"The San Juan and Aguadores rivers would often suddenly rise so as to prevent the passage of wagons, and then the eight pack trains with the command had to be depended upon for the victualing of my army, as well as the 20,000 refugees, who could not in the interests of humanity be left to starve while we had rations."
During the Chicago Peace Jubilee, General Shafter made an address at the Armory of the First Illinois Volunteers, and, released from the continual forms of official reports, added much of interest to the story of Santiago. He says of the send-off:
"We were twice embarked and twice taken back to Tampa and disembarked. On the first occasion the cause was the appearance of Admiral Cervera's fleet; it requiring the entire navy that was disposable to go after that fleet, and the second time by a report that afterwards turned out to be incorrect, that in the St. Nicholas channel, through which we would have to go, some Spanish cruisers had been seen."
When ordered to Tampa to command the first Cuban expedition, he continued:
"I took the troops that I thought best fitted and prepared for that service. There were some magnificent regiments of volunteers, but to part of them I had issued arms only two or three days before. They were not properly equipped, and lacked experience. As I had the choice, I took all of the regulars that were there, and with them three regiments of volunteers. They were magnificent men, as perfect as men could be, but, as you know who served in '61, poorly prepared to take care of themselves at first. You recollect it was months before we were prepared, and we made numerous mistakes that led to sickness and death. The same things have occurred again, and they always will continue with troops that are not used to the field, and in this campaign men were taken directly from their camps immediately after being mustered in, and put into the most difficult campaign of modern military history.
"I practically had the entire regular army of the United States, twenty of the twenty-five regiments of infantry, five of the ten regiments of cavalry, and five batteries of artillery, with three regiments of volunteers, the Seventy-first New York, the Second Massachusetts, and the regiment known as Roosevelt's rough riders. The last were practically seasoned soldiers. They were men from the frontier, men who had been accustomed for years to taking a little sack of corn meal on their saddles, and a blanket, and going out to sleep out of doors for a week or a month at a time. Of course, they knew how to care for themselves in camp.
"Early in June I was called to the telephone in Tampa, and told from the President's mansion in Washington to proceed immediately with not less than 10,000 men to Santiago; that news had been received that day that the fleet of Cervera was surely within that harbor, and that if 10,000 men could be placed there at once the fleet and the city could be captured in forty-eight hours. The horses and mules had been taken off from the ships as well as the men, and the time consumed in reloading the horses and mules allowed me to embark 17,000 men nearly. That was very fortunate for me and our cause."
On arrival off Santiago, he, "with Admiral Sampson, went down the coast about twenty miles, and saw General Garcia, and asked him his opinion of the country, what his force was, and whether he was disposed to assist. I found him very willing and very glad to offer his services at once, with 3,000 men that he had with him and another thousand that he had up the country a little further, which were to join us immediately. In sailing along the coast, looking for a landing place, I selected two places—Siboney, a little indentation in the coast about twelve or thirteen miles east of Santiago, and another little bay about eight miles further east, where small streams entered into the sea, making a valley and a sandbar about 150 to 200 yards in extent. All the rest of the coast is abrupt, perpendicular walls of rock from ten to thirty feet high, against which the waves were dashing all the time, and where it is utterly impossible to land.
"We had the earnest and able support of the navy and their assistance in disembarking, and the next morning were bombarding the two little places and driving the few hundred Spanish soldiers, that were there away. We began disembarking, and before the end of the day the men were on shore, with 2,000 horses and mules that we had to throw overboard to get ashore, and the artillery."
The General noted the loss of 17,000 troops out of 24,000 in the English army that besieged Havana in 1762, at the same time of year that he landed at Santiago, and remarked:
"I knew that my entire army would be sick if it stayed long enough; that it was simply a question of getting that town just as soon as possible. I knew the strength, the courage, and the will of my men, or I thought I did, and the result shows that I was not mistaken. It was a question of starting the moment we landed and not stopping until we reached the Spanish outposts, and, therefore, as soon as a division was put on shore it was started on the march.
"On the 24th the first engagement took place, in which we had between 800 and 900 men on the American side and probably 1,000 or 1,200 on the Spanish. The enemy was strongly intrenched, showing only their heads, while the American forces had to march exposing their whole bodies to the fire of the enemy.
"It is announced by military experts as an axiom that trained troops armed with the present breech-loading and rapid-firing arm cannot be successfully assailed by any troops who simply assault. Of course you can make the regular approaches and dig up to them. The fallacy of that proposition was made very manifest that day when the men composing the advance marched as deliberately over those breastworks as they ever did when they fought with arms that you could only load about twice in a minute and of the range of only 200 or 300 yards.
"This army was an army of marksmen. For fifteen years the greatest attention has been paid to marksmanship, and I suppose four-fifths of all the men in that army wore on their breasts the marksman's badge. I had given orders, knowing that the noise of firing is harmless and that shots put in the air are harmless—I had given the strictest orders to all officers that their men should be told not to fire a shot unless they could see something moving, and the firing was to be by individuals, what is called file firing, individual firing. The Spanish troops, not so well drilled in firing as ours, used volley firing, which is very effective against large bodies of troops massed and moving over a plain, but utterly inefficient when used against skirmishers moving over a rough country. In that battle, which lasted two hours, less than ten rounds of ammunition per man was fired by my men, and the losses, notwithstanding my men were exposed, their whole bodies, while the enemy were in trenches, where only their heads could be seen, were about equal.
"I saw the commander of that force a few days later in Santiago, and in talking about it he said to me: 'Your men behaved very strange. We were much surprised. They were whipped, but they didn't seem to know it; they continued to advance (laughter and applause), and we had to go away.' He was quite right about it. They did have to go away.
"On the 29th we had reached the immediate vicinity of the peaks in front of Santiago, about a mile and a half from the city. On the 30th I carefully reconnoitered the ground as much as one could in the dense undergrowth, and determined where I would make my attack, which was simply directed in front, and to make a direct assault. There was no attempt at strategy, and no attempt at turning their flanks. It was simply going straight for them. In that I did not misjudge my men, and that is where I succeeded so well. (Applause.) If we had attempted to flank them out or dig them out by regular parallels and get close to them my men would have been sick before it could have been accomplished, and the losses would have been many times greater than they were.
"The only misfortune, as I judged it, of the first day's fight,but which I have since learned was for the best, was that immediately on our right, and what would be in our rear when we attacked the town, was a little village called El Caney, four miles and a half from Santiago, and whence the best road in the country connected with Santiago. I did not know the exact force there, but it was estimated to be 1,000, and perhaps a little more, and it would, of course, have been very hazardous to have left that force so near in our rear.
"Instead of finishing the affair by 9 o'clock, as we expected, it took until 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon before the last shot was fired, and then after a loss of nearly a hundred killed and 250 wounded on our side and the almost total annihilation of the force opposed to us. They had an idea that they would be killed, and when men believe that it is hard to capture them. Just at the close of the battle three or four hundred did attempt to escape, but ran out in front of a brigade that they did not see, and in the course of about three or four hundred yards most of them were dead or mortally wounded, so that probably not more than twenty men on the other side escaped from that battle. It was a most desperate struggle.
