definitions, divisions, and detailed means and results; and there is no rule that such an exposition must follow previous tranquillity of mind, &c., the rule rather being that, as far as the teacher is concerned, it must follow a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; for it is rather the student's desire to know and his derived knowledge, which should have quiet of mind, &c., as their precursors, in accordance with the words of Śruti: "Thereforehaving become tranquil, self-subdued, loftily indifferent, patient, full of faith and intent, let him see the soul in the soul."[368]Nor can the wordathaimply the necessary precedence, in the teacher, of a profound knowledge of the truth and a desire to impart it to others; because, even granting that both these are present, they need not to be mentioned thus prominently, as they are powerless in themselves to produce the necessary intelligence and effort in the student. Still [however we may settle these points] the question arises, Is the exposition of theyogaascertained to be a cause of final beatitude or not? If it is, then it is still a desirable object, even if certain presupposed conditions should be absent; and if it is not, then it must be undesirable, whatever conditions may be present.[369]But it is clear that the exposition in questionissuch a cause, since we have such a passage of the Śruti as that [in the Kaṭha Upanishad, ii. 12]: "By the acquirement ofyogaor intense concentration on the Supreme Soul, the wise man having meditated leaves behind joy and sorrow;" and again, such a passage of the Smṛiti as that [in the Bhagavad Gítá, ii. 53]: "The intellect unwavering in contemplation will then attainyoga." Hence we conclude that it is untenable to interpretathaas implying that the exposition must follow "after" a previous inquiry on the part of the student, or "after" a previous course of ascetic training and use of elixirs, &c. [to render the body strong].

But in the case of the Vedánta Sútras, which open with the aphorism, "Now, therefore, there is the wish to know Brahman," Śaṅkara Áchárya has declared that the inceptive meaning ofathamust be left out of the question, as the wish to know Brahman is not to be undertaken [at will]; and therefore it must be there interpreted to mean "after,"i.e., that this desire must follow a previouscourse of tranquillity, &c., as laid down by the well-known rule which enjoins the practice of tranquillity, self-control, indifference, endurance, contemplation, and faith, the object being to communicate the teaching to a proper student as distinguished by the possession of the four so-called "means."[370]

"Well, then, let us grant thatathacannot mean 'after;' but why should it not be simply an auspicious particle?" But this it cannot be, from the absence of any connection between the context and such auspicious meaning. Auspiciousness implies the obtaining of an unimpeached and desired good, and what is desired is so desired as being the attainment of pleasure or the avoidance of pain; but this auspiciousness cannot belong to the exposition ofyoga, since it is in itself neither pleasure nor the cessation of pain.[371]Therefore it cannot be at all established that the meaning of the aphorism is that "the exposition of theyogais auspicious;" for auspiciousness cannot be either the primary meaning ofathaor its secondary meaning by metonymy, since it is its very sound which is in itself auspicious [without any reference to the meaning], like that of a drum. "But why not say that just as an implied meaning may enter into the direct meaning of a sentence, so an effect [like this of auspiciousness] may also be included, since both are equally unexpressed so far as the actual words are concerned?"[372]We reply, that in the meaning of a sentence the connection must be between the meaning of one word and that of another; otherwise we should be guilty of breaking the seal which the rule of the grammarians has set, that "verbal expectancy[373]can be fulfilled bywordsalone."

"But ought not a prayer for an auspicious commencement to be put at the beginning of a Śástra, in order to lay the hosts of obstacles that would hinder the completion of the work which the author desires to begin, and also to observe the immemorial practice of the good, since it has been said by the wise, 'Those śástras become widely famous which have auspicious commencements, auspicious middles, and auspicious endings, and their students have long lives and are invincible in disputation'?[374]Now the wordathaimplies 'auspiciousness,' since there is a Smṛiti which says,

"'The wordOmand the wordatha,—these two in the ancient time,"'Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth; therefore they are both auspicious.'

"'The wordOmand the wordatha,—these two in the ancient time,

"'Cleaving the throat of Brahman, came forth; therefore they are both auspicious.'

