Still there may have been cogent—nay irresistible reasons which caused Colonel Durnford to push forward his forces. Were Colonel Pulleine alive, he might give equally good reasons for acceding to Durnford's urgent request and sending out the reinforcements.
The British regular infantry advanced successfully, retired slowly and in unbroken order; they were still firing rapidly, coolly, and with great effect. Things though desperate were by no means hopeless. Suddenly the native levies, "though their officers tried to restrain them, rushed back in the utmost disorder," thus exposing the flank and rearof the regulars. "Few of the men had time to fix bayonets before the enemy were amongst them, using their assegais with terrible effect." Here is the answer to "How did it happen?" The natives on one side—the Zulu—were regarded too lightly; on the other, fighting for the English with too great confidence. "Why," it will be asked, "were not the waggons laagered? Whose duty was it to see this done?" Lord Chelmsford had issued a standing order at the very commencement of the campaign, that this was to be the first consideration in all camps. Lord Chelmsford, accompanied Colonel Glyn from Rorke's Drift, saw the site chosen at Isandhlwana, and then immediately started on a reconnaissance which lasted till after nightfall. Doubtless Lord Chelmsford supposed Colonel Glyn had done what was necessary. On the following morning with the first streak of dawn Colonel Glyn was ordered to proceed to Major Dartnell's assistance, and Lord Chelmsford determined to accompany him, after despatching an express to Colonel Durnford ordering him up "to strengthen the camp." Doubtless Colonel Glyn supposed that Colonel Pulleine would see to laagering the waggons. Colonel Pulleine was in command of the camp a bare three hours, and doubtless, knowing how brief his tenure of office was to be, preferred to let things remain as they were till his successor's arrival. Colonel Durnford had not been a single half-hour in camp before the action was commenced.
It is asked why did not the troops form squares? Hastings, we are told, had Harold's men only remained in their position, would have been a Saxon victory—Torres Vedras a disgrace instead of a gloryhad the British troops been rashly taunted into leaving their trenches: and Waterloo a more glowing theme for Beranger's lyre had Napoleon been able to entice the patient English squares to forsake their adamantine formation. But why was Colonel Durnford to form squares? How was he to imagine that such an immense force was arrayed against him when the Commander-in-chief had with him a superior force to that left in the camp avowedly to operate against the enemy's main body? For such his information and personal observation led him to believe was the force against whom he and Major Dartnell were acting.
Colonel Durnford was no novice in South African war; like Cæsar, he had the gift of the pen no less than the sword; he had both written and fought well. Colonel Pulleine was an experienced officer of no mean reputation, and by whatever device they were deceived, we may be sure that it was no ordinary one, and that few would have stood where they fell.
Again, who could have anticipated the attack? We have it from the lips of a Zulu that the onset was unpremeditated, and the result of accident. With all humbleness, let it be confessed that—
"Our indiscretion sometimes serves us wellWhen our deep plots do fail; and that should teach usThere's a divinity that shapes our endsRough hew them as we will."
"Our indiscretion sometimes serves us wellWhen our deep plots do fail; and that should teach usThere's a divinity that shapes our endsRough hew them as we will."
Another question, often asked, is, "Why did not Lord Chelmsford, immediately on his return, make a counter-attack on the enemy." First of all he had to wait for Colonel Glyn and the main body to comeup to him. Meanwhile darkness had come on. When Glyn arrived he did advance with his troops formed up for action, and with the intention of re-taking the camp, which he had every reason to suppose was occupied by the enemy. The event proved they had abandoned it. Was not this a good reason for striking a blow? Let the facts of the case be well borne in mind. Lord Chelmsford knew that there was a large force in his rear; the force that had sacked the camp was supposed, and reasonably enough, to be on the right flank. In front were the bright watchfires of another force, and the blazing hospital at Rorke's Drift, which, together with Helpmakaar, there was every ground to believe had been captured and looted by the foe; in a word, his force was surrounded. The men had only fifty rounds of ammunition apiece; they had been twenty-four hours without food; they were physically exhausted by eighteen hours' continuous marching, and no less morally by the loss of their camp; their probabilities of escape were distant. How could a general lead troops in such a condition against a foe flushed and elated with spoil and recent victory?
Ekowe described—The fort—Guard for the frontier—Raid on Dabulamanzi's Kraal—Another raid—Life in Ekowe—Wood at Potter's Kraal—Capture of Baglusini—Skirmish and capture of cattle—Destruction of Manyanyoba Kraal—Colonel Rowlands—Capture of Makatees Kop—Junction with Wood—Camp at Kambula—Coming in of Oham—Disaster at Intombi Drift—Death of Moriarty—Rescue of Oham's wives and people—Events that led to the attack on Umbelini—The Zlobani—The attack—Details—Death of Campbell—Narrow escape of Wood—Death of Weatherly—St. Helena and H.M.S. "Shah."
