BUCHAREST FALLS
On December 6, 1916, the German War Office announced the entry of Teutonic troops into the Rumanian capital, and what was more important still from a military point of view, the capture of Plœchti, an important railroad junction thirty-five miles northwest of Bucharest, famous for its oil wells and therefore of great value to the Austro-Germans. As developed later, however, these wells were destroyed by the retreating Rumanians, and for some time to come, at least, rendered almost useless.
Whatever the value of Bucharest from a military point of view, there can be no doubt that its capture was a heavy blow to the Allies. With it went one-half of Rumania. The mightiest efforts of Russia had been unable to save the kingdom from the hands of the invaders. Thereby she had been forced to confess a certain degree of weakness. Nor had Sarrail in Macedonia been able to divert the activities of the Bulgarians from Dobrudja to any serious extent. This too constituted a second confession of weakness.
Indeed the activities, or lack of activities, on the part of the Allies in Macedonia, in spite of the capture of Monastir, had been even more disappointing than the inability of the Russians to save Rumania.
But the disaster to the cause of the Allies was more apparent than real. As has been demonstrated on the Russian front more than once during this war, the capture of territory alone has very little influence on the final result of a campaign. It is not enough to defeat an enemy; his forces must be destroyed, eliminated, wholly or in part, and this can only be accomplished by the capture of his forces. Though the Germans claimed that the Rumanians had lost 100,000 men to them as prisoners, an obvious exaggeration, the Rumanian fighting forces remained comparatively intact after the fall of Bucharest. The best of theRumanian troops undoubtedly remained, for by this time they were becoming seasoned veterans.
Having taken Bucharest, the German rush noticeably subsided; it lost its force. This was in part due to the bad weather conditions which now set in and lasted a week; rain fell in the plains in torrents and made the passage of troops, and especially of artillery, very difficult, even impossible. No doubt this also hindered the retreat of the Rumanians, but the advantage was on their side.
On the 18th it was reported from Petrograd that the entire Rumanian front was being held by Russian soldiers, the Rumanians having retired to their rear beyond the Sereth River at Jassy and in Bessarabia, where they were being reorganized for future operations. After the Bucharest-Plœchti line had been lost, according to one unofficial report, the Russians had sent some strong cavalry divisions to support the Rumanian retreat. The Russians offered strong resistance in the region of Buzeu so as to permit their engineers to construct a defensive front between Rimnik Sarat and the marshes at the mouth of the Danube. On that same date Berlin announced an advance of the Teutonic forces in northern Dobrudja. It was in this latter section that the Teutons now centered their activities. The Russo-Rumanians still remained in Dobrudja, on the south side of the Danube. So long as they had a footing here they remained a potential threat to the Teutons, which might awaken into active danger at the first favorable opportunity. To be ousted from this northern tip of Dobrudja would be even more serious to the Russo-Rumanians than the loss of Wallachia. From this point they might, at some future day, initiate an offensive against Bulgaria which might become extremely dangerous. Once across the river, however, it would be difficult for them to recross, for reasons that have already been discussed: no line of fortifications, no intrenched positions they might throw up, would be so effective a defense to the Teutons as the mouth of the Danube.
In Rumania, west of the river, continuous and at times heavy fighting continued, sometimes assuming almost the proportions of pitched battles. During the last week of the month Mackensenapparently realized the hopelessness, for the present at least, of driving the enemy out of Dobrudja, and shifted some of his forces over to the west bank of the river. The Russians had retired behind the Rimnik River, a small stream which is about twenty-five miles north of the Buzeu and parallel to it. On January 1, 1917, the Germans announced that the Russians had been forced back against the bridgehead at Braila and that in the Dobrudja they had advanced beyond Matchin. On the 5th, Braila, the most important city left to the Rumanians, fell into the hands of Mackensen, and at the same time the last of the Russians retired from the northern tip of Dobrudja. This was the heaviest blow that had fallen since the capture of Bucharest, and from a military point of view was even more serious. Once driven across the broad waters of the Danube mouth, the Russians and the Rumanians could not recross in the future except in very strong force and with great losses. At the same time it was now possible for Mackensen to reduce his forces in Dobrudja to a minimum and reenforce the troops operating over in Rumania proper.
During the rest of the month the fighting continued up and down the line with unabated vigor, though without any sensational results. The Germans were now hammering at the main line of the Russian defense and could not expect any large gains. The defeat of the Rumanians had been, after all, only the driving back of a salient. But in general the fighting during the latter half of January, 1917, seemed to favor the Teutons.
On the 15th Berlin reported that the Bulgarian artillery was bombarding Galatz from across the Danube. On this date too the Russians lost Vadeni, ten miles southwest of Galatz, their last position south of the Sereth. On the other hand, Petrograd announced on this same day that on the northern Rumanian front, in a violent engagement on the Kasino River, the Rumanian troops forced the Germans back, while the German attacks northeast of Fokshani were repulsed by the Russians. By the following day these local attacks developed into a general engagement, such as had not been fought since before Bucharest had fallen. At Fundani, Berlin reported, the Russians hurledone mass attack after another—waves of humanity as they were termed—against the German lines and gained some temporary advantages. On the 17th Petrograd announced the recapture of Vadeni. After a prolonged artillery preparation the Russians rushed their infantry against the position in the town and drove the Germans out. The latter, after receiving reenforcements and assisted by an artillery drumfire, made a powerful counterattack, but did not succeed in driving the Russians back. Berlin admitted this defeat, incidentally mentioning that Turkish troops were here engaged. Berlin also admitted that "between the Kasino and Suchitza Valleys the Russians and Rumanians made another mass attack and succeeded in regaining a height recently taken from them." On the 20th, Mackensen's forces, as was stated by Berlin and admitted by Petrograd, succeeded in taking Nanesti and driving the Russians back to the Sereth.
On January 22, 1917, an Overseas News Agency dispatch stated that the number of Rumanian prisoners taken during the entire campaign to date now numbered 200,000. Describing the situation of the Rumanian army at that time, the dispatch continued:
"The rest of the Rumanian army, part of which fought well, is reorganizing in Moldavia and Bessarabia. The few Rumanian divisions which still are engaged at the front are very much reduced in numbers. According to the assertions of Rumanian prisoners, one division was composed of only 2,800 men, while another numbered but 2,400. The Rumanians suffered their heaviest losses from artillery fire. The large number of dead in proportion to the wounded is remarkable. On one square kilometer (about three-fifths of a square mile) of the battle field of Campulung 6,000 Rumanian dead were counted. Some of the Rumanian infantry regiments were composed of only four companies of 150 men each. Because of the lack of sanitary organization, an extraordinary large percentage of the wounded died in the hospitals, which, however, afforded room only for the officers, while large numbers of wounded soldiers were lodged in damp cellars, peasants' huts, and barns, where they died miserably."