"Men were killed in the trenches by being knocked on the head with muskets, and one man I was shown two days later with what would be called a tremendous head on him, and the interpreter asked him how that had occurred, and he doubled up his fist and spoke of the soldier that had hit him as a black man, that he had dropped his gun and hit him in the head with his fist. That was pretty close work.
"Meanwhile the battle in front of Santiago progressed, with three divisions on our side, one of dismounted cavalry and two of infantry. It was beautifully fought. Every man knew what he had to do, and so did every officer. The orders were that Immediately upon being deployed they were to attack. They did it. Every man kept going, and when one's comrade dropped the rest kept going. The result was that in about two hours the line was taken, and practically that afternoon the battle of Santiago was ended, for those men never advanced beyond that point.
"During the night I brought up the division of General Lawton that had been on the right at Caney and put them on the extreme right, where I had intended to have them the day before, and where, had they been, we should probably have taken the town and have gotten only the men that were there, and not the 12,000 that were far beyond our reach who were surrendered a few days later.
"On the morning of the 2d a weak attempt was made upon our lines. In that the Spaniards had to expose themselves, while my men were covered. The fight lasted but a little while, and they retreated.
"On the morning of July 3 I thought we had so much of an advantage that I could notify the enemy, first, that I wanted a surrender, and, second, if they declined to surrender that they could have twenty-four hours to get the women and children out of town. Of course, civilized people do not fire on towns filled with women and children if they will come out if it can be avoided. The Spanish commander declined very promptly to surrender, but said he would notify the women and children and those that desired to go, but he wanted twenty-four hours more, and said there were a great many people to go out. They began to stream out at once, and for forty-eight hours old men, women, and children poured out until it was estimated that at least 20,000 people passed through our lines and out into the woods in the rear. Of course, there was an immense amount of suffering, and numbers died, especially of the old. Fortunately we were enabled to give them some food, enough so that they existed, but at that time, with the Cuban forces that I had, I was issuing daily 45,000 rations. Forty-five thousand people are a good many to feed when you have such fearful roads and food could only be carried on the backs of mules.
"On that morning of the 3d, about an hour after the time for surrendering, Cervera's fleet left the harbor, and went out, as you know, to total annihilation. It was not more than twenty or thirty minutes after they left the mouth of the harbor before, so far as we could hear, the firing had ceased, and 1,700 men were prisoners, 600 were killed, and three or four battleships and some torpedo boats were either on the rocks or in the bottom of the sea—a most wonderful victory, never equaled before in naval history, and due mainly to the magnificent marksmanship of our men, which covered the Spanish decks with such a hail of iron that no sailors on earth could stand against it.
"Two days after this I saw General Toral, and I was convinced from conversation with him that he was going to surrender. I had no one but myself to take the responsibility, in fact, I did not want anyone else to do it, but while I was convinced myself it was hard to convince others. I knew that we could capture the town at any time, that we had it surrounded so that they could not possibly get away, although on the night of July 2 2,800 men marched in. I had understood there were 8,000, but when we counted them a few days afterward there were only 2,800. I knew that if we carried that town by force a thousand men at least would be lost to the American army, and a thousand good American men are a good many to expend in capturing a Spanish town (applause), and I did not propose to do it if I could possibly talk them out of it.
"General Toral knew just as well as I did that I knew just what he had—that he was on his last rations, and that nothing but plain rice, that we had his retreat cut off, that we had the town surrounded, that he could not hurt us, while we could bombard him and do some little damage, perhaps, and that it was only a question of a few days.
"I found out a few days later what the hitch was which caused the delay, for General Toral had told me that he had been authorized by Blanco, the Governor-General, to enter into negotiations and make terms for surrender, and in Cuba you know General Blanco was in supreme command. His authority was such that he could even set aside a law of Spain. Knowing that, I felt sure that after very little delay they would surrender. They desired to get permission from the Madrid government to return to Spain. It was that that delayed them. Immediately upon receiving the permission to return to Spain they surrendered.
"I had in line when the fighting was going on, about 13,000 men—not more than that at any time. Inside the Spanish trenches there were about 10,000. There were 11,500 surrendered, and I think about 1,500 of them were sick. The disproportion, considering the difference of situation, is not very great. In fact, I think that 10,000 American soldiers could have kept 100,000 Spaniards out had they been in the same position (applause), although I do not wish to disparage the bravery of the Spanish troops. They are gallant fellows, but they have not the intelligence and do not take the initiative as do the American soldiers; and they have not the bull-dog pluck that hangs on day after day.
"Toral made the first proposition to surrender. He said if I would let him take his men and such things as they could carry on their persons and on a few pack mules that they had and guarantee him safe conduct to Holguin, which was fifty-two miles away to the north and in the interior, they would march out. I told him, of course, that was out of the question; that I could not accept any such terms as that, but I would submit it to the President. I did so, and was very promptly informed that only unconditional surrender would be received, but I was at liberty to say to General Toral that if they would surrender they would be carried, at the expense of the United States government, back to Spain. When that proposition was made to him I could see his face lighten up and the faces of his staff, who were there. They were simply delighted. Those men love their country intensely, they had been brought to Cuba against their will, and had stayed there three years, poorly clad, not paid at all, and not well fed, and the prospect of going back to their homes had as much to do with conforming their views to our wishes as anything that was done during the campaign.
"Meanwhile ten or twelve days had elapsed and I had received quite a number of volunteer regiments—two from Michigan, the First District of Columbia, a Massachusetts regiment, and an Ohio regiment, the Eighth Ohio—all splendid troops and well equipped, and while they were not there at the hardest of the fighting they were there during the suffering, and everything that soldiers were called upon to do they did like men.
"It is a great deal harder to stand up day after day and see companions go from sickness and disease than it is to face the perils of battle.
"When I told General Toral that we would carry his men back he said: 'Does that include my entire command?' I said: 'What is your command and where are they?' He replied the Fourth Army Corps; 11,500 men in the city, 3,000 twenty miles in the rear of us; 7,500 he said were up the coast less than sixty miles, and about 1,500 125 to 150 miles off on the northeastern coast.
"There were 3,440 odd, and at a place less than sixty miles east there were 7,500 and a few over, because we counted them and took their arms. The result of that surrender was as unexpected to us as probably it was to every person in the United States. There was simply a little army there, which had gone down to assist the navy in getting the Spanish fleet out and capturing that town, and we expected no other result from it than victory at the spot at the utmost, but in attacking the limb we got the whole body. It was expected that, beginning about the first of October, the objective point of the campaign was to be Havana, where we knew there were from 125,000 to 150,000 men, and it was expected that about the first of October a large army would be sent over there, and the battle that would decide the war would be fought in the vicinity of Havana. I think that was the universal feeling. The loss of that city and of those 24,000 men—23,376, to be accurate—so dispirited them that within a week the proposition of Spain to close the war was made, and, happily, the war was ended.
