THAW AND SPRING FLOODS
With the coming of thaw and the resulting spring floods roads along the eastern front, not any too good under the most favorable climatic conditions, had become little else than rivers of mud. Many of them, it is true, had been considerably improved during the long winter months, especially on the German-Austrian side of the line. But in many instances this improvement consisted simply of covering them with planks in order to make it possible to move transports without having wheels sink into the mud up to the axles. When the creeks and rivers along the line were now suddenly transformed by the melting snows into streams and torrents, much of this improvement was carried away and many roads not only sank back into their former impossible state, but, becoming thoroughly soaked and saturated with water in many places became impassable even for infantry. Movements of large masses soon were out of the question. To shift artillery, especially of the heavier kind, as quickly as an offensive movement required, and to keep both guns and men sufficiently supplied with munitions, were out of the question. The natural result, therefore, of these conditions was the prompt cessation of the Russian offensive which had been started in March, 1916, just before the breaking up of a severe winter.
However, this did not mean everywhere a return to the trench warfare, such as had been carried on all winter, although in many parts of the front activities on both sides amounted to little more. At other points, however, offensive movements were kept up,even if they were restricted in extent and force. Throughout the months of April and May, 1916, no important changes took place anywhere on the eastern front. A great deal of the fighting, almost all, indeed, was the result of clashes between scouting detachments or else simply a struggle for the possession of the most advantageous points, involving in most instances only a trench here or another trench there, and always comparatively small numbers of soldiers.
Though the story of this series of minor engagements as it can be constructed from official reports and other sources offers few thrills and is lacking entirely in the sensational accomplishments which mark movements of greater extent and importance, this is due chiefly to the fact that few details become known about fighting of only local character. In spite of this it must be borne in mind that all of this fighting was of the most determined kind, was done under conditions requiring the greatest amount of endurance and courage, and resulted in innumerable individual heroic deeds, which, just because they were individual, almost always remained unknown to the outside world.
On April 1, 1916, a German attack against the bridgehead at Uxkull was repulsed by Russian artillery. Farther south, in the Dvinsk sector German positions were subjected to strong artillery bombardment at many points, especially at Mechkele, and just north of Vidzy. On the following day, April 2, 1916, fighting again took place in the Uxkull region. Mines were exploded near Novo Selki, south of Krevo, a town just south of the Viliya River. The Germans launched an attack north of the Baranovitchy railway station. This is the strategically important village through which both the Vilna-Rovno and the Minsk-Brest-Litovsk railways pass and around which a great deal of fighting had taken place in the past. Even though this attack was extensively supported by aeroplanes, which bombarded a number of railway stations on that part of the Minsk-Baranovitchy railway which was in the hands of the Russians, it was repulsed by the Russians.
April 3, 1916, brought a renewal of the German attacks against the Uxkull bridgehead. For over an hour and a halfartillery of both heavy and light caliber prepared the way for this attack. But again the Russian lines held and the Germans had to desist. Before Dvinsk and to the south of the fortress artillery duels inflicted considerable damage without affecting the positions on either side. Just north of the Oginski Canal German troops crossed the Shara River and attacked the Russian positions west of the Vilna-Rovno railway, without being able to gain ground. All along the line aircraft were busily engaged in reconnoitering and in dropping bombs on railway stations.
The bombardment of the Uxkull region was again taken up on April 4, 1916, by the German artillery. South of Dvinsk, before the village of Malogolska, the German troops had to evacuate their first-line of trenches when the arising floods of neighboring rivers inundated them. German aeroplanes bombarded the town of Luchonitchy on the Vilna-Rovno railway, just southeast of Baranovitchy.
By April 5, 1916, the German artillery fire before Uxkull had spread to Riga and Jacobstadt, as well as to many points in the Dvinsk sector. Floods were still rising everywhere and the ice on the Dvina began to break up.
Again on April 7, 1916, the German guns thundered against the Russian front from Riga down to Dvinsk. Lake Narotch, where so many battles had already been fought, again was the scene of a Russian attack which resulted in the gain of a few advanced German positions. The next day the Germans promptly replied with a determined artillery attack which regained for their side some of the points lost the previous day. Artillery duels also were staged near Postavy, in the Jacobstadt sector, and at the northernmost end of the line where the German guns bombarded the city of Schlock.
All day on April 9, 1916, the guns of all calibers kept up their death-dealing work along the entire Dvina front, and in the Lake district south of Dvinsk. The railway stations at Remershaf and Dvinsk were bombarded by German aeroplanes, while other units of their aircraft visited the Russian lines along the Oginski Canal. Both on April 11 and 12, 1916, artillery activityon the Dvina was maintained. A German infantry attack against the Uxkull bridgehead, launched on the 11th, failed.
By this time the ice had all broken up and the floods had stopped rising. In the Pinsk Marshes considerable activity developed on both sides by means of boats. A vivid picture of conditions as they existed at this time in the Pripet Marshes may be formed from the following description from the pen of a special correspondent on the staff of the Russian paper "Russkoye Slovo":
"The marshes," he writes, "have awakened from their winter sleep. Even on the paved roads movement is all but impossible; to the right and left everything is submerged. The small river S——en has become enormously broad; its shores are lost in the distance.
"The marshes have awakened, and are taking their revenge on man for having disturbed the ordinary life of Poliessie. But however difficult the operation, the war must be continued and material obstacles must be overcome. Owing to the enormous area covered by water the inhabitants have taken to boat building. Sentries and patrols move in boats, reconnoitering parties travel in boats, fire on the enemy from boats, and escape in boats from the attentions of the German heavy guns.
"The great marshy basin of the S——en and the P—— is full of new boats, which are called 'baidaka.' These 'baidaka' are small, constructed to hold three or four men. The boats are flat-bottomed and steady. The scouts take the 'baidaka' on their shoulders, and as soon as they come to deep water launch their craft and row to the other side. Small oars or paddles are used, and punting operations are often necessary.
"On the S——en these boats move with great secrecy in the night; in the daytime they are hidden in rushes and reeds.
"It was a foggy day when we decided on making a voyage in a 'baidaka.' 'The Germans came very suddenly to this place,' said one of my companions. 'Our soldiers are concealed everywhere.' We decided to row near the forest, so that in case of necessity we might gain the shelter of the trees. The silence was broken by occasional rifle reports from the direction ofPinsk, and a big gun roared now and then. Once a shell flew overhead, hissing as it went. But this was very ordinary music to us.