"Therefore let the wordathastand here as signifying 'auspiciousness,' like the word 'vṛiddhi' used by Páṇini in his opening sútra 'vṛiddhir ád aich.'"[375]This view, however, is untenable; since the very wordatha, when heard, has an auspicious influence, even though it be employed to convey some other special signification, just as the hearing the sound of lutes, flutes, &c. [is auspicious for one starting on a journey]. If you still object, "How can the particleathahave any other effect, if it is specially used here to produce the idea that the meaning of the sentence is that a new topic is commenced?" we reply that it certainlycanhave such other additional effect, just as we see that jars of water brought for some other purpose are auspicious omens at the commencement of a journey.[376]Nor does this contradict the smṛiti,since the smṛiti will still hold good, as the words "they are both auspicious" mean only that they produce an auspicious effect.

Nor can the particleathahave here the meaning of "reference to a previous topic," since the previously mentioned faults will all equally apply here, as this meaning really involves that of "after" [which we have already discussed and rejected]. And again, in such discussions as this, as to whether this particularathameans "the inceptive now" or "after," if another topic had been previously suggested, then "reference thereto" would be a possible meaning; but in the present case [where no other topic has been previously suggested] it is not a possible meaning. Therefore, by exhaustion, the commentator finally adopts, for theathaof the sútra, the remaining meaning of "the inceptive now." So, when it is said [in the Táṇḍya Bráhmaṇa, xvi. 8, 1; xvi. 10, 1], "Now this is the Jyotis," "Now this is the Viśvajyotis,"[377]the particleathais accepted as signifying the commencement of the description of a particular sacrifice, just as theathain the commencement of the Mahábháshya, "now comes the exposition of words," signifies the commencement of the Institutes of Grammar. This has been declared by Vyása in his Commentary on the Yoga Aphorisms, "theathain this opening aphorism indicates a commencement;" and Váchaspati has similarly explained it in his gloss; therefore it may be considered as settled that theathahere indicates a commencement and also signifies auspiciousness. Therefore, accepting the viewthat thisathaimplies a commencement, let the student be left in peace to strive after a successful understanding of the śástra through the attainment of theyoga, which is its proposed subject, by means of the teacher's explanation of its entire purport. But here some one may say, "Does not the smṛiti of Yájñavalkya say, 'Hiraṇyagarbha is the promulgator of the Yoga, and no other ancient sage?' how then is Patañjali the teacher thereof?" We reply that it was for this reason that the venerable Patañjali,[378]that ocean of compassion, considering how difficult it was to grasp all the different forms of Yoga scattered up and down in the Puráṇas, &c., and wishing to collect together their essence, commenced hisanuśásana,—the prepositionanuimplying that it was a teaching which followed a primary revelation and was not itself the immediate origin of the system.

Since thisathain the aphorism signifies "commencement," the full meaning of the sentence comes out as follows: "be it known that the institute for the exposition of theyogais now commenced." In this institute the "object-matter," as being that which is produced by it, isyoga[or the "concentration of the mind"], with its means and its fruit; the producing this is its inferior "end;" supreme absorption (kaivalya) is the highest "end" of theyogawhen it is produced. The "connection" between the institute andyogais that of the producer and the thing to be produced; the "connection" betweenyogaand supreme absorption is that of the means and the end; and this is well known from Śruti and Smṛiti, as I have before shown. And it is established by the general context that those who aim at liberation are the duly qualified persons to hear this institute. Nor need any one be alarmed lest a similar course should be adopted with the opening aphorism of the Vedánta sútras, "Now, therefore, there is a wish to know Brahman;" andlest here, too, we should seek to establish by the general context that all persons who aim at liberation are duly qualified students of the Vedánta. For the wordatha, as there used, signifies "succession" [or "after"]; and it is a settled point that the doctrine can only be transmitted through a regular channel to duly qualified students, and consequently the question cannot arise as to whether any other meaning is suggested by the context. Hence it has been said, "When Śruti comes [as the determining authority] 'the subject-matter' and the rest have no place."[379]The full meaning of this is as follows: Where a thing is not apprehended from the Veda itself, there the "subject-matter" and the rest can establish the true meaning, not otherwise; but wherever we can attain the meaning by a direct text, there the other modes of interpretation are irrelevant. For when a thing is declared by a text of the Veda which makes its meaning obvious at once, the "subject-matter" and the rest either establish a contrary conclusion or one not contrary. Now, in the former case, the authority which would establish this contrary conclusion is [by the very nature of "śruti"] already precluded from having any force; and in the latter it is useless. This is all declared in Jaimini's aphorism [iii. 3, 14]; "A definite text, a 'sign,' the 'sentence,' the 'subject-matter,' the 'relative position,' or 'the title,'—when any of these come into collision, the later in order is the weaker because its meaning is more remote"[380][and therefore less obvious]. It has been thus summed up—