"The difficulties of that campaign were not in the fighting. That was the easiest part of it. The difficulties were in getting food and medicine to the front. There was but a single road, a muddy and terrible road, and with five or six wagons going over it the sixth wagon would be on the axle tree, and in taking up some artillery I had fourteen horses on one battery that was usually drawn by four, and even with that number it went out of sight, and we had to leave it and dig it out after the water had subsided."
Admiral Sampson's report, dated August 3d, was published October 23d, and covers the conduct of the fleet under his command, in its operations in the West Indies, for about two months prior to the destruction of Admiral Cervera's ships on July 3. It was made up largely of official dispatches and the movements of the fleet, with explanations and comment by the Admiral, and begins with a statement of the determination reached by the Navy department to send a squadron to the Windward Passage for the purpose of observation, because of the information received of the sailing, on April 29, of Admiral Cervera's squadron from the Cape Verde Islands.
On the voyage eastward from the naval base at Key West, which began on May 4, Admiral Sampson reports there was experienced endless trouble and delay because of the inefficiency of the two monitors accompanying the other ships, and which had to be taken in tow. Their coal supply was so small that it was at once evident that they must either frequently coal or be towed. The Admiral says:
"Had the sea been rough, or had the enemy appeared at this juncture, the squadron would have been in a much better position for an engagement had the monitors been elsewhere. Subsequently, when engaging the batteries of San Juan, it was evident that their shooting was bad.
"Owing to the quick rolling of these vessels, even in a moderate sea, they were unable to fire with any degree of accuracy."
Among the telegrams received by the Admiral from the department atWashington when off Cape Haytien was the following:
Washington, D.C., May 6.—Do not risk or cripple your vessels against fortifications as to prevent from soon afterwards successfully fighting Spanish fleet, composed of Pelayo, Carlos V., Oquendo, Vizcaya, Maria Teresa, Cristobal Colon, four deep sea torpedo boats, if they should appear on this side.Long.
It was determined to go to Porto Rico, and the squadron arrived off San Juan on the morning of the 12th and the bombardment of that place ensued. Regarding his action at this place the Admiral says:
"It was clear to my own mind that the squadron would not have any great difficulty in forcing the surrender of the place, but the fact that we should be held several days in completing arrangements for holding it; that part of our force would have to be left to await the arrival of troops to garrison it; that the movements of the Spanish squadron, our main objective, were still unknown; that the flying squadron was still north and not in a position to render any aid; that Havana, Cervera's natural objective, was thus open to entry by such force as his, while we were a thousand miles distant, made our immediate movement toward Havana imperative.
"I thus reluctantly gave up the project against San Juan and stood westward for Havana."
Several telegrams are here presented, based on reports that Cervera's squadron had returned to Cadiz and they had in view "to return and capture San Juan, the desire to do so and occupy the place being assured in the event of Admiral Cervera's failure to cross the Atlantic."
Shortly after news was received that the Spanish fleet had appeared off Curacao, West Indies, and the squadron under orders from the department proceeded to Key West, to which place the flying squadron under Commodore (now Admiral) Schley had already been ordered.
Arrangements were then hurriedly made and the flying squadron, augmented by the other vessels under Commodore Schley, was sent off Cienfuegos, where it was believed the enemy would go, in which case an effort was to be made to engage and capture him. Sampson was given the choice either of the command of the blockading squadron off Havana or at Cienfuegos, Schley in either case to remain with his own squadron.
From messages received by the Admiral from the department about May 20 it appears that reports had reached the United States that the Spanish fleet was at Santiago, so the department advised Sampson to send immediately word to Schley to proceed to that place, leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos.
On May 21 instructions were written by Samnson for Commodore Schley and sent to him via the Marblehead regarding the possibility of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago. They are in part as follows:
United States Flagship New York, First Rate, Key West, Fla., May 21.—Sir: Spanish squadron is probably at Santiago de Cuba—four ships and three torpedo boat destroyers. If you are satisfied they are not at Cienfuegos proceed with all dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there blockade him in port. You will probably find it necessary to establish communication with some of the inhabitants—fishermen or others—to learn definitely that the ships are in port, it being impossible to see into it from the outside.
The Admiral said he felt much concerned as to the delivery of these orders and sent a duplicate by the Hawk with an additional memorandum. The Admiral suggested that if the information did not reach Commodore Schley before daylight of May 23 to mask the real direction he should take as much as possible. He adds: "Follow the Spanish squadron whichever direction they take."
The Admiral off Havana gives copies of orders of battle which were to be followed in the event that Cervera left Santiago on the approach of Schley's fleet from Cienfuegos and attempted to cruise around the coast to Havana, in which case the Havana squadron would attempt to intercept him by going east about 200 miles beyond the junction of Santiren and Nicholas Channels. Strict orders were given for screening lights and to see that none were accidentally shown.
The squadron was to cruise generally to the eastward in the day and westward during the night.
On May 23, as shown by the report, Commodore Schley expressed the belief that the Spaniards were at Cienfuegos. On the 27th the Admiral sent word to Schley, directing him to proceed with all possible speed to Santiago because of information received that the Spaniards were there. The same time orders were sent to have the collier Sterling dispatched to Santiago with an expression of opinion that the Commodore should use it to obstruct the channel at its narrowest part leading into the harbor.
The details of the plan were left to the Commodore's judgment, as he (Sampson) had "the utmost confidence in his ability to carry this plan to a successful conclusion, and earnestly wished him good luck."
Sampson apparently felt certain of the presence of the Spaniards at Santiago and urged that the harbor must be blockaded at all hazards. Schley in the meantime had proceeded to Santiago, although it appears not the same day Admiral Sampson expected.
At one time Commodore Schley contemplated going to Key West with the squadron for coal, but this was abandoned, his collier having been temporarily repaired, and the necessity for a trip to Key West being avoided Santiago was then blockaded.
Admiral Sampson arrived at Santiago June 1st. June 8 the Admiral urged upon the department, as he had previously done, to expedite the arrival of the troops for Santiago, the difficulty of blockading the Spanish ships daily increasing.
In a memorandum dated June 15, the Admiral says:
"The Commander-in-Chief desires again to call the attention of the commanding officers to the positions occupied by the blockading fleet, especially during the daytime, and it is now directed that all ships keep within a distance of the entrance to Santiago of four miles, and this distance must not be exceeded.
"If the vessel is coaling or is otherwise restricted in its movements it must nevertheless keep within this distance. If at any time the flagship makes signal which is not visible to any vessel, such vessel must at once approach the flagship or retreating vessel to a point where it can read the signal.
"Disregard of the directions which have already been given on this head has led to endless confusion. Many times during the day the fleet is so scattered that it would be perfectly possible for the enemy to come out of the harbor and meet with little opposition.
"The Commander-in-Chief hopes that strict attention will be given this order."