"I was more interested in the intense silence of the marsh, for I knew that all this silence was false. Our secret posts abounded, and perhaps German scouts were in the vicinity. The marsh was full of men in hiding, and the waiting for a chance shot was more terrible than a continuous cannonade. Our sentinels fired twice close by; we did not know why. The shots resounded in the forest. We lay down in our boat and hid our heads. It was difficult for us to advance through the undergrowth as the spaces between the bushes were generally very narrow. We could not row, and we had to punt with our oars.
"We advanced in this fashion half an hour. Then we reached a lakelike expanse clear of growth. 'This is the river S——en,' I was further informed. 'The Germans are on the other side.'
"I could not see where the 'other side' was. The water spread to the horizon and ended only in the purple border of the forest. 'We must be quiet here,' one whispered. The boat moved along the river without a splash, and strange, unaccustomed outlines grew up as we proceeded. 'What place is that yonder?' I asked my neighbor. 'Pinsk,' he replied. I felt excited; we were near a town that was occupied by the Germans, and I wished that boat would turn back.
"We got into the rushes and moved through the jungle as though we were advancing in open water, for the path through the rushes had been prepared in the autumn. We advanced in this manner forty minutes until we could distinctly hear the whistling of steam engines and the bells ringing in the monastery at Pinsk. It was evident that the monks had remained. 'The kaiser himself was in Pinsk in November,' said one of my companions, 'and we knew it. The Germans blew horns all over the railway line and sang their national hymn. In Pinsk there was much animation.'
"A minute or two later the boat stopped and I was told it was dangerous to go farther. On the right we could see the outlinesof houses and of the quay at Pinsk, only about a thousand paces distant. The town was covered by a thin mist and a faint fog was rising from the marsh.
"'There on your left are their heavy guns.' I could see nothing except some trenches near the quay.
"We took our leave of Pinsk. The twilight had arrived and it was necessary to retire."
Though the ice on the rivers and lakes had well broken up by the middle of April, thaw, of course, steadily increased, and with it the volume of water carried by the creeks and rivers. More and more difficult it became, therefore, to carry out military operations, and, as a result of these conditions, they were especially limited at this period.
In spite of this the Russians attempted local advance on April 13, 1916, in the region of Garbunovka, northwest of Dvinsk and south of Lake Narotch; however, though their losses were quite heavy, they could not gain any ground. This was also true of another local attack made against the army of Prince Leopold of Bavaria near Zirin, on the Servetsch River northeast of Baranovitchy. Similarly unsuccessful were German attacks made the same day between Lakes Sventen and Itzen. German artillery still kept up its work along the entire front, especially at Lake Miadziol, south of Dvinsk at Lake Narotch, and at Smorgon, the little railroad station south of the Viliya River on the Vilna-Minsk railway.
On the following day, April 14, 1916, the Russians repeated their efforts in the Servetsch region. After strong artillery preparation they launched another attack near Zirin, and southeast of Kovelitchy, but were again repulsed. The same fate was suffered by an attack attempted northwest of Dvinsk. South of Garbunovka, however, they registered a slight local success. After cutting down four lines of barbed-wire obstacles that had been erected by the Germans, they stormed and occupied two small hills west and south of this village. This gain was maintained in the face of strongly concentrated artillery and rifle fire, and repeated German counterattacks, which later proved very sanguinary to the German troops. German artilleryagain directed violent fire against the Russian positions between Lake Narotch and Lake Miadziol and near Smorgon. A German attack made northwest of the latter village broke down under Russian gunfire.
At this point the Germans resumed their offensive at daybreak on April 15, 1916, after strong artillery preparation accompanied by the use of asphyxiating gas. Concentrated fire from the Russian artillery, however, prohibited any noticeable advance. During the following day, April 16, 1916, both sides restricted themselves more or less to artillery bombardments, which became especially violent on the Dvina line, around the Uxkull bridgehead, and in the neighborhood of the Russian positions south of the village of Garbunovka, as well as between Lake Narotch and Lake Miadziol.
Two days later, on April 18, 1916, German detachments temporarily regained some of the ground lost about a week before south of Garbunovka. Again on that day the guns on both sides roared along the entire northern sector of the eastern front. On the 19th the bombardment became especially intense at the bridgehead at Uxkull and south of lake.
The artillery attack against the former was maintained throughout the following two days. German scouting parties which crossed the river Shara, north of the Oginski Canal, on April 22, 1916, were surrounded in the woods adjoining and practically annihilated. On the same day a German squadron of ten aeroplanes bombarded the Russian hangars on the island of Oesel, a small island in the Baltic across the entrance to the Gulf of Riga.
As if both sides had agreed to observe the Easter holidays, a lull set in during the next four or five days. Only occasional unimportant local attacks and artillery duels were reported. Aeroplanes were the only branch of the two armies which showed any marked activity. Dvinsk was visited repeatedly by German machines and extensively bombarded. On April 26, 1916, a German airship dropped bombs on the railway station at Duna-Muende, at the mouth of the Dvina, and caused considerable damage. Other railway stations and warehouses atvarious points, as well as a number of Russian flying depots, were attacked on April 27, 1916.
The end of April, 1916, brought one more important action, the most important, indeed, which had occurred anywhere on the eastern front since the Russian offensive of the latter half of March, 1916. On April 28, 1916, at dawn, German artillery began a very violent bombardment of the Russian positions south of Lake Narotch. There, between the village of Stavarotche and the extensive private estate of Stakhovtsy, the Germans had lost a series of important trenches on March 20, 1916, during the early part of the short Russian offensive. Part of these positions had been recaptured a few days later on March 26, 1916. Now, after a considerable artillery preparation, a strong attack was launched with the balance of the lost ground as an objective. Large bodies of German infantry came on against the Russian positions in close formation. They recaptured not only all of the ground lost previously but carried their attack successfully into the Russian trenches beyond. The most fierce hand-to-hand fighting resulted. Losses on both sides were severe, especially so on the part of the Russians, who attempted unsuccessfully during the night following to regain the lost positions by a series of violent counterattacks, executed by large forces of infantry, who, advancing in close formation over difficult ground, were terribly exposed to German machine-gun fire and lost heavily in killed and wounded. The Germans officially claimed to have captured as a result of this operation the remarkably large number of fifty-six officers, 5,600 men, five guns, twenty-eight machine guns and ten trench mortars. During the same day artillery attacks were directed against Schlock on the Gulf of Riga and Boersemnende near Riga, as well as against Smorgon, south of the Lake district. An infantry attack, preceded by considerable artillery preparation, near the village of Ginovka, west of Dvinsk, was met by severe fire from the Russian batteries and the Germans were forced to withdraw to their trenches. In the early morning hours German airships bombarded railway stations along the Riga-Petrograd railroad as far as Venden, about fifty miles northeast of Riga, and alongthe Dvinsk-Petrograd railway as far as Rzezytsa, about fifty miles northeast of Dvinsk. At the latter point considerable damage was done by a dirigible which dropped explosive and incendiary bombs.
