Detail of Austrian Offensive, May, 1916.
Detail of Austrian Offensive, May, 1916.
"Asked about their food, they replied that they did not get enough to eat, but their looks belied their statements. Whatever may be the truth in regard to the meatless and fatless days in the Hapsburg Empire, the armies in the field are not suffering in this respect, and, though the civilians at home are now put on strict rations, their soldiers' rations, in this sector at least, havenot been cut down. I was shown small tins of meat, taken from the knapsack of a prisoner, and several carried 3-ounce tins of a good quality of butter. In another sector I saw Bosnian prisoners wearing a gray fez, and looking much like Turkish troops. They also impressed me as very fit men; in fact, all the prisoners taken recently would seem to be of strong fiber, and far better equipped than Austrian troops which I have seen elsewhere.
"It is evident that the Austrian commanders have assembled the picked troops of the Dual Monarchy for the storming of these Trentino heights. Everything would point to the fact that they are making a supreme and final effort to win the war. Prisoners confirm this by stating that the war cannot go on much longer.
"Are the last good reserves being used up in this battle? Yesterday morning an Italian patrol coming in from the night's tour of inspection of their positions bring in a prisoner. He is a burly, thick-lipped peasant boy of twenty, dressed in a Russian uniform. On his loose-fitting blouselike tunic, torn in many places, is pinned a black and yellow ribbon, and hanging from a thin remaining strand shines the silver medal of St. George. An Italian subaltern takes charge of the prisoner.
"'A Russian refugee,' the officer remarks, in answer to my look of surprise at the sight of a Russian prisoner being brought in by an Italian patrol on the Trentino front. The Russian smiles good-naturedly, as he feels secure, now that he is among friends. In due time he will be repatriated, or perhaps join the Russian corps in France. We leave him busy over a big bowl of macaroni.
"'There are close to 20,000 Russian prisoners of war employed by the Austrians along our front, repairing roads, making trenches, and engaged on other 'noncombatant military duties,' the officer informed me. 'A few manage to escape into our lines nearly every day, but many more Russian dead lie in the silent crevasses of our high mountains who have lost their lives while attempting to escape.
"'You see, they need the men,' he concluded, as we watched an endless stream of fresh Italian troops winding their way up from the valley."[Back to Contents]
THE ITALIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN THE TRENTINO
Hardly had the Austro-Hungarian offensive shown signs of weakening when the Italians themselves began to attack the invaders. The first indication of this change was gleaned from the wording of the official statements, covering military operations on the Italian front for June 9, 1916. No longer is there any mention of Austro-Hungarian advances, but on the contrary this term appears now in the reports concerning the military operations of the Italian troops, who are also reported as "making attacks." Of course, this turn in affairs developed slowly in the beginning.
Thus, although on June 9, 1916, the Italian troops attacked at many points along the entire front between the Adige and Brenta Rivers, most of these attacks were repulsed by the Austro-Hungarians, who were still able to claim the capture of some 1,600 prisoners. At the same time Italian forces began to push back the invaders at some points and were able to advance in the upper Arsa Valley in the Monte Novegno region, between the Posina and Val d'Astico, as well as on the western slopes of Monte Cengio. Artillery duels were maintained along the entire balance of the front to the sea. Austrian aeroplanes dropped bombs on various localities in the Venetian plain, while an Italian squadron shelled Austro-Hungarian positions in the Arsa Valley and the Val d'Astico.
Much the same was the result of the fighting on June 10 and 11, 1916. On the former day the Austro-Hungarians concentrated their efforts still more and restricted themselves to an attack against a small portion of the Italian front southeast of Asiago. After an intense bombardment strong forces numbering about one division repeatedly attacked the Monte Lemerle positions. They were repulsed with very heavy losses by counterattacks.
From the Adige to the Brenta the Italian offensive action was increasing. Infantry, effectively supported by artillery, made fresh progress along the Vallarsa height, south of the Posina, in the Astico Valley, at the Frenzela Valley bridgehead, on the Asiago Plateau, and to the left of the Maso torrent.
During the following day Austro-Hungarian artillery intensely bombarded the Italian positions near Conizugna in the Lagarina Valley. In the Arsa Valley, in the Pasubio sector, on the Posina, and on the Astico line Italian infantry advance continued despite violent artillery fire and a snowstorm.
Two Austrian counterattacks toward Forni Alti and Campigliazione were repulsed with very heavy losses. In the plateau of the Sette Comuni, southwest of Asiago, Italian advanced detachments, after passing the Canaglia Valley, progressed toward the southeastern slopes of Monte Cengio, Monte Barco, and Monte Busibello. In the Sugana Valley detachments progressed toward the Masso torrent, repulsing two Austrian counterattacks near Sucrelle. Along the remainder of the front there were artillery duels and bomb-throwing activity by small detachments. Austrian aeroplanes dropped bombs on Vicenza, hitting the military hospital, and also attacked Thiene, Venice, and Mestre, causing slight damage.
Still further ground was gained by the Italian forces on June 12, 1916, in spite of the most obstinate resistance.
In the Lagarina Valley, by a strong attack after artillery preparation, the Italians carried the strongly fortified line from Parmesan, east of the Cima Mezzana, to Rio Romini. The Austro-Hungarians immediately launched violent counterattacks, but were always repulsed.
Along the Posina-Astico front there was an intense bombardment by both sides. Austrian infantry, which succeeded in penetrating Molisini, was driven out by gunfire, pursued and dispersed.
In the Sugana Valley on the night of June 12, 1916, and the following morning, Austrian detachments attempting to advance east of the Maso torrent were repulsed with very heavy losses.
Once more the Austro-Hungarians attempted to wrest the initiative from their opponents, without, however, succeeding to any extent. On the Posina front on the evening of June 12, 1916, after violent artillery preparation, they attacked Monte Forni Alti, the Campiglia (both southwest of Posina), Monte Ciove and Monte Brazonne (both south of Arsiero), but were everywhere repulsed with heavy losses.
During the day they bombarded with numerous batteries of all calibers the Italian positions along the whole front from the Adige to the Brenta, especially in the Monte Novegno zone. The Italian troops firmly withstood the violent fire and repelled infantry detachments which attempted to advance.
Austro-Hungarian hydroaeroplanes attacked the station and military establishments at San Giorgio di Nogaro, as well as the inner harbor at Grado.
More and more it became evident that the Austro-Hungarian drive in the Trentino region had definitely been stopped or abandoned. From time to time, it is true, the Austrians returned to the offensive. But this was always of local importance only and restricted in strength and extent. The Italians, on the other hand, not only maintained their new offensive movement, but even extended gradually its sphere.
Two attempted attacks by the Austro-Hungarian forces in the region of Monte Novegno, made in the direction of Monte Ciove and Monte Brazonne, were repulsed. But on Monte Lemerle, against which the Austrians had launched without success a very violent attack only a few days before, they now surprised a hostile detachment near the summit and captured the mountain completely, taking 500 prisoners.
Italian activity was renewed again on the Isonzo front. After intense artillery preparation a Naples brigade, supported by dismounted cavalry detachments, in a surprise attack, penetrated Austrian lines east of Monfalcone. The trenches remained in Italian possession after a severe struggle, during which 10 officers, 488 men, and 7 machine guns were captured.
