THE CAUCASUS—THE BARRED DOOR
We now come to that section of the eastern theatre of the war which received the least extended notice in printed reports—the barred doorway between Europe and Asia,—the Caucasus. Not because the fighting there was less furious, but because the region was less accessible to war correspondents. The struggle was in fact quite as bloody and even more savage and barbarous here than elsewhere, for on this front Russ meets Turk, Christian meets Moslem, and where they grapple the veneer of chivalry blisters off.
Here again, as in Galicia, we come to a natural frontier, not only between two races, but between two continents. For here, crossing the isthmus between the Black Sea and the Caspian, stretches a mountain range over seven hundred miles in length, rising abruptly out of the plains on either side. These are theCaucasus Mountains, forming the boundary between Europe and Asia.
The higher and central part of the range (which averages only from sixty to seventy miles in width) is formed of parallel ridges, not separated by deep and wide valleys, but remarkably connected by elevated plateaus, which are traversed by narrow fissures of extreme depth. The highest peaks are in the most central chain; Mt. Elburz, attaining an elevation of 18,000 feet above the sea, while Mt. Kasbeck reaches a height of more than 16,000 feet, and several other peaks rise above the line of perpetual snow. The outlying spurs and foothills of this chain of lofty mountains are of less extent and importance than those of almost any other mountain range of similar magnitude, subsiding, as they do, until they are only 200 feet high along the shores of the Black Sea. Some parts are almost entirely bare, but other parts are densely wooded and the secondary ranges near the Black Sea are covered by magnificent forests of oak, beech, ash, maple, and walnut.
This range is an almost impassable wall across the narrow isthmus which joins Europe and Asia, and the Gorge of Dariel is the gateway in this wall through which have come almost all the migrating races that have peopled the continent of Europe. As is well known, the white peoples of Europe have been classified as the Caucasian race, because they were all supposed to have passed through this gateway originally. Apparently each of these oncoming waves of barbaric humanity, bursting through the great gateway, must have left behind some few remnants of their volume, for nowhere in the world, in so limited an area, is there such a diversity and mixture of peoples. In the words of one writer, who speaks with authority on this region, the Caucasus is "an ethnological museum where the invaders of Europe, as they traveled westward to be manufactured into nations, left behind samples of themselves in their raw condition."
Here may be found the Georgians, who so long championed the Cross against the Crescent, the wild Lesghians from the highlands of Daghestan; the Circassians, famed for the beauty of their women; Suanetians, Ossets, Abkhasians, Mingrelians, notto enumerate dozens of other tribes and races, each speaking its own tongue. It is said that over a hundred languages are spoken throughout this region; seventy in the city of Tiflis alone.
The scenery of the mountains themselves is unparalleled in grandeur except by the Himalayas and offers many a virgin peak to the ambitious mountain climber. Here may be found the ibex, the stag, the wild boar, the wild bull and an infinite variety of feathered game. The animal life of the mountains has, in fact, become more abundant of late years on account of the high charges for hunting licenses fixed by the Russian Government. Wolves are so plentiful that in severe winters they descend to the lowlands in great packs and rob the flocks before the very eyes of the shepherds.
The most important mineral resources of the region are the oil wells; here, in fact, around Batum, are situated some of the most important oil fields in the world. Of manganese ore, an essential of the steel industry, the Caucasus furnishes half of the world's supply, which is exported from the two ports of Poti and Batum. Its mineral wealth seems to be practically unlimited, copper, zinc, iron, tin, and many other metals being found throughout the region, in most cases in exceedingly rich deposits. The agricultural resources are not so important, especially from a military point of view, though vast quantities of sheep are raised in the highlands in the spring and summer, the flocks being driven down into the plains to the south in winter.
One of the outstanding features of Russian occupation is the great Georgian military road which has been built across the mountains of recent years and maintained by the Government. Its engineering is masterly; here and there it passes close to or under vast overhanging lumps of mountainside. Everywhere the greatest care has been taken of this most important military highway, Russia's avenue into that country she coveted and fought for so long. Beginning at Vladikavkaz, it runs through Balta, Lars, thence through the famous Gorge of Dariel, the "Circassian Gates," the dark and awful defile between Europe and Asia. The gorge is what the geologists call a "fault," for it is not really a pass over the mountain chain, but a rent clear acrossit. Seventy years ago it was almost impassable for avalanches or the sudden outbursts of pent-up glacial streams swept it from end to end, but the Russians have spent over $20,000,000 on it and made it safe. In 1877, during the Russo-Turkish War, nearly all the troops and stores for carrying the war into Turkey and Asia came by this road.
Its importance has since been lessened to a certain degree, for there is now direct railway communication from Moscow to Baku, at one end of the Trans-Caucasian Railway, and therefore to Kars itself, via Tiflis; and equally from Batum to Kars at the other end to which military steamers can bring troops and supplies from Odessa and Novorossik in the Black Sea.
The most important city in this region is Tiflis, the "city of seventy languages." It may, indeed, be called the modern Babel. As seen from the mountains, it lies at the bottom of a brown, treeless valley, between steep hills, on either side of the River Kura.
It is a point of great importance to modern Russia. It forms, to begin with, the end of the great military road across the mountains which, in spite of the railways, is still the quickest way to Europe for an army as well as for travelers, and all the mails come over it by express coaches. From Tiflis a railway runs to Kars, a strong frontier on the Persian frontier.
Tiflis has been much developed under the Russian Government. In the modern section of the city the streets are wide and paved and lighted by electricity and the stores are large and handsome while electric railways run in all directions. In the older parts of the city, however, the houses remain as they were built centuries ago, divided out into the many quarters devoted to the residences of the many races and nationalities that compose the population of Tiflis. Between most of them is bitter enmity and prejudice, even among those of the two great religious faiths, Christians and Mohammedans. It is this diversity of interests, which extends throughout all the section down into Persia, which has so complicated the situation on this front. For not only are the two military forces fighting here, but wherever governmental authority is momentarily relaxed, there these mutual animositiesflare up into active expression and the most barbarous features of warfare take place, such as the massacres of the Armenians by the Mohammedans. Neither Turkey nor Russia has been especially eager to suppress these bitter feuds, even in time of peace. In time of war there is nothing to restrain them, and the whole region is swept by carnage infinitely more hideous than legitimate warfare.
