The third science which is supposed to come into collision with the Mosaic Record is Physiology. Here, however, we meet with no objections which rest upon ascertained facts, as in the case of geology. We have only to do with theories. All that can be brought forward is merely matter of opinion or theory—such theory resting indeed on a foundation of ascertained facts—but being in itself a mere inference more or less probable from those facts. Even if it were proved to be a true account of the causation of those facts, it would be by no means certain that other facts, however similar, might not have had a totally different origin.
At one time it was very confidently asserted, by many eminent physiologists, that the differences between various branches of the human race were so great, that it was impossible that all should have descended from the same original stock. Probably this opinion is still maintained in some quarters, but of late years views of a diametrically opposite character have been brought forward, and very ably advocated. In proportion as these views are admitted to have in them an element of truth, the importance of the older objection is diminished. It will therefore be unnecessary to dwell upon it. This new view is, that not only all branches of the human race, but all living beings now existing, or that have ever existed on the face of the earth, are descended by the process of "evolution," carried on under what are designated as "natural laws" from some one variety, or small number of varieties of living creatures of the lowest type.
This theory, like that of Laplace, had its origin among the French Academicians, at the close of the last century. Its author was La Marck. According to his view the simplest form of animal life, the "monad," was spontaneously developed by some unknown process. From this monad higher forms of animal life were produced, and the course of development was continued till it finally culminated in man. But it does not appear that La Marck suggested any means by which the various stages of development were brought about, and the view attracted little attention. Some thirty years ago it was revived by an anonymous writer, in a work called "Vestiges of Creation." In this work the idea of spontaneous generation was repudiated. The original monad was supposed to have derived its existence from an act of Creative Power, and to have been then left to work out its own development, by virtue of powers originally implanted in it. All its variations and advances were supposed to be the result of the will and efforts of the creature acting through many generations. Thus the desire and attempt to walk ended in the development of legs, while wings were the final result of its efforts to fly. It was felt, however, that this was by no means a satisfactory account of the state of things, and so the work, though it produced a great sensation at the time, has now been almost entirely forgotten.
Latterly, however, the theory has found a far more able advocate in the person of Mr. Darwin, with whose name it has been popularly identified. By his indefatigable labours a vast variety of facts have been collected and skilfully arranged, to show that all the varieties of life may be satisfactorily accounted for by the continued action, through a long course of ages, of certain natural causes, with the results of which we are familiar, and of which intentional use is continually made by man. Mr. Darwin does not deny the existence of a Creator, but the tendency of his arguments is to prove that His interference was limited to the single act of original Creation; and that from the moment of its creation the world has been a sort of automatic machine, producing its results without any interference from any higher power.
The theory taken as a whole comes into contact with the MosaicRecord in three points:—
1. As it assumes the possibility that life may be self-originated.
2. As it indicates a mode of procedure different from that given by Moses.
3. As it requires unlimited time.
Of these the last is already disposed of, when the narrative is shown to be capable of an interpretation in accordance with it. The first requires only a brief notice; but the second must be carefully investigated, to separate ascertained truth from inferences which have no sufficient foundation.
The theory of spontaneous generation rests almost entirely upon assumptions. Its only semblance of support from facts is derived from certain experiments of a very unsatisfactory character, which are said to have resulted in the production of some of the lowest forms of animal life. These experiments have been by no means uniformly successful. One or two experimenters have thought that they have succeeded, but not uniformly, while the same process, repeated by men whose scientific and manipulative powers are universally recognized, has never once resulted in any seeming development of life. Even if, however, they had been uniformly successful, there would have been great reason to doubt whether the apparent success was not really a failure—a failure in the precautions necessary to exclude all germs of life from the matter experimented upon. For the lower forms of life are excessively minute; and their germs—eggs, seeds, or spores—must be far smaller. It is known that these are constantly floating in the atmosphere, though, owing to their extreme minuteness, the fact can only be ascertained by the most skilful investigation. And the lower forms of animalcules have a singular tenacity of life; they can pass unharmed through processes which would be fatal to creatures of higher organization. One variety is known to survive entire desiccation; another lives upon strychnine; others bear without injury great extremes of heat and cold; and if this is the case with the mature creatures, it is probable that the germ possesses still stronger powers of vitality. If one acarus can live upon strychnine, then it is not impossible that mineral acids should be harmless to others; the germs might be carried through sulphuric acid in air without coming into contact with the acid, as air would pass through in bubbles, in the centre of which they might be suspended; or if like the diatomaceae, they were coated with silex, they might come into contact with it and resist its action. Thus one of the precautions commonly taken is not certain in its action, and the same might be shown to be true of the others. The theory of spontaneous generation is, in fact, generally repudiated by Evolutionists, and cannot therefore be taken as a starting-point.
We come then to the theory of Evolution with which Mr. Darwin's name is associated. This theory asserts that all the varieties of animal life now existing on the earth, however widely they may differ from each other, are in reality derived from one, or a very few original types; and that in this general statement the human race is to be included. This theory rests upon the following admitted facts.
