CHAPTER VI.THE KING.

197. The Cherusci feeling the want of a king sent to Rome for a descendant of Arminius. Tac. An. xi. 17. The Heruli in Illyria having slain their king, sent to their brethren in Thule (Scandinavia) for a descendant of the blood royal. During his journey however they accepted another king from the hands of Justinian. This person and their alliance with the emperor they renounced upon the arrival of the prince from the North. Procop. Bell. Got. ii. 15. “Reges ex nobilitate, duces ex virtute summit.” Tac. Germ. vii. “Magna patrum merita principis dignationem etiam adolescentulis assignant.” Ibid. xiii. Although mere boys might be kings, they could hardly beduces, in the old Teutonic sense.

198. Möser,Osnabrückische Geschichte (1780), 1erAbschn. § 8. “Solche einzelne wohner waren Priester und Könige in ihren Häusern und Hofmarken,” etc. See his references to Tac. Germ. x. etc.

199. Genesis xiii. 6,seq.

200. Osnab. Gesch. i. § 2.

201. Ibid. i. §. 7.

202. There cannot be any doubt respecting England, where the Germanic race are not autochthonous. The organization of the Suevi may be learnt from Caesar (Bell. Gall. iv. 1, 2, 3), and Möser very justly observes that the Swabian law must necessarily have differed from the Saxon. Osnab. Gesch. i. § 7. So, to a certain degree, must the Anglosaxon from both.

203. Aristotle’s Politics, book i. cap. 1. Dahlmann, Politik, § 1, 2, 3.

204. It is of course extremely difficult to conceive this apart from the existence of a common priesthood; but such a priesthood is already the commencement of a regular state.

205. In such a case, power or force being the only term of reference, each household will be determined by that alone in its intercourse with others. If A wants a slave, he will war upon and take B, if he can: but to prevent this, B and C will unite: so that at last a regulated union is found best for all parties, in respect to themselves as a community, and against all other communities.

206. Tac. Germ. x. “Si publice consuletur, Sacerdos civitatis,sin privatim, ipse paterfamiliae, precatus Deos....” This seems to indicate, at the commencement, an independent priestly power in the paterfamilias. Compare the remarkable history in Judges, cap. xvii, xviii.

207. The only place where I can admit of such solitary settlements is Scandinavia, and even there they must have formed the exception, not the rule. See Chap. II. p. 68.

208. “Summa itaque divisio personarum hæc est, quod omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut servi.” Fleta, bk. i. cap. 1. “Est autem libertas, naturalis facultas ejus, quod cuique facere libet, nisi quod de jure aut vi prohibetur.” Ibid. cap. 2.

209. See Fleta, bk. i. cap. 5, 6, 7, 9.

210. It is probably in this sense that the Hindu Institutes assert, “Then only is a man perfect when he consists of three persons united, his wife, himself, and his son.” Manu, ch. ix. 45.

211. The converse iscollibertus,qui collum liberavit,culvert,coward.

212.Swá eác we settað be eallum hádum, ge ceorle, ge eorle: “so also we ordain concerning all degrees of men, churl as well as earl.” Leg. Ælfr. § 4.

213. Conf. Grimm, Deut. Rechtsalt. 283. The Latin laws of the Middle Ages usually adopt the words,Liber,liber homo,ingenuus. In reference to the noble, he ismediocris,minofledus, καταδεέστερος; in respect of his wife, he isbaro.

214. “Si quis liber homo migrare voluerit aliquo, potestatem habeat infra dominium regni nostri, cum fara sua, migrare quo voluerit.” Leg. Roth. 177. The free folk on the Leutkircher Heide “are free and shall have nonachjagende Herr,” (i. e.Lord hunting after them, theDominus persequensof our early law-books). Lünig. Reichsarch. p. spec. cont. 4. p. 803. See further Grimm, Deut. Rechtsalt. 286, etc.

215. Tac. Germ. xiii. A century ago gentlemen wore swords in France and England, and courtiers still wear them. The Hungarian freeman transacts no public business unarmed.

