But among the scenes of rejoicing there was others of sadness. Both American and Spanish troops laydead and wounded around us; all were cared for alike. I saw a colored trooper stop at a trench filled with Spanish dead and wounded and gently raise the head of a wounded Spanish lieutenant and give him the last drop of water from his own canteen. Their dead, of whom there were many, had fought bravely and we buried them in the trenches where they gallantly fell.The losses of the day were heavy—the Tenth Cavalry losing one-half of its officers and twenty per cent of its men. We officers of the Tenth Cavalry have taken our black heroes in our arms. They had again fought their way into our affections, as they here had fought their way into the hearts of the American people. Though we had won, it had cost us dearly.An attempt was made that evening to recapture the hill, but our defense was so strong that the attempt was futile; the Spaniards retreating to their first interior line of intrenchments 300 to 500 yards away.The firing on both sides was kept up until dark and ceased only at intervals during the night. Over El Caney the battle had raged all day, but steadily as the Spaniards had held their positions the fierce charges of the gallant Seventh, Twelfth and Twenty-fifth regiments of infantry were resistless. Soon after San Juan was ours, El Caney fell.By morning the position was strengthened so that our line was fairly well protected, reveillé was soundedby Spanish small arms and artillery in chorus, but the signal had been anticipated and all men were in their places at the firing line.Daylight was breaking in the east when both sides began where they had left off the night before and the firing all day was incessant. A few moments after the firing opened, some cannoneers permitted a limber from one of the guns of the light battery near us to get away and it went rolling down the hillside to the rear for a quarter of a mile. Our artillery was silenced by the enemy's small arms and compelled to take up a new position; strong shrapnel went screeching over head and bursting beyond. The adjutant of my regiment was stricken by a hidden sharpshooter. The heat soon became intense and there was no shelter and cannon balls plunged through the lines at the top of the hill and went rolling to the bottom of the valley; bullets spattered against the isolated trees or grazed the newly made earthworks covering with dirt the men in the trenches and fairly mowing the grass for many yards in our front. Thus the day went on and the night and the succeeding day began. Then came the welcome truth; everybody drew a long breath and thanked God; it was possible once more to walk erect; however, the echoes of the last three days were slow to die away and at the breaking of a bough or the rusting of a leaf there was a temptation to duck.At noon on July 4th the regiments were formed into line and I had the pleasure of reading to my regimenta telegram from the President extending the thanks and congratulations of the American people to the army in front of Santiago for its gallantry and success.The brave Linares, however, had already realized the hopelessness of his cause, but he would not surrender without permission from his home government. Therefore the city must be bombarded. Pacificos and the non-combatants were ordered out of the city and were permitted to come within our lines. All day long on the dusty road leading from Santiago to El Cancy passed the long white line; faint, hungry women carried a bundle of clothing and parcel of food or an infant while helpless children trailed wearily at the skirts of their wretched mothers. An old man tottered along on his cane and behind him a puny lad and an aged woman; old and young women and children and decrepit men of every class—those refined and used to luxury together with the ragged beggar—crowding each other in this narrow column. It was a pitiful sight; from daylight to dark the miserable procession trooped past. The suffering of the innocent is not the least of the sorrows of war.The days of truce and hostilities alternated; all roll calls were suspended except the sunset call and retreat on days of truce.At the evening call we daily ceased our chatting, cooking or working and groups or lines of officers and men stood with uncovered heads in respectful andreverent attention as the music of the Star Spangled Banner and the sight of the flag we had planted on the hill above us, lifted us out of ourselves and carried us in thought to home and country; it was the soldiers' silent Ave Maria.Duty in the trenches was no less arduous because of the few days of truce; all the available men would report to work at strengthening positions and building bomb-proof shelters. Vigilance never relaxed until the capitulation. The rainy season had set in in earnest and the trenches were at times knee deep with mud and water. The constant exposures to the heat and rain together with the strain of battle began to have its effect upon even the strongest of us. Our sick list gradually grew and the dreaded yellow fever appeared in our ranks; the field hospitals already overcrowded with wounded were compelled to accommodate the increasing number of fever patients; medical supplies and food for the sick were lacking and though many things were furnished by the Red Cross there was yet a shortage.Since July 3d the firing from the Spanish trenches had become irregular, desultory and non-effective. Our artillery gunners now knew the range of every Spanish battery and our men in the trenches—every one a trained marksman—knew the distance of every Spanish position. A Spanish captain told me afterward that it was dangerous for them even to stick up a finger for fear of having it shot off; and yet the Spanish commander still held out.
But among the scenes of rejoicing there was others of sadness. Both American and Spanish troops laydead and wounded around us; all were cared for alike. I saw a colored trooper stop at a trench filled with Spanish dead and wounded and gently raise the head of a wounded Spanish lieutenant and give him the last drop of water from his own canteen. Their dead, of whom there were many, had fought bravely and we buried them in the trenches where they gallantly fell.
The losses of the day were heavy—the Tenth Cavalry losing one-half of its officers and twenty per cent of its men. We officers of the Tenth Cavalry have taken our black heroes in our arms. They had again fought their way into our affections, as they here had fought their way into the hearts of the American people. Though we had won, it had cost us dearly.
An attempt was made that evening to recapture the hill, but our defense was so strong that the attempt was futile; the Spaniards retreating to their first interior line of intrenchments 300 to 500 yards away.
The firing on both sides was kept up until dark and ceased only at intervals during the night. Over El Caney the battle had raged all day, but steadily as the Spaniards had held their positions the fierce charges of the gallant Seventh, Twelfth and Twenty-fifth regiments of infantry were resistless. Soon after San Juan was ours, El Caney fell.
By morning the position was strengthened so that our line was fairly well protected, reveillé was soundedby Spanish small arms and artillery in chorus, but the signal had been anticipated and all men were in their places at the firing line.
Daylight was breaking in the east when both sides began where they had left off the night before and the firing all day was incessant. A few moments after the firing opened, some cannoneers permitted a limber from one of the guns of the light battery near us to get away and it went rolling down the hillside to the rear for a quarter of a mile. Our artillery was silenced by the enemy's small arms and compelled to take up a new position; strong shrapnel went screeching over head and bursting beyond. The adjutant of my regiment was stricken by a hidden sharpshooter. The heat soon became intense and there was no shelter and cannon balls plunged through the lines at the top of the hill and went rolling to the bottom of the valley; bullets spattered against the isolated trees or grazed the newly made earthworks covering with dirt the men in the trenches and fairly mowing the grass for many yards in our front. Thus the day went on and the night and the succeeding day began. Then came the welcome truth; everybody drew a long breath and thanked God; it was possible once more to walk erect; however, the echoes of the last three days were slow to die away and at the breaking of a bough or the rusting of a leaf there was a temptation to duck.