We have now passed over the entire theatre of the battles on the Eastern frontiers of the war in Europe. The battle grounds are familiar to us. In the succeeding chapters we will follow the armies over this war-ridden dominion and watch the battle lines as they move through the war to its decisive conclusion.[Back to Contents]
SERBIA'S SITUATION AND RESOURCES
The first great campaign on the southeastern battle grounds of the Great War began on July 27, 1914, when the Austrian troops undertook their first invasion of Serbia. They crossed the Serbian border at Mitrovitza, about fifty miles northwest of Belgrade, driving the Serbians before them. The first real hostilities of the war opened with the bombardment of Belgrade by the Austrians on July 29, 1914—six days before the beginning of the campaigns on the western battle fields.
We are now familiar with the theatre of war as described in the preceding chapters, and will now follow the first Austrian armies into Serbia.
A stubborn fight excites the admiration of all observers, regardless of the moral qualities of the combatants. So, wherever our sympathies may lie, considering the war as a whole, there can be no doubt that the defense which the Serbians made against the first efforts of the Austrians to invade their country will stand out in the early history of the war as one of the most brilliant episodes of that period of the general struggle. Like a mighty tidal wave from the ocean the Austrian hosts swept over the Serbian frontier in three furious successive onslaughts, only to be beaten back each time. Naturally, there were material and moral causes, aside from the mere valor of the Serbians, which combined to create this disaster for the Austrian forces, but enough of the human element enters into the militaryactivities of these campaigns to make them easily the most picturesque of the early period of the war.
Before entering into a description of the actual events in 1914, it is well to consider the forces engaged. From a material point of view the Serbians entered into these campaigns greatly handicapped. They had lately been through two wars. In the First Balkan War they had not, it is true, been severely tested; the weight of the fighting had been borne by the Bulgarians in Thrace. The real test, and the great losses, came only with the second war, when the Serbian army threw every fiber of its strength against the Bulgarians in the Battle of the Bregalnitza, one of the most stubborn struggles in military history. The result was a Serbian victory, but it was very far from being a decisive and conclusive victory. The Bulgarians were forced back some fifteen miles into their own territory, but had it not been for the intervention of Rumania there can be no doubt that the Serbs would have entered Sofia. Here it was that the Serbians lost 7,000 killed and 30,000 wounded of their best men, as against 5,000 killed and 18,000 wounded in the whole war with Turkey; a total loss that was bound to be felt a few months later when the struggle was to be against so powerful an adversary as Austria-Hungary. The two previous wars had, without exaggeration, deprived the Serbian fighting forces of one-tenth their number—a tenth that was of the very best of first-line troops.
Pictorial Map of the Balkans.
Pictorial Map of the Balkans.
Added to this was another serious handicap, possibly even more serious. Serbia had, indeed, emerged victorious from the two wars, with a large stretch of conquered territory at her backdoor. But this acquired territory, practically all of Macedonia that had not gone to Greece, was peopled by Serbs. For twenty-five years these Macedonians had been organized into revolutionary fighting bands, the "Macedonian Committee" for the liberation of Macedonia and Albania from the Turks, and had struggled, not only against the Turks, but against foreign armed bands of propagandists. Some eight years subsequently to the foundation of the Macedonian Committee of native origin, the Bulgars founded in 1893 their committee which was called the Macedo-AdrianopleCommittee. During the First Balkan War these experienced guerrilla fighters were valuable allies to the Serbian forces operating against the Turks.
But even before the First Balkan War the Serbians had very distinctly given the Macedonians to understand that they were to remain Serbian subjects. This action on their part had had not a little to do with rousing the Bulgarians to precipitate the Second Balkan War. And when finally Serbia conquered all this territory, confirmed to her down to Doiran by the treaty of Bucharest, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria began at once a fiery anti-Serb propaganda throughout the world, and took measures through provocatory agents and Bulgar bands crossing from Bulgaria into Macedonia to create disturbances.
When the Great War broke out in July, 1914, this Bulgarian activity in Serb Macedonia grew more intense. Thus it was that when the Austrians attacked the Serbians on their front the Serbians had still to detach enough of their forces to guard the Serbo-Bulgar border to prevent the crossing into Serb Macedonia of Bulgar bands. And added to this was the danger from Bulgaria herself. The Serbians knew that the opportune moment had only to come and Bulgaria, too, would hurl herself on the Serbian eastern flank. Thus another large percentage of the Serbian fighting forces had also to be stationed along the Bulgarian frontier to guard against possible attack from that quarter.
Offsetting these handicaps, however, and more than equalizing them, was the moral strength of the Serbian fighting units. They had just emerged through two victorious wars; they had triumphed so completely that there was small wonder if the Serbian farmers had come to believe themselves invincible and their leaders infallible. Practically every man in the Serbian army was a seasoned veteran; he had had not only his baptism of fire, but he had been through some of the bloodiest battles of modern times. He had got over his first fright; he was in that state of mind where danger and bloodshed no longer inspired either fear or horror. And even the warlike savage trembles on entering his first battle. Finally, he was now defendinghis country, his home, his very fireside and his family against foreign invasion. And it is generally admitted that a man fighting in that situation is equal to two invaders, all other things being equal.
The Serb army opposing the Austrian invasions was composed of ten divisions of the First Ban and five divisions of the Second Ban. Five of the divisions of the First Ban and the five of the Second came from the kingdom as it was prior to the two Balkan wars, but the second five divisions of the First Ban were new creations recruited from Serb Macedonia.
The principles on which the organization of the Serbian army was based were very simple. The former kingdom was divided into five territorial divisional districts—Nish, Valievo, Belgrade, Kragujevatz, and Zaitchar. Each of these territorial divisional districts was subdivided into four regimental recruiting districts, each of which provided one infantry regiment of four battalions and one depot battalion. The battalion numbered about a thousand men, so that the war strength of the divisional infantry amounted to, about 16,000 men. Attached to each division was a regiment of artillery, consisting of three groups of three 6-gun batteries; in all, 54 guns. The divisional cavalry, existing only in war time, consisted of a regiment of four squadrons, from men and horses previously registered. To each division was also attached its own technical and administrative units, engineers, and supply column, and its total strength amounted to 23,000 officers and men of first-line troops.
In addition to these five divisions of the First Ban, there was also a regiment of mountain artillery, made up of six batteries, six howitzer batteries and two battalions of fortress artillery. Then there was a separate cavalry division composed of two brigades, each of two regiments. Its war strength was 80 officers and 3,200 men. Attached to the cavalry division were two horse artillery batteries, of eight guns each. All told, this first-line army numbered about 200,000, with about 5,200 sabers and 330 guns.
Serbian and Austrian Invasions.
Serbian and Austrian Invasions.