216. Lex. Fres. ii. 2.

217. There were differences in this respect among the different races, and in some, the long hair may have been confined to the noble families. Among the Saxons, however, it seems that it was also used by the free: gif freo wíf, locbore, lyswæs hwæt gedó,if a free woman, that wears long hair, do any wrong. Lex Æðelb. § 73. To cut a freeman’s hair was to dishonour him. Lex Ælfr. § 35. See also Grimm, Deut. Rechtsalt. pp. 240, 283. Eumenius speaks of the Franks as “prolixo crine rutilantes.” Paneg. Constant. c. 18.

218. “De minoribus rebus principes consultant; de majoribus omnes. Ita tamen ut ea quoque quorum penes plebem arbitrium est, apud principes pertractentur.” Tac. Germ. xi. Something similar to this probably prevailed in the Dorian constitution, and in the old Ionian before the establishment of the great democracy. The mass of the people might accept or reject, but hardly, I think, debate the propositions of the nobles. After all the πρόβουλοι seem necessary in all states. See Arist. Polit. iv. § 15.

219. In the Rígsmál, Jarl is the progenitor of all the noble races, as Karl is of the free.

CHAPTER VI.THE KING.

As the noble is to the freeman, so in some respects is the King to the noble. He is the summit of his class, and completes the order of the freemen. Even in the dim twilight of Teutonic history we find tribes and nations subject to kings: others again acknowledged no such office, and Tacitus seems to regard this state as the more natural to our forefathers. I do not think this clear: on the contrary, kingship, in a certain sense, seems to me rooted in the German mind and institutions, and universal among some particular tribes and confederacies. The free people recognize in the King as much of the national unity as they consider necessary to their existence as a substantive body, and as the representative of the whole nation they consider him to be a mediator between themselves and the gods[220]. The elective principle is the safeguardof their freedom; the monarchical principle is the condition of their nationality. But this idea of kingship is not that which we now generally entertain; it is in some respects more, in others less, comprehensive.

And here it seems necessary to recur to a definition of words. With us, a king is the source both of the military and the judicial powers; he is chief judge and general in chief; among protestants he is head of the church, and only wants the functions of high priest, because the nature of the church of Christ admits of no priestly body exclusively engaged in the sacrifices, or in possession of the exclusive secrets, of the cult[221]. But in the eye of the state, and as the head of a state clergy, he is the high priest, the authority in which ultimately even the parochial order centres and finds its completion. He is an officer of the state; the highest indeed and the noblest, but to the state he belongs as a part of itself: with us a commission of regency, a stranger or a woman may perform all the functions of royalty; the houses of parliament may limit them; a successful soldier may usurp them. With the early Germans, the king was something different from this.

The inhabitants of the Mark or Gá, however numerous or however few they may be, must always have some provision for the exigencies of peace and war. But peace is the natural or normal state, that for which war itself exists, and the institutionsproper to war are the exception, not the rule. Hence the priestly and judicial functions are permanent,—the military, merely temporary. The former, whether united in the same person, or divided between two or more, are the necessary conditions of the existence of the state as a community; the latter are merely requisite from time to time, to secure the free exertion of the former, to defend the existence of the community against the attacks of other communities.

We may admit that the father is the first priest and judge in his own household; he has, above all other, the sacerdotal secrets, and the peculiar rites, of family worship; these, not less than age, experience and the dignity of paternity, are the causes and the justification of his power. The judicial is a corollary from the sacerdotal authority. But what applies to the individual household applies to any aggregate of households: even as the family worship and the family peace require the exertion of these powers for their own maintenance and preservation, so do the public worship and the public peace require their existence, though in a yet stronger degree. From among the heads of families some one or more must be elected to discharge the all-important functions which they imply. If the solemn festivals and public rites of the god are to be duly celebrated, if the anger of the thunderer is to be propitiated, and the fruits of the earth to be blessed,—if the wounded cattle are to be healed, the fever expelled, or the secret malice of evil spirits to be defeated,—who but the priest canlead the ceremonies and prescribe the ritual? Who but he can sanctify the transfer of land, the union of man and wife, the entrance of the newborn child upon his career of life; who but himself can conduct judicial investigations, where the deities are the only guardians of truth and avengers of perjury, or where their supernatural power alone can determine between innocence and guilt[222]? Lastly, who but he can possess authority to punish the freeman for offences dangerous to the wellbeing of all freemen? To what power less than that of God will the freeman condescend to bow[223]?