At noon on July 4th the regiments were formed into line and I had the pleasure of reading to my regimenta telegram from the President extending the thanks and congratulations of the American people to the army in front of Santiago for its gallantry and success.
The brave Linares, however, had already realized the hopelessness of his cause, but he would not surrender without permission from his home government. Therefore the city must be bombarded. Pacificos and the non-combatants were ordered out of the city and were permitted to come within our lines. All day long on the dusty road leading from Santiago to El Cancy passed the long white line; faint, hungry women carried a bundle of clothing and parcel of food or an infant while helpless children trailed wearily at the skirts of their wretched mothers. An old man tottered along on his cane and behind him a puny lad and an aged woman; old and young women and children and decrepit men of every class—those refined and used to luxury together with the ragged beggar—crowding each other in this narrow column. It was a pitiful sight; from daylight to dark the miserable procession trooped past. The suffering of the innocent is not the least of the sorrows of war.
The days of truce and hostilities alternated; all roll calls were suspended except the sunset call and retreat on days of truce.
At the evening call we daily ceased our chatting, cooking or working and groups or lines of officers and men stood with uncovered heads in respectful andreverent attention as the music of the Star Spangled Banner and the sight of the flag we had planted on the hill above us, lifted us out of ourselves and carried us in thought to home and country; it was the soldiers' silent Ave Maria.
Duty in the trenches was no less arduous because of the few days of truce; all the available men would report to work at strengthening positions and building bomb-proof shelters. Vigilance never relaxed until the capitulation. The rainy season had set in in earnest and the trenches were at times knee deep with mud and water. The constant exposures to the heat and rain together with the strain of battle began to have its effect upon even the strongest of us. Our sick list gradually grew and the dreaded yellow fever appeared in our ranks; the field hospitals already overcrowded with wounded were compelled to accommodate the increasing number of fever patients; medical supplies and food for the sick were lacking and though many things were furnished by the Red Cross there was yet a shortage.
Since July 3d the firing from the Spanish trenches had become irregular, desultory and non-effective. Our artillery gunners now knew the range of every Spanish battery and our men in the trenches—every one a trained marksman—knew the distance of every Spanish position. A Spanish captain told me afterward that it was dangerous for them even to stick up a finger for fear of having it shot off; and yet the Spanish commander still held out.
The literary style of the young lecturer reveals the direct virile qualities that since have made General Pershing one of the most forceful and clear American writers on topics having to do with the military affairs of the country. His use of adjectives perhaps is somewhat freer than in his later writings, but there is the same vivid, direct power of expression and description. His modesty at the time prevented him from referring to the fact that twice he was recommended for brevet commissions in the war with Spain for "personal gallantry and untiring energy and faithfulness." Nor did he mention the words of General Baldwin, a brave soldier of the Civil War, who said of him: "Pershing is the coolest man under fire I ever saw." And he makes no mention of the earnest protest of a certain foreign officer, the representative of his own government in the Santiago campaign, who begged the daring troops not to make the now famous charge up San Juan Hill because they would be rushing into certain death.
The official records, however, are now availableand consequently we are not dependent upon stories which occasionally seem to possess a snow-ball like quality of increasing in size as they gain in distance from their starting points.
Headquarters, Tenth U. S. Cavalry,Camp Hamilton, Cuba, July, 1898.Adjutant General, Second Brigade, Cavalry Division, Fifth Army Corps.Sir:—I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Tenth Cavalry in the battle of July 12th and 13th, 1898, before Santiago de Cuba.On the morning of July 1st the regiment, consisting of troops, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I, field and staff, occupying a position on the left of the second cavalry, directed the line extending nearly north and south on a ridge some three or four miles from Santiago.At about 6:30 A. M. a battery of artillery massed a short distance from our right opened upon the works of Santiago, the regiment being exposed to much of the return fire of the American batteries. After the artillery fire had ceased the regiment moved right past the sugar mills and proceeded in rear of the town on the road toward Santiago. The movement was delayed as we approached the San Juan river and the regiment came within range of fire about half a mile from the crossing. Upon reaching theriver I found that the Seventy-first N. Y. Volunteers were at the crossing and that the regiment preceding mine had moved to the right. The Tenth Cavalry was here subject to and confronting radically an infantry fire from the three block houses and intrenchments in front and the works farther to the left and nearer Santiago. The fire was probably drawn by a balloon which preceded the regiment to a point near the ford where it was held. I was directed to take a position to the right behind the river, however, forprotectionmoving to this position and while there the regiment suffered considerable loss. After an interval of 20 to 30 minutes I was directed to form line of battle in a particularly open field facing toward the blockhouse and strong intrenchments to the north occupied by the enemy. Much difficulty was found on account of the dense undergrowth crossed in several directions by wire fences. As a part of the cavalry division under General Sumner, the regiment was formed on two lines. The first squadron under Major S. T. Norvall consisting of troops A, E, B and I leading. The second line under Major T. J. Wint consisting of troops C, F and G. Troop D having crossed further down the river attached itself to a command of infantry and moved with that command on the two blockhouses. The regiment advanced in this formation under a heavy fire from the enemy's position proceeding but a short distance when the two lines were reunited into one. The advance was rapidly continued in an irregular line toward theblockhouses and intrenchments to the right front. During this advance the lines passed some troops of the first cavalry which I think had been previously formed on our right. Several losses occurred before reaching the top of them; first lieutenant W. H. Smith being killed as he arrived at its crest. The enemy having retreated toward the northwest toward the second and third blockhouses, new lines were formed and rapid advance was made upon the new positions.The regiment assisted in capturing these works from the enemy and with the exception of Troops C and I who had joined the first volunteer cavalry, then took up a position north of the second blockhouse, remaining there during the night. With some changes in the positions of troops they held this line of the second and third under a heavy and continuous fire from the enemy's intrenchments in front and the regiment now occupying a part of the advance intrenched positions. Some troops lost their relative positions in line during the first day of the battle but attached themselves to others and continued to move forward. During the entire engagement the regiment acted with exceptional coolness and bravery. It held its position at the ford and moved forward unflinchingly after deploying through the advance under the heavy fire from the enemy's works.The officers and men in general throughout exhibited great bravery obeying orders with unflinching alacrity while attacking with small arms anenemy strongly posted in intrenchment and blockhouse supported with artillery. Words cannot express my gratification at such conduct and I would request such service receive some special recognition. It is difficult to distinguish between officers and men all of whom are so deserving but of the officers whose conduct on the field came under my direct personal observation I would especially mention Major S. T. Norvall, Major T. J. Wint, squadron commander, first lieutenant J. J. Pershing, quartermaster, and first lieutenant M. H. Bowman, adjutant, for their untiring energy, faithfulness and gallantry during this engagement and would recommend the officers mentioned for brevet commissions, . . .Very respectfully,(s)T. A. Baldwin,Lieutenant Colonel, Tenth Cavalry,Commanding.[A True Copy]Second lieutenant, Tenth Cavalry, acting regimental adjutant.
