AMERICA'S WAR AIMS
Nevertheless, the Papal and Lansdowne letters were not entirely fruitless. It brought the Allies a step nearer to restating their war aims through Lloyd-George and President Wilson. But their utterances pointed to a steadfast continuance of the war until those aims were achieved, not a slackening of hostilities to effect an inconclusive peace lenient to Germany.
Addressing a body of trades-union delegates at Westminster on January 5, 1918, the British Premier faced a situation—an apparent outgrowth of the Lansdowne letter—where national unity in the prosecution of the war was perceived to be in jeopardy. A suspicion was rife that the war was being pursuedfor objects which could not be openly avowed. Lloyd-George therefore saw the need of a restatement of war aims:
"We may begin by clearing away some misunderstandings and stating what we are not fighting for.
"We are not fighting a war of aggression against the German people. Their leaders have persuaded them that they are fighting a war of self-defense against a league of rival nations, bent on the destruction of Germany. That is not so. The destruction or disruption of Germany or the German people has never been a war aim with us from the first day of this war to this day.
"Nor did we enter this war merely to alter or destroy the imperial constitution of Germany, much as we consider that military and autocratic constitution a dangerous anachronism in the twentieth century. Our point of view is that the adoption of a really democratic constitution by Germany would be the most convincing evidence that her old spirit of military domination has, indeed, died in this war and would make it much easier for us to conclude a broad, democratic peace with her. But, after all, that is a question for the German people to decide.
"We are not fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary or to deprive Turkey of its capital or the rich lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish.
"The settlement of the new Europe must be based on such grounds of reason and justice as will give some promise of stability. Therefore, it is that we feel that government with the consent of the governed must be the basis of any territorial settlement in this war. For that reason also, unless treaties be upheld, unless every nation is prepared, at whatever sacrifices, to honor the national signature, it is obvious that no treaty of peace can be worth the paper on which it is written."
The British Premier then restated the Allies' specific war aims, which did not materially differ from the first declaration recorded in a previous volume of this history, except with regard to Russia, conditions in that country having called for a suspension of judgment on territorial questions affecting her.
Three days later (January 8, 1918), President Wilson gave to the world the peace terms of the United States in an address toCongress. His declaration was the most advanced doctrine of internationalism pronounced by any of the Allied statesmen. It definitely committed the United States not only to promoting and safeguarding the peace of Europe but the peace of the world. The frequent question: What was America fighting for? was answered. It was not merely to uphold American rights. The aims of the United States had developed far beyond nationalism. It was to uphold the rights of all the peoples menaced or outraged in the world war.
The purpose of the President's address appeared to be threefold:
To drive a wedge into the political structure of Germany by encouraging the Socialists and liberal elements, and exhibiting the military party as the single obstacle to democracy and world peace.
To expose the insincerity of Germany's pretensions of liberality in her peace offers to Russia and thus bring Russia back into partnership with the democracy of the Allies, which she showed symptoms of abandoning.
To show the agreement of the United States with the speech of Lloyd-George and to develop further the principles of world peace for which America stood.
The Entente Allies welcomed the President's pronouncement as putting the seal of American approval on their war aims, as reiterated by Lloyd-George, and as committing the United States to the Allied cause till it was won. The necessity for any restatement of war aims by the United States was regarded as a question for the President to determine, and he had done so at a time when the need was clearly urgent in Great Britain. Hence his address, echoing and, indeed, amplifying that of Lloyd-George, buttressed British solidarity on the war by definitely establishing an abiding Anglo-American Entente while the war lasted.
Far from opening a way to peace, the Papal and Lansdowne pleas produced a sequence of utterances which were in effect renewed war declarations from the spokesmen of the Allies. Lord Lansdowne sought a reiteration of war aims as a basis forpeace negotiations. President Wilson's answer to that suggestion was not confined to a reassertion of America's war objects. While the dove of peace was fluttering a pair of weak wings he went to Congress (December 4, 1917) and called for war against Austria-Hungary to remove an "embarrassing obstacle" in the conduct of hostilities against Germany.
"Austria-Hungary," he told Congress, "is for the time being not her own mistress, but simply the vassal of the German Government. We must face the facts as they are and act upon them without sentiment in this stern business.
"The Government of Austria-Hungary is not acting upon its own initiative or in response to the wishes and feelings of its own peoples, but as the instrument of another nation. We must meet its force with our own and regard the Central Powers as but one. The war can be successfully conducted in no other way. The same logic would lead also to a declaration of war against Turkey and Bulgaria. They also are the tools of Germany. But they are mere tools and do not yet stand in the direct path of our necessary action."
Both branches of Congress responded by passing a joint war resolution with only one dissentient House vote, and on December 7, 1917, war with Austria-Hungary was declared.
Germany meditated. There was an answer to be made to Lloyd-George and President Wilson, but what? The military situation, as seen through German eyes, and the political situation in Germany, as dominated by the Junkers and annexationists, duly supplied it. Germany seemed to have become convinced that a German peace was certain. Her confidence was stated to be based on the war map, added to a belief that a lack of cohesion and community of spirit prevailed among the Allies, in contrast with her own unified will to victory, and that the United States was merely gesturing in entering the war. There was obvious camouflage in affecting to question the solidarity of the Allies and to asperse the sincerity of American intervention; but no posturing was perceived in Germany's reliance on the war map as a tangible basis for a German peace.
The kaiser's new chancellor, Count von Hertling, addressing the Reichstag main committee on January 22, 1918, emphasized this reliance in a speech which constituted a tardy response to the war aims reaffirmed by Lloyd-George and President Wilson. Demanding that the Entente Powers abandon their attitude that Germany was the guilty party who must do penance and promise improvement, he said:
"They may take it from me that our military position was never so favorable as it now is. Our highly gifted army leaders face the future with undiminished confidence in victory. Throughout the army, in the officers and the men, lives unbroken the joy of battle.
"Our repeatedly expressed willingness for peace and the spirit of reconciliation revealed by our proposals must not be regarded by the Entente as a license permitting the indefinite lengthening of the war.
"If the leaders of the enemy powers really are inclined toward peace let them revise their program once again. If they do that and come forward with fresh proposals, then we will examine them carefully."
