6. BATTLE FOR NAHA
During the latter part of April the Tenth Army had found itsXXIVCorps heavily engaged in southern Okinawa. It was decided that theIIIAmphibious Corps would be assigned the western half of the southern line on about 7 May. It was further decided that on 1 May the First Marine Division would be attached to theXXIVCorps and committed in the vicinity of Machinato Airfield. Its mission was clear out the Jichaku plateau area and then strike toward Shuri, the core of the Japanese defensive position. The Sixth Marine Division would then be committed on the right of the First Division.
All through the last week in April, the Sixth Division patrolled and garrisoned northern Okinawa. Preparations were made for the move to the south. The regiments rested, re-equipped themselves and received replacements. During the month of April the division had traveled over 84 miles, seized 436 square miles of enemy territory, captured 46 prisoners and killed nearly 2,500 of the enemy. In the same period the division had lost 236 men killed and 1,061 wounded in action.
On 2 May the division began to move southward to assembly areas near Chibana, east of the original landing beaches. The responsibility for the defense of northern Okinawa passed from the Sixth Marine Division to the Twenty Seventh Infantry Division on 4 May.
According to Tenth Army order, theIIIAmphibious Corps was to assume responsibility for the western portion of the southern front on 7 May. The First Marine Division was already committed and was fighting to secure the high ground north and northeast of the Asa River. The Sixth Marine Division was ordered to commit one regimental combat team on the right of the First Division on 8 May. General Shepherd chose the Twenty Second Marines to be committed first. Its mission was to cross the Asa and seize the first high ground to the south. From here, the division could attack to carry out its mission, which was: To seize Naha and the line of the Kokuba River in its zone of action, to assist the First Marine Division by fire and maneuver, and to protect the Corps’ right (west) flank.
Map 5. Final Drive. Motobu Peninsula.Map 5. Final Drive. Motobu Peninsula.
Map 5. Final Drive. Motobu Peninsula.
Map 5. Final Drive. Motobu Peninsula.
All during the fighting on Motobu, the men of the Sixth Marine Division had heard stories of the fighting down south. They knew that the Tenth Army had uncovered the main Japanese defensive positions; that the enemy had chosen rough hilly ground across a narrow part of the island. The enemy was well dug in on a high and broken hill mass which took its name from its geographical center—Shuri. The line, or series of lines really, ran from north of Naha through Shuri to Yonabaru on the east coast. They had heard that theXXIVCorps had run into a virtual stalemate; that some sixty thousand of the enemy were offering fierce resistance from concealed positions; that the enemy was using mortars and artillery on an unprecedented scale; and that the enemy troops in southern Okinawa were excellent soldiers, well disciplined, and well prepared to fighta long and costly campaign. Before the second week in May had passed the men were certain that none of the stories were exaggerated.
In the new zone of action, the Sixth Marine Division launched its first attack when it sent the Twenty Second Marines across the Asa River in the early morning hours of 10 May. Patrols had crossed the river on the previous day and reconnoitered the ground to its immediate south. The only bridge across the river in this sector had been totally destroyed. Through the night of 9-10 May, the Sixth Engineer Battalion worked to construct a footbridge. Although the little bridge was finally completed in time for the pre-dawn attack, a group of the enemy carrying demolitions packs succeeded in destroying themselves and a section of the bridge before many of the Marines got across.
At 0330, 10 May, the First and Third Battalions of the Twenty Second Marines crossed the Asa; the First waded across upstream on the regiment’s left, while the Third started to use the footbridge. When it was destroyed, the battalion was forced to go upstream and wade across. At first enemy resistance was light, but as the Japanese became aware of this threat to their left flank, opposition became fierce. Despite heavy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire, the troops moved on up the first ridges. By nightfall, and after a day of heavy casualties, a bridgehead 1400 yards wide and about 400 yards deep had been established.
Next morning the reserve battalion of the Twenty Second Marines, the Second, was committed to cover the left flank of the First which was fighting to reduce an enemy stronghold on a formidable coral hill southeast of Asa village. When flanking action failed to secure the hill, the troops withdrew so that naval gunfire from the USS Indianapolis could be utilized. In the meantime the engineers labored under sporadic enemy fire to construct a Bailey Bridge across the Asa, where the footbridge had been. About noon the structure was completed and tanks roared across to support the troops. With the added fire power of the tanks, the First Battalion attacked the hill again, this time successfully. Over on the right, the Third Battalion fought for three hours before capturing the precipitous cliff area in its zone of action.