Wemust now return to Pearson, whom we left entrenching himself at Ekowe.
The position is a most commanding one, being almost on the summit of the Tyoe range, and more than 2000 feet above the sea level; and for beauty of site could scarcely be surpassed. To the north, about a mile and a half, is the Umlalazi river, at that time rather full from the late rains, and beyond this stream are long undulating grassy plains, almost devoid of bush, with the exception here and there of a few wild and dwarf date-palms, and lichens in the hollows. Behind, to the south, is the Umkukusi range, and a hilly but open country, while on the west is a very broken and difficult country, bounded by the Hintza forest. Away to the east, right to thecoast at Port Durnford, is about forty miles of undulating and here and there hilly country. About 1200 yards to the south-east there is a rocky eminence at least 600 feet higher than the fort, and from this place a magnificent view of Port Durnford and the mouth of the Umlalazi can be seen. The sea is not more than twenty-two miles off, in a line as the crow flies. The original building was formerly a Norwegian mission station, and when the present war began it was abandoned by the missionaries and plundered by the Zulus. The buildings, when Pearson arrived, consisted of three moderately-sized brick erections, thatched originally with straw, but subsequently covered with a less inflammable material. In addition to these buildings, which were utilized as stores, there was a small church, built of the native-made sun-dried bricks, and covered, as most of these edifices are in that country, with corrugated galvanized iron. The church was turned into an hospital, while the tower made a capital look-out, from whence could be seen the next post, and which afterwards proved of such service in the way of signalling. Pearson now began to suffer the inconveniences of a regular siege; his communications were cut, and it was found that of the twelve messengers belonging to the Natal Native Contingent sent from Ekowe with letters during the first week in February, only one arrived, the others having been intercepted and killed on their way. The fort soon completely changed its character under the incessant labour bestowed upon it by Pearson's men, under the vigilant supervision of their chief. It now became a six-angled enclosure, about sixty yards wide,having a ditch eighteen feet in depth, while its breadth was twelve feet. At the bottom it was studded profusely with assegai heads securely planted, and the parapets, carefully rivetted, were proof not only against any musketry fire, but field artillery. From its southern angles ran out two well-built curtain walls, enclosing a fine kraal for cattle and horses. These curtains were well protected by the fire of the angles from which they sprung, while the kraal itself had its own massive gateway and drawbridge. At the end of the kraal, or cattle enclosure, furthest from the angular fort, was constructed from the remains of a dilapidated magazine, a kind of irregular redoubt, which also had a deep ditch and thick mud walls, defended by a quantity of powerful thorns laid along the parapet. It was most fortunate that this force brought with them a large supply of well-selected entrenching tools, consisting of shovels, picks, spades, billhooks, axes, and crowbars. Day by day, whenever their time could be spared from patrol and outpost duty, the men were employed in making entanglements of rows of felled trees, as well as constructing fascines, filling sandbags, turning out gabions, loopholes, andabattis. All these obstacles possessed the usual requisites. They were under the close fire of the fort, were covered from the enemy's fire, and gave him no cover; while they were all made so substantially that they could not be cut down or removed without immense difficulty. The piquet duties were rather severe, and each piquet had to furnish two or three double sentries in reliefs, patrols, and links. They were posted under the best circumstances obtainable, being sheltered from the enemy, having a goodrange in front, with every advantage in retreating if attacked in force. Each face or front of the fort was cleared up to 800 yards; shelter trenches were made for the first line of defence; cover was left for the supports and reserves; ranges were marked and measures taken for the artillery and rifle fire, and all precautionary arrangements made in regard to the supply and storage of provisions, forage, water, and ammunition.
The water was good, and not brackish at that time of the year. It was taken from a bright stream well under the fire of the fort, and fed by a capital spring, also under fire of one of the seven-pounders. The church and the storehouses were also carefully loopholed, and sandbags furnished to make the defences more secure. These three strong loopholed buildings, forming part of theenceinte, were rendered more formidable by double planking, backed crossways by iron barrel hoops, while fine, damp, heavy sand from the neighbouring hill was employed in filling bags, made from old provision sacks.
Every man in the fort had his proper place assigned to him, and at exercise it was found that with three minutes' notice each detachment was in its place. The Buffs were told off to the two northern faces, on which side there was a well-madecaponnièrethrown up in the re-entering angle. At the west angle of this fort one gun and a detachment of the Royal Artillery were posted, while on the east salient were two guns and a somewhat stronger number of men. Here there was a small outlet for water-parties, guarded on the flank by a little loopholed building, and commanded in therear by a strong building with a thatched roof. The rocket tubes were placed under charge of the Royal Marines, on the south-west front, and could, if necessary, sweep the trek oxen laager, and slaughter oxen laager outside the fort on that side. The principal gateway was on the west face, and was guarded by a company of the Buffs, who loopholed the church tower in their rear to fall back upon, and to act as a commanding flanking fire. The front, facing due south, was served by the 99th, with one gun at the salient angle, acaponnièrein the centre, guarded by a Gatling, and with a thirteen feet stockade at the opposing angle. Another strong building, also thatch roof, commanded this front. Not a day passed but some improvement was made in strengthening these works, and this as much for prudence against possible attack, as to keep the men occupied and free from the lassitude attendant upon long confinement. It should also be mentioned that torpedoes had been laid down by the bluejackets for three miles along the bed of the Tugela, so that if the Zulus attempted to cross near any of the posts of observation they might be somewhat astonished.