How then is it to be determined to whom such power, once admitted to be necessary, shall be at first entrusted? The first claim clearly lies with those who are believed to be descended from the gods, or from the local god of each particular district[224]. They are his especial care, his children; he led them into the land, and gave them the secret of appeasing or pleasing him: he protects them by his power, and guides them by his revelations: he is their family and household god, the progenitor of their race, one of themselves; and they are thebest, indeed the only, expounders of his will. A single family, with which others have by slow degrees united themselves, by which others have been adopted, and which in process of time have thus become the nucleus of a state, will probably remain in possession of this sacerdotal power; the god of the land does not readily give place to others, and those with whom his worship identifies him will continue to be his priests long after others have joined in their ceremonies. Or it is possible that a single household wandering from a more civilized community may be admitted among a rude people, to whom they impart more perfect methods of tillage, more efficient medical precepts, more impartial maxims of law, better or more ornamental modes of architecture, or more accurate computations of time, than they had previously possessed: the mysterious courses of the stars, the secrets of building bridges[225], towers and ships, of ploughing and of sowing, of music and of healing, have been committed to them by their god: for the sake of the benefits they offer, their god is received into the community; and they remain his priests because they alone are cognizant of, and can conduct, the rites wherewith he is to be served.

Even in periods so remote as not to be confounded with those of national migrations, a small body of superior personal strength, physical beauty, mental organization, or greater skill in arms, mayestablish a preponderance over a more numerous but less favoured race: in such a case they will probably join the whole mass of the people, receiving or taking lands among them, and they will by right of their superiority constitute a noble, sacerdotal, royal race, among a race of freemen[226]. They may introduce their religion as well as their form of government, as did the Dorians in the Peloponesus. Or if, as must frequently be the case, a compromise take place, they and their god will reserve the foremost rank, although the conquered or otherwise subjected people may retain a share in the state, and vindicate for their ancient deities a portion of reverence and cult: the gods of nature, of the earth and agriculture, thus yield for a while to the supremacy of the gods of mental cultivation and warlike prowess: Demeter gives way before Apollo, afterwards however to recover a portion of her splendour: Odinn obtains the soul of the warrior and the freeman; Ðórr must content himself with that of the thrall.

In all the cases described,—to which we may add violent conquest by a migratory body, leaving only garrisons and governors behind it[227],—the family or tribe which are the ruling tribe, are those in whom the highest rank, dignity, nobility and power are inherent: but unless some peculiar circumstances,arising within the ruling tribe itself, limit the succession to the members of one household, as for example among the Jews, the sanctity of the tribe will be general and not individual. They will be alone qualified to hold the high and sacred offices; but the will of the whole state[228],i. e.popular election, must determine which particular man shall be invested with their functions. Out of the noble race the election cannot indeed be made, but the choice of the individual noble is, at first, free. This is the simplest mode of stating the problem: history however is filled with examples of compromise, where two or more noble tribes divide the supreme authority in even or uneven shares: two kings, for instance, represent two tribes of Dorians in the Spartan πολιτεια[229]. The seven great and hereditary ministerial houses in the German empire, the five great Ooloos of the Dooraunee Afghans, with their hereditary offices, represent similar facts. Among the old Bavarians, the Agilolfings could alone hold the ducal dignity, but three or four other families possessed a peculiar nobility, raising them nearly as much above the rest of the nobles,as the nobles were raised above the rest of the people. Under these circumstances the attributes of sovereignty may be continually apportioned: to one family it may belong to furnish kings or judges; to another, generals; to a third, priests[230]; or this division may have arisen in course of time, within a single family. Or again, the general may only have been chosen,pro re nata, when the necessity of the case required it, from among the judges or priests, or even from among those who were not capable by birth of the judicial or sacerdotal power. We are able to refer to an instance in support of this assertion; Beda[231]says of the Oldsaxons, that is, the Saxons of the continent: “Non enim habent regem iidem antiqui Saxones, sed satrapas plurimos, suae genti praepositos, qui, ingruente belli articulo, mittunt aequaliter sortes, et quemcumque sors ostenderit, hunc tempore belli ducem omnes sequuntur, huic obtemperant; peracto autem bello, rursum aequalis potentiae omnes fiunt satrapae.” And this throws light upon what Tacitus asserts of the Germanic races generally[232]:“Eliguntur in iisdem conciliis et principes, qui iura per pagos vicosque reddunt.”