Throughout the last day of April, 1916, artillery duels were fought again at many points. Once more the railway station and bridgehead at Uxkull was made the target for a most violent German artillery attack. Along the Dvinsk sector, too, guns of all caliber were busy.[Back to Contents]
ARTILLERY DUELS
With the beginning of May, the weather became warmer and the rain and watersoaked roads more accessible. In spite of this, however, conditions along the eastern front throughout the entire month of May were very much the same as during April. Continuously the guns on both sides thundered against each other, with a fairly well-maintained intensity which, however, would increase from time to time in some places. Frequently, almost daily, infantry attacks, usually preceded by artillery preparation, would be launched at various points. These, however, were almost all of local character and executed by comparatively small forces. Even smaller detachments, frequently hardly more than scouting parties, often would reach the opponent's lines, but only rarely succeed in capturing trenches, and then usually were soon forced to retire to their own lines in the face of successive counterattacks. Again in May the story of events on the eastern front is lacking in sensational movements, accompanied by equally unsensational success or failure. But, nevertheless, it is on both sides a story of unceasing activity, of unending labor, of unremitting toil, of endless suffering, of unlimited heroism, and of unsurpassed courage, the more so, because much of all that was accomplishedwas counted only as part of the regular daily routine, and lacked both the incentive and the reward of widespread publicity, which more frequently attaches to military operations of more extensive character. Not for years to come will it be possible to write a detailed history of this phase of the Great War as far as the eastern front is concerned. Not until the regimental histories of the various Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian military units will have been completed will it become practicable to recount all the uncounted deeds of valor accomplished by heroes whose names and deeds now must remain unknown to the world at large, even though both perchance have been for months and months on the lips of equally brave comrades in arms.
The new month was opened by the Germans with another intensive artillery bombardment of the Uxkull bridgehead. Farther to the south, before Dvinsk, and also at many points in the Lake district to the south of this fortress, the Russian positions likewise were raked by violent gunfire. An attempted offensive movement on the extreme northern end of the line before Raggazem, on the Gulf of Riga, broke down before the Russian gunfire, even before it was fully developed. German naval airships successfully bombarded Russian military depots at Perman, while another squadron of sea planes inflicted considerable damage to the Russian aerodrome at Papenholm. A Russian squadron was less successful in an attack on the German naval establishment at Vindau on the east shore of the Baltic Sea.
May 2, 1916, brought a continuation of artillery activity at many points. It was especially intensive in the Jacobstadt and Dvinsk sectors of the Dvina front, as well as in the Ziriu-Baranovitchy sector in the south and along the Oginski Canal, still farther to the south. At two other points the Germans, after extensive artillery preparation, attempted to launch infantry attacks, but were promptly driven back. This occurred near the village of Antony, ten miles northwest of Postavy, where two successive attacks failed, and farther north in the region east of Vidzy.
The following day again was devoted to artillery duels at many points. Aeroplanes, also, became more active. German planes bombarded many places south of Dvinsk, and attacked the railway establishments at Molodetchna, on the Vilna-Minsk railway, at Minsk, and at Luniniets, in the Pripet Marshes, east of Pinsk on the Pinsk-Gomel railway. May 4, 1916, brought especially intensive artillery fire along the entire Dvina front, in the Krevo sector south of the Vilna-Minsk railway, and along the Oginski Canal, particularly in the region of Valistchie.
The Dvina front along its entire length was once more the subject of a violent artillery attack from German batteries on May 5, 1916. Uxkull, so many times before the aim of the German fire, again received special attention. The Friedrichstadt sector, too, came in for its share. All along this front aeroplanes not only guided the gunfire, but supported it extensively by dropping bombs. Between Jacobstadt and Dvinsk a Russian battery succeeded in reaching a German munition depot and with one well-placed hit caused havoc among men and munitions. Southeast of Lake Med a surprise attack, carried out by comparatively small Russian forces, resulted in the capture of some German trenches. Northwest of Krochin strong German forces, after artillery preparation lasting over three hours, attacked the village of Dubrovka. Some ground was gained, only to be lost again shortly after as a result of a ferocious counterattack made by Russian reenforcements which had been brought up quickly.
May 6, 1916, brought a slightly new variation in fighting. Russian torpedo boats appeared in the Gulf of Riga, off the west coast, and bombarded, without success, the two towns of Rojen and Margrafen. Artillery fire of considerable violence marked the next day, May 7, 1916. Russian batteries before Dvinsk caused a fire at Ill, the little town just northwest of Dvinsk on the Dvinsk-Ponevesh railway, and so well was this bombardment maintained that the Germans were unable to extinguish the conflagration before it had reached some of their munition depots. In the early morning hours very violent gunfire was directed south of Illuxt. But an infantry attack, for which thisbombardment was to act as preparation, failed. Other bombardments were directed against Lake Ilsen and the sector north of it, and against the region south of the village of Vishnieff on the Beresina River. Mining operations of considerable extent were carried out that night near the village of Novo Selki, south of the town of Krevo. On May 8, 1916, artillery fire again roared along the Dvina front, especially against the Uxkull bridgehead. An attack in force was made by German troops against the village of Peraplianka north of Smorgon on the Viliya May 9, 1916. After considerable artillery preparation the Germans rushed up against the Russian barbed-wire obstacles. There, however, they were stopped by concentrated artillery and rifle fire and, after heavy losses, had to withdraw. A Russian attack of a similar nature south of Garbunovka was not any more successful. In the Pripet Marshes, too, artillery operations had by now become possible again and the Russian positions west of the village of Pleshichitsa, southeast of Pinsk, were subjected to a violent bombardment.
Throughout the balance of May not a day passed during which guns of all calibers did not maintain a violent bombardment at many points along the entire front. Especially frequent and severe was the gunfire which the Germans directed against the Dvina sector of the Russian positions. But, just as in the past weeks, the result, though not at all negligible as far as the damage inflicted on men, material, and fortifications was concerned, was practically nil in regard to any change in the location of the front.
Infantry attacks during this period were not lacking, though they were less frequent than artillery bombardments, and were at all times only of local character, and in most cases executed with limited forces. A great deal of this kind of fighting occurred in the region of Olyka where engagements took place almost every day. One of the few more important events was a German attack against the Jacobstadt sector of the Dvina front. For two days, May 10 and 11, 1916, the fighting continued, becoming especially violent to the north of the railway station of Selburg on the Mitau-Kreutzburg railway. Therevery heavy artillery fire succeeding the infantry attacks had destroyed some small villages for the possession of which the most furious kind of hand-to-hand fighting ensued. Finally the Germans captured by storm about 500 yards of the Russian positions as well as some 300 unwounded soldiers and a few machine guns and mine throwers.