The ration daily used to be two pounds of beef—fresh killed and tough as leather—a couple of commissariat biscuits—hard as flint—a very small complement of coffee or tea, sugar, and one spoonful of lime juice, which every man had to take whether he liked it or not; preserved potatoes, compressed vegetables, and an occasional ration of beans, made a little variety now and then. During the last days of the siege the meat and biscuit ration was reduced. A day's routine was as follows:—The men rosewith theréveilleat four a.m. for a parade of all hands and fatigue duties for a couple of hours, weather permitting: the breakfast bugle sounded at eight, and fatigues were again performed from 9.30 till noon; dinner bugle at 1.30, and rest and recreation till 4.30, and finally "retreat" at 6.30, when no one was to be outside the walls. The men amused themselves with quoits, cricket, and athletics, some of the Buffs being good "all round;" while all the officers, especially the colonel, encouraged these pastimes by example as well as precept. After all, the life was not more monotonous than that on board ship. There was no lack of ammunition, as Colonel Ely on march to Ekowe had to abandon only ten waggons, and these were looted. The rest, however, arrived safely. The garrison also from time to time received valuable and most reassuring information regarding the disposition and whereabouts of their friends along the line of the Tugela, and in their rear. At Fort Pearson, which might be said to be the principal base of operations, and which commanded the river and lower drift from the Natal side, there were sufficient men of the Naval Brigade to work the two guns there. They had also the European officers and the non-commissioned officers of the disbanded native corps. Then, to keep up communications, the Mounted Volunteers of Coast District were posted at intervals along the river, between Fort Pearson and Kranz Kop. Another fort on the Zulu bank of the Tugela was called "Fort Tenedos," in compliment to the detachment which formed its garrison. Major Barrow, with a squadron of mounted infantry, and Lieutenant Kingscote, with a smartbody of marines and bluejackets, formed the defensive force. At Rorke's Drift there were now five companies of the 2nd battalion of the 24th Regiment. A strongly entrenched position had also been formed on a commanding site called Macdonald's Farm, on a rocky eminence overlooking the Tugela. Ditches ten feet deep were cut, parapets seven feet high thrown up, the farmhouse itself strengthened, and all the garden walls loopholed. The garrison consisted of the Stanger Mounted Rifles, and some native auxiliaries, who proved most trustworthy as scouts and messengers. Captain Lucas, whose admirable powers of organization were quite proverbial amongst the colonists, and whose frontier experiences were of long standing, was strongly posted at a bend of the river between the farm and Thring's Post, and had with him a useful body of natives. Thring's Post came next on the list, and here there were a couple of hundred of well-mounted and well-armed volunteers divided into squadrons, or corps of fifty men. Thring's Post is on the Imyamazana Mountain, and is about twenty-seven miles from Fort Pearson. The volunteers, knowing the country well, were employed in keeping up by constant patrols communications with Fort Pearson and Fort Cherry.
News also reached them that Wood had been reinforced, and was more than holding his own. There was, therefore, little anxiety felt for the security of the frontier, and everything strengthened Colonel Pearson in his determination to remain in his position instead of attempting to cut his way out.
The health of the Ekowe garrison continued verygood. The hospital, it has been said, was the old church of the mission-station. At the end of the second week in March there were only twenty-five men on the sick-list, and many of these almost convalescent. They had, however, lost two of their number lately, namely, poor Williams of the Buffs, and another great favourite, young Coker, the mid-shipman, who fought his Gatling so well at Inyanezi. Both these fine fellows were ill but a short time, and succumbed to fever. They were buried with the usual honours just outside the fort.
Lieutenant Rowden, 98th Regiment, who was nominated by Colonel Pearson commander of the mounted scouts, performed his difficult and dangerous task to perfection. He had by the end of February successfully explored the country in the direction of the Isangweni military kraal, which was not far from Ondini, and about three miles from Ekowe. He reported that there were 1500 men there, and more collecting. The 1500 were composed of the married regiment Isangu, whose average age is fifty-four, and whose services in former wars had been most distinguished. The country between the fort and Isangweni was an undulating table-land, running parallel to the forests on either side, and admirably suited for cavalry. Another brother of Cetywayo, named Dabulamanzi, had a fortified kraal not far from that of Isangweni, and Pearson determined to attack both those places as soon as he was in a position to move upon them.