This was by way of preface to answering President Wilson's fourteen requirements if the United States was to lay down its arms. The first four, in the chancellor's view, were susceptible to agreement. Germany accepted in principle the abolition of secret diplomacy and favored open covenants of peace. The chancellor saw no difference of opinion on the subject of freedom of navigation upon the seas; but it was "highly important for the freedom of shipping in future if strongly fortified naval bases on important international routes, such as England has at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Hongkong, the Falkland Islands, and many other places, were removed." Further, Germany was in accord with the President regarding the removal of economic barriers that interfered with international trade. She also affirmed that the limitation of armaments desired by President Wilson was "discussable."
The fifth clause of the Wilson peace aims, which called for self-determination by colonial peoples as to whose sovereigntythey should recognize, was less easily disposed of. The chancellor evaded the issue by throwing the onus of putting the proposal in practice upon Great Britain:
"I believe that for the present it may be left for England, which has the greatest colonial empire, to make what she will of this proposal of her ally. This point of the program also will have to be discussed in due time, on the reconstitution of the world's colonial possessions."
Thus Germany submitted, as one of the foundations of peace, that England should not only abandon her naval bases but assent to the dismemberment of her colonial empire.
The President's demand for the evacuation of Russian territory was met by a refusal. The Entente Powers having declined to participate in the negotiations between the so-called Russian Government and the Teutonic Powers, the matter was one to be decided between the negotiators alone.
Belgium was not to be evacuated and restored as a condition insisted upon by the United States. The settlement of the Belgian question, the chancellor said, belonged to the peace conference:
"So long as our opponents have unreservedly taken the stand-point that the integrity of the Allies' territory can offer the only possible basis of peace discussion, I must adhere to the stand-point hitherto always adopted and refuse the removal in advance of the Belgian affair from the entire discussion."
The chancellor took the same attitude toward the question of freeing and restoring the invaded French territory and of the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France to right an old wrong. "The occupied parts of France are a valued pawn in our hands," said the chancellor. "The conditions and methods of procedure of the evacuation, which must take account of Germany's vital interest, are to be agreed upon between Germany and France. I can only again expressly accentuate the fact that there can never be a question of dismemberment of imperial territory."
The next four Wilson requirements (VIII to XI), relating to a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy, autonomy for the subjugated races of Austria-Hungary, the restoration and integrityof Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro were not Germany's immediate concern, and the chancellor airily relegated them to Austria-Hungary for consideration. As to Turkey, for whose subject races the President demanded self-government, as well as a free Dardanelles, the chancellor intimated that her integrity vitally concerned the German Empire, while the future of Poland was to rest entirely in the hands of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Finally, President Wilson's proposed league of nations admitted of basic consideration only when all other pending questions had been settled.
The chancellor's answer was a mere repetition of the defiant and arrogant presentations of the German position with which the Allies had become familiar. The war aims of the President to which Count von Hertling could assent were of trivial importance compared to the Allies' chief aim—the overthrow of Prussian militarism. Peace gropings had produced another declaration of war. Germany openly announced that she was engaged on a war of conquest. Chancellor von Hertling's address admitted of no other interpretation. The fate of Poland was to be decided by the kaisers, that is, annexed in substance, if not in form. The Baltic provinces of Russia were earmarked for Germany, and Russia, thus cut off from the western seas, was to have icebound Archangel and distant Vladivostok as her only ports. The disposition or division of Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro was to be left to Austria-Hungary, with Germany pledged to support her decisions. Armenia, Palestine, and Arabia, were to be returned to the Turks, while as to Constantinople and the Dardanelles no settlement could be permitted that was not agreeable to German imperialism. As to Belgium, the conclusion was that it would receive the same status as Luxemburg had before the war, with railroads, ports, commerce, and army in German hands. Not even the return of northern France was promised, this being a question to be discussed, not with the Allies, but only between Germany and France, and Alsace-Lorraine was to be kept on the fraudulent claim that it was and always had been German territory. The question of Italia Irredenta was remitted to Austria-Hungary, and the German colonies were to be restored,regardless of the wishes of their inhabitants or the safety of their neighbors.
When this grandiose scheme of conquest was ratified and realized, then, and then only, would Germany consider entering into a league of peace, or discuss mutual disarmament, or other of the Allies' proposals for safeguarding peace when it came. Germany sought to be placed in possession of doubled power before she would even talk about creating conditions making for a durable peace. She must be able to reject flatly any scheme proposed, and then, snapping her fingers, defy the Allies to do what they would, for she in no wise bound herself to disarm a single soldier or spike a single gun.
The Austrian Reichsrat heard a speech of a different tenor by Count Czernin, Foreign Minister, on the subject of President Wilson's peace aims. The contrast in tone from that of Chancellor von Hertling was so marked and significant as to revive the preexisting belief that the road to peace negotiations would eventually be opened through Austria. Though Count Czernin's speech resolutely upheld the integrity of Austria-Hungary and the preservation and development of her neighboring interests without dictation from the Entente Powers, he held out an olive branch that seemed less of an imitation than those offered by Berlin.
"I think," he said, "there is no harm in stating that I regard the recent proposals of President Wilson as an appreciable approach to the Austro-Hungarian point of view, and that to some of them Austria-Hungary joyfully could give her approval.
"Our views are identical not only on the broad principles regarding a new organization of the world after the war, but also on several concrete questions, and differences which still exist do not appear to me to be so great that a conversation regarding them would not lead to enlightenment and a rapprochement.
"This situation, which doubtless arises from the fact that Austria-Hungary on the one side and the United States on the other are composed of States whose interests are least at variance with one another, tempts one to ask if an exchange of ideas between the two powers could not be the point of departure for apersonal conversation among all States which have not yet joined in peace negotiations."
This conciliatory overture—significantly addressed, the Allies quickly noticed, only to the United States—was clearly governed by expediency. Count Czernin revealed a recognition of the critical condition of internal affairs in Austria-Hungary, and sought to make advances that would placate the restless and war-worn people of the dual monarchy without offending the autocratic rulers in Berlin. If peace could come by compromise, then let there be compromise, and approaches to the United States seemed to afford a line of least resistance.