Italian squadrons of aeroplanes bombarded the railway station at Mattarello, in the Lagarina Valley, and encampments at thejunction of the Nos and Campomulo Valleys on the Asiago Plateau, while Austrian aeroplanes dropped bombs on Padova, Giorgio di Nogaro, and Porto Rosega.
The Italian advance was steadily maintained from now on, not without, however, finding everywhere the stiffest kind of resistance, which at times made it even possible for the Austro-Hungarians to gain slight local successes. These, however, were not extensive or frequent enough to change the general picture of military operations on the Austro-Italian front. The Austrians, though still on Italian territory in a number of localities, were on the defensive with the Italians, though making only very slow and painful progress, unquestionably on the offensive.
On June 16, 1916, the Italians advanced northeast of Asiago, between the Frenzela Valley and Marcesina. Notwithstanding the difficult and intricate nature of the terrain and the stubborn resistance of the Austrians, intrenched and supported by numerous batteries, the Italian troops made progress at the head of the Frenzela Valley, on the heights of Monte Fior and Monte Castel Gomberto and west of Marcesina. The best results were attained on the right wing, where Alpine troops carried the positions of Malga Fossetta and Monte Magari, inflicting heavy losses on the Austrians and taking 203 prisoners, a battery of 6 guns, 4 machine guns, and much material.
During the next few days the most fierce fighting occurred on the plateau of Sette Comuni. All Austrian attempts to resume the offensive and continue their advance failed. The Italian advance was scarcely more successful; fighting had to be done in the most difficult territory; strong Austrian resistance developed everywhere. Thunderstorms frequently added to the difficulties already existent. Yet slowly the Italian forces pushed back the invader.
On June 18, 1916, Alpine troops carried with the bayonet Cima di Sidoro, north of the Frenzela Valley. Fighting developed in the Boite sector, where the Italians had made some slight gains during the previous days, which the Austrians tried to dispute. Heavy Italian artillery bombarded the railway station at Toblach and the Landro road in the Rienz Valley. Artilleryand aeroplane activity was extremely lively during this period. Not a day passed without artillery duels at many scattered points along the entire front from the Swiss border down to the Adriatic. Aeroplane squadrons of considerable force paid continuously visits to the opposing lines, dropping bombs on lines of communication and railway stations.
Alpine troops captured a strong position for the Italians on June 20, 1916, at the head of the Posina Valley, southwest of Monte Purche. On the 22d the Italians pushed their advance beyond Romini in the Arsa Valley, east of the Mezzana Peak, and on the Lora Spur, west of Monte Pasubio.
On the same day the Austrians counterattacked with extreme violence at Malga Fossetta and Castel Gomberto, but were repulsed with heavy losses. On the 21st a further Austrian attack at Cucco di Mandrielle resulted in a rout. On the 22d the Italians, while holding all the Austrian first-line approaches under heavy fire to prevent the bringing up of reserves, attacked on the entire front, but still encountered a strong resistance. During the night of the 24th the remaining peak of Malga Fossetta, held by the Austrians, Fontana Mosciar, and the extremely important Mandrielle were taken by storm, while the Alpini on the right made themselves masters of the Cima Zucadini by the 22d.
Henceforth retreat was inevitable, and during the night of the 25th the Italians on Monte Fior, seeing that the Austrian resistance had greatly diminished, pushed their offensive vigorously. Shortly after the advance was begun along the whole right. Monte Cengio, which had received an infernal bombardment for three days and nights, fell at last, and the advance proceeded apace.
On June 26, 1916, Italian troops in the Arsa Valley carried strong trenches at Mattassone and Naghebeni, completing the occupation of Monte Lemerle. Along the Posina front, after driving out the last Austrian detachments from the southern slopes of the mountain, the Italians crossed the torrent and occupied Posina and Arsiero, advancing toward the northern slopes of the valley.
On the Sette Comuni Plateau Italian infantry, preceded by cavalry patrols, reached a line running through Punta Corbin, Fresche, Concafondi, Cesuna, southwest of Asiago, and passing northeast of the Nosi Valley, and occupied Monte Fiara, Monte Lavarle, Spitzkaserle and Cimasaette.
On the right wing Alpine troops, after a fierce combat, carried Grolla Caldiera Peak and Campanella Peak.
The inside workings of the Italian armies engaged in this offensive movement are interestingly pictured in the following account from the pen of the special correspondent of the London "Times," who, of course, had special opportunities for observation:
"Thanks to the courtesy of the Italian Government and higher command, I have been allowed to go everywhere, to see a great deal on the chief sectors of a 400-mile Alpine border, and to study the administrative services on the lines of communication.
"I have visited the wild hills of the upper Isonzo, have inspected the strange Carso region on the left bank of the river, and have continued my investigations on the Isonzo front as far as Aquileia and the sea. I have threaded beautiful and rugged Carnia nearly as far west as Monte Croce, have ascended the valley of the But to Mount Timau, where the Austrians, as elsewhere, are in close touch, and, passing on to wonderful Cadore, have visited the haunts of the Alpini above the sources of the Tagliamento and Piave.
"Coming then to the Trentino sector, I have traversed the Sugana Valley as far as was practicable, accompanied the army in its reconquest of Asiago Plateau, and concluded an instructive tour by ascending the mountains which dominate Val Lagarina to the point of contact between the contending armies.
"The rest of the front, from the Lago di Garda to the Stelvio and the frontier of Switzerland, is not at present the scene of important operations, so I contented myself by ascertaining at second hand how matters stand between the Valtellina and the Chiese.
"I have had the honor of a private audience with his Majesty the King of Italy, and have seen and talked to nearly all the leadingsoldiers. Nothing could exceed the kindness with which I have been received, and my grateful thanks are due especially to Colonels Count Barbarich and Claricetti, who were placed at my disposal by General Cadorna and accompanied me during my tour.
"It is necessary for those who wish to have a clear understanding of Italy's share in the war to look back and realize the situation of our Italian friends when, at the most critical moment for the cause, they threw the weight of their sword into the scales.
"Italy, like England, had lost the habit of considering policy in military terms. Home politics ruled all decisions. The army had been much neglected, and the campaign in Libya had left the war material at a very low ebb. United Italy had not yet fought a great modern campaign, and neither the army nor the navy possessed in the same measure as other powers those great traditions which are the outcome of many recent hard-fought wars. Italy was without our coal and our great metallurgic industries. She did not possess the accumulation of resources which we were able to turn to warlike uses; nor could she find in her oversea possessions, as we did, the strength and vitality of self-governing younger people of her own race. The old Sardinian army had given in the past fine proofs of valor, but it was not known how the southern Italians would fight, and it was at first uncertain whether the whole country would throw itself heart and soul into the war.
"These impediments to rapid decisions and the extreme difficulty of breaking with an old alliance explain the apparent hesitation of Italy to enter the war.
Gorizia.
Gorizia.
"On the other hand, there were compensations. The heart of Italy was always with the Allies, and the hatred of Austria was very deep. There was every hope that the long-prevailing system of amalgamating the various races of Italy in the common army would at last bear fruit, and that this amalgamation, combined with the moral and material progress of Italy in recent years, and the pride of the country in its past history, would enable Italy to play an honorable and notable part in the warby land and sea, and to wrest from her hereditary enemy those portions of unredeemed Italy which still remained in Austrian hands.