Sir:—I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the Tenth Cavalry in the battle of July 12th and 13th, 1898, before Santiago de Cuba.
On the morning of July 1st the regiment, consisting of troops, A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I, field and staff, occupying a position on the left of the second cavalry, directed the line extending nearly north and south on a ridge some three or four miles from Santiago.
At about 6:30 A. M. a battery of artillery massed a short distance from our right opened upon the works of Santiago, the regiment being exposed to much of the return fire of the American batteries. After the artillery fire had ceased the regiment moved right past the sugar mills and proceeded in rear of the town on the road toward Santiago. The movement was delayed as we approached the San Juan river and the regiment came within range of fire about half a mile from the crossing. Upon reaching theriver I found that the Seventy-first N. Y. Volunteers were at the crossing and that the regiment preceding mine had moved to the right. The Tenth Cavalry was here subject to and confronting radically an infantry fire from the three block houses and intrenchments in front and the works farther to the left and nearer Santiago. The fire was probably drawn by a balloon which preceded the regiment to a point near the ford where it was held. I was directed to take a position to the right behind the river, however, forprotectionmoving to this position and while there the regiment suffered considerable loss. After an interval of 20 to 30 minutes I was directed to form line of battle in a particularly open field facing toward the blockhouse and strong intrenchments to the north occupied by the enemy. Much difficulty was found on account of the dense undergrowth crossed in several directions by wire fences. As a part of the cavalry division under General Sumner, the regiment was formed on two lines. The first squadron under Major S. T. Norvall consisting of troops A, E, B and I leading. The second line under Major T. J. Wint consisting of troops C, F and G. Troop D having crossed further down the river attached itself to a command of infantry and moved with that command on the two blockhouses. The regiment advanced in this formation under a heavy fire from the enemy's position proceeding but a short distance when the two lines were reunited into one. The advance was rapidly continued in an irregular line toward theblockhouses and intrenchments to the right front. During this advance the lines passed some troops of the first cavalry which I think had been previously formed on our right. Several losses occurred before reaching the top of them; first lieutenant W. H. Smith being killed as he arrived at its crest. The enemy having retreated toward the northwest toward the second and third blockhouses, new lines were formed and rapid advance was made upon the new positions.
The regiment assisted in capturing these works from the enemy and with the exception of Troops C and I who had joined the first volunteer cavalry, then took up a position north of the second blockhouse, remaining there during the night. With some changes in the positions of troops they held this line of the second and third under a heavy and continuous fire from the enemy's intrenchments in front and the regiment now occupying a part of the advance intrenched positions. Some troops lost their relative positions in line during the first day of the battle but attached themselves to others and continued to move forward. During the entire engagement the regiment acted with exceptional coolness and bravery. It held its position at the ford and moved forward unflinchingly after deploying through the advance under the heavy fire from the enemy's works.
The officers and men in general throughout exhibited great bravery obeying orders with unflinching alacrity while attacking with small arms anenemy strongly posted in intrenchment and blockhouse supported with artillery. Words cannot express my gratification at such conduct and I would request such service receive some special recognition. It is difficult to distinguish between officers and men all of whom are so deserving but of the officers whose conduct on the field came under my direct personal observation I would especially mention Major S. T. Norvall, Major T. J. Wint, squadron commander, first lieutenant J. J. Pershing, quartermaster, and first lieutenant M. H. Bowman, adjutant, for their untiring energy, faithfulness and gallantry during this engagement and would recommend the officers mentioned for brevet commissions, . . .
Very respectfully,(s)T. A. Baldwin,Lieutenant Colonel, Tenth Cavalry,Commanding.
[A True Copy]
Second lieutenant, Tenth Cavalry, acting regimental adjutant.
"A foreign officer standing near our position when we started to make that charge was heard to say, 'Men, for Heaven's sake don't go up that hill. It is impossible for human beings to take that position and you cannot stand the fire.' Notwithstanding this with a terrific yell we rushed up to the enemy's works and you know the result. Men who were nearsaid that when this officer saw us make the charge he turned his back and wept."
"A foreign officer standing near our position when we started to make that charge was heard to say, 'Men, for Heaven's sake don't go up that hill. It is impossible for human beings to take that position and you cannot stand the fire.' Notwithstanding this with a terrific yell we rushed up to the enemy's works and you know the result. Men who were nearsaid that when this officer saw us make the charge he turned his back and wept."
Camp A. G. Forse,Huntsville, Ala., December 1, 1898.The Adjutant General, U. S. Army,Washington, D. C.,Through military channels,Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by Troop D, Tenth Cavalry, in the engagement before Santiago de Cuba so far as it is known to me. As we approached the foot of the hill our artillerymen fired over our heads at the enemy on top of it. This caused a slowing up on the general advance. When I was about half way up the hill I was disabled by three bullet wounds received simultaneously. I had already received one, but did not know it. What took place after my disablement is known to me only through the statement of my men and others subsidized by the depositions enclosed herewith. My platoon went to the top of the hill with the infantry and was soon afterward conducted by Lieutenant J. J. Pershing, R. O. M., Tenth Cavalry, to the line of the Tenth Cavalry some distance to the right.Very respectfully,John Bigelow, Jr.,Tenth Cavalry, Commanding,Troop D.
Camp A. G. Forse,Huntsville, Ala., December 1, 1898.
Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by Troop D, Tenth Cavalry, in the engagement before Santiago de Cuba so far as it is known to me. As we approached the foot of the hill our artillerymen fired over our heads at the enemy on top of it. This caused a slowing up on the general advance. When I was about half way up the hill I was disabled by three bullet wounds received simultaneously. I had already received one, but did not know it. What took place after my disablement is known to me only through the statement of my men and others subsidized by the depositions enclosed herewith. My platoon went to the top of the hill with the infantry and was soon afterward conducted by Lieutenant J. J. Pershing, R. O. M., Tenth Cavalry, to the line of the Tenth Cavalry some distance to the right.
Very respectfully,John Bigelow, Jr.,Tenth Cavalry, Commanding,Troop D.
In the report of Major Wint, November 28th, 1898, to the adjutant-general is the following: "Lieutenant Pershing, R.O.M., was with the Second Squadron when passed on Sugar House Hill and during its advance on San Juan Hill he conducted himself in a most gallant and efficient manner."
The war with Spain was soon terminated but the executive ability of Lieutenant Pershing was still in demand. The period of reconstruction was difficult then, as it always is, presenting problems different from those of active fighting, but no less puzzling and perplexing. In this trying time we find him serving as an executive under the direction of the War Department and manifesting in his quiet, persistent way the same qualities of efficiency which had marked his career up to this time. On August 18, 1898, he was serving as Major Chief Ordnance Officer with the United States Volunteers, remaining on duty at the Headquarters of the Army until December 20, 1898, and then on duty in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War, under whom he organized the Bureauof Insular Affairs, and was at the head of that Bureau until the following August. On May 12, 1899, he was honorably discharged from Volunteer service and on June 6, 1899, he was Major and Assistant Adjutant General, United States Volunteers.
Office and work of detail did not, however, appeal strongly to him. Having known the life and work in the field, and also possessed of a temperament that demanded more active work and out-of-door life that an office provided, at his own request he was sent to the Philippine Islands and was assigned to duty as Adjutant General of the District of Mindanao and Jolo (afterwards a Department under the same name).
He became captain in the First Cavalry, February, 1901, and on August 20th of the same year he was transferred to the Fifteenth Cavalry. His work in the Philippine Islands continued and there his soldierly qualities found a larger field for development and activity than they had known before.
Thesupreme testing of Pershing up to this time in his career came in the Philippines. There he was dealing with a strange people who for three centuries had learned their lessons and formed their opinions of the white men from their contact and dealings with the Spaniards, of whom they had seen chiefly the adventurers or those who for the "good of their country" had fled from their homes. To such men the exploitation of the "natives" was a legitimate game and the little brown men had thoroughly learned to play their part in it.
The provinces in which Pershing was to find his field of activity were as difficult as any in the islands. For years the natives had been accustomed to import arms from Borneo and elsewhere. Certain of the tribes were famousalso for their skill as forgers of swords, krises and barongs. Every datto had numbers of lantaka or brass cannon and was well skilled in the use of them. Pershing's problem was not only to subdue these men,—farmers, artificers and all alike fighters after their own manner, but he must also at the same time convince them of the good will and helpful intentions of the new Government, which for a time and for their own good was now to control them. Naturally suspicious, treacherous in many ways, the Islands presented difficulties that well might have staggered the young officer.
General Pershing's first term of service in the Philippines was from 1899 to 1903. In the interval between his first and second terms of service as soldier and governor in the Islands, he was back in the United States to serve on the General Staff and also was serving as military attaché in the army of General Kuroki in the war between Russia and Japan.
In his first years in the Philippines his work was of a character that made him known tothe Army and to the authorities at Washington, but it did not make him widely known to his countrymen.
Briefly stated, his record during his two terms of service in the Philippines is as follows: he was in the field November, 1900, to March, 1901, against General Capistrano, the commander of the insurrectionary forces; he was in command of an expedition against the hostile Moros of Maciu, starting from Camp Vicars, Mindanao, September 18, 1902. In the actions at Guam, September 18, and at Bayabao, September 20, 1902, he had a responsible part. On September 29, 1902, he captured Fort Moru, driving the Moros from that Peninsula on that date. He attacked the Moros at Maciu, September 30, 1902, capturing their two forts and then returned to Camp Vicars October 3, 1902. He was again in action at Bacolod, April 6-8, 1903, and again at Calabui April 9, 1903, and Iaraca River, May 4, 1903. He commanded the first military force that ever encircled Lake Lanao.
In May, 1902, General Chaffee was desirousof securing a young leader to deal with the troublesome and specific problem in the province of Zamboanga, where the fierce and turbulent little Moros dwelt. Many of these people were Mohammedans and had been taught that the swiftest and surest way to secure happiness in the next world was by the slaughter of Christians in this present world. During 300 years they had fought the Spanish invaders, whose every attempt to subdue them had failed.
Pershing in command of five troops of the Fifteenth Cavalry, together with a battery of artillery, a company of engineers and a battalion of the Twenty-seventh Infantry, was stationed at Camp Vicars in the Lake Lanao District of Mindanao. He had taken the place made vacant by the promotion of Colonel Baldwin.
Although the Americans had obtained a foothold on the southern side of Lake Lanao, very few of them had actually become friendly. In fact the Spaniards, in all the years of their occupation, had never subdued the main tribes to subordination.
Among those who especially defied the American authority was the Sultan of Bacalan and 600 of his followers who occupied a stronghold on the western side of Lake Lanao from which they made almost daily forays. Walls of earth and bamboo some 20 feet in thickness had been added to the natural defenses of the position they selected. A moat 40 feet wide and 30 feet deep surrounded the position. The defenders thought it was proof against any possible attack. Friendly overtures failed to make an impression upon their leaders, and their cotta was finally surrounded and their surrender demanded. Still confident of their prowess, they declined to accede to the American Commander's demands and the latter was compelled to assault this strong fortification. Accordingly trees were felled and used to make a crossing over the moat and when all was in readiness the place was taken in a fierce hand-to-hand encounter between the Americans and the Moros. The American success was complete and a severe lesson was taught to Moros in that region. General Pershing completed the conquest of MindanaoMoros by marching his command entirely around Lake Lanao through the dense jungles and swamps bordering the lake.
As a matter of interest several reports made by General Pershing on his work in the Philippines follow, and some in which reference is made to him by certain of his superior officers at that time.