Austria's sincerity, however, was questioned alike in Washington, Paris, and London. Count Czernin was suspected of dangling a familiar bait to split the Allies. The Administration view was that his endeavor to single out the United States as a party with whom to begin preliminary peace conversations was so naive as to be amusing if the situation were not so serious. His invitation was not acceptable. The American Government had thrown in its lot with Great Britain, France, and Italy, and was determined to stand or fall with them. His attempt to promote a separate peace between Austria and the United States was viewed as inspired by a hope that its consideration would either lessen the effectiveness of America's part in the war or provide an opportunity for the pacifists in the Allied countries to extend such a peace movement to the other powers before the war's purposes had been achieved.
The French view was that while the deliverances of Count von Hertling and Count Czernin disclosed that a real cleavage on peace sentiment existed in the two Central Empires, and that the Austrian minister was the first of their spokesmen to show breadth and detachment, the contrast between the two speeches indicated Germanesque stage play. Germany's move was not to show a conciliatory spirit; she left Austria to perform that rôle. The Allies could take their choice in measuring the negotiable value of the two outgivings.
The Allies decided that the war must proceed. Germany regarded herself as a conqueror, was determined upon aggression,and would listen to no peace terms except her own. Count Czernin's conciliatory tone was discounted by his declared fidelity to Austria's alliance to Germany. The two speeches were believed to have been concocted in collusion with the object of springing a combined diplomatic offensive against the Entente Allies.
"The attack," said the London "Times," "obviously was intended to shake the solidarity of our defense at several points, but President Wilson manifestly was the chief objective of the converging forces. Neither speech discloses the least readiness to make any concessions which the Allies declare to be indispensable."
The effect of the Austro-German pronouncements on Great Britain was to stiffen her resolution to continue hostilities. Little weight was attached to what Austria, the tool of Germany, had to say; the former's peace yearnings, set against the latter's aspirations, were impotent unless energized by a revolution in the dual monarchy. The British only took cognizance of Count von Hertling's words, which confirmed the prevalent belief that Prussian militarism considered itself more firmly seated in the saddle than ever, and that although the chancellor seemed to hold the reins, the team which drew the German car of state was at the mercy of Ludendorff's whip and Hindenburg's spur.
MOVING THE MILITARY MACHINE
When Congress closed an epochal session on October 6, 1917, it had appropriated over twenty-one billion dollars. Except for $7,000,000,000 loaned to the Allies, and another billion for the normal expenses of the Government, the amount voted was placed at the service of the Administration as America's sinews of war for defeating the Central Powers. No nation had applied such a huge sum to war purposes in a like period.
The loans to the Allies were not considered as part of the American war outlays. The Allies gave their own bonds to the Government as collateral for the loans, bearing the same rate of interest, and a condition attached to the loans was that the money be spent in the United States for war equipment. Hence the loans were allocated for the purchase of material in this country and substantially aided American industries.
Included in the work of Congress was final agreement on a war revenue measure after six months of debate (with wide divergence of taxation plans between the House and Senate) estimated to produce $2,534,870,000, of which $851,000,000 was to be levied on incomes, and $1,000,000,000 on excess profits.
On October 1, 1917, the Government appealed for popular subscriptions to the second Liberty Loan for $3,000,000,000. As in the case of the first Liberty Loan the response at the outset flagged. Two weeks later only 14 per cent. of the maximum total had been subscribed and a daily subscription of $358,000,000 was needed to make the loan a success within the time allotted for receiving subscriptions. A period of apprehension and misgiving followed; but that had happened during the floatation of the first loan, and no European war loan had been asked without a similar experience. It was not an easy task to draw three billion dollars from the public purse, and the purse was leisurely, even lax, in loosening its strings. It needed a nationwide advertising propaganda to open it. The President entered the fray by naming a Liberty Day, fixed for October 24, on which he asked the American people to assemble in their respective communities and pledge to one another and to the Government the fullest measure of financial support.
"The might of the United States," he declared in his proclamation, "is being mobilized and organized to strike a mortal blow at autocracy in defense of outraged American rights and of the cause of liberty. Billions of dollars are required to arm, feed, and clothe the brave men who are going forth to fight our country's battles and to assist the nations with whom we are making common cause against a common foe. To subscribe to the Liberty Loan is to perform a service of patriotism.
"Let the result be so impressive and emphatic that it will echo throughout the empire of our enemy as an index of what America intends to do to bring this war to a victorious conclusion."
The Government's efforts to brace popular interest in the loan, aided by hundreds of thousands of voluntary workers throughout the country who formed Liberty Loan organizations, bankers, boy scouts, girl scouts, the newspapers and magazines, and patriotic, commercial, and fraternal bodies, produced a flood of subscriptions at the last moment which dissipated all fear of failure. The people needed driving, knew that their procrastination called for a dinning advertising campaign to translate intentions into deeds, and finally yielded good-humoredly to the impetus. They responded in such good measure that on October 27, 1917, when the loan closed, $4,617,532,300 had been subscribed, or $1,617,532,300 over the amount asked. The oversubscription exceeded that which the first loan yielded. Approximately 9,400,000 shared in applying for the loan. Of this number, it was estimated, 9,306,000, or 99 per cent., subscribed in amounts ranging from $50 to $50,000, the aggregate of such subscriptions being $2,488,469,350.
The loan proved to be popular in a degree of which the world afforded no equal. Never had there been a loan taken by 9,400,000 subscribers. It surpassed all previous experience of Government loans. The single offering was larger than the total takings in all subscriptions made in the four years of the Civil War. It far exceeded the response to any government loan of the other belligerents.
With an ample treasury to draw from, provided by Congress and the public, the Government proceeded with the war preparations, but in face of inevitable obstacles and friction. The American military establishment was not designed for making War on a huge scale, and, like the British War Office at the beginning of hostilities, was swamped and confused by an avalanche of new responsibilities. There were admitted shortages in clothing, artillery, and machine guns in the cantonments, and delays in the construction of new shipping also produced impatient criticism. Congress interposed by investigations intothe general conduct of the war, with the result that the air was cleared and defects of organization located. The investigations appeared to have developed primarily not so much from ineffective and wrong decisions in meeting war needs as from delays due to indecision and procrastination. The result was a change of administrative methods aiming at a centralization of authority, which England and France had early found imperative in conducting the war, instead of depending on a bureaucratic system with its complicated channels of distributed authority. The friction which had arisen seemed to be substantially due to a clash between the methods of business men, whom the administration had requisitioned into war service, and the red tape of an established governmental system. The Administration recognized at length that an infusion into the Government ranks of capable business organizers, bent on conducting their share of the war with expedition, could not blend with departmental systems clogged by traditions, customs, rules, and regulations, written and unwritten. The whole Government became engaged in a process of introspection. The investigations compelled it to see itself as others saw it, and were salutary in that respect alone. In other directions the inquiries revealed, in spite of departmental shortcomings, that an enormous amount of work had been accomplished in a short time. When war was declared the country was wholly unprepared; it was working at full capacity in many war fields to maintain the largest foreign commerce reached in its history. Its industries being thus occupied on the outbreak of war, they could not readily digest a flood of orders, aggregating more than ten billion dollars in value, which the Government suddenly superimposed upon their capacities, with their equipments already driving at top speed under forced draft. On one point at least there was agreement—that the task so far accomplished could not have been done in the same period by any other nation.
