Sept. 26th, 1918.—Sept. 29th, 1918.
A great effort was to be made to break the Hindenburg Line. Preliminary orders received on September 26th were to the effect that the 46th Division, as part of a major operation (simultaneous attacks by the British and French taking place at several other points), would at an early date cross the St. Quentin Canal between Bellenglise and Riquerval Bridge, and capture the Hindenburg Line. The general scheme was that the 137th Brigade were to capture the canal and hold the crossings, advancing as far as the "Brown Line" shown on the map, whilst the 139th Brigade on the right and 138th Brigade on the left, were to pass through them and consolidate up to and including the "Green Line." If all went well the 32nd Division were to pass through and make further progress. The 1st Division were to protect our right flank, where the enemy were still occupying a large area of ground which might be decidedly dangerous to us, and in the event of the enemy withdrawing, they were to follow up and, if possible, capture Thorigny and the high ground round about it. On our left the 30th American Division, attached to the Australian Corps, were to seize the Bellicourt Tunnel (where the canal ran underground) and continue the attack in that direction. Tanks were to cross the canal by passing over the tunnel and come down to operate with the 138th and 139th Brigades and help them to reach their objectives.
Inorder to improve our position the 138th Brigade, who were holding the line running along the high ground just East of "Victoria Cross Roads," carried out an attack on September 27th against the German trenches on the high ground North-East of "Chopper Ravine." This was successful and the trenches were handed over to the 137th Brigade. Unfortunately, the following morning the enemy delivered a heavy counter-attack against the Staffords, and recovered so much ground that at night the latter had to withdraw from the portions still held and come back to our original line. This set-back, however, had no ill result.
Our preparations had to be made on the assumption that the attack would take place on the early morning of Sunday, September 29th, as it did.
From the line held by the Division it was possible to get a good view of the canal and the ground beyond for some distance, and such reconnaissance as could be carried out in the time at our disposal was made by observation from this line.
The St. Quentin Canal, Bellenglise—looking North—1918.
The St. Quentin Canal, Bellenglise—looking North—1918.]
Running diagonally across the front, through No Man's Land, down the slope to the Riquerval Bridge, on the left, was a narrow road known as "Watling Street." Immediately in front of our trenches was the ridge which we had had to evacuate, and from there the land again sloped down to the canal. Immediately the other side of the canal was the village of Bellenglise, about three-quarters-of-a-mile from our present front line, but looking much closer. The canal ran in a cutting, into which it was not possible to see, but from descriptions obtained from various sources it appeared that it had steep banks twelve to eighteen yards deep, and we were told that where there was water we might expect it to be seven to eight feet deep. As a matter of fact the canal in some parts was quite dry, and in other parts the water was held up by big dams of concrete. When we did properlysee it, it appeared to be more or less derelict. On the right towards Bellenglise it was mostly dry. Rising from the canal on the other side was a fairly gradual, but none the less decided, slope for some distance, fortified with lines of trenches, barbed wire and concrete machine gun emplacements, apparently a most unpromising position to attack—indeed, we thought it impregnable, and no doubt the Boche did so, too. It was an ideal spot for concealed dug-outs all along the canal banks. Many were found there, and Bellenglise itself contained a wonderfully constructed tunnel, estimated to be capable of holding at least a thousand men.
The problem of dealing with any water that might be found in the canal was a difficult but important one, as every preparation had to be made for getting across on the assumption that all the bridges would be destroyed. Accordingly the 137th Brigade were equipped with a number of collapsible boats and rafts, also mats for getting across any soft mud they might encounter, whilst almost at the last moment, numbers of lifebelts were sent up for their use, taken from the leave boats.
As it was doubtless realised that this great stronghold would require pounding almost to atoms, arrangements were made for getting together what must have been the largest array of guns that ever was collected, at any rate in such a short space of time. Battery after battery of every known calibre took up positions in one or other of the ravines and valleys behind the line. Indeed, there seemed no room for them all and many of them were practically in the open.
Behind the line an immense amount of railway and road work was being carried out in order to maintain supplies. Probably the most interesting piece of work was the relaying of the railway line from Roizel to Vermand, preparatory to its being continued into St. Quentinas soon as the latter should be liberated. We enjoyed watching the Canadian Engineers at work rebuilding bridges and bringing up and relaying fresh sleepers and metals, all the old ones having been removed by the enemy for several miles. The rapid reconstruction of the line was of vital importance, as it would form the main source of transport for all our supplies.
On the night of September 27/28th, we moved from bivouacs near Vendelles, and marched to our preliminary assembly position in some trenches near "Red Wood," about half-a-mile North-West of that well-known landmark "The Tumulus," a high chalk mound from which an excellent view could be obtained, but where it was not wise to pause to admire the scenery. Battalion Headquarters was in a dug-out at "Hudson's Post," between Red Wood and the "Twin Craters." This move was carried out without casualty, but the very dark night, coupled with a certain amount of gas shelling, and the absence of good guiding marks, made going somewhat difficult. A section from the 139th Trench Mortar Battery, which was to be attached to us for the battle, joined us just before the move.