The second week of March had now come to an end, and it was deemed advisable to vary the monotony of life in the fort by one or two offensive expeditions. The most important of these, both asto the numbers engaged and its effects, was the foray on Dabulamanzi's kraal. The forces detailed for this expedition consisted of fifty men of the Buffs, the same number of the 99th, and twenty-five of the Naval Brigade, with their Gatling, and a small body of mounted scouts, under the active Lieutenant Rowden (98th). Starting about five a.m., the party descended the slopes that led to the river, and continued its march along a valley running north-east, and gradually narrowing. The track in some places was crossed by difficult spruits, and was scarcely defined; but their guides were well acquainted with the landmarks, although the pathways were often obliterated by thorns and bush. The track was also frequently commanded by spurs and bluffs projecting overhead, but these were carefully explored by the mounted men, and no enemy could be seen. A considerable watershed was reached about eight miles from Ekowe, and here, in a favourable and secluded position, was made the first off-saddle for half an hour. The country about here was entirely denuded of fodder, but the horsemen had been fortunately directed to bring a few mealies for their mounts. On resuming the march they crossed the bottom of a deep sandy nullah with very precipitous sides, which they were forced to follow, as it was the only practicable track. About a mile and a half further on the advanced patrols sent back to inform the officer of the main body that there was a camping-ground or temporary kraal about three miles and a half north, where there was sufficient water and grass. The orders were therefore given to push on for this point, and in about forty-five minutes it was reached. It was now sundown, and their chief,having decided that it was inexpedient to march during the night, orders were issued for the usual precautions to be taken, and to bivouac till daybreak.
During the night, however, no one slept, as they had several alarms, and it became evident from certain indications known to the experienced in Zulu camping-out, that they were being reconnoitred by the enemy, though in all probability not in sufficient force to deliver an attack. As, however, it was quite possible that messengers would be despatched to the neighbouring kraals, it was deemed advisable to strengthen the position, in case of their being surrounded before the morning. Taking one of the guides, who said he knew the neighbourhood, from having frequently hunted here, one of the officers and a couple of men were sent to make a reconnaissance round the bivouac. This party at once started without making any noise, and entering on the old watercourse worked their way up towards the summit of the kloof. Large, indeed enormous, blocks of stone were lying about in various directions, and the water during the heavy rains had so far worked its way among these rocks that several hollows were scooped out so as to form caves large enough to hold one or two human beings. These places had evidently been recently occupied, remains of mealies and the charred wood of a recent fire indicating the use to which the shelter had been applied. Ascending the kloof still farther, and keeping well under cover of the bush, these scouts walked along what at first seemed an old war-path, and this being examined it was evident that it had been worn by human beings, and not long since. On followingthis path, it led to a small piece of table-land not much larger than an ordinary mess-tent or marquee, and this platform was formed by a solid piece of rock rising, not unlike the Pieter Bot at Mauritius, to a couple of hundred feet above where the explorers were standing. To the eye of a soldier the place was impregnable, and as the scouts scanned the country round by the fitful gleams of occasional moonlight they saw that twenty well-armed and steady men could hold the rock against an army. The face of the rock had been scooped out, and, either by time or human labour, a sort of cave or shelter afforded additional protection. Upon leaving the rock and descending the ravine to carry the intelligence to the column in bivouac, these patrols were startled to see the outlines of several dark figures moving in the neighbouring bush. Making all possible speed, therefore, the messengers hurried back, and at the news received every man stood to his arms. They had not long to wait, for the enemy soon appeared, drawn out in clear relief against the grey of the early dawn, which was now coming on. Bodies of Zulus on the opposite ridges, which could not have been seen lower down, were now observed, while a few cattle were being rapidly hurried away in the distance. The Zulu scouts were evidently puzzled at the white men's proceedings, the more so as before leaving the kop one of the guides had tied his handkerchief to an overhanging branch, thus giving the enemy the idea that a detachment had been left to occupy the post. This error on the part of their antagonists served the troops materially, as, by hurrying forward at a quick pace, they were enabled to gain the kop, and with some considerabledifficulty get their Gatling to the summit. Their horses, of course, could not ascend, but halfway up there was an excellent position, where grass and water were found, and here the animals were tethered in the usual manner—by the head and knee. When daylight enabled them to examine the surrounding country with field-glasses, they could see the neighbouring kraals of the chief Dabulamanzi and his neighbour, Ungakamatue, and it was evident that the alarm had been given. Several extraordinary movements attracted their attention. Armed bodies of natives were seen to be leaving the villages in various directions, as if going upon messages of importance. Aware of the celerity of movement