In Secretary Baker's view, much of the criticism leveled at the War Department was due to a natural and praiseworthy impatience of the people at large to build a war machine worthy of their country's power. "Every one of us," he said, "wants to seeour country hit like a man at the adversary." Answering the charge that the War Department had fallen down the Secretary set out to remove the impression prevalent in the country that the failures and delays were disproportionate to what had been achieved. He thereupon disclosed the results accomplished.
On April 1, 1917, a few days before the United States declared war on Germany, the army stood at 9,524 officers and 202,510 men. On December 31 of that year this force had grown to 110,856 officers and 1,428,650 men, composed of the regular army, the National Guard, and the National Army. In other respects the work accomplished by the War Department at the close of 1917 was summed up by Secretary Baker as under:
"1. A large army is in the field and in training; so large that further increments to it can be adequately equipped and trained as rapidly as those already in training can be transported.
"2. The army has been enlisted and selected without serious dislocation of the industries of the country.
"3. The training of the army is proceeding rapidly, and its spirit is high. The subsistence of the army has been above criticism; its initial clothing supply, temporarily inadequate, is now substantially complete, and reserves will rapidly accumulate. Arms of the most modern and effective kind—including artillery, machine guns, automatic rifles, and small arms—have been provided by manufacture or purchase for every soldier in France, and are available for every soldier who can be gotten to France in the year 1918.
"4. A substantial army is ready in France, where both men and officers have been additionally and specially trained and are ready for active service.
"5. Independent lines of communication and supply and vast storage and other facilities are in process of construction in France.
"6. Great programs for the manufacture of additional equipment and for the production of new instruments of war have been formulated."
An outcome of the investigation was the creation of a War Council within the War Department, composed of the Secretaryof War, the Assistant Secretary of War, and five general officers. Its purpose was to supervise and coordinate the supplies of the field armies and the military relations of those armies with the War Department.
The National Army, composed of civilians enrolled under the selective draft law, was the most ambitious experiment in constructive military organization any country had ever attempted. It presented innumerable problems for which no solutions could be found in available textbooks, and the celerity with which it was converted into a real army rested wholly upon the skill with which the problems were grappled by the cantonment commanders and drill officers. Before the magnitude of a training organization could be considered and the drilling set in motion, much groundwork had to be covered in preparing the cantonments. There were sixteen of them, situated in various sections of the country, each roughly housing 40,000 men, and cost the Government at least $100,000,000. Their sites generally were in rugged, partially cleared country, marked by scrubby timber, dirt roads, wooden buildings, occasional patches of canvas, clouds of dust or acres of mud. They sprang up, in brief, out of wilderness tracts, usually some miles away from large centers of population. Their construction meant the creation out of the void of sixteen fully equipped cities, furnished with water supply, sewage systems, electric installations, governing organizations, police, and transportation. Standardization of construction was the only method by which the camps could be brought into being with dispatch. Each type of building, and every stick and board, ventilator and window sash used therein for all the cantonments were shaped to identical measurements, and produced by the enormous driving power of modern engineering, working under contract. Out of industrial plants, devising standardized material, came the camps. The number of buildings in the camps varied from 1,200 to 1,600, and included, besides the barracks proper, kitchens, shower baths and sanitary units, hospitals and administration offices, churches, schools, clubs and lodges, laundries, commissary stores, and even moving-picture theaters.
The first stage of training the men was confined largely to elementary military drill, which was a test of their physical capacity to withstand the driving routine of marching fifteen to twenty miles a day, burdened with a sixty-pound pack, ammunition, and rifle. The second stage embraced advanced military drill, involving several weeks of Swedish exercises, manipulating the army Springfield and marching and countermarching in close or extended order. The third phase was specialized warfare as taught abroad, with British and French trench instructors.
Military tactics having been revolutionized by modern trench warfare, no time was wasted in the open-country maneuvers formerly employed to accustom the troops to actual field service. The National Army was trained for the single purpose of effective trench fighting. On adjacent hillsides and plains extensive field fortifications were prepared, equipped with barbed-wire entanglements, artillery, and machine-gun emplacements, bomb-proof dugouts, communication trenches, support trenches, listening posts, and every other device which had been evolved from the war operations in Europe. The men were taught how to enter and leave a trench, to repel attacks, make raids in pursuit of information, surprise forays by day or night behind the protection of barrage fire, and how to take care of themselves, repair artillery damage, and reenforce the barbed-wire barriers.
The training was intensive and embraced a sixteen weeks' course crowded with manifold detail, which was vigorously observed. More attention was paid in the curriculum to drilling individual men, platoons, and companies than to conducting brigade, divisional, and regimental exercises, these latter being deferred until the smaller units were fit for advanced warfare. The platoon, commanded by a lieutenant, was the fighting unit in trench operations, and upon the lieutenants was therefore imposed the responsibility of training less than company units in order to effect an intimate and sympathetic cooperation between officers and men when they encountered the stern realities of warfare in Europe.
Camp conditions formed a chief subject of the Congressional investigation. The War Department had been confronted withthe task of providing for a new army which had to be rushed into training, and had to depend upon congested railroad facilities to equip the camps. But everything had been done, Secretary Baker told the committee, to care for the men, and where defects had occurred they were quickly removed.
"And where, I want to know, in all history can you find an achievement comparable to that of America's in raising this great army from her citizenry in this period of time?" asked the Secretary of War. "It has never been done before, and it is to America's credit that she has accomplished it in the nine months we have been at war."