1. There are not, as was at one time commonly supposed, broad and distinct lines of demarcation between the different varieties of animals and plants. Our increasing knowledge of zoology has brought to light the fact that one species shades off into another by almost imperceptible gradations. As we go back in the fossil records of animal life in the past, we find that the species now existing, while they are closely allied to correspondent species of an earlier period, are scarcely ever identical with them, and that the few cases of identity which do occur, are limited to the most recent rocks. Either then the old species must have perished, and new ones, similar but not identical, must have been created to take their places, or there must have been a process of gradual change, by which the present species have been derived from their predecessors. In one or two cases fossils have been found which combine, to some extent, forms which are now found in distinct species, as if the process of variation had proceeded in distinct lines from a common source.
2. No two animals of any class are exactly alike in all points. Each has its individual peculiarities, and in some cases these peculiarities are strongly marked.
3. Man has been enabled, to a certain extent, to make use of these individual peculiarities, and by means of them to produce great varieties in the breeds of domesticated animals. This has been sometimes done unconsciously through a selection influenced by other motives, and then the process has been very slow; but latterly intentionally, with a view to the production of improved breeds, and whenever this has been the case, changes of considerable extent have been rapidly produced. By carefully selecting the animals to be paired, any desired modification can generally be produced in the course of a few generations. This is exemplified in the numerous and increasing varieties of the breeds of almost all domestic animals and birds.
The theory of Evolution then suggests that the same processes which are employed by the cattle-breeder have been in operation through untold ages. For the intention and care of the human agent, Mr. Darwin substitutes two principles; one designated as "Natural Selection," the other as "Sexual Selection." For their full development he claims unlimited time. The ground on which the Process of Natural Selection is maintained is as follows:—
It has been already noticed that no two individuals of the same kind are exactly alike in all respects; each individual has some peculiarities, generally very trifling, but sufficient to distinguish it from all other individuals. Some of these peculiarities will probably be such as to be of some service to the individual in the struggle of life; they will assist it in procuring food, or in resisting or escaping from its natural enemies, while on the other hand the peculiarities of other individuals will be prejudicial to them in these ways. The consequence will be that a larger proportion of those having favourable peculiarities will survive and propagate their kind; their offspring will inherit the peculiarities of their parents, and reproduce them in various degrees. The same process will then be repeated, and thus from generation to generation the peculiarity will be increased, till at last it is sufficient to mark out, first a new variety, then a new species, and so on. This process then, continued through a long course of ages, was at one time considered by Mr. Darwin sufficient to account for all the varieties of living creatures now existing, or that have existed in past ages. But he has more recently satisfied himself [Footnote: Descent of Man, vol. i p. 152.] that there are many phenomena which are not satisfactorily accounted for by this principle, since many of the specific differences of animals are found to exist in matters which, cannot directly promote their success in the struggle of life. Such, for instance, are the brilliant colours which are found, especially among the males, in many species of birds. These he proposes to explain by the supplementary theory of "Sexual Selection." His suggestion is that these peculiarities are in some way attractive to animals of the opposite sex, so that the individuals in which they are most strongly developed are more successful than others in obtaining mates, and that in this way the peculiarity is gradually fixed and increased.
By these two processes, then, Mr. Darwin supposes that all the differences now existing among animals have been produced and perpetuated; and not only that, but that man also is the result of similar processes, acting through a very long period; that the progeny of certain "anthropomorphous apes" have, by slow degrees, risen in the scale of being above their progenitors; that all our faculties, intellectual and moral as well as physical, differ from those possessed by lower animals in DEGREE only, and not in KIND, [Footnote: Descent of Man, chaps, ii.-v.] so that man has arrived at his present state by what may be termed purely natural processes, without the intervention of any external power.
In considering these theories, our attention must first be directed to some defects which appear to weaken the whole course of the argument; and then we may consider the peculiar difficulties in the way of the processes of natural and sexual selection; and the grounds for the belief that man is in possession of something entirely different in KIND from any faculty or power possessed by any lower animals, which could not therefore be derived by inheritance and improvement.
The first thing which strikes us in Mr. Darwin's works is that, from time to time, he betrays a sort of latent consciousness that his theory is insufficient; that the processes to which he ascribes such vast results are not quite adequate to the purpose, but that they need in some way to be supplemented. Every now and then recourse is had to some law—some unknown cause—which must co-operate in the production of the results he is considering. In spite of the apparent care which he has taken to guard against it, he is continually betrayed into a confusion between the two senses in which the word "law" is employed. In its proper significance, law is an expression of the will of an intelligent superior, enforced by adequate power. In this sense the law may be considered as an efficient cause. The combination of will and power is an adequate cause for any result whatever. But Mr. Darwin expressly excludes this sense of the word, in a sentence which seems to involve a self-contradiction. "I mean by nature only the aggregate action and product of many natural laws, and by law only the ascertained sequence of events." [Footnote: Plants and Animals under Domestication, vol. i. p. 6.] Law, in this sense, then, is simply the statement of observed facts, and as such can have no action at all. It asserts that certain phenomena do uniformly follow each other in an ascertained order; but it gives us no information whatever as to the cause of those events, or the reason why they do thus succeed each other. But, taking law in this last sense, by his own definition, Mr. Darwin does, nevertheless, continually bring forward certain "laws" as accounting for certain results. Thus, we have the laws of "Correlation of Growth," [Footnote: Origin of Species, ed. 1872, p. 114.] "Inheritance limited to Males," [Footnote: Descent of Man, vol. i. pp. 256, 257.] and a "Principle of Compensation." [Footnote: Origin of Species, p. 117.] When Mr. Darwin, therefore, brings forward these laws as efficient causes, he not only tacitly admits the inadequacy of his theory to account for the phenomena in question, but he also endeavours to supply the defect by another cause, which, by his own definition, is no cause at all. And further, Mr. Darwin calls in the action of "unknown agencies." [Footnote: Descent of Man, vol. i. p. 154.]