The early separation of the judicial from the strictly sacerdotal functions, to a certain degree at least, is easily conceived. It would be mere matter of convenience, as soon as a population became numerous and widely dispersed. Yet to a very late period among the Teutons we find traces of the higher character. The ordeal or judgment of God, the casting of lots and divination, are all derived from and connected with priesthood. The heathen place of judgment was sanctified to the gods by priestly ceremonies; nor can it be supposed that the popular councils were held without a due inauguration by religious rites, or a marked exertion of authority by the priests. Tacitus speaking of these parliaments makes the intervention of the priest the very first step to business: “Ut turbae placuit, considunt armati. Silentium per sacerdotes, quibus tum et coercendi ius est, imperatur[233].” TheWitena-gemótof later times was opened by the celebration of mass[234], and even yet Mr. Speaker goes to prayers. During the flourishing period of Christianity among the Anglosaxons, synods of the bishops and their clergy were commanded to be held twice a year, to act as supreme courts of justice,at least in civil causes[235]. The law of the Visigoths, while it recognizes a separation of the persons, implies a confusion of the jurisdiction: “Si iudex vel sacerdos reperti fuerint nequiter iudicasse[236].” The people, it is true, found the judgment or verdict, but the judge declared the law, pronounced the sentence, and most probably superintended the execution: in this he represented at once the justice of the god, and the collective power of the state. Thus then we may conclude that at first in every Mark, and more especially in every Gá or Scír, when various Marks had coalesced, there was found at least one man of a privileged family, who either permanently or for a time conducted the public affairs during peace, and was, from his functions, not less than his descent, nearly connected with the religion of the people and the worship of the gods: whether this man be called ealdorman,iudex,rex,satrapaorprinceps, seems of little moment: he is the president of the freemen in their solemn acts, as long as peace is maintained, the original King of the shire or small nation. If he be by birth a priest, and distinguished by military talents, as well as elected to be a judge, he unites all the conditions of kingship[237]: and, under such circumstances, he will probably not only extend his power over neighbouring communities,but even render it permanent, if not hereditary, in his own: a similar process may take place, if the priest or judge be one, the general another, of the same household. We may conclude that the regal power grows out of the judicial and sacerdotal, and that, whether the military skill and authority be superadded or not,kingis only another name for the judge of a small circuit[238]. It is only when many such districts have been combined, when many such smaller kings have been subdued by one more wise, more wealthy, powerful or fortunate than themselves, that the complete idea of the German kingdom developes itself: that the judicial, military, and even, in part, the priestly powers sink into a subordinate position, and the kingdom represents the whole state, the freemen, the nobles, and thefolcrihtor public law of both. It is thus that the king gains the ultimate and appellate jurisdiction, the right of punishment, and the general conservancy of the peace, as well as the power of calling the freemen to arms (cyninges ban, cyninges útware). When this process has taken place the former kings have becomesubreguli,principes,duces, ealdormen: they retain their nobility, their original purity of blood, their influence perhaps over their people; but they have sunk into subordinate officers of a state, of which a king at once hereditary and elective is the head[239].

We are tolerably familiar with the fact that at least eight kingdoms existed at once in Saxon England; but many readers of English history have yet to learn that royalty was much more widely spread, even at the time when we hear but of eight, seven or six predominant kings: as this is a point of some interest, a few examples may not be amiss.