"These hopes have either been fulfilled or are in course of fulfillment. United Italy is unitedly in the war, and, except among a few political busybodies, who intrigue after the manner of their kind, there are not two opinions about the war. There are many cases of mothers compelling their sons to volunteer and other cases of fathers insisting upon being taken because their sons are at the front. The prefect of Friuli told me that nearly all the 24,000 men in his province who were absent abroad when the war broke out returned home to fight before they were recalled. The south and the island areas warm for war as the north, and the regiments of Naples and of Sicily have done very well indeed in the field. Some people think that Piedmont is not quite so enthusiastic as other parts of Italy, because she flags her streets rather less, but I do not think that there is any real difference of feeling. In all the capitals of the Allies the political climate has been a trifle unhealthy, and of Rome it has been said that the old families of the Blacks have not taken a leading part in the campaign. My inquiries make me doubt the accuracy of this statement, and I think on the whole it will be found that, despite the old and persistent divergence of opinion on certain topics, all ranks and all classes are heartily for the war, and that an enemy who counts on assistance from within Italy will be grievously disappointed.
"Italy is fortunate in having at her head, at this critical hour of her destinies, a king who is a soldier born and bred.
"It is a common saying here that the King of Italy is homesick when he is absent from the army, and it is certain that his majesty spends every hour that he can spare from state affairs with his troops. He wears on his breast the medal ribbon, only given to those who have been at the front for a year, and, though he deprecates any allusion to the fact, it is true that he is constantly in the firing line, has had many narrow escapes, and is personally known to the whole army, who love to see him in their midst.
"I have not found any officer of his army who has a better, a more intimate, or a more accurate knowledge of his troops than the king. His attention to the wants of the army is absolutely untiring, and I fancy that his cool judgment and large experience must often be of great service to his ministers and his generals.
"I do not know whether the field headquarters of the King of Italy or of King Albert of Belgium is the most unpretentious, but certainly both monarchs live in circumstances of extreme simplicity. My recollection is that when I last had the honor of visiting King Albert's headquarters, the bell in what I must call the parlor did not ring, and the queen of the Belgians had to get up and fetch the tea herself.
"When I had the honor of being received by the King of Italy I found his majesty in a little villa which only held four people, and the king was working in a room of which the only furniture which I can recall consisted of a camp bed close to the ground and of exiguous breadth, a small table, and two chairs of uncompromising hardness. The only ornament in the room was the base of the last Austrian shell which had burst just above the king's head and has been mounted as a souvenir by the queen.
"When a prince of the House of Savoy lives in the traditions of his family, and shares all the hardships of his troops, it needs must that his people follow him. And so they do.
"The hardy Alpini from the frontiers, the stout soldiers of Piedmont, the well-to-do peasantry of Venetia, the Sardinians, who are ever to the front when there is fighting to be enjoyed, the Tuscans, Calabrians, and those Sicilians once so famous amongst the legionaries, are all here or at the depots training for war. Mobilization must have affected two and a half million Italians at least. There have been fairly heavy losses, and fighting of one kind or another is going on in every sector that I have visited, and every day, despite the great hardships of fighting on the Alpine frontier, the moral of the army remains good, the men are in splendid health, and Italy as a whole remains gay and confident, less affected on the whole by the war than any other member of the grand alliance.
"There are certainly more able-bodied men of military age out of uniform in Italy than there are in France, or than there are now with us. Except volunteers, no men under twenty are at the front. There are large reserves still available upon which to draw. The army has been more than doubled since the war began.
"The Italian regular officers, and the officers of reserve, are quite excellent. The spirit of good comradeship which prevails in the army is most admirable, and the corps of officers reminds me of a large family which is proverbially a happy one. Those foreign observers who have seen much of the Italian officers under fire tell me that they have always led their men with superb valor and determination, while, though Italy has not such a professional body of N. C. O.'s as Germany, I believe that most of these men are capable of leading when their officers fall.
"But there are not enough of good professional officers and N. C. O.'s to admit for the moment of a considerable further expansion of the army. Existing formations can be, and are being, well maintained, and this is what matters most for the moment.
"The peasant in certain parts of Italy rarely eats meat. In the army he gets 300 to 350 grams a day, according to the season, not to speak of a kilogram of good bread and plenty of vegetables, besides wine and tobacco. He is having the time of his life, and if, as cynics say, peace will break up many happy homes in England, peace in Italy will certainly make some peasants less joyful than before."[Back to Contents]
CONTINUATION OF THE ITALIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE
Between the Adige and the Brenta the retreating Austro-Hungarian forces had now reached strongly fortified and commanding positions which considerably increased their power of resistance. The Italians, however, continued, even if at reduced speed, to make progress. On June 27, 1916, they shelled Austrian positions on Monte Trappola and Monte Testo and took trenches near Malga Zugna. Between the Posina and the Astico they took Austrian positions on Monte Gamonda, north of Fusine, and Monte Caviojo. Cavalry detachments reached Pedescala (in the Astico Valley, about three miles north of Arsiero).
On the Asiago Plateau other Italian forces occupied the southern side of the Assa Valley and reached the slopes of Monte Rasta, Monte Interrotto and Monte Mosciagh, which were held strongly by the Austrian rear guards. Further north, after carrying Monte Colombara, Italian troops began to approach Calamara Valley.
On June 28, 1916, the Vallarsa Alpine troops stormed the fort of Mattassone, and detachments of infantry carried the ridge of Monte Trappola. On the Pasubio sector Italian troops took some trenches near Malga Comagnon. Along the Posina line their advance was delayed by the fire of heavy batteries from the Borcola.
In the Astico Valley they occupied Pedescala. On the Sette Comuni Plateau the Austrians strengthened the northern side of the Assa Valley Heights on the left bank of the Galmarara to the Agnella Pass. The Italians established themselves on the southern side of the Assa Valley and gained possession of trenches near Zebio and Zingarella.
The following day, June 29, 1916, the Italian line in the region between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana was pushed forwardstill further until it reached the main Austrian line of resistance. The Italians occupied the Valmorbia line, in the Vallarsa, the southern slopes of Monte Spil, and began an offensive to the northwest of Pasubio, in the Cosmagnon region.
Farther east on the line of the Posina Valley, the Italians took Monte Maggio, the town of Griso, northwest of Monte Maggio; positions in the Zara Valley and Monte Scatolari and Sogliblanchi. Monte Civaron and the Zellonkofel, in the Sugana Valley, fell into the hands of the Italians.
The Italians continued their advance along the Posina front on June 30, 1916, despite the violent fire of numerous Austro-Hungarian batteries dominating Borcola Pass, and also Monte Maggio and Monte Toraro. Italian infantry occupied Zarolli in the Vallarsa, north of Mattassone. On the left wing, overcoming stubborn resistance, Italian troops scaled the crest of Monte Cosmagnon, whose northerly ridges they shelled to drive out the enemy hidden among the rocks. On the Sette Comuni Plateau they kept in close contact with Austrian positions. Conflicts in the densely wooded and rocky ground were carried on chiefly by hand grenades.
Between the Adige and the Brenta the Italians continued their offensive vigorously on July 1, 1916. In the Vallarsa infantry began an attack on the lines strongly held by the Austrians between Zugna Torta and Foppiano.
