The memorials express the desire that the hospitals should be broken up into smaller establishments, erected in each district; that theasylums for beggars (dépôts de mendicité) should be suppressed, and replaced by charitable workhouses (ateliers de charité); that funds for the aid of the sick and needy should be established under the management of the Provincial States, and that surgeons, physicians, and midwives should be distributed among thearrondissementsat the expense of the provinces, to give their gratuitous services to the poor; that the courts of justice should likewise be gratuitous to the people; finally, that care should be taken for the establishment of institutions for the blind, the deaf and dumb, foundling children, &c.
Generally speaking, in all these matters the order of nobles does no more than express its desire for reform, without entering into any minor details of execution. It may be easily seen that it mixed much less with the inferior classes than the lower order of clergy; and thus, having come less in contact with their wretchedness, had thought less of the means for mitigating it.
Admissibility to Public Functions; Hierarchy of Ranks; Honorary Privileges of the Nobility.—It is more especially, or rather it is solely, upon the points that concern the hierarchy of ranks and the difference of social classes, that the nobility separates itself from the general spirit of the reforms required, and that, though willing to concede some few important points, it still clings to the principles of the old system. It evidently is aware that it is now struggling for its very existence. Its memorials, consequently, urgently demanded the maintenance of the clergy and the nobility as distinct orders. They even require that efforts should be made to maintain the order of nobility in all its purity, and that to this intent it should be rendered impossible to acquire the title of noble by payment of money; that it should no longer be attached to certain places about Court, and that it should only be obtained by merit, after long and useful services rendered to the State. They express the desire that men assuming false titles of nobility should be found out and prosecuted. All these memorials, in fact, make urgent protestations in favour of the maintenance of the noble in all his honours. Some even desire that a distinctive mark should be given to the nobles to ensure their exterior recognition. It is impossible to imagine anything more characteristic than this demand, or more indicative of the perfect similitude that must have already existed between the noble and the plebeian in spite of the difference of their social conditions. In general, in its memorials, the nobility, although it appears easily disposed enough to concede many of its more profitable rights, clings energetically to its honorary privileges. So greatly does it feel itself already hurried on by the torrent of democracy, and fear to sink in the stream, that it not only wants to preserve all the privileges it already enjoys, but is desirous of inventing others it never possessed. It is singular to remark how it has a presentiment of the impending danger without the actual perception of it.
With regard to public employments, the nobles require that the venality of offices should be done away with in all places connected with the magistracy, and that, in appointments of this kind, the citizens in general should be presented by the nation to the king, and nominated by him without any distinction, except as regards conditions of age and capacity. The majority also opines that theTiers-Étatshould not be excluded from military rank, and that every military man, who had deserved well of his country, should have the right to rise to the very highest grade. ‘The order of nobility does not approve of any law that closes the portals of military rank to the order of theTiers-État,’ is the expression used by some of the memorials. But the nobles desire that the right of coming into a regiment as officer, without having first gone through the inferior grades, should be reserved to themselves alone. Almost all the Instructions, however, require the establishment of fixed regulations, applicable alike to all, for the bestowal of rank in the army, and demand that they should not be entirely left to favour, but be conferred, with the exception of those of superior officers, by right of seniority.
As regards the clerical functions, they require the re-establishment of the elective system in the bestowal of benefices, or at least the appointment by the King of a committee that may enlighten him in the distribution of these benefices.
Lastly, they express the opinion that, for the future, pensions ought to be given away with more discernment; that they ought no longer to be exclusively lavished upon certain families; that no citizen ought to have more than one pension, or receive the salary of more than one place at a time, and that all reversions of such emoluments should be abolished.
The Church and the Clergy.—In matters which do not affect its own interests and especial constitution, the nobility is far less scrupulous. In all that regards the privileges and organisation of the Church, its eyes are opened wide enough to existing abuses.
It desires that the clergy should have no privileges in matters of taxation, and that it should pay its debts without putting the burden of them on the nation: moreover, that the monastic orders should undergo a complete reformation. The greater part of the Instructions declare that these monastic establishments have wholly departed from the original spirit of their institution.
The majority of the bailiwicks express their desire that the tithes should be made less prejudicial to agriculture; many demand their abolition altogether. ‘The greater part of the tithes,’ says one of the memorials, ‘is collected by those incumbents who do the least towards giving spiritual succour to the people.’ It is easy to perceive, that the latter order has not much forbearance for the former in its remarks. No greater respect was shown in its treatment of the Church itself. Several bailiwicks formally admit the right of the States-General to suppress certain religious orders, and apply their revenues to some other use. Seventeen bailiwicks declare the competence of the States-General to regulate their discipline. Several complain that the holidays (jours de fête) are too frequent, are prejudicial to agriculture, and are favourable to drunkenness, and suggest that, in consequence, a great number of them ought to be suppressed and kept only on the Sundays.
Political Rights.—As regards political rights, the Instructions establish the right of every Frenchman to take his part in the government, either directly or indirectly; that is to say, the right to elect or be elected, but without disturbing the gradation of social ranks; so that no one may nominate or be nominated otherwise than in his own Order. This principle once established, it is considered that the representative system ought to be established in such wise, that the power of taking a serious part in the direction of affairs may be guaranteed to each Order of the nation.
With regard to the manner of voting in the Assembly of the States-General the opinions differ. Most desire a separate vote for each Order; others think that an exception ought to be made to this rule in the votes upon taxation; whilst others again consider that it should always be so. ‘The votes ought to be counted by individuals and not by Orders,’ say the latter. ‘Such a manner of proceeding being the only sensible one, and the only one tending to remove and destroy that egotism of caste, which is the source of all our evils—to bring men together and lead them to that result, which the nation has the right to expect from an Assembly, whose patriotism and great moral qualities should be strengthened by its united intelligence.’ As an immediate adoption of this innovation, however, might prove dangerous in the existing state of general feeling, many of the Instructions provide that it should be only decided upon with caution, and that the assembly had better decide whether it were not more prudent to put off the system of individual voting to the following States-General. The nobility demands that, in any case, each Order should be allowed to preserve that dignity which is due to every Frenchman, and consequently that the humiliating ceremonies, to which theTiers-Étatwas subjected under the old system, should be abolished, as,for instance, that of being obliged to kneel—‘inasmuch,’ says one of these documents, ‘as the spectacle of one man kneeling before another is offensive to the dignity of man, and emblematic of an inferiority between creatures equal by nature, incompatible with their essential rights.’