Engagements of a similar character, though not always yielding such definite results to either side, occurred on May 11, 1916, southwest of Lake Medum, on May 12, 1916, at many points along the Oginski Canal and also in the Pripet Marshes, where fighting now had again become a physical possibility. On the latter day a Russian attempt to recapture the positions lost previously near Selburg failed.
Thus the fortunes of war swayed from side to side. One day would bring to the Germans the gain of a trench, the capture of a few hundred men or guns, or the destruction of an enemy battery, to be followed the next day by a proportionate loss. So closely was the entire line guarded, so strongly and elaborately had the trenches and other fortifications been built up, that the fighting developed into a multitude of very short but closely contested engagements. In each one of these the numbers engaged were very small, though the grand total of men fighting on a given day at so many separate points on a front of some 500 miles was, of course, still immense.
Amongst the places which saw the most fighting during this period were many which had been mentioned a great many times before. Again and again there appeared in the official records such names as: Lake Sventen, Krevno, Lake Miadziol, Ostroff, Lake Narotch, Smorgon, Dahlen Island, and many others.
The net result of all the fighting during May, 1916, was that both sides lost considerable in men and material. Both Russians and Germans, however, had succeeded in maintaining their respective lines in practically the same position in which they had been at the beginning of May.[Back to Contents]
THE GREAT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE
During the first two days of June, 1916, a lull occurred at almost all important points of the eastern front. Only one or two engagements of extremely minor importance between scouting parties were reported. In the light of future events this remarkable condition might well be called ominous, especially if one connects with it a decided increase in Russian aeroplane activity, which resulted in two strong attacks on June 1, 1916, against points on the Vilna-Minsk and Sarny-Kovel railways.
On June 2, 1916, a more or less surprising increase in the strength of the Russian artillery fire was noticed, especially along the Bessarabian and Volhynian fronts and in the Ikva sector. So strong did this fire become that the official Austrian statement covering that day says that at several places the artillery duels "assumed the character of artillery battles."
More and more the extent and violence of the Russian artillery attack increased. The next day, June 3, 1916, Russian artillery displayed the greatest activity all along the southern half of the eastern front, and covered the Dniester, Strypa, and Ikva sectors, as well as the gap between the last two rivers, northwest of Tarnopol, and the entire Volhynian front. Near Olyka in the region of the three Volhynian fortresses of Rovno, Dubno, and Lutsk, the Russian gunfire was especially intense along a front of about seventeen miles. That this unusually strong artillery activity increased the alarm of the Austro-Hungarian commanders may readily be seen from the concluding sentence of that day's official Austrian statement, which read: "Everywhere there are signs of an impending infantry attack."
The storm began to break the next day, June 4, 1916. That it was entirely unexpected, was not likely, for this new Russian offensive coincided with the Austro-Hungarian offensive againstthe Italian front which by that time had assumed threatening developments. Undoubtedly it was one of the objects of the Russian offensive to force the Austrians to withdraw troops from the Italian front and at least curtail their offensive efforts against the Italian armies, if not to stop them entirely. At the same time the limits within which the Russian offensive was undertaken indicated that the Russian General Staff had another much more important object in view, the breaking of the German-Austrian front at about the point where the German right touched the Austrian left. Along a front of over 300 miles the Russian forces attacked. From the Pinth in the south—at the Rumanian border to the outrunners of the Pripet Marshes—near Kolki and the bend of the Styr—in the north the battle raged. At many points along this line the Russians achieved important successes, with unusual swiftness they were pushing whatever advantage they were able to gain. But not only swiftness did they employ. Immense masses of men were thrown against the strongly fortified Austrian lines and quantities of munitions of the Russian artillery which transcended everything that had ever been done along this line on the eastern front. Not against one or two points chosen for that particular purpose, but against every important point on the entire line the Russian attacks were hurled. The most bitter struggle developed at Okna, northwest of Tarnopol, at Koklow, at Novo Alexinez, along the entire Ikva, at Sanor, around Olyka and from there north to Dolki. No matter how strong the natural defenses, no matter how skillful the artificial obstacles, on and on rolled the thousands and thousands of Russians. So overwhelming was this onrush that the Austro-Hungarians had to give way in many places in spite of the most valiant resistance, and so quick did it come that as a result of the first day's work the Russians could claim to have captured 13,000 prisoners, many guns and machine guns.
By June 5, 1916, this number had increased to 480 officers, 25,000 men, twenty-seven guns and fifty machine guns. The battle on the northeast front continued on the whole front of 218 miles with undiminished stubbornness. North of Okna,the Austrians had, after stiff and fluctuating battles, to withdraw their shattered first positions to the line prepared three miles to the south. Near Jarlowiec, on the lower Strypa, the Russians attacked after artillery preparation. They were repulsed at some places by hand fighting. At the same time a strong Russian attack west of Trembowla (south of Tarnopol) broke down under Austrian fire. West-northwest of Tarnopol there was bitter fighting. Near Sopanow (southeast of Dubno) there were numerous attacks by the enemy. Between Mlynow, on the Ikva, and the regions northwest of Olyka, the Russians were continually becoming stronger, and the most bitter kind of fighting developed.
Especially heavy fighting developed in the region before Lutsk. There the pressure from the Russian army of General Brussilov had become so strong that the Austrians had found it necessary by June 6, 1916, to withdraw their forces to the plain of Lutsk, just to the east of that fortress and of the river Styr. This represented a gain of at least twenty miles made in two days. The official Russian statement of that day claimed that during the same period General Brussilov's armies had captured 900 officers, more than 40,000 rank and file, seventy-seven guns, 134 machine guns and forty-nine trench mortars, and, in addition, searchlights, telephone, field kitchens, a large quantity of arms and war material, and great reserves of ammunition.
On the other hand, the Austrians were still offering a determined resistance at most points south and north of Lutsk, and Russian attacks were repulsed with sanguinary losses at many places, as for instance at Rafalowka, on the lower Styr, near Berestiany, on the Corzin Brook, near Saponow, on the upper Strypa, near Jazlovice, on the Dniester, and on the Bessarabian frontier. Northwest of Tarnopol were repulsed two attacks. At another point seven attacks were repulsed.
The Russians also suffered heavy losses in the plains of Okna (north of the Bessarabian frontier) and at Debronoutz, where there were bitter hand-to-hand engagements.