On January 20, 1917, the military critic of the Overseas News Agency summed up the situation as follows:
"The Russo-Rumanian efforts to delay the advance of the Teutons against the Sereth Plain are taking the form of fierce counterattacks, launched to avert the danger that their position on the Putna and the Sereth be outflanked. During the last few days especially violent attacks have been directed against the position situated on the Carpathian slopes north of the Suchitza. These developed no success and cost the enemy heavy losses in casualties and prisoners.... On the Carpathian front, in the Oituz district, the Teutonic forces have pressed forward until they are in a position whence they can take the circular valley of Ocna under their fire. As has been confirmed by the Russian headquarters report, Bogdaneshti and Ocna were shelled. Ocna is an important railroad station and a point of support for the Russian defense in the upper Trotus Valley, while Bogdaneshti bars the outlet to the great valley of the Trotus and Oituz. All the determined attempts made by the Russians and Rumanians to extend the narrow limits of their hold on the southern bank of the Sereth have been more or less unsuccessful. The German troops, however, with their capture of the village of Nanesti, tore the pillar from the wall of the Russian defense. Nanesti forms the strategical center of the bridgehead of Fundeni and covers the great iron bridge across the Sereth, which is in the immediate vicinity of Nanesti. The entire construction of the Nanesti-Fundeni bridgehead, which is a modern field fortification, illustrates its importance as a central point of support of the Sereth line. In the remaining sectors of the Sereth snowstorms and mists have interfered with military activity."
During the middle of January, 1917, the French Admiral du Fournier of the Entente fleet in Greek waters paid a visit to the Russo-Rumanian front. On his return from this tour, which was taken on the way to France, he wrote in the Paris "Matin":
"The Russian army was surprised by the rapid succession of Rumanian reverses and had to suspend Brussilov's offensive in Galicia in order to send large reenforcements to Rumania, but its position was such that it could not cover its flank in Wallachiaand its rear in Dobrudja rapidly enough to stop the advance of the invaders. It was only on the Sereth that it succeeded in forming with the first corps that arrived from the army of General Sakharoff a front which was lengthened by several good Rumanian divisions. A few weeks will witness a change in the military situation. In my journey in a motor car with the troops on the march I saw nothing but magnificent soldiers, admirably equipped and in excellent form."[Back to Contents]
SARRAIL'S OFFENSIVE
The half year ending with February 1, 1917, was a period of almost continuous activity before Saloniki, in sharp contrast to the previous six months, which had been quite uneventful. Yet that interval between the conquest of Serbia by the Austro-German and Bulgarian troops and the renewal of fighting, beginning in August, 1916, were months of furious preparation by General Sarrail and his colleagues. From what was little more than a precarious footing in Saloniki itself they had established a firm base protected by a wide circle of intrenchments, while their forces had been augmented to something not far from three-quarters of a million men under arms and a huge supply of ordnance and munitions. From a mere expedition to keep a back door open for the defeated Serbians, Sarrail's army had developed into what was obviously going to be a gigantic campaign against the rear of the Central Powers, an attempt to enter Austria through a back window. Such, at least, was the supposition of military critics the world over. Incidentally the presence of so large a force of the Allies in Macedonia served various other purposes. Viewing the situation with a retrospective eye, at the present moment, there can be no doubt that Greece would by now have thrown her lot in with the Central Powers had it not been for her fear of Sarrail's forces. Also,the Teutons and the Bulgarians were compelled to devote a large force to holding a front opposite Sarrail, and so weaken their other fronts. And finally, without Sarrail in Saloniki, Rumania would never have decided to join hands with the Allies, certainly not so early as she did. To be sure, Rumania was defeated, but her defeat must have cost the Central Powers grave losses which may eventually prove to have turned the tide in favor of the Allies.
Already before August, 1916, it was becoming obvious that Sarrail was beginning to feel strong enough to play a less passive part. Little by little he had been pushing out his lines. The remnants of the Serbian army, which had been recuperating at Corfu, were reorganized and transported to Saloniki by sea, whence they were sent to take over a portion of the front on the extreme left. Somewhere around August 1, 1916, Russian soldiers began landing at Saloniki, though this significant fact was not reported till nearly three weeks afterward, when about 80,000 of them had joined Sarrail's force and had been sent out on the left front, west of the Serbians. During this interval a large force of Italians also joined the Allied troops at Saloniki and joined the British near Doiran. All the Allies except Japan were now represented on this front by their contingents, though of course the French and British were still in vastly preponderating majority. The moral effect was strong, for it was the first time that troops of all the Allies were camped side by side. The landing of the Russians, who had come through France, thence by the sea route, was no doubt effected in the hope of affecting the Bulgarians, who are not only Slavs, but have a very strong feeling of affinity for the Russians, who liberated them from the Turks. It was probably hoped that on being brought face to face with them on the firing line many Bulgarians would desert, or possibly even there would be an uprising in Bulgaria against Czar Ferdinand's policy. That nothing of this sort did actually happen, either in Macedonia or in Dobrudja and Rumania, where the Russians also faced Bulgarians, may perhaps be ascribed to the revulsion of feeling against the Russians which many Bulgarians had begun experiencing ofrecent years, on account of the many black intrigues which the Russian Government had hatched against the independence of Bulgaria.
In the matter of Bulgaria, it is but fair to state that Russia, Rumania, and Serbia had little right to complain; Bulgaria had just scores to wipe off against all of them. Each was but paying the price for some selfish policy in the past for which Bulgaria had had to suffer.[Back to Contents]
UNREST IN GREECE
There was the intense racial hatred between Greeks and Bulgars, more fully explained in previous volumes. Hatreds of this nature affect the public more than governing bodies. On the public sentiment of Greece this hatred seems to have been a more powerful influence than more subtle political considerations. The detested Bulgar, the barbarian, the "kondri-cephalous" (blockhead) was advancing into eastern Macedonia, which the Greeks had gained at so much cost, and they were taking possession of that section of the country where the population really is preponderatingly Greek. In the north, in western Macedonia, he was also invading Greek territory, taking Florina, approaching the very boundaries of Greece proper; indeed, cavalry patrols of the Bulgarians had descended as far as the plains of Thessaly.
Public indignation flamed to a white heat. On September 1, 1916, came a press dispatch from Athens stating that the population was rising against the Government and that the king had abdicated in fear. This latter statement proved untrue, but in the Macedonia occupied by the Allies a modified revolution was indeed taking place, no doubt encouraged by the Allies. A provisional committee, or government, had been organized, and to this authority the Greek garrisons at Vodena, Port Karaburun,and Saloniki had surrendered. "Cretan gendarmes and Macedonian volunteers," continued the report, "have surrounded the barracks of the Greek infantry in Saloniki and exchanged shots with the garrison after cutting the water main and electric-light wires and shutting off food supplies. A detachment of sixty regulars attempted to break its way out. Its surrender was demanded, and when the regulars refused the volunteers fired shots in the air. The regulars replied with a volley, whereupon the volunteers opened fire on them, compelling them to return to the barracks. Altogether three men were killed and two wounded. Before the garrison finally surrendered three companies of French colonial infantry marched to the parade grounds. They were soon followed by two battalions of infantry, which took up positions on both sides of the parade grounds in the rear of the barracks. Machine guns were posted at conspicuous points and armored cars were stationed opposite the entrance of the barracks.... At 11 o'clock that night the Greek troops marched out unarmed and were interned at Camp Keitinlek outside the city."