"A text always precludes the rest; the 'title' is always precluded by any of the preceding modes;"But whether any intervening one is precluded, or itself precludes, depends on circumstances."

"A text always precludes the rest; the 'title' is always precluded by any of the preceding modes;

"But whether any intervening one is precluded, or itself precludes, depends on circumstances."

Therefore [after all this long discussion] it may be now considered as settled that, since it has an "object," as well as the other preliminaries, the study of the Śástra, which teaches the Yoga, is to be commenced like that of the Vedánta, which discusses the nature of Brahman. "But," it may be objected, "it is the Yoga which was said to be the object-matter, since it is this which is to be produced, not the Śástra." We grant that the Yoga is the principal object, as that which is to be produced; but since it is produced by the Śástra, especially directed thereto, this Śástra is the means for its production, and, as a general rule, the agent's activity is directly concerned with the means rather than with the end. Just as the operations of Devadatta the woodcutter,i.e., his lifting his arm up and down, &c., relate rather to the instrument,i.e., the axe, than to the object,i.e., the tree, so here the speaker, Patañjali, in his immediate action of speaking, means the Yoga-Śástra as his primary object, while he intends the Yoga itself in his ultimate action of "denotation." In consequence of this distinction, the real meaning is that the commencing the Yogaśástra is that which primarilyclaims our attention; while the "yoga," or the restraint of the modifications of the mind, is what is to be expounded in this Sáśtra. "But as we read in the lists of roots that the rootyujis used in the sense of 'joining,' should not the wordyoga, its derivative, mean 'conjunction,' and not 'restraint'? And indeed this has been said by Yájñavalkya:[381]—

'The conjunction of the individual and the supreme souls is calledyoga.'"

This, however, is untenable, since there is no possibility of any such action,[382]&c., in either as would produce this conjunction of the two souls. [Nor, again, is such an explanation needed in order to remove the opposition of other philosophical schools]; for the notion of the conjunction of two eternal things is opposed to the doctrines of the Vaiśeshika and Nyáya schools [and therefore they would still oppose our theory]. And even if we accepted the explanation in accordance with the Mímáṃsá [or Vedánta], our Yogaśástra would be rendered nugatory by this concession [and the very ground cut from under our feet]; because the identity of the individual and supreme souls being in that school something already accomplished, it could not be regarded as something to be produced by our Śástra. And lastly, as it is notorious that roots are used in many different senses, the rootyujmay very well be used here in the sense of "contemplation."[383]Thus it has been said—

"Particles, prepositions, and roots—these three are all held to be of manifold meaning; instances found in reading are their evidence."

Therefore some authors expressly giveyujin this sense, and insert in their lists "yujin the sense ofsamádhi." Nor does this contradict Yájñavalkya's declaration, as the wordyoga, used by him, may bear this meaning; and he has himself said—

"Samádhiis the state of identity of the individual and supreme souls; this abiding absolutely in Brahman is thesamádhiof the individual soul."

It has been also said by the venerable Vyása [in his Commentary on the Yoga-sútras, i. 1], "Yoga is samádhi."