of the Zulus, and the enormous distances their soldiers can cover in a few hours, this activity was not reassuring, as it was concluded that reinforcements were being sent for, for the purpose of intercepting the retreat to the fort of Ekowe. The English commander, however, was not long in choosing his plan of operations. It would never do to sustain a siege on the rock or kop, which, however defensible if provisioned, was sure to be taken by starvation in the long-run. The Dabulamanzi kraal had evidently been weakened by the absence of men harvesting, and it did not seem more than a mile from where the troops were. One of the guides remembered a cattle-track which, by a circuitous route, led back on the eastern side to Ekowe, and as the road they had arrived by was certain to be now ambushed, it was deemed advisable to make a dash at the kraal, and return with what spoil they could obtain in the new direction. Having cut some long canes, some of the soldiers fixed them securelybetween the ledges of the rocks, and attached to them some coloured clothes, which they hoped would lead to the belief that they still occupied the kop. These precautions having been taken, the troops moved silently down through the dense bushes on the reverse side of the cliff, and succeeded in getting away without being observed by the Zulus, who evidently seemed principally anxious about their cattle. Part of the mounted force went in front to explore the bush, while the rest remained in rear to follow and reconnoitre. On coming again to the valley, they moved still more rapidly until they came to a little rise, which, on surmounting, they found led to a deep kloof, the mouth of which was almost closed by the proximity of the hills, on either side rising to about 600 feet in height. These curious-looking hills appeared to be a series of ledges of rocks, with lines of dykes—probably of volcanic origin—cropping up, and forming the most natural-looking breastworks, behind which a determined party of men might destroy any attacking party. Having waited to collect the tail of the column, they descended the rise, and sending out a few men to scout on the ridge skirting the hill on their right, the commander led the main body under cover of this range towards the mouth of the kloof, which the guides said was the main entrance to the kraal. When about 200 yards from the mouth of the gorge, the enemy commenced firing upon the advanced files from behind a formidable-looking dyke, and seeing that one of the horses had been badly wounded in the quarter, an officer sent up a dozen men to the top of the range to extend as a covering party. These had barely been postedin a good position, when a perfect shower of bullets fell amongst the main body, the only casualty being, however, one man struck by an almost spent bullet. It being thus seen that they were out of range as far as any material injury could be effected, the men were directed to keep moving along the flank, while the Buffs advanced along the valley in a parallel line, closing to their centres as they neared the mouth of the kloof. At the same time, the men of the Naval Brigade (twenty-five) were detached with their Gatling towards the foot of the left-hand hill, to see if there was a path by which the kraal could be taken in reverse. This left-hand hill seemed to be the key of the position, as it looked down upon the kraal itself. The 99th were all this time held in reserve to prevent the troops being taken in reverse should the enemy's reinforcements come up. While the English were effecting these movements the Zulus, whose forces did not seem to be augmenting, kept up what would have been a hot cross-fire had they been armed with Martinis, but which was perfectly innocuous at 700 yards.
A bugle-call now gave notice to the skirmishers to close in, and when this was effected the mounted men dashed through the kloof, followed by the Buffs and the 99th at the double. The Naval Brigade meanwhile was seen working its way in the most energetic manner round the left flank and ready to effect a junction with the others at the foot of the mound on which stood the outer defences of the kraal. A general stampede of men, women, and cattle now took place, the soldiers being specially warned not to fire at the two latter, and only at the former in return. In ten minutes the outer andinner circles of the kraal were fired, care having been taken to see that no living creature was hidden within. As the Zulus generally store their mealies (Indian corn) underground in the cattle enclosures, there was not time to look for any supplies, but they managed to carry off a few large packages which were found in two huts, as well as some millet (Kaffir corn). They also collected all the cattle they could find, not many having been left, and getting them together in the centre of the column, moved away by the path mentioned by their guides. These movements were conducted so quickly, that they were on the homeward march within half an hour of the time they had entered the kraal. About half a mile from the kraal the kloof separated into two narrow gullies, the ledges of rock between them being inaccessible, and as it was known that these paths made a junction some two miles on, it was decided to use them both, to enable the troops to march more quickly. The Buffs accordingly took one trek, and the 99th detachment the other, both uniting again without any casualty later on. The English attack was undoubtedly a complete surprise, inasmuch as the bulk of the people belonging to the kraal were away, and could not be recalled in time to defend their village. Had the British column possessed a larger force of mounted men, they could have intercepted and carried back the cattle which they saw the attendants driving off. As it was, however, it was not safe or prudent to risk the chances of communications with the fort being cut off by delaying to pursue these animals.