Apparently these incidents had a temporary influence on the Government at Athens, for on September 3, 1916, it was reported that all parties had agreed to give their support to the Zaimis cabinet, which was now ready to reconsider its previous policy and give its full support to the cause of the Allies. The German Ambassador, it was said, had left Athens. How confident was Venizelos in the belief that the Government had come around to his policy is obvious from the following statement, which he made on that same date:
"The addition of one more nation to the long list of those fighting against Prussian militarism for the liberty of Europe and the independence of the smaller states cannot but give more strength to the common confidence in a complete victory of the Allies. I deeply grieve that my country has so much delayed in paying her due contribution to the struggle for these most precious benefits of humanity, and trust the influence caused by Rumanian intervention will render it absolutely impossible for the existing Greek authorities any further to persist in their policyof neutrality, and that at the earliest moment Greece too will join the camp of her proved and traditional friends for the purpose of accomplishing her own national ideals."
Meanwhile the revolt in Greek Macedonia seemed to be spreading. A provisional government was declared established with a Colonel Zimorakakis at the head, and all the gendarmes and the cavalry had gone over to the new régime.
What gave further color to the reports that Greece was definitely deciding to go over to the Allies was the announcement that the elections had been postponed indefinitely. The Zaimis cabinet, it will be remembered by those who have read the previous volume, was merely provisional to fill the interim until the next elections. These had at first been fixed for August 7, 1916, then postponed for another month. Now they were again postponed indefinitely. Truly it seemed that the two big parties had come to an understanding. Added to this was the report that Baron Schenk, the chief of the German propaganda, had been arrested and brought a prisoner aboard one of the French warships. Also the telegraph and telephone systems of the country had been given over to the control of the Allies.
There now followed an interval of complete silence, broken only on the 10th, when it was reported from London that the Greek Premier, Zaimis, had held a conference with the Entente ministers and had asked what consideration Greece would receive should she join the Allies. The ministers were reported to have replied that they would ask instructions from their respective governments. On the following day Zaimis suddenly offered his resignation. The king refused to accept it and, on the ministers of the Entente expressing their confidence in his sincerity, he withdrew his resignation. On the following day the Entente Powers made their reply to Premier Zaimis, regarding what reward Greece might expect should she join them. They were not disposed, they stated, to enter into a discussion of this subject. If Greece desired to join them, she must waive the question of compensation for the present, though the Entente Powers stood ready to assist her in equipping her with arms and munitions.[Back to Contents]
A GREEK ARMY SURRENDERS TO GERMANY
Meanwhile an incident in eastern Macedonia occurred which aroused a great deal of feeling against the Greek Government in the Entente countries. It will be remembered that the Bulgarians had advanced along the coast in this region, being unopposed there by Allied troops, and that they had finally appeared before Kavala. In spite of the vigorous shelling from the Allies' warships they occupied the forts surrounding the city, which were immediately evacuated by the Greek garrisons. These, together with the soldiers in the city and other outlying garrisons, numbering between six and eight thousand, constituted a part of the Fourth Army Corps of the Greek army. On September 13, 1916, Germany suddenly issued the announcement that this body of Greek soldiers had surrendered.
"After German and Bulgarian troops," continued the announcement, "had found themselves compelled by General Sarrail's offensive to march as a counterattack into Greek Macedonia, the Fourth Greek Army Corps stood ready in Seres, Drama, and Kavala, behind the left Bulgarian wing, which had advanced to the Struma. The measures of the Entente aimed at forcing these Greek troops to its side or preparing for them a fate similar to that which befell the overpowered portions of the Eleventh Greek Division at Saloniki. Free communication with Athens was interrupted and intercourse with the home authorities was controlled by the Entente and refused arbitrarily by the Entente.
"The commanding general of the Fourth Greek Army Corps at Kavala, faithful to the will of the chief commander and the legally constituted Government's policy of maintaining neutrality, and in view of the unsupportable situation of the troops under his command, menaced by famine and disease, has been compelled to proceed on his own authority. On September12, 1916, he asked the German chief commander to protect his brave troops, loyal to the king, to relieve them of the pressure of the Entente and provide food and shelter for them. In order to prevent any breach of neutrality, it has been agreed with the commanding general to transport to lodging places in Germany these Greek troops in the status of neutrals with their entire arms and equipment. Here they will enjoy hospitality until their fatherland is free of invaders."
There now arose the cry in the press of all the Entente countries that the surrender of this force of Greek soldiers was only an act on the part of the Greek Government to assist the Germans, whom it planned to support actively when a propitious moment should come. In reply the Greek Government published the telegrams that it had exchanged with the Greek commander at Kavala. On the 11th he had telegraphed to Athens, through the admiral of the British fleet:
"The Fourth Greek Army Corps at Kavala wishes to surrender immediately to the British. The Bulgarians have threatened to bombard the city to-morrow."
The British admiral thereupon sent the following message to General Calaris, the War Minister in Athens:
"Do you wish me to permit the Greek troops to embark on Greek ships?"
In response the Greek War Minister wired:
"To the Fourth Army Corps at Kavala: Transport yourselves immediately with all your forces to Volo, arranging with the British admiral. The police and civil authorities must remain at Kavala."
Apparently the division that existed throughout the entire Greek population appeared among these Greek soldiers, for not all surrendered with their commander to the Germans; a large number withdrew and escaped to Thaos. On the face of the telegraphic correspondence, involving the British admiral, it would seem that the Greek commander acted in accordance with his personal sympathies rather than from instructions, but the incident nevertheless succeeded in stirring strong feeling against Greece in France and England.
That matters were not running smoothly within the inner circle of the Greek Government became evident on September 16, 1916, when it was announced that Premier Zaimis had now definitely and absolutely resigned, and that Nikolas Kalogeropoulos had been asked by the king to form a new cabinet. He was one of the foremost lawyers of Greece, had lived for many years in France, and was said to be in sympathy with Venizelos and the Allies. In 1904 he had been Minister of Finance for a brief period, and in 1908 and 1909 he had been Minister of the Interior. The new premier was sworn into office under the same conditions as surrounded his predecessor: his was merely a service cabinet, to maintain control until the elections could be held in accordance with the constitution.