The attack was to be carried out under a creeping barrage, and the objective allotted to us was the "Yellow Line" East of Bellenglise. The frontage allotted to the Battalion was about 1,200 yards, and the advance in its final stages was to be carried out with two Companies in the front line and two in support. In each case there were to be three Platoons leading, with one in support, each front Platoon thus having a frontage of about 200 yards. The distance between front and support Companies was to be 200 to 250 yards. The Artillery barrage was to move at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes, making long pauses after each objective had been gained in order to allow time for the rear troops to continue the advance. A machine gun barragealso was to be fired during the opening stages of the attack, and for this purpose our Divisional Battalion was strengthened by the addition of the 2nd Life Guards Machine Gun Battalion and the 100th Machine Gun Battalion. By a happy coincidence some South Notts. Yeomanry were included amongst these Machine Gunners. The Royal Engineers and Monmouth Pioneers, detailed to put emergency bridges on cork piers across the canal for foot traffic and artillery, were to follow in rear of the 137th Brigade, and immediately in front of us. Second Lieut. Davis with ten men was to keep touch with the last Battalion of the 137th Brigade, whilst 2nd Lieut. Plant was detailed to act as Liaison Officer with the 137th Brigade Headquarters. Second Lieut. Bradish was to do similar duty with the 139th Brigade, and 2nd Lieut. Winter with the 6th Battalion, who were to follow immediately behind us, the 5th Battalion bringing up the rear. Guides from each Company were detailed to follow the 137th Brigade and direct their Companies to the canal crossings. Flags were to be carried to mark Battalion and Company Headquarters. In addition to red flares for notifying the position of the advanced troops to our 'contact aeroplanes,' a number of tin discs were issued, which were to be waved by the men carrying them so as to catch the eye of the Observers. "Success Signals"—rifle grenades bursting into "white over white over white"—were to be fired by the leading Companies as soon as they reached their objective. Pack transport was arranged in readiness for taking forward ammunition, water and other supplies, if required, as soon as it was possible to get them across the canal.
Enough and more than enough work was entailed in all these details to keep us busy during the short time available before the attack. Nevertheless all was ready by the appointed time, and about 3 a.m. on the morning ofSeptember 29th, after a most welcome issue of rum, which fortunately arrived just in time, we began to move into our final assembly position on the Eastern side of "Ascension Valley." The valley never had been a place to linger in, as most nights and early mornings the Hun was in the habit of treating it liberally with high explosive and gas shells, and this occasion was no exception, a combination of the two making things very unpleasant. Further, it was a dark night, and, worse than all, a dense fog came down over everything, so that movement over these more or less open spaces with little or nothing to guide us was extremely difficult. However, in the end everyone got into position in good time and without accident. Fortunately most of the shells were then passing over us into the valley behind. Companies were drawn up as follows: Right Front (A Company), Capt. Thomas; Left Front (B Company), 2nd Lieut. Bloor; Right Support (C Company), Lieut. Cairns, in the absence of Capt. Miners on leave; Left Support (D Company), Capt. White. Capt. C. P. Elliott was acting as Second-in-Command, Major Andrews being away on leave.
Zero was fixed for 5.50 a.m., at which time the 137th Brigade were to advance from our front line. At the same time the 1st Division were to advance so as to protect our right flank up to a point near Bellenglise Bridge.
Promptly at Zero an uncanny stillness was broken by an inferno of noise. With a din and roar that can never be forgotten by those who heard it, one of the greatest concentrations of artillery the World had ever seen came into action. The crash and rattle were appalling. Sandwiched as we were, with machine guns blazing away just in front, and 18-pounders belching out fire just behind, it was perfect pandemonium. Speech was impossible. Though it was now practically daylight the fog was so intense that you could not see a yard infront of you. All over the battlefield it was the same. We could only imagine the difficulty with which the Staffords were going, if they were going at all, and we could see nothing. Our right Company, A, had been detailed to assist that Brigade to mop up the enemy trenches West of the canal, and on completion re-form in the old German front line, and await the arrival of the other Companies. This Company advanced in Artillery formation as soon as the machine guns ceased firing, about 15 minutes after Zero, and reached these trenches without accident. Little was found to be done there, and having distributed themselves in the trenches, they awaited the time for the general advance to begin. The rest of the Battalion moved forward at the same time in a similar formation to "Nib" and "Quill" trenches on "Hélène Ridge." Even for this short move direction could only be maintained by means of compasses. We made ourselves as comfortable as possible there, as we knew that we should have some time to wait before advancing further. In any case we were not to move without orders from Brigade Headquarters, and it was not intended that we should be involved in the actual fighting until the 137th Brigade were East of the canal, and then probably not for some time unless they were in difficulties. The Boche had put down a counter-barrage directly after our attack began, and a certain number of shells and some machine gun bullets fell about the ridge where we were, but caused us little inconvenience.