An objection however, may be here raised that "the termsamádhiis used by Patañjali [in ii. 29] in the sense of one of the eight ancillary parts[384]of the eightfold concentration (oryoga); and the whole cannot be thus itself a part as well as a whole, since the principal and the ancillary must be completely different from each other, as all their attendant circumstances must be different, just as we see in thedarśapúrṇamásasacrifices and their ancillary rites theprayájas, and thereforesamádhicannot be the meaning ofyoga." We however reply that this objection is incorrect; for although the termsamádhiis used for etymological reasons[385]to express the ancillary part which is really defined [in iii. 3] as "the contemplation which assumes the form of the object, and is apparently devoid of any nature of its own;" still the further use of this term to describe the principal state is justified by the author's wish to declare the ultimate oneness of the two states [as the inferior ultimately merges into the superior]. Nor can you hold that etymology alone can decide where a word can be used; because if so, as the wordgo, "a bull," is derived by all grammarians from the rootgam, "to go," we ought never to use the phrase "a standing bull" [as the two words would be contradictory], and the man Devadatta, when going, would properly be calledgo, "a bull;" and, moreover, the Sútra, i. 2, distinctly gives us a definite justification for employing the word in this sense when it declares that "concentration (yoga) is the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle." [The second or principal sense ofsamádhiwill therefore be quite distinct from the first or inferior.]

"But surely ifyogais held to be the suppression of the modifications of the thinking principle, then as these modifications abide in the soul as themselves partaking of the nature of knowledge, their suppression, or in other words their 'destruction,' would also abide in the soul, since it is a principle in logic that the antecedent non-existence and destruction abide in the same subject as the counter-entity to these negations;[386]and consequently in accordance with the maxim, 'This newly produced character will affect the subject in which it resides,' the absolute independence of the soul itself would be destroyed." This, however, we do not allow; because we maintain that these various modifications which are to be hindered,[387]such as "right notion," "misconception," "fancy," "sleep," and "memory" (i. 6), are attributes of the internal organ (chitta), since the power of pure intelligence, which is unchangeable, cannot become the site of this discriminative perception. Nor can you object that this unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul[388]has not been proved, since there is an argument to establish it; for the intelligent soul must be unchangeable from the fact that it always knows, while that which is not always knowing is not unchangeable, as the internal organ, &c. And so again, if this soul were susceptible of change, then, as this change would be occasional, we could not predicate its always knowing these modifications. But the true view is, that while the intelligent soul always remains as the presiding witness, there is another essentially pure substance[389]which abides always the same; and as it is this which is affected by any given object, so it is this perceptible substance which is reflected as a shadow on the soul, and so produces animpression;[390]and thus Soul itself is preserved in its own proper independence, and it is maintained to be the always knowing, and no suspicion of change alights upon it. That object by which the understanding becomes affected is known; that object by which it is not affected is not known; for the understanding is called "susceptible of change," because it resembles the iron, as it is susceptible of being affected or not by the influence or want of influence of the object which resembles the magnet,—this influence or want of influence producing respectively knowledge or the want of knowledge. "But inasmuch as the understanding and the senses which spring from egoism are all-pervading, are they not always connected with all objects, and thus would it not follow that there should be a knowledge everywhere and always of all things?" We reply that even although we grant that they are all-pervading, it is only where a given understanding has certain modifications in a given body, and certain objects are in a connection with that body, that the knowledge of these objects only, and none other, is produced to that understanding; and therefore, as this limitation is absolute, we hold that objects are just like magnets, and affect the understanding just as these do iron,—coming in contact with it through the channels of the senses. Therefore, the "modifications" belong to the understanding, not to the soul; and so says the Śruti, "Desire, volition, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, want of firmness,—all this is only the mind." Moreover, the sage Pañchaśikha declared the unchangeable nature of the intelligent soul, "The power that enjoys is unchangeable;" and so Patañjali also (iv. 18), "The modifications of the understanding are always known,—this arises from the unchangeableness of the Ruling Soul." The following is the argument drawn out formally to establish thechangeableness of the understanding. The understanding is susceptible of change because its various objects are now known and now not known, just like the organ of hearing and the other organs of sense. Now, this change is notoriously threefold,i.e., a change of "property," of "aspect,"[391]and of "condition." When the subject, the understanding, perceives the colour "blue," &c., there is a change of "property" just as when the substance "gold" becomes a bracelet, a diadem, or an armlet; there is a change of "aspect" when the property becomes present, past, or future; and there is a change of "condition" when there is a manifestation or non-manifestation[392]of the perception, as of blue, &c.; or, in the case of gold, the [relative] newness or oldness [at two different moments] would be its change of condition. These three kinds of change must be traced out by the reader for himself in different other cases. And thus we conclude that there is nothing inconsistent in our thesis that, since "right notion" and the other modifications are attributes of the understanding, their "suppression" will also have its site in the same organ.