In strange contrast to this event, which seemed to bode well for the Allies, the "Saloniki movement," as the revolt in favor of intervention was called by the British press and which had been lying quiet for some time, now broke out afresh. On September 21, 1916, came the report that the people on the island of Crete had risen and declared a Provisional Government in favor of the Allies, and that the new authorities had sent a committee to Saloniki to tender their adherence to General Sarrail. Also it was rumored that Venizelos was going to Saloniki to place himself at the head of the revolt. On the 20th he gave out an interview to the Associated Press correspondent in which he certainly did not deny the possibility of his doing so:
"I cannot answer now," he said, "I must wait a short time and see what the Government proposes to do.... As I said on August 27, if the king will not hear the voice of the people, we must ourselves devise what it is best to do."[Back to Contents]
THE SERBIANS ADVANCE
Having reviewed the situation in Greece during the month of September, 1916, we may now return to our narrative of the military activities along the Macedonian front. At the end of August, 1916, a lull seemed to settle down along the entire front, nothing being reported save minor skirmishes and trench raids. On the 2d the Italians at Avlona in Albania, said to number 200,000, were reported from Rome to be making an advance. Here the Austrians were facing them, the only point along the line in which Austrian troops were posted. The Italians made an attack on Tepeleni on the Voyusa, and drove the enemy from that position as well as from two neighboring villages. After this event nothing further was heard from them, though, as will appear later, it was obvious that they were making some headway. Apparently it was their object to cooperate with the rest of the Allies in Macedonia by turning the extreme right of the Bulgarian line.
On the 11th the silence was broken by the announcement from London that an energetic offensive was being resumed along the entire front on the part of the Allies. On that date the British made a crossing of the Struma over to the east bank and attacked the Bulgarians vigorously and, in spite of the counterattacks of the enemy, were able to hold their advanced position. The French, too, began hammering the foe opposite them west of Lake Doiran to the Vardar, and a few days later reported that they had taken the first line of trenches for a distance of two miles.
It was over on the extreme left, however, that the Allies were to gain what seemed to be some distinct advantages. Near Lake Ostrovo the Serbians hurled themselves up the rocky slopes toward Moglena and stormed the well-intrenched positions of the Bulgarians, and succeeded in dislodging them and driving them back. A few miles farther over, at Banitza, a station on therailroad, they also centered on a determined attack, and there a pitched battle developed, the Bulgarians having the advantage of the bald but rocky hills behind them. Over in the west, before Kastoria (Kostur, in Bulgarian dispatches), the Russians advanced and succeeded in driving the Bulgarians back. Some miles north of the town rise the naked crags and precipices of an extremely difficult range of mountains; here the Bulgarians stood and succeeded in preventing the Russians from making any further progress, their right flank being protected by the two Prespa lakes.
For almost a week the battle raged furiously back and forth along this section of the front. On the 15th the Bulgarian lines opposed to the Serbians suddenly gave way and broke, and the triumphant Serbs made a rapid advance, pursuing the enemy for nine miles and capturing twenty-five cannon and many prisoners, according to dispatches of Entente origin. For the next thirty-six hours the fighting was intense, and then the whole Bulgarian right wing seemed to crumple and swing backward. For a while the Bulgarians made a stand on the banks of the Cerna, at the southern bend of the great loop made by the river, but finally the Serbians effected a crossing and continued driving the Bulgarians up along the ridges forming the eastern side of the Monastir Valley. Farther to the left the French and Russians were also succeeding in their efforts. The Bulgarians were driven out of and beyond Florina (Lerin in Bulgarian dispatches) and General Cordonnier, in command of the French, immediately established his headquarters at this important point, commanding the whole Monastir plain. Up this level country the Bulgarians fled. Reports did not indicate to just what point up the valley the French were able to advance, but it was quite obvious that the Bulgarians were able to stay them some distance before Monastir, where the mountains approach the city and offer excellent positions for artillery against troops advancing up the railroad line toward the city. On the map at least this important city seemed to be threatened, but it was still too premature to pronounce it in serious danger, as did the Entente press.[Back to Contents]
THE GREEKS ON THE FIRING LINE
It was during these six days' hard fighting that the Greek volunteers underwent their baptism of fire and the first of them shed their blood for the cause of the Allies. These constituted the First Regiment of Greek volunteers commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Gravanis. He was under the command of the French general at Fiorina, and he and his men took a prominent part in the capture of the town. During the next few days the fighting calmed down, except farther eastward above Ostrovo, where the Serbians had succeeded in driving the Bulgarians from their important positions along the Kaimakcalan ridges. Here the Bulgarians counterattacked bitterly and continuously, but apparently with no success. These assaults were repeated at intervals of several days during the rest of the month, and though Sofia reported the recapture of Kaimakcalan Heights and a general triumph along this whole section of the front, the reports from both sides later indicated that these dispatches were wholly false, probably issued to satisfy a restless general public. On the other hand, the Allies made no further advance: by the first day of the following month they held about the same ground they had gained during the intensive fighting shortly after the middle of September, 1916. As is usual after extreme military activity, there followed a period of calm, during which both sides were preparing for the next outburst of effort. But the end of September, 1916, showed plainly that the Bulgarians and Teutons were entirely on the defensive in Macedonia and were content to hold their own.
During the month of October, 1916, little of a sensational aspect occurred on the Macedonian front; the latter half of this period was, however, one of hard fighting and steady hammering along the Serbian sector. On the 2d the Serbians reported that they had not only consolidated the positions they had taken on the important heights of Kaimakcalan but they had advanced beyondthis point three kilometers and taken Kotchovie. At the end of the week Jermani, a village at the base of a high ridge on the lower shore of Little Prespa Lake, was taken by the French. Some days after came a rather detailed dispatch from Rome, significant in the light of later events. The Italians from Avlona were obviously making steady progress over a very difficult territory—difficult on account of the poor communications. On the 10th it was reported that they had taken Klisura, about thirty-five miles from Avlona, in the direction of Monastir. This was barely a fourth of the distance; nevertheless they were advancing toward Lake Ochrida, west of the Prespa Lakes, against which the Bulgarians rested their right wing. It was evident that they had driven back the Austrians who were supposed to hold this section.
On the 12th the British made an advance over on the right section of the front; nothing of any real importance had occurred over here since the supposed advance had begun, but there had been a great deal of noise from the artillery on both sides. On this date the British reached Seres, but were held back by the Bulgarians, who had previously driven out the Greek garrison and occupied the forts in the immediate neighborhood. These positions the British now began hammering with great vigor, with their biggest guns, though without any immediate result.
At the end of the third week of the month the Serbians, under General Mischitch, made another drive ahead and succeeded in penetrating the enemy's lines for a distance of two miles, taking Velyselo, and a day later Baldentsi. At the beginning of this battle, which lasted two days, the advantage rested with the Bulgarians. They held the higher line beyond the Cerna River, whose slopes were so steep that they could roll huge bowlders down on the attacking parties. After a two hours' artillery preparation early in the morning, the Serbians suddenly sprang forward with loud cheers and rushed the heights. From the rear they could be recognized at a great distance, on account of the large square of white calico which each man had sewn to the back of his coat, and the leaders carried white and red flags with which to indicate the farthest point reached, so that the artilleryin the rear could see and avoid shelling them. While the Serbians stormed one crest, the artillery pounded the crest just beyond. Finally all the crests were covered by little fluttering red and white flags, while the Bulgarians fled headlong down the opposite slopes. On the following day a period of very bad weather set in and drowned further operations in a deluge of rain.