But it may be said, "Is not this the case with all sciences, at least in their earlier stages? Are there not frequently, or always, many phenomena which at first seem inexplicable, but which are gradually accounted for as knowledge increases? If, then, this is no objection in scientific pursuits generally, why should it be so here?" This reasoning would be perfectly valid if Darwinism were regarded simply as a scientific investigation. But it is under consideration now on very different rounds. Whatever Mr. Darwin's own views may be, the theory is brought forward by others, not as a mere interesting speculation, but as antagonistic to a record whose authority is attested by evidence of the very highest class. It claims to discredit that record, and to be received as a substitute for it. But that record, however it may be interpreted, does give us adequate causes for all that it professes to account for, in the will and operation of an Almighty Creator. The theory, therefore, which professes to supplant it, must at least stand upon an equal ground—it must give an adequate account of everything. There must be no unverified laws. To fall back upon such laws is in reality to fall back on the working of that very power whose operation is formally denied. [Footnote: See Foster's Essays, Essay i. Letter 5.]
The next point to be noticed is a great confusion between assumptions and proved facts. This is especially prominent in that part of his last work which is devoted to sexual selection. Thus, in one case it is taken for granted, that various characteristics of the males "serve only to allure or excite the female." [Footnote: Descent of Man, vol. i. p. 258.] "Hence" (because brilliant colours of insects have probably not been acquired FOR THE PURPOSE of protection), "I am led to suppose that the females generally prefer, or are most excited by the more brilliant males." [Footnote: Ibid. p. 399.] "Nevertheless, when we see many males pursuing the same female, we can hardly believe that the pairing is left to blind chance; that the female exerts no choice, and is not influenced by the gorgeous colours, or other ornaments with which the male alone is decorated" [Footnote: Descent of Man, vol. i p. 421.] Such sentences are of continual occurrence, and do duty in the argument as if they expressed ascertained facts. And not only this, but in the very part of the work which is devoted to establishing the adequacy of sexual selection to produce certain effects, that adequacy is assumed from the very beginning. Thus, we read, "That these characters are the result of sexual selection is clear," [Footnote: Ibid. p. 258.] before we have got six pages into an argument which occupies a volume and a half. This is surely a strong instance of what is commonly called "begging the question." Another instance of confusion of ideas is to be found in the assumption of design which occasionally occurs. Thus, we read, "In some other remarkable cases beauty has been gained for the sake of protection, through the imitation of other beautiful species." [Footnote: Ibid. p. 393.] "From these considerations Mr. Bates inferred, that the butterflies which imitate the protected species, had acquired their present marvellously deceptive appearance through variation and natural selection, in order to be mistaken for the protected kinds." [Footnote: Descent of Man, vol. i. p. 411.] In these cases there is an assumption of purpose and design, which, necessarily implies a designer, just as law, treated as an efficient cause, implies a law-giver. It may indeed be that this is only an inaccurate way of expressing something else; but then, such modes of expression are usually the result of a want of clear perception of the ideas to be expressed; and, in this case, such expressions must diminish the weight to be assigned to Mr. Darwin's judgment.
We come now to the consideration of the first of Mr. Darwin's supposed agencies—"Natural Selection," or, "Survival of the fittest." The results produced by this process must be ascribed to one of two causes: either they are the work of a Superintending Providence, watching over and directing every separate detail; or they are the result of pure chance and accident. There is nothing intermediate between these two causes. Natural law—apart from design and a designer—is, as we have seen, a nonentity—a mere expression of observed facts, for which it can give no account whatever. Mr. Darwin's argument is expressly directed to exclude the interference of a superintending Providence. Chance is the only cause which he can bring forward. The very first question, then, which arises is, What is there upon which chance may operate? What are the conditions from which the probabilities may be calculated? Mr. Darwin assumes, and no doubt correctly, that minute variations are continually taking place. But as these variations are the result of accident [Footnote: If they are not the result of accident, we again see design and need a designer.] they will take place in various directions; some of them will have a beneficial, some of them a noxious tendency. As, moreover, they are supposed to be very small at each step, the difference of advantage in the case of different individuals must be also very small, and will not be likely to produce any considerable difference in the chances of pairing. But in order that any variation may be perpetuated and increased, the pairing of similarly affected individuals is necessary. Parents, in which the variations took opposite directions, would probably have offspring of the normal type, the opposite variations neutralizing each other. And this must be repeated again and again; and with every repetition of the process required, the probabilities against it would rapidly increase. Thus, supposing that in the first generation the proportion of favourable conditions were such, that of those animals that paired there were four of each sex that had them to three that wanted them, the chances that any given pair were alike in possessing them would be represented by the product 4/7 x 4/7, or 16/49. Hence, the chances would be rather more than two to one against it. In the next generation it would be 256/2401, or more than eight to one, and so on. [Footnote: This is given merely as an illustration of the nature of the calculation. In any actual case the conditions would be infinitely more complex, but the calculation, if it could be made at all, must be made on this principle.]