The System to be established in the Form of Government, and the Principles of the Constitution.—With regard to the form of government, the nobility desired the maintenance of the monarchical constitution, the preservation of the legislative, judicial, and executive powers in the person of the King, but, at the same time, the establishment of fundamental laws for the purpose of guaranteeing the rights of the nation in the exercise of these powers.
All the Instructions, consequently, declare that the nation has the right to assemble in States-General, composed of a sufficient number of members to ensure the independence of the Assembly; and they express the desire that, for the future, these States should assemble at fixed periodical seasons, as well as upon every fresh succession to the throne, without the issue of any writs of convocation. Many of the bailiwicks even advise the permanence of this Assembly. If the convocation of the States-General were not to take place within the period prescribed by the law, they should have the right of refusing the payment of taxes. Some few of the Instructions desire that, during the intervals between the sittings of the States, an intermediary commission should be appointed to watch over the administration of the kingdom; but most of them formally oppose the appointment of any such commission, as being unconstitutional. The reason given for this objection is curious enough. They feared lest so small an Assembly, left to itself in the presence of the Government, might be seduced by it.
The nobility desires that the Ministers should not possess the right of dissolving the Assembly, and should be punished by law for disturbing it by their cabals; that no public functionary, no one dependent in any way upon the Government, should be a deputy; that the person of the deputies should be inviolable, and that they should not be able (according to the terms of the memorials) to be prosecuted for any opinions they may emit; finally, that the sittings of the Assembly should be public, and that, in order that the nation might more generally take part in them, they should be made known by printed reports.
The nobility unanimously demands that the principles destined to regulate the government of the State should be applied to the administration of the different parts of the kingdom, and that, consequently, Assemblies made up of members freely elected, and for a limited period of time, should be formed in each district and each parish.
Many of the Instructions recommend that the functions ofIntendantsandReceveurs-Générauxought to be done away with; all are of opinion that, in future, the Provincial Assemblies should alone take in hand the assessment of the taxes, and see to the special interests of the province. The same ought to be the case, they consider, with the Assemblies of eacharrondissementand of each parish, which ought only to be accountable for the future to the Provincial States.
Distribution of the Powers of State.—Legislative Power.—As regards the distribution of the powers of the State between the assembled nation and the King, the nobility requires that no law should be considered effective until it has been consented to by the States-General and the King and entered upon the registers of the courts empowered to maintain the execution of the laws; that the States-General should have the exclusive attribute of determining and fixing the amount of the taxes; that all subsidies agreed upon should be only for the period that may elapse between one sitting of the States and the next; that all which may be levied or ordained, without the consent of the States, should be declared illegal, and that all ministers and receivers of such subsidies, who may have ordered or levied them, should be prosecuted as public defaulters; that, in the same way, no loan should be contracted without the consent of the States-General,but that a credit alone should be opened, fixed by the States, of which the Government might make use in case of war or any great calamity, taking care, however, that measures should be taken to convoke the States-General in the shortest possible time; that all the national treasuries should be placed under the superintendence of the States; that the expenses of each department should be fixed by them; and that the surest measures should be taken to see that the funds voted were not exceeded.
The greater part of the Instructions recommend the suppression of those vexatious taxes, known under the names ofinsinuation,entérinement, andcentième denier, coming under the denomination of ‘Administration (Régie) of the Royal domains,’ upon the subject of which one of the memorials says: ‘The denomination ofRégieis alone sufficient to wound the feelings of the nation, inasmuch as it puts forward, as belonging to the King, matters which are in reality a part of the property of the citizens;’ that all the domains, not alienated, should be placed under the administration of the Provincial States, and no ordinance, no edict upon financial matters, should be given without the consent of the three Orders of the nation.
It is evidently the intention of the nobility to confer upon the nation the whole of the financial administration, as well in the regulation of loans and taxes, as in the receipt of the same by the means of the General and Provincial Assemblies.
Judicial Power.—In the same way, in the judicial organisation, it has a tendency towards rendering the power of the judges, at least in a great measure, dependent upon the nation assembled. And thus many of the memorials declare ‘that the magistrates should be responsible for the fact of their appointments to the nation assembled;’ that they should not be dismissed from their functions without the consent of the States-General; that no court of justice, under any pretext whatever, should be disturbed in the exercise of its functions without the consent of these States; that the disputed matters in the Appeal Court, as well as those before the Parliament, should be decided upon by the States-General. The majority of the Instructions add that the judges ought only to be nominated by the King, upon presentation to him by the people.
Executive Power.—The executive power is exclusively reserved to the King; but necessary limits are proposed, in order to prevent its abuse.
For instance, in the administration, the Instructions require that the state of the accounts of the different departments should be rendered public by being printed; likewise, that before employing the troops in the defence of the country from without, the King should make known his precise intention to the States-General; that, in the country itself, the troops should never be employed against the citizens, except upon the requisition of the States-General; that the number of the troops should be limited, and that two-thirds of them alone should remain, in common times, upon the second effective list; and that the Government ought to keep away all the foreign troops it may have in its pay from the centre of the kingdom, and send them to the frontiers.
In perusing the Instructions of the nobility, the reader cannot fail to be struck, more than all, with the conviction that the nobles are so essentially of their own time. They have all the feelings of the day, and employ its language with perfect fluency; they talk of ‘the inalienable rights of man’ and ‘the principles inherent to the social compact.’ In matters appertaining to the individual, they generally look to his rights—in those appertaining to society, to its duties. The principles of their political opinions appear to themas absolute as those of morality, both one and the other being based upon reason. In expressing their desire to abolish the last remnants of serfdom, they talk ofeffacing the last traces of the degradation of the human race. They sometimes denominate Louis XVI. the ‘Citizen-King,’ and frequently speak of that crime oflèse-nation(treason to the nation), which afterwards was so frequently imputed to themselves.In their opinion, as in that of every one else, everything was to be expected from the results of public education, which the States were to direct. ‘The States-General,’ says one of theCahiers, ‘must take care to inspire a national character by alterations in the education of children.’ Like the rest of their contemporaries, they show a lively and constant desire for uniformity in the legislation, excepting, however, in all that affected the existence of ranks. They are as desirous as theTiers-Étatof administrative uniformity—uniformity of measures, &c. They point out all kinds of reforms, and expect that these reforms should be radical. According to their suggestions, all the taxes, without exception, should be abolished or transferred, and the whole judicial system changed, except in the case of the Seignorial Courts of Justice, which they considered only to need improvement. They, as well as all the other French, looked upon France as a field for experiment—a sort of political model-farm, in which every portion was to be turned up and every experiment tried, except in one special little corner, where their own privileges blossomed. It must be said to their honour, however, that even this was but little spared by them. In short, as may be seen by reading their memorials, all the nobles wanted in order to make the Revolution was that they should be plebeians.