In the order of battle incidental to the landing of Shafter's army corps June 22, when ships were sent to shell the beach and cover the landing of the men" the following occurs:
"The attention of commanding officers of all vessels engaged in blockading Santiago de Cuba is earnestly called to the necessity of the utmost vigilance from this time forward, both as to maintaining stations and readiness for action and as to keeping a close watch upon the harbor mouth. If the Spanish Admiral ever intends to attempt to escape that attempt will be made soon."
The Admiral says trouble was experienced in the landing of Shafter's army on account of the wandering proclivities of some of the transports. The progress of the disembarkation was rendered somewhat difficult by a heavy sea, the heaviest during the three weeks the fleet had been stationed there, owing to a stiff blow off the coast of Jamaica.
According to a dispatch to Secretary Long, dated June 26, the channel at Santiago not having been obstructed by the sinking of the Merrimac, Admiral Sampson was preparing a torpedo attack to hasten the destruction of the Spanish vessels, although he regretted resorting to this method because of its difficulties and small chance of success. He would not do this, he says, were the present force to be kept there; as it then insured a capture, which he believed would terminate the war.
There was contemplated at this time sending a fleet to the Spanish coast; and this expedition was to consist of the Iowa, Oregon, Newark, Yosemite, Yankee, and Dixie, and they were to go to the Azores for orders, en route to Tangier, Morocco. The colliers were to join the fleet at the Azores.
On June 30 the Admiral received a communication from Major-General Shafter announcing that he expected to attack Santiago the following morning, and asking that he (Sampson) bombard the forts at Aguadores in support of a regiment of infantry, and make such demonstrations as he thought proper at the harbor's mouth, so as to keep as many of the enemy there as possible.
This request was complied with, and on July 1 General Shafter asked that the Admiral keep up his fight on the Santiago water front. On July 2 the following was received from General Shafter.
"Terrible fight yesterday, but my line is now strongly intrenched about three-fourths of a mile from town. I urge that you make effort immediately to force the entrance to avoid future losses among my men, which are already heavy. You can now operate with less loss of life than I can. Please telephone answer."
A reply was telephoned General Shafter from Admiral Sampson, through Lieutenant Stanton, which said the Admiral had bombarded the forts at the entrance of Santiago and also Punta Gorda battery inside, silencing their fire, and asked whether he (Shafter) wanted further firing on the Admiral's part. The explanation was made that it was impossible to force an entrance until the channel was cleared of mines—a work of some time after the forts were taken possession of by the troops. To this General Shafter replied:
"It is impossible for me to say when I can take batteries at entrance of harbor. If they are as difficult to take as those which we have been pitted against it will be some time and at great loss of life. I am at a loss to see why the navy cannot work under a destructive fire as well as the army. My loss yesterday was over 500 men. By all means keep up fire on everything in sight of you until demolished. I expect, however, in time and with sufficient men to capture the forts along the bay."
On the 2nd of July, Sampson wrote to Shafter.
"An officer of my staff has already reported to you the firing which we did this morning, but I must say in addition to what he told you that the forts which we silenced were not the forts which would give you any inconvenience in capturing the city, as they cannot fire except to seaward. They cannot even prevent our entrance into the harbor of Santiago. Our trouble from the first has been the channel to the harbor is well strewn with observation mines, which would certainly result in the sinking of one or more of our ships if we attempted to enter the harbor, and by the sinking of a ship the object of attempting to enter the harbor would be defeated by the preventing of further progress on our part.
"It was my hope that an attack on your part of these shore batteries from the rear would leave us at liberty to drag the channel for torpedoes.
"If it is your earnest desire that we should force our entrance I will at once prepare to undertake it. I think, however, that our position and yours would be made more difficult if, as is possible, we fail in our attempt.
"We have in our outfit at Guantanamo forty countermining mines, which I will bring here with as little delay as possible, and if we can succeed in freeing the entrance of mines by their use I will enter the harbor.
"This work, which is unfamiliar to us, will require considerable time.
"It is not so much the loss of men as it is the loss of ships which has until now deterred me from making a direct attack upon the ships within the port."
The Admiral says he began making preparations to countermine, and, with the object of arranging an attack upon the batteries at the entrance a visit was arranged to General Shafter, so that the matter might be thoroughly discussed, and combined action take place.
He adds: "I had in view the employment of the marines for an assault an either the Morro or Socapa battery, while at the same time assaulting the defenses at the entrance with the fleet."
The Admiral says of the sortie and destruction of Cervera's fleet:
"This event closes the purely naval campaign, crowning with complete success the anxious work of almost exactly two months."
The error of Commodore Schley as to the location of Cervera's fleet, his hesitation in accepting the report of the Spaniards' presence at Santiago, appears to have caused the advancement of Admiral Sampson and subordinated Schley. Out of this came differences of opinion about facts among the close friends of the two distinguished officers. Schley was close at hand when Cervera's run from Santiago took place, while Sampson was out of the way on other duty, and Schley has been charged with an evasive movement of the New York just then that lost valuable time. It is related by the Washington staff correspondent of the Chicago Times-Herald that just after the battle of Santiago, Commodore Schley went aboard the Iowa and hailed Captain Evans with the remark that it had been a great day for the American navy.
"But why didn't you obey orders and close in on the mouth of the harbor instead of heading out to sea?" inquired Evans.
Commodore Schley's reply was that he was afraid the Vizcaya would ram the Brooklyn. This colloquy referred to a striking maneuver of the flagship Brooklyn early in the engagement at Santiago, which has been commented on before. In justice to Commodore Schley the navy department officers admit the Spanish officers after the battle said that it had been their purpose, on emerging from the harbor, to have the Vizcaya ram the Brooklyn, believing that the Spanish cruisers could outrun the remaining vessels in the American fleet, most of which were battleships, supposed to be of a lower rate of speed than the Spanish cruisers.
The action of the Vizcaya as she headed toward the Brooklyn indicated her determination to carry out this programme. But the remark of Captain Evans to the nominal commander of the squadron would under ordinary circumstances have been an act of insubordination and only illustrates the feeling of some of the captains of the fleet toward the Commodore.
It has been said that Schley, being ordered to Key West when Cervera appeared in Cuban waters, "proceeded to Cienfuegos, which was thought to be the destination of the Spanish warships. That port commanded the only direct railroad connection with Havana, and had the Spanish fleet gone there Admiral Cervera could have relieved General Blanco with money and munitions of war and received in return supplies necessary for his squadron. It is believed even now that had the Spanish ships been properly supplied and equipped they would have gone to Cienfuegos instead of to Santiago. But subsequent developments have shown that Admiral Cervera was permitted to take only enough coal to carry him to the nearest port, Santiago."
Schley credited Cervera with knowing enough to know that Cienfuegos was the better port for his purposes, and therefore adhered to his opinion, and Sampson was made his superior officer. So important have the differences seemed that the Wainwright Board was convened to investigate the parts taken in the Santiago naval battle respectively by Admiral Sampson and Admiral Schley. But in official phrase this board was convened for the purpose of determining the position and courses of the ships engaged in the action at Santiago July 3, and reporting to the Secretary of the Navy.