But next, we have not to do with one series of changes only, but with a vast number of different series going on in different directions, if we are to have a large variety of animals produced from a common stock. All the probabilities against the separate variations must be combined, not by addition, but by multiplication, so that the probabilities against the production of all these separate forms become enormous.
Against all this improbability Mr. Darwin brings forward the supposed advantages which these variations give to their possessors. But here again a new element is introduced into the calculation. It is assumed, in the very statement of the question, that the process of adaptation has already taken place; the original stock must have been adapted to the circumstances under which they existed, or in their case the whole theory fails. If, then, a fresh adaptation is wanted, it must be because a change in external circumstances must have taken place. In order that a new variety may be established there must be a concurrence between the change of external circumstances and the change in the animals. Here we get a new, and a large factor for our multiplication.
This argument may be, perhaps, made clearer by an illustration. Mr. Darwin has written a very interesting book on the fertilization of orchids by means of insects. According to his view all insects are descended from one common type, and all orchids are also descended from one parent; but we meet with insects and orchids in pairs, each perfectly adapted to the other. We will suppose that a change takes place in a particular orchid, that the nectary recedes to a greater distance from the point to which the insect can penetrate, and so an advantage is given to those insects in which the haustellum is of a length above the average. This may have a slight tendency to increase the number of such insects; but then it will have an opposite tendency in the case of the orchid. It cannot, of course, be supposed that the variation, which is only partial in the insect, is universal in the plant. The unchanged insects will therefore be confined to the unchanged flowers, while the changed insects will be indifferent on the subject, as they will be able to reach the nectary in any case. Hence, an advantage will be given to the unchanged flower, which will be more likely to be fertilized, and the two lines of variation will move in opposite directions.
But next, the variation in the insects and the flowers must take place at the same time and the same place, or no result will follow to the insect, while the new variety of orchid must perish for want of an insect to fertilize it. It is this which makes the supposition of unlimited time almost useless, because just in proportion as the time is increased the probability of two independent events happening simultaneously is diminished.
But even supposing this difficulty out of the way, we meet with an immediate repetition of it. The insect derives an advantage from its increased haustellum, but what advantage does the plant derive from its retiring nectary? How does that help it in the "struggle of life?" But if it produces no beneficial result, the variation according to the theory must drop. Hence we should arrive at an insect suited for a new form of the flower, but no flower suited to the new form of the insect.
If, then, we reject the idea of superintendence and design, we have on the one hand an enormous antecedent improbability, while on the other hand we have only a very small power by which a direction may be given to the course of events, since by the hypothesis in any one generation the change, and consequently the superior advantage, is exceedingly small, and there is a strong tendency in related changes, as in the case of the orchid and insect, to move in opposite directions.
But next, in the varieties of animals with which we are acquainted, there is a certain connexion between the differences of independent organs, for which this theory does not help us to account. Thus, for instance, according to this theory the canine and the feline races are descended from a common ancestor. But there are several points of difference between a cat and a dog. There are the differences in the form of jaws, in the dentition; in the muscles by which the jaws are moved, and in the feet and claws. All animals of the cat tribe agree in all these respects, so do all animals of the dog tribe. We never find a cat's head combined with the feet of a dog. Why is this? Mr. Darwin attempts to account for it by his supposed law of "correlation of growth," but, as has been already shown, any such law, being by Mr. Darwin's definition the observed sequence of events and nothing more, is utterly useless, when it is brought forward as a cause for those events. On this point the theory completely breaks down.