The Second Ban, or reserve, much inferior in armament to the first line, brought the strength up to about 280,000 men.But this figure is probably an underestimate. Volunteers were enrolled in immense numbers. Some of them were men who had been exempted in the first conscription; others were Serbs from Austrian territory. The United States sent back thousands of Austrian and Macedonian Serbs who had emigrated there. It is probable, therefore, that the total strength of the Serbian forces shortly after the war broke out was at least 280,000, if not a trifle more. To this must be added the Montenegrin army which, though operating in a separate field, contributed its share in driving the Austrians back; another 40,000 men of first-class fighting ability and experience.
Finally, there was the third reserve, another 50,000 men, but they could be used for fighting only in the gravest emergency.
The infantry of the First Ban was armed with excellent Mauser rifles, caliber 7 mm., model 1899. The Second Ban carried a Mauser, the old single loader, to which a magazine was fitted in the Serbian arsenals; while the Third Ban had the old single-loader Berdan rifle. The machine gun carried was the Maxim, of the same caliber as the new Mauser.
In artillery the Serbians were perhaps not so well off. Their cannons had seen a great deal of service in the Balkan wars, and the larger a piece of artillery the more limited is the number of rounds it can fire. It is extremely doubtful that there had been time to replace many of these worn-out pieces.
The field gun was of French make; it was a 3-inch quick firer with a maximum range for shrapnel of 6,000 yards, a little over 3-½ miles. The Second Ban was armed with old De Bange guns of 8 cm. caliber. The heavy guns, which had done much service outside Adrianople, were of Creuzot make, and included 24 howitzers of 15 cm. and some mortars of 24 cm. As for the aviation wing, there was none.
The Serbian army was under the superior command of the Chief of the General Staff, Voivode (Field Marshal) Putnik. Unlike his younger colleagues, his military education was entirely a home product; he had never studied abroad. His father was one of those Serbs born on Austrian soil; he had emigrated from Hungary to Serbia in the early forties where he had followedthe vocation of school-teacher. In 1847 the future general was born. After passing through the elementary schools, young Putnik entered the military academy at Belgrade. He had already attained a commission when the war of 1876 with Turkey broke out, through which he served as a captain of infantry. His next experience was in the unfortunate war with Bulgaria, in 1885, in which the Serbians were beaten after a three days' battle. At the outbreak of the war with Turkey, in 1912, General Putnik was made head of the army and received the grade of voivode (field marshal), being the first Serbian to enjoy that distinction. The grade of field marshal was created in the Serbian army during the First Balkan War.
With him worked Colonel Pavlovitch, the son of a farmer, who had won a series of scholarships, enabling him to study in Berlin. He had directed the military operations in the field against Turkey and Bulgaria, and he was to do the same thing under his old chief against the Austrians.[Back to Contents]
AUSTRIA'S STRENGTH AND STRATEGY
Let us now review the Austrian forces that participated in the invasions of Serbia. In number they were practically unlimited, at least they far outnumbered the Serbian forces that met them in the field. Their armament was of the best and their equipment as complete as boundless resources could make it. They were, however, partly made up of the peoples of the Slavic provinces of Austria—Bohemians, Croatians, Dalmatians, and Bosnians. Naturally there could be but little enthusiasm in their attacks on their brother Slavs, and while there are many mutual animosities between these various branches of the Slavic race, such feelings are, at any rate, secondary to the general dislike of the "Schwabs," as the German-Austrians are called, and the Magyars. Possibly this had much to do with the Austriandefeats. The Hungarian, or Magyar, regiments were probably in the majority. But the Magyars from the interior of Hungary have no special reason to hate the Serbians, and, aside from that, they were attacking on foreign soil.
At the head of the Austrian campaigns against Serbia was General Potiorek, generally described as a textbook strategist. But just how much his failures were due to his own inefficiency and how much to the inefficiency of those under him will probably never be determined; he had in the end to suffer for both.
These were the two great contending forces that were set in motion by the departure of Baron Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, from Belgrade, on July 25, 1914. On the same day the Prince Regent Alexander signed a decree ordering the general mobilization of the Serbian army. Three days later, on July 28, 1914, Austria declared war. By that time Serbia was in the midst of her mobilization.
That the Austrians, who had the advantage of having taken the initiative, and who had presumably chosen their own time for the opening of hostilities, did not immediately take full advantage of their favorable situation has caused much surprise among impartial military critics. On the same day that they declared war they had the opportunity to hurl their troops across the Danube and take Belgrade with practically no opposition. Apparently they were not ready; from that moment the difficulties that would have attended such a movement increased hourly.
A force of 20,000 men was raised almost immediately for the defense of Belgrade. To meet this opposition the Austrians had, on the evening of the day war was declared, July 18, 1914, only one division concentrated between Semlin and Pancsova, opposite Belgrade—a force that was hardly sufficient to take the Serbian capital. Two days later an army corps would have been needed for the enterprise, for by this time the Serbian army had begun concentrating considerable numbers within striking distance of the capital. Thus the first opportunity was lost by the tardiness of the Austrians to act.
It is presumed that the reader has already studied the descriptionof this theatre of the war presented elsewhere in this work. Aside from that, the movements that follow should only be traced with the aid of a map. Written words are inadequate to give a concrete picture of the field of operations.
The Austrian General Staff realized the difficulties of crossing the Danube. Its general plan, probably prepared long before, contemplated a main attack that should begin from another quarter.
The Austro-Serbian frontier, almost 340 miles in extent, is formed on the north by the Save as well as by the Danube, and on the east and southeast by the Drina River. These two smaller streams abound in convenient fords, especially in summer. To many of these points on the northeastern frontier Austria had already constructed strategic railways. Moreover, the Austrian territory throughout this section is so mountainous and well timbered that large forces of troops could be well screened from observation, whereas the country opposite Belgrade is flat and bare.
It was from this direction that the Serbian General Staff expected the first advance of the enemy. And yet there were dozens of other points where an attack in force was possible. Each must be covered with a force at least strong enough to hold the enemy back long enough to enable the forces stationed at the other points to come up to support. Here was the great advantage that the Austrians had to begin with; an advantage which the attacking army always enjoys. The attacking general alone knows where the first battle shall be fought.
The Serbians, therefore, could not count on meeting the Austrians in full force before they could enter Serbian territory. They realized that they must give way at the first contact; that the Austrians would undoubtedly advance quite some distance within Serbian territory before enough Serbian forces could be brought up against them to make the opposition effective.
Realizing this, it was decided to place fairly strong advance guards at all probable points of invasion with orders to resist as long as possible; until, in fact, defensive tactics could beadapted to the situation and the main Serbian army could be brought up to offer battle.