The report is:
"U.S.F.S. New York, First Rate, Navy Yard, New York, Oct. 8, 1898.—Sir: In obedience to your order of Sept. 2, 1898, appointing us a board to plot the positions of the ships of Admiral Cervera's squadron and those of the United States fleet in the battle of July 3, off Santiago de Cuba, we have the honor to submit the following report, accompanied by a chart, showing the positions of the ships at seven different times.
"These times, as taken by the United States ships engaged, with the incidents noted, are as follows:
"No. 1, 9:35 a.m.—Maria Teresa came out of the harbor.
"No. 2, 9:50 a.m.—Pluton came out.
"No. 3, 10:15 a.m.—Maria Teresa turned to run ashore.
"No. 4, 10:20 a.m.—Oquendo turned to run ashore.
"No. 5, 10:30 a.m.—Furor blew up and Pluton turned to run ashore.
"No. 6, 11:05 a.m.—Vizcaya turned to run ashore.
"No. 7, 1:15 p.m.—Colon surrendered.
"The chart selected by the board for plotting is H.O. chart No. 716, 1885, West Indies, eastern part of Bahama Islands, with part of Cuba and north coast of San Domingo. This selection was made after a careful comparison with all other charts at hand, as the positions of the principal headlands and inlets and the distances between them on it agree more nearly with the observation of members of the board than those given by any other.
"The positions of the United States ships were established by known bearings and distances from the Morro at No. 1, with the exception of the New York, whose position is plotted by the revolutions of its engines during a run of forty-five minutes cast from its position, southeast half south of the Morro, 6,000 yards. Position at No. 2 is plotted by all ships according to their relative bearings from each other, the operations of their engines from 9:35 to 9:50, the evidence of the officers on board them, and the ranges used in firing at the Spanish ships. Position No. 3 is plotted from observations of the officers of the United States ships, with regard to their nearness to each other, and relative bearings of themselves from Teresa, with ranges in use at the time, the performance of the engines, and general heading of the ships. Position No. 4 same as No. 3, substituting Oquendo for Teresa. Position Nos. 5, 6, and 7 are plotted on the same general plan.
"Before plotting these positions the board took each ship separately and discussed the data for the position under consideration—this data being obtained from the report of the commanding officers, notes taken during the action, and the evidence of the members of the board. In reconciling differences of opinion in regard to distances, bearings, ranges, etc., full liberty was given to the representative of the ships under discussion to bring in any argument or data he considered necessary, and the board submits this report with a feeling that, under the circumstances, it is as nearly correct as is possible so long after the engagement. Very respectfully,
"Richard Wainwright, "Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N., Senior Member. "S.P. Comly, "Lieutenant, U.S.N. "L.C. Heilner, "Lieutenant, U.S.N. "W.H. Schuetze, "Lieutenant, U.S.N. "A.C. Hodgson, "Lieutenant, U.S.N. "W.H. Allen, "Lieutenant, U.S.N. "Edward E. Capehart, "Lieutenant, U.S.N.
"To the Commander-in-Chief."
Measurements upon the chart showing the positions of the vessels at the specified times named in the report will give as fair an idea of the work of the board as can be made without the chart itself.
"Position No. 1, 9:35 a.m. When the Maria Teresa came out of the harbor the New York was nine miles east of Morro, accompanied by the Hist and Ericsson. The Brooklyn was three miles southwest of Morro, being two and two-tenths miles from the shore west of the mouth of the harbor. The Texas was eight-tenths of a mile east of the Brooklyn; the Iowa one and eight-tenths miles east and south of the Brooklyn, and the Oregon a half mile east of the Iowa, the Iowa being three miles directly south of Morro. The Indiana was two and two-tenths miles southwest of Morro and the Gloucester one mile almost directly north of the Indiana, a mile and four-tenths from Morro.
"Position No. 2, 9:50 a.m. When the Pluton came out all the Spanish vessels had come out of the harbor and their positions were: Maria Teresa two and a half miles southwest of Morro, the Vizcaya, Colon and Oquendo, in the order named, behind the Teresa and from four-tenths to half a mile apart. The position of the American vessels were: The New York had moved up two and one-tenth miles westward. The Brooklyn had started north, swerved to the northeast and toward the mouth of the harbor, and was turning east on the swing it made to the right and around to the westward course; it was eight-tenths of a mile from the Vizcaya. At position No. 2 the Texas first went east a half mile, swinging toward the harbor, then turning to the left it is at No. 2 a half mile directly north of the first position. The Iowa moved by a varying course northwest and was a mile and four-tenths from the Vizcaya, the Oregon being two-tenths of a mile behind the Iowa, the Indiana three-tenths behind the Iowa. The Gloucester's first start was half a mile directly away from the harbor, but swinging to the right, had advanced toward the Spanish ships, being one and seven-tenths miles from the nearest, the Oquendo.
"Position No. 3, 10:15 a.m. Maria Teresa turned to run ashore. It was five and one-half miles from Morro. The Vizcaya was two and three-tenths miles westward from the Teresa, the Oquendo one and two-tenths miles, and the Colon one and four-tenths miles in advance of the Teresa. The American vessels were as follows: The New York had come within three miles of Morro, being southeast of that point. The Brooklyn had made its swing to the westward, crossing its track, and was two and one-half miles south and west of the Teresa, and one and three-tenths miles directly south of the Colon, and one and one-tenth miles and a little behind the Vizcaya, one and three-tenths miles and a little in advance of the Oquendo. The Texas was one and two-tenths miles from the Teresa, a little behind it, and one and four-tenths miles from and behind the next Spanish ship, the Oquendo. The Iowa was one and one-tenth miles from the Teresa and a little closer in, but not quite as far west as the Texas. The Oregon had pulled up and passed the Texas and Iowa, being a little further in shore than the Texas and a little further out than the Iowa. It was in advance of the Teresa, being one and seven-tenths miles from that vessel, six-tenths of a mile from and directly in the line of the Oquendo, seven-tenths of a mile from the Colon, and one and two-tenths miles behind the Vizcaya. The Indiana was two miles from the Texas and two and six-tenths miles from the Oquendo, the nearest Spanish vessel. The Gloucester had moved up six-tenths of a mile and was just a mile directly south of Morro.
"Position No. 4, 10:20 a. m. Oquendo turned to run ashore. Only five minutes elapsed from position No. 3. All vessels had been running westward without material changes in their positions. The Colon had run one and three-tenths miles, the Vizcaya about one-tenth of a mile less, and swerved to the left, bringing it to within one and one-tenth miles of the Brooklyn. The Iowa was the same distance, but almost directly astern, and the Oregon was one and three-tenths miles from the Vizcaya, but farther out to sea. The Iowa was eight-tenths of a mile from the Oquendo, the Oregon nine-tenths of a mile from the same vessel, and both somewhat in advance of the doomed Spanish ship. The Indiana had advanced eight-tenths of a mile and was two and six-tenths miles away from the Oquendo, the nearest Spanish ship. The New York had advanced nearly a mile, but was not yet abreast of Morro. The Gloucester had run over two miles and was now well west of Morro, but five miles east of the Oquendo.