In spite of the fog wounded men were finding their way back, and odd lots of German prisoners were being brought back by escorts of Staffords. How they did it we never quite knew, but it was reported that in one case the escort of a party of prisoners having been lost in the fog, got a captured German Officer to act as guide by marching due West on a compass bearing! Forover three hours we were unable to get any definite news as to the progress of the battle. The first official message which reached our Brigade Headquarters to the effect that the 137th Brigade were across the canal, arrived at 8.30 a.m., and orders were at once sent to the three Battalions to get on the move and keep in close touch. Unfortunately our telephone line to Brigade Headquarters was broken, and the message had to be sent by runners, who after experiencing the greatest difficulty owing to the fog, eventually reached us at 9.37 a.m. Orders were sent to Companies as quickly as possible, and we moved off again in artillery formation, keeping direction with our compasses. Progress, of course, was extremely slow. By the time we reached the canal, which seemed much further away than we had imagined, the fog began to clear and caused us no more trouble. The canal was crossed by plank foot bridges, which, fortunately, were still more or less intact, and Companies pushed on in a direction practically half-right towards the villages of Bellenglise on the right and La Baraque on the left.
Here our first real fighting began, considerable opposition being met with from isolated snipers and machine gun posts, particularly on the right, where A Company had a very rough time. Two Platoons of that Company, under 2nd Lieuts. Bradwell and Shackleton, worked their way along the bend of the canal sheltered by a large ditch, and rushed several "pill-boxes" from the rear. At one large concrete dug-out a Boche was discovered just emerging with his machine gun ready to fire. Bradwell stopped him with a revolver bullet through the chest. The bullet went through the next man behind him as well, and finished by lodging in the throat of a third—a very useful shot! A little later the same Officer got a sniper, who was obstinately holding up the advance with a small group ofmen, by a rifle bullet neatly placed between the eyes at 300 yards. The left of A Company also met with opposition from machine gun nests in the ruins of the houses. Thomas himself, in rushing one machine gun, had no time to draw his revolver, but put one Boche out of action by a kick under the jaw. C Company reinforced A and shared with them the clearing of Bellenglise, but in doing so they also had a bad time. Stanley Cairns led them with great dash, only to be killed in an attack on a group of Boches who were holding up the left of A Company. They were, however, eventually rushed and all bayoneted. On the left some of B Company lost direction and strayed over to the 138th Brigade. Though the resistance on this flank was not so great it was not altogether easy going, and there was considerable shelling and machine gun fire. Bloor, in command, got badly wounded, and Rawding, his very gallant Comp. Sergt.-Major also fell, dying the next day. Mobilised with the Battalion he went out with it as a Private and won promotion by sheer merit. All ranks of the Battalion had the greatest regard for him and his loss was very keenly felt. D Company, under Capt. White, ably assisted by 2nd Lieut. Smith, acting as Second-in-Command, also gave a hand in the mopping up. Casualties were, of course, mounting, as there was heavy shelling going on most of the time, particularly on the Eastern edge of Bellenglise. Eventually, however, the village was cleared and we got to our next starting-point, the "Brown Line," with our right on the canal, at 11.30 a.m. This was only ten minutes after our scheduled time which, considering the almost insuperable difficulties caused by the fog, must be considered excellent. It meant, of course, that our barrage, which advanced again at 11.20 a.m. (five-and-a-half hours after Zero) was slightly ahead of us, but that was now too late to be altered and we had to make the best of it.
Atthis point we were to have been joined by a Company of five Tanks, but they had not turned up. They arrived, however, a little later and were going forward to help the attack of the 6th Battalion, who followed us, when they were put out of action by enemy field guns firing from South of the canal and at point blank range. Our final advance, therefore, had to be continued without their help. We moved off this time in extended order and met with little opposition, though there was considerable machine gun fire from the South side of the canal, which was not particularly accurate and did little damage. We reached our final objective about 12.15 p.m., only a few minutes after scheduled time, and the 6th Battalion immediately pushed on through us.
Our right flank was somewhat exposed, as the enemy were still holding the ground South of the canal, and one or two feeble attempts at counter-attacks were made from that direction, but were easily broken up. The 1st Division had been unable to advance to connect across with us at Bellenglise, but by their demonstration they doubtless prevented the enemy from concentrating for a counter-attack in that quarter, which was a decidedly weak spot.
Our advance had been extremely rapid and to a certain extent our success was due to that fact. The enemy in many cases were taken before they had time to get to their battle positions. At the same time every member of the Battalion was determined to "get there." Particularly good work was done by Sergt. Peach, who was acting Comp. Sergt.-Major of C Company, and himself accounted for three of the enemy at one post, by Sergt. Oldham, Lance-Sergts. Field and Illger, and Corpl. Slater, when in temporary command of Platoons, also by Sergt. Claxton, Corpls. Gadsby, Skelton and W. Foster, L.-Corpl. R. Harvey. andPvtes. Cook, Titmus, Welbourne and Stapleton. Communication throughout the day was almost entirely by runners, who had an exceptionally strenuous time, but in spite of all their difficulties they never failed to get their messages through. Specially valuable work was done in this respect by Pvtes. B. Smithurst, Feighery, Sully, Colton and Parker. The Signallers had a thankless task in trying to keep their lines repaired. A special word of praise is due to L.-Corpl. J. North for his work in this connection. The Medical Officer, Capt. Homan, had a difficult task in attending to the wounded in open trenches and often under heavy shell fire. He got great help from Padre Sturt, who was always rendering faithful service, and from a willing band of Stretcher Bearers, who worked unceasingly throughout the battle, notably Corpl. Wrigglesworth and Pvtes. Westnidge and Green. Comp. Sergt.-Major Stokes, who was acting as Regt.-Sergt.-Major, was also of the greatest service in looking after ammunition and other stores.
