Pictorial Map of the Dardanelles, Showing where the Allies Landed.
Pictorial Map of the Dardanelles, Showing where the Allies Landed.
Meantime the French were to make a landing at Kum Kale on the Asiatic side of the straits. There is some doubt as to the real purpose of this landing. After the French had reembarked—"driven off with terrible losses," according to the Turkish officialaccount—it was claimed that the landing was merely a diversion. Certainly nothing more than that could be claimed for a feint made by a portion of the Naval Division farther up the Gulf of Saros.
These, then, were the plans of Sir Ian Hamilton: four landing operations in widely separated points, two of serious importance and the other two, probably, intended only to draw the troops and energy of the defenders. How they prospered, what measure of success they obtained, how the Turks, fighting with the valor which has made them famous through ages, how the British Colonial and French troops accomplished almost unbelievable deeds of heroism and skill, make one of the most fascinating stories in the annals of warfare.
While these operations were timed to occur simultaneously, they will appear more clear to the reader if they are taken separately and each followed to its conclusion from the opening day. In this way we will tell the story, first, of the Australian-New Zealand landing northeast of Gaba Tepe; then of the landings on the five beaches at the tip of the peninsula; and, finally, of the French landing on the Asiatic shore and the naval brigade demonstration at Bulair.
By one o'clock on the morning of Sunday, April 25, 1915, the allied expeditionary force had arrived within five miles of the Gallipoli shore. Under cover of darkness the final dispositions were made and the ships maneuvered so that the timing of the several landings would be accurately synchronized. Shortly after one o'clock the landing boats were lowered from the transports.
Strung in lines of four and five the boats were slowly towed toward shore by steam pinnaces. Not a sound was heard but the panting of the engines of the little boats. The speed was accurately calculated to bring the parties close in shore with the first break of the dawn.
Accompanying the Australian and New Zealand troops, were a number of destroyers. Just as they reached the shallow water in front of the cliffs of Gaba Tepe, a Turkish lookout spied them in the hazy light of the morning. Instantly he gave the alarm and a flaring searchlight flashed its rays on the little flotilla.
The need for silence had disappeared. With a cheer the British troops leaped from their boats into the shoal water and splashed their way ashore. While many of them were still in their boats, however, the Turks opened fired. The whole ground had been carefully prepared and from every cover on the shore and the cliffs beyond a deadly fire was poured upon the Colonial troops.
Without faltering, however, the Australian and New Zealand troops, supported by a squadron of battleships and destroyers, came on straight at the strongly intrenched Turks. The first of the Australians to reach the shore were the Third Brigade under Colonel Sinclair Maglagan. With a rush they charged the first Turkish lines, bayoneted the defenders, and scrambled up the steep cliffs that rise a hundred feet in the air.
Fortunately for the British troops, as these and subsequent events proved, there had been a slight miscalculation in the landing, and the men had actually gone ashore a mile and a half northeast of Gaba Tepe, instead of at that point. Gaba Tepe is so rugged and uninviting that it was believed that the Turks would not trouble to intrench it. Actually the Turks appeared to have intrenched and prepared every inch of the coast. But at Sari Bair, where the Australian and New Zealand troops actually landed, the character of the ground, although not so advantageous at first, afforded much more protection once the men were ashore. Sir Ian Hamilton, in his graphic account of the operations, subsequently said:
"Owing to the tows having failed to maintain their exact direction, the actual point of disembarkation was rather more than a mile north of that which I had selected, and was more closely overhung by steeper cliffs. Although this accident increased the initial difficulty of driving the enemy off the heights inland, it has since proved itself to have been a blessing in disguise, inasmuch as the actual base of the force of occupation had been much better defiladed from shell fire.
"The beach on which the landing was actually effected is a very narrow strip of sand about 1,000 yards in length, bounded on the north and the south by two small promontories. At itssouthern extremity, a deep ravine with exceedingly deep, scrub-clad sides, runs inland in a northeasterly direction. Near the northern end of the beach a small but steep gully runs up into the hills at right angles to the shore. Between the ravine and the gully the whole of the beach is baked by the seaward face of the spur which forms the northwestern side of the ravine. From the top of the spur the ground falls almost sheer, except near the southern limit of the beach where gentler slopes give access to the mouth of the ravine behind. Farther inland lie in a tangled knot the under-features of Sari Bair separated by deep ravines which take a most confusing diversity of direction. Sharp spurs, covered with dense scrub and falling away in many places in precipitous sandy cliffs, radiate from the principal mass of the mountain, from which they run northwest, west, southwest and south to the coast."
As fresh British troops came ashore they cast aside their heavy packs and followed their comrades across the forty feet of open beach and into the scrub that covered the side of the cliffs. Halfway up the Turks had prepared a second position. Attacking it in open formation the Third Brigade succeeded in clearing it within fifteen minutes of the time they came ashore, despite the desperate and brave defense of the Turks.