[Our opponent now urges a fresh and long objection to what we have said above.] "But if we accept your definition that 'yogais the suppression of the modifications of thechitta,' this will apply also to 'sound sleep,' since there too we may find the suppression [or suspension] of the modifications found inkshipta,vikshipta,múḍha,[393]&c.; but this would be wrong, because it is impossible for the 'afflictions' to be abolished so long as those states calledkshipta, &c., remain at all, and because they only hinder the attainment of thesummum bonum. Let us examine this more closely. For the understanding is calledkshipta, 'restless,' when it is restless [withan excess of the qualityrajas], as being tossed about amidst various objects which engage it. It is calledmúḍha, 'blinded,' when it is possessed by the modification 'sleep' and is sunk in a sea of darkness [owing to an excess of the qualitytamas]. It is calledvikshipta, 'unrestless,' when it is different from the first state[394][as filled with the qualitysattva]." We must here, however, note a distinction; for, in accordance with the line of the Bhagavad Gítá (vi. 34), 'The mind, O Kṛishṇa, is fickle, turbulent, violent, and obstinate,' the mind, though naturally restless, may occasionally become fixed by the transient fixedness of its objects; but restlessness is innate to it, or it is produced in it by sickness, &c., or other consequences of former actions; as it is said [in the Yoga Sútras, i. 30], 'Sickness, languor, doubt, carelessness, laziness, addiction to objects, erroneous perception, failure to attain some stage, and instability,—these distractions of the mind are called "obstacles".' Here 'sickness' means fever, &c., caused by the want of equilibrium between the three humours; 'languor' is the mind's want of activity; 'doubt' is a sort of notion which embraces two opposite alternatives; 'carelessness' is a negligence of using the means for producing meditation; 'laziness' is a want of exertion from heaviness of body, speech, or mind; 'addiction to objects' is an attachment to objects of sense; 'erroneous perception' is a mistaken notion of one thing for another; 'failure to attain some stage' is the failing for some reason or other to arrive at the state of abstract meditation; 'instability' is the mind's failure to continue there, even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached. Therefore we maintain that the suppression of the mind's modifications cannot be laid down as the definition ofyoga.

We reply, that even although we allow that, so far as regards the three conditions of the mind calledkshipta,múḍha, andvikshipta, which [as being connected with the three qualities] are all to be avoided as faulty states, the suppression of the modifications in these conditions is itself something to be avoided [and so cannot be calledyoga], this does not apply to the other two conditions calledekágraandniruddha, which are to be pursued and attained; and therefore the suppression of the modifications in these two praiseworthy conditions is rightly to be considered asyoga. Now byekágrawe mean that state when the mind, entirely filled with thesattvaquality, is devoted to the one object of meditation; and byniruddhawe mean that state when all its developments are stopped, and only their latent impressions [or potentialities] remain.