However, two points stood out as the most probable. These were the two already mentioned; the north, along the line from Obrenovatz to Belgrade and to Semendria; or, the front Obrenovatz-Ratza-Losnitza-Liubovia. The first possibility had the advantage to the Austrians of offering the shortest route to the center of the country—the Morava Valley, their natural objective. But it also necessitated a difficult crossing of the Danube, which would have had to be preceded by the building of pontoon bridges. This would have given the Serbians time to move up their main forces. The second alternative, an invasion from the east, would have entailed a longer journey, but the advantage of natural covering and easy crossing made it a sounder plan.
On July 28, 1914, the Serbians concentrated their forces in anticipation of either event. The outpost forces were stationed at or near Losnitza, Shabatz, Obrenovatz, Belgrade, Semendria, Pozarevatz and Gradishte. But their principal armies were centrally grouped along the line Palanka-Arangelovatz-Lazarevatz, while weaker, though important, detachments were stationed in the vicinity of Valievo, a branch railroad terminus, and Uzitze. This narrowed the field down to such limits that it was possible to march the troops from point to point, while the few railway facilities available were utilized for food and ammunition supplies.[Back to Contents]
AUSTRIAN SUCCESSES
On the morning of July 29, 1914, the day after war had been declared, the residents of Belgrade were startled by a deep roar, followed by the whistling shriek of a huge body, hurtling through the air, and a shell burst over the battlements of the old Turkish citadel, doing no damage. Immediately there came another deep shock; the Serbian guns were responding. Thence onthe cannonading along the Danube front continued for week after week, with only now and then a lull.
The Austrian batteries bombarded not only Belgrade, but Semendria, Gradishte and a number of other points along the river bank. Next they were seen building a pontoon bridge out to one of the little islands in the river, opposite the city and barges were towed alongside the landings on the opposite shore, presently to be crowded with black masses of Austrian troops. Naturally, the Serbian gunners made these objects the targets of their fire. But these were mere bluffs, such feints as the skilled boxer makes when he wants to get behind the guard of his opponent. If anything, these demonstrations only served to deepen the conviction of General Putnik that the real danger was not from this quarter.
But where was the first great blow to strike? Naturally, not only the General Staff, but the whole army and population waited in deep anxiety. This tension lasted over the last days of July, into the first week of August, 1914.
Then, on August 6, 1914, some Bosnian peasants, Serbs, appeared and reported that they had seen great bodies of soldiers moving along the mountain roads toward Syrmia, in northeastern Bosnia. Two days later, early in the morning, two Austrian aeroplanes whirred over the River Save and circled over Krupanie, Shabatz and Valievo. The last doubts were then dispelled; the attack was coming from the east.
And finally, on August 12, 1914, the message flashed over the wires that the outposts had seen boats in movement, full of soldiers, behind an island on the Drina, opposite Loznitza. Near that town, and in fact along the whole lower course of the Drina, the river has frequently changed its channel, thus cutting out numerous small islands, which would serve as a screen to the movements of troops contemplating a crossing. Pontoon bridges could be built on the farther side of almost any of these islands without being observed from the other shore. This was exactly what the Austrians were doing.
Serbian Infantrymen on their Way to the Front.
Serbian Infantrymen on their Way to the Front.
Suddenly, on August 12, 1914, there came a burst of rifle fire and the boom of heavy field guns, and a fleet of barges, under coverof this fire, emerged from around both ends of one of these islands and made for the Serbian shore. The two battalions of Third Reserve Serbians, stationed there as an outpost, trained their old De Bange field guns, of which they had two batteries, on the oncoming swarms and began firing. But the Austrian fire became heavier and heavier; a blast of steel pellets and shells swept through the cornfields and the plum orchards, tearing through the streets of the village and crumpling up the houses. The breastworks of the small Serbian detachment were literally the center of a continuous explosion of shells.
When a full tenth of their number lay dead or disabled, the Serbians began retiring across the cornfields and up the slopes leading to the heights behind Losnitza. There, on higher ground, which offered more effective shelter, they made a determined stand and continued their fire on the Austrian masses.
Having crossed the river, the Austrians threw up defensive breastworks and dug elaborate trenches, thus fortifying their crossing. Next they built a pontoon bridge, and then the main Austrian army poured across; a whole army corps and two divisions of a second.
Meanwhile, on the same day, August 12, 1914, a similar event was happening at Shabatz, on the Save, where that river takes a sharp southward turn and then swings up again before joining the Danube at Belgrade. Here the country is a level plain, really the southern limit of the great plain which stretches up to the Danube, past Belgrade and so into Hungary. Here, too, the Austrians screened themselves behind an island in the river, then hurled their forces across, driving the feeble detachment of Third Reserve Serbian troops back across the plain up into the hills lying to the southeast of Shabatz. Then the advance guard of the Austrian Fourth Army occupied the town, strongly fortified it and built a pontoon bridge across the river from their railroad terminus at Klenak.
Further passages of a similar nature were forced that day, August 12, 1914, at other points by smaller forces; one at Zvornik and another at Liubovia. In addition the Austrians also threw bridges across the river at Amajlia and Branjevo. Thusit will be seen that the invasion covered a front of considerably over a hundred miles and that six strong columns of the enemy had crossed, all of which naturally converged on Valievo. For Valievo was the terminus of a small, single track railroad which joined the main line at Mladenovatz. Thus the Austrians would have a convenient side door open into the heart of Serbia which was, of course, their main objective. To this Belgrade was merely incidental. With this line of transport and communication in Austrian hands, Belgrade would fall of itself.
From Losnitza, where the main column of Austrians crossed the Drina to Valievo, runs the River Jadar, along a level valley, which narrows as it nears Valievo. On the left-hand side of the Jadar Valley rise the southern slopes of the Tzer Mountains, covered with cornfields, prune orchards, with here and there a stretch of thick timber. Continuing southward, slightly to the eastward, up the Jadar Valley another range rises, slightly smaller than the Tzer Mountains, forming a smaller valley which branches off eastward. Along this runs the River Leshnitza, parallel with the Jadar until it makes an independent junction with the Drina. Still farther up the valley the foothills of the Iverak ridges are lost in a series of fairly important summits which closely flank the Jadar River.
To the south of the Jadar River the valley stretches into a rolling plain, which rises abruptly into the giant Guchevo Mountains. It is this range, converging with the Tzer and Iverak Mountains toward Valievo, and forming the plain of the Jadar Valley, which was presently to become the center of the first great battle between the Serbians and Austrians.