Italian artillery shelled Fort Pozzacchio. On Monte Pasubio the Austrians were offering stubborn resistance from their fortified positions between Monte Spil and Monte Cosmagnon.
Along the Posina-Astico line Italian forces completed the conquest of Monte Maggio and occupied the southern side of Monte Seluggio. On the Asiago Plateau there were skirmishes on the northern side of the Assa Valley.
On July 2, 1916, in the region of the Adige Valley, the Austrians directed a heavy bombardment against the Italian positions from Serravalle, north of Coni Zugna to Monte Pasubio. Some shells fell on Ala. Italian artillery replied effectively. The infantry fighting on the northern slopes of Pasubio was continued with great violence. In the Posina Valley Italian troopsoccupied the spur to the northwest of Monte Pruche, Molino, in the Zara Valley (northwest of Laghi), and Scatolari, in the Rio Freddo Valley. The operations against Corno del Coston, Monte Seluggio, and Monte Cimono (northwest and north of Arsiero), the main points of Austrian resistance, were continued.
On the Asiago Plateau Italian detachments were pushed forward beyond the northern edge of Assa Valley. On the remainder of this sector there was a lull in the fighting, preparatory to further attacks on the difficult ground. In the Brenta Valley small encounters took place on the slopes of Monte Civaron north of Caldiera.
Monte Calgari, in the Posina Valley, was occupied by the Italians on July 3, 1916, while other detachments completed the occupation of the northern edge of the Assa Valley on the Asiago Plateau.
Between the Adige and the Brenta the Austrians on July 4, 1916, contested with great determination the Italian advance and attempted to counterattack at various points.
After several attempts, Alpine troops reached the summit of Monte Corno, northwest of the Pasubio.
In the upper Astico Basin they captured the crest of Monte Seluggio and advanced toward Rio Freddo.
Between the Lagarina and Sugana Valleys the Italian offensive was continued on July 5, 1916. In the Adige Valley and in the upper Astico Basin pressure compelled the Austrians to withdraw, uncovering new batteries on commanding positions previously prepared by them.
On the Asiago Plateau Italian artillery bombarded the Austrian lines actively. In the Campelle Valley the Austrians evacuated the positions they still held on the Prima Lunetta, abandoning arms, ammunitions and supplies.
The following day brought some new successes to the Italians on the Sette Comuni Plateau. With the support of their artillery they renewed their attack on the strongly fortified line of the Austrians from Monte Interrotto to Monte Campigoletto and captured two important points of the Austrian defenses, near Casera, Zebio and Malga Pozza, taking 359 prisoners, including5 officers and 3 machine guns. Between the Adige and the Astico, north of the Posino and along the Rio Freddo and Astico Valleys there was intense artillery activity, especially in the region of Monte Maggio and Monte Camone. The same condition continued throughout July 7, 1916.
On July 8, 1916, Italian infantry advanced on the upper Astico in the Molino Basin and toward Forni. Dense mist prevented all activity of artillery on the Sette Comuni Plateau. In the northern sector the Italians stormed some trenches north of Monte Chiesa, and occupied Agnella Pass.
A great deal of the fighting, both during the Austro-Hungarian offensive in the Trentino and the Italian counteroffensive, took place in territory abounding with lofty mountain peaks. Though it was now midsummer, these were, of course, covered with eternal snow and ice. Austrians and Italians alike faced difficulties and hardships, the solution and endurance of which would have seemed utterly impossible a few years ago until the Great War swept away many long-established military and engineering maxims. An intimate picture of this new mode of warfare was given by a special correspondent of the London "Daily Mail" who, in part, says:
"The villages in the lower ground behind the front have been aroused from their accustomed appearance of sleepy comfort. In their streets are swarms of soldiers on their way to the front or back from it for a holiday. Thousands are camping out in the neighborhood of the villages or billeted on the inhabitants. Constant streams of motor vehicles rumble through the villages on their way up the steep road, bearing ammunition, food and supplies of all sorts, to the batteries, trenches and dugouts on the peaks.
"The road over which these vehicles travel was before the war a mere hill path—now the military engineers have transformed it into a modern road, graded, metaled and carried by cunningly devised spirals and turns three-quarters of the way up the mountains.
"It is a notable piece of military engineering, but it is not merely that. It will serve as an artery of commerce when itis no longer needed for the passage of guns and army service wagons. There is nothing temporary or makeshift about it. Rocks have been blasted to leave a passage for it and solid bridges of stone and steel thrown across rivers.
"Because the Austrians started with the weather gauge in their favor, being on the upper side of the great ridges, it was necessary for the Italians to get their guns as high as they could. The means by which they accomplished this task was described to me. They would seem incredible if one had not ocular demonstration of the actual presence of the cannon among these inaccessible crags.
"There are some of them on the ice ledges of the Ortler nearly 10,000 feet above sea level, in places which it is by way of an achievement for the amateur climber to reach with guides and ropes and porters, and nothing to take care of but his own skin. But here the Alpini and Frontier Guides had to bring up the heavy pieces, hauling them over the snow slopes and swinging them in midair across chasms and up knife-edged precipices, by ropes passed over timbers wedged somehow into the rocks. I was shown a photograph of a party of these pioneers working in these snowy solitudes last winter. They might have been a group of Scott's or Shackleton's men toiling in the Antarctic wilderness.
"By means of a suspension railway made of wire rope with sliding baskets stretched across chasms of great depth, oil, meat, bread and wine are sent up, for the soldier must not only be fed, but must be fed with particular food to keep the blood circulating in his body in the cold air and chilling breezes of the snow-clad peaks. Kerosene stoves in great numbers have been sent aloft to make the life of the mountaineer soldiers more comfortable."
On July 9, 1916, there was bitter fighting between the Brenta and the Adige. Strong Alpine forces repeatedly attacked the Austrian lines southeast of Cima Dieci, but were repulsed with heavy losses. Shells set fire to Pedescala and other places in the upper Astico Valley. An attempt by the Austrians to make attacks on Monte Seluggio was checked promptly.
In the Adige Valley another intense artillery duel was staged on July 10, 1916. On the Pasubio front the Italians captured positions north of Monte Corno, but the Austrians succeeded in obtaining partial repossession of them by a violent counterattack. On the Asiago Plateau Alpine detachments successfully renewed the attack on the Austrian positions in the Monte Chiesa region.
The next day, July 11, 1916, the Italians again made some progress in the Adige Valley, north of Serravalle and in the region of Malga Zugna, and reoccupied partially some of the positions lost on the northern slopes of Monte Pasubio on the previous day. Heavy artillery duels took place in the Asiago Basin and on the Sette Comuni Plateau.
The Austrians promptly responded on July 12, 1916, by attacking in the Adige Valley, after artillery preparation on an immense scale, the new Italian positions north of Malga Zugna. They were driven back in disorder, with heavy loss, by the prompt and effective concentration of the Italian gunfire.
Fighting in the Adige Valley and on the Sette Comuni Plateau continued without cessation during the next few days without yielding any very definite results. In that period there also developed extremely severe fighting at the head of the Posina Valley. During the night of July 13, 1916, the Italians succeeded in carrying very strong Austrian positions south of Corno del Coston and east of the Borcola Pass, notwithstanding the strong resistance of the Austrians and the difficulty presented by the roughness of the ground. During the night the Austrians launched several violent but unsuccessful counterattacks in which they lost heavily.