"Position No. 5, 10:30 a. m. Furor blew up and Pluton turned to run ashore. This is ten minutes later than position No. 4. The Gloucester had run a little more than two miles, and was four-tenths of a mile from the Furor and but little further from the Pluton. The New York had run two and two-tenths miles, and was three and three-tenths miles from the Furor, the nearest Spanish ship, and two and two-tenths miles south and a little west of Morro. The Colon had run two and nine-tenths miles, and the Vizcaya two and seven-tenths miles. The Brooklyn had run two and three-tenths miles, and was one and two-tenths miles from the Vizcaya and one and six-tenths miles from the Colon, which was running nearer the shore. The Oregon had sailed two and a half miles, and was one and one-half miles from the Vizcaya, and about the same distance from the Colon. The Texas was one and two-tenths miles astern of the Oregon, two and four-tenths miles from the Oregon. The Indiana was one and one-half miles astern of the Texas.
"Position No. 6, 11:05 a.m. Vizcaya turned to run ashore. In thirty-five minutes the Vizcaya had sailed about seven miles, and was off the mouth of the Aserradero River. The Colon had run five and one-half miles further, and was more than that distance in advance of any of the American vessels. The Brooklyn was one and three-tenths miles distant from the Vizcaya and slightly behind it. The Oregon was one and a half miles from the Vizcaya, but nearer the shore and somewhat more astern of the enemy. The Texas was two and seven-tenths miles from the Vizcaya and directly astern of the Oregon. The Iowa was three and two-tenths miles directly astern of the Vizcaya. The New York was five miles behind the Iowa. The Ericsson had kept along with the New York all the time, and was, at this position, one-half a mile in advance of it. The Indiana was nearly four miles behind the Iowa.
"Position No. 7, 1:15 p.m. The Colon surrendered. In the two hours and ten minutes from the last position given the vessels had coursed westward a great distance. The Colon had run twenty-six and one-half miles and was off the Tarquino River. The Brooklyn was the nearest American vessel. It had sailed twenty-eight and one-half miles and was three and four-tenths miles from the Colon. The Oregon was four and one-half miles from the Colon and more in shore than the Brooklyn. The Texas was three and four-tenths miles behind the Oregon. The New York was nine and one-half miles from the Colon. No one of the other vessels had come up save the Vixen, which was abreast of the New York. This little vessel in the beginning of the fight steamed out to sea and sailed westward on a course about two and one-quarter miles from that of the nearest Spanish ships.
"The tracings of the chart show that the Spanish vessels sailed on courses not more than three-tenths of a mile apart until the Oquendo ran ashore. Then the Vizcaya veered out to sea and the Colon kept nearer the shore, their courses being about seven-tenths of a mile apart. Up to the time the Oquendo went ashore the Iowa, Indiana, Oregon, and Texas sailed on courses within three-tenths of a mile of each other, the Iowa being the nearest and the Texas the farthest from the course of the Spanish ships. The Brooklyn's course was from three-tenths to one-half of a mile outside that of the Texas. The swing to the right which the Brooklyn made at the beginning of the engagement shows an oval four-tenths of a mile across. It crossed the courses of the Texas, Oregon, and Indiana twice while making the turn, but before these vessels had gone over them. The course of the New York after passing Morro was nearer the shore than any other United States vessel except the Gloucester, and a mile behind where the Oquendo turned to run ashore it passed inside the courses of the Spanish vessels. Ten miles west of the Vizcaya disaster it crossed the Colon's track, but followed close the course of that vessel until the latter surrendered.
"The Iowa, Indiana, and Ericsson did not go further west than where the Vizcaya ran ashore. The Gloucester stopped by the Maria Teresa and Oquendo, as also did the Hist. The latter vessel was not able to keep pace with the New York and Ericsson, the vessels it was with at the beginning of the battle."
Major General Nelson A. Miles was carrying on, as master of the art and science of war, a prospering campaign in Porto Rico, when the protocol of peace between the United States and Spain was signed, and "the war drum throbbed" no longer. It is the testimony of those who have studied the management of the invasion of Porto Rico by the military head of the army, that it was going on guided with consummate skill when the war closed. The American forces had the pleasure in Porto Rico of moving in a country that had not been desolated as Cuba was. The island was a tropical picture of peace, only the glitter of armies breaking the spell. The defenders had the help of good roads, by which they could, on the inner lines, shift their columns with rapidity and ease. But the Porto Rico people were largely favorable to United States sovereignty—just as the Cubans would be if it were not for the selfishness and jealousies, hatreds and scheming, regardless of the favor or prosperity of the people, that the most deplorable warfare known in the later years of the earth has engendered. It was on October 18, 1898, that the American flag was raised over San Juan de Porto Rico. The telegram of the Associated Press contained this announcement of the ceremony and symbol by which was announced the glorious initial chapter of a new dispensation that adds to America's territory one of the loveliest islands of the sea:
San Juan de Porto Rico, Oct. 18.—Promptly at noon to-day the American flag was raised over San Juan. The ceremony was quiet and dignified, unmarred by disorder of any kind.
The Eleventh Regular Infantry, with two batteries of the FifthArtillery, landed this morning. The latter proceeded to the forts,while the infantry lined up on the docks. It was a holiday for SanJuan, and there were many people in the streets.
Rear Admiral Schley and General Gordon, accompanied by their staffs, proceeded to the palace in carriages. The Eleventh infantry Regiment and band, with Troop H of the Sixth United States Cavalry, then marched through the streets and formed in the square opposite the palace.
At 11:40 a. m. General Brooke, Admiral Schley, and General Gordon, the United States Evacuation Commissioners, came out of the palace, with many naval officers, and formed on the right side of the square. The streets behind the soldiers were thronged with townspeople, who stood waiting in dead silence.
At last the city clock struck the hour of 12 and the crowds, almost breathless and with eyes fixed upon the flagpole, watched for developments. At the sound of the first gun from Fort Morro, Major Dean and Lieutenant Castle, of General Brooke's staff, hoisted the Stars and Stripes, while the band played the "Star Spangled Banner."
All heads were bared and the crowds cheered. Fort Morro, Fort San Cristobal, and the United States revenue cutter Manning, lying in the harbor, fired twenty-one guns each.
Senor Munoz Rivera, who was President of the recent autonomist council of secretaries, and other officials of the late insular government, were present at the proceedings.
Congratulations and handshaking among the American officers followed, Ensign King hoisted the Stars and Stripes over the intendencia, but all other flags on the various public buildings were hoisted by military officers. Simultaneously with the raising of the flag over the Captain General's palace many others were hoisted in different parts of the city.
Washington, D. C., Oct. 18.—The War Department has received the following to-day:
"San Juan, Porto Rico, Oct. 18.—Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.: Flags have been raised on public buildings and forts in this city and saluted with national salutes. The occupation of the island is now complete.
"Brooke, Chairman."
The two Spanish fleets—of the East and West Indies, were annihilated, the former May 1st, and the latter July 2nd, two months and two days between the events. The respective fleets in Manila bay were as follows:
American Fleet.