Note(XLV.)—Page97, line 2.
SPECIMEN OF THE RELIGIOUS GOVERNMENT OF AN ECCLESIASTICAL PROVINCE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.
1. The Archbishop.
2. Seven Vicars-General.
3. Two Ecclesiastical Courts, denominatedOfficialités. One, called the MetropolitanOfficialité, took cognisance of the judgments of the suffragans. The other, called theOfficialitéof the Diocess, took cognisance (1) of personal affairs between clerical men; (2) of the validity of marriages, as regarded the performance of the ceremony.
This latter court was composed of three judges, to whom were adjoined notaries and attorneys.
4. Two Fiscal Courts. The one, called the office of the Diocess (Bureau Diocésain), took cognisance, in the first instance, of all matters having reference to the dues levied on the clergy of the diocess. (As is well known, they were fixed by the clergy themselves.) This court was presided over by the Archbishop, and made up of six other priests. The other court gave judgment in appeals on causes, which had been brought before the otherBureaux Diocésains, of the ecclesiastical province.
All these courts admitted counsel and heard pleadings.
Note(XLVI.)—Page97, line 10.
GENERAL FEELING OF THE CLERGY IN THE STATES AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES.
What has been said in the text respecting the States of Languedoc is applicable just as well to the Provincial Assemblies that met in 1779 and 1787, for instance, in Haute-Guienne. The members of the clergy, in this Provincial Assembly, were among the most enlightened, the most active, and the most liberal. It was the Bishop of Rhodez who proposed to publish the minutes of the Assembly.
Note(XLVII.)—Page98, line 26.
This liberal disposition on the part of the priests in political matters, which displayed itself in 1789, was not only produced by the excitement of the moment, evidence of it had already appeared at a much earlier period. It exhibited itself, for instance, in the province of Berri as early as 1779, when the clergy offered to make voluntary donations to the amount of 68,000 livres, upon the sole condition that the provincial administration should be preserved.
Note(XLVIII.)—Page100, line 11.
It must be carefully remarked that, if the political conditions of society were without any ties, the civil state of society still had many. Within the circle of the different classes men were bound to each other; something even still remained of that close tie which had once existed between the class of theSeigneursand the people; and although all this only existed in civil society, its consequence was indirectly felt in political society. The men, bound by these ties, formed masses that were irregular and unorganised, but refractory beneath the hand of authority. The Revolution, by breaking all social ties, without establishing any political ties in their place, prepared the way at the same time for equality and servitude.
Note(XLIX.)—Page101, line 5.
EXAMPLE OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE COURTS EXPRESSED THEMSELVES UPON THE OCCASION OF CERTAIN ARBITRARY ACTS.
It appears, from a memorial laid before theContrôleur-Généralin 1781, by theIntendantof theGénéralitéof Paris, that it was one of the customs of thatGénéralitéthat the parishes should have two syndics—the one elected by the inhabitants in an Assembly presided over by theSubdélégué, the other chosen by theIntendant, and considered the overseer of the former. A quarrel took place between the two syndics in the parish of Rueil, the elected syndic not choosing to obey the chosen syndic. TheIntendant, by means of M. de Breteuil, had the elected syndic put into the prison of La Force for a fortnight; he was arrested, then dismissed from his post, and another was put in his place. Thereupon the Parliament, upon the requisition of the imprisoned syndic, commenced proceedings at law, the issue of which I have not been able to find, but during which it declared that the imprisonment of the plaintiff and the nullification of his election could only be considered asarbitrary and despotic acts. The judicial authorities, it seems, were then sometimes rather hard in the mouth.
Note(L.)—Page103, line 30.
So far from being the case that the enlightened and wealthy classes were oppressed and enslaved under theancien régime, it may be said, on the contrary, that all, including thebourgeoisie, were frequently far toofree to do all they liked; since the Royal authority did not dare to prevent members of these classes from constantly creating themselves an exceptional position, to the detriment of the people; and almost always considered it necessary to sacrifice the latter to them, in order to obtain their good will, or put a stop to their ill humour. It may be said that, in the eighteenth century, a Frenchman belonging to these classes could more easily resist the Government, and force it to use conciliatory measures with him, than an Englishman of the same position in life could have done at that time. The authorities often considered themselves obliged to use towards such a man a far more temporising and timid policy than the English Government would ever have thought itself bound to employ towards an English subject in the same category—so wrong is it to confound independence with liberty. Nothing is less independent than a free citizen.
Note(LI.)—Page103, line 37.
REASON THAT FREQUENTLY OBLIGED THE ABSOLUTE GOVERNMENT IN THE ANCIENT STATE OF SOCIETY TO RESTRAIN ITSELF.
In ordinary times the augmentation of old taxes, and more especially the imposition of new taxes, are the only subjects likely to cause trouble to a Government, or excite a people. Under the old financial constitution of Europe, when any Prince had expensive desires, or plunged into an adventurous line of policy, or allowed his finances to become disordered, or (to take another instance) needed money for the purpose of sustaining himself by winning partisans by means of enormous gains or heavy salaries that they had never earned, or by keeping up numerous armies, by undertaking great public works, &c. &c., he was obliged at once to have recourse to taxation; a proceeding that immediately roused and excited every class, especially that class which creates revolutions—the people. Nowadays, in similar positions, loans are contracted, the immediate effect of which passes almost unperceived, and the final result of which is only felt by the succeeding generation.