In spite of violent thunderstorms, seriously interfering with artillery activity, fighting continued in this sector on July 14 and 15, 1916. Italian troops made some progress on the southern slopes of Sogli Bianchi, south of Borcola and the Corno di Coston and in the Boin Valley, where they occupied Vanzi on the northern slopes of Monte Hellugio.
Austrian reenforcements arrived at this time, and as a result a series of heavy attacks was delivered in the upper Posinaarea in an attempt to stop the Italian advance between Monte Santo and Monte Toraro. Italian counterattacks, however, were launched promptly and enabled the Italian forces to maintain and extend their lines. Throughout the balance of July, 1916, the Italian troops succeeded in continuing their advance, although the Austro-Hungarian resistance showed no noticeable abatement and frequently was strong enough to permit not only very effective defensive work, but rather considerable counterattacks. However, all in all, the Italians had decidedly the better of it. Step by step they pushed their way back into the territory from which the Austro-Hungarian offensive of a few weeks ago had driven them.
On July 18, 1916, the Italians gained some new positions on the rocky slopes of the Corno del Coston in the upper Posina Valley. Four days later, July 22, 1916, they captured some trenches on Monte Zebio on the Sette Comuni Plateau. The next day, July 23, 1916, between Cismon and Aviso they completed the occupation of the upper Trevignolo and St. Pellegrino Valleys, taking the summit of Monte Stradone and new positions on the slopes of Cima di Bocche.
On the Posina-Astico line at daybreak of July 24, 1916, after a fierce attack by night, they captured Monte Cimone, for the possession of which violent fighting had been in progress for days.
Further north, Alpine troops renewed their efforts against the steep rock barrier rising to more than 2,000 yards between the peaks of Monte Chiesa and Monte Campigoletto. Under heavy fire from the Austrian machine guns they crossed three lines of wire and succeeded in establishing themselves just below the crest.
Again and again the Austrians launched attacks against the Italian positions on these various mountains without, however, accomplishing more than retarding the further advance of General Cadorna's forces.
The second anniversary of the outbreak of the Great War, August 1, 1916, found the Italians on the Trentino front still strongly on the offensive and well on their way toward regainingall of the ground which they had lost in June and July, 1916, before the Austro-Hungarian offensive had been brought to a standstill, while the Austrians were yielding only under the force of the greatest pressure which their opponents could bring to bear on them.[Back to Contents]
MINOR OPERATIONS ON THE AUSTRO-ITALIAN FRONT IN TRENTINO OFFENSIVE
Just as soon as the Austro-Hungarian forces began to concentrate their activities in the latter part of May, 1916, on their drive in the Trentino, military operations in the other sectors of the Austro-Italian front lost in importance and strength. During the greatest part of both the Austro-Hungarian drive and the Italian counteroffensive in the Trentino—May to July, 1916—operations along the rest of the Austro-Italian fronts—on the northwestern frontier of Tyrol, along the Boite River in the northeastern Dolomites, in the Carnic and Julian Alps, and on the Isonzo front—were practically restricted to artillery duels. Only occasional, and then but very local infantry engagements took place, none of which had any particular influence on general conditions in these various sectors. However, as the Italian counteroffensive in the Trentino progressed, there developed from time to time minor operations along the other parts of the front. Quite a number of these were initiated by the Austro-Hungarians, undoubtedly in the hopes that they might thereby reduce the Italian pressure on their newly gained successes in the Trentino. Others found their origin on the Italian side, which at all times attempted to avail itself of every opportunity to extend and strengthen its positions anywhere along the front. And as the Austrian resistance against the Italian counteroffensive stiffened and showed no signs of abatement, General Cadorna, in undertaking operations in other sectors of the front than the Trentino, was undoubtedly influenced by motives similar to those guiding his opponents. He, too, hoped to impress his adversarysufficiently by minor operations in sectors unconnected with the Trentino, to reduce their strength there.
Considerable light is thrown upon the organization of the Italian army, which made it possible to carry on successfully these operations, in the following article from the pen of the special correspondent of the London "Times":
"I have been allowed to visit the offices of the general staff at army headquarters and those of the administrative services at another point within the war zone. This is not a favorable moment for describing how the army machinery works; but there is no harm done in saying that all these services appear to run smoothly, have good men at their head, and produce good results.
"I was particularly struck by the maps turned out. They do great credit to the Military Geographical Institute at Florence, and to the officers at headquarters who revise the maps as new information pours in. All the frontiers have been well surveyed and mapped on scales of 1:25,000, 1:50,000, 1:100,000, and 1:200,000. These maps are very clear and good. I like best the 1:100,000, which is issued to all officers, and on which operation orders are based. The photographs are also very fine, and the panoramas excellent, while the airmen's photographs, and the plans compiled from them, are quite in the front rank.
"The service of information at headquarters also appears to me to be good. There are more constant changes in all the Italian staffs than we should consider desirable, and officers pass very rapidly from one employment to another, but in spite of this practice the information is well kept up, and the knowledge of the enemy's dispositions is up to standard, considering the extraordinary difficulty of following the really quite chaotic organization of the Austro-Hungarian forces.
"I am not sure that I like very much the liaison system in Italy. The comparatively young officers intrusted with it report direct to army headquarters, and on their reports the communiqués are usually based. These officers remind us of themissi dominiciof the great Moltke, but on the whole I confess that the system does not appeal to me very much.
"All the rearward services of the army are united under the control of the intendant general, who is a big personage in Italy. He deals with movements, quarterings, railways, supply, munitions in transit, and, in fact, everything except drafts and aviation, both of which services come under the general staff. There is a representative of the intendant general in each army and army corps. An order of movement is repeated to the intendant general by telephone and he arranges for transport, food, and munitions.
"The means of transport include the railways, motor lorries, carts, pack mules, and porters. The railways have done well. They had 5,000 locomotives and 160,000 carriages available when war broke out, and on the two lines running through Venetia, they managed during the period of concentration to clear 120 trains a day. Between last May 17 and June 22, 1916, for the purposes of General Cadorna's operations in the Trentino, the railways carried 18,000 officers, 522,000 men, about 70,000 animals, and 16,000 vehicles, with nearly 900 guns. These figures have been given by the Italian press, so there is no harm done by alluding to them. The railway material is much better than I expected it to be, but coal is very dear.
"The motor lorries work well. There are three types in use—the heavy commercial cars, the middleweight lorries, which carry over a couple of tons, and the lightweights, taking about one and a half tons. These lorries form an army service. Each army park has a group of lorries for each army corps forming part of the army, and each group has two sections for each division. The motor cars of the commanders and staffs are good. I traveled several thousand miles in them, and having covered 300 miles one day and 350 another, am prepared to give a good mark to Italian motor-car manufacturers, and also to Italian roads and Italian chauffeurs.
"I may also point out that the army has hitherto administered the Austrian districts which have been occupied on various parts of the front, and has had to deal with agriculture, roads, births, deaths, marriages, police, and a great many other civil matters. As I had once seen a French corps of cavalry farming nearly5,000 acres of land I was prepared to see the Italian army capable of following suit; but I fancy that if Signor Bissolati is to take over all these civil duties General Porro will be far from displeased.