Meanwhile some of the landing boats, subjected to the terrible fire of the Turkish guns, were having a bad time. The towing ropes of three of them were cut by the fire and the boats drifted helplessly about under the withering rain of bullets that rapidly wiped out their cargoes of men. But despite these mishaps the First and Second Brigades were hurried ashore to support the Third. Soon, in the face of terrible difficulties including the narrowness of the beach, there were between 3,000 and 4,000 allied troops ashore.
By this time the Turks, by means of the mobile carriages prepared for them by the Germans, had maneuvered some heavy artillery into position on the heights inland. Also some of their warships, moored in the Narrows, began throwing heavy shells across the peninsula into the allied fleet standing close inshore. So dangerous and accurate became this fire that the transportshad to be ordered out to sea and this delayed the operations seriously.
At Gaba Tepe and on the heights to the north of the beach the Turks posted guns and enfiladed the Narrows beach. Thus the troops, as they landed, had to make their way through a rain of shrapnel, machine gun and rifle fire that wiped out hundreds. Despite the success of the Australian Brigades in clearing the beach and the face of the cliff, the Turkish fire never seemed to slacken.
Because of the nature of the country there could be no central control over the advance fighting and no continued communications between the several forces making their way to the top of the cliffs. The battle resolved itself into a series of fights between small parties, or even individual soldiers, whose one object was to kill as many of the enemy as possible and make their way as far inland as possible in the first rush.
By two o'clock about twelve British regiments had been landed and the ground gained consolidated and prepared against counterattack. Thousands of Turkish troops were by this time pouring along the road from Maidos and by the middle of the afternoon it was calculated that there were fully 20,000 of them before the Australian and New Zealand troops. The latter, in the meantime, had been further reenforced by two batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery. The pressure of the constantly increasing Turkish force compelled General Birdwood, who came ashore about this time, to contract his lines and to reach a decision that, at that time at least and until the arrival of more troops, no further advance could be made. The Gaba Tepe landing had not been the surprise that was expected and the Turks had proved to be in unexpected strength.
About three o'clock the Turkish counterattacks began. Absolutely regardless of human life, they threw themselves in dense masses against the Second and Third Brigades. The British battleships, theQueen, theLondon, thePrince of Wales, theTriumphand theMajestic, posted close inshore, poured a devastating fire on the advancing Turkish troops as they came into the open.
About five o'clock the Turks, after repeated assaults upon the British lines, massed for a final attempt to drive the invaders into the sea. On and on they came, concentrating on the hard-pressed Third Brigade as the weak spot in the British defense. Fighting gamely against heavy odds, this Australian Brigade which had borne the brunt of the landing attack and which had been almost continually counterattacked all afternoon, gave way slowly, selling every inch of ground dearly. Hundreds of the brave Turkish troops were mown down by the machine guns which the Australians had by this time brought ashore. At nightfall, however, General Birdwood, as a consequence of the persistence of the enemy, had to contract his lines further.
As night settled on the battle field on the ridge above Gaba Tepe and Sari Bair, and the two forces rested from sheer exhaustion, the British troops, who once were well inland toward Maidos, their objective, were barely hanging onto the ridge overlooking the shore of the Gulf of Saros. All their water and food and munitions and reenforcements had to be brought ashore across the exposed beach, while the landing of the necessary artillery in the face of the Turkish fire was a feat to appal the bravest. But though their hold on their position was precarious it was tenacious and, in the end, effective. If they had not won all they expected to win they had at least won a foothold in the face of terrific difficulties.
While the Australians and New Zealanders were fighting desperately beyond Gaba Tepe, the other forces of the allied army were accomplishing similar deeds of heroism at the tip of the peninsula.
Coming down the coast of the peninsula from Gaba Tepe, about three miles from the extreme southwestern tip, was what was known as Beach Y. It was almost due west of the important town of Krithia, and the landing was intended primarily to protect the left flank of the British landing forces from attack by the considerable forces believed to be concentrated there.
The actual landing seems to have been somewhat of a surprise to the Turks. Indeed, subsequent events showed that they were correct in their estimate that a landing at the so-called Beach Ywould be a mistake. A narrow strip of sandy beach led to the cliffs, two hundred feet high, that were believed to be almost unscalable. It is easy to be wise after the event, but military writers subsequently declared that if the Turks had been prepared to defend the position, the force that landed at Beach Y would have been wiped out in the preliminary attempt to establish a footing.
The force assigned to this point of attack consisted of the First King's Own Scottish Borderers, and the Plymouth Battalion of the Royal Naval Division, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Koe. The latter was under orders, if the landing proved successful, to work his way south to effect a junction with the force landing at Beach X, some two miles away.
About five o'clock, Koe's force appeared off Beach Y, on the transportsBraemar CastleandSouthland, and escorted by the battleshipGoliath, and the cruisersAmethystandSapphire. The Turks had posted a large force at Beach Y 2, between Beach Y and Beach X, but half of the Scottish Borderers were ashore before the Turkish command had realized what was happening. As a result Colonel Koe's force was partly established on the cliffs before the Turks had begun to arrive.