3. The theory does not account for any changes which are not immediately beneficial. [Footnote: In the "Origin of Species" (Ed. 1872) Mr. Darwin makes an admission which is virtually a giving-up of his whole theory. He says, "In many other cases modifications are probably the direct result of the laws of variation or of growth, independently of any good having been thus gained; but even such structures have often, as we may feel assured, been subsequently taken advantage of," pp. 165, 166. Here, then, we have a preparation for future circumstances, which surely implies design.] If any rudimentary advance is made in the organism, if, for instance, the rudiments of a new bone, or joint, or organ of sense are developed, the nascent organ must, according to the hypothesis of minute changes, be useless in the first instance. Hence it would confer no advantage in the struggle of life; there would be no tendency towards its preservation and growth. This becomes a very important consideration, when certain important differences in animal structure and habits are to be accounted for. How, for instance, could the mammary glands be developed in oviparous creatures? Mr. Darwin regards them as originating in cutaneous glands, developed in the pouch of the marsupials. But his grounds for this statement are very meagre. To a great extent they rest on what an American Naturalist "believes he has seen;" and besides, the ornithorhyncus, which has no pouch, and which is lower in the scale of life than the marsupials, by Mr. Darwin's own admission (O. S., p. 190), possesses the glands. Mr. Mivart's question (Darwin, O. S., p. 189) is a very pertinent one.
Another point which this view fails to explain, is the determination of the line of development in particular directions at different periods. At one time it is most marked in fishes, at another in reptiles, at another in mammals. How is this to be accounted for?
4. The experience of cattle-breeders does not warrant the assumption that the principle of natural selection has more than a limited operation. No case has as yet been brought forward in which varieties have been produced which were not capable of interbreeding. Apart from their experience there is not a particle of evidence in favour of the assertion that races which cannot be made to breed together can be descended from a common stock. The unlimited application of this principle is therefore a pure assumption.
5. To this must be added the circumstance that no authenticated instance of variation by natural selection can be brought forward. It is true that this is not a very important argument, because our knowledge of those classes of animals in which natural selection could act is even now very incomplete; and our knowledge of their past history is still more limited, so that we are not in a condition to prove a negative. But in such a case as this the onus of proof should surely lie on the other side. It is for those who would assert the theory to bring forward positive proof of it. There is, however, one point in Mr. Darwin's view of domesticated animals which tells against his theory. The cat remains unchanged, because from its vagrant habits man has no control over its pairing [Footnote: Darwin's "Animals and Plants," vol. ii. p. 236.]. Now considering the variety of conditions under which cats exist, here is surely a great opening for natural selection. But it has produced no results.
We come now to the theory of Sexual Selection, which is to account for those peculiarities and distinctions which can have no beneficial effect in the struggle of life, and which are accounted for on the supposition that they render their possessors more agreeable to the opposite sex, and so facilitate pairing, so that those animals which possess them in a remarkable degree would have the greatest chance of continuing their race. The case on which Mr. Darwin mainly rests his argument is that of birds, in which the males are frequently distinguished by exquisite colours and very graceful markings, and in which also the proceedings of the sexes can, in many cases, be more easily watched.
It is in maintaining this theory that Mr. Darwin has such frequent recourse to what may be called the "argumentum ad ignorantiam." "If such and such organs or ornaments were not designed for this or that particular object, then we do not know of what use they are." [Footnote: For instance, Descent of Man, vol. ii. pp. 284. 399.] This maybe very true, but it proves nothing, unless we assume that we are or ought to be acquainted with, the use and object of everything in nature. And it involves another and a very wide question. There are certain tastes which seem to be inherent in our nature, and there are certain external objects which afford gratification to those tastes. Must we view this coincidence as merely accidental? or is it a part of the design of the world that it should minister not only to our needs, but also to our enjoyments? Mr. Darwin does not reject the idea of an Author and Designer of Nature, is he then prepared to assert that beauty did not form a part of the design as well as utility? [Footnote: In the "Origin of Species," p 159, Mr. Darwin does seem to assert this; but he says in conclusion, "How the sense of beauty in its simplest form—that is, the reception of a peculiar kind of pleasure from certain colours, forms, and sounds—was first developed in the mind of man and of the lower animals is a very obscure subject," p. 162. To Mr. Darwin, with his present views, it may well be obscure; but it presents no obscurity at all to those who believe that the universe in all its details was designed, and its formation superintended, by a loving Father, whose will was that it should not only supply the needs, but also minister to the enjoyment of all His creatures, nor to those who in every form of beauty, physical, intellectual, or moral, behold a far-off reflexion of the glory of the Invisible Creator.] If he is not prepared to assert this, he must admit the possibility that many things exist whose sole object is to minister to that sense of beauty which is probably possessed by other beings besides ourselves.
Mr. Darwin admits that many other causes, beside the supposed preference on the part of one sex for certain material adornments possessed by the other, influence the pairing of animals. In a very large number of cases the female is quite passive in the matter. The question is decided by a battle between the males, and the female seems, as a matter of course, to become the mate of the conqueror. In many other cases pairing seems to be the result of accident; the two sexes pair as they happen to meet each other. The great points on which Mr. Darwin rests his argument are that in some cases, on the approach of breeding-time, certain ornamental appendages become more highly developed or more brilliantly coloured, [Footnote: Descent of Man, vol. ii. p. 80.] and that in many cases the males, when courting the females, are observed to display their ornaments before them. [Footnote: Ibid. vol. ii. p. 86, et seq.] but then there are other facts, which Mr. Darwin. also notices, which detract more than he seems willing to allow, from the relevancy of these facts. The development of ornaments at breeding-time sometimes takes place in both sexes, indicating some latent connexion with the reproductive organs; thus the comb of the domestic hen becomes a bright red, as well as that of the cock. It would appear then that the object of the change is not to render the cock more attractive to the hens, for how could it serve the hens (if the choice lies with them) to be made more attractive to the cocks? Then again an old hen who is past laying, often assumes, to a considerable extent, the plumage of the cock. When these ornaments are the exclusive possession of the male, they are often displayed for other purposes than the gratification of the female. The possessors seem to be conscious of their beauty, and to take a pleasure in displaying it to any spectators.