The column had made good about ten miles of the return march when they discovered that theirretreat had been found out; straight in front of them also were wooded krantzes and dark ravines, where an army of Zulus might have been concealed, but pioneers having been sent out reported that all was safe in that direction. Upon this they used the utmost speed to gain the friendly covert, as they saw that if pursued there was the best chance of eluding the vigilance of their enemies; or if unable to do this, they would have the opportunity of fighting them to the best advantage. As the troops moved quickly on, they entered the forest and lost sight of the Zulus, who seemed in force, and were apparently retracing their steps for some mysterious object. They were not, however, kept long in doubt as to their proceedings, for upon sending on scouts to an eminence where they could see without being seen, it was found that the whole Zulu force, apparently some 2000 strong, was upon the crest of the hill over which they had passed. An advanced party of skirmishers were running very rapidly, their shields held aloft, and their assegais waving over their heads. They had discovered the trick played upon them, and the ruse of the coloured cloths planted upon the kop. When, however, they could not discover the spoor upon the direct trek by which the English party had come, they lost a considerable amount of time in casting about to make out their real direction. At last, however, when crossing a bit of open veldt, the keen-sighted Zulus observed their cattle being carried away, at least five miles from them. The rage of the pursuers, and their contempt for the marching qualities of British soldiers—compared to their own speed and powers of endurance—no doubt made them confidentof overtaking them; but the latter had little apprehension of the result, even if this were effected. They knew that as soon as their foes came within range, they could pick them off at 1000 or 1200 yards, and the little column had been specially furnished with several crack marksmen to whom this distance was no difficulty. They continued their march therefore steadily, and did not abandon the cattle, which, strange to say, gave little trouble, and were kept at a good pace by some of the mounted men, whose anticipation of a full beef ration on their return, from the spoil, made them doubly zealous in their duties. In about an hour the Zulus had gained considerably upon them; they were imprudent enough to move in close order. The evening was, however, now drawing on, and in another hour the troops should be under the guns of the fort. A mist, which had been for some time hanging about the streams and the kloof, prevented the exact progress of the pursuers being seen, but the pursued were not long without intimation of their whereabouts. The rear-guard were attracted, when about three miles from the fort, by what seemed to be dark objects moving between some rocks about half a mile on their left rear. So fitful was the view obtained, however, that the men were uncertain whether they were Zulus or some of the larger species of baboon, which often come out of their holes and caves to look at any human creature passing by. A steady watch was, however, maintained, and before many minutes they could plainly see that a large body of the enemy had, by the most tremendous pedestrian feat, succeeded in getting almost on a level with them, in a position to assailthem in flank. The column had not long to wait, for as they came to a portion of the trek they could not avoid, on account of the proximity of a deep morass on the right, the pursuers, deeming them within range, treated them to a volley which rattled up to about fifty paces short of their flank. Ten of the mounted men, all excellent shots, were now sent out to cover the attacked flank, and, as far as they could, to harass the enemy. The ground was difficult and broken, but this was no impediment to these gallant fellows, who, gaining a commanding position 500 yards from the Zulus, and where there was admirable cover, dismounted, and kept up such a galling fire that the Zulus retreated, as if waiting for their main body to come up. As the mist rolled away, they could distinctly be seen carrying off their dead and wounded with improvised stretchers of branches of mimosa. A running fire was now kept up, the English shot taking deadly effect, while no casualty occurred to their men. For more than half an hour this went on, until the fort was sighted, and as the Zulu main body had not come up, the flanking party drew quietly off.
The sun was sinking in the horizon as the returning soldiers received their well-earned welcome from their beleaguered comrades, who were beginning to be somewhat anxious as to their safe return.
Pearson's next raid was a most brilliant affair. It was found out from reliable sources that a body of Zulus had charge of a convoy of cattle, intended for the king's kraal at Ulundi. Deeming the Ekowe garrison as of no account for more than defensive purposes, the Zulu general had merely detailed 400 or 450 men to form the escort, whichwas known to be on its march not more than seven miles to the north-west of Ekowe, not far from the Inyezani river. Now here Pearson had an opportunity of achieving two objects at one stroke. He wished to explore the land and salient features of the country towards Inyezani, in order to see whether a road could be made by which the dense bush of Hintza could be avoided, while, at the same time, he could inflict a lesson upon the Zulus, and possibly obtain some cattle. The foray was not to be on such a grand scale as that made on Dabulamanzi's kraal, but it was intended to be equally important for military purposes. Twenty men of the Naval Brigade, all the small force of acting engineers, forty of the Buffs, twenty of the 99th, and the mounted scouts were placed under orders to parade before daylight on Friday, 21st March. No Gatling was to accompany, as the utmost celerity of movement was required, and if the expedition did not succeed in its first dash an immediate retreat upon the guns was to be made. On leaving the fort at 3.30 a.m., the road by which the band advanced was found to be good, although here and there commanded from the neighbouring mountains. About two miles from Ekowe a bluff runs out from the spur of the range of hills which had often served as a reconnoitring point, and this was immediately occupied by the mounted men, who had orders to keep up signalling both with the fort and the rest of the expedition. Continuing on its march, the column came to the Inyezani river, which for several miles runs between two remarkable mountains, the bases of which are clothed with luxuriant forest growths, while above spring sheerprecipices 1000 and 1100 feet high. The formation seemed to be sandstone and limestone, affording excellent material for building purposes. Before reaching these dark solitudes the river passes through a country undulating and fertile, and the horizon is closed by higher hills, covered in the most part by forest. These