The outlook, as viewed by Secretary Baker, was that if adequate transport facilities were available, 1,500,000 men could be shipped to France during 1918. He indicated that a third of that number would be on the western front early in the year as a forerunner of the main body.
The country appeared satisfied by this prospect. The War Secretary had revealed much information regarding the military preparations to the Senate investigators; but he had to suppress much more to keep Germany—who was anxious to learn General Pershing's plans—in the dark, especially as to the number and disposition of American troops already there. The conclusions drawn from the progress of war preparations at the beginning of 1918 were that greater advances had been made than was expected. American troops would be in the thick of the fighting in the early spring and would be greatly reenforced just as soon as the Entente Allies pooled their tonnage resources.
The Administration's critics in Congress, nevertheless, were not pacified. A bill was proposed in the Senate creating a War Cabinet, the purpose of which was to divest the executives of Government departments of all authority in the conduct of the war. The new body was to be composed of "three distinguished citizens of demonstrated ability," to be named by the President and indorsed by the Senate. They were to control the administrative Cabinet officers and other department heads in the war's conduct, and adjust all differences, subject to the President's review.
The President saw in the proposed new war administration nothing but "long additional delays" and the turning of the Government's experience into "mere lost motion." He said as much to Senator Chamberlain, the author of the measure, in a letter which stoutly defended the Government's military preparations.
"The War Department," he wrote, "has performed a task of unparalleled magnitude and difficulty with extraordinary promptness and efficiency. There have been delays and disappointments and partial miscarriages of plan, all of which have been drawn into the foreground and exaggerated by the investigations which have been in progress since the Congress assembled.... But by comparison with what has been accomplished, these things, much as they were to be regretted, were insignificant, and no mistake has been made which has been repeated."
FLEETS IN THE MAKING
The navy was not exempt from the searchlight Congress cast upon the manifold war preparations of the Government. But nothing was adduced before the investigating subcommittee to indicate that the Navy Department had not met the abnormal situation produced by American belligerency. The outstanding development disclosed was that the navy had more than 1,000 ships commissioned in the winter of 1917, as against 300 two years ago; that 425 vessels were under construction, exclusive of 350 submarine chasers; and that contracts had been let for building hundreds of other small craft.
The expansion of the navy occasioned by the war was notable in other directions. Since January 1, 1917, the naval force increased from 4,500 officers and 68,000 men to 15,000 officers and 254,000 men; the number of stations operated by the navy from 130 to 363; the number of civil employees from 35,000 to 60,000;the strength of the Naval Reserve from a few hundreds to 49,246 men; the average monthly expenditures from $8,000,000 to $60,000,000; the Hospital Corps from 1,600 to 7,000; the National Naval Volunteers from zero to 16,000 men; the Marine Corps from 344 officers and 9,921 men to 1,197 officers and 30,000 men.
The navy placed great reliance on destroyers to fulfill the part allotted to it in the sea warfare against German submarines. A formidable fleet of these vessels was planned at a cost of $350,000,000, and contracts for the construction were placed with five shipbuilding concerns in October, 1917. Their actual number was guarded as a military secret. It was the largest project the navy department had undertaken, and would probably give the United States a destroyer fleet exceeding those of all other countries. The expenditure embraced the expansion of existing shipbuilding plants and the building of additional engine and boiler factories, as the destroyer program taxed the full capacity of the shipbuilding industry.
The destroyer had proved to be the deadliest weapon utilized against the submarine, and was superior to the submarine chaser, even for harbor and in-shore patrol work, besides having better seagoing qualities. Submarine chasers were regarded as a necessity, but the navy evinced little enthusiasm for them as a weapon of permanent effectiveness, and rather pinned its faith to an overwhelming destroyer armada to combat the U-boats.
In aviation the Government made no less impressive strides. The building of 20,000 aeroplanes, for which Congress had voted $640,000,000, was undertaken for the creation of a great American aerial force to operate against Germany. Their types covered the whole range of training machines, light, high-speed fighting airships, and powerful battle and bombing planes of heavy design. The training of aviators, the building of motors, and the assembling and framing of the wings proceeded uniformly so that men and equipment would be ready for service simultaneously.
Numbers of American aviators were already abroad undergoing intensive training behind the battle fronts. The thousandsin training at home were coached by a corps of Allied air experts of various nationalities, forming virtually an international aviation general staff for organizing the American aerial force.
The United States had set out resolutely to do its part in wresting the air spaces over the western front from Germany. The arrival in France in the autumn of 1917 of a group of American aviators with American-built airships brought an administration announcement which viewed the event as of signal importance. The opportunity rested with the United States to give its Allies such a great preponderance of airships that the enemy would be driven from the skies altogether, impotent either to give battle or defend himself. With this aim in view, Congress was asked for further funds for developing aviation during 1918 and 1919 to the amount of $1,138,000,000, of which it was proposed that $1,032,294,260 be expended on aviation: $553,219,120 on extra engines and spare parts, $235,866,000 for airplanes and hydroaeroplanes, $77,475,000 for machine guns, $8,050,000 for schools for military aeronautics, and the balance for stations, depots, equipment, upkeep, and pay for instructors, inspectors, mechanics, engineers, accountants, &c.
There was an army of aviators to meet all this development in equipment, numbering, at the beginning of 1918, 3,900 officers and 82,120 men.
Perhaps the shipping situation called most for legislative investigation. The paramount need of the Allies was for 6,000,000 tons annually, and the British Shipping Controller warned that if the United States could not produce this tonnage to replace the losses by submarines the Allies' military and naval efforts would be crippled. The construction of new tonnage in American shipyards had been beset by personal conflicts in the shipping administration, resulting in reversals of policy and retarded operations. Edward J. Hurley, chairman of the Shipping Board, told the Senate investigating committee that one obstacle to the expeditious pursuit of the vast program of ship construction was that it had been superimposed on an equally extensive naval program. When war was declared 70 per cent. of theeighteen prominent shipyards then in existence were overtaxed by the naval program, while only the remaining 30 per cent. of the yards could be utilized to proceed with the mercantile ship program. The task was to bring an adequate merchant marine into being to assist the Allies and he assured the committee (December, 1917) that it was being accomplished with the utmost dispatch despite past dissensions and many obstacles. The number of ships under construction or contract was 1,427, representing 8,573,108 dead-weight tons. Of this number 431 were ships embracing 3,056,000 tons which were in course of building in the yards for private and foreign owners and had been commandeered for war service under Government order. The rest were composed of 559 steel ships of 3,965,200 dead-weight tons, 379 wooden ships of 1,344,900 dead-weight tons, and 58 composite ships of 207,000 tons. The main need in proceeding with this huge program was shipyard space. New yards constructed and tonnage contracts awarded to each called for a constant expansion in the shipping organization, so that by the end of 1917 the Shipping Board controlled 132 yards, of which only 58 were old establishments, the remainder, 74, being new.