Now thissamádhi, "meditation" [in the highest sense], is twofold: "that in which there is distinct recognition" (saṃprajñáta), and "that in which distinct recognition is lost" (asaṃprajñáta) [Yoga S., i. 17, 18].[395]The former is defined as that meditation where the thought is intent on its own object, and all the "modifications," such as "right notion," &c., so far as they depend on external things, are suppressed, or, according to the etymology of the term, it is where the intellect[396]is thoroughly recognised (samyak prajñáyate) as distinct from Nature. It has a fourfold division, assavitarka,savichára,sánanda, andsásmita. Now this "meditation" is a kind of "pondering" (bhávaná), which is the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is thus to be pondered is of two kinds, being either Íśwara or the twenty-five principles. And these principles also are of two kinds—senseless and not senseless. Twenty-four, including nature, intellect, egoism, &c., are senseless; that which is not senseless is Soul. Now among these objects which are to be pondered, when, having taken as the object the gross elements, as earth,&c., pondering is pursued in the form of an investigation as to which is antecedent and which consequent,[397]or in the form of a union of the word, its meaning, and the idea which is to be produced [cf. i. 42]; then the meditation is called "argumentative" (savitarka). When, having taken as its object something subtile, as the five subtile elements and the internal organ, pondering is pursued in relation to space, time, &c., then the meditation is called "deliberative" (savichára). When the mind, commingled with some "passion" and "darkness," is pondered, then the meditation is called "beatific" (sánanda), because "goodness" is then predominant, which consists in the manifestation of joy.[398]When pondering is pursued, having as its object the pure element of "goodness," unaffected by even a little of "passion" or "darkness," then that meditation is called "egoistical" (sásmita), because here personal existence[399]only remains, since the intellectual faculty becomes now predominant, and the quality of "goodness" has become quite subordinate [as a mere stepping-stone to higher things].

But the "meditation, where distinct recognition is lost," consists in the suppression of all "modifications" whatever.

"But" [it may be asked] "was not 'concentration' defined as the suppression of all the modifications? How, then, can the 'meditation where there is distinct recognition' be included in it at all, since we still find active in it that modification of the mind, with the quality of goodness predominant, which views the soul and the quality of goodness as distinct from each other?" This, however, is untenable, because we maintain that concentration is the suppression of the "modifications" of the thinking power, as especially stopping the operation of the "afflictions," the "actions," the "fructifications," and the "stock of deserts."[400]

The "afflictions" (kleśa) are well known as five, viz., ignorance, egoism, desire, aversion, and tenacity of mundane existence. But here a question is at once raised, In what sense is the wordavidyá, "ignorance," used here? Is it to be considered as anavyayíbhávacompound, where the former portion is predominant, as in the word "above-board"?[401]or is it atatpurusha[orkarmadháraya] compound, where the latter portion is predominant, as in the word "town-clerk"? or is it abahuvríhicompound, where both portions are dependent on something external to the compound, as "blue-eyed"? It cannot be the first; for if the former portion of the compound were predominant, then we should have the negation the emphatic part inavidyá(i.e., it would be an instance of what is called the express negation, orprasajya-pratishedha);[402]and consequently, asavidyáwould be thus emphatically a negation, it would be unable to produce positive results, as the "afflictions," &c., and the very form of the word should not be feminine, but neuter. It cannot be the second; for any knowledge, whatever thing's absence it may be characterised by (a+vidyá), opposes the "afflictions," &c., and cannot therefore be their source. Nor can it be the third; for then,—in accordance with the words of the author of the Vṛitti,[403]"there is abahuvríhicompound which is formed with some word meaning 'existence' used after 'not,' with the optional elision of this subsequent word"[404]—we must explain this supposedbahuvríhicompoundavidyáas follows: "Thatbuddhiis to be characterised asavidyá(sc.an adjective),of which there is not avidyáexisting." But this explanation is untenable; for such anavidyácould not become the source of the "afflictions;"[405]and yet, on the other hand, it ought to be their source,[406]even though it were associated with the suppression of all the "modifications,"[407]and were also accompanied by that discriminative knowledge of the soul and the quality of goodness [which is found in thesásmitameditation].

Now it is said [in the Yoga Sútras, ii. 4], "Ignorance is the field [or place of origin,i.e., source] of the others, whether they be dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple." They are said to be "dormant" when they are not manifested for want of something to wake them up; they are called "extenuated" when, through one's meditating on something that is opposed to them, they are rendered inert; they are called "intercepted" when they are overpowered by some other strong "affliction;" they are called "simple" when they produce their several effects in the direct vicinity of what co-operates with them. This has been expressed by Váchaspati Miśra, in his Gloss on Vyása's Commentary, in the following memorial stanza:—

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