The Russian Offensive from Pinsk to Dubno.
The Russian Offensive from Pinsk to Dubno.
It was quite clear by this time that the Russian offensive threatened not only the pushing back of the Austrian line, buttheir very existence. Unless the Austrians either succeeded in repulsing the Russians decidedly or else found some other way of reducing immediately the strength of this extensive offensive movement, it was inevitable that many of the important conquests which the Central Powers had made in the fall of 1915 would be lost again. In spite of this and in spite of the quite apparent strength of the Russian forces, it caused considerable surprise when it was announced officially on June 8, 1916, that the fortress of Lutsk had been captured by the Russians on June 7, 1916.
The fortress lies halfway between Rovno and Kovel, on the important railway line that runs from Brest-Litovsk to the region southwest of Kiev. It is this railway sector, between Rovno and Kovel, that has been the objective of the Russian attacks ever since the Teuton offensive came to a standstill eight months ago, for its control would give the Russians a free hand to operate southward against the lines in Galicia.
An Austrian 30.5 centimeter mortar in position. The gunner is ready and the officer is just giving the command to fire. Meanwhile, another great 12-inch shell is being brought up for the next loading.
Lutsk is a minor fortress, the most westerly of the Volhynian triangle formed by Rovno, Dubno, and Lutsk. The town is the center of an important grain trade, and the districts of which it is the center contained before the war a considerable German colony. It is supposed to have been founded in the seventh century. In 1791 it was taken by Russia. It is the seat of a Roman Catholic bishop and at the outbreak of the war had a population of about 18,000. During the war it suffered a varied fate. On September 1, 1915, it was captured by the combined German and Austro-Hungarian forces which had accomplished a month before the capture of Warsaw and had forced the Russian legions to a full retreat. Twenty-three days later it was evacuated by the forces of the Central Powers and recaptured by the Russians on September 24, 1915. Four days later, September 28, 1915, the Russians were forced to withdraw again, and on October 1, 1915, it fell once more into the hands of the Austrians. During the winter the Russians had made a dash for its recapture, but had not succeeded, and ever since the front had been along a line about twenty miles to the east. The capture of the fortress was due primarily to the immensity of theRussian artillery, which maintained a violent, continuous fire, smashing the successive rows of wire entanglements, breastworks, and trenches. The town was surrounded with nineteen rows of entanglements. The laconic order to attack was given at dawn on June 7, 1916. Up to noon the issue hung in the balance, but at 1 o'clock the Russians made a breach in the enemy's position near the village of Podgauzy. They repulsed a fierce Austrian counterattack and captured 3,000 prisoners and many guns. Almost simultaneously another Russian force advanced on Lutsk along the Dubno and stormed the trenches of the village of Krupov, taking several thousand prisoners. General Brussilov seemed to have at his disposal an immense infantry force, which he sent forward in rapid, successive waves after artillery preparation. Reserves were brought up so quickly that the enemy was given no time to recover from one assault before another was delivered.
Fifty-eight officers, 11,000 men and large quantities of guns, machine guns, and ammunition fell in the hands of the victorious Russian armies. On the same day on which Lutsk was captured other forces stormed strong Austrian positions on the lower Strypa in Galicia between Trybuchovice and Jazlovice and crossed both the Ikva and the Styr. Along the northern part of the front, north of the Pripet River, comparative quiet reigned throughout the early stages of the Russian offensive. During the evening of June 7, 1916, however, German artillery violently bombarded the region northeast of Krevo and south of Smorgon, southeast of Vilna. The bombardment soon extended farther north, and during the night of June 8, 1916, the Germans took the offensive there with considerable forces.
In the neighborhood of Molodetchna station (farther east) on the Vilna-Minsk railway, a German aeroplane dropped four bombs.
Five German aeroplanes carried out a raid on the small town of Jogishin, north of Pinsk, dropping about fifty bombs.
The battle in Volhynia and Galicia continued with undiminished force on June 8, 1916. Near Sussk, to the east of Lutsk, a squadron of Cossacks attacked the enemy behind his fortifiedlines, capturing two guns, eight ammunition wagons, and 200 boxes of ammunition.
Near Boritin, four miles southeast of Lutsk, Russian scouts captured two 4-inch guns, with four officers and 160 men. A 4-inch gun and thirty-five ammunition wagons were captured, near Dobriatin on the Ikva below Mlynow, fourteen miles southeast of Lutsk.
Young troops, just arrived at the front, vied with seasoned Russian regiments in deeds of valor. Some regiments formed of Territorial elements by an impetuous attack drove back the Austrians on the Styr, and pressing close on their heels forced the bridgehead near Rozhishche, thirteen miles north of Lutsk, at the same time taking about 2,500 German and Austrian prisoners, as well as machine guns and much other booty. Other regiments forced a crossing over the Strypa and some advanced detachments even reached the next river, the Zlota Potok, about five miles to the west.
The number of prisoners captured by the Russians continually increased. Exclusive of those already reported—namely, 958 officers, and more than 51,000 Austrian and German soldiers, they captured in the course of the fighting on June 8, 1916, 185 officers and 13,714 men, making the totals so far registered in the present operations 1,143 officers and 64,714 men.
The next day, June 9, 1916, the troops under General Brussilov continued the offensive and the pursuit of the retreating Austrians. Fighting with the latter's rear guards, they crossed the river Styr above and below Lutsk.
In Galicia, northwest of Tarnopol, in the regions of Gliadki and Cebrow, heavy fighting developed for the possession of heights, which changed hands several times. During that day's fighting the Russians captured again large numbers of Austrians, consisting of ninety-seven officers and 5,500 men and eleven guns, making a total up to the present of 1,240 officers and about 71,000 men, ninety-four guns, 167 machine guns, fifty-three mortars, and a large quantity of other war material.
At dawn of June 10, 1916, Russian troops entered Buczacz on the west bank of the Strypa and, developing the offensivealong the Dniester, carried the village of Scianka, eight miles west of the Strypa. In the village of Potok Zloty, four miles west of the Strypa, they seized a large artillery park and large quantities of shells.
In the north the Germans again attempted to relieve the pressure on their allies by attacking in force at many points. Artillery duels were fought along the Dvina front and on the Oginski Canal.