A military movement against Valievo, therefore, demanded complete possession of these two ridges, which overlooked the line of march. This the Austrians knew well enough, even before the first of their troops had crossed the Drina. As is well known, the best maps, not only of Serbia but of all the Balkan countries, have been made by Austrian engineers. There was probably not a spur, not a fissure, certainly not a trail, of these mountains that had not been carefully surveyed and measured by engineers of the Austrian staff.
The Austrians knew the country they were invading quite as well as did the native Serbians. All through it may be said that it was not through want of accurate knowledge that the Austrians finally met disaster. Rather was it because they misjudged the relative values of their facts. And one of their first mistakes was in overestimating the effects of the two Balkan Wars on the efficiency of the Serbian army. First of all, as was obvious from the leisureliness with which they proceeded to occupy the two mountain chains in question, that they vastly misjudged the capacity of the Serbian troops to make rapid movements. Even as the first shots were being fired across the Drina at Losnitza, the Serbian forces were on the move, westward. Two army corps were at once rushed toward the Valley of the Jadar; part of a third was sent to block the advance of the Austrians from Shabatz. Meanwhile the Austrians took their time. For two days they busied themselves fortifying the bridge at Losnitza.[Back to Contents]
THE GREAT BATTLES BEGIN
On August 14, 1914, began the first battle of the Serbian campaign. The Austrians proceeded to storm the heights from which the small outpost detachments had all the time been bombarding them with its old-fashioned guns. The Serbians, though few in number, made a desperate resistance. It was their business to hold back the enemy as long as possible, even until the reenforcements should arrive.
Early in the morning of August 14, 1914, the Austrians advanced in a great mass, then charged up the hillsides toward the Serbian position. The Serbians waited until they were well up the steep slopes and the rush of the enemy had subsided to a more toilsome climb. Then they sent down volley after volley from every available weapon.
The Austrian soldiers, who had until then never experiencedanything more warlike than field maneuvers, lost their nerves; the first line broke and ran at the first fire. However, that was likely to happen to any troops under fire for the first time. Down in the plain they formed again, and again they swept up the slopes. This time they did not turn at the first volley. On they came, with fixed bayonets. And presently the first line reached the top of the heights, and the fighting was hand-to-hand. For a moment the Serbians, overwhelmed by numbers, were on the point of fleeing. But these same men had been through many a hand-to-hand encounter with both Turks and Bulgars; that experience stood them in good stead. And again they swept back the attacking masses of Austria-Hungary.
By evening, August 14, 1914, the Austrians had not yet taken the heights. But the Serbians, most of them middle-aged and old men, had spent their vitality. As the dark night lowered over the scene, they fell back, until, at Jarebitze, they met the first advance guards of the oncoming Serbian main army. And here they halted, and the united forces proceeded to dig a trench on a ten-mile front, extending from north to south, through the town and clear across the Jadar Valley. Nor did the Austrians then attempt to follow up this first success. Thus the Serbians were allowed to intrench themselves unmolested until, next day, August 15, 1914, they were joined by the balance of their forces.
Now, by studying the map, it will be seen at a glance that it was only the Tzer Mountains which separated the Austrian column crossing the Drina at Losnitza and the column which had crossed the Save and had occupied Shabatz. Should the Austrians from over the Drina get possession of the Tzer ridges, they would thus effect a junction with the forces in Shabatz, and so form a line that would cut off a large portion of northwestern Serbia. Aside from that, they would have a solid front. But should the Serbians possess themselves of the Tzer ridges first, then they would have driven a wedge in between their two main forces. This would make it difficult for either to advance, for then they would be exposing a flank to the enemy, who would also have a great advantage in position. Moreover, the Serbians would be in a position to turn immediately towardeither of the Austrians' columns, whichever might need most attention.
Meanwhile, the Serbian cavalry had made a reconnaissance toward Shabatz. They immediately sent back reports of overwhelming forces occupying the town. It was out of the question to make any attack there for the present.
It was now learned, for the first time, that another of the enemy's columns had crossed the Drina far down in the south, and was marching on Krupanie, just below the Guchevo Mountains and on the way to the upper part of the Jadar Valley. However, as the first report seemed to indicate that this was only a minor force, a small force of third reserve men was detached to hold this force back and prevent its entrance into the main field of operations.
During the day and night of August 15,1914, the two opposing forces were moving into position for battle: setting the pawns for the game of strategy that was to be played. The Austrians at Losnitza were advancing up the mountain slopes and took possession of the Tzer and Iverak ridges, straddling the Leshnitza Valley.
Up in Shabatz, Austrian troops were pouring across the pontoon bridges. A flanking column, coming from the Drina, had arrived at Slepehevitch. Another force was stationed with its left and center on Krupanie, its right spread out into the mountains north of Liubovia.
On the Serbian side the right wing of the Second Army, screened by the cavalry division, were preparing to cut off the Austrian forces in the north from their juncture with those advancing along the Tzer ridges; the center and left was marching on the enemy on the Iverak ridges, in conjunction with the right of the Third Army, then north of Jarebitze. The center of the Third held the positions south of Jarebitze, while its left, split into small detachments, had been directed to oppose the invasion toward Krupanie and the advance from Liubovia.
Such were the positions of the various forces as dawn broke brightly on the morning of August 16, 1914. As the growing light made objects visible, the extreme right division of theSerbian front, which was creeping northward to cut off Shabatz, discovered a strong Austrian column moving along the lower spurs of the Tzer Mountains. Obviously this body was clearing the ground for a general descent of the forces up along the ridges; a whole army corps. This movement threatened to become a serious obstacle to the Serbian plan of separating the Austrians in Shabatz from those farther south. But the situation was saved by one of those incidents which sometimes stand out above the savagery of warfare and give to it a touch of grandeur.
A young artillery officer, Major Djukitch, of the Fourth Artillery Regiment, asked permission to go out and meet this body of advancing Austrians with but a single cannon. He would create a diversion which would give the Serbians time to adapt themselves to the changed conditions, though the chances were very largely in favor of his losing his life on this mission. Permission was granted. Calling on volunteers from his command, he advanced with his single cannon and took up a position in the path of the approaching enemy. The moment he opened fire the Austrians, naturally not realizing that only one cannon was opposing them, and believing that a large Serbian force had surprised them, broke into a panic. Half an hour after he had opened fire, the Serbian field commander sent a messenger to Major Djukitch, ordering him to retire. In reply he sent a message to the commander, describing the confusion he had created in the Austrian ranks, and instead of retiring, he asked for reenforcements. The balance of his own battery, a detachment of infantry, and a cavalry division was sent him. The result was that the Austrian column was temporarily driven back into the mountains. Hastily re-forming, the Austrians now massed along a line extending from Belikamen to Radlovatz, while the Serbians deployed along a front running from Slatina through Metkovitch to Gusingrob.