Very great beauty and brilliancy of colour is often found in cases in which it can have nothing whatever to do with the relation between the sexes. Thus, a vast number of caterpillars are remarkable for their beauty; but in their immature state it can have no relation to sexual selection; and if it may, or rather must, have a different object in one case, what ground have we for assuming that it may not have a different object in the other?
Again, we are not in a position to form any opinion as to the causes which really influence the pairing of animals when choice is exercised. We have no certain knowledge upon the important question whether the ideal of beauty, if possessed by the lower animals at all, is in all, or even in many cases, in accordance with our own. We, for instance, admire a male humming-bird; what certainty have we that he is equally beautiful in the eyes of his mate? In cases where we have reason to believe that deliberate selection has taken place, we do not know that that selection was influenced by only one condition—that of beauty. There may have been a thousand causes at work of which we know nothing. Mr. Darwin brings forward an instance in which the owner of a number of peahens wished them to breed with a peacock of a particular variety, while they showed a deliberate preference for another bird; and he supposes that their preference was decided by the plumage. But there might have been another cause—at least the circumstances as related by him seem to suggest it—which would give a very different turn to the affair. The favoured peacock, spoken of as "old," [Footnote: Descent of Man, vol. ii. p. 119.] was probably an old friend of the hens, while his unsuccessful rival seems to have been a new introduction. The preference shown by the hens would in this case be fully accounted for, without supposing them to have exhibited any choice in the matter of plumage.
Then there are a vast number of peculiarities which are certainly not ornamental in our eyes, but which are confined to the male sex. They are, so far as we can tell, of no service whatever in the struggle of life. With reference to these Mr. Darwin's argument seems to be this,—"They can serve no other purpose with which we are acquainted, therefore they must be attractive to the female—therefore they must be acquired by sexual selection." Such arguments as these cannot carry much weight. [Footnote: Descent of Man, vol ii p 284.]
On the whole, we can hardly come to any other conclusion than that the theory of sexual selection is not proved. In many cases it is known that such selection is not the result of choice; in other cases, where choice seems probable, we have no ground for believing that external appearance is the sole ground of that choice. It may exercise some influence, but that is all. Even if admitted, there are many things which cannot be accounted for by it without very extravagant assumptions. It cannot then be admitted as covering the large classes of phenomena left unaccounted for by the theory of natural selection.
So far as the lower animals are concerned, the results to which an examination of Mr. Darwin's views has led us may be summed up in the following propositions:—
1. That the two causes, natural and sexual selection, have probably exercised some influence in the modification of animal forms; but that the laws of probability preclude our entertaining the belief that these causes can have had, by themselves, and apart from a superintending power, anything beyond a very limited operation.
2. That in cases where there have been related changes in different parts of the same organism, or in different organisms, the inadequacy of these two causes is virtually admitted by the introduction of certain supposed laws; and that these laws, being defined by Mr. Darwin to be no more than "the ascertained sequence of events," cannot be regarded as efficient causes, and so cannot supply the defect.
3. That there are particular points in the chain of life, in which the transition from one form to another is so great, and so incapable of graduation, that it is impossible to suppose that these two causes can have been adequate to produce it. Of this a notable instance is to be found in the transition from oviparous animals to the mammalia.
We come now to the consideration of the origin of man, which Mr. Darwin, in his last work, ascribes also to natural and sexual selection. His view is, that man is descended from some family of anthropomorphous apes, and that all those enormous differences which, as he admits, exist between the highest ape and the most degraded member of the human race, are differences of degree only, and not of kind; that all our intellectual wealth, and all our moral laws, are simply the development of faculties and ideas which were possessed in a ruder form by the creatures from whom man is descended.
So far as man's physical constitution is concerned, there is undoubtedly something to be said in favour of this view. For man's bodily frame is composed of the same elements, and moulded upon the same general plan as that of the higher apes, and, what is still more remarkable, it retains, in a rudimentary form, certain muscles and organs which are fully developed and answer important purposes in many of the quadrumana. Of these the tail is a remarkable instance. But when the differences between the physical peculiarities of man, and those of his supposed progenitors are examined, the theory of natural selection collapses entirely, for the development has taken the form which would be most disadvantageous in the struggle of life. This is very clearly put by the Duke of Argyll.[Footnote: "Recent Speculations on Primeval Man," in Good Words, April, 1868.]