Note(LII.)—Page105, line 29.
As one example, among many others, the fact may be cited, that the principal domains in the jurisdiction of Mayenne were farmed out toFermiers-Généraux, who took asSous-Fermierslittle miserable tillers of land, who had nothing of their own, and for whom they were obliged to furnish the most necessary farming utensils. It may be well conceived thatFermiers-Générauxof this kind had no great consideration for the farmers or due-paying tenants of the old feudalSeigneur, who had put them in his place, and that the exercise of feudalism in such hands as these was often more hard to bear than in the Middle Ages.
Note(LIII.)—Page105, line 29.
ANOTHER EXAMPLE.
The inhabitants of Mantbazon had put upon thetaillethe Stewards of the Duchy, which was in possession of the Price de Rohan, althoughthese Stewards only farmed in his name. This Prince (who must have been extremely wealthy) not only caused this ‘abuse,’ as he termed it, to be put a stop to, but obtained the reimbursement of 5344 livres 15 sous, which he had been improperly made to pay, and which was charged upon the inhabitants.
Note(LIV.)—Page108, line 7.
EXAMPLE OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE PECUNIARY CLAIMS OF THE CLERGY ALIENATED FROM THEM THE HEARTS OF THOSE WHOSE ISOLATED POSITION OUGHT TO HAVE CONCILIATED THEM.
The Curé of Noisai asserted that the inhabitants were obliged to undertake the repairs of his barn and wine-press, and asked for the imposition of a local tax for that purpose. TheIntendantgave answer that the inhabitants were only obliged to repair the parsonage-house, and that the barn and wine-press were to be at the expense of this pastor, who was evidently more busied about the affairs of his farm than his spiritual flock (1767).
Note(LV.)—Page110, line 4.
In one of the memorials sent up in 1788 by the peasants—a memorial written with much clearness and in a moderate tone, in answer to an inquiry instituted by a Provincial Assembly—the following passages occur:—‘In addition to the abuses occasioned by the mode of levying thetaille, there exists that of thegarnissaires. These men generally arrive five times during the collection of thetaille. They are commonlyinvalides, or Swiss soldiers. They remain every time four or five days in the parish, and are taxed at 36 sous a day by the tax-receipt office. As to the assessment of thetaille, we will forbear to point out the too well-known abuses occasioned by the arbitrary measures employed and the bad effects produced by the officious parts played by officers who are frequently incapable and almost always partial and vindictive. They have been the cause, however, of many disturbances and quarrels, and have occasioned proceedings at law, extremely expensive for the parties pleading, and very advantageous to the courts.’
Note(LVI.)—Page110, line 39.
THE SUPERIORITY OF THE METHODS ADOPTED IN THE PROVINCES POSSESSING ASSEMBLIES (PAYS D’ÉTAT) RECOGNISED BY THE GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONARIES THEMSELVES.
A confidential letter, written by the Director of the Taxes to theIntendant, on June 3rd, 1772, has the following:—‘In thePays d’États, the tax being a fixedtantième(per-centage), every taxpayer is subject to it, and really pays it. An augmentation upon thistantièmeis made in the assessment, in proportion to the augmentation required by the King upon the total supplied—for instance, a million instead of 900,000 livres. This is a simple operation; whilst in theGénéralitéthe assessment is personal, and, so to say, arbitrary; some pay their due, others only the half, others the third, the quarter, or nothing at all. How, in this case, subject the amount of taxation to the augmentation of one-ninth?’
Note(LVII.)—Page112, line 37.
THE MANNER IN WHICH THE PRIVILEGED CLASSES UNDERSTOOD AT FIRST THE PROGRESS OF CIVILISATION IN ROAD-MAKING.
Count X., in a letter to theIntendant, complains of the very little zeal shown in the establishment of a road in his neighbourhood. He says it is the fault of theSubdéléguéwho does not use sufficient energy in the exercise of his functions, and will not compel the peasants to do their forced labour (corvées).
Note(LVIII.)—Page112, line 42.
ARBITRARY IMPRISONMENT FOR THE CORVÉE.
An example is given in a letter of aGrand Prévôt, in 1768:—‘I ordered yesterday,’ it says, ‘the imprisonment of three men (at the demand of M. C., Sub-Engineer), for not having done theircorvée. Upon which there was a considerable agitation among the women of the village, who exclaimed, “The poor people are thought of quite enough when thecorvéeis to be done; but nobody takes care to see they have enough to live upon.â€â€™
Note(LIX.)—Page113, line 20.
The resources for the making of roads were of two kinds. The greater was thecorvée, for all the great works that required only labour; the smaller was derived from the general taxation, the amount of which was placed at the disposition of thePonts et Chausséesfor the expenses of works requiring science. The privileged classes—that is to say, the principal landowners—though more interested than all in the construction of roads, contributed nothing to thecorvéeand, moreover, were still exempt otherwise, inasmuch as the taxation for thePonts et Chausséeswas annexed to thetaille, and levied in the same manner.
Note(LX.)—Page113, line 29.
EXAMPLE OF FORCED LABOUR IN THE TRANSPORT OF CONVICTS.
It may be seen by a letter, addressed by a Commissary at the head of the police department of convict-gangs, to theIntendant, in 1761, that the peasants were compelled to cart the galley-slaves on their way; that they executed this task with very ill will; and that they were frequently maltreated by the convict-guards, ‘inasmuch,’ says the Commissary, ‘as the guards are coarse and brutal fellows, and the peasants who undertake this work by compulsion are often insolent.’
Note(LXI.)—Page113, line 32.
Turgot has given descriptions of the inconvenience and hardship of forced labour for the transport of military baggage, which, after a perusal of the office papers, appear not to have been exaggerated. Among other things, he says that its chief hardship consisted in the unequal distribution of a very heavy burden, inasmuch as it fell entirely upon a small number of parishes, which had the misfortune of being placed on the high road. The distance to be done was often one of five, six, or sometimes ten and fifteen leagues. In which case three days were necessary for the journey out and home again. The compensation given to the landowners only amounted to one-fifth of the expense that fell upon them. The period when forced labour was required was generally the summer, the time of harvest. The oxen were almost always overdriven, and frequently fell ill after having been employed at the work—so much so that a great number of landowners preferred giving a sum of 15 to 20 livres rather than supply a waggon and four oxen. The consequent confusion which took place was unavoidable. The peasants were constantly exposed to violence of treatment from the military. The officers almost always demanded more than was their due; and sometimes they obliged the drivers, by force, to harness saddle-horses to the vehicles at the risk of doing them a serious injury. Sometimes the soldiers insisted upon riding upon carts already overloaded; at other times, impatient at the slow progress of the oxen, they goaded them with their swords, and when the peasants remonstrated they were maltreated.