On 12 May the Twenty Second Marines, with all three battalions in the line, continued to advance despite increasing enemy resistance. Not only was the regiment receiving fire from its front, but also from the left flank, where the enemy in his positions on Wana Ridge and the Shuri heights could observe troop movements and bring fire to bear at an instant’s notice. As it became apparent that the division’s left was becoming open, General Shepherd ordered the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth Marines into the line to protect the east flank. It was quite plain that another regiment would have to be committed if the momentum of advance were to be maintained.
Next day, the Sixth Marine Division continued the attack with the Second Battalion, Twenty Second Marines and the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, in assault. About three hundred yards was all that could be gained due to heavy enemy resistance. In the late afternoon the other two battalions of the Twenty Ninth Marines moved up behind the Third, and prepared to go into the assault on 14 May.
By this time General Shepherd had discovered the following: (1) In attempting to outflank the Shuri line, the Sixth Marine Division had uncovered the western anchor of the enemy’s main defensive position; (2) Three terrain features, heavily fortified and manned, and mutually supporting formed this anchor; (3) Unprotected but heavily guarded corridors led into each of these terrain features. (4) There was no ground offering covered routes of approach, from which these terrain features could be assaulted; (5) the three terrain features (later called Horseshoe Ridge, Sugar Loaf Hill, and Half Moon Hill)would be held by the enemy at all costs; if they were lost, the enemy’s main position at Shuri would be outflanked; (6) The battle efficiency of the Twenty Second Marines was seriously impaired; It had lost over 800 men killed or wounded since crossing the Asa; (7) Naha, the capital city of Okinawa, lay open in front of the Twenty Second Marines, but it could not be seized until the Sugar Loaf defensive position, Horseshoe Ridge, and the Half Moon were reduced and cleared of enemy.
Map 6. Attack of 2nd Bn., 22nd Marines.Map 6. Attack of 2nd Bn., 22nd Marines.
Map 6. Attack of 2nd Bn., 22nd Marines.
Map 6. Attack of 2nd Bn., 22nd Marines.
Commanding the surrounding countryside, Sugar Loaf Hill was the apex of a triangle. All three elements of the triangle were mutually supporting: Horseshoe Ridge and the Half Moon covered Sugar Loaf; from Sugar Loaf the enemy could cover the other two with fire; all three terrain features were, in turn, under observation and fire from Shuri. Troops attacking any one of the three hills would be subjected immediately to fire from the other two. There was no room for extended maneuver; on the right of the division was the sea; on the left the zone of the First Marine Division, which offered no protection or cover.
Late in the afternoon of 14 May the Second Battalion, Twenty Second, attempted a tank-infantry assault, and despite heavy 47-mm. fire that drove the tanks back, succeeded in getting a few men from“G”Company up on the top of Sugar Loaf. The attack caught the Japanese by surprise, but only momentarily; during the night, they reorganized to launch an attack next morning that drove the Second Battalion back from the ground immediately to the north of Sugar Loaf, and finally spread over into the zone of the Twenty Ninth Marines. This counterattack, in approximately battalion strength, started a day of the bitterest fighting yet seen by the Twenty Second Marines. The desperate character that the fight now assumed was indicative of the enemy’s resolve to hold the Sugar Loaf system regardless of the cost. Two battalions of the Twenty Ninth, the First and Third, encountered the same bitter fighting that was experienced by the First and Second Battalions, Twenty Second. In the corridor leading to the Half Moon, the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, finally reduced an enemy pocket that had been bypassed but had become so troublesome as to prevent further advance. To the left, the First Battalion was fighting in the low ground north of the Half Moon. During the afternoon of this day, 15 May, the Third Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, moved up to relieve the Second Battalion which had lost over 400 men in the last three days. Over on the division’s right, the First Battalion of the Twenty Second drove down the long ridge overlooking the Asato, but could advance no further due to heavy fire from the Horseshoe and Sugar Loaf.
All during the night of 15-16 May the enemy used his mortars and artillery to interdict the front lines, causing light casualties. Early next morning the Sixth Marine Division, with the Twenty Second and Twenty Ninth regiments in assault, again attacked to seize the Sugar Loaf—Half Moon positions. Heavy enemy fire greeted the attack; from near the town of Takamotoji the enemy commenced to fire, although that area had been quiet previously. It was apparent that the enemy was moving in replacements and additional troops to bolster the Sugar Loaf system. Working its way into position on the left of the regimental front, the Third Battalion, Twenty Second Marines prepared to assault Sugar Loaf Hill. Behind tanks, and after an intense artillery barrage, the battalion advanced rapidly up the pitted north slope of the hill in the face of extremely heavy fire from enemy mortars, grenades, and automatic weapons. Several times the battalion reached the top of the hill and closed with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting only to be driven back. Finally, with losses steadily mounting, the battalion was forced to withdraw.