The sight presented by the enemy defences East of the canal gave no room for doubt that our guns had done most deadly work. The ground was literally torn to pieces, trenches and wire being blown to atoms in all directions, and there seemed to be scarcely a spot that had not been touched.
The prisoners taken by us numbered something like 300. There is no doubt that our bombardment had caused many of them to become more or less senseless. In many cases all they did was to retire to their dug-outs and await the end. Full dug-outs emptied themselves at the first word, and poured out their garrisons, which were as quickly marshalled by our men and led off to the prisoner cages in batches, 50 or more in a batch, and very often not more than one of our men in charge. In addition to prisoners we captured over 40 machine guns and 10 trench mortars. Gunsdid not come within our province, as they were all beyond our objective.
Our casualties, considering all things, were small, and this was doubtless due to the great rapidity with which the advance had been carried out. In addition to the two Officer casualties, our losses during the day were 14 other ranks killed and 80 wounded.
The battlefield after the fog lifted presented a sight never to be forgotten. On the left, Tanks could be seen working their way along the German trenches, followed by groups of Infantry, who at once took possession of the ground gained. Behind, guns were limbering up and being got forward to fresh positions; pack ponies and limbers were being taken up with ammunition; parties of Boche prisoners were wending their way back from the front areas in batches of 10's, 20's, up to 200 or more, presenting a very bedraggled appearance. Many of them had been requisitioned for duty at the forward aid posts and were carrying back our wounded. Add to the whole, shells bursting here and there—one knew not when or where the next was coming and didn't care—and some idea may be formed of what the battlefield of Bellenglise looked like. It was like an enormous circus.
The 138th Brigade on the left met with equal success, but North of them the attack did not go so well, and at the end of the day the Australians and Americans, though in a satisfactory position for continuing the attack, were considerably behind their objective.
During the afternoon the 32nd Division came moving over the back areas by Companies in artillery formation and pushed on through us, but there was no time that day for them to make any fresh attacks, and they had to be content with putting out outposts. There is no doubt that could their attack have been pushed on at once the fighting of the next few days would not have beennecessary. As it was our line did not get further than the final objective of the 5th Battalion, and further preparation was required to push the Boche from the few remaining points that he still held in the Hindenburg Line. By the victory of the 46th Division on September 29th the main portion of that line had been absolutely smashed and the last great turning-point in the war passed, and from now onwards the final defeat of the enemy was but a matter of days. It must be confessed that the fog, which lasted practically the whole morning, largely accounted for our success. Without it it is very difficult to conceive how we could have managed to get possession of the canal and the high ground on the East of it. A naturally strong defensive line itself, it formed with the addition of the artificial defences made by the enemy, an almost impregnable position. General Headquarters thought itwasimpregnable.
It has since transpired that our fears that our attack was only in the nature of a "demonstration" were only too well founded, as it appears to be a fact that we were not expected to cross the canal at all. Lieut.-General Sir John Monash, who commanded the Australian Corps on our left, referring in his book, "The Australian Victories in France in 1918,"[1]to the action of September 29th, says:—
"Quite early in the day news came in that the IX Corps on my right hand had achieved an astonishing success, that Bellenglise had been captured, and that the deep canal had been successfully crossed in several places. It was the 46th Imperial Division to which this great success was chiefly due.——There can be no doubt that this success, conceived at first as a demonstration to distract attention from the Australian Corps' front, materially assisted me in the situation in which I was placed later on the same day."
Foronce General Headquarters' arrangements for the 46th Division miscarried.
Sappers got the Riquerval Bridge fit for transport early in the afternoon, and by 3.0 p.m. guns and other horse transport were passing over it. Later in the evening, after the 32nd Division had got clear, some of our Transport and cookers came up, and our hardworking Quarter-Master-Sergts. brought us very welcome and much-needed refreshment after a most strenuous day.
Sept. 30th, 1918.—October 4th, 1918.
September 30th was spent in dug-outs and trenches in the region of our objective of the previous day, between Bellenglise and Lehaucourt. Early that morning the 1st Division advanced and occupied Thorigny and Talana Hill, South of the canal, thus securing our right flank, the retreating enemy offering splendid targets for our Lewis guns. The same day St. Quentin fell to the French.