On the 21st came another report from Rome of some significance. In the Iskeria Mountains east of Premeti an Italian detachment occupied Lyaskoviki, on the road from Janina to Koritza. The latter town marks the racial boundary between the Bulgarian and Albanian countries. To the eastward was the rough country of Kastoria in which the Russians were operating. In other words, the Italians were emerging from Albania and were getting within reach of the Macedonian field of operations. In fact, on the 29th it was reported that this Italian expedition had linked up with the extreme left of the Allied wing, but this report must have been quite premature; it still had some very rough country to traverse before this could be accomplished. The end of the month saw a lull in the operations in the entire Macedonian theater on account of the bad weather.[Back to Contents]
SEIZURE OF THE GREEK FLEET
On October 11, 1916, the patience of the Allies seems to have been again exhausted with the wavering policy of the Greek monarch. On that date Admiral du Fournier came to Athens and demanded the surrender of the entire Greek fleet, except the cruiserAveroffand the battleshipsLemnosandKilkis(the latter two formerly the American shipsIdahoandMississippi). He further demanded the transfer of control to the Allies of the Piræus-Larissa railroad and that the shore batteries should all be dismantled. These demands were complied with at once, andall but the three vessels named were surrendered and their crews landed. The ships so handed over consisted of three battleships, one protected cruiser, four gunboats, three mine layers, one torpedo depot ship, sixteen destroyers, twelve torpedo boats, four submarines, and the royal yacht. The rest of the Greek navy had already gone over to the Allies, as was mentioned, and was now in Saloniki. The Piræus-Larissa railroad, which the Allies also demanded, runs for a distance of 200 miles in a winding course from Piræus, the seaport of Athens, to Larissa. The cause of this sudden action, as explained by the British press, was that for some time Greek troops had been concentrating in the interior near Larissa, while other troops were gathering in Corinth, from whence they could easily reach the force in Larissa.
An Athens division had been quietly moving along the railroad line, leaving a regiment to intrench themselves before the king's palace at Tatoi. Apparently the fear was that King Constantine was preparing, at a favorable moment, to retire with his army and intrench himself in the plains of Thessaly until he could there join hands with the Bulgarians and the Germans and perhaps attack the Allies on their left flank. The surrender of the railroad now made this impossible.
The result of this action was that large street demonstrations began at once, supposed to have been instigated by the Reservists' League. The French admiral thereupon landed a large force of marines and occupied a number of public buildings whence he could control the main streets with machine guns. By the 16th all Athens seemed to be in an uproar, but the violence which took place was directed against Venizelist sympathizers, while in their demonstrations against the Allies the rioters contented themselves with jeering and hurling insulting remarks. In these disorders the police remained absolutely passive, and on some occasions joined with the rioters. This caused the French admiral to demand that the command of the police force should be practically turned over to him. A French officer was at once established as chief inspector at the Ministry of the Interior. Transfers or dismissals in the force could nownot be made without his consent, while he himself had arbitrary power in dismissing and transferring. He was also empowered to appoint inspectors throughout the rest of the kingdom. Naturally, the royalist press came out in strong denunciations, but these were terminated when the French established a press censorship.
On the 22d the Allied governments demanded that the Greek force concentrated at Larissa be withdrawn from that point and scattered throughout the southern part of the country, and this demand was also promised. During the rest of the month there were reports of conferences between King Constantine and the French admiral and the representatives of the Entente, all tending to show that he was again becoming intensely pro-Ally.[Back to Contents]
THE BULGARIANS DRIVEN BACK
The quiet which prevailed in the field of military effort in Macedonia toward the end of October, 1916, continued well into November, 1916, save for local artillery activity and trench raids. But on the 11th fighting broke out again in the bend of the Cerna River on the sector held by the Serbians and French. That the Allies here made serious gains was proved by the fact that for the first time Sofia dispatches admitted an enemy advance, though they minimized it to trifling significance. On that date the Serbians began a series of attacks which resulted in the capture of Polog and 600 prisoners. During all of the following day the battle continued, and again the Serbians advanced, supported by the French, this time penetrating the enemy's lines for a distance of seven miles, enabling them to take the village of Iven and another 1,000 prisoners. On this date the Serbians announced that since September 14, 1916, when the offensive began, they had taken 6,000 prisoners, 72 cannon, and 53 machine guns. Again the Sofia dispatch admitted that theSerbians had succeeded in "making a salient before our positions northeast of Polog."
The Serbians had now broken through the range of hills intervening between themselves and the eastern edge of the Monastir Plain. For a day there was a lull, and then the Serbians and French resumed their attacks. Northeast of Iven the Bulgarians and Germans were compelled to fall back, close pressed by the Serbians, who occupied the village of Cegal. North of Velyeselo the French and Serbians also advanced; the fighting spread westward as far as Kenali. The prisoners taken during the past few days now numbered 2,200, among whom were 600 Germans. But more important still, the Allies were now almost due east of the city of Monastir. That city was now in imminent danger.
On the 16th the entire line of formidable frontier defenses centered on Kenali had to be abandoned by the German and Bulgarian troops, in which operation they lost heavily. They then retreated across the Viro River, west of the railroad and across the Bistritza River to the east of the line, so that the Russians, following them up closely, succeeded in arriving within four miles of the city. Meanwhile the Serbians, in the mountains east of the swamps which protected the plain along the Cerna, were rushing rapidly on in their effort to swing around to the northeast of the city before the enemy should be able to intrench himself among the rolling hills that bound the northern extent of the plain. It was significant that among the prisoners were a number of members of regiments which had been fighting, only a week previously, upon the Dobrudja front under Mackensen.[Back to Contents]
MONASTIR FALLS
A glance at the map will show that Monastir was now practically in the hands of the Allies, that it would be impossible for the Germans and Bulgarians to hold it any longer. As has already been explained, the plain or valley near whose head it stands is a broad, level region which here penetrates the mountainous interior of this portion of the Balkan Peninsula. To the eastward it is bounded by low, rolling foothills, which gradually rise into high, rocky mountains or heights. On the west there are no foothills: the mountains rise abruptly, stretching south almost to Kastoria. The railroad, after leaving Banitza, in the foothills, swings around into the plain, but under the shadows of the high ridges on the western side. Up toward the head of the plain these mountains curve slightly inward. About ten or fifteen miles below the point where they meet the rolling foothills, thus forming the head of the valley, the city of Monastir lies, some of its outlying suburbs being plastered up against the base of the mountains.
An army occupying the heights above would absolutely dominate the city; its artillery could pound it to a wreck within a few hours.