But if the initial stages were unexpectedly easy for this force, difficulties soon developed. Once on the heights, Colonel Koe ordered an advance to link up with the force at Beach X. The British troops had not gone far when they ran into the Turkish troops from Beach Y. So large was this force and so determined an opposition did it offer to the British troops that Colonel Koe soon decided it would be impossible, with the two battalions at his disposal, to accomplish the task assigned him.
Early in the afternoon the little British force was dismayed by the approach on its left flank of a large force of Turks from Krithia, which threatened to cut it off from the landing beach. Reluctantly Colonel Koe, just before he received a fatal wound, gave the order to intrench.[Back to Contents]
THE BRITISH IN DANGER—BITTER FIGHTING
The British troops were now in a critical position. There was a peculiar spoonlike formation of the ground at the end of the Gallipoli Peninsula. From the high cliffs along the shore the ground fell away. Thus it was impossible for the supporting warships lying offshore to give any effective aid to the little British force once it had left the shore and the edge of the heights. The Turks realized to the full their advantage and attacked the Borderers and the marines with fury. Frequent attacks were launched against the dwindling line of the British force. Guns of large caliber were rapidly brought up from Krithia, while the Turks showed extraordinary daring and cleverness in bomb attacks upon the hastily dug trenches of the enemy.
All night long the Turks attacked. By morning the remnants of the British force were in desperate straits. Sir Ian Hamilton subsequently declared that the losses at this time had been "deplorable." Many of the officers, in addition to Lieutenant Colonel Koe, had been killed or wounded, while 50 per cent of the Borderers had been put out of action. They were no longer able to defend properly their trenches. Food, water, and ammunition were running short. A consultation of the remaining officers was held. The question of trying to hold out until reenforcements arrived was considered, but ultimately it was decided to retreat to the shore and to reembark.
At seven o'clock on Monday morning the order was given. The attending fleet had been strengthened by the arrival of the cruisersTalbotandDublin, and, supported by theGoliath, theAmethyst, and theSapphire, they began a terrific bombardment of the tops of the cliffs. Protected by this screen of fire, the few remaining British troops were able to get away in their boats without molestation save for a long distance bombardment by the Turkish artillery.
The landing at Beach X was more successful. The Eighty-seventh Brigade, under the command of Brigadier General Marshall, was assigned to this part of the field. It was to work its way as far as possible inland and link up with the troops coming ashore at Beach W. At Beach X the Turks were well prepared. They had constructed bomb-proof shelters and trenches on the heights and were well led by German officers.
Before the actual landing the supporting battleships, led by theSwiftsureand theImplacable, bombarded the Turkish positions for almost an hour with their heaviest guns. The ground was thoroughly swept by the great 12-inch and smaller guns of the warships. Finally, just before the actual landing, theImplacablesteamed within 500 yards of the shore, dropped her anchor and smothered the near cliffs and the foreshore with her fire.
Subsequent investigation proved that in this affair of Gallipoli, as in Flanders and elsewhere, the British suffered from their lack of foresight in the provision of proper shells. The battleships used shrapnel, which, it was afterward discovered, did little damage to the deep, protected trenches prepared by the Turks under the supervision of the German officers. If the British had had instead the high-explosive shells that were necessary for the work, the story of the Gallipoli landings under the wing of the great fleet of battleships might have made different reading.
After about a quarter of an hour's final bombardment by theImplacable, two companies and a machine-gun section of the First Royal Fusiliers were thrown ashore at Beach X. Under cover of the battleships, the landing was safely accomplished and the Fusiliers advanced almost 1,000 yards without much opposition. Hill 114 on their right, where the Turks proved to be firmly intrenched, then proved a serious obstacle to the advance. While the Royal Fusiliers were considering the best method of attacking this position, a Turkish battery, in position near the town of Krithia, opened fire and tore holes in the left wing of the British force. At the same time they were heavily counterattacked by a Turkish force coming from the east. Gradually the Royal Fusiliers were compelled to give ground. Two battalionsof the Eighty-seventh Division were sent ashore and with these reenforcements the British again advanced, this time clearing Hill 114 of the enemy. There they joined hands with the First Battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers, and although all day long the Turks tried to break the union of the two forces, they did not succeed in doing so.
However, General Marshall's force was hard pressed. Once more the unceasing Turkish counterattacks drove them back to the very edge of the heights overlooking Beach X, where only the intense bombardment of the protecting warships saved them. General Marshall was wounded, but refused to relinquish his command, and a very large proportion of the total force was either killed or wounded in the day's fighting. When night fell the British troops held only half a mile of territory around their original landing place, with their right wing resting on Hill 114, linked up with the force from Beach W.