In the afternoon the 32nd Division moved forward to the attack, supported by Cavalry, which it was hoped it would be possible to use if the Infantry broke through the last remaining fragment of the Hindenburg Line. This was known as the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line and ran more or less North and South about midway between Joncourt and Ramicourt. It consisted of a strong barbed wire entanglement and a double line of shallow trenches about a foot deep, with concrete machine gun emplacements every 50 yards. The whole was in a very incomplete state, but at the same time constituted a strong line of defence. Unfortunately the 32nd Division were unable to break this line, which the enemy were holding in force. Similarly, the 1st Division on the right were unable to make any further progress, and the 2nd Australian Division met with no greater success on the left. In consequence the Cavalry had to withdraw behind the canal.
The arrival of the Cavalry a few days previously behind our lines had presented one of the most picturesque scenes one could wish to see. Two abreast theycame in almost endless streams along the roads and side-tracks and passed on to forward positions behind the canal, and the sight was one never to be forgotten. Not less wonderful, perhaps, was the unceasing flow of transport of every conceivable kind backwards and forwards along the Vadencourt-Bellenglise Road. The surface of the road was in excellent condition and in an incredibly short period the Sappers, who were now having very strenuous times, erected an Inglis bridge over the canal at Bellenglise, capable of carrying lorries and guns of all calibres. The way all this work was pushed on was little short of marvellous, and one could not help being struck by the enormous amount of organisation it all entailed, and the care with which every detail connected with the advance had been arranged.
The 139th Brigade were now temporarily attached to the 32nd Division, whilst the 137th and 138th Brigades were concentrated near the canal. We were supposed at this moment to be ready either for another battle or for moving forward according to the ordinary rules of warfare, with advanced guards and so on, if the enemy should give way. Preliminary orders were indeed received that portions of the Brigade were to be employed as Advanced Guard to the Corps, with their objective as Le Cateau.
With the object, therefore, of reorganising as far as possible, we were withdrawn from our position near Lehaucourt on October 1st, and moved about a mile North, to the trench system in "Springbok Valley," just behind Magny la-Fosse. On the same day the Transport, Quarter-Master's Stores and Battle Details which had previously moved to a field near "Hart Copse," a few hundred yards North-West of the Twin Craters, moved further forward and established themselves in Chopper Ravine, near the canal. This was nota specially comfortable spot, and the Quarter-Master's Department was constantly put out of order by the arrival from time to time of odd shells from a German long-range gun. Several of the riding horses, the cookers and some of the ammunition and Lewis gun limbers were up with the Battalion, so that the amount of transport left behind was not great. Both men and horses were now having a most strenuous time, and we were lucky at this juncture in getting back Capt. A. Bedford from a tour of duty at home. He arrived on September 29th and was at once appointed Transport Officer. We had been obliged to leave behind at Bernes large quantities of stores, including packs and Lewis gun tin boxes, owing to lack of transport, and it was a most trying business, when everyone was wanting lorries, to get the extra transport necessary to bring them along. To make matters worse the Hun was just now particularly active with his aeroplanes, and with fine nights he made frequent trips over our lines, dropping bombs. When the nights were very dark he often used to let off brilliant white parachute lights, and as they descended he was able to get some view of the roads and transport lines and any movement there might be. Usually he flew extremely low, and there is no doubt that he did considerable damage; especially as there were such masses of troops and transport concentrated in a particularly small area. We unfortunately lost several horses, but casualties amongst personnel were insignificant. His best bombing effort was on the evening of October 3rd. Having evidently seen a large party of men near La Baraque cross-roads, the airman promptly made for them and let loose two bombs, which fell right amongst them. Between 40 and 50 were blown to bits, whilst nearly as many were badly wounded, and the rest scared out of their wits. What the airman doubtless did not know was that they were a party of Bocheprisoners! Only about six British soldiers were killed. It made a ghastly mess at the cross-roads, which was a most uninviting spot to pass for days afterwards.
During the short time at our disposal we did the best we could to reorganise our somewhat reduced forces. In spite of our losses at Bellenglise we still had 46 Officers and 752 other ranks, so were fairly well off. Second Lieut. Winter was put in command of B Company, and Capt. Miners, who had just returned from leave, resumed command of C.
On October 2nd orders were received that we were to take part in another big attack in conjunction with the 2nd Australian Division. Our Divisional Commander only received his orders for this attack at 4.30 p.m. on that day, and the operation was to take place early the next morning, so that there was very little time to get orders passed to the lower commanders and the necessary arrangements made. The orders were explained by the Brigade Commander to Battalion Commanders at a conference at Brigade Headquarters at Magny-la-Fosse about 9 p.m., and it was after 10 p.m. before Col. Dempster was able to give his orders out to Companies. The general scheme was that the 139th Brigade were to break through the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line and capture the villages of Ramicourt and Montbrehain, whilst the 137th Brigade on the right and the 2nd Australian Division on the left, were to attack at the same time, and the 1st Division, on the right of the 137th Brigade, were to capture Sequehart.