Hope was held for a while on this day that the Twenty Ninth Marines might seizeHalf Moon Hill. Closely supported by tanks, troops moved forward slowly and reached the edge of the ridge by late afternoon. Before they could organize defensive positions, or dig in, the enemy poured so much fire in from Shuri, Sugar Loaf, and the reverse slopes of the Half Moon, that the troops had to withdraw under the cover of smoke. Casualties were extremely heavy.
This day, 16 May, was perhaps the bitterest day of the entire Okinawa Campaign for the Sixth Marine Division. With all the strength at their command, two regiments had attacked without apparent success. A week of steady fighting had reduced the offensive capabilities of the Twenty Second Marines so General Shepherd now shifted the burden of attack to the Twenty Ninth, leaving the Twenty Second to hold where it was.
Before the Twenty Ninth Marines began the attack of 17 May, the enemy in the Sugar Loaf area was subjected to a terrific bombardment which included 16-inch shells from the main batteries of battleships, 8-inch howitzer shells, and 1000-pound aerial bombs. With tanks in close support and immediately behind a heavy and continuing artillery barrage, the First and Third Battalions, Twenty Ninth Marines edged their way to the northern edge of Half Moon Hill. Finally the Third Battalion seized a slim foothold on the north-western edge of the hill but intense enemy fire made the position untenable and the troops were forced to withdraw. Meanwhile“E”Company of the Second Battalion was attempting a flanking attack around the east side of Sugar Loaf Hill. Despite heavy enemy mortar barrages and grenade fire, the company drove to the top of the hill three times; each time the enemy counterattacked and drove the men off. Finally at 1830 in the last vestige of light, the company mustered strength enough to assault the hill again. This time when it reached the top it beat off an enemy counterattack, but had so few men left, and so many wounded to be evacuated, that it had to pull back to better ground for the night.
At dusk, but while there was still enough light to be seen, the enemy attempted to reinforce Sugar Loaf and began to move his troops in the open. Almost immediately twelve battalions of our artillery took the enemy troops under time-on-target fire and inflicted such heavy losses that the reinforcement threat was broken up. While the Half Moon and Sugar Loaf still remained in enemy hands, the division had made gains that were not yet perceptible. There was no way of knowing as yet the extent of the enemy’s losses. So far, he had been able to move in enough reinforcements to counter our attacks, but his losses had reached the point where he could no longer readily replace them. Meanwhile, the Twenty Ninth Marines had got into position for the final attack, which was to be launched next day.
'MapMap 7. 29-Th Marines Secure Sugar Loaf.
Map 7. 29-Th Marines Secure Sugar Loaf.
Map 7. 29-Th Marines Secure Sugar Loaf.
At 0830, 18 May, the First and Third Battalions, Twenty Ninth again assaulted the enemy on the Half Moon. After a foothold was established the fighting resolved itself into a slugging match, and this enabled the Second Battalion to make its move. It first attempted to encircle Sugar Loaf with tanks but enemy mines, 47-mm.fire, and artillery fire disabled six tanks and drove the rest back.
Map 8. Attack of 4-Th Marines.Map 8. Attack of 4-Th Marines.
Map 8. Attack of 4-Th Marines.
Map 8. Attack of 4-Th Marines.
Next, the Second Battalion launched a combined tank-infantry assault on Sugar Loaf, working the tanks, closely supported by troops, around each flank of the hill simultaneously. One tank accompanied by troops, edged its way around the west side of the hill and commenced firing into the enemy’s reverse slope defenses. Then, as the enemy moved to repel this threat, another tank worked its way around the east side of the hill and emptied its machine guns into the backs of the defenders of Sugar Loaf. In the ensuing pandemonium troops swarmed all over the hill and, after an hour of heavy fighting, the hill was firmly held by Marines.“F”Company was sent to seize the Horseshoe and reduce the mortar positions there that were firing on Sugar Loaf. The company movedrapidly across the intervening ground, climbed up on the Horseshoe, and engaged the enemy in a hand grenade battle. During the night the enemy counterattacked and drove“F”Company back to Sugar Loaf but could not regain the lost hill. Over on the left of the zone of action of the Twenty Ninth Marines, the First and Third Battalions held their positions at the base of the Half Moon, despite heavy enemy fire. For the action during the period 14-19 May, the Twenty Ninth Marines, and attached units, were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation.