Here at Beach W, a mile and a half down the coast, midway between Tekke Burna and Hellas Burna, was being enacted a feat of arms which, in the opinion of competent military men, is fit to rank with the great military accomplishments of all time. In speaking of it subsequently Sir Ian Hamilton made use of the following terms:
"So strong, in fact, were the defenses of Beach W that the Turks may well have considered them impregnable, and it is my firm conviction that no finer feat of arms has ever been achieved by the British soldier—or any other soldier—than the storming of these trenches from open boats on the morning of April 25."
At Beach W the Turks, fully foreseeing a landing, had prepared as at no other point. The beach is in a wide bay and leads into a gully flanked on one side by the hills extending to Cape Tekke and, on the other side by the steep cliffs extending to Cape Hellas.
Every inch of the ground had been prepared against attack. Sea and land mines had been profusely laid, wire entanglements had been placed along the shore and stretching out into the water. Deep trenches had been dug on the heights and on thesides of the slopes while strong redoubts had been built at two dominating positions. Every bush and cover contained a sniper while larger covers concealed machine guns trained to sweep the beach and the slopes leading to the Turkish trenches.
As a defensive position Beach W was almost ideal. It had two weak points, however, which in the end turned the scales and made success possible for the attacking force. At either end of the bay were small rock positions from which it was possible to enfilade the elaborate system of defenses.
The landing party at Beach W consisted of the First Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, under command of Major Bishop. "It was," wrote Sir Ian Hamilton, "to the complete lack of the sense of danger or of fear of this daring battalion that we owed our astonishing success." After a preliminary bombardment by the supporting warships the men of the First Battalion, in thirty-two cutters drawn by eight picket boats, approached the shore. The Turks made no move until the men were in shallow water and were leaping out of the boats. Then they opened fire with a murderous torrent from artillery, machine guns, and rifles. The first line of the First Battalion went down to a man. The second never faltered, but came on bravely into the fire, striving desperately to cut the wire entanglements. So quickly did they fall that observers on the warships wondered why they were "resting" on the bullet swept shore instead of running to cover.
Rapidly the men from Lancashire worked. Finally a remnant of the battalion forced its way through the last line of wire and ran for shelter on the bush covered slopes. Almost at the same moment, detachments that had landed on the rocks at Cape Tekke and under Cape Hellas began to have an important effect upon the struggle. At the latter point, the Eighty-eighth Brigade, under Brigadier General Hare, clambered up the steep side of the cliffs, searched out the machine gun positions of the enemy and swept the ground clear with the bayonet. This and the work of the force at Cape Tekke eased the Turkish fire on the beach and, on the slopes of the Cape Tekke side of the ravine, the few remaining officers of the First Battalion were able to re-form the remnants of their force and advance upon Hill 114.
About nine o'clock reenforcements were landed, this time not on the exposed beach but under Cape Tekke, the heights of which were by now largely in the hands of the British troops. With the help of these fresh troops, three lines of Turkish trenches were carried. Brigadier General Hare was seriously wounded and his place was filled by Colonel Wolley-Dod, who was sent ashore with orders to organize a further advance at all speed. At this point the attacking force ran up against the Turkish redoubt at Hill 138.
The afternoon opened with an intense naval bombardment of the ground around Hill 138 and of that redoubt itself. At two o'clock the Fourth Battalion of the Worcesters was ordered to take the position by assault. Under Lieutenant Colonel D. E. Cayley, they advanced a considerable distance under rifle fire and charged up the heights with a cheer. The Turks fought bravely against a stronger force, but by four o'clock Hill 138 was in the hands of the Worcesters.
Less than a mile down the coast, almost to the old fort and village of Sedd-el-Bahr, was what was known as V Beach. There a landing in great force was attempted. Largely because of the scale of the operations, but also because of the difficulties and the accidents of warfare, this landing was made with great losses.
The beach and the shore in the immediate vicinity form a most regular amphitheatre of a radius of about 400 feet. The beach is about 10 yards wide and 350 to 400 feet long and it runs into a slightly concaved, grassy slope that rises gently to a height of a hundred feet. Little or no real cover was to be found on this slope and the defenders were able to sweep it from all angles with a devastating rain of all kinds of shells. Just at the edge of the strip of sand, however, was a continuous escarpment about four feet high, which afforded a cover in which troops once ashore might be re-formed. As a result of the early naval bombardment of the tip of the peninsula, much of the village of Sedd-el-Bahr and the fort and the barracks had been reduced to ruins. The ruins afforded, however, excellent cover for the Turkish troops and proved a serious obstacle to the advance of the British when they reached the shore.
In addition to the natural disadvantages under which the attacking party had to work, the Turks had constructed two lines of barbed wire obstacles—one at the edge of the beach and the second two-thirds of the way up to the top of the ridge. These two lines of barbed wire were more stoutly constructed than were any others with which the British had to contend. Just beyond the second obstacle the Turks had built their first line of trenches and beyond the ground was scored with innumerable covers for the defenders.