In the later reports sent by Pershing there is manifest the same painstaking carefulness and thorough understanding of his task. He makes recommendations concerning the distribution of the troops in the Philippines, goes into detail about the necessity and the location of cold storage plants, and has positive convictions as to what changes ought to be made in the Subsistence Department. Certain posts also ought to be made permanent. He clearly presents the reasons leading to his conclusions.
Annual Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army—1901The command left Cagayan, December 16th, under Major Case, accompanied by Major J. J. Pershing, adjutant general, department of Mindanao and Jolo.In a narrow gorge 800 feet deep formed by the river the insurgents were found in three strongly constructed forts which our troops attacked without loss. The enemy must have suffered severely, but his loss was not ascertained. Two cannon fell into our hands. The 18th and 19th of December were consumed in surrounding the stronghold of Maxajambos by gaining a position commanding Langaran to the south of Maxajambos. Langaran, which was the headquarters of the insurgents, was entered on the 20th and considerable quantity of provisions, ammunitions of war, cuartels, etc., were found and destroyed. The insurrectos had made good their escape under cover of darkness.On the 28th, the insurgents were discovered a mile and a half south of Langaran occupying a strong position which our troops succeeded in reaching and the enemy was forced to retreat in disorder. The command then moved on to Talacao but was not met by any resistance. Such buildings as had been used by the insurgents for storehouses, etc., were destroyed as well as supplies. One prisoner was taken. The surrounding country was thoroughly scouted without encountering any enemy force. The troops returned to Cagayan the 31st of December.
Annual Report of the Lieutenant General commanding the Army—1901
The command left Cagayan, December 16th, under Major Case, accompanied by Major J. J. Pershing, adjutant general, department of Mindanao and Jolo.
In a narrow gorge 800 feet deep formed by the river the insurgents were found in three strongly constructed forts which our troops attacked without loss. The enemy must have suffered severely, but his loss was not ascertained. Two cannon fell into our hands. The 18th and 19th of December were consumed in surrounding the stronghold of Maxajambos by gaining a position commanding Langaran to the south of Maxajambos. Langaran, which was the headquarters of the insurgents, was entered on the 20th and considerable quantity of provisions, ammunitions of war, cuartels, etc., were found and destroyed. The insurrectos had made good their escape under cover of darkness.
On the 28th, the insurgents were discovered a mile and a half south of Langaran occupying a strong position which our troops succeeded in reaching and the enemy was forced to retreat in disorder. The command then moved on to Talacao but was not met by any resistance. Such buildings as had been used by the insurgents for storehouses, etc., were destroyed as well as supplies. One prisoner was taken. The surrounding country was thoroughly scouted without encountering any enemy force. The troops returned to Cagayan the 31st of December.
From the report of Captain James J. Mays, 40th Infantry, concerning the attack on Cagayan, December 16th to 25th, 1900:
He reports, "late in the afternoon of December 17th insurgents concealed in the brush fired on horses that were being watered in the cañon. Major Pershing, who was with the command, took fifteen men on one bluff and I took about the same number on another and poured volleys into the cañon, firing at smoke from insurgent pieces, silencing their fire. I think we killed some of them, but do not know. The following morning Major Pershing crossed the river and joined Captain Millar. Captain Millar threw shells into Maxajambos and signaled that the place seemed deserted. During the day I kept patrols on the plateau. Señor Cruz came out on the morning of this day and I sent him to Captain Millar. I questioned him about the plan of cutting through the timber. He said he never heard of anyone getting through there and that it would be very difficult on account of the cañon, and also that it would end on top of a cliff 400 or 500 feet high. I concluded not to attempt it."
He reports, "late in the afternoon of December 17th insurgents concealed in the brush fired on horses that were being watered in the cañon. Major Pershing, who was with the command, took fifteen men on one bluff and I took about the same number on another and poured volleys into the cañon, firing at smoke from insurgent pieces, silencing their fire. I think we killed some of them, but do not know. The following morning Major Pershing crossed the river and joined Captain Millar. Captain Millar threw shells into Maxajambos and signaled that the place seemed deserted. During the day I kept patrols on the plateau. Señor Cruz came out on the morning of this day and I sent him to Captain Millar. I questioned him about the plan of cutting through the timber. He said he never heard of anyone getting through there and that it would be very difficult on account of the cañon, and also that it would end on top of a cliff 400 or 500 feet high. I concluded not to attempt it."
To the Headquarters Department of Mindanao and Jolo.Cagayan de Misamis, P. I.February 2, 1901.The Commanding Officer, Provincial District of Mindanao and Jolo.Sir: I am instructed by the department commander to advise you that General Capistrano, commandingthe insurgent forces in Northern Mindanao, has signified his wish to meet the department commander in conference and to direct that you take whatever measures are possible to insure his safe conduct accompanied by his staff and that of any tribes with a pass signed by the commanding general and countersigned by the adjutant general. Patrols and expeditionary forces need not be suspended but should be warned to be at special pains not to molest unresisting parties of natives and to take special care not to interfere with individuals or squadrons, to indicate that their mission is peaceful.Very respectfully,J. J. Pershing,Assistant Adjutant General.
To the Headquarters Department of Mindanao and Jolo.Cagayan de Misamis, P. I.
February 2, 1901.
Sir: I am instructed by the department commander to advise you that General Capistrano, commandingthe insurgent forces in Northern Mindanao, has signified his wish to meet the department commander in conference and to direct that you take whatever measures are possible to insure his safe conduct accompanied by his staff and that of any tribes with a pass signed by the commanding general and countersigned by the adjutant general. Patrols and expeditionary forces need not be suspended but should be warned to be at special pains not to molest unresisting parties of natives and to take special care not to interfere with individuals or squadrons, to indicate that their mission is peaceful.
Very respectfully,J. J. Pershing,Assistant Adjutant General.