Note(LXII.)—Page113, line 38.
EXAMPLE OF THE MANNER IN WHICH FORCED LABOUR WAS APPLIED TO EVERYTHING.
A correspondence arising, upon a complaint made by the Intendant of the Naval department at Rochefort, concerning the difficulties made by the peasants who were obliged by thecorvéeto cart the wood purchased by the navy contractors in the different provinces for the purposes of shipbuilding, shows that the peasants were in truth still (1775) obliged to do this forced labour, the price of which the Intendant himself fixed. The Minister of the Navy transferred the complaint to the Intendant of Tours, with the order that he must see to the supply of the carriages required. The Intendant, M. Ducluzel, refused to authorise this species of forced labour, whereupon the Minister wrote him a threatening letter, telling him that he would have to answer for his refusal to the King. The Intendant, to this, replied at once (December 11th, 1775) with firmness, that, during the ten years he had been Intendant at Tours, he never had chosen to authorise thesecorvées, on account of the inevitable abuses resulting from them, for which the price fixed for the use of the vehicles was no compensation. ‘For frequently,’ says his letter, ‘the animals are crippled by the weight of the enormous masses they are obliged to drag through roads as bad as the time of year when they are ordered out.’ What encouraged the Intendant in his resistance seems to have been a letter of M. Turgot, which is annexed to the papers on this matter. It is dated on July 30th, 1774, shortly after his becoming Minister; and it says that he himself never authorised thesecorvéesat Limoges, and approves of M. Ducluzel for not authorising them at Tours.
It is proved by some portions of this correspondence that the timber contractors frequently exacted this forced labour even when they werenot authorised to do so by the contracts made between themselves and the State, inasmuch as they thus profited at least one-third in the economy of their transport expenses. An example of the profit thus obtained is given by aSubdéléguéin the following computation: ‘Distance of the transport of the wood from the spot where it is cut to the river, by almost impracticable cross-roads, six leagues; time employed in going and coming back, two days; reckoning (as an indemnity to thecorvéables) the square foot at the rate of six liards a league, the whole amounts to 13 francs 10 sous for the journey—a sum scarcely sufficient to pay the actual expenses of the small landowner, of his assistant, and of the oxen or horses harnessed to his cart. His own time and trouble, and the work of his beasts, are dead losses to him.’ On May 17th, 1776, the Intendant was served by the Minister with a positive order from the King to have thiscorvéeexecuted. M. Ducluzel being then dead, his successor, M. l’Escalopier, very readily obeyed, and published an ordinance declaring that theSubdéléguéhad to make the assessment of the amount of labour to be levied upon each parish, in consequence of which the different persons obliged to statute labour in the said parishes were constrained to go, according to the time and place set forth by the syndics, to the spot where the wood might happen to be, and cart it at the price regulated by theSubdélégué.
Note(LXIII.)—Page115, line 22.
EXAMPLE OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE PEASANTS WERE OFTEN TREATED.
In 1768 the King allowed a remittance of 2000 francs to be made upon thetaillein the parish of Chapelle-Blanche, near Saumur. Thecuréwanted to appropriate a part of this sum to the construction of a belfry, in order to get rid of the sound of the bells that annoyed him, as he said, in his parsonage-house. The inhabitants complained and resisted. TheSubdéléguétook part with thecuré, and had three of the principal inhabitants arrested during the night and put into prison.
Further examples may be found in a Royal order to imprison for a fortnight a woman who had insulted two of the mounted rural police; and another order for the imprisonment for a fortnight of a stocking-weaver who had spoken ill of the same police. In this latter case the Intendant replied to the Minister, that he had already put the man in prison—a proceeding that met with the approval of the Minister. This abuse of themaréchausséehad arisen from the fact of the violent arrest of several beggars, that seems to have greatly shocked the population. TheSubdélégué, it appears, in arresting the weaver, made publicly known that all who should continue to insult themaréchausséeshould be even still more severely punished.
It appears by the correspondence between theSubdéléguéand their Intendant (1760-1770) that orders were given by him to them to have all ill-doing persons arrested—not to be tried, but to be punished forthwith by imprisonment. In one instance theSubdéléguéasks leave of the Intendant to condemn to perpetual imprisonment two dangerous beggars whom he had arrested; in another we find the protest of a father against the arrest of his son as a vagabond, because he was travelling without his passport. Again, a householder of X. demands the arrest of a man, one of his neighbours, who had come to establish himself in the parish, to whom he had been of service, but who had behaved ill, and was disagreeable to him; and the Intendant of Paris writes to request the Intendant of Rouen to be kind enough to render this service to the householder, who is one of his friends.
In another case an Intendant replies to a person who wants to havesome beggars set at liberty, saying that theDépôt des Mendicantswas not to be considered as a prison, but only as a house intended for the detention of beggars and vagabonds, as an ‘administrative correction.’ This idea has come down to the French Penal Code, so much have the traditions of the old monarchy, in these matters, maintained themselves.
Note(LXIV.)—Page121, line 7.
It has been said that the character of the philosophy of the eighteenth century was a sort of adoration of human reason—a boundless confidence in its almighty power to transform at its will laws, institutions, and morals. But, upon examination, we shall see that, in truth, it was more their own reason that some of these philosophers adored than human reason. None ever showed less confidence in the wisdom of mankind than these men. I could name many who had almost as much contempt for the masses as for the Divinity. The latter they treated with the arrogance of rivals, the former with the arrogance of upstarts. A real and respectful submission to the will of the majority was as far from their minds as submission to the Divine will. Almost all the revolutionists of after days have displayed this double character. There is a wide distance between their disposition and the respect shown by the English and Americans to the opinion of the majority of their fellow-citizens. Individual reason in those countries has its own pride and confidence in itself, but is never insolent; it has thus led the way to freedom, whilst in France it has done nothing but invent new forms of servitude.