The force assigned to the attack upon V Beach was composed of the Dublin Fusiliers, the Munster Fusiliers, half a battalion of the Hampshire Regiment, the West Riding Field Company and a few minor units. The action opened with a short range bombardment of the enemy's trenches and such parts of the fort, the village and the barracks as were still standing and believed to be affording cover for riflemen and machine-gun batteries. Then three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers were towed ashore. At this point one of the great experiments of the Gallipoli landings was put to the test, and, despite the cleverness of its conception, it did not meet with great success.
A large transport vessel, theRiver Clyde, had been loaded with about 2,000 troops. She had been reconstructed inside and great doors had been cut in one of her sides. The troops were ready on long platforms for instant disembarkation. The ships were to be run ashore, as close as possible to the beach, lighters were to be floated in between her and the shore, the side doors were to be flung open, and the troops were to rush ashore and carry the slopes by sheer momentum. In the front of the vessel, protected by sandbags, was a battery of machine guns which, it was hoped, would be especially effective in protecting the landing force from counterattacks.
As at the other landings, the Turks gave no sign of life until the collier had been beached and the other landing force had almost reached the shore in its tows. Indeed, so long did they hesitate in opening fire that at one time the watchers on the warships thought the landing was going to be unopposed. They were soon disabused of such an idea, however, as the first of the towboatsgrounded on the sandy beach, the Turks opened fire from a dozen different positions. Many of the Dublin Fusiliers were killed before they were able to get out of their boats. A few scrambled ashore and reached the shelter of the escarpment that rimmed the beach. The Turks concentrated their fire on the boats and their crews. None of them were able to get away, and almost instantly their crews were killed and the boats wrecked.
Meantime theRiver Clyde, had been run ashore. Unfortunately, the operation was not carried out as expeditiously as it was hoped it would be, and the Turks soon became aware of the intentions of the British. They poured a punishing fire on the naval party attempting to get the lighters into position between the ship and the shore. The heavy tide that at this point sweeps around the point of land also seriously interfered with the work. Finally however, by deeds of heroism that received subsequent official acknowledgment, the lighters were got into position and the doors of theRiver Clydeflung open.
At a trot a company of the Munster Fusiliers led the way. It was almost impossible to live for even a short time in the fire that the Turks concentrated upon the lighters, and hardly a man reached the shore. Nothing daunted, a second company of the same battalion followed. As they dropped in scores the lighters began to drift and dozens of the men, in attempting to swim ashore in their heavy kits, were drowned.
Despite the storm of fire, volunteers once more swung the lighters into position. The third company of the Munsters were ordered to attempt to reach the beach. By this time the Turks had been able to concentrate shrapnel fire on theRiver Clydeand her human freight, and the third company suffered even more casualties than had the first two.
There is a limit to human sacrifice, and Brigadier General Napier, in command of the troops, called a halt in the attempt to land. A little later, it was resumed, with General Napier and Captain Costeker and a detachment of the Hampshire Regiment heroically leading the way. When they had reached the lighters the moorings again gave way and they drifted into deep water. In the torrent of bullets that was being poured down upon them bythe Turks it was impossible to do anything but lie flat on the exposed decks and wait for the lighters to be swung into position again. Scores of them were killed, including both Brigadier General Napier and Captain Costeker.
With this major disaster, all attempts to make further landings were abandoned for the day. A few hundred British troops had succeeded in reaching the escarpment on the shore and there they huddled, not daring to lift their heads above the four-foot natural cover. Fortunately for them, the machine-gun battery on theRiver Clyderaked the slope, kept the fire of the Turkish defenders down and prevented any counterattacks, which might have ended disastrously for the British troops. The troops still on board theRiver Clyde, numbering about 1,000 were effectively protected from the fire of the Turks, suffering few casualties, although shrapnel tore four great holes in the side of the collier.
Matters had not gone any better at other sections of the beach. Half a company of the Dublins landed east of Sedd-el-Bahr for the purpose of flanking the Turkish defenses, failed to accomplish its purpose and lost all except twenty-five of its men. In the afternoon the landing at V Beach was definitely accepted as a failure and plans made for the diversion of the troops not yet landed to one of the other beaches. It was first thought that Y Beach would be the best point, but it was decided that it would be too late to effect the issue there and the troops were finally diverted to W Beach, where, despite the heavy cost, the Lancashire landing had led to some real results.
As nightfall approached there was a momentary thrill of hopefulness among those who remained on V Beach because of the fact that some of the Worcestershire and Lancashire Fusiliers succeeded in working their way across country from W Beach and threatened to make untenable the Turkish positions. The few hundred men on V Beach and the thousand or more cooped up in theRiver Clydecould hear the fight coming closer and closer and, cheered by their officers, their spirits rose. But the men from W Beach were stopped finally by the frequent lines of barbed-wire obstructions that had been stretched by the Turk at rightangles to the shore, between the two beaches, in preparation for just such an eventuality as this.