Name Class Armanent Men andOfficersOlympia Protected Cruiser Four 8-in., ten 5-in., 24 R.F. 466Baltimore Protected Cruiser Four 8-in., six 6-in., 10 R.F. 395Boston Par. Ptd. Cruiser Two 8-in., six 6-in., 10 R.F. 272Raleigh Protected Cruiser One 6-in., ten 5-in., 14 R.F. 295Concord Gunboat Six 6-in., 9 R.F. 150Petrel Gunboat Four 6-in., 7 R.F. 100McCulloch Revenue Cutter Four 4-in 180
Spanish Fleet.
Name. Class. Armament. Men andOfficers*Rema Cristina Steel Cruiser Six 6.2-in., two 2.7,13 R.F. 370Castilla Wood Cruiser Four 5.9, two 4.7, two 3.4,two 2.9, 12 R.F. 300Don Antonio de Ulloa Iron Cruiser Four 4.7, 5 R.F. 173Don Juan de Austria Iron Cruiser Four 4.7, two 2.7, 21 R.F. 173Isla de Luzon Steel Ptd. Cruiser Six 4.7, 8 R.F 164Isla de Cuba Steel Ptd. Cruiser Six 4.7, 8 R.F 164Velasco Iron Cruiser Three 6-in., two 2.7, twoR.F. 173Marques del Duero Gunboat One 6.2, two 4.7, 1 R.F. 98General Lezo Gunboat One 3.5, 1 R.F. 97El Correo Gunboat Three 4.7, 4 R.F. 116Quiros Gunboat 4 R.F. 60Villalobos Gunboat 4 R.F. 60Two torpedo boats and two transports.
The American squadron was thus officered:
Acting Rear Admiral George Dewey, Commander-in-Chief.
Commander B.P. Lamberter, Chief-of-Staff.
Lieutenant L.M. Brumby, Flag Lieutenant.
Ensign H.H. Caldwell, Secretary.
Olympia(Flagship).
Captain, Charles V. Gridley.
Lieutenant-Commander, S. C. Paine.
Lieutenants: C.G. Calkins, V.S. Nelson, G.S. Morgan, S.M. Strite.
Ensigns: M.M. Taylor, F.B. Upham, W.P. Scott, A.G. Kavanagh,H.V. Butler.
Medical Inspector, A.F. Price; Passed Assistant Surgeon, J.E. Page;Assistant Surgeon, C.H. Kindleberger; Pay Inspector, D.A. Smith;Chief Engineer, J. Entwistle; Assistant Engineer, S.H. DeLany;Assistant Engineer, J.F. Marshall, Jr.; Chaplain, J.B. Frazier;Captain of Marines, W.P. Biddle; Gunner, L.J.G. Kuhlwein; Carpenter,W. Macdonald; Acting Boatswain, E.J. Norcott.
The Boston.
Captain, F. Wildes.
Lieutenant-Commander, J.A. Norris.
Lieutenants: J. Gibson, W.L. Howard.
Ensigns: S.S. Robinson, L.H. Everhart, J.S. Doddridge.
Surgeon, M.H. Crawford; Assistant Surgeon, R.S. Balkeman; Paymaster,J.R. Martin; Chief Engineer, G.B. Ransom; Assistant Engineer,L.J. James; First Lieutenant of Marines, R. McM. Dutton; Gunner,J.C. Evans; Carpenter, L.H. Hilton
U. S. Steamship Baltimore.
Captain, N. M. Dyer.
Lieutenant-Commander, G. Blocklinger.
Lieutenants: W. Braunersreuther, F. W. Kellogg, J. M. Ellicott,C. S. Stanworth.
Ensigns: G. H. Hayward, M. J. McCormack, U. E. Irwin.
Naval Cadets, D. W. Wurtsbaugh, I. Z. Wettersoll, C. M. Tozer T. A. Karney; Passed Assistant Surgeon, F. A. Heiseler; Assistant Surgeon, E. K. Smith; Pay Inspector, E. Bellows; Chief Engineer, A. C. Engard; Assistant Engineers, H. B. Price, H. I. Cone; Naval Cadet (engineer), C. P. Burt; Chaplain. T. S. K. Freeman; First Lieutenant of Marines, D. Williams; Acting Boatswain, H. R. Brayton; Gunner, L. J. Connelly; Acting Gunner, L. J. Waller; Carpenter, O. Bath.
U. S. Steamship Raleigh.
Captain, J. B. Coghlan.
Lieutenant-Commander, F. Singer.
Lieutenants: W. Winder, B. Tappan, H. Rodman, C. B. Morgan,
Ensigns: F. L. Chidwick, P. Babin.
Surgeon, E. H. Marsteller; Assistant Surgeon, D. N. Carpenter; PassedAssistant Paymaster, S. E. Heap; Chief Engineer, F. H. Bailey;Passed Assistant Engineer, A. S. Halstead; Assistant Engineer,J. E. Brady; First Lieutenant of Marines, T. C. Treadwell; ActingGunner, G. D. Johnstone; Acting Carpenter, T. E. Kiley.
The Concord.
Commander, A. S. Walker.
Lieutenant-Commander, G. P. Colvocoreses.
Lieutenants: T. B. Howard, P. W. Hourigan.
Ensigns: L. A. Kiser, W. C. Davidson, O. S. Knepper.
Passed Assistant Surgeon, R. G. Broderick; Passed Assistant Paymaster,E. D. Ryan; Chief Engineer, Richard Inch; Passed Assistant Engineer,H. W. Jones; Assistant Engineer, E. H. Dunn.
The Petrel.
Commander, E. P. Wood.
Lieutenants: E. M. Hughes, B. A. Fiske, A. N. Wood, C. P. Plunkett.
Ensigns: G. L. Fermier, W. S. Montgomery.
Passed Assistant Surgeon, C. D. Brownell; Assistant Paymaster,G. G. Siebells; Passed Assistant Engineer, R. T. Hall.
The marvel of the naval engagements that disarmed Spain in both the Indies, is that only one American was killed in the Santiago action, and the only man who lost his life on Dewey's fleet was overcome by heat. The Spaniards were deceived as well as surprised at Manila, the deception being their dependence upon the belief that the Americans would take it for granted that the falsified official charts were correct, and stand off. The course of the American fleet, finding with the lead on the first round 32 feet of water where the chart said 15, dismayed the enemy. The Spanish had but one chance to cripple Dewey, and that was by closing with him, but they never seem, except in the case of the flagship, to have contemplated taking the offensive.
In the course of the war crowded with victory, two Spanish fleets were destroyed, two Spanish armies surrendered, thirty-six thousand soldiers and sailors of Spain made prisoners of war, the only heavy losses of Americans were at Santiago, and they happened because in the terrible climate of Cuba in summer, for those unaccustomed to it and forced to be in the rain and sleep on the ground, it was necessary to carry the enemy's lines of defense by assault, because it was certain that delay would be destruction of the troops. The campaign was hurried and short, but such was the effect of the few weeks spent in Cuba that, bloody as were the first days of July, the weeks succeeding witnessed the death from sickness of more soldiers than fell in battle.