The objective of the 5th and 8th Battalions was the "Red Line" running North-West to South-East, just West of Montbrehain, the 5th Battalion being on the right and the 8th on the left, whilst the 6th Battalion was to pass through, capture Montbrehain and push out outposts as far as the "dotted blue line." This was something like 4,000 yards from our present Outpost Line. ACompany of nine Tanks were to co-operate with the Brigade, advancing immediately behind the first line. The attack was to be launched at dawn and was to be carried out under an artillery barrage which, after delaying six minutes on the opening line, was to move at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes. The delay was to enable the Infantry to adjust their distance behind the barrage, which was to open a good deal further in front of them than usual, owing to the fact that the Artillery had mostly to move into fresh positions, and we could not, therefore, risk getting up close to its assumed line, whilst allowance also had to be made for the attacking troops not being exactly in their right position, owing to the difficulty of forming up in the dark on an uncertain mark.
Our jumping-off line ran from near Joncourt Cemetery to the Railway Cutting. The Battalion frontage was approximately 1,000 yards and was divided into two Company lengths. A (Thomas) on the right, and B (Winter) on the left were to lead, with C (Miners) and D (White) in support about 150 yards behind them. Second Lieut. Plant was sent as Liaison Officer to the Australian Battalion on our left, 2nd Lieut. Newton to Brigade Headquarters, and 2nd Lieut. Jacques to the 5th Battalion. Some additional work was to be thrown on C and D Companies, who were to follow up the 6th Battalion, mop up for them in Montbrehain and then return to the "Red Line." There was no time for reconnaissance. All we knew of the country was what we had gathered from maps or our Intelligence Department. From personal observation we knew nothing. Even the front held by the 32nd Division was not at all certain. We did know, however, that the enemy were holding the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line in force and that the country was of a fairly open type, sloping gently down to Ramicourt in the valley and up again beyond toMontbrehain, which would probably be a difficult problem to tackle.
It was in these circumstances that we set out shortly before midnight in the pitch darkness from Springbok Valley. Guides from the 32nd Division met us at the entrance to Joncourt and conducted us to the forming-up line, A and B Companies throwing out a screen of scouts in front as a precaution before we formed up. Though this was a most precarious proceeding it was carried out successfully, and by 5.30 a.m. on October 3rd, all troops were in their assembly positions, leading Companies extended in two lines and support Companies in lines of "section-blobs." During this operation the enemy did a certain amount of shelling, but not enough to cause us any great trouble. There was some fog at first, and this in the early stages of the battle, combined with smoke from a screen put down by the Artillery to hide the Tanks, made direction somewhat difficult. Later on it cleared and the day became quite bright and fine.
There was not such a concentration of guns as we had had on September 29th, nor had we anything like so many heavies, though there was a certain number of them firing on a few special targets, such as villages and other points behind the lines. The Guards Machine Gun Battalion again helped with the preliminary barrage, which opened promptly at 6.5 a.m., just as it was beginning to get light. We adjusted our position to the line of bursting shells and followed on as soon as the guns lifted. The rate of progress, 100 yards in four minutes, was throughout found to be too slow in this more open fighting, and we were constantly either waiting for the barrage to move on or running into it—not at all a pleasant proceeding.
It was not long before we began to encounter, in addition to the enemy's counter-barrage, opposition of aserious nature from his Infantry. The inevitable delay since we crossed the canal on September 29th had given the enemy time to bring up large reserves, and on this occasion the 46th Division had opposed to it four Boche Divisions—two tired and two fresh. Doubtless the enemy realised that every effort must be made to retain this, his last organised defence on this part of the front, and certainly the men holding the line we had to attack put up a most strenuous fight, and in hundreds of cases died bravely, fighting to the last.
The Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line was strongly held. In addition to many machine guns in the line itself, there were also machine gun sections in rifle-pits immediately behind it. Unfortunately the barrage put down by our guns was somewhat thin. There had been no previous bombardment, and as a result we found that the defences of this line were practically intact. No machine gun emplacements had been touched and not a single gap made in the wire, which was very strong, and we had to manipulate it as best we could.
A good deal of resistance in the early part of the fight was met with from the neighbourhood of Wiancourt on the left, and the high ground South-East of Swiss Cottage, and it was found that the Australians had not been able to make much progress and were practically held up. This being the case it was realised that the village of Wiancourt, which should have been taken by them, would be a serious menace to our left flank, and it was, therefore, decided that we should go out of our way and take it in the general advance. Two Platoons of A Company, with portions of B and D (Companies having got somewhat mixed owing to loss of direction), penetrated into the village and opened heavy Lewis gun and rifle fire on its defenders, who offered a stubborn resistance, mainly from machine gun posts. Eventually some of them were seen to run back, and our line immediatelyrushed forward with the bayonet and killed or captured the whole of the garrison. Several were killed whilst still holding the handles of their machine guns. Comp. Sergt.-Major Attenborough, of A Company, here performed several gallant feats in leading rushes against machine gun groups, and later did most valuable work in trying to establish liaison with the Australians, who unfortunately, even after the capture of Wiancourt, were unable to advance so as to help us.