At 11 a. m., August 16, 1914, the two opposing forces opened fire in earnest, up and down the line. All day the cannon roared and the rifles and machine guns crackled; now and again the Austrians would shoot forth from their line a sharp infantryattack, but these were repulsed, with more and more difficulty as the day advanced, for the Serbians were much inferior in numbers. Toward evening their situation became very critical. Yet every part of the line held out desperately, knowing that reenforcements were being hurried forward from the rear as fast as men could move.
And just before dark, along the roads from the eastward, came the distant cheers from the advancing columns. An officer dashed up on horseback shouting encouragement to the battered men in the trenches. A cheer arose, which rolled up and down the line. Again it rose, then, even before it had died out, with wild yells the Serbians sprang over their breastworks and swept madly across the intervening space to the Austrian lines; smashing through cornfields, over rocks, through the tall grass of orchards. At their heels followed the reenforcing soldiers, though they had that day marched nearly sixty miles. Over the Austrian breastworks they surged, like an angry wave from the sea, their bayonets gleaming in the sunset glow. It was the kind of fighting they knew best; the kind that both Serbians and Bulgars know best, the kind they had practiced most.
Small wonder if the inexperienced peasants from the plains of Hungary, unused till then to any sight more bloody than a brawl in the village inn, trembled before this onslaught. Their officers shouted encouragement and oaths, barely audible above the mad yells of the Serbians. Nevertheless, they gave way before the gleaming line of bayonet blades before them. Some few rose to fight, stirred by some long-submerged instinct generated in the days of Genghis Khan. But the majority turned and fled, helter-skelter, down the sides of the mountains toward the valleys, leaving behind guns, ammunition, and cannon. One regiment, the Hundred and Second, stood its ground and fought. As a result it was almost completely annihilated. The same fate befell the Ninety-fourth Regiment. But the majority sought and found safety in flight. By dark the whole Austrian center was beaten back, leaving behind great quantities of war material.[Back to Contents]
FIRST VICTORY OF THE SERBIANS
The Serbians had made their first move successfully on that day of August 16, 1914. More important than this mere preliminary defeat of the enemy was the fact that the Austrians in Shabatz were now definitely cut off from any possible juncture with the Austrians in the south. For the present they were debarred from entering the main field of operations. This freed the Serbian cavalry for action elsewhere. Meanwhile a portion of the right wing of the Serbian line was detached to keep the Austrians inside Shabatz.
Farther to the south the Serbians were not so decidedly successful. The center of the Serbian Second Army, that directed against the southern slopes of the Tzer Mountains and the Iverak ridges, had arrived at Tekerish at midnight.
As dawn broke on August 16, 1914, they perceived a strong Austrian column descending from above, coming in the same direction. Unfortunately the Serbians were in the midst of bald, rolling foothills, while the Austrians were up among the tall timber which clothes the mountain slopes at this point. The Serbians deployed, extending their line from Bornololye through Parlok to Lisena, centering their artillery at Kik. The Austrians made the best of their superior position.
For some hours there was furious firing, then, at about eight o'clock the Austrian gunners got the range of the Serbian left flank with their field pieces, which was compelled to fall back. But just then timely reenforcements arrived from the rear, and the Serbians dug themselves in. By evening the Serbians had lost over a thousand men, though they had succeeded in taking 300 prisoners and several machine guns from the Austrians.
The left wing of the Second Army had, in the meantime, arrived against Iverak. That this division was able to arrive at such a timely juncture was due to its having made a forced march of fifty-two miles over the mountain roads during the previous day.Yet before dawn on the morning of August 16, 1914, it was ready to continue its march to Poporparlok. But then came the news that the Austrians had driven back the left wing of the Third Army from that position and had occupied it.
The situation in which this division found itself was by no means clear. Nothing had been heard from Shabatz. The division operating along the Tzer ridges had been badly hammered. The Third Army had lost Poporparlok. The commander decided to stay where he was and simply hold the ground against any advance of the enemy from Iverak. This division was, therefore, intrenched along a line from Begluk to Kik, and a strong advance was thrown out toward Kugovitchi. During the morning this advance guard made a strong attack against Kugovitchi, drove the Austrians out, and established themselves there.
At dawn, August 16, 1914, the left flank of this division, at Begluk, was shelled by the Austrian artillery, which was followed by infantry attacks. These were easily repulsed during the day. But then the enemy was reenforced, and late that night they came on again in great masses. The Serbians allowed them to almost reach their trenches: then, emptying the magazines of their rifles at them, they piled themselves over their breastworks and into them with bayonets and hand bombs. This was too much for the Austrians; they fled in wild disorder.
Least encouraging was the experience of the Serbian Third Army, which was defending the territory south of the Iverak Mountains. Here the Austrians developed a vigorous and persistent offensive, hoping to turn the Serbian left and thus capture the road to Valievo.
The attack on the positions at Jarebitze commenced at daybreak on August 16, 1914. Here the Serbians held good ground: rocky summits, but so limited in extent that there was room only for a few companies at a time. On the other hand the ground before them was broken up into hollows screened by growing corn. This enabled the Austrians to deploy their lines beyond the Serbian flanks unseen. They did execute just such a movement, and attempted to circle around toward the Serbian rear.
At the same time the Serbians here were attacked from infront by another hostile column which had come from across the plain on the south side of the Jadar valley, where hollows, sunken roads, and fields of corn again formed ample screening. However, in spite of all these movements, the Serbians were able to hold their own. The Austrian attacks were all beaten back. Their position might have been held indefinitely, but developments to the south were taking on a threatening form.
It will be remembered that an Austrian force had been reported approaching from the south, moving on Krupanie, and that it had seemed so insignificant that a small detachment of third reserve troops had been sent to hold it back. But this enemy force now developed into three mountain brigades.
Reenforcements of infantry and mountain artillery were hurried down to support the retaining force, but the Austrians were able to force their way on toward Zavlaka. Seeing Valievo thus threatened, the Serbians retired from their position at Jarebitze and took up a new position along a line from Marianovitche to Schumer, thus enabling them to face both the enemy columns. This retreat was fortunately not interfered with by the Austrians, though in executing it the Serbian artillery, which had been in position on the right bank of the Jadar, was obliged to pass along the Austrian front in single file, in order to gain the main road.