Note(LXV.)—Page132, line 15.
Frederick the Great, in his Memoirs, has said: ‘Your great men, such as Fontenelle, Voltaire, Hobbes, Collins, Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, have struck a mortal blow at religion. Men began to look into that which they had blindly adored; reason overthrew superstition; disgust for all the fables they had believed succeeded. Deism acquired many followers. As Epicureanism became fatal to the idolatrous worship of the heathen, so did Deism in our days to the Judaical visions adopted by our forefathers. The freedom of opinion prevalent in England contributed greatly to the progress of philosophy.’
It may be seen by the above passage that Frederick the Great, at the time he wrote those lines, that is to say, in the middle of the eighteenth century, still at that time looked upon England as the seat of irreligious doctrines. But a still more striking fact may be gathered from it, namely, that one of the sovereigns, the most experienced in the knowledge of man, and of affairs in general, does not appear to have the slightest idea of the political utility of religion. The errors of judgment in the mind of his instructors had evidently disordered the natural qualities of his own.
Note(LXVI.)—Page150, line 1.
The spirit of progress which showed itself in France at the end of the eighteenth century appeared at the same time throughout all Germany, and was everywhere accompanied by the same desire to changethe institutions of the time. A German historian gives the following picture of what was then going on in his own country:—
‘In the second half of the eighteenth century the new spirit of the age gradually introduced itself even into the ecclesiastical territories. Reforms were begun in them; industry and tolerance made their way in them on every side; and that enlightened absolutism, which had already taken possession of the large states, penetrated even there. It must be said at the same time, that at no period of the eighteenth century had these ecclesiastical territories possessed such remarkable and estimable Princes as during the last ten years preceding the French Revolution.’
The resemblance of this picture to that which France then offered is remarkable. In France, the movement in favour of amelioration and progress began at the same epoch; and the men the most able to govern appeared on the stage just at the time when the Revolution was about to swallow up everything.
It must be observed also how much all that portion of Germany was visibly hurried on by the movement of civilisation and political progress in France.
Note(LXVII.)—Page151, line 1.
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND PROVE THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR INSTITUTIONS TO BE FULL OF DEFECTS AND YET NOT PREVENT THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL END AND AIM FOR WHICH THEY WERE ESTABLISHED.
The power, which nations possess, of prospering in spite of the imperfections to be met with in secondary portions of their institutions, as long as the general principles and the actual spirit which animate those institutions are full of life and vigour, is a phenomenon which manifests itself with peculiar distinctness when the judicial constitution of England in the last century, as described by Blackstone, is looked into.
The attention is immediately arrested by two great diversities, that are very striking:—
First. The diversity of the laws.
Secondly. The diversity of the Courts that administer them.
I.—Diversity of the Laws.—(1.) The laws are different for England (properly so called), for Scotland, for Ireland, for the different European dependencies of Great Britain, such as the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, &c., and, finally, for the British Colonies.
(2.) In England itself may be found four kinds of laws—the common law, statute laws, canon law, and equity. The common law is itself divided into general customs adopted throughout the whole kingdom, and customs specially belonging to certain manors or certain towns, or sometimes only to certain classes, such as the trades. These customs sometimes differ greatly from each other; as those, for instance, which, in opposition to the general tendency of the English laws require an equal distribution of property among all the children (gavelkind), and, what is still more singular, give a right of primogeniture to the youngest child (borough-English).
II.—Diversity of the Courts.—Blackstone informs us that the law has instituted a prodigious variety of different courts. Some idea of this may be obtained from the following extremely summary analysis:—
(1.) In the first place there were the Courts established without the limits of England, properly so called; such as the Scotch and Irish courts, which never were dependencies of the superior courts in England, although an appeal lies from these several jurisdictions to the House of Lords.
(2.) In England itself, if I am correct in my memory, among the classifications of Blackstone are to be found the following:
1. Eleven kinds of Courts of Common Law, four of which, it is true,seem to have already fallen into disuse.
2. Three kinds of courts, the jurisdiction of which extends to the whole country, but which take cognisance only of certain matters.
3. Ten kinds of courts, having a special character of their own. One of these kinds consists of Local Courts, established by different Acts of Parliament, and existing by tradition, either in London itself or in towns and boroughs in the counties. These Courts were so numerous, and were so extremely various in their constitution and in their regulations, that it would be out of the question to attempt to give a detailed account of them.
Thus, in England (properly so called) alone, if Blackstone is to be believed, there existed, at the period when he wrote, that is to say, in the second half of the eighteenth century, twenty-four kinds of Courts, several of which were subdivided into a great number of individual courts, each of which had its special peculiarities. If we set aside those kinds, which appear at that time to have almost fallen into disuse, we shall then find eighteen or twenty.
If now the judicial system in itself be examined it will be found to contain all sorts of imperfections.
In spite of the multiplicity of the courts there was frequently a want of smaller courts, of primary instance, placed within the reach of those concerned, and empowered to judge on the spot, and at little expense, all minor matters. This want rendered such legal proceedings perplexing and expensive. The same matters came under the jurisdiction of several courts; and thus an embarrassing uncertainty hung over the commencements of legal proceedings. Some of the Appeal Courts were also Courts of original jurisdiction—sometimes the Courts of Common Law, at other times the Courts of Equity. There was a great diversity of Appeal Courts. The only central point was that of the House of Lords. The administrative litigant was not separated from the ordinary litigant—a fact which, in the eyes of most French legal men, would appear a monstrous anomaly. All these courts, moreover, looked for the grounds of their judgments in four different kinds of legislation; that of the Courts of Equity was established upon practice and tradition, since its very object was most frequently to go against custom and statute, and to correct, by the rules of the system framed by the Judges in Equity, all that was antiquated or too harsh in statute and custom.
These blemishes were very great; and if the enormous old machine of the English judicial system be compared with the modern construction of that of France, and the simplicity, consistence, and natural connexity to be observed in the latter, with the remarkable complication and incoherence of the former, the errors of the English jurisprudence will appear greater still. Yet there is not a country in the world in which, in the days of Blackstone, the great ends of justice are more completely attained than in England; that is to say, no country in which every man, whatever his condition of life—whether he appeared in court as a common individual or a Prince—was more sure of being heard, or found in the tribunals of his country better guarantees for the defence of his property, his liberty, and his life.