Meanwhile the right was not making much headway, and C Company, from support, had become one with the attacking Company. The advance here being held up by machine gun fire, L.-Corpl. Vann with much gallantry crawled forward and managed to knock out the gun team which was causing most of the trouble. A trench something like 100 yards long, crowded with the enemy, was thus taken in the flank, and those who did not surrender were killed in trying to escape. They had, however, caused us many casualties, including 2nd Lieut. Dunkin and Sergt. Hurt killed, besides many wounded. One of the most gallant N.C.O.'s in the Battalion, Sergt. Hurt had already won the D.C.M. and M.M., and his death was a very great loss.
Similar actions had been taking place in other parts of the line. Again and again nests of machine guns were rushed at the point of the bayonet, which weapon undoubtedly did more deadly work on this occasion than on any other in our experience. Where they could not be taken by frontal attack, parties worked round their flanks and rushed them from the rear. The intensity of the fighting can be imagined from the fact that after the battle nearly 200 dead Germans were found along this line of trenches on the front of the 139th Brigade alone.
The main Fonsomme Line was now ours, though won at heavy cost. Direction had improved, though we wereall too far to the left and much disorganised. We had to make the best of it and try to straighten out as we pushed on into the valley towards Ramicourt. Here we were met with fire from Boche guns firing from behind Montbrehain with open sights, causing many casualties. The position was as exposed as it could be, the only shelter being provided by one or two sunken roads. At the same time four or five of the Tanks, which for some reason had got behind at the start, had now come up and did much useful work in the outskirts of Ramicourt, though the same Boche guns brought most effective fire to bear on them, one of them getting five direct hits. On the left, B Company, who under Winter's excellent leadership, had done much fighting, now mixed up with A and reinforced by D, were also suffering heavily from the enemy artillery fire, and advanced by section rushes covered by Lewis gun fire. It was here that 2nd Lieut. T. F. Mitchell, commanding a Platoon of D Company, which he led with supreme gallantry, caring nothing for his own safety, was mortally wounded, dying the next day.
Ramicourt was eventually reached by oddments of A, C and D Companies, the remainder of the Battalion having got too far left, and passing through its Northern outskirts. There were several machine guns in the village, and snipers were active from the windows of the houses. These were all successfully mopped up with the help of the 6th Battalion, who pushed up a Company and their Battalion Headquarters, as there were so few troops at this point, the 5th Battalion having edged off through the Southern outskirts of the village. Jack White was seen in the village, wandering round quite unconcerned, revolver in holster—a small cane which he carried being apparently his most trusty weapon.
Havingcompleted the capture of the village, which yielded a total of something like 400 prisoners, the remnants of the troops there were gathered together and the advance continued. A machine gun nest at Ramicourt Station having been rushed with the aid of a Tank, we pushed on to our objective, which, except on the extreme left, we reached practically up to scheduled time, 10.30 a.m., most of the troops being disposed in sunken roads on the West of Montbrehain. It had not been a good day for the Tanks, which in the end were all knocked out, though the last one working with the 5th Battalion on the right had a good run and knocked out no fewer than 16 machine guns before being put out of action.
As soon as the barrage lifted from the "Red Line," the 6th Battalion began to push on. They had met with an appalling disaster soon after crossing the Beaurevoir-Fonsomme Line, where Col. Vann, once more gallantly leading his Battalion and in the forefront of the battle, was killed, shot through the head. The 5th Battalion too, lost Col. A. Hacking, who was wounded in the arm. Thus two old Officers of the 8th were put out of action almost at the same moment, both leading Battalions in our own Brigade. Alfred Hacking had done invaluable work during the few months he had commanded the 5th Battalion, and for his excellent leadership and gallantry during the fighting of September 29th and October 3rd was awarded the D.S.O. and Bar. Bernard Vann, affectionately known to some of his earlier friends as "Vasi," was described on one occasion by General Allenby, as the most fearless Officer he had ever met, whilst a brother Officer writes of him: "I can think of him only as a fighter, not merely against the enemy in the field, but a fighter against everything and everybody that was not an influence for good to his men. It was his extraordinary courage and tenacity which will be remembered by all who knew him: he inspired allby his wonderful example of courage and energy." Wounded at least eight times, and awarded the M.C. and Bar, and the French Croix de Guerre with Palm, it was fitting that his constant gallantry and magnificent example should be further recognised—alas! after his death—by the award of the Victoria Cross.
On continuing the advance the 6th Battalion edged towards the South, going through the centre and right of Montbrehain, and leaving the Northern portion alone. This left us considerably exposed, and an enemy machine gun firing from a position at the cross-roads on our left front, was doing much damage. White, Thomas and Miners held a hasty conference and decided to rush it, and the two former with a reconnoitring party went into the village to see if it could be outflanked from the region of the cemetery. At this moment a little "Joey" came in with "hands up," and it was decided to try a ruse. It was suggested to him that he should go and tell his friends to surrender, and after a little persuasion he went. The Machine gun stopped firing and he approached the post and disappeared into the ground, thus telling us what we wanted to know—the way in. Action was taken at once to deal with it. Second Lieut. Harrap, who had already done much valuable work, got together some Lewis guns and opened frontal fire on the position, whilst Miners and Sergt. Stimson worked round the flank from the village side and by a careful manoeuvre rushed on to the post the instant Harrap's guns stopped firing. Much to their surprise the post was found to be a quarry containing something like ten or a dozen machine guns and 60 or 70 men! A few bombs and revolver shots and the white flag went up. Harrap, who had rushed his men forward across the intervening 200 yards, was also at hand, and the capture of the post was complete. Second Lieut. Barker's Platoon (A Company) also assisted with rifle and Lewis gun fire, Barker himself being wounded.