The burden imposed on American shipyards can be realized by contrasting their output in the prewar period with the total tonnage under construction for both the navy and the Shipping Board. The navy program was the equivalent in value, and therefore in shipbuilding effort, of 2,500,000 tons of merchant shipping. The mercantile marine program represented a tonnage of over 8,500,000. Here was 11,000,000 tons being produced by American shipyards whose greatest previous output in one year had only amounted to 615,000 tons according to Mr. Hurley. For 1918 he promised an output of 6,000,000 tons. Of the vessels under contract a good proportion were of 7,500 tons or more, classified as cargo steamers, and of these a number were designed specially for transports.
Tonnage being the immediate need, the Shipping Board did not wait for the completion of the new construction to supply it. As a war emergency measure it requisitioned all American ocean cargo and passenger-carrying vessels over 2,500 tons.This step was taken as a means to control freight rates as well as to enable the Government to command the tonnage it needed for war purposes. American merchant vessels for oversea traffic exceeded 2,000,000 tonnage. Some had already been requisitioned by the army and navy. With the exception of craft taken over for Government service, the vessels were left in their owners' hands for operation on Government account as the Shipping Board directed.
Between 600,000 and 700,000 tons of German shipping seized in American ports had already been utilized as troop transports and freighters for reenforcing the American army in France. These vessels included theLeviathan, formerly theVaterland, which was capable of carrying 10,000 troops on a single voyage, but the number was limited to 8,000 to insure comfort. In January, 1918, it was disclosed that theLeviathan, with fifteen other former German ships, had safely reached Entente ports laden with men and supplies. The announcement was made from the American army headquarters in France to disprove false reports circulated in Germany belittling the assistance rendered the Entente cause by the use of these vessels. They had, on their first voyage, escaped the submarines, a feat which was not palatable to Germany, who sought to bolster up a waning popular confidence in the U-boat campaign. The German vessels which had run the gantlet, besides theVaterland, were theCovington(ex-Cincinnati),America(ex-Amerika),President Grant,President Lincoln,Powhatan(ex-Hamburg),Madawaska(ex-König Wilhelm II),George Washington,Mount Vernon(ex-Kronprinzessin Cecilie),Agamemnon(ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II),Aeolus(ex-Grosser Kurfürst),Mercury(ex-Barbarossa),Pocahontas(ex-Princess Irene),Huron(ex-Friedrich der Grosse),Von Steuben(ex-Kronprinz Wilhelm),De Kalb(ex-Prinz Eitel Friedrich).
A further step to expedite the shipment of men and supplies to Europe was the formation of a Committee of Shipping Control, composed of American and Allied membership. Its chief object was to endeavor to fulfill Secretary Baker's expectation that 1,500,000 American troops and their requisite equipmentcould be landed in France in 1918 if sufficient shipping was available. It was endowed with power of absolute control in the allocation of all tonnage on both sides of the Atlantic, and aimed to end the complications and delays that had hitherto prevented the fullest use of American shipping for war purposes.
The Shipping Board had succeeded in turning over to the War Department over 1,000,000 tons of ships on the bare board basis for the transportation of soldiers, live stock, and munitions. Much of this tonnage was commandeered by the Government for that purpose, the shipyards not being sufficiently advanced in their work to provide much new construction. To facilitate the production of the enormous amount of new tonnage under way the Board sought a further appropriation of $800,000,000, increasing the amount Congress had authorized for the shipping program to $2,100,000,000.
FOOD AS A WAR FACTOR
Economic conditions generally had been shaped and dictated by the nation's entry into the war. The financial advantages which the country enjoyed in the two previous years through being neutral and not belligerent, disappeared with the war declaration; but the accumulated resources of the country's previous neutrality remained a continuing bulwark, and its distance from the theaters of war gave the country certain economic advantages of a neutral.
The situation greatly changed upon the United States throwing its entire resources into the common stock of the Entente Allies. The Government's enormous advances of credits to them took place when its own war requirements were even larger. Shipments to the Allies of maximum consignments of food and equipment proceeded in face of heavy home demands for the same products. The abnormal efforts with which the ShippingBoard set about building new ships to repair the ravages of the submarines coincided with unexampled calls upon the mills for domestic needs. Such developments could not occur without profoundly affecting American finance and production; especially in view of the intensified economic strain on belligerent Europe by the continuance of the war through another year and the reliance of the Allies on American aid.
There came an immediate and violent rise in commodity prices, due largely to the Government's new demands, coming in the wake of the increased needs of the Allies. As a consequence maximum prices on many products were imposed either by imperative Government orders or by agreement between the Government and the producers. The wheat crop failed in volume, being barely eleven million bushels above the deficient yield of 1916, and except for that season was the smallest in half a dozen years. On the other hand, corn and oats yielded record-breaking crops, and there was such an excellent harvest of other cereals that the total out-turn of the five leading grains, including wheat, exceeded by 970,000,000 bushels that of 1916. Except for 1915 the general crops surpassed in yield that of any other year. The war, however, robbed the country of the fruit of its own fertility. The effect of full granaries was offset by a European wheat harvest worse even than that of 1916 and by the difficulty of sparing ships to bring Australia's wheat to Europe. The demand on American wheat for export became so urgent that the Government was compelled to place the wheat trade virtually in the hands of a paramount commission.