It is not meant by this that the defects of the English judicial system were of any service to what I have here called the great ends of justice: it proves only that in every judicial organisation there are secondary defects that are only partially injurious to these ends of justice; and other principal ones, that not only prove injurious to them, but destroy them altogether, although joined to many secondary perfections. The first mentioned are the most easily perceived; they are the defects that generally first strike common minds: they stare one in the face, as the saying goes. The others are often more concealed; and it is not always the men the most learned in the law, and other men in the profession, who discover them and point them out.
It must be observed, moreover, that the same qualities may be either secondary or principal, according to the period of history or the political organisation of a country. In periodsof aristocratic predominance and inequality everything that tends to lessen any privilege of any individual before the face of justice, to afford guarantees to the weak against the strong, and to give a predominance to the action of the state—which is naturally impartial in differences only occurring between subjects—becomes a principal quality; whereas it diminishes in importance in proportion to the inclination of the social state and political constitution towards democracy.
In studying the English judicial system upon these principles it will be found that, although it permitted the existence of every defect that could contribute to render justice in that country obscure, hampered, slow, expensive, and inconvenient, it had taken infinite precautions to prevent the strong from ever being favoured at the expense of the weak, or the State at the expense of the private individual. The more the observer penetrates into the details of the English legislation the more he will see that every citizen was provided with all sorts of weapons for his defence, and that matters were so arranged as to afford to every one the greatest number of guarantees possible against partiality, actual venality, and that sort of venality which is more common, and especially more dangerous in democratic times—the venality consisting of the servility of the courts towards the Government.
In this point of view the English judicial system, in spite of the numerous secondary errors that may still be found in it, appears to me superior to the French, which, although almost entirely untainted, it is true, by any one of these defects, does not at the same time offer in like degree the principal qualities that are to be found in it, which, although excellent in the guarantees it affords to every citizen in all disputes between individuals, fails precisely in that point that ought always to be strengthened in a democratic state of society like the French, namely, in the guarantees afforded to individuals against the State.
Note(LXVIII.)—Page151, line 19.
ADVANTAGES ENJOYED BY THE GÉNÉRALITÉ OF PARIS.
ThisGénéralitéwas as much favoured in charities bestowed by the Government as it was in the levying of taxes. An example may be found in a letter of theContrôleur-Généralto theIntendantof theGénéralitéof the Île-de-France (dated May 22nd, 1787), in which he informs the latter that the King had fixed the sum, which was to be employed upon works of charity during the year, in theGénéralitéof Paris, at 172,800 livres; and 100,000 livres, moreover, were destined for the purchase of cows, to be given to different husbandmen. It may be seen by this letter that the sum of 172,000 livres was to be distributed by theIntendantalone, with the proviso that he was to conform himself to the general rules already made known to him by the Government, and that he was to lay the account of the distribution before theContrôleur-Généralfor approval.
Note(LXIX.)—Page152, line 27.
The administration of the old monarchy was made up of a multitude of different powers, which had been established at different times, but generally for the purposes of the Treasury, and not of the Administration, properly so called, and which frequently had the same field of action. It was thus impossible to avoid confusion and contention otherwisethan by each party acting but little, or even doing nothing at all. As soon as they made any efforts to rise above this sort of languor, they hampered and entangled each other’s movements; and thus it happened that the complaints made against the complication of the administrative machinery, and the confusion as to its different attributions, were very much more grievous during the years that immediately preceded the Revolution than thirty or forty years before. The political institutions of the country had not become worse—on the contrary, they had been greatly ameliorated; but the general political movement had become much more active.
Note(LXX.)—Page157, line 30.
ARBITRARY AUGMENTATION OF THE TAXES.
What was here said by the King respecting thetaillemight have been said by him, with as much reason, concerning thevingtièmes, as may be seen by the following correspondence:—In 1772 theContrôleur-GénéralTerray had decided upon a considerable augmentation (as much as 100,000 livres) upon thevingtièmesof theGénéralitéof Tours. It is evident that this measure caused M. Ducluzel, an able administrator and an honourable man, both sorrow and embarrassment; for, in a confidential letter, he says: ‘It is probably the facility with which the 200,000 livres’ (a previous augmentation) ‘have been given, that has encouraged the cruel interpretation and the letter of the month of June.’
In a private and confidential letter, which the Director of Contributions wrote thereupon to theIntendant, he says: ‘If the augmentations which have been demanded appear to you, on account of the general distress, to be as aggravating and as revolting as you give me to understand, it would be better for the province, which can have no other defence or protection than in your generous good-feeling, that you should spare it, at least, therôles de supplément, a retroactive tax, that is always odious.’
It may be seen by this correspondence what a complete absence there was of any solid basis, and what arbitrary measures were exercised, each with honest intentions. Both Minister and Intendant laid the weight of the increased taxation sometimes upon the agricultural rather than the manufacturing interests, sometimes upon one kind of agriculture more than another (as the growth of vines, for instance), according as they fancied that the manufacturing or any one branch of the agricultural interest ought to be more tenderly handled.
Note(LXXI.)—Page159, line 13.
EXPRESSIONS USED BY TURGOT RESPECTING THE COUNTRY PEOPLE IN THE PREAMBLE OF A ROYAL DECLARATION.
‘The rural communities consist, throughout the greater part of the kingdom, of poor peasants, who are ignorant and brutal, and incapable of self-administration.’
Note(LXXII.)—Page163, line 24.
HOW IT WAS THAT REVOLUTIONARY IDEAS NATURALLY SPRANG UP IN MEN’S MINDS, EVEN UNDER THE OLD MONARCHY.
In 1779 anavocataddressed a petition to the Council for a decree to establish a maximum of the price of straw throughout the whole kingdom.
Note(LXXIII.)—Page163, line 32.
The Head Engineer, in a letter written to theIntendant, in 1781, relative to a demand for an increase of indemnification, thus expresses himself: ‘The claimant does not pay heed to the fact that the indemnifications granted are an especial favour to theGénéralitéof Tours, and that people ought to consider themselves very fortunate in recovering only a part of their loss. If such compensations as the claimant requires were to be given, four millions would not suffice.’