It was along these heights on the western edge of the plain that the French and the Serbians had advanced, driving the Bulgarians and Germans before them. Just at Monastir these heights are especially high and jagged, and the Bulgarians and Germans might very well have held out here against the enemy for a much longer period. But the foothills over on the eastern side of the plain had been passing into the hands of the Serbians operating in that region. These forces were now passing to the northward of the city, though the marshy plain still intervened. They were advancing toward the head of the valley. Should they succeed in reaching this point, where the highway to Prilep passed, they would cut off the retreat of the Bulgarians.
But there was still another road by which the Bulgarians might have retreated: the highway leading through Resna to the upper part of Lake Ochrida. Had this been open they might have risked the blocking of the Prilep road. But, as was later indicated by the reports, the Italians had by this time advanced above Koritza and were not only in touch with the Russians operating around Kastoria and the lower part of the Prespa and Ochrida lakes, but they were skirting the western shore of Ochrida and threatening to advance on Monastir by this very highway. Thus the Bulgarians were threatened from two directions—by the Italians, who were turning their right flank, and by the Serbians, who had broken through their lines in the foothills east of the Monastir plain. There is probably no doubt that they could have held off all frontal attacks from the heights above Monastir. Thus they were squeezed, rather than driven, out of the city.
On the night of the 18th the German and Bulgarian forces in the city quietly withdrew and retreated along the Prilep road to the head of the valley. At 8 o'clock the following morning, on November 19, 1916, exactly a year since the Serbians had been driven out of the city by the Austrians and Bulgarians, the Allied forces marched into the Macedonian city, and an hour later the flag of King Peter once more floated above the roofs. Apparently the Bulgarian retreat had been too long delayed, for before reaching the head of the valley they were cut off by the Serbians and only escaped after heavy losses, both in killed, wounded, prisoners, and materials. At the same time the Serbians effectually closed the road, taking several villages and all the dominating heights.
From a military point of view the fall of Monastir was not of vast importance; it was of about the same significance from a tactical aspect as Bucharest. But from a moral and political aspect it was of immense importance. Though only populated by some 50,000 of mixed Turks, Vlachs (Rumanians), Greeks, a few Serbs and Bulgarians, the latter predominating, it was the center of the most Bulgarian portion of Macedonia. Throughout the outlying districts down to Kastoria, over to Albania, andup to Uskub, the population is purely and aggressively Bulgar. Here the simple peasants were persecuted by the Greek Church for fifteen years preceding the First Balkan War and by the Serbians afterward; by the one on account of their religion, by the other on account of their nationality. Here, too was the center of the revolutionary movement against the Turks, and here the people rose time and time again in open insurrection, only to be quenched by fire and blood. Nowhere in the Balkan Peninsula has there been so much oppression and bloodshed on account of nationality. For these reasons Monastir has a deep sentimental significance to every Bulgarian. No part of Macedonia means so much to him. Its possession by the Serbians after the Balkan Wars did more, probably, to reconcile the country to King Ferdinand's otherwise hateful pro-German policy than anything else. As is now well known, Ferdinand stipulated that this city should not only be taken from the Serbians, but that it should belong to Bulgaria, before he entered the war on the side of the Germans and Austrians. Otherwise it is quite likely that the Teutons would not have considered it worth while to advance so far south. Its recapture by the Serbians and their allies must, therefore, have had a corresponding depressing effect in Bulgaria.
On the day following the evacuation of Monastir the Italians appear for the first time in the reports of the fighting in this region. They had obviously come in contact with the Bulgarians on their extreme right and were pressing them back, thus forcing the whole line to retire. The French, too, made some advance along the eastern shore of Lake Prespa, while the Serbians took five villages in the foothills at the head of the plain. The main forces of the Bulgarians and Germans were making their stand about twelve miles north of the city, well up in the hills and crossing the Prilep highway.
For some days following bad weather again settled down over the Monastir section of the Macedonian front, and though it did not stop the fighting, it rendered further progress on the part of the Allies very difficult. But in spite of the brilliant victories announced by the dispatches from Berlin and Sofia, these veryreports indicated, by the changing localities of the skirmishes that the Germans and Bulgarians were still being pressed back. By the end of the month the Serbians northeast of Monastir had advanced as far as Grunishte. In the northwest the Italians were fighting in the mountains about Tcervena Stana. Reporting on the last day of the month, Berlin announces that "this was the day of hardest fighting." The Germans and the Bulgarians had now reached their next line of defense and were making desperate efforts to hold it.
Meanwhile, over on the right of the Allied front, between Doiran and the Vardar, violent fighting had been going on during the past few weeks, and though the Allies seemed to make some slight progress here and there, none of these gains were of a significant nature. Here the Bulgarians seemed to be holding their own completely. Possibly it was not Sarrail's object to attempt any real advance over in this section; merely to keep the enemy engaged there and prevent his rendering too much aid to the harried Bulgarian right wing. His main offensive, if he really had contemplated a real advance, had evidently been planned for the Monastir route into Serbia. That all the Slavic troops, the Russians and Serbians, were placed over in this section gives, besides, some little color to this supposition.[Back to Contents]
GREEK FIGHTS GREEK
In Greece the same old situation continued. In the beginning of the month there had come the first clash between the volunteer soldiers of the Provisional Government and the troops of the king. The Greek troops at Larissa had not yet had time to remove to southern Greece, in accordance with the demands of the Allies, when on November 2, 1916, a body of volunteers of the Provisional Government marched overland to Katerina, a town twenty-five miles northeast of Larissa, where a garrisonof royalist troops was stationed. Whether the insurgents really attacked the garrison, or whether the royalist force withdrew peacefully, was not made clear, but the fact was that the volunteers entered the town and took possession. Following this incident, it was stated from Athens on the 12th that King Constantine had given his permission that any of his officers in either the army or navy might join the forces of the Provisional Government, provided they first resigned from the regular establishment. On this date Germany entered her official protest against Greece handing over her ships and much war material to the French admiral. In connection with this report it was stated that Germany herself, on taking the forts and towns in eastern Macedonia, had seized 350 cannon, 60,000 rifles and $20,000,000 worth of ammunition. In the light of these facts, naturally Germany's protest was not taken very seriously. Indeed, it seems only to have suggested to the Allies that they complete what Germany had so well begun, for on the 18th Admiral Fournier presented a demand to the Greek Government that it surrender all arms, munitions, and artillery of the Greek army, with the exception of some 50,000 rifles. The reason given was that the equilibrium had been disturbed by Germany's seizure of so much war material. This demand the Greek Government refused to concede five days later. Admiral Fournier thereupon declared that the Greek Government had until December 1, 1916, in which to make its decision.
On the 26th the Provisional Government, through President Venizelos, formally declared war against Germany and Bulgaria. On this same date the Allied representatives protested to the Greek Government against the continued persecution of the adherents of the Provisional Government, and warned it that these must stop. At the same time several prominent Venizelists in Athens were advised that they would be fully protected, among them the mayor of the city.