Without let up, however, the Russian advance continued. So furious and swift was the onslaught of the czar's armies that the Austrians lost thousands upon thousands of prisoners and vast masses of war material of every kind. For instance, in one sector alone the Austrians were forced to retreat so rapidly that the Russians were able to gather in, according to official reports, twenty-one searchlights, two supply trains, twenty-nine field kitchens, forty-seven machine guns, 193 tons of barbed wire, 1,000 concrete girders, 7,000,000 concrete cubes, 160 tons of coal, enormous stores of ammunition, and a great quantity of arms and other war material. In another sector they captured 30,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, 300 boxes of machine-gun ammunition, 200 boxes of hand grenades, 1,000 rifles in good condition, four machine guns, two optical range finders, and even a brand-new Norton well, a portable contrivance for the supply of drinking water.
The prisoners captured during June 10, 1916, comprised one general, 409 officers, and 35,100 soldiers. The material booty included thirty guns, thirteen machine guns, and five trench mortars. The total Russian captures in the course of about a week thus amount to one general, 1,649 officers, more than 106,000 soldiers, 124 guns of all sorts, 180 machine guns, and fifty-eight trench mortars.
This was now the seventh day of the new Russian offensive, and on it another valuable prize fell into the hands of General Brussilov, the town and fortress of Dubno. This brought his forces within twenty-five miles of the Galician border and put the czar's forces again in the possession of the Volhynian fortress triangle, consisting of Lutsk, Dubno, and Rovno.
Dubno, which had been in the hands of the Austrians since September 7, 1916, lies on the Rovno-Brody-Lemberg railway, and is about eighty-two miles from the Galician capital, Lemberg. The town has about 14,000 inhabitants, mostly Jews, engaged in the grain, tobacco, and brickmaking industry. It was in existence as early as the eleventh century.
So powerful was the Russian onrush on Dubno that the attackers swept westward apparently without meeting any resistance, for on the same day on which the fortress fell, some detachments crossed the Ikva. One part of these forces even swept as far westward as the region of the village of Demidovka, on the Mlynow-Berestetchko road, thirteen miles southwest of the Styr at Mlynow, compelling the enemy garrison of the Mlynow to surrender. Demidovka is twenty-five miles due west of Dubno. Thus the Russians have in Volhynia alone pushed the Austro-Hungarian lines back thirty-two miles.[Back to Contents]
THE RUSSIAN RECONQUEST OF THE BUKOWINA
Simultaneously with the drive in Volhynia, the extreme left wing of the Russian southern army under General Lechitsky forced the Austro-Hungarians to withdraw their whole line in the northeastern Bukowina, invaded the crownland with strong forces and advanced to within fourteen miles of the capital, Czernowitz. On the Strypa the Austrians had to fall back from their principal position north of Buczacz. In spite of the most desperate resistance and in the face of a violent flanking fire, and even curtain fire, and the explosions of whole sets of mines, General Lechitsky's troops captured the Austrian positions south of Dobronowce, fourteen miles northeast of Czernowitz. In that region alone the Russians claimed to have captured 18,000 soldiers, one general, 347 officers, and ten guns.Southeast of Zaleszcyki on the Dniester the Russians again were victorious and forced the withdrawal of the Austrian lines. Fourteen miles north of Czernowitz the Austrian troops tried to stem the tide by blowing up the railroad station of Jurkoutz. At the same time they made their first important counterattack in the Lutsk region. Making a sudden stand, after being driven over the river Styr, north of Lutsk, they turned on the Russians with the aid of German detachments rushed to them by General von Hindenburg, drove the Muscovite troops back over the Styr and took 1,508 prisoners, including eight officers. At other points, too, the Austrian resistance stiffened perceptibly, especially in the region of Torgovitsa, and on the Styr below Lutsk.
Dubno, a modern fortress, built, like Lutsk, mainly in support of Rovno, to ward off possible aggression, now supplied an excellent starting point for a Russian drive into the heart of Galicia. Proceeding on both sides of the Rovno-Dubno-Brody-Lemberg railway the Russians should be able to cover the eighty-two miles which still separates them from the Galician capital within a comparatively short time, provided that Austrian resistance in this region continues as weak as it has been up to date.
A greater danger than the capture of Lemberg was, however, presented by the Russian advance into the Bukowina. If these two Russian drives—to Lemberg and to Czernowitz—would prove successful the whole southeastern Austro-Hungarian army would find itself squeezed between two Russian armies, and its only escape would be into the difficult Carpathian Mountain passes, where the Russians, this time well equipped and greatly superior in numbers, could be expected to be more successful than in their first Carpathian campaign.
Still the Russian advance continued, although on June 11, 1916, there was a slight slowing down on account of extensive storms that prevailed along the southern part of the front.
In Galicia, in the region of the villages of Gliadki and Verobieyka, north of Tarnopol, the Austrians attacked repeatedly and furiously, but were repulsed on the morning of the 11th. Farther south, however, near the town of Bobulintze, on the Strypa, fifteen miles north of Buczacz, the Austro-Hungarians,strongly reenforced by Germans, scored a substantial success. They launched a furious counterattack, bringing the Russian assaults to a standstill and even forcing the Muscovite troops to retreat a short distance. According to the German War Office more than 1,300 Russian prisoners were taken.
Simultaneously with this partial relief in the south Field Marshal von Hindenburg began an attack at several points against the Russian right wing and part of the center. He penetrated the czar's lines at two points near Jacobstadt, halfway between Riga and Dvinsk, and at Kochany between Lake Narotch and Dvinsk. At the three other points, in the Riga zone, south of Lake Drisviaty and on the Lassjolda, his attacks broke down under the Russian fire.
Lemberg, Galicia's capital, was now threatened from three sides. Czernowitz, the capital of the Bukowina, was even in a more precarious position. It had been masked by the extreme left wing of the Russian armies and, unless some unexpected turn came to the assistance of the Austrians, its fall was sure to be only a matter of days, or possibly even of hours. All of southern Volhynia had been overrun by the Russians who were then, on the ninth day of their offensive, forty-two miles west of the point from where it had begun in that province.
Northwest of Rojitche, in northwestern Volhynia, after dislodging the Germans, General Brussilov on June 12, 1916, approached the river Stokhod. West of Lutsk he occupied Torchin and continued to press the enemy back.
On the Dniester sector and farther General Lechitsky's troops, having crossed the river after fighting, captured many fortified points and also the town of Zaleszcyky, twenty-five miles northwest of Czernowitz. The village of Jorodenka, ten miles farther, northwest of Zaleszcyky, also was captured.
On the Pruth sector, between Doyan and Niepokoloutz, the Russian troops approached the left bank of the river, near the bridgehead of Czernowitz.
The only point at which the Austrian line held was near Kolki in northern Volhynia, south of the Styr. There attempts by the Russians to cross that river failed and some 2,000 men werecaptured by the Austro-Hungarians. In the north Field Marshal von Hindenburg's efforts to divert the Russian activities in the south by a general offensive along the Dvina line had not developed beyond increased artillery bombardments which apparently exerted no influence on the movements of the Russian armies in Volhynia, Galicia and the Bukowina.