Outof the medley of troops which collected there—of all Battalions in the Brigade—some attempt was then made to organise a Company, and posts were pushed further forward. The rest of the village after a hard struggle fell into the hands of the 6th Battalion about the scheduled time, 11.30 a.m. Loud explosions, heard soon after the village was entered, were caused by the blowing up by the Boche of two houses in the main street near the Church. Attempts were made to push out Platoons to the "line of exploitation," beyond the village, but this was found to be impossible owing to heavy machine gun fire.
Both in Ramicourt and Montbrehain we found French civilians, whose pleasure at being at last released from the Hun terror knew no bounds. About 70 all told had remained behind, refusing to be evacuated by the Boche. They gave us a great welcome and in spite of shells and bullets, brought out coffee to our men as they passed by. Later, under the guidance of the Brigade Interpreter, M. Duflos, they were taken back to safer regions.
It soon became evident that further trouble was in store for us owing to the fact that our left flank was again in the air. The Australians were not up with us and we were very uncertain of their whereabouts, though apparently not altogether out of touch with them, for one of their Officers, who was met in hospital later in the day, reported having received from someone in our Battalion the laconic message: "We are at ——. Where is the Australian Corps?" The enemy were still holding in force a position at no great distance from our left flank, and indeed, at one time were reported to be massing for a counter-attack which, however, did not mature. But on the right of the Brigade the situation was far worse. There the 137th Brigade, after making some progress, had eventually to give ground, and their leftwas now considerably behind our right. We were thus in a most awkward salient with both flanks exposed. It was, therefore, not surprising to find soon after noon very evident signs of a real counter-attack being prepared against the Brigade exposed right flank, and when a little later this attack was launched, the enemy managed to get round the South-East of Montbrehain and into that corner of the village in some strength, and it was decided to withdraw from it. This was successfully carried out under great difficulties, and eventually the Brigade took up a line just East of Ramicourt, the 8th Battalion occupying the railway and sunken road North-East of that village. The enemy soon reoccupied the whole of Montbrehain, but was unable to advance further.
We were now very short of ammunition as no supplies had been sent forward. This was mainly due to the fact that we had depended on a "Supply Tank," which did not fetch up quite where we expected. Fortunately no ill results accrued, but it taught the lesson that the supply of ammunition to advanced troops in moving warfare requires very careful prearrangement.
Company Commanders again conferred and decided to alter their dispositions, and with a view to protecting our left flank, B and C Companies moved across to bridge the gap there, leaving A and D Companies in the railway cutting. In these positions we were left for the rest of the day more or less in peace.
In spite of a slight set-back it had been a glorious day for the 8th Battalion. There was really no comparison between this battle and that of September 29th. The attack on September 29th was undoubtedly more spectacular, but in our humble judgment, having regard to the extremely short notice received, the strength of the enemy and the many difficulties encountered, the breaking of the Fonsomme Line on October 3rd may trulybe counted as one of the most gallant exploits of the whole war.
Where one and all did so well and so many gallant deeds were performed it is difficult to single out any for special praise, but it is desired to note specially the good work of the following in addition to those already mentioned: Sergt. H. Wilson, L.-Sergt. Wicks, Corpl. Clark, L.-Corpl. Creamer, and Pvtes. Draper, Crowe, Slater, Wesley, Starr, Baxter, Jackson, and Martin. The day, however, had cost us much. Our casualties were one Officer and 20 other ranks (including Sergt. Gurdens) killed, and three Officers (2nd Lieuts. T. F. Mitchell, who died the next day, Barker, and F. T. W. Saunders), and 86 other ranks wounded.
Captain Homan had his Regimental Aid Post with Battalion Headquarters in a dug-out in the sunken road near our jumping-off line. Here he and Padre Sturt worked for something like 24 hours on end, attending to the wounded, though both badly gassed, whilst a willing band of Stretcher Bearers again performed a prodigious amount of work under most trying circumstances. Particular praise is due to Corpls. Wrigglesworth and J. Wright, and to Pvtes. L. Thomas and F. Green, the latter of whom was awarded a bar and the former a second bar to his M.M., for gallant work on this occasion.
It was impossible to estimate the actual number of prisoners captured by us, as there was one "pool" for the whole Brigade, but undoubtedly we had a very large share of the total, which was 36 Officers and nearly 1,500 other ranks; in addition to which large numbers were left on the ground dead. Of machine guns too, we captured a very large number, but owing to the impossibility of collecting them, little idea of the total could be formed.