In order to exploit the recently won gains General Shepherd ordered the Fourth Marines fresh after a two weeks’ rest, to relieve the Twenty Ninth on 19 May. On the right of the division’s front, the Twenty Second Marines remained in position, but were in no condition to continue the attack. After relieving the Twenty Ninth Marines, the Fourth prepared to attack next day to seize the upper reaches of the Asato River. The night of 19 May saw the enemy making full use of his mortars and artillery but casualties were light. Next morning the Fourth Marines attacked Horseshoe Ridge and managed to seize a part of it. While the fighting raged, the enemy on the Shuri Hill mass turned his weapons and hit the flank of the Fourth with heavy fire. At 2130, following a terrific 90-mm. mortar barrage, the enemy commenced to counterattack with Sugar Loaf as the objective. Centering on the Third Battalion, Fourth Marines, the counterattack continued until midnight. During this time naval star shells kept the critical area illuminated and six battalions of artillery fired to break up the counterattack. Before the enemy was driven back, it was necessary to commit part of the regimental reserve. In this unsuccessful counterattack, the enemy lost nearly 300 killed while the Fourth Marines only lost 1 man killed and 19 wounded.
On 21 May the Fourth Marines made slight gains in the interior of Horseshoe Ridge but the foothold on the Half Moon could not be expanded. Until Shuri fell it would be virtually impossible to take the Half Moon in its entirety. It was futile to attack on the left. Now the emphasis was shifted to the regiment’s right and on the morning of 22 May the front lines advanced slowly to the Asato.
Employing a holding attack on the extreme left of the division front, General Shepherd was ready to exploit his gains. After a thorough reconnaissance of the ground just across the Asato, the Fourth Marines moved two battalions across the river during the afternoon of 23 May and ran into determined enemy resistance. The position of the Fourth Marines, while not precarious, was extremely difficult. Two attempts to bridge the Asato had failed; all food, water and ammunition had to be carried across by hand. The past three days had brought unusually heavy rains and the entire division zone of action was a sea of mud. Wading through mud ankle deep, stretcher bearers had a hard time getting the wounded back to evacuation points north of the rear. Few vehicles could negotiate the morass of mud that characterized the area. These rains were to continue until the last of May.
Map 9. Attack of Fourth Marines. Asato River Area.Map 9. Attack of Fourth Marines. Asato River Area.
Map 9. Attack of Fourth Marines. Asato River Area.
Map 9. Attack of Fourth Marines. Asato River Area.
On 25 May the Fourth Marines resumed the attack and seized most of the north-south ridge line west of Machishi. About a company of the enemy counterattacked during the night and spent its force in the sector of the Third Battalion. While the Fourth Marines were moving into the eastern outskirts of Naha, the Division Reconnaissance Company crossed the Asato near its mouth and penetrated the urban portion of Naha west of the north-south canal. Enemy resistance was very light; only a few snipers harassed the company. Next day, with the heavy rain still falling, the Fourth Marines confined its efforts to vigorous patrolling. The reconnaissance company moved 300 yards further into Naha.
Unmistakable signs on 26 May pointed toward a Japanese withdrawal from the Shuriposition. In order to determine the extent of the withdrawal to the front of the Sixth Marine Division, all units commenced patrolling. Part of the Second Battalion, Twenty Second Marines, crossed the Asato and passed through the Reconnaissance Company while pushing farther into Naha. The city was almost a total wreck. Only a few buildings around the outskirts remained standing and these were badly damaged. During the day the Fourth Marines sent patrols over 300 yards forward of the lines and found only light opposition.
Again General Shepherd reoriented his attack; he ordered the Twenty Second Marines to complete the capture of Naha and be prepared to advance through the hills that overlook the Kokuba River from the north. At the same time, he ordered the Twenty Ninth Marines to relieve the Fourth, and to be prepared to continue the attack to the southeast toward the Shichina hills. On 28 May the Twenty Ninth Marines commenced to relieve the Fourth Marines; at the same time, the Twenty Second Marines completed the capture of urban Naha, the part that lies to the west of the north-south canal.
Initially, the Twenty Ninth Marines were to carry out a holding attack while supporting the Twenty Second Marines by fire. On 29 May, with the Twenty Ninth Marines holding on its left, the Twenty Second Marines crossed the north-south canal and commenced to fight through the low hills that lead to Shichina, and parallel the Kokuba River. The attack moved rapidly at first on the right but the enemy rear guard, stationed in the hills to the front of the two regiments, began to resist more fiercely, and it wasn’t until 1 June that the two regiments were able to clean out the enemy in the Shichina area; now the division could look down from its position above the Kokuba and see the Naha-Yonabaru cross-island highway. Across the river, troops could see destroyed materiel abandoned by the enemy in his hasty withdrawal to the south.
The Twenty Second Marines rested now for the first time since crossing the Asa River on 10 May. For this period the regiment, and its attached units, was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. In the drive from the Asa to the Kokuba casualties had been heavy.