Not until November 5,1898, did the State Department make public the complete text of the Protocol between the United States and Spain for the preliminary settlement of the war. A copy was cabled to this country from the French translation, but the department here never gave out the text of the document in official form. The Protocol textually is as follows:
"Protocol of agreement between the United States and Spain, embodying the terms of a basis for the establishment of peace between the two countries, signed at Washington Aug. 12, 1898. Protocol: William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and his Excellency, Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively possessing for this purpose full authority from the government of the United States and the government of Spain, have concluded and signed the following articles, embodying the terms on which the two governments have agreed in respect to the matters hereinafter set forth, having in view the establishment of peace between the two countries—that is to say:
ArticleI.
"Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.
ArticleII.
"Spain will cede to the United States the Island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrones, to be selected by the United States.
ArticleIII.
"The United States will occupy and hold the City, Bay, and Harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.
ArticleIV.
"Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and to this end each government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, appoint commissioners, and the commissioners so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands now under, Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies.
ArticleV.
"The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five commissioners to treat of peace, and the commissioners so appointed shall meet at Paris not later than Oct. 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall be subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries.
ArticleVI.
"Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.
"Done at Washington in duplicate, in English and in French, by the undersigned, who have hereunto set their hands and seals, the 12th day of August, 1898.
"William R. Day.Jules Cambon."
The Peace Jubilee.
The Lessons of War in the Joy Over Peace in the Celebrations at Chicago and Philadelphia—Orations by Archbishop Ireland and Judge Emory Speer—The President's Few Words of Thrilling Significance—The Parade of the Loyal League, and Clover Club Banquet at Philadelphia—Address by the President—The Hero Hobson Makes a Speech—Fighting Bob Evans' Startling Battle Picture—The Destruction of Cervera's Fleet—The Proclamation of Thanksgiving.
The lessons of war—that which has been through it accomplished for the country—the new lands over which our sovereignty is established—the gain in the national character—the increased immensity of the outlook of destiny, found impressive expression in the peace jubilee, the President of the United States participating, and interpreting history with dignity, in great Chicago, the giant of the West and North, and Philadelphia, the holy city of Independence Hall and the liberty bell.
Of the celebrations of Peace with honor and victory, the first was that at Chicago, and it will be memorable for remarkable speeches in which many orators rose to the height of the occasion, their speeches worthy of celebrity and certain to give imperishable passages to the school books of the future. We have to pass over much of meritorious distinction, and confine ourselves in the selections for these pages, to the utterances of the President—Archbishop Ireland, whose golden periods of Americanism ring through the land, and the Southern orator, Judge Emory Speer, of Georgia, whose patriotism springs forth and elevates the nobility of his thought, and touches with sacred fire the ruddy glow of his eloquence.
"Lead, my country, in peace!" was Archbishop Ireland's passionate exclamation, the key-note of his oration. He said:
"War has passed; peace reigns. Stilled over land and sea is the clang of arms; from San Juan to Manila, fearless and triumphant, floats the star spangled banner. America, 'Be glad and rejoice, for the Lord hath done great things.' America, with whole heart and soul, celebrate thy jubilee of peace.
"Welcome to America, sweet, beloved peace; welcome to America, honored, glorious victory. Oh, peace, thou art heaven's gift to men. When the Savior of humanity was born in Bethlehem the sky sang forth, 'Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace and good will to men.' Peace was offered to the world through Christ, and when the spirit of Christ is supreme, there is universal peace—peace among men, peace among nations.
"Oh, peace, so precious art thou to humanity that our highest ideal of social felicity must ever be thy sovereignty upon earth. Pagan statesmanship, speaking through pagan poetry, exclaims: 'The best of things which it is given to know is peace; better than a thousand triumphs is the simple gift of peace.' The regenerated world shall not lift up sword against sword; neither shall they he exercised any more in war.
"Peace is the normal flow of humanity's life, the healthy pulsation of humanity's social organism, the vital condition of humanity's growth and happiness.
"'O first of human blessings and supreme,Fair Peace! how lovely, how delightful thou.
Oh peace! thou soul and source of social life,Beneath whose calm inspiring influenceScience his views enlarges, art refines,And swelling commerce opens all her ports.Blessed be the man divine who gave us thee.'
"The praise of peace is proclaimed beyond need of other words, when men confess that the only possible justification of war is the establishment of peace. Peace, we prize thee.
"'But the better thou,The richer of delight, sometime the moreInevitable war.'
"'Pasis imponero morem'—to enforce the law of peace: this, the sole moral argument which God and humanity allow for war. O peace, welcome again to America.
"War—how dreadful thou art! I shall not, indeed, declare thee to be immoral, ever unnecessary, ever accursed. No; I shall not so arraign thee as to mete plenary condemnation to the whole past history of nations, to the whole past history of my own America. But that thou art ever dreadful, ever barbarous, I shall not deny. War! Is it by cunning design—in order to hide from men thy true nature—that pomp and circumstance attend thy march; that poetry and music set in brightest colors, the rays of light struggling through thy heavy darkness, that history weaves into threads of richest glory the woes and virtues of thy victims? Stripped of thy show and tinsel, what art thou but the slaying of men?—the slaying of men by the thousands, aye, often by the tens, by the hundreds of thousands.
"With the steady aim and relentless energy tasking science to its utmost ingenuity, the multitudes of men to their utmost endurance, whole nations work day and night, fitting ourselves for the quick and extensive killing of men. This preparation for war. Armies meet on the field of battle; shot and shell rend the air; men fall to the ground like leaves in autumnal storms, bleeding, agonizing, dying; the earth is reddened by human blood; the more gory the earth beneath the tread of one army the louder the revel of victory in the ranks of the other. This, the actual conflict of war. From north to south, from east to west, through both countries whose flags were raised over the field of battle, homes not to be numbered mourned in soul-wrecking grief, for husband, father, son or brother who sank beneath the foeman's steel or yielded life within the fever tent, or who, surviving shot and malady, carries back to his loved ones a maimed or weakened body. This, the result of war.
"Reduced to the smallest sacrifice of human life the carnage of the battlefields, some one has died and some one is bereft. 'Only one killed,' the headline reads. The glad news speeds. The newsboys cry: 'Killed only one.' 'He was my son. What were a thousand to this one—my only son.'
"It was Wellington who said: 'Take my word for it, if you had seen but one day of war you would pray to Almighty God that you might never see such a thing again.' It was Napoleon who said: 'The sight of a battlefield after the fight is enough to inspire princes with a love of peace and a horror of war.'
"War, be thou gone from my soul's sight! I thank the good God that thy ghastly specter stands no longer upon the thresholds of the homes of my fellow countrymen in America, or my fellow beings in distant Andalusia. When, I ask heaven, shall humanity rise to such heights of reason and of religion that war shall be impossible, and stories of battlefields but the saddening echoes of primitive ages of the race?