Note(LXXIV.)—Page167, line 39.
The Revolution did not break out on account of this prosperity, but that active, uneasy, intelligent, innovating, ambitious spirit, that was destined to produce the Revolution—the democratic spirit of new states of society—began to stir up everything, and, before it overthrew for a period the social state of France, was already strong enough to agitate and develop it.
Note(LXXV.)—Page169, line 13.
COLLISION OF THE DIFFERENT ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS IN 1787.
The following may be taken as an example:—The intermediate commission of the Provincial Assembly of the Île-de-France claimed the administration of theDépôt de Mendicité. TheIntendantinsisted upon its remaining in his own hands, ‘inasmuch,’ said he, ‘as this establishment is not kept up by the funds of the province.’ During the discussion, the intermediate commission communicated with the intermediate commissions of other provinces, in order to learn their opinions. Among other answers given to its questions, exists one from the intermediate commission of Champagne, informing that of the Île-de-France that it had met with the very same difficulties, and had offered the same resistance.
Note(LXXVI.)—Page172, line 2.
In the minutes of the first Provincial Assembly of the Île-de-France, the following declaration may be found, proceeding from the mouth of the reporter of the committee:—‘Up to the present time the functions of syndic, which are far more onerous than honourable, are such as to indispose from accepting them all those who unite a sufficient competency to the intelligence to be expected from their position in life.’
Note(LXXVII.)—Page173, line 9.
FEUDAL RIGHTS, WHICH STILL EXISTED AT THE PERIOD OF THE REVOLUTION, ACCORDING TO THE FEUDAL LAWYERS.
It is not the intention of the author here to write a treatise upon feudal rights, and, least of all, to attempt any research into their possible origin. It is simply his desire to point out those which were still exercised in the eighteenth century. These rights played so important a part at that time, and have since retained so large a space in the imagination of the very persons who have no longer anything to suffer from them, that it was a most interesting task to find out precisely what they were when the Revolution destroyed them all. For this purpose a great number ofterriers, or rolls of feudal manors, were studied,—those of the most recent date being selected. But this manner of proceeding led to nothing; for the feudal rights, although regulated by a legal code, which was the same throughout the whole of feudal Europe, were infinitely various in their kinds, according to the province, or even the districts, where they existed. The only system, then, which appeared likely to lead, in an approximate manner, to the required result, was the following:—These feudal rights were continually giving rise to all sorts of disputes and litigation. In these cases it was necessary to know how these rights were acquired, how they were lost, in what they consisted exactly, which were the dues that could only be collected by virtue of a Royal patent, which those that could only be established by private title, which those on the contrary that had no need of formal titles, and might be collected upon the strength of local custom, or even in virtue of long usage. Again, when they were for sale, it was necessary to know in what manner they were to be valued, and what capital each of them represented, according to its importance. All these points, so immediately affecting a thousand pecuniary interests, were subject to litigation; and thus was constituted a distinct class of legal men, whose only occupation it was to elucidate them. Many of these men wrote during the second half of the eighteenth century; some even just upon the threshold of the Revolution. They were not lawyers, properly speaking, but practitioners, whose only task it was to point out to professional men the rules to be followed in this special and little attractive portion of legal science. By an attentive study of thesefeudistes, a tolerably minute and distinct idea of a subject, the size and confusion of which is at first bewildering, may be at last come at. The author gives below the most succinct summary he was able to make of his work. These notes are principally derived from the work of Edmé de Fréminville, who wrote about the year 1750, and from that of Renauldon, written in 1765, and entitled ‘Traité historique et pratique des Droits Seigneuriaux.’
Thecens(that is to say, the perpetual quit-rent, in kind and in money, which, by the feudal laws, was affixed to the possession of certainlands) still, in the eighteenth century, affected most deeply the position of a great number of landed proprietors. Thiscenscontinued to be indivisible, that is to say, the entirecensmight be claimed of any one of the possessors of the property, subject to thecensat will. It was always irredeemable. No proprietor of any lands, subject to thecens, could sell them without being exposed to theretrait censuel, that is to say, without being obliged to let the property be taken back at the price of the sale; but this only took place in certaincoutumes. Thecoutumeof Paris, which was the most general, did not recognise this right.
Lods et Ventes.—It was a general rule that, in every part of the country where thecoutumeprevailed, the sale of every estate subject to thecensshould produce what were calledlods et ventes; in other words, the fines paid to the lords of the manor, upon the alienation of this kind of property. These dues were more or less considerable, according to the customs of the manor, but were everywhere considerable enough; they existed just as well in parts where thedroit écrit(written law) was established. They generally consisted of one-sixth of the price, and were then namedlods. But in these parts the lord of the manor had to establish his rights. In what was calledpays écrit, as well as inpays coutumier, thecensgave the lord of the manor a privilege which took precedence of all other debts on the estate.
Terrage or Champart.—Agrier.—Tasque.—These dues consisted of a certain portion of the produce, which the lord of the manor levied upon lands subject to thecens. The amount varied according to the contracts or the customs of the place. This right is frequently to be met with in the eighteenth century. I believe that theterrage, even inpays coutumier, could only be claimed under express deed. Theterragewas eitherseigneurialorfoncier. It is not necessary to explain here the distinctions which existed between these two different kinds. Suffice it to say that theterrage foncierwas fixed for thirty years, like therentes foncières, whilst theterrage seigneurialwas irredeemable. Lands subject toterragecould not be mortgaged without the consent of the lord of the manor.
Bordelage.—A right which only existed in the Nivernais and Bourbonnais countries, and which consisted in an annual quit-rent, paid in money, corn, and fowls, upon lands subject to thecens. This right entailed very rigorous consequences: non-payment of the dues during three years gave cause for the exercise of thecommiseor entry to the advantage of the lord of the manor. A tenant owing thebordelagewas more open than any other to a variety of annoyances on his property. Sometimes the lord of the manor possessed the right of claiming his inheritance, even when he died having heirs who had legal rights to the succession. This was the most rigorous of any of the feudal rights; and the law had finally restricted it only to rural inheritances. ‘For,’ as our author says, ‘the peasant is always the mule ready to bear every burden.’