On December 1, 1916, when the ultimatum regarding the surrender of the arms and ammunition of the Greek forces expired, a crisis was again precipitated. The day before a transport with French troops appeared in Piræus Harbor and preparationswere made to land them. At the same time the Greek Government took control of the telegraphs and the post office, expelling the French officers in charge. During the day Admiral du Fournier notified the Greek Government that the first installment of war material must be delivered that day. The reply was a definite refusal. Thereupon troops and marines were landed from the transport and ships at Piræus. Again large mobs assembled in the streets, and on the Allied troops marching into Athens a number of the demonstrators fired on them with revolvers. It was even reported that royalist troops took part in these disorders and made organized attacks on the French troops. Three Greek officers and twenty-six soldiers were reported killed, while the Allies lost two officers and forty-five marines. Apparently the Venizelists also took part in the rioting and the street fighting against the royalists, for General Corakas, head of the recruiting bureau for the Provisional Government in Athens, was arrested on a charge of inciting guerrilla warfare in Athens and using his room in the Hotel Majestic as a point from which to fire upon Greek soldiers. Mayor Benakas of Athens, a sympathizer of the Provisional Government, was also removed from office.
On the following day, the disorders still continuing, the Entente Powers declared an embargo on all Greek shipping in their ports.[Back to Contents]
FIGHTING IN THE STREETS OF ATHENS
On December 4, 1916, Lord Robert Cecil, War Trade Minister, said in the British House of Commons that the situation was more serious than it had ever been before. Despite assurances from the Greek king that no disturbances would be permitted, a "most treacherous and unprovoked attack was made on the Allies' detachments landed by the French admiral on Friday." The British Government, Lord Cecil continued, considered the responsibilityof the king and Greek Government to be deeply involved in this matter and Great Britain was considering, in conjunction with her Allies, immediate steps to secure a radical solution of the situation which had arisen. During these troubles the Greek ministers at Paris and London and the consuls at London and Manchester resigned, stating that they could no longer identify themselves with the present Government of Greece.
By the following day the Allied forces had been compelled to withdraw under the protection of their ships at Piræus. Meanwhile, it was said, the Greeks were intrenching on all the heights around the city. All the citizens of the Allied nations had left the city and had taken refuge in Piræus. The diplomatic representatives of the United States, Holland, and Spain entered a protest against the treatment being accorded the Liberals. To this the Greek Government replied as follows:
"The Royal Government from the first day had in view only the reestablishment and maintenance of order in the trouble on Friday and Saturday caused by revolutionary elements. This was done completely with as little damage as possible.
"If, contrary to the orders given, there was some excess of tension and indignation on the part of the population and the troops, who saw in a movement so tragic for the fatherland agitators taking advantage of the unhappy events of the day to take up arms against the country and try to overthrow the established government, this must be taken into consideration. This exasperation was particularly aroused by the bombardment of the Royal Palace and the neighborhood thereof, in this, an open city, at the very moment when, an armistice having been concluded, it was hoped that peace would finally reign. Nevertheless, the Royal Government is decided to punish every person guilty of committing illegal acts and exceeding instructions, and a severe investigation will be begun to this end so soon as acts of this nature are brought to the attention of the Royal Government. In this connection the Foreign Minister considers it his duty to recall to your attention that by his note of November 28 he warned the neutral powers of the tragic position in whichthe Greek nation was placed as a result of measures taken against Greece and of the consequences which the French admiral's insistence on obtaining Greek war material might well have."
A further explanation of the Greek point of view, with special reference to the street fighting in which the Allied troops were engaged, was contained in a note sent to the United States Government, on December 9, 1916. This communication was, in part, as follows:
"Please bring to the knowledge of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that the Royal Government, with two letters and several oral declarations, had informed the French admiral of the impossibility of delivering the war material they were summoned to give away. Despite these warnings the admiral decided to land a certain number of detachments which in several columns proceeded from Piræus to the capital, which was under military control. The detachments occupied some of the outskirts and repulsed the royal army, which only at that moment decided to defend themselves without any orders. After the morning skirmishes between the Allied detachments and our troops, a truce was decided upon, at the request of the admiral. Despite the armistice, however, and after firing had ceased, the Allied warships bombarded several parts of the city and fired not less than thirty-eight shells, seven of which were directed against the Royal Palace. There can, under these conditions, be no question of treachery or of an unprovoked attack."
After the fighting and rioting had continued for some forty-eight hours, quiet and order seem to have been reestablished in Athens. Then followed a period of secret conferences between members of the Greek Government, the king and the representatives of the Entente Powers, the details of which were not made public. On December 16, 1916, it was announced from Paris that Greece had accepted unreservedly the conditions of the Allies. Regarding the disorders of the first few days of the month, the Greek Government declared its desire to give every legitimate satisfaction and proposed arbitration. A hope was expressed, at the same time, that the Allies would lift the blockade which had been in force ever since the disorders.Further details were not given out; until the end of the month calm again prevailed in Greece. But as yet there was no indication that permanent settlement of the difficulties was in sight.[Back to Contents]
THE SERBIANS CHECKED
With regard to the military activities of the Allies along the Macedonian front, little more need be said for the period ending with February 1, 1917. Having been ousted out of the Monastir Plain, the German-Bulgarian troops were now defending a new line which seemed more advantageous to them. Apparently fighting continued, sometimes with furious determination on both sides, but the results were negligible. The terrain was now somewhat similar to that in France, and the situation seemingly became similar. The opposing lines faced each other deeply intrenched. Neither side could seriously drive the other back. By this time the Serbian capital had been reestablished in Monastir and the Serbians could make the claim that they were again fighting on native soil, though the Monastir district outside the city never gave birth to one Serbian.
Considering the whole period covering the half year ending with February 1, 1917, it may well be said that, whatever his reasons, General Sarrail's activities have deeply disappointed the friends of the Entente. Reviewing the results of the entire half year's fighting along the Macedonian front, no results worthy of mention are visible save the capture of Monastir, and even this is almost entirely limited to its political value. From a military point of view, the Bulgarians have held their own with forces obviously inferior in numbers to those of the Allies. Naturally, in such a country the advantage is always with the defensive. It is significant that throughout the half year there are few dispatches indicating strong counterattacks on the part of the Bulgarians.[Back to Contents]
THE FALL OF GORITZ
Next to the Trentino the Isonzo was the part of the Austro-Italian front which had seen most fighting in the past. From the very beginning of the war it was there that the Italians had made their most elaborate efforts. Not only did the territory, difficult though it was ever there, allow the use of larger numbers and make possible more extensive operations, but success on the Isonzo front held out a greater promise than anywhere else—possession of Trieste.