Night came, but with it not much relief from the constant vigilance of the Turks. There was in the perfect sky not a cloud to screen the moon's rays. A successful attempt was made, however, to land the infantry from theRiver Clyde, and subsequently the force then ashore, numbering close upon 1,500 men, tried to clear the ruins of the fort and the outskirts of the village. All these efforts were in vain, however, and finally the troops returned to the protection of the escarpment along the shore. From there the task of removing the wounded to the protection of theRiver Clydewas proceeded with under a heavy fire.
In comparison with the sanguinary affairs at the four other beaches, the landing at S Beach was a minor affair, costing only about fifty casualties. This beach was located at the extreme eastern end of Morto Bay, close by Eski Hissarlik Point, and the work was delegated to the Second South Wales Borderers under Lieutenant Colonel Casson. The chief difficulty of this landing was found in the powerful current which delayed it for several hours beyond the appointed time. However, the men were finally got ashore and easily drove out the small Turkish force that had been posted in the neighborhood.[Back to Contents]
FURTHER EFFORTS AT LANDING—FAILURE TO TAKE KRITHIA
Meanwhile the French were carrying on a disastrous operation at Kum Kale, on the Asiatic shore, directly south of S Beach. About 2,800 men had been landed after a preliminary bombardment by the French fleet. Before they reembarked next morning they had lost more than a quarter of their effectives. After landing they stormed the ruined castle of Kum Kale and then drove inland with the object of clearing the village ofYeni Shehr. The Turks were in force, however, at that point and held the French midway between Kum Kale and Yeni Shehr. Finally it became apparent that further advance was impossible without reenforcements and the French intrenched for the night. All through the darkness the Turks launched a counterattack upon the landing force and morning found the French preparing to reembark. Under the guns of the French warships this was accomplished without any great further loss.
Thus of the seven landings that had been attempted by the allied forces two, that at Kum Kale and that at Y Beach, had been definitely abandoned. Of the remaining five only two had been successful in linking up—that at Beach X and that at Beach W. Farther up the Gulf of Saros, near the lines known by the name of Bulair, a force of the Royal Naval Reserve made a demonstration but did not effect a landing.
The Australians and the New Zealanders on the cliffs above Gaba Tepe were fighting desperately against the constant Turkish counterattacks, but, assisted by the fleet under Admiral Thursby, successfully resisted all attempts to drive them into the sea. Already the little cove in which the landing had been made had been christened "Anzac Cove," "Anzac," of course, was formed by taking the first letters of the official designation of the colonial forces—Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. The spirits of the men were high, despite the awful experience they had gone through, and they frequently exchanged cheery messages with the gunners of the warships who were pounding away at the Turkish positions, although not accomplishing any great damage in their blind firing.
It had been intended to organize an immediate resumption of the advance from Anzac Cove with daybreak of April 26. But the Turks were constantly bringing up reenforcements. Watchers on the warships could see them creeping over the crest of Sari Bair and although the naval guns were turned on them, their loss was comparatively small because of their open formation and their cleverness in making use of every bit of cover.
During the early morning the Anzacs had hauled heavy field guns up the face of the steep cliffs and had, in many other ways,strengthened their positions. This was all the more necessary as it became apparent that the Turks were massing for a great attack shortly after nine o'clock. About noon the battle reached its height. The Turks attacked bravely and although they suffered great losses, never wavered. Despite their efforts, however, the Anzacs held fast. By this time reenforcements were beginning to arrive and a more permanent character was given to the trenches. An attempt was made to organize for an advance as headquarters were constantly impressing upon the individual commands the necessity of making good as much ground as possible before the Turks were able to bring into action their undoubted superiority in forces.
The constant attacks of the Turks, however, made any real attempt at advance impossible, although a little ground was gained on the 26th by counterattacks. It soon became apparent, too, that, although the operation at Anzac Cove was part and parcel of the general attack, it had, through its inability to make progress, become a separate affair and had been so conducted for the rest of the campaign—or at least until a much greater advance had been made in all quarters.
At the tip of the peninsula the chief events of the second day of the landing, April 26, 1915, occurred at V Beach, where theRiver Clydehad been run ashore. About 1,500 men were left, composed of the survivors of the Dublins and the Munsters and two companies of the Hampshires, under cover of the escarpment on the beach. There Colonel Doughty-Wylie and Captain Walford rallied them on the morning of the 26th and covered by a heavy bombardment by the warships set out to clear the village. Desperate hand-to-hand fighting followed and the casualties were appalling. Most of the houses contained squads of riflemen and the more important machine guns. Each had to be carried separately. By noon, however, the town had been cleared. Captain Walford had fallen, bravely leading his troops in a way that earned him the Victoria Cross.