To the Headquarters Department of Mindanao and Jolo.Cagayan de Misamis, P. I.February 28, 1901.To the Commanding Officer, 1st District of Mindanao and Jolo.Sir: I am instructed by the Department commander to invite your attention to the fact that there are at this place ten prisoners of war either now or recently officers in the insurgent forces. With one or two exceptions these officers have voluntarily surrendered one at a time and have been induced to do so with a distinct understanding that they wouldnot be closely confined or otherwise molested so long as they refrained from all conduct which might be construed as hostile to the United States.It is understood that most of these have severed their connections with the insurgent forces and have thrown up their appointments as officers.You will please assemble these men, give them strict, but fair limits of arrest, extending in no case beyond the limits of the town of Cagayan de Misamis and inform them that any violation of their obligations as prisoners of war, however slight, will be followed by immediate arrest and deportation from the Philippine Islands to Guam; also that they are to report daily in a body at a stated hour to the Provost Marshal.The Department Commander further directs that you assemble all the more prominent citizens of this and adjoining towns who are known or suspected of being in sympathy with the insurgents and inform them that they must refrain absolutely from giving aid or comfort to them and without communicating with the insurgent forces in any manner under penalty of immediate arrest and deportation.In carrying out the terms of this order you are directed to exercise considerable vigilance and the most drastic vigor.Very respectfully,J. J. Pershing,Assistant Adjutant General.
To the Headquarters Department of Mindanao and Jolo.Cagayan de Misamis, P. I.
February 28, 1901.
Sir: I am instructed by the Department commander to invite your attention to the fact that there are at this place ten prisoners of war either now or recently officers in the insurgent forces. With one or two exceptions these officers have voluntarily surrendered one at a time and have been induced to do so with a distinct understanding that they wouldnot be closely confined or otherwise molested so long as they refrained from all conduct which might be construed as hostile to the United States.
It is understood that most of these have severed their connections with the insurgent forces and have thrown up their appointments as officers.
You will please assemble these men, give them strict, but fair limits of arrest, extending in no case beyond the limits of the town of Cagayan de Misamis and inform them that any violation of their obligations as prisoners of war, however slight, will be followed by immediate arrest and deportation from the Philippine Islands to Guam; also that they are to report daily in a body at a stated hour to the Provost Marshal.
The Department Commander further directs that you assemble all the more prominent citizens of this and adjoining towns who are known or suspected of being in sympathy with the insurgents and inform them that they must refrain absolutely from giving aid or comfort to them and without communicating with the insurgent forces in any manner under penalty of immediate arrest and deportation.
In carrying out the terms of this order you are directed to exercise considerable vigilance and the most drastic vigor.
Very respectfully,J. J. Pershing,Assistant Adjutant General.
Thefirst period of General Pershing's service in the Philippine Islands lasted until 1903. He then was recalled to the United States and became a member of the General Staff Corps. This position he held until 1906.
Within that time, however, he was appointed the military attaché at Tokio, Japan, and was with General Kuroki in the latter's campaign in the war between Japan and Russia. It is said that his report forwarded to our Government is one of the most lucid and forceful military documents ever received by the Department.
If any discouragements had come to the young officer in his lonely campaigns in the jungles of the Philippines and he had felt that somehow he had been banished to a region where his services of necessity would never berecognized, that thought was banished by the action of President Roosevelt in 1906.
His services in the First and Fifteenth Cavalry as well as his activities in Washington and his report as the military attaché of his Government, had brought him very strongly before the attention of the President, who now was eager to reward him for his faithful services.
There were certain obstacles, however, in the way, and the President did his utmost to secure the proper legislation to enable him to reward the soldier whom he was eager to honor. There were delays, however, and the delays continued. Red tape exerted its binding force upon the makers of the laws and no apparent progress was made.
Thereupon President Roosevelt in his direct way determined to wait no longer for changes in the laws. Promptly he nominated Pershing to be Brigadier General; the nomination was confirmed and the long deferred recognition was now manifest.
He had labored in somewhat obscure fields.He had assisted in subduing insurrections, had supervised many local improvements in the territory within which he was working. He had assisted in winning victories and had warded off attacks by hostile Moros. There had, however, been nothing spectacular in his work. His reliability, good sense, bravery and administrative ability, however, were now better known and he was in every way prepared for the more important problems which now confronted him.
The President by his action had raised or "jumped" the new general eight hundred and sixty-two orders. Worthy as the honor was and worthily bestowed, for a time there were protests from disappointed seekers after office. Some cried "politics," but as a rule these objections came in loudest tones from those who by devious ways had sought certain "pulls" for their own elevation. Personal ambitions and personal jealousies, perhaps, also entered to a degree and aided not a little in delaying the legislation which President Roosevelt desired.
Doubtless this condition deeply hurt General Pershing, but there was no complaining on his part. It was his to show that he was not unworthy of his new honor. Years before he had been taught by his father that to be worthy of promotion was more than the promotion itself. And now he was soon to return to the Philippines to show in the jungle and on the field, in council and administration, that the action of the President had not been the result of idle or thoughtless impulse.
Not long before this time, on January 26, 1905, General Pershing was married. There is a current story, for the truthfulness of which the writer cannot vouch, that when the nomination of Major Pershing for promotion was placed before the Senate, there was made at the same time a just and true statement of the distinguished services he had rendered his country in his career in the Philippines. In the visitors' gallery with friends, intently listening to the proceedings, was Miss Frances Warren, daughter of United States Senator Warren of Wyoming. As she listened to thewords spoken concerning the American officer in the Philippines it is said she remarked, "What a wonderful record. I should like to see the man who made it." Not long afterward she did see him though the meeting was entirely unexpected. Doubtless the man impressed her more than had his praises to which she had listened in the halls of Congress, for on January 26, 1905, she became Mrs. John Joseph Pershing.
The general, who for years had been compelled to live a somewhat lonely life, whose activities had kept him far from friends and his own people, was now to have the help and comfort of the strong and beautiful daughter of Senator Warren. Never effusive nor one to refer to his personal or private affairs, his friends nevertheless have told of the deep love of the General for his wife and family—a tragic setting for the terrible tragedy which later in a moment disrupted his home and deprived him forever of his wife and three little daughters.
Directly after the wedding and before the general and his bride could carry out the plansof a trip they were expecting to make to Japan, he was abruptly ordered to join the forces of General Kuroki, as has been said, as the representative of the Army of the United States in the war between Japan and Russia. Like the good soldier that he was there was no complaining, no expression of his personal disappointment; he at once obeyed.
For a time General Pershing's work in the Philippines, to which he soon returned, was not unlike that in which he formerly had been engaged.
The raids of the Moros on the coast towns were checked by Pershing's brilliant victory at Bayan. But the tribe though defeated in this battle were by no means conquered. They were obdurate and their long experience with the Spaniards made them confident of their ability to hold off the new invading force.