It is probable that from the very earliest times Kent had at least two kings, whose capitals were respectively Canterbury and Rochester, the seat of two bishoprics[240]. The distinction of East and West Kentings is preserved till the very downfall of the Saxon monarchy: not only do we know that Eádríc and Hlóðhere reigned together; but also that Wihtred and his son Æðelberht the Second did so[241]. Óswine is mentioned as a king of Kent during the period when our general authorities tell us of Ecgberht alone[242]; contemporary with him we have Swæbheard, another king[243], and all these extend into the period usually given to Eádríc and Hlóðhere. The later years of Æðelberht the Second must have seen his power shared with Eádberht[244],Eardwulf[245], Sigirǽd[246]and Ecgberht[247], and Sigirǽd deliberately calls himself king of half Kent. A very remarkable document of Eádbehrt is preserved in the Textus Roffensis[248]; after the king’s own signature, in which he calls himself Rex Cantuariorum, his nobles place their names, thus, “Ego Wilbaldus comites meos confirmare et subscribere feci:” and in the same words Dimheahac, Hósberht, Nothbalth, Banta, Ruta and Tidbalth sign. Now the fact of these persons havingcomitesat all is only conceivable on the supposition that they were all royal, kings or sub-kings. That they were subordinate appears from the necessity of the grant being confirmed by Æðelberht, which took place in presence of the grantor and grantee, and the Archbishop, at Canterbury. Among the kings of this small province are also named Æðelríc, Heardberht, Eádberht Pren[249]and Ealhmund[250], the last prince, father of the celebrated Ecgberht of Wessex.

Among the territories which at one time or other were incorporated with the kingdom of Mercia, one is celebrated under the name of Hwiccas: it comprised the then diocese of Worcester. This small province not only retained its king till a late period[251], but had frequently several kings at once; thusÓsric[252]and Óshere[253]; Æðelweard[254], Æðelheard[255], Æðelríc[256]and in all probability Óswudu, between an. 704-709. A few years later, viz. between an. 757 and 785, we find three brothers Eánberht[257], Ealdred[258]and Uhtred[259]claiming the royal title in the same district, while Offa their relative swayed the paramount sceptre of Mercia. That other parts of that great kingdom had always formed separate states is certain: even in the time of Penda (who reigned from 626 to 656) we know that the Middle Angles were ruled by Peada, his son[260], while Merewald, another son, was king of the West Hecan or people of Herefordshire[261]. In the important battle of Winwidfeld, where the fall of Penda perhaps secured the triumph of Christianity, we learn that thirty royal commanders fell on the Mercian side[262]. Under Æðilræd, Penda’s son and successor, we find Beorhtwald calling himself a king in Mercia[263]. During the reign of Centwine in Wessex, we hear of a king, Baldred, whose kingdom probably comprisedSussex and part of Hampshire[264]; at the same period also we find Æðilheard calling himself king of Wessex[265], and perhaps also a brother Æðilweard[266]unless this be an error of transcription. Friðuwald in a charter to the Monastery of Chertsey, mentions the followingsubregulias concurring in the grant: Ósríc, Wighard and Æðelwald[267].

There was a kingdom of Elmet in Yorkshire, and even till the tenth century one of Bamborough. The same facts might easily be shown of Eastanglia[268], Essex and Northumberland, were it necessary; but enough seems to have been said to show how numerously peopled with kings this island, alwaysfertilis tyrannorum[269], must have been in times whereof history has no record. As a chronicler of the twelfth century has very justly said, “Ea tempestate venerunt multi et saepe de Germania, et occupaverunt Eástangle et Merce sed necdum sub uno rege redacti erant. Plures autem proceres certatim regiones occupabant, unde innumerabilia bella fiebant: proceres vero, quia multi erant, nomine carent[270].”

From all that has preceded, it is clear that by the term King we must understand something very different among the Anglosaxons from the sensewhich we attach to the word: one principal difference lies indeed in this, that the notion of territorial influence is never for a single moment involved in it. The kings are kings of tribes and peoples, but never of the land they occupy,—kings of the Westsaxons, the Mercians or the Kentings, but not of Wessex, Mercia or Kent. So far indeed is this from being the case, that there is not the slightest difficulty in forming the conception of a king, totally without a kingdom:

“Solo rex verbo, sociis tamen imperitabat”[271]

is a much more general description than the writer of the line imagined. The Norse traditions are full of similar facts[272]. The king is in truth essentially one with the people; from among them he springs, by them and their power he reigns; from them he receives his name; but his land is like theirs, private property; one estate does not owe allegiance to another, as in the feudal system: and least of all is the monstrous fiction admitted even for a moment, that the king is owner of all the land in a country.