"There is the little matter of the 4,000 ladies who remain at Cortina d'Ampezzo while their men are away fighting in the Austrian ranks, and there are such questions as those of the Aquileia treasures, which have fortunately been preserved intact. I must confess that it is a novelty and a pleasure to enter an enemy's territory and sit down in a room markedMilitär Wachtzimmer, with all the enemy's emblems on the walls, but on the whole I liked best the adviceevitare di fumare esplosionipainted by some Italian wag on an Austrian guardhouse, and possibly intended as a hint to Austro-German diplomacy in the future.
"The Italians regard Austria as we regard Germany, and Germany as we regard Austria. Austria is the enemy, but at the same time, while every crime is attributed to Austria on slight suspicion, I find no unworthy depreciation of Austrian soldiers. I am told that while Austrian discipline is very severe, and the officer's revolver is ever quick to maintain it, the Austrian private soldier has a sense of deep loyalty toward his emperor, and that this is a personal devotion which will not easily be transferred to a successor. In meeting the Kaiserjäger so often the Italians perhaps see Austria's best, but the fact remains that the Italian has a good word for the Austrian as a soldier, and that I did not see many signs of such willful and shameless vandalism by the Austrians as has disgraced the name of Germany in Belgium and in France. Even towns which are or have been between the contending armies have not, I think, been willfully destroyed, but they have naturally suffered when one army or the other has used the town as a pivot of defense.
"The officers who have to keep the tally of the Austrian forces and to locate all the divisions have my deepest sympathy. Long ago the Austrian army corps ceased to contain the old divisions of peace times, but one now finds army corps with as many as four divisions, while the division may be composed ofanything from two to eight battalions. A certain number of the divisions reckoned to be against the Italians on the whole front are composed of dubious elements, and there are some sixty Austrian battalions of rifle clubmen.
"The Austrians shift regiments about in such apparently haphazard fashion that it is hard to keep track of them. They may take half a dozen battalions from different regiments and call it a mountain group. In a week or two they will break it up and distribute the battalions elsewhere. They usually follow up their infantry with so-called march battalions, but whether these battalions are 100 or 1,000 strong seems quite uncertain. Some surprise occurs elsewhere, and away go some of the march battalions. They may lose prisoners, say, on the Russian front, and the Russians naturally believe that the regiment and the division to which the regiment belongs are all on the Russian front, whereas only one weak battalion of drafts may be there and all the rest may still be against the Italians. The Austrians also take a number of regiments from a division and send them elsewhere, leaving a mere skeleton of the divisional command behind.
"For these reasons one must regard with a good deal of scepticism any estimate which professes to give an accurate distribution list of the Austrian army. Also it is difficult to believe that any realesprit de corpscan remain when such practices are common, and we are reduced to the belief that the only real soldier of the army is the personal devotion to the emperor of which I have already written.
"I could not find time to study the Italian air service, but foreign officers with the army speak well of it. The Austrian airmen deserve praise. They watched us daily and bombed with pleasing regularity.
"My view of the war on the Italian front is that Italy is in it with her whole heart, and has both the will and the means to exercise increasing pressure on Austria, whom she is subjecting to a serious strain along 400 miles of difficult country. I think that few people in England appreciate the special and serious difficulties which confront both combatants along the Alpineborderland, and especially Italy, because she has to attack. The Italian army is strong in numbers, ably commanded, well provided, and animated by an excellent spirit. As this army becomes more inured to war, and traditions of victory on hard-fought fields become established, the military value of the army is enhanced.
"As I think over the Italian exploits during the war, I remember that the men of Alps, of Piedmont and Lombardy, of Venetia, and Tuscany, of Rome, Naples, Sardinia, and Sicily have one and all contributed something to the record, and have had the honor of distinguished mention in General Cadorna's bulletins, which are austere in character and make no concessions to personal or collective ambitions. I find much to admire in the cool and confident bearing of the people, in the endurance of great fatigues by the troops, and in the silent patience of the wounded on the battle field. I fancy that the army is better in the attack than in the defense, and I should trust most with an Italian army to an attack pressed through to the end without halting."
The first indications of renewed activity, outside of artillery duels, anywhere except in the Trentino, appeared during the last days of June. On June 28, 1916, the Italians suddenly, after a comparative quiet of several months, began what appeared to be a strong offensive movement on the Isonzo front. They violently bombarded portions of the front on the Doberdo Plateau (south of Goritz). In the evening heavy batteries were brought to bear against Monte San Michele and the region of San Martino. After the fire had been increased to great intensity over the whole plateau, Italian infantry advanced to attack. At Monte San Michele, near San Martino and east of Vermigliano, violent fighting developed. At the Goritz bridgehead the Italians attacked the southern portion of the Podgora position (on the right bank of the Isonzo), and penetrated the first line trenches of the Austrians, but were driven out.
The Italian offensive was continued the next day, June 29, 1916, and resulted in the capture of Hills 70 and 104 in the Monfalcone district. The Austrians undertook a counteroffensiveat Monte San Michele and Monte San Marino, on the Doberdo Plateau, attacking the Italian lines under cover of gas. Fighting continued in the Monfalcone sector of the Isonzo front for about a week, during which time the Austrians vainly endeavored to regain the positions which they had lost in the first onrush of the Italian offensive. After that it again deteriorated into artillery activity which was fairly constantly maintained throughout the balance of July, 1916, without producing any noteworthy changes in the general situation.
Coincident with this short Italian offensive in the Monfalcone sector of the Isonzo front, there also developed considerable fighting to the east on the Carso Plateau, north of Trieste, which, however, was equally barren of definite results.
Minor engagements between comparatively small infantry detachments occurred in the adjoining sector—that of the Julian Alps—on July 1, 1916, especially in the valleys of the Fella, Gail and Seebach. These were occasionally repeated, especially so on July 19, 1916, but throughout most of the time only artillery duels took place.
In the Carnic Alps hardly anything of importance occurred throughout the late spring and the entire summer of 1916, excepting fairly continuous artillery bombardments, varying in strength and extent.
Considerable activity, however, was the rule rather than the exception in the sector between the Carnic Alps and the Dolomites. There, one point especially, saw considerable fighting. Monte Tofana, just beyond the frontier on the Austrian side, had been held by the Italians for a considerable period, and with it a small section of the surrounding country, less than five miles in depth. The Italians at various times attempted, with more or less success, to extend and strengthen their holdings, while the Austrians, with equal determination, tried to wrest from them what they had already gained, and to arrest their further progress.
In this region Alpine detachments of the Italian army on the night of July 8, 1916, gained possession of a great part of the valley between Tofana Peaks Nos. 7 and 2, and of a strongposition on Tofana Prima commanding the valley. The Austrian garrison was surrounded and compelled to surrender. The Italians took 190 prisoners, including eight officers, and also three machine guns, a large number of rifles and ammunition.
A few days later, on July 11, 1916, the Italians exploded a mine, destroying the Austro-Hungarian defenses east of Col dei Bois peak. This position commanded the road of the Dolomites and the explosion blew it up entirely, and gave possession of it to the Italians. The entire Austrian force which occupied the summit was buried in the wreckage. On the following night the Austrians attempted to regain this position which the Italians had fortified strongly in the meantime, but the attack broke down completely.