The only hopeful sign for the fate of the threatened Austro-Hungarian armies was the fact that the daily number of prisoners taken by the Russians gradually seemed to decrease, indicating that the Austrians found it possible by now, if not to withstand the Russian onslaught, at least to save the largest part of their armies. Even at that the Russian General Staff claimed to have captured by June 12, 1916, a total of 1,700 officers and 114,000 men. Inasmuch as it was estimated that the total Austrian forces on the southwestern front at the beginning of the operations were 670,000, of which, according to Russian claims, the losses cannot be less than 200,000, including an estimated 80,000 killed and wounded, the total losses now constituted 30 per cent of the enemy's effectives.
How the news of the continued Russian successes was received in the empire's capital and what, at that time, was expected as the immediate results of this remarkable drive, secondary only to the Austro-German drive of the summer and fall of 1915, are vividly described in the following letter, written from Petrograd on June 13, 1916, by a special correspondent of the London "Times":
"As the successive bulletins recording our unprecedented victories on the southwestern fronts come to hand, the pride and joy of the Russian people are becoming too great for adequate expression. There is an utter absence of noisy demonstrations. The whole nation realizes that the victory is the result of the combined efforts of all classes, which have given the soldiers abundant munitions, and of an admirable organization.
"The remarkable progress in training the reserves since the beginning of this year was primarily responsible for the enormous increase in the efficiency of our armies and the heightening of their morale. The strategy of our southwestern offensive hasbeen seconded by a remarkable improvement in the railways and communications. Last, but not least, it must be noted that the Russian high command long ago recognized that the essential condition of the overthrow of the Austro-German league, so far as this front is concerned, was the completion of the work of disintegration in the Austrian armies, in which Russia has already achieved such wonderful results. At the rate at which they are at present being exterminated it would require many weeks completely to exhaust the military resources of the Dual Empire and to turn the flank of the German position in Poland.
"The consensus of military opinion is inclined to the belief that the Germans will not venture to transfer large reenforcements to the Galician front, as it would require too much time and give the Allies a distinct advantage in other theaters. But as the Germans were obviously bound to do something to save the Austrian army, they are endeavoring to create a diversion north of the Pripet in various directions. The points selected for these efforts are almost equidistant on the right flank of the Riga front, near Jacobstadt, and south of Lake Drisviaty, where the enemy's maximum activity synchronized with General Lechitsky's greatest successes on the southern front....
"On the southwestern front all eyes are now focused on General Lechitsky's rapid advance on Zaleszcyky and Czernowitz. As the official reports show, the Austrians have already blown up a bridge across the Pruth at Mahala, thus indicating that they entertain scant hope of being able to hold Czernowitz, and they may even now be evacuating the city. General Lechitsky's gallant army, which some months ago stormed the important stronghold of Uscieszko on the Dniester, has performed prodigies of valor in its advance during the last few days. The precipitous banks of the Dniester had been converted into one continuous stronghold which appeared impregnable and last December defied all our efforts to overcome the enemy's resistance. In the first few days of the offensive we took one of the principal positions between Okna and Dobronowce, southeast of Zaleszcyky. Dobronowce and the surrounding mountains, which are thickly covered with forests, were regarded by the enemy as a reliable protectionagainst any advance on Czernowitz. The country beyond offers no such opportunities for defense.
"General Brussilov's operations on the flanks of the Austro-German army under Von Linsingen are proceeding with wonderful rapidity. All the efforts of German reenforcements to drive in a counterwedge at Kolki, Rozhishshe and Targowica, at the wings and apex of our Rovno salient, proved ineffectual. On the other hand, we have scored most important successes west of Dubno, capturing the highly important point of Demidovka, marking an advance of twenty miles to the west. Demidovka places us in command of the important forest region of Dubno, which, as its name indicates, is famous for its oak trees. These forests form a natural stronghold, of which the Ikva and the Styr may be compared to immense moats protecting it on two sides. The possession of this valuable base will enable General Brussilov to checkmate any further effort on the part of the enemy to counter our offensive at Targowica, which is situated fifteen miles to the north.
"The valiant troops of our Eighth Army, who have altogether advanced nearly thirty miles into the enemy's position in the direction of Kovel, will doubtless be in a position powerfully to assist the thrust of the troops beyond Tarnopol and join hands with them in the possible event of an advance on Lemberg."
On June 13, 1914, the progress of the Russian armies continued along the entire 250-mile front from the Pripet River to the Rumanian border. The capture of twenty officers, 6,000 men, six cannon, and ten machine guns brought the total, captured by the Russian troops, up to about 120,000 men, 1,720 officers, 130 cannon and 260 machine guns, besides immense quantities of material and munitions.
South of Kovel the Austrians, reenforced by German troops, offered the most determined resistance near the village of Zaturzi halfway between Lutsk and Vladimir-Volynski. Southwest of Dubno, in the direction of Brody and Lemberg, Kozin was stormed by the Russians, who were now only ten miles from the Galician border. To the north of Buczacz, on the right bank of the Strypa, a strong counterattack launched by the Austrians couldnot prevent the Russians from occupying the western heights in the region of Gaivivonka and Bobulintze, where only two days before the Austrians had been able to drive back their opponents. But the most furious battle of all raged for the possession of Czernowitz. A serious blow was struck to the Austro-Hungarian defenders when the Russians captured the town of Sniatyn, on the Pruth, about twenty miles northwest of Czernowitz, on the Czernowitz-Kolomea-Lemberg railway. This seriously threatened the brave garrison which held the capital of the Bukowina, as it put the Russians in a position where they could sweep southward and cut off the defenders of Czernowitz, if they should hold out to the last. In fact the entire Austro-Hungarian army in the Bukowina was now facing this peril.
The first massed attack against Von Hindenburg's lines since the offensive in the south began was delivered on June 13, 1916, when, after a systematic artillery preparation by the heaviest guns at the Russians' disposal, troops in dense formation launched a furious assault against the Austro-German positions north of Baranovitchy. The attack was repeated six times, but each broke down under the Teuton fire with serious losses to the attackers, who in their retreat were placed under the fire of their own artillery.
Baranovitchy is an important railway intersection of great strategical value and saw some of the fiercest fighting during the Russian retreat in the fall of 1915. It is the converging point of the Brest-Litovsk-Moscow and Vilna-Rovno railways. Sixty-one miles to the west lies Lida, one of the commanding points of the entire railway systems of western Russia.