Six hundred hot-headed Moros were ready to defend their fortress—the first of forty similar ones,—in the crater of an extinct volcano. The most hot-headed of all was the leader, the Sultan of Bacolod. Walls of earthand bamboo, forty feet in thickness, had been added to the natural defenses. A moat forty feet wide and thirty feet deep surrounded the position. The defenders believed it was proof against every possible attack.
With five hundred of his own men and an equal number of selected Filipino scouts Pershing advanced. The march was difficult and slow, for in many places the troops were compelled to cut a pathway through dense jungles and all the way they were exposed to sudden and fierce attacks by the fanatical Moros. But Pershing relentlessly pushed forward and at last arrived at the foot of the mountain on which the Moros had confidently gathered in their supposedly impregnable stronghold,—"proof against all attacks."
Not a day was lost. Quietly the leader remarked that he would "take the place if it took ten years to capture it"—a remark that reminds one of a similar declaration by another American soldier that he would "fight it out on this line if it takes all summer."
First, his jungle fighters cut a trail entirelyaround the base of the mountain, at the same time doing their utmost to protect themselves against attacks from the Moros who were as skillful in this work as they were in nearly every phase of fighting in the jungle. The men were compelled also to protect themselves from attacks from above, for it was a favorite method of the Moros by unexpected attacks, in rushes of wild fury, to scatter their enemies when they tried to ascend.
The soldiers speedily formed a complete cordon around the mountain and the siege promptly began. Pershing knew what the Moros did not know that he knew,—when they had withdrawn to their stronghold they had done so in such haste that they neglected or were unable to bring with them supplies sufficient for a long siege, and not many days would pass before the necessity of obtaining food would compel them to try to break the iron ring about them and to send out parties for help.
Pershing's information soon proved to be correct. After a few days, in small detachmentsthe Moros did their utmost to gain the open jungle by dashing through the surrounding lines. But every dash was frustrated, although the fanatical fighters recklessly threw themselves into what was certain death. The failure of one band to break through was merely a clarion call to others of their fellows to renew the attempt. The mad and useless efforts were all baffled.
At last on Christmas Day, 1911, the Moros in the little fortress did what Moros had not done before,—they marched down the mountain side and surrendered,—that is, all did save a few who made a final wild attempt to break through the jungle. The effort was vain, however, for the regulars hotly pursued the little brown fighters and the desperadoes paid the penalty of their daring.
A second fortress was taken in a similar manner. But the leader was as wise as he was brave and determined. After he had permitted the knowledge of the fall of the first forts to be carried throughout the tribe, soon after the beginning of the siege, he sent amessage within the third fort that the inmates, if they surrendered, would receive the same generous treatment the defenders of the other forts had received.
Soon the brown fighters were convinced and promptly acted accordingly. They discovered that they were dealing with a leader different from any they had previously known. He did exactly what he said he would do. His promise could be trusted. His word was reliable; and forty forts soon were given over to the Americans.
The subjection of all the Moros, however, had not yet been accomplished. Some still distrusted the white men and, as they believed, fought to retain and defend their homes. At last, however, at the Battle of Bagsag in June, 1913, the task was completed, though Pershing's work was not yet all done. What he had believed to be only a temporary task had now assumed larger and longer proportions. He had done so well that he was retained not only in command but also was the governor of the newly conquered, but not yetfriendly province. Perhaps there is no better proof of the ability and sterling character of General Pershing anywhere to be found than the fact that the little brown Moros whom he defeated and overthrew, later made him a datto of their tribe—an official position that granted him full power of life and death over every man, woman and child in their numbers and also made him a judge as well as a ruler over them.
In his quiet, efficient, modest manner General Pershing in a larger way had manifested the same qualities that had marked the lad at Laclede, the student at West Point, and the young lieutenant leading his black troops in Cuba. To-day all Americans are proud as well as pleased that there were leaders able to recognize, and brave enough to reward, the services of a soldier who had filled with honor every position to which he had been assigned.
In the reports to the War Department there are many interesting incidents descriptive of the daring and labors of General Pershing, who was not only in command of the troops,but also, as has been said, the military governor of the Province of Mindanao. In his own reports there are general as well as specific recommendations and the directness with which he states what to him appear to be needful for the good of the Filipinos as well as of the American troops, is marked.
[From the Report of June 30, 1910.]To the Adjutant-General of the United States Army:To keep down the lawless element among the Moros and pagan tribes a relatively large force must be maintained in this department. We have now occupied these Islands long enough to determine quite definitely where such posts should be located. There should be a regiment post on the Island of Jolo, a brigade post in the Lake Lanoa division and the regimental post in some point in the vicinity of Zamboanga, besides smaller posts at Fort Overton and Malabang.Jolo is the strategical site for the post in the Sulu Archipelago. From there any point in the Island can be quickly reached and the other islands of the Sulu group can be easily controlled. It possesses a good harbor and is otherwise well situated as a military station. Mounted troops can go anywhere on the Island and they exert more influence over the Moros than dismounted troops.The Lake Lanoa Moros are turbulent and unruly and the presence of a relatively large force in that region will be required for years to come. The shores of Lake Lanoa afford a very desirable place for a military post. The country is very fertile and in case of necessity troops could maintain themselves there almost indefinitely.The erection of a permanent post at Zamboanga is in every way desirable. Troops located at Zamboanga could be sent to any place in the department more quickly than from any other point.
[From the Report of June 30, 1910.]
To keep down the lawless element among the Moros and pagan tribes a relatively large force must be maintained in this department. We have now occupied these Islands long enough to determine quite definitely where such posts should be located. There should be a regiment post on the Island of Jolo, a brigade post in the Lake Lanoa division and the regimental post in some point in the vicinity of Zamboanga, besides smaller posts at Fort Overton and Malabang.
Jolo is the strategical site for the post in the Sulu Archipelago. From there any point in the Island can be quickly reached and the other islands of the Sulu group can be easily controlled. It possesses a good harbor and is otherwise well situated as a military station. Mounted troops can go anywhere on the Island and they exert more influence over the Moros than dismounted troops.
The Lake Lanoa Moros are turbulent and unruly and the presence of a relatively large force in that region will be required for years to come. The shores of Lake Lanoa afford a very desirable place for a military post. The country is very fertile and in case of necessity troops could maintain themselves there almost indefinitely.