Three days later, July 14, 1916, Italian Alpine detachments surprised and drove the Austrians from their trenches near Castelletto and at the entrance of the Travenanzes Valley. They took some prisoners, including two officers, as well as two guns, two machine guns, one trench mortar and a large quantity of arms and ammunition. An Austrian counterattack against this position was launched on July 15, 1916, but was repulsed.
Finally on July 30, 1916, the Italians registered one more success in this region. Some of their Alpine troops carried Porcella Wood and began an advance in the Travenanzes Valley.
Throughout this period considerable artillery activity was maintained on both sides. As a result Cortina d'Ampezzo, on the Italian side, suffered a great deal from Austrian shells, while Toblach, on the Austrian, was the equally unfortunate recipient of Italian gunfire.
On the western frontier, between Italy and Austria, along Val Camonica, only artillery bombardments were the order of the day. These were particularly severe at various times in the region of the Tonale Pass, but without important results.
Aeroplanes, of course, were employed extensively, both by the Austro-Hungarians and the Italians, although the nature of thecountry did not lend itself as much to this form of modern warfare as in the other theaters of war. Some of these enterprises have already been mentioned. The Austrians, in this respect, were at a decided advantage, because their airships had many objects for attacks in the various cities of the North Italian plain. Among these Bergamo, Brescia, and Padua were the most frequent sufferers, while Italian aeroplanes frequently bombarded Austrian lines of communication and depots.[Back to Contents]
RUSSIAN SUCCESSES AFTER ERZERUM
With the same surprising vigor with which the Russian armies in the Caucasus had pushed their advance toward Erzerum, they took up the pursuit of the retreating Turkish army, after this important Armenian stronghold had capitulated on February 16, 1916. With Erzerum as a center the Russian advance spread out rapidly in all directions toward the west in the general direction of Erzingan and Sivas; in the south toward Mush, Bitlis and the region around Lake Van, and in the north with the important Black Sea port of Trebizond as the objective. This meant a front of almost 300 miles without a single railroad and only a limited number of roads that really deserved that appellation. Almost all of this country is very mountainous. To push an advance in such country at the most favorable season of the year involves the solution of the most complicated military problems. The country itself offers comparatively few opportunities for keeping even a moderate-sized army sufficiently supplied with food and water for men and beasts. But considering that the Russian advance was undertaken during the winter, when extremely low temperatures prevail, and when vast quantities of snow add to all the other natural difficulties in the way of an advancing army, the Russian successes were little short of marvelous.
As early as February 23, 1916, the right wing of the Russian army had reached and occupied the town of Ispir on the river Chorok, about fifty miles northwest of Erzerum, and halfwaybetween that city and Rizeh, a town on the south shore of the Black Sea, less than fifty miles east of Trebizond. At the same time Russian destroyers were bombarding the Black Sea coast towns. Under their protective fire fresh troops were landed a few days later at Atina on the Black Sea, about sixty miles east of Trebizond, which promptly occupied that town. From there they rapidly advanced southward toward Rizeh, forcing the Turks to evacuate their positions and capturing some prisoners as well as a few guns, together with rifles and ammunition.
The center, in the meantime, had advanced on the Erzerum-Trebizond road, and by February 25, 1916, occupied the town of Ashkala, about thirty miles from Erzerum. From all sides the Russian armies were closing in on Trebizond, and their rapid success threw the Turkish forces into consternation, for the loss of Trebizond would mean a serious threat to their further safety, having been up to then the principal point through which supplies and ammunition reached them steadily and rapidly by way of the Black Sea. No wonder then that the London "Times" correspondent in Petrograd was able to report on March 5, 1916, that all accounts agreed that the population of the Trebizond region were panic-stricken and fleeing even then in the direction of Kara-Hissar and Sivas, flight along the Black Sea route being out of question on account of the presence of Russian warships.
In the south the left wing of the Russian army was equally successful. On March 1, 1916, it occupied Mamawk, less than ten miles north of Bitlis, a success foreshadowing the fall of that important Armenian city. And, indeed, on the next day, March 2, 1916, Bitlis was occupied by the Russians. This was indeed another severe blow to the Turkish armies. Bitlis, 110 miles south of Erzerum, in Armenian Tamos, is one of the most important trade centers, and commands a number of important roads. It is only about fifty miles north of the upper Tigris, and even though it is more than 350 miles from Bagdad, its occupation by Russian forces seriously menaced the road to Bagdad, Bagdad itself, and even the rear of the Turkish army, fighting against the Anglo-Indian army in Mesopotamia.
Hardly had the Turks recovered from this blow when their left wing in the north suffered another serious reverse through the loss of the Black Sea port of Rizeh. This event took place on March 8, 1916, and the capture was accomplished by the fresh Russian troops that had been landed a few days before at Atina, from which Rizeh is only twenty-two miles distant. Along the Black Sea coast the Russians were now within thirty-eight miles of Trebizond. On and on the Russians pressed, and by March 17, 1916, their advance guard was reported within twenty miles of Trebizond. However, by this time Turkish resistance along the entire Armenian front stiffened perceptibly. This undoubtedly was due to reenforcements which must have reached the Turkish line by that time. For on March 30, 1916, the official Russian statement announced that seventy officers and 400 men who had been captured along the Caucasus littoral front belonged to a Turkish regiment which had previously fought at Gallipoli. At the same time it was also announced that fighting had occurred northwest of Mush. The Turkish forces involved in this fighting must have been recent reenforcements, because Mush is sixty-five miles northwest of Bitlis, the occupation of which took place about four weeks previously, at which time the region between Erzerum and Bitlis undoubtedly had been cleared of Turkish soldiers. Their reappearance, now so close to the road between Bitlis and Erzerum, presented a serious menace both to the center and to the left wing of Grand Duke Nicholas's forces, for if the Turkish troops were in large enough force, the Russians were in danger of having their center and left wing separated. This condition, of course, meant that until this danger was removed, the closest cooperation between the various parts of the Russian army became essential, and therefore resulted in a general slowing down of the Russian advance for the time being.
In the meantime the Russian center continued its advance against Erzingan. This is an Armenian town of considerable military importance, being the headquarters of the Fourth Turkish Army Corps. On March 16, 1916, an engagement took place about sixty miles west of Erzerum, resulting in the occupationby the Russians of the town of Mama Khatun, located on the western Euphrates and on the Erzerum-Erzingan-Sivas road. According to the official Russian statement the Turks lost five cannon, some machine guns and supplies and forty-four officers and 770 men by capture. Here, too, however, the Turks began to offer a more determined resistance, and although the official Russian statement of the next day, March 17, 1916, reported a continuation of the Russian advance towards Erzingan, it also mentioned Turkish attempts at making a stand and spoke even of attempted counterattacks.
This stiffening of Turkish resistance necessitated apparently a change in the Russian plans. No longer do we hear now of quick, straight, advances from point to point. But the various objectives toward which the Russians were directing their attacks—Trebizond, Erzingan, the Tigris—are attacked either successfully or consecutively from all possible directions and points of vantage. Not until now, for instance, do we hear of further advances toward Erzingan from the north. It will be recalled that as long ago as February 23, 1916, the Russians occupied the town of Ispir, some fifty miles northwest of Erzerum on the river Chorok.