Again, on June 14, 1916, the number of prisoners in the hands of the Russians was increased by 100 officers and 14,000 men, bringing the grand total up to over 150,000. All along the entire front the Russians pressed their advance, gaining considerable ground, without, however, achieving any success of great importance.
Closer and closer the lines were drawn about Czernowitz, though on June 16, 1916, the city was still reported as held bythe Austrians. On that day furious fighting also took place south of Buczacz, where the Russians in vain attempted to cross the Dniester in order to join hands with their forces which were advancing from the north against Czernowitz with Horodenka, on the south bank of the Dniester as a base. To the west of Lutsk in the direction toward Kovel, now apparently the main objective of General Brussilov, the Austro-Hungarians had received strong German reenforcements under General von Linsingen and successfully denied to the Russians a crossing over the Stokhod and Styr Rivers.
June 17, 1916, was a banner day in the calendar of the Russian troops. It brought them once more into possession of the Bukowinian capital, Czernowitz.
Czernowitz is one of the towns whose people have suffered most severely from the fluctuating tide of war.
Its cosmopolitan population, the greater part of whom are Germans, have seen it change hands no less than five times in twenty-one months. The first sweep of the Russian offensive in September, 1914, carried beyond it, but they had to capture it again two months later, when they proceeded to drive the Austrians out of the whole of the Bukowina. By the following February, however, the Austrians, with German troops to help them, were again at its gates, and they forced the Russians to retire beyond the Pruth. For a week the battle raged about the small town of Sudagora, opposite Czernowitz, the seat of a famous dynasty of miracle-working rabbis, but the forces of the Central Powers were in overwhelming numbers, and with the loss of Kolomea—the railway junction forty-five miles to the west, which the Russians were again rapidly approaching—the whole region became untenable and the Russians retired to the frontier.
Czernowitz is a clean and pleasant town of recent date. A century ago it was an insignificant village of 5,000 people. To-day it has several fine buildings, the most conspicuous of which is the Episcopal Palace, with a magnificent reception hall. In one of the squares stands the monument erected in 1875 to commemorate the Austrian occupation of the Bukowina.
The population consists for the most part of Germans, Ruthenes, Rumanians, and Poles. Among these are 21,000 Jews and there are also a number of Armenians and gypsies. With all these diverse elements, therefore, the town presents a very varied appearance, and on market days the modern streets are crowded with peasants, attired in their national dress, who mingle with people turned out in the latest fashions of Paris and Vienna.
How violently the Russians assaulted Czernowitz is vividly described in a letter from a correspondent of a German newspaper who was at Czernowitz during this attack.
"The attack began on June 11, 1916. Shells fell incessantly, mostly in the lower quarter of the town and the neighborhood of the station. They caused a terrible panic. Incendiary shells started many fires.
"Austrian artillery replied vigorously. The Russians during the night of June 12, 1916, attempted a surprise attack against the northeast corner defenses, launching a tremendous artillery fire against them and then sending storming columns forward. These were stopped, however, by the defenders, who prevented a crossing of the Pruth, inflicting severe losses upon the Russians.
"The Russian artillery attack on the morning of June 16, 1916, was terrific. It resembled a thousand volcanoes belching fire. The whole town shook. Austrian guns replied with equal intensity. The Russians advanced in sixteen waves and were mown down and defeated. Hundreds were drowned. Russian columns were continually pushed back from the Pruth beyond Sudagora."
Serious, though, this loss was to the Central Powers, they had one consolation left. Before the fall of Czernowitz the Austro-Hungarian forces were able to withdraw and only about 1,000 men fell into Russian captivity. In one respect then the Russians had not gained their point. The Austrian army in the Bukowina was still in the field.
Slowly but steadily the force of Von Hindenburg's offensive in the north increased. On the day on which Czernowitz fell attacks were delivered at many points along the 150-mile line betweenDvinsk in the north and Krevo in the south. Some local successes were gained by the Germans, but generally speaking this offensive movement failed in its chief purpose, namely, to lessen the strength of the Russian attack against the Austrian lines.
A more substantial gain was made by the combined German and Austro-Hungarian forces, opposing the Russians west of Lutsk, in order to stop their advance against Kovel. There the Germans drove back the center of General Brussilov's front and captured 3,500 men, 11 officers, some cannon, and 10 machine guns.
On the day of Czernowitz's fall the official English newspaper representative with the Russian armies of General Brussilov secured a highly interesting statement from this Russian general who, by his remarkable success, had so suddenly become one of the most famous figures of the great war.
"The sweeping successes attained by my armies are not the product of chance, or of Austrian weakness, but represent the application of all the lessons which we have learned in two years of bitter warfare against the Germans. In every movement, great or small, that we have made this winter, we have been studying the best methods of handling the new problems which modern warfare presents.
"At the beginning of the war, and especially last summer, we lacked the preparations which the Germans have been making for the past fifty years. Personally I was not discouraged, for my faith in Russian troops and Russian character is an enduring one. I was convinced that, given the munitions, we should do exactly as we have done in the past two weeks.
"The main element of our success was due to the absolute coordination of all the armies involved and the carefully planned harmony with which the various branches of the service supported each other.
"On our entire front the attack began at the same hour and it was impossible for the enemy to shift his troops from one quarter to another, as our attacks were being pressed equally at all points.
"The most important fighting has been in the sector between Rovno, and here we have made our greatest advances, which are striking more seriously at the strategy of the whole enemy front in the east.
"If we are able to take Kovel there is reason to believe that the whole eastern front will be obliged to fall back, as Kovel represents a railway center which has been extraordinarily useful for the intercommunications of the Germans and Austrians.
"That this menace is fully realized by the enemy is obvious from the fact that the Germans are supporting this sector with all the available troops that can be rushed up. Some are coming from the west and some from points on the eastern front to the north of us.
"In all of this fighting the Russian infantry has proved itself superb, with a morale which is superior even to that of 1914, when we were sweeping through Galicia for the first time. This is largely due to the fact that the army now represents the feeling of the whole people of Russia, who are united in their desire to carry the war to its final and successful conclusion."
To the question how he had been able to make such huge captures of prisoners the Russian general replied:
"The nature of modern trenches, which makes them with their deep tunnels and maze of communications, so difficult to destroy, renders them a menace to their own defenders once their position is taken in rear or flank, for it is impossible to escape quickly from these elaborate networks of defenses.
"Besides, we have for the first time had sufficient ammunition to enable us to use curtain fire for preventing the enemy from retiring from his positions, save through a scathing zone of shrapnel fire, which renders surrender imperative."[Back to Contents]