forest-trees are of fine growth and of the most valuable description. The banks of the river are fringed by a quantity of bamboo-looking reeds, which serve as wattles in the district, and which are about the thickness of a finger, and some ten or twelve feet high. Tracks of hippopotami are occasionally seen, and it is known that such are in the neighbourhood. The river here is about 200 yards broad, while the depth averages twenty-five feet. The expedition now noticed a few deserted kraals on the right bank, while those on the left were found to be in ruins, as if lately destroyed. At eight a.m. a herd of cattle was seen some two miles off, and rapidly skirting the base of a friendly hill the troops managed to cut in between these animals and a body of Zulus, who appeared to be bivouacking in front of some neighbouring caves, where fires were lit and cooking was going on. The mounted men, who were observing these movements, now descended from the bluff where they had been watching, and coming up rapidly at a canter, made a dash at the Zulus, to cover the infantry retreat, which they effected with the capture of some thirty-five fine cattle. A desultory fire was kept up upon them from the hills during their return, and the enemy, who seemed to be gradually augmented, at one narrow gorge managed to get within range, slightly wounding two or threeof the rear-guard. By noon on the same day the men with the captured cattle were safely discussing their frugal dinner, consisting of an extra half-ration in honour of the event, within the old fort, which they were already beginning to look upon as a friend from whom they were soon to part.
In spite of the rapidity of the raid, the necessary observations were made by the officers deputed for this duty, and a rough sketch of the ground passed over gave all the information requisite for the construction of the projected road. This work, which was forthwith taken in hand, had a most satisfactory effect upon the spirits of the garrison generally. The working parties were occasionally driven in, but not without inflicting loss upon the enemy, whose attention was much taken up in guarding and patrolling the main road by which Pearson came.
Wood, it has been mentioned, fell back upon receiving the news of Isandhlwana; but this retrograde movement was of short duration, and from that time till all was ready for the relief of Ekowe, his was the only column acting on the offensive.
From the 25th January to the 1st February his marches and countermarches afford little matter of interest. On the 28th he moved on to a new camping-ground, called Potter's Store, and there obtained full particulars of the Maglisini or Baglusini Kraal. This place Colonel Wood had for some time known as one of the principal rallying-points and depôts of supplies for the Zulu armies. Large quantities of "mealies" (Indian corn) and grain of other sorts were known to have been accumulated at this magazine, while cattle in large droves had been seenon their way to the depôt. Under these circumstances it was necessary to proceed with caution, as, had any ostentatious preparations been made for an advance in the direction of the magazine, it is more than probable Wood's object would only have been gained at a severe cost. In this view it was determined that a cavalry raid should be made by the mounted troops under Piet Uys, with his Burghers, and Colonel Buller, with his dashing corps of Frontier Light Horse. From the camp near Potter's Store to the Baglusini stronghold was at least thirty miles. A plain suitable to the passage of cavalry intervened before the Manzana river was reached, and Colonel Buller saw no reason why the distance should not be covered in one day. The kraals of Umbelini and of Inyatini were also in the same neighbourhood, therefore the utmost caution and secrecy were necessary in making preparations for the attack. The weather had been most unfavourable for some days, but fortunately cleared up, and became settled on the 1st of February. On that morning Colonel Buller, having selected on the previous day 106 of his best mounted men and thirty-three of the Dutch Contingent under Piet Uys, their commandant, paraded his men under the supervision of Colonel Wood, and explained to them clearly the feat they were about to attempt, not concealing the danger which they would have to incur in the performance of a most difficult and dangerous duty. The scene was a most dramatic one, as the camp lanterns lit up the faces of the bronzed and stalwart volunteers who formed the devoted band. Each man was exceedingly well horsed, and no precaution had been neglected in the careful overhaulingof arms, accoutrements, and saddlery. Biscuit and, for those who cared, a little ration of rum were served out, and with a hearty "God-speed" from their comrades, who half envied their chances of adventure, the little troop of 141 gallant fellows started long before the earliest streak of dawn. The utmost silence was ordered and maintained, while the ground for some miles was so favourable that the horses' hoofs were scarcely heard as they cantered over the light and springy veldt. Distances on horseback are so differently estimated out in South Africa and at home in England, that when the ground is favourable, very long, and to European experience almost impossible, marches are constantly made without distress to horse or rider. In the present instance two short off-saddles only were indulged in; the first not far from the centre of the flat, and the next after the Manzana river had been safely crossed. The country now became more broken and the pace was reduced to a walk, but before the sun was well up the goal was in sight, and the herds of cattle were seen calmly feeding on the slopes. No suspicion would seem to have been excited, and it is more than probable that the very smallness of the attacking force, and its being all composed of the mounted branch, contributed to the success of the affair. The kraal was exceedingly well built, and seen from a distance of 1200 or 1000 yards it was doubtful whether it held a large guard or not. Cautiously yet swiftly advancing, Colonel Buller felt his way, with a few of his best shots thrown out as vedettes. These men soon encountered some scattered Zulus, who did not seem at all prepared for any hostile demonstration, but onretiring towards the hills they were reinforced by several other larger bodies, who had evidently been sent out to reconnoitre. After a few shots had been fired, a sudden and simultaneous advance was made on two sides of the kraal, and almost without resistance on the part of its defenders the kraal was captured. Two hundred and fifty well-built huts were counted by Buller's men, who, losing not a moment, collected no less than four hundred head of cattle, and a large quantity of grain, and then set fire to the magazine. Six Zulus were killed in the capture of the place, and although more than one body of them were seen hovering about in the vicinity, numbering severally 100 to 200 and 300 men, no opposition was offered to the rear-guard or patrols.