Colonel Doughty-Wylie called a halt and collected the survivors of the attack. Under cover of some empty houses he rallied them, re-formed them as best he could, called upon themfor one last effort and walked out into the open at the head of his troops for the assault upon the old Castle, and Hill 141.
Carrying a light cane, the figure of Colonel Doughty-Wylie was a conspicuous one. Yet he survived almost to the end and to victory. He reached the slope leading up to Hill 141, urging his men forward. He was in the lead when a bullet killed him instantly. Fired by his splendid example which earned him a posthumous Victoria Cross, the Dublins, Munsters, and Hampshires swept on and carried the summit. By two o'clock the commanding position was in the hands of the British.
At the same time the Lancashire Landing force had linked up with the landing at V Beach. Also, the French Expeditionary force, after its hard experience at Kum Kale, was successfully landed at V Beach. Additional troops were landed at S Beach to prevent the South Wales Borderers being wiped out in their isolation.
On the morning of April 27, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton looked over the positions. He found that, although he had several beaches securely in his grasp, he lacked room in which to maneuver. Also his force was beginning to suffer from lack of water. Accordingly he decided that an immediate advance was necessary.
Sir Ian Hamilton set his men the task of clearing the comparatively low ground at the tip of the peninsula—a distance of about two miles from the extreme southwestern point of the land. He drew a straight line from the position held by the South Wales Borderers near the ruined De Tott's Battery to Y Beach. After some hard fighting this was accomplished with the exception of the extreme left wing, which got only as far as Y 2 Beach, where the Turks were in force.
On the following day, April 27th, despite the fact that his forces were almost exhausted, Sir Ian Hamilton called upon them for a supreme effort. He intended, he said, to capture the Village of Krithia and, from that point, carry Achi Baba, the first main objective in the campaign to open the Narrows.
The advance was ordered for eight o'clock in the morning. The Twenty-ninth Division, under Major General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston, was to move on Krithia, the French force was tomove along the right flank of the Twenty-ninth to the Kereves Dere, which ran from the base of Achi Baba, and there await the capture of Krithia and the assault upon the main height.
The leading units of the Twenty-ninth Division advanced almost without opposition for a couple of miles, but was then heavily attacked by the enemy. Despite all further attempts the British troops were able to make no further advance at this point and intrenched for the night. A little to the right, other units eventually got within three-quarters of a mile of Krithia, but finally were compelled to fall back in line with the force on its left. Still farther to the right the Eighty-eighth Brigade had been brought to a halt and found itself running short of ammunition.
The Eighty-sixth Brigade, which had been held in reserve, came into action shortly after one o'clock in the afternoon. It was ordered to move through the Eighty-eighth Brigade and carry Krithia. A few units got within sight of Krithia, but the main body of the Eighty-sixth Brigade was unable to force a way beyond the line reached by the Eighty-eighth.
The French, meanwhile, were having an equally hard time. At one time they were within a mile of Krithia, but ultimately they, in company with the whole allied line, had to give way before strong Turkish counterattacks. Masses of Turkish troops advanced against the British center and right and against the whole line of the French and drove them back with the bayonet. An almost successful attempt was made to pierce the allied line at the point where the French linked up with the British. The French gave way and uncovered the right flank of the Eighty-eighth Brigade. The Fourth Worcesters suffered cruelly and had it not been for the reenforcements of the Eighty-sixth Brigade a serious situation might have ensued.
In speaking of this critical moment Sir Ian Hamilton subsequently wrote:
"The men were exhausted and the few guns landed at the time were unable to afford them adequate artillery support. The small amount of transports available did not suffice to maintain the supply of munitions, and cartridges were running short despite all efforts to push them up from the landing places."
The situation was now becoming serious and it became apparent that Krithia could not be carried. Accordingly, the allied forces were ordered to dig in as rapidly as possible and hold their ground at all costs. Thus ended the Battle of the Landings, extending over three days. The results obtained fell far short of expectations. Krithia and Achi Baba had not been carried, the Australians and New Zealanders had been unable to advance along the road to Maidos and, indeed, were hanging on to a thin strip of shore by their very teeth. It became more apparent with each new attempt that the difficulties before the attackers in the Gallipoli Peninsula were far beyond anything that had been conceived.
In speaking of his failure to reach Krithia, Sir Ian Hamilton said:
"Had it been possible to push in reenforcements in men, artillery and munitions during the day, April 27, Krithia should have fallen, and much subsequent fighting for its capture would have been avoided.
"Two days later this would have been feasible, but I had to reckon with the certainty that the enemy would, in that same time, have received proportionately greater support. I was faced by the usual choice of evils, and although the result was not what I had hoped, I have no reason to believe that hesitation and delay would better have answered my purpose."[Back to Contents]
KRITHIA AGAIN ATTACKED—HEROIC WORK OF "ANZACS"
On April 28, 1915, Sir Ian Hamilton decided to send reenforcements in force to Anzac Cove. Despite the constant landing of fresh troops there the Australians and New Zealanders, because of their heavy losses and the increasing pressure of the Turkish attacks, had been almost continually in the firing line.They had been able to enjoy little or no rest or sleep, and things began to look serious. Accordingly four battalions of the Royal Naval Division were sent to General Birdwood. On the following day two more naval battalions were landed and as well a company of the Motor Maxim Section.