"The unclothed and unprotected condition of the human body, its comparative slowness of foot; the absence of teeth adapted for prehension or for defence; the same want of power for similar purposes in the hands and fingers; the bluntness of the sense of smell, so as to render it useless for the detection of prey which is concealed;—all these are features which stand in fixed and harmonious relation to the mental powers of man. But, apart from these, they would place him at an immense disadvantage in the struggle for existence. This, therefore, is not the direction in which the blind forces of selection could ever work …. Man must have had human proportions of mind before he could afford to lose bestial proportions of body."
But it is in the intellectual and spiritual part of man's nature that the greatest difficulty in the way of the application of these theories arises. The strongest argument of all against them is one which is incapable of proof, since it arises not from facts around us, but from our own self-consciousness—our realization of our own powers—and so, to each individual man it must vary in apparent strength, in proportion as he realizes what he is, and what it is in his power to become. The very outcry that has been raised against Mr. Darwin's proposition is a proof of this. The theory of the descent of man, as he propounds it, was felt to be an outrage upon the universal instincts of humanity. But, because this objection rests upon such a foundation, it is incapable of being duly weighed and investigated as an argument, and we proceed therefore to such considerations as are within our reach.
First of all it is desirable to dispose of one of the stock arguments in favour of the theory. That argument is, that the difference between the lowest type of savage and the highest type of civilized man—between a Fuegian or an Australian on the one hand, and a Newton, a Shakspeare, or a Humboldt, on the other,—is quite as great as that between the higher forms of ape and the lowest forms of humanity. But in this argument there is a fatal confusion of ideas. The capacity for acquisition is confounded with the opportunity for acquisition. That the savage is in possession of but very few ideas does not prove that he is incapable of more; it may equally well arise from the fact that he had had no opportunity of acquiring more. The only way to test the question is by putting a savagoe from his earliest infancy, under the same favourable circumstances as the child of civilisation. Whenever this experiment has been tried, and our missionaries have had many opportunities of trying it, the difference has either not appeared at all, or has proved to be very trifling. Mr. Darwin himself seems to have been very much surprised at what he saw in some natives of Terra del Fuego, who were for a time his companions on board the "Beagle." "The Fuegians rank amongst the lowest barbarians, but I was continually struck with surprise how closely the three natives on board H.M.S. 'Beagle,' who had lived some years in England, and could talk a little English, resembled us in disposition, and in most of our mental faculties." [Footnote: Descent of Man, vol. i. p 34] And these Fuegians had not been educated from their infancy, they had only come to England later in life, and were thus under an incalculable disadvantage. Had they been heirs to such an intellectual inheritance as fell to the lot of Mr. Darwin, there is nothing extravagant in the supposition that they might have proved themselves equal to him in the ability to make use of it. The comparison then proves to be quite illusory; but it draws our attention to a fact which is of very high importance in our investigation of the difference between man and all other animals. Man alone seems to be capable of laying up what may be termed an external store of intellectual wealth. Other animals in the state of nature make, so far as we know, no intellectual advances. The bee constructs its cell, the bird builds its nest precisely as its progenitors did in the earliest dawn of history. There is a possibility that some advance, though a very small one, may be made by animals brought under the control of man. It is said, for instance, that a young pointer dog will sometimes point at game without any training. But in this case the acquired knowledge is congenital, and is therefore to be regarded as a development brought about by superintended selection. But with man none of the acquired knowledge is innate. It is a treasure entirely external to himself until he has appropriated it by study of some kind or other. There is no reason to believe that any advance in intellectual power has been made by man, in his collective capacity, since his first appearance on earth. Various individuals have varying powers, but these differences are no result of development, since they may often be found among members of the same family, who have been subjected to the same discipline, and enjoyed the same educational advantages. It follows that the gulf between the ape and the lowest type of humanity is almost if not quite as great as between the ape and the highest type. The savage does not in any way help to bridge over that gulf.
But it is said that the moral and intellectual faculties which man possesses, and which he looks upon as the great badge of his superiority, are in truth only different in degree and not in kind from those possessed by the lower animals. But the grounds on which this assertion is based are wonderful in their tenuity. Dogs are possessed of self-consciousness because they sometimes emit sounds in their sleep from which it is concluded that they dream. [Footnote: Descent of Man, vol. i. p. 62.] "Can we feel sure that an old dog, with an excellent memory, and some power of imagination, as shown by his dreams, never reflects on his past pleasures in the chace? And this would be a form of self- consciousness." Our duty to our neighbour is entirely the result of "social instinct," [Footnote: Descent of Man, vol. i. pp. 70- 106.] and our duty to our God the development of a belief which has its origin in dreams. [Footnote: Ibid, p. 66.]