Governmental food control became a reality on November 1, 1917, when the manufacture, storage, importation, and distribution of practically all essential foodstuffs came under the jurisdiction of the Food Administration headed by Herbert C. Hoover, and could only be conducted under license from that body. Probably the Government had never before undertaken such a step in commercial regulation which came so close to the lives of the people. About twenty important and inclusive classes of food were brought under Federal control. Virtually the whole machinery of their manufacture and distribution becamesubject to Federal pressure. All food brokers, commission men, wholesalers, jobbers, warehousemen, importers, and grain elevator men not previously licensed were required to take out permits, in most cases without reference to the size of their business. Only meat packers, canners, millers, egg packers, ginners, etc., whose business was small, were exempted. All retailers whose gross sales of food exceeded $100,000 yearly were licensed. The control affected small retailers also, for it was expressly provided by Mr. Hoover that no licensee shall "knowingly sell any food commodity to any person who shall, after this regulation goes into effect, violate the provisions" of the Food Administration Act; and wholesalers and jobbers were to be furnished information concerning small retailers who hoarded or extorted. It also affected manufacturers and dealers whose merchandise was not included in the specified classes of food controlled.
The object, of course, was to keep food prices down to the minimum. The Food Administration Act forbade manipulation or speculation, excessive profits, discriminatory practices, and waste. The licensing system was simply a means of enforcing these prohibitions. Mr. Hoover looked for their successful operation not so much by formulating strict regulations as by awakening a spirit of public service among food traders.
The grocers undertook to concentrate their efforts upon selling substitutes for white flour and meat, in view of the Allies' calls on American produce and the consequent shortage for home purposes. Retailers promised to encourage the sale of "articles of food cheap but good in quality in place of high-priced staples." Wholesale grocers were urged to arrange with manufacturers for larger supplies of corn meal, rye, and oat products. Food distributing and selling organizations throughout the country began a campaign to induce retailers to stop soliciting orders, to reduce deliveries to one daily for a family or route, and to stimulate the sale of prunes, oats, corn meal, and rice in bulk and for cash. Mr. Hoover had laid down the principle that it was the delivered cost of food to jobber, wholesaler, and merchant that determined the price on resale, and not market conditionsat the time of resale. No one was to profit by fluctuations upward while he held goods in stock.
The Food Administration's task was to awaken millions of families to recognize the necessity of food conservation, to educate millions of producers to maximum effort, and to banish greed from the business of thousands of distributors. The last presented the greatest difficulty. Yet the readiness of dealers to be content with living-profit margins and to increase efficiency, the eagerness of commission men to discourage all speculation and to help constructively in effecting adequate deliveries on full cars, and the assurances of most distributors that they would aid in bringing recalcitrants into subjection, promised that the problem was not impossible of solution. Profiteering had been one of the banes of the war in Europe, and the Government sought to check this rapacious method of using war conditions to acquire ill-gotten gains by traders who preyed upon public necessities.
Mr. Hoover thus presented the situation in the autumn of 1917:
"There is plenty of food in this country, and our problem is one of surplus and not a deficit. This does not mean that we can send to the Allies all they need, for there is not enough when considered from the war point of view. The wheat we export will be the direct amount that the people save out of their bread, for we have shipped our surplus and must keep the bread supply for the country. We will ship wheat or flour from month to month, but such shipments will not be allowed except our supply warrants them. Through conservation we are gaining a 20 per cent. surplus of wheat. This means literally that every one who saves a slice of bread is giving a slice of bread to our Allies. We are consuming 20 per cent. less wheat than last year."
According to Mr. Hoover, the Allies' wheat requirements from the United States amounted to 210,000,000 bushels. The country's production of wheat in 1916 was 670,000,000 bushels, of which 590,000,000 bushels was consumed at home, leaving only 80,000,000 bushels available for export. There were thus 130,000,000 bushels to be found to fulfill the Allies' needs, that is, bysaving that much from the normal consumption of flour by the people. The Food Administration found a spokesman in President Wilson, who, in a proclamation, called on the people at large to observe more wheatless days, and on wheat traders to curtail their stocks and sales.
The application of the slogan, "Food will win the war," was extended to neutral countries contiguous to Germany. If food was to win the war, then victory would come by the weakening of Germany through being unable to obtain American food, since the United States had virtually become Europe's chief food source, and Germany could always obtain American supplies through the neutrals. The President stopped further trading in American food between the neutrals and Germany by a proclamation ordaining that after August 30, 1917, no exports from American ports could be shipped, except under a strict license of the Exports Council, to any country in the Eastern Hemisphere. The restraint, though made of universal application, was specifically aimed at the European neutrals which flourished upon trading with Germany.
A large number of Dutch and other neutral vessels lying in New York harbor were chartered by the American Government and added to the available merchant shipping.
TRANSPORTATION AND FUEL
The war was gradually being brought home to the nation, not by tidings of American troops taking their places side by side with their Allies in Europe, but by internal changes. The Government stretched forth an expropriating arm in all directions where public and private service could be utilized for war purposes, and it duly took charge of the railroads.
As a war measure, the President's intervention in assuming control of the country's transportation systems was the mostsweeping step he had taken under the extraordinary powers vested in him by Congress. The railroad authorities themselves realized its need. The war had received many designations, but analyzing its conduct down to fundamentals, it was a railroad war. So Marshal Joffre had termed it in recalling how the railroad had enabled him to win the Battle of the Marne by rushing troops and munitions where they were critically needed.
The American railroads were already overtaxed when war was declared, and lacked facilities for proper repairs and new equipment. Early in 1915 and thenceforth they became swamped by a flood of traffic in munitions, food, and other supplies from the interior to the seaboard for transshipment overseas to the Allies. They needed more locomotives and cars for this huge traffic; but the day of reasonable prices had passed, labor was costly and uncertain, and engine and car builders were absorbed in producing for the Allies. When the war drew in the United States the railroad's burdens were swollen manifold by the transportation problem incident to the mobilizing of an army of 1,500,000 men. Troop trains had to be operated by the tens and hundreds and even thousands; for every troop train there were ten, fifteen, and twenty trains of camp equipment; ore and fuel had to be carried; more and more material called for transit to the seaboard for the Allies. The traffic grew 50 per cent. above that of 1914, the year the European war started, and it was operated with little more than 3 per cent. of additional equipment. The working forces of the railroads, in addition, were depleted, not only by numerous volunteer enlistments to the regular army, but by the selective draft, and by the creation of nine full regiments of railroad engineers for service in France.
Reviewing the situation in December, 1917, the Interstate Commerce Commission recommended immediate unification of the railroads into one system, operated under government control, as the only solution of the problem of conducting the war traffic.