These fresh units moved into the Anzac trenches and held them against renewed Turkish attacks. Meanwhile the Australian and New Zealand battalions were being reorganized behind the line and after three and a half days' rest took their places again in the front-line trenches.
From the evening of the 27th of April until May 1 there was comparative quiet on what might be called the Krithia front, at the tip of the peninsula. Fresh forces were landed by the French and the English, the latter bringing into line the Twenty-ninth Indian Infantry Brigade. Heavy artillery was brought ashore and moved up to positions inland, and the whole organization of the allied force was re-formed and strengthened.
At 10 p. m. on the evening of May 1 opened what is known as the first battle of Krithia. It was elaborately organized by the German staff of the Turkish forces and took the allied troops by surprise. Indeed, the first line of the attacking force, creeping up on its hands and knees, got into the trenches of the Eighty-sixth Brigade and bayoneting most of the defenders opened up what Sir Ian Hamilton subsequently described as "an ugly gap." Thanks to the fine conduct of some territorial units, however, the Turks were not able to press home this temporary advantage and the hole was soon closed.
Along the rest of the British front the attack of the Turks was not serious. Instead they concentrated on the left of the French line, held by a Senegalese brigade. After several attacks the African troops began to give way. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, the two companies of the Worcesters moved across from the British right and saved the day. Some hours later, the extreme French right was hard pressed, and it was necessary to bring up a battalion of the Royal Naval Division from the reserves to strengthen it.
The following morning, the allied troops moved out of their trenches in a counterattack. It at first met with great success. As Sir Ian Hamilton wrote in his dispatch to London: "Had it not been for those inventions of the devil—machine guns and barbed wire—which suit the Turkish character and tactics to perfection, we should not have stopped short of the crest of Achi Baba."
By 7.30 in the morning the British left had advanced more than 500 yards, while the center and the right and the French left had also registered promising advances. The rest of the French line, however, was held up by strong Turkish forces posted along the Kereves Dere and the more advanced sections of the British left came under heavy cross-fire. In the end it was necessary to relinquish all the ground gained and to retire to the original trenches.
Although the Turks made night attacks against the French line on May 2 and 3, 1915, and in the end inflicted such heavy losses that it was necessary to shorten the line held by General d'Amade's troops, it was not until May 6, 1915, that heavy fighting occurred again along the whole line. On May 5 the Lancashire Fusilier Brigade of the East Lancashire Territorial Division, which had been training in Egypt, arrived and was placed in reserve, behind the British left.
At this time it was calculated that the British total losses, killed, wounded and missing since the initial operations of the landing, had been just short of 14,000 men. This of course did not include the sick who must have numbered 10,000 or the French losses, which were not revealed. These were heavy and serious and more than counterbalanced the reenforcements that had arrived.
Sir Ian Hamilton decided to make a fresh attempt against Krithia and Achi Baba on May 6, 1915. This battle was important because it marked the turning point in the character of the campaign carried on by the allied troops in Gallipoli. Although an advance was registered none of the main positions of the Ottoman troops were carried or even reached, and it became apparent that the task of reducing the Dardanelles was not onelikely to be solved by rush frontal attacks. Rather, as in other fields of the world war, the problem became one of siege tactics, and from the date of the end of this second battle of Krithia the operations in Gallipoli resolved themselves into variations of the methods that were being forced upon the troops of all the belligerent countries in Europe.
For his grand attack upon Krithia and Achi Baba, Sir Ian Hamilton brought down from Anzac Cove the Second Australian Infantry Brigade and the New Zealand Brigade. With two brigades of the Royal Naval Reserve he formed them into a reserve division. The Twenty-ninth Division held the British line, and was ordered forward about 11 a. m. of May 6, 1915, with orders to go as far as Krithia if possible, but at all events to seize as much of the ground around that point as possible. At the same time the French corps were to attempt to wrest from the Turks the crest above the Kereves Dere.
The advance was extremely slow. At the end of two hours the Twenty-ninth Division had progressed less than three hundred yards and had not yet come into touch with any of the main Turkish positions. Three hours more of desperate fighting showed many fluctuations but no more progress. Finally they were ordered to intrench where they were for the night.
The French had succeeded in reaching the crest aimed at, but found it by no means a comfortable position. They could not go forward and they dared not go back. Yet they were subject to a raking fire that cost them hundreds of casualties. Time and time again the Senegalese troops were sent against the Turkish trenches and machine gun positions, but each time they were beaten back with cruel losses. To make matters even worse, the French could not, in the heavy fire maintained by the Turks, intrench until after nightfall, and they had to spend hours in the exposed position.