The headwaters of this river are located less than twenty-five miles northeast of Erzingan, and up its valley a new Russian offensive against Erzingan was started as soon as the new strength of the Turkish defensive along the direct route from Erzerum made itself felt.
On April 1, 1916, and again on April 12, 1916, the Turks reported that they had repulsed attacks of Russian scouting parties advancing along the upper Chorok, and even claimed an advance for their own troops. But on the next day, April 3, 1916, the Russians apparently were able to turn the tables on their opponents, claiming to have crossed the upper basin of the Chorok and to have seized strongly fortified Turkish positions located at a height of 10,000 feet above sea level, capturing thereby a company of Turks. Again on the following day, April 4, 1916, the Russians succeeded in dislodging Turkish forces from powerful mountain positions.
Concurrent with these engagements, fighting took place both in the south and north. On April 2, 1916, a Turkish camp was stormed by Russian battalions near Mush to the northwest of Bitlis. Still farther south, about twenty-five miles southeast of Bitlis, the small town of Khizan had fallen into the hands of the Russians, who drove its defenders toward the south. The Russian advance to the southwest of Mush and Bitlis continued slowly but definitely throughout the next few days, with the town of Diarbekr on the right bank of the upper Tigris as its objective.
Beginning with the end of March, 1916, the Turks also launched a series of strong counterattacks along the coastal front. The first of these was undertaken during the night of March 26, 1916, but apparently was unsuccessful. It was an answer to a strong attack on the part of the Russians during the preceding day which resulted in the dislodgment of Turkish troops holding strong positions in the region of the Baltatchi Darassi River and in the occupation by the Russians of the town of Off on the Black Sea, thirty miles to the east of Trebizond. This success was due chiefly to the superiority of the Russian naval forces, which made it possible to precede their infantry attack with heavy preparatory artillery fire. By March 27, 1916, the Russians had advanced to the Oghene Dere River, another of the numerous small rivers flowing into the Black Sea between Rizeh and Trebizond. There they had occupied the heights of the left (west) bank. During the night the Turks made a series of strong counterattacks, all of which, however, were repulsed with considerable losses to the attackers. Another Turkish counterattack in the neighborhood of Trebizond was launched on April 4, 1916. Although strongly supported by gunfire from the cruiserBreslau, it was repulsed by the combined efforts of the Russian land forces and destroyers lying before Trebizond. During the next few days the Turks offered the most determined resistance to the Russian advance against Trebizond, especially along the river Kara Dere. This resistance was not broken until April 15, 1916, when the Turks were driven out of their fortified positions on the left bank of thatriver by the combined action of the Russian land and naval forces. The Russian army was now, after almost a fortnight's desperate fighting, within sixteen miles of its goal, Trebizond. On April 16, 1916, it again advanced, occupying Surmench on the Black Sea, and reaching later that day, after a successful pursuit of the retreating Turkish army, the village of Asseue Kalessi, only twelve miles east of Trebizond.
With this defeat the fall of Trebizond apparently was sealed. Although reports came from various sources that the Turkish General Staff was making the most desperate efforts to save the city by dispatching new reenforcements from central Anatolia, the Russian advance could not be stopped seriously any longer. Every day brought reports of new Russian successes along the entire Armenian front. On April 17, 1916, they occupied Drona, only six and a half miles east of Trebizond. Then finally, on April 18, 1916, came the announcement that Trebizond itself had been taken.
Trebizond is less important as a fortified place than as a port and harbor and as a source of supply for the Turkish army. It is in no sense a fortress like Erzerum, though the defenses of the town, recently constructed, are not to be despised. As a vital artery of communications, however, its value is apparent from the fact, first, that it is the Turks' chief port in this region, and secondly, that railway facilities, which are so inadequate throughout Asia Minor, are nonexistent along the northern coast. Hence the Turks will have to rely for the transport of troops and supplies upon railways which at the nearest point are more than 300 miles from the front at Trebizond.
Trebizond is an ancient seaport of great commercial importance, due chiefly to the fact that it controls the point where the principal trade route from Persia and central Asia to Europe, over Armenia and by way of Bayezid and Erzerum, descends to the sea. It has been the dream of Russia for centuries to put her hands forever upon this important "window on the Black Sea."
Trebizond's population is about 40,000, of whom 22,000 are Moslems and 18,000 Christians. The city first figured in history during the Fourth Crusade, when Alexius Comnenus, with anarmy of Iberian mercenaries, entered it and established himself as sovereign. In 1461 Trebizond was taken by Mohammed II, after it had for two centuries been the capital of an empire, having defied all attacks, principally by virtue of its isolated position, between a barrier of rugged mountains of from 7,000 to 8,000 feet and the sea.
As far as capturing important ports of the Turkish left wing was concerned, the victory of Trebizond was an empty one. For the Turks evacuated the town apparently a day or two before the Russians occupied it. The latter, therefore, had only the capture of "some 6-inch guns" to report. This quick evacuation, at any rate, was fortunate for the town and its inhabitants, for it saved them from a bombardment and the town did not suffer at all as a result of the military operations.
The campaign resulting in the fall of Trebizond did really not begin until after the fall of Erzerum on February 16, 1916. Up to that time the Russian Caucasian army had apparently been satisfied to maintain strong defensive positions along the Turkish border. But since the occupation of Erzerum a definite plan of a well-developed offensive was followed looking toward the acquisition of Turkish territory which had long been coveted by Russia.
With the fall of Trebizond Russia became the possessor, at least temporarily, of a strip of territory approximately 125 miles wide along a front of almost 250 miles length, or of an area of 31,250 square miles. In the north this valuable acquisition was bounded by that part of the south shore of the Black Sea that stretches from Batum in Russian Transcaucasia to Trebizond. In the south it practically reached the Turko-Persian frontier, while in the west it almost reached the rough line formed by the upper Euphrates and the upper Tigris. It thus comprised the larger part of Armenia. As soon as the Russians had found out that the Turks had a start of almost two days, they began an energetic pursuit. The very first day of it, April 19, 1916, brought them into contact with Turkish rear guards and resulted in the capture of a considerable number of them. The retreat of the Turks took a southwesterly direction towardBaiburt along the Trebizond-Erzerum road and toward Erzingan, to which a road branches off the Trebizond-Erzerum road. Baiburt was held by the Turks with a force strong enough to make it impossible for the Russians to cut off the Trebizond garrison. Along the coast the Russians found only comparatively weak resistance, so that they were able to land fresh forces west of Trebizond and occupy the town of Peatana, about ten miles to the west on the Black Sea.
A desperate struggle, however, developed for the possession of the Trebizond-Erzerum road. The Russians had been astride this road for some time as far as Madan Khan and Kop, both about fifty miles northwest of Erzerum and just this side of Baiburt. There the Turks put up a determined resistance and succeeded in holding up the Russian advance. Although they were not equally successful farther north, the Russians managed to advance along this road to the south of Trebizond only as far as Jeyizlik—about sixteen miles south of Trebizond—where they were forced into the mountains toward the Kara Dere River. This left still the larger part of the entire road in possession of the Turks, and especially that part from which another road branched off to Erzingan.