Early the next morning, August 17, 1914, the Serbians were in position and had extended their line to Soldatovitcha, whence the detachment from Krupanie had retired. Summing up the day's fighting, and considering it as a whole, it will be seen that the Austrians had pretty well held their own, except on their extreme left, where they had failed to get in touch with their forces in Shabatz.
After the defeat of the Austrians at Belikamen on August 16, 1914, the cavalry division was reenforced by some infantry and artillery, then sent on the delicate mission of driving a wedge in between the Austrians in Shabatz and those along the Drina. Spreading out across the Matchva plain, its left wing up against the slopes of the Tzer Mountains, and its right wing within reach of Shabatz, it advanced as far as Dublje in the north. At thesame time it was able to assist the column advancing along the Tzer ridges by playing its artillery on the Austrian position in the mountains at Troyan. Throughout all the fighting this cavalry division rendered notable service by its dismounted action.
On the morning of August 17, 1914, the extreme right of the Serbian front now turned toward Shabatz. Though only half the number of the forces they were proceeding to engage, they continued onward. But on closer approach it became apparent that they could do nothing more than hold the Austrians inside the town. So well and so thoroughly had the Austrians fortified themselves that it was hopeless for so small a force to attempt an attack. Thus this section of the Serbian front settled down to wait for reenforcements.
The center and left of the Second Army now prepared to advance along the Tzer and Iverak ridges. The Austrians in this section, who had suffered so severely the day before at Belikamen, were now concentrated around Troyan, the most easterly and the second highest peak of the chain.
At dawn on August 17, 1914, the Serbians located the Austrians. Immediately they began a heavy artillery fire on this position, then proceeded to infantry attack. Two regiments hurled themselves up the slopes, and with bayonets and hand bombs drove the Austrians back. After that no further progress was possible that day, the Serbians having to wait for their artillery to come up. The Austrians now began intrenching themselves on the heights of Kosaningrad, the loftiest portion of the Tzer range.
Along the Iverak ridges the Austrians made a determined advance. The situation of the Serbian troops in this section, the left wing of the Second Army, was extremely dangerous, for their left flank was becoming exposed by the continued retreat of the Third Army. The only hopeful aspect of their situation was that the Austrians were also having their left flank exposed by the retreat of the Austrians along the Tzer ridges. Evidently the opposing forces realized this fact, for they made a fierce attempt to drive back the Serbians opposing them, so that their danger from the north might be lessened. Half an hour laterthey were severely repulsed. But heavy reenforcements came up to the Austrians just then, and again they attacked, this time more successfully.
By noon, August 17, 1914, the Austrians had extended their line over to the Serbian right wing.
Unfortunately, at about that time the Third Army again called for assistance, and this hard-pressed division was compelled to send it. The result was that it was compelled to withdraw gradually to the heights of Kalem. The retirement was executed in good order, and the Austrians satisfied themselves with occupying Kugovitchi. Intrenching themselves in their new position, the Serbians awaited further attacks. Only an ineffectual artillery fire was maintained by the enemy. Meanwhile came the good news of the success of the Serbians along the Tzer ridges, so preparations were made for another advance on the following day, August 18, 1914.
As has already been stated, the extreme south wing of the Serbian front, the Third Army, had retreated the day before so that it could present a solid front against not only the forces opposing it, but also another column coming up from the south, whose advance had been inadequately covered by third reserve men. Here the Austrians attempted to pierce the Serbian line in the extreme south and come out at Oseshina. But though vastly outnumbered, the Serbians held their ground stoutly until late afternoon, when, as already shown, they were compelled to ask the division operating along Iverak for assistance. When this help came they were able to resume their defense.
Thus ended the second day of the general battle. On the whole the Austrians had suffered most, but the general situation was still somewhat in their favor. The Austrian center, along the Tzer ridges, had been pushed back. To retrieve this setback the logical course for the Austrian commander in chief was to curl his wings in around the Serbian flanks. That he appreciated this necessity was obvious, to judge from the furious onslaughts against the Serbian Third Army in the extreme south. But to weaken the Serbian center by these tactics it was also necessary to free the Austrians in Shabatz, or, at least, it was necessarythat they should assume a strong offensive against the extreme right of the Serbians, and, if possible, flank them.
But the Serbians anticipated the plans of the Austrians. Additional reenforcements were sent to the extreme right with orders to spare no sacrifice that would keep the Austrians inclosed within their fortifications around Shabatz.
And true enough, next morning, August 18,1914, shortly after the hot summer sun had risen over the eastern ridges, the Austrians emerged from Shabatz and attacked the Serbians. The Austrian onslaught was furious, so furious that, step by step, the Serbians, in spite of their reenforcements, were driven back. Fortunately toward evening the Austrian offensive began losing its strength, and that night the Serbians were able to intrench along a line from Leskovitz to Mihana.
This obliged the cavalry division, which had been cooperating with the Serbian center and was driving the Austrians toward Leshnitza, to retire along a line from Metkovitch to Brestovatz. Naturally the advance of the Austrians from Shabatz was endangering its right flank. Moreover, a reenforced column of Austrians also appeared before it. But this opposing force did not press its advance.
Meanwhile, on the same day, August 18, 1914, the Austrians were reenforcing their position on the Tzer ridges. They had also strongly fortified the height of Rashulatcha, which lay between the heights of Tzer and Iverak, whence they could direct an artillery fire to either field of activities.
But the difficulties which the Serbians operating along the Iverak ridges were meeting also hampered the Serbians who were attempting to sweep the Austrians back along the Tzer ridges. If they advanced too far they would expose their flank to the Austrians over on Iverak. As a general rule, it is always dangerous for any body of troops to advance any distance beyond the general line of the whole front, and this case was no exception. However, though delayed, this division did advance. Oxen were employed in dragging the heavy field pieces along the trails over the rocky ridges.
With savage yells the Serbian soldiers leaped over the rocks,up the jagged slopes of Kosaningrad. Again they had fallen back on their favorite weapons, bayonets and hand bombs. The Austrians put up a stout resistance, but finally their gray lines broke, then scattered down the slopes, followed by the pursuing Serbians. Having gained possession of Kosaningrad Peak, the Serbian commander next turned his attention to Rashulatcha, which, in conjunction with the Serbians over on Iverak, could now be raked by a cross artillery fire. He had previously left a reserve force behind at Troyan. This he now ordered to reenforce his left, which had been advancing along the southern slopes of the Tzer range. This force he now directed against the heights, but the movement was not vigorously followed up.