It is impossible for us satisfactorily to meet these assertions with a direct negative, [Footnote: There are some who think that this statement may be directly refuted. Their views will be found in the QUARTERLY REVEIW, July, 1871.] for this simple reason, that we have no means whatever of knowing what ideas are present in the minds of the lower animals, or even what communications pass between them. For anything we can tell to the contrary, the bark of a dog may be as articulate to his fellow-dogs as our speech is to our fellow-men, while on the other hand to the dog our speech may be as inarticulate as his bark is to us. But our total ignorance of the mental state of animals which have been the companions of man from the very earliest ages, our utter inability to hold any conversation with them, is in itself a proof of the wide gulf that separates them from us. Put two men of the most widely separated races on a desert isle together, and a very little time will elapse before they are able to hold some communication with each other. If then the difference between man and the lower animals were a difference of the same kind as that between the civilized man and the savage, though greater in degree, surely in so many thousand years something might have been done to open a way for intellectual communication; some development of the faculties of the lower creatures would have been perceived, some means of interchanging ideas would have been discovered. If Mr. Darwin had had for his companions on board the "Beagle," instead of three Fuegians, as many Gorillas or Chimpanzees, would he, at the end of the voyage, have been able to report any approximation, at all to European mental characteristics, or even to those of the lowest savage? But if the difference be only one of degree, some approximation ought to have taken place.
As then we can have no direct knowledge of the moral and intellectual powers of animals, we can only judge of them from their actions, and other external signs. One great mark of difference has already been noticed. Man has, other animals have not, the power of laying up an external treasure of intellectual acquirements. Then there are certain arts which seem to be indispensable to man in his lowest state—no savage is so low that he is utterly destitute of them—no animal makes any pretence to them. Such are the designing, construction, and use of tools. Mr. Darwin asserts that in certain cases—very rare ones—apes have been known to use stones to break open nuts; but the mere use of a stone is a very different thing from the conception and deliberate formation of a tool, however rude. Then there is the kindling of fire, and the use of it for the purpose of cooking; and lastly, the preparation and the wearing of clothes. The tools or the clothes may be of the rudest kind, the tools may be formed from a flint, and the clothes from bark or skin, but in the preparation of each there are signs of intellectual power, of which we find no indications whatever in the lower animals.
Another important difference between man and all other animals lies in the fact, that whatever an animal does it does perfectly from the first, but it makes no improvements. A bird's first nest is perfect. With man the case is the reverse, it is only by many trials, many failures, that he attains to skill in any operation, but then he goes forward. Arts improve from generation to generation. This seems to show that the faculties of man differ from those of animals in kind, and not in degree only.
The question also arises, if man has been produced from an anthropomorphous ape by a process of natural development, how is it that the same process has not gone on in other lines? The dog, the horse, and the elephant are at least equal in intelligence and sagacity to the highest known apes. Such a development from them cannot have proceeded through the line of the apes. If these different orders are at all connected it must be through some remote common ancestor. Why then has this development come to an abrupt termination in some cases and not in all? It may indeed be said that the dog and the horse are indebted for their intelligence to the inherited results of long intercourse with man, but this cannot be the case with the elephant, which is never known to breed in captivity. Nor is there any reason to believe that the present intelligence of the elephant is recently developed. Why then has it been arrested in its course?
Whether or not we assume the theory of development to be wholly or partially correct in reference to the lower animals, we must admit that it is true of man, but in a sense totally different from that which Mr. Darwin suggests. The development of which he is the advocate is a development of race, in which the advance made by each individual generation is exceedingly small, while the difference in remote generations, the accumulated advance of successive generations, is great. In man, on the contrary, there is no reason whatever to believe that there has been any advance at all in the race from the very earliest periods—that either in physical power or intellectual ability the present generation of men, taken as a whole, are in any way superior to their most remote ancestors. The development of which man is especially capable is the development of the individual, that development being not physical, but intellectual and moral, and being in a great degree dependent on the will and perseverance of the individual, and very little on external circumstances. The result of these individual developments has been the accumulation of a vast fund of wealth, useful arts, sciences, literature, which form the common possession of the whole race, but do not necessarily imply the slightest advance in any particular individual—that advance being dependent, not on the possession of those treasures, but on the use made of them. In the case of man then development does certainly exist, but it takes a line totally distinct from that which Mr. Darwin advocates, and thus forms another broad line of demarcation between man and the most advanced of the lower animals.
It appears then that the faculties of man differ generically from those of the animals. A new order of things seems to have commenced with the appearance of man on the earth—an order in which the highest place was to be maintained by intellectual instead of physical power. No mere process of evolution then will account for man's origin. His physical nature may have been formed in that way; but we cannot believe that his intellectual and moral nature were developed from any lower creatures. Only some special Creative interference can account for his existence.
So far then as it tends to negative the continued operation of the Creator, the theory of evolution is untenable. Like that of Laplace, it fails to give an adequate cause for existing phenomena. But it seems probable, as will be seen in the next chapter, that both theories have in them much of truth. They cannot point out the cause of the universe, but they may give us a more or less accurate view of the manner in which that cause operated. The facts brought forward by geologists have been shown not to be incompatible with interpretations which the Mosaic Record readily admits, though they conflict with existing notions upon certain points. In no one then of the three sciences which have been supposed to be specially antagonistic to that record, is there anything to be found which can be maintained as a reasonable ground for doubting that that record is, what it has always been held to be by the Church, a direct Revelation from the Creator.