The erection of a permanent post at Zamboanga is in every way desirable. Troops located at Zamboanga could be sent to any place in the department more quickly than from any other point.
After stating that many of the barracks and quarters will not last long, he comments:
Permanent posts should be built entirely of concrete or of a combination of concrete and most durable hard woods.The khaki uniform furnished by the quartermasters' department for tropical service is poorly made and ill-fitting. The American made cotton khaki cloth is heavy, shrinks badly, fades rapidly and is almost as warm as woolen cloth. This clothing is as poor an excuse for a military uniform as can be imagined. Instead of offering inducements to soldiers to enter and remain in foreign service by giving them good-looking and well-fitted clothes, we force upon them these unbecoming, hot, heavy, ill-fitting uniforms. The best khaki cloth is of English manufacture and should be prescribed for the army.It is light, cool, holds its color and does not shrink. All uniform cloth ought to be manufactured by tailors enlisted for the purpose.
Permanent posts should be built entirely of concrete or of a combination of concrete and most durable hard woods.
The khaki uniform furnished by the quartermasters' department for tropical service is poorly made and ill-fitting. The American made cotton khaki cloth is heavy, shrinks badly, fades rapidly and is almost as warm as woolen cloth. This clothing is as poor an excuse for a military uniform as can be imagined. Instead of offering inducements to soldiers to enter and remain in foreign service by giving them good-looking and well-fitted clothes, we force upon them these unbecoming, hot, heavy, ill-fitting uniforms. The best khaki cloth is of English manufacture and should be prescribed for the army.It is light, cool, holds its color and does not shrink. All uniform cloth ought to be manufactured by tailors enlisted for the purpose.
He goes on to discuss the water supply, public animals, ships and drydocks, and pack and wagon transportation, water and sewer systems, the roads and the works, ice and cold storage plants and also makes suggestions for the engineering and ordnance departments. He asks for the construction, for military purposes, of a telegraph line of communication with the District of Davao. He speaks also of the marked improvement in the target practice, especially in small arms. He gives the details of the eighteen expeditions entered upon and has a complete description of the Subano uprising, which occurred in November, 1909, among the hill people of Zamboanga. Certain Moro chiefs from Lake Lanoa, assisted by pagan and Christian outcasts and criminals from the Misamis Strip, planned to gather the hill people into an inaccessible part of the "Bolman Country." This plan was carried out by resorting to false prophecies,and, in many cases, to violence. Thousands of these small pastoral Subanos were driven into camps, where they would be more completely under the control of these self-appointed leaders. Large camps were built, one at Bolman and one at Dampalan, and preparations were made for defending them. The positions were well selected. The occupants were armed with spears, krises, kampilans and barongs. A constabulary force from Capitan was sent November 28th, by the Governor of the Moro provinces, to the outskirts of the Barbon camp. The Subanos, under the leadership of their Moro chiefs, attacked the constabulary with spears, and several of the men were killed. Upon the call of the Provincial Governor for troops, the second company of Philippine scouts, commanded by Captain Moses T. Barlow, was sent to Dipolog to report to Major John J. Finley, Governor of the District of Zamboanga, who was placed in command.
In the report of Major Finley that officer writes:
"The considerable reward offered for the apprehension of the leaders did not stimulate the natives to search for them. The Subanos were thoroughly subdued and terrorized by the rigorous discipline of the camp and after the fight of November 28th they were only too glad to hide themselves in the woods and mountains. The Philippines made no effort whatever to earn the reward."Ample time was given for the hill people to take a look at the troops and become convinced that this form of governmental power was friendly and really interested in their salvation and prosperity. After becoming thus convinced, the good influence of the government spread with rapidity among the Subanos. They returned to their farms by hundreds daily, they preferred their services to the government and declined remuneration. The important witnesses emerged from their hiding places and the apprehension of the leaders became a possibility. The leaders were caught, the witnesses came forward from their hiding places to convict them, and the wondering Subanos reclaimed their homes and began life anew. There was a general rejoicing among them."
"The considerable reward offered for the apprehension of the leaders did not stimulate the natives to search for them. The Subanos were thoroughly subdued and terrorized by the rigorous discipline of the camp and after the fight of November 28th they were only too glad to hide themselves in the woods and mountains. The Philippines made no effort whatever to earn the reward.
"Ample time was given for the hill people to take a look at the troops and become convinced that this form of governmental power was friendly and really interested in their salvation and prosperity. After becoming thus convinced, the good influence of the government spread with rapidity among the Subanos. They returned to their farms by hundreds daily, they preferred their services to the government and declined remuneration. The important witnesses emerged from their hiding places and the apprehension of the leaders became a possibility. The leaders were caught, the witnesses came forward from their hiding places to convict them, and the wondering Subanos reclaimed their homes and began life anew. There was a general rejoicing among them."
He reports a shortage of officers and states that two-year troops hardly get acquainted with the people or really become interested in the larger problems that are being worked out under American control. "The army cannotdo itself full justice in the administration of civil affairs in a Moro Province unless the period of service be extended." He declares that service in the Philippine Islands is not more arduous than service in Texas or Arizona. "There is no reason why enlisted men should be given credit for double service for every year spent in the Islands."
He reports also that the Philippine Scouts are in excellent condition. A high state of discipline exists among them. Their officers are enthusiastic and willing, and the same spirit extends to the men.
In 1911, similar reports are made concerning uniforms, clothing, etc. The general good health of the soldiers is described. Only three cases of typhoid fever occurred in the entire department. "Too much time is devoted to target practice in comparison with other classes of training. The increased pay for expert riflemen, sharpshooters and marksmen does not serve to increase appreciation and the efficiency in rifle fire." He recommended that extra pay be discontinued.
He reports nineteen expeditions of the troops and gives a clear account of the pagan uprising. He urges an increase in the regular regiments of infantry in time of peace, to form a substantial basis in the first line when war comes. "Under no circumstances should the enlisted strength of a regiment be less than one thousand men, in time of peace. In war this should be increased to two thousand four hundred or even three thousand." He recommends that the cavalry regiments be made smaller. He states that the efficiency of the cavalry is not as high as it should be, while the field artillery is below the recognized requirements. The Philippine Scouts sometimes are inclined to consider themselves on the same footing as the white troops, with a consequent disinclination to perform duties away from well-equipped and centrally located garrisons.