In spite of heroic efforts on the part of the Italian troops, however, so far not a great deal had been accomplished. It was time that the Italian lines were well in Austrian territory. But in midsummer, 1916, they were still not much farther advanced than soon after the outbreak of hostilities between Italy and Austria. The Austrians so far had resisted all Italian attempts to take Goritz, an important town on the Isonzo, about twenty-two miles northwest of Trieste. With Goritz in the hands of the Austrians Trieste was safe. For it could not be approached by the Italians as long as this important position threatened the flank and rear of any army attacking Trieste along the seashore.
For considerable time little activity had been reported from the Isonzo front. In fact, during the beginning of August, 1916, nothing but occasional artillery engagements occurred anywhere on the Austro-Italian front. On August 4, 1916, however, signs of renewed Italian activity on the Isonzo front became noticeable. On that day a vigorous attack was launched against Austrian positions on the Monfalcone sector, the most southern wing ofthe Isonzo front. This sector was about ten miles southwest of Goritz and fifteen miles northwest of Trieste.
Goritz was protected by three strong positions, Monte Sabotino to the north, Podgora to the west, and Monte San Michele to the south. The second of these had been in possession of the Italians for some time, but was of little use, though only just across the river from Goritz, because it was exposed to murderous fire from the Austrian positions on Monte Sabotino. To the south of Monte San Michele and north and east of Monfalcone there stretched the Doberdo and Carso Plateaus. These were elevated flatlands of a rocky character, very much exposed. They were bounded on all sides by hills, the western slopes of which rose almost directly out of the Gulf of Trieste. Before Trieste itself could be reached these plateaus had to be crossed.
Following their initial successes of August 4 and 5, 1916, the Italians extended their operations on August 6, 1916. Stubborn fighting took place in the region of the Goritz bridgehead, on Monte Sabotino and Monte San Michele, as well as near Monfalcone and the Doberdo Plateau. The Italians, as may be seen from the following description of the special correspondent of the London "Times" who observed the attack, preceded the general attack with an elaborate artillery bombardment.
"From 7 o'clock yesterday morning until 3.30 in the afternoon a fearful bombardment swept the Austrian positions from Monte Sabotino to Monfalcone such as has never been equaled even in this desolate zone. Gray-green clouds veiled the entire front, contrasting with the limpid atmosphere of a perfect day. All the hillsides on this side of the Isonzo were covered with new batteries, which belched forth an unceasing rain of projectiles on the surprised Austrians on the rocks of Sabotino, whose summit (2,030 feet) completely dominates Goritz. The Carso, the possession of which by the Austrians has been a deciding factor in many memorable struggles, was completely hidden by smoke until 3.30 in the afternoon. The general attack had been arranged for 4 o'clock, but the waiting troops on the Sabotino by 3.30 could endure restraint no longer. Their commander ordered the cessation of the bombardment and ordered the advance.
"Since October 23 last year the Italian line on the Sabotino remained unchanged. The southern side of the mountain sloping down to the Pevmica was honeycombed with elaborately constructed caverns, drilled out of the solid rock by the Italians. During these months each cavern was made to contain an entire company of infantry.
"Recently, unknown to the enemy, a tunnel 850 feet long, which reached to within 90 feet of the Austrian trenches had been added to the engineering exploits of the Italians; 800 men were assembled in this tunnel. At a given signal they led the attack, supported by first-line troops and strong reserves, thanks to this intricate system of galleries on Sabotino's crest. The attack was watched by countless observers, who, on other mountains, were hanging breathless on the result of this hour's work. Innumerable patches of scrubby undergrowth had been set on fire by the Italians to prevent their serving Austrian snipers and were now wrapped in low-hanging clouds of black smoke. Between these black patches the Italians crept ahead when the signal came. The assault of the Austrian positions was of incredible rapidity. So much so that the first positions were carried by the time the enemy turned on his curtain of fire. The first, second, and third lines of trenches were carried in twenty minutes, after which the Austrians began a terrific bombardment of their old positions. The redoubt on the summit fell within an hour and the chase went on along the crest and down the sides, straight to the Isonzo, the pursuers everywhere gathering up prisoners in droves. San Mauro (one and one-fourth miles south of Sabotino) was taken by 6 o'clock, after which the work of intrenchment began."
In spite of the most stubborn resistance the Austrians had to give way gradually. On August 7, 1916, the Austrian troops on Monte Sabotino were withdrawn to the eastern bank of the Isonzo. At the same time the positions on Monte San Michele were evacuated and the Italians thereby were put in full possession of the Goritz bridgehead. Their attacks of August 5, 6, and 7, 1916, had netted them territory for which they had been fighting for months, besides about 10,000 prisoners, some 20guns and 100 machine guns and considerable war material of all description.
Without loss of time they brought in heavy artillery and opened a devastating fire on unfortunate Goritz. Strong resistance was offered by the Austrians at many points, not so much now in the hope of preventing the fall of Goritz as in order to protect their retreat. In spite of this resistance small detachments of Italians crossed the Isonzo at nightfall of August 8, 1916, while their engineers threw bridges over the river at various points.
On August 9, 1916, the bridge over the Isonzo leading directly into Goritz was stormed after one of the most sanguinary battles of the entire attack. This removed the last obstacle, and Italian troops immediately occupied the city. At the same time other troops took up the pursuit of the retreating Austrians. The latter delayed these operations as much as possible by rear-guard actions and by counterattacks against the new Italian positions on Monte San Michele and against the village of San Martino, just south of the mountain.
On August 10, 1916, the Third Italian Army continued with increased pressure the attack on the San Michele and San Martino sectors, which had begun on the 9th instant, and succeeded in capturing very strong Austrian defenses between the Vippacco and Monte Cosich. The Austrians were routed completely and retired east of Vallone, leaving, however, strong rear guards on Cima Debeli and on Hill 121, east of Monfalcone.
The Italians also occupied Rubbia and San Martino del Carso and the whole of the Doberdo Plateau, reaching the line of the Vallerie. East of Goritz the Austrians were holding out in trenches on the lines of Monte San Gabriele and Monte San Marto.
The Vallone was crossed by Italian troops on August 11, 1916. The same detachments stormed the western slopes of Monte Nadlogern and the summit of Crn-Hrid and occupied Opacchiasella, on the northern edge of the Carso Plateau.
By this time the Austrians had recovered their breath to some extent. They had taken up strong positions previously preparedfor them in the hills to the east of Goritz and there resisted successfully all Italian attacks. Occasional counterattacks against the new Italian positions, however, brought no results.
To the south of Goritz, too, the Italian advance came to a standstill after the Vallone Valley, separating the Doberdo from the Carso Plateau, had been crossed. Continuous fighting, however, went on along the northern edge of the Carso Plateau throughout the balance of the month of August, 1916, much of it being done by the artillery of both sides. The end of August, 1916, then, saw the Italians in possession of Goritz and their lines at some points as much as five miles nearer to Trieste. The latter, however, seemed at least for the time being safely in the hands of the Austrians, who by this time had received reenforcements and appeared to be determined to stop the Italian advance across the Carso Plateau at all odds.[Back to Contents]