Over on Iverak the Serbians had succeeded in making some headway. Forming into two columns, this wing marched out and attacked the Austrians at Yugovitchi and succeeded in driving them from their trenches. But immediately the Austrian artillery on Reingrob opened fire on them, and they were compelled to dig themselves in. And late that night, August 18,1914, the Austrians delivered a fierce counterattack. But night fighting is especially a matter of experience, and here the Serbians with their two Balkan campaigns behind them, proved immensely superior. They drove the Austrians back with their bayonets.
During that same day, August 18, 1914, the Austrians had renewed their pressure on the Third Army and the Third Ban men. Soldatovitcha was their first objective. During the day reenforcements arrived and the commanding general was able to hold his own, retaking Soldatovitcha after it had once been lost. Thus ended the day of August 18, 1914, the third day of the battle.
Early next morning, on August 19, 1914, the Austrians in Shabatz renewed their efforts to penetrate the Serbian lines to the southward. So determined was their effort that finally the Serbians in this sector were driven back over on to the right bank of the River Dobrava. All day the fighting continued, the Serbians barely holding their position, strong as it was.
This success of the Austrians hampered the cavalry division, which had not only to secure its flank, but had also to keep between the Shabatz Austrians and the Serbians operating on Tzer, whom they might have attacked from the rear.
Along the Tzer ridges, however, things were going well for the Serbians. At noon they had taken Rashulatcha, which left the column free to continue its pursuit of the fleeing Austrians along the ridges. From the heights above the Serbian guns fired into the retreating Austrians down along the Leshnitza River, turning the retreat into a mad panic. By evening the advance guard of this division had arrived at Jadranska Leshnitza.
In the early morning, August 19,1914, the Serbians over on the Iverak ridges had attacked in deadly earnest. Naturally the huge success and rapid advance of the Serbians over on the Tzer ridges were of great importance to them. Here the Austrians were put to rout too. At 11 a. m. the Serbians stormed Velika Glava and took it, but here their progress was checked by a strong artillery fire from the west of Rashulatcha. Then rifle firing broke out along the whole line from Velika Glava to Kik. Near Kik the Austrians were massing in strong force, and the Third Army was reported to be again in danger, this time from a hostile turning movement. Fortunately general headquarters was able to come to the rescue with reenforcements. This lessened the danger from Kik. Whereupon the advance along Iverak was continued. By the middle of the afternoon, when the Austrians were driven out of Reingrob, the Serbians controlled the situation. The defeat of the Austrians was complete.
The Third Army was again in trouble during this day, August 19,1914. Its left flank continued its advance from Soldatovitcha, but the Austrians attempted to pierce their center. But finally this sorely tried section of the Serbian front emerged triumphant. Before evening the Austrians were driven back in scattered disorder, leaving behind them three hospitals filled with wounded, much material, and 500 prisoners.
Here ended the fourth day of the bloody struggle—August 19, 1914. In the north around Shabatz the Austrians had made some advance, but all along the rest of the line they had suffered completedisaster. The two important mountain ridges, Tzer and Iverak, which dominated the whole theatre of operations, were definitely in the hands of the Serbians. And finally, the Third Army had at last broken down the opposition against it.
Next morning, August 20, 1914, dawned on a situation that was thoroughly hopeless for the Austrians. Even up around Shabatz, where they had been successful the day before, the Austrians, realizing that all was lost to the southward, made only a feeble attack on the Serbians, who were consequently able to recross the Dobrava River and establish themselves on the right bank.
The cavalry division, whose left flank was not freed by the clearing of the Tzer ridges, hurled itself against the Austrians in the plains before it and threw them into wild disorder. First they shelled them, then charged. The panic-stricken Magyars fled through the villages, across the corn fields, through the orchards.
"Where is the Drina? Where is the Drina?" they shouted, whenever they saw a peasant. A burning, tropical sun sweltered over the plain. Many of the fleeing soldiers dropped from exhaustion and were afterward taken prisoners. Others lost themselves in the marshy hollows and only emerged days later, while still others, wounded, laid down and died where they fell.
In the Leshnitza similar scenes were taking place. From the ridges above the Serbian guns roared and poured hurtling steel messages of death down into the throngs of retreating Austrians. Some few regiments, not so demoralized as the others, did indeed make several attempts to fight rear-guard actions, to protect their fleeing comrades, but they again were overwhelmed by the disorganized masses in the rear pouring over them.
In the Jadar valley another disorganized mob of Austrians was fleeing before the Serbians up on the Iverak ridges, who also were pouring a hot artillery fire into their midst. Presently the Third Army joined in the mad chase. And now the whole Austrian army was wildly fleeing for the Drina River.
There remained only one exception during the early part of the day, August 20, 1914. This was the Austrian forces on Kik, to the northwest of Zavlaka. The Serbian reenforcements which, it will be remembered, had originally been directed toward Marianovitche, had been afterward sent westward, and at dawn on August 20 they approached Kik in two columns. The left column occupied Osoye without resistance, but in descending from that position, the Austrian artillery opened fire on it.
An hour later the right column came up and opened an artillery fire, and under cover of this bombardment a Serbian regiment reached the foot of the mountain. As was afterward learned, the Austrians at this point had had their machine guns destroyed by the Serbian artillery fire, and by this time their own artillery had been sent back, in preparation for the retreat. Consequently they were only able to receive the Serbian attack with rifle fire.
At the height of this skirmish the extreme left of the Serbians on Iverak, which had remained to guard against attack from this quarter, moved over against the Austrians. The cross-fire was too much for them; they turned and fled, leaving behind over six hundred dead, the Serbians in this affair losing only seven killed. Jarebitze was now occupied; the rest of the Serbians joined in the general pursuit.
That night, August 20, 1914, the Austrians swarmed across the Drina, fleeing for their lives. By the next day the whole river bank was cleared of them. Serbian soldiers lined the whole length of the frontier in this section. There remained now only the Austrians in Shabatz to deal with. The whole Serbian army was now able to concentrate on this remaining force of the enemy left in Serbian territory.
Early on August 21, 1914, the attack began, and the Austrians here fought stoutly. Indeed, all that day they held the Serbians off from behind their intrenchments. On August 22, 1914, the Serbians made a general assault. Fortunately they found a weakness in the fortifications on the western side of the town. To create a diversion, the Austrians delivered a counterattack along the road toward Varna.
By the morning of August 24, 1914, the Serbians had brought up a number of heavy siege guns. But when the general bombardment had already commenced, it was found that the Austrians had evacuated the town during the night, and retreated across the river. And so the first Austrian invasion of Serbia came to its disastrous end.[Back to Contents]