The Teutonic names for a king are numerous and various, especially in the language of poetry; many of them are immediately derived from the words which denote the aggregations of the people themselves: thus from þeód, we have the Anglosaxonþeóden; fromfolc, the Old NorseFylkr; but the term which, among all the Teutons, properlydenotes this dignity, is derived from the fact which Tacitus notices, viz. the nobility of the king: the Anglosaxoncyningis a direct derivative from the adjectivecyne,generosus, and this again fromcyn,genus[273].

The main distinction between the king and the rest of the people lies in the higher value set upon his life, as compared with theirs: as thewergyldor life-price of the noble exceeds that of the freeman or the slave, so does the life-price of the king exceed that of the noble. Like all the people he has a money value, but it is a greater one than is enjoyed by any other person in the state[274]. So again his protection (mund) is valued higher than that of any other: and the breach of his peace (cyninges handsealde frið) is more costly to the wrong-doer. He is naturally the president of theWitena-gemótand the ecclesiastical synod, and the supreme conservator of the public peace.

To the king belonged the right of calling out the national levies, theposse comitatus, for purposes of attack or defence; the privilege of recommending grave causes at least to the consideration of the tribunals; the reception of a certain share of the fines legally inflicted on evil-doers, and of voluntary gifts from the free men; and as a natural and rapid consequence, the levy of taxes and the appointment of fiscal officers. Consonant with his dignity werethe ceremonies of his recognition by the people, and the outward marks of distinction which he bore: immediately upon his election he was raised upon a shield and exhibited to the multitude, who greeted him with acclamations[275]. Even in heathen times it is probable that some religious ceremony accompanied the solemn rite of election and installation: the Christian priesthood soon caused the ceremony of anointing the new king, perhaps as head of the church, to be looked upon as a necessary part of his inauguration. To him were appropriated the waggon and oxen[276]; in this he visited the several portions of his kingdom, traversed the roads, and proclaimed his peace upon them; and I am inclined to think, solemnly ascertained and defined the national boundaries[277],—a duty symbolical in some degree, of his guardianship of the private boundaries. Among all the tribes there appear to have been some outward marks of royalty, occasionally or constantly borne: the Merwingian kings were distinguished by their long and flowing hair[278], the Goths by a fillet or cap; among the Saxons thecynehelm, or cynebeáh, a circle of gold, was in use, and worn round the head. In the Ðing or popular council he bore a wand or staff: in wartime he was preceded by a banner or flag. The most precious however of all the royal rights, and a very jewel in the crown, was the power to entertain acomitatusor collection of household retainers, a subject to be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

The king, like all other freemen, was a landed possessor, and depended for much of his subsistence upon the cultivation of his estates[279]. In various parts of the country he held lands in absolute property, furnished with dwellings and storehouses, in which the produce of his farms might be laid up, and from one to another of which he proceeded, as political exigencies, caprice, or the consumption of his hoarded stock rendered expedient. In each villa or wíc was placed a bailiff,villicus,wícgeréfa, whose business it was to watch over the kings interests, to superintend the processes of husbandry, and govern the labourers employed in production; above all to represent the king as regarded the freemen and the officers of the county court.

The lot, share, or, as we may call it, τεμενος of the king, though thus divided, was extensive, and comprised many times the share of the freeman. We may imagine that it originally, and under ordinary circumstances would be calculated upon the same footing as thewergyld; that if the life of the king was seventy-two times as valuable as that of the ceorl, his land would be seventy-two times as large; if the one owned thirty, the other would enjoy 2160 acres of arable land. But thecomitatusoffers a disturbing force, which, it will hereafter be seen, renders this sort of calculation nugatory in practice; and the experience of later periods clearly proves the king to have been a landowner in a very disproportionate degree. In addition to the produce of his own lands, however, the king was entitled to expect voluntary gifts in kind,naturalia, from the people, which are not only distinctly stated by Tacitus[280]to have been so given, but are frequently referred to by early continental historians[281]. In process of time, when these voluntary gifts had been converted into settled payments or taxes, further voluntary aids were demanded, upon the visit of a king to a town or country, themarriage of a princess, or of the king himself, and other public and solemn occasions; from which in feudal times arose the custom of demanding aids from the tenants to knight the lord’s son or marry his daughter.