The President by proclamation took over the railroads on December 28, 1917. He exercised this power both under the resolutions declaring war against Germany and Austria-Hungary, wherein he was authorized to employ the resources of theGovernment and of the country to bring the conflict to a successful termination, and under an army appropriation bill passed on August 29, 1916 (eight months before the United States entered the war), which provided:
"The President, in time of war, is empowered, through the Secretary of War, to take possession and assume control of any system or systems of transportation, or any part thereof, and to utilize the same, to the exclusion as far as may be necessary of all other traffic thereon, for the transfer or transportation of troops, war material and equipment, or for such other purposes connected with the emergency as may be needful or desirable."
The President, explaining his action in a supplementary statement, told the country:
"This is a war of resources no less than of men, perhaps even more than of men, and it is necessary for the complete mobilization of our resources that the transportation systems of the country should be organized and employed under a single authority and a simplified method of coordination which have not proved possible under private management and control.
"The Government of the United States is the only great government now engaged in the war which has not already assumed control of this sort. It was thought to be in the spirit of American institutions to attempt to do everything that was necessary through private management, and if zeal and ability and patriotic motive could have accomplished the necessary unification of administration, it would certainly have been accomplished; but no zeal or ability could overcome insuperable obstacles, and I have deemed it my duty to recognize that fact in all candor now that it is demonstrated and to use without reserve the great authority reposed in me. A great national necessity dictated the action, and I was therefore not at liberty to abstain from it."
The Government undertook to guarantee to each company such net earnings as would amount to the ascertained average of the three-year period ending with June, 1917. The rights of stockholders and bondholders and other creditors of the railroads were not to be impaired by the change in control, and theroads were to be kept in as good repair and equipment as when taken over. For their upkeep and betterment the President sought an appropriation of $500,000,000 from Congress.
The Secretary of the Treasury, William G. McAdoo, was appointed director general. His first act was to order that all terminals, ports, locomotives, rolling stock and other transportation facilities be utilized in the common cause of serving the country. By this course he ended all railroad compacts apportioning the distribution of traffic, and pooled the terminals for the common use of all carriers whose lines or cars could reach them.
Meantime a coal famine, due to freight congestion of unexampled proportions, had been gradually developing. At the beginning of December the country, except in the northwest, faced a serious shortage of fuel, not through lack of coal, but through lack of means to transport it. Dr. H. A. Garfield, the Federal Fuel Administrator, took steps to have coal and coke given the right of way over general freight, which in turn was subordinate to the transit of actual war supplies. Traffic priority of coal shipments was the remedy sought to loosen the congestion of coal cars at mines and terminals. But sufficient coal did not reach the various points of distribution for normal winter use, nor, what was as serious, for war purposes. It was solely a transportation problem, involving a general freight problem, and its solution would also solve the fuel problem. The navy and factories alone required 100,000,000 tons more than they needed before, and could get little above half that quantity. There came an imperative call for fuel economy from Dr. Garfield, who warned the country that unless it could save 50,000,000 tons by retrenchment, the Government would have to stop the operation of nonessential industries where coal was a big factor in order to apply the use of fuel so saved for essential war industries.
In the end Dr. Garfield resorted to heroic measures. Without prior notice he issued a closing order to the industries east of the Mississippi, which were thus made to feel the full force of the coal famine. The operation of all factories, except thoseengaged in the manufacture of foodstuffs, was suspended for five days (from January 18 to January 22, 1918), and they were also to close every Monday from January 28 to March 25 inclusive. Coal merchants were required in selling fuel to give preference to railroads, domestic, and public service consumers, ships for bunker purposes, Government departments, national and local, and manufacturers of perishable food. On the five days named and on the succeeding Mondays, no fuel was to be delivered to any other person or corporation for any purpose except for plants which must be operated seven days a week to avoid injury to their equipment, and printing establishments. The curtailment of the use of fuel was further prescribed on the Mondays named to an extent that virtually made them holidays. All private, business, and professional offices, except those of banks and trust companies, physicians and dentists, were forbidden to be heated or lighted at all except to avert the danger of damage from frozen apparatus. Wholesale and retail stores (except those selling food), business buildings, saloons, theaters, dance halls and all other places of amusement came under this ban.
The country was startled by the sweeping order. Protests poured into the White House; Congress was in a ferment; the Senate passed a resolution urging a postponement of such a drastic step. But Dr. Garfield remained firm. He insisted that the inadequacy of the coal supply and transportation facilities to meet the enormous war demands, coupled with unprecedented adverse weather, had made immediate restrictive measures imperative. The order, with a few modifications, was enforced in the face of a rising storm of indignation from a multitude of objectors who saw nothing but industrial chaos in its operation.
The protests subsided as quickly as they arose. Industry had received a violent shock; confusion and uncertainty followed; but the order was obeyed. It fell with stunning effect upon an unprepared public opinion which in some directions exploded with symptoms of a panic-stricken hysteria. But presently it began to dawn on the public mind that if a cessation of business for a few days helped the railroads to move coal and war freight, whereby ships could get fuel and cargoes to depart to Europe,and also removed the tantalizing spectacle (one of many like situations elsewhere) of a coalless New York while 350,000 tons were traffic-bound a few miles away, the fuel-curtailment order would be remembered as marking a decision of great courage and statesmanship. The congestion of the railroads and their terminals had produced a condition bordering on transportation immobility. The arteries of commerce, as it were, had become frozen. Factories and plants piled their daily output in railroad yards and near the docks in rising quantities. The accumulations of undelivered freight grew and grew and the panting railroads, working beyond the limits of what their traffic would bear, could only reduce the incubus piecemeal. The tardy recognition came that, even had there been no coal shortage, which was the primary cause of the shutdown, a temporary cessation of manufacture was necessary to clear the loaded tracks and empty the groaning storehouses before they were burdened with further accretions from the hives of industry.
The antagonism provoked by the closing order soon gave way to a cordial spirit of cooperation, and many industries affected undertook to assume in large part the financial burdens incident to enforced idleness. Manufacturing was halted and further merchandise was kept from cluttering the crowded railroads. Improved transportation conditions followed, due largely to milder weather. The way was rapidly cleared for a steady movement of coal to tidewater for bunkering ships loaded with supplies for the American oversea forces and for the Allies, as well as for supplying domestic fuel needs.