Another source of the royal revenue was a share of the booty taken in war, where the king and the freemen served together. The celebrated story of Clovis and the Soissons vase[282], proves that the king received his portion by lot, as did the rest of his army; but there is no reason to doubt that his share as much exceeded that of his comrades, as hiswergyldand landed possessions were greater than theirs.

As conservator of the public peace, the king was entitled to a portion of the fines inflicted on criminals, and the words in which Tacitus mentions this fact show that he was in this function the representative of the whole state[283]: it is a prerogative derived from his executive power. And similar to this is his right to the forfeited lands of felons, which, if they were to be forfeited, could hardly be placed in other hands than those of the king, as representative of the whole state[284].

In proportion as this idea gains ground, the influence of the king in every detail of public life necessarily increases, and the regalia or royal rights become more varied and numerous: he is looked upon as the protector of the stranger, who has no other natural guardian, inasmuch as no stranger can be a member of any of those associations which are the guarantee of the freeman. He has the sole right of settling the value and form of the medium of exchange: through his power of calling out the armed force, he obtains rights which can only consist with martial law,—even the right of life and death[285]: the justice of the whole country flows from him: the establishment of fiscal officers dependentupon himself places the private possessions of the freeman at his disposal. The peculiar conservancy of the peace, and command over the means of internal communication enable him to impose tolls on land- and water-carriage: he is thus also empowered to demand the services of the freemen to receive and conduct travelling strangers, heralds or ambassadors from one royal vill to another; to demand the aid of their carts and horses to carry forage, provisions or building-materials to his royal residence. Treasure-trove is his, because where there is no owner, the state claims the accidental advantage, and the king is the representative of the state. It is part of his dignity that he may command the aid of the freemen in his hunting and fishing; and hence that he may compel them to keep his hawks and hounds, and harbour or feed his huntsmen. As head of the church he has an important influence in the election of bishops, even in the establishment of new sees, or the abolition of old established ones. His authority it is that appoints the duke, the geréfa, perhaps even the members of the Witena-gemót. Above all, he has the right to divest himself of a portion of these attributes, and confer them upon those whom he pleases, in different districts.

The complete description of the rights of Royalty, in all their detail, will find a place in the Second Book of this work; they can only be noticed cursorily here, inasmuch as they appertain, in strictness, to a period in which the monarchical spirit, and the institutions proper thereto, had become firmlysettled, and applied to every part of our social scheme. But whatever extension they may have attained in process of time, they have their origin in the rights permitted to the king, even in the remotest periods of which we read.

There cannot be the least doubt that many of them were usurpations, gradual developments of an old and simple principle; and it is only in periods of advanced civilization that we find them alluded to. Nevertheless we must admit that even at the earliest recorded time in our history, the kings were not only wealthy but powerful far beyond any of their fellow-countrymen. All intercourse with foreign nations, whether warlike or peaceful, tends to this result, because treaties and grave affairs of state can best be negotiated and managed by single persons: a popular council may be very properly consulted as to the final acceptance or rejection of terms; but the settlement of them can obviously not be beneficially conducted by so unwieldy a multitude. Moreover contracting parties on either side will prefer having to do with as small a number of negotiators as possible, if it be only for the greater dispatch of business. Accordingly Tacitus shows us, on more than one occasion, the Senate in communication with the princes, not the populations of Germany[286]: and this must naturally be the case where the aristocracy, to whose body theking belongs, have the right of taking the initiative in public business[287].

But although we find a great difference in the social position, wealth and power of the king, and those of the noble and freeman, we are not to imagine that he could at any time exercise his royal prerogatives entirely at his royal pleasure[288]: held in check by the universal love of liberty, by the rights of his fellow nobles, and the defensive alliances of the freemen[289], he enjoyed indeed a rank, a splendour and an influence which placed him at the head of his people,—a limited monarchy, but happier than a capricious autocracy: and the historian who had groaned over the vices and tyranny of Tiberius, Nero and Domitian, could give the noble boon of his testimony to the eternal memory of thebarbarousArminius.

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