Wood then again moved his camp to the White Umvolosi. His position here was a remarkably strong one, and from it he commanded the passage of the White Umvolosi, the Pewana, while his day and night patrols held the disputed territory south of the Pongolo. A raid was next made in the direction of the Insulwa Kraal. The men got upon the road about seven a.m., and steady marching for about three miles brought them opposite the spot where, a few days before, a large force of Zulus had been seen engaged at drill. A scout who had been sent out on the right front came galloping back with the news that the Zulu cattle were in considerable numbers at the lower end of the valley, while he also added that the guard over these animals was not much larger than the English party. Piet Uys at once concerted with a couple of his smart non-commissioned officers, anddecided, as they were exceedingly well mounted, to ride for the kloof which formed the exit to the valley. To execute this manœuvre was the work of ten minutes, during which they were hidden from sight of the Zulus by a tall ledge of scarped rocks which almost divided the valley. In the meanwhile the remainder moved steadily on at a walk, so as not to alarm their prey. In rather more than half an hour they had so far gained upon the cattle that they could make a tolerable guess as to their probable number, which was estimated at a couple of hundreds. The main body had now arrived at a place which Piet Uys and his Dutchmen seemed intimately acquainted with, and the Zulu cattle and guard could be seen on a ridge running parallel to the one they themselves were upon. Below was a deep kloof leading to the river. Some of Buller's Horse were now sent round to the opposite side, to drive the enemy down the kloof to the main party, while they continued to march down the ridge to meet these men as they came on. But they had not advanced very far when, as was expected, a much larger force appeared on the neighbouring heights, but the cliff was so precipitous they could not join their comrades. The seven-pounder was now brought into action, and sent a couple of shells right in amongst them, one of the rounds being a capital shot. Advancing still, the English leader saw that the enemy lately on the heights had managed, by making a détour, to get to the cover of a dense mimosa bush on his left. This move was answered by several rounds of canister, which it was afterwards found were not without effect. The foes were thus driven out into the open, and at onemoment it seemed as though they were going to fight; the Boers, however, who had been detached to the neck of the valley now served their comrades by an excellent ruse. They had taken with them one of the bugle boys of the 13th, mounted on a wiry Kaffir pony, and the main party now heard coming across the valley the echoes of his bugle sounding the advance. The Zulus could not make out the meaning of this sound, and evidently imagined that the English commander had posted at least the wing of a regiment to intercept them. The consequence was, that the moment the main body cantered forward with a bold front, the cattle were abandoned; and they were left masters of the field, taking 170 head and some few wounded prisoners. Two villages were left in flames behind the retiring troops, who, as the crackling and flashing approached the bush where the hills met the plain, could see individual forms of black warriors shouting and gesticulating from out of the dust and smoke, wild with impotent rage at the loss of their kraal and cattle. The ridges beyond the gullies still afforded considerable shelter, and the English party were continually fired upon as they returned with their spoil; but it was evident that the Zulus had not any long-range weapons, as it could be seen from the splashes of dust how far short their bullets were falling. Ten of Buller's men were now sent on to cover the passage of the guns through the drift, and in about twenty minutes, and under the protection of the rear-guard, it was passed over in safety.
On the 15th, Wood was fortunate enough to destroy the great military kraal of Manyanyoba.Several reconnaissances had been made by Colonel Wood's directions, and from the local knowledge of one of Piet Uys's men, Colonel Buller was enabled to carry out the instructions of his chief with a success fully equal to the most sanguine expectations. The stronghold in question was situated on the Intomba river, and had always been considered by Cetywayo and his Indunas as a place of more than ordinary strength. At ten p.m. on the 14th the men were got under arms, and the column was composed of a strong detachment of Buller's Horse and fifty of the Burgher Volunteers under Piet Uys, whose services had on more than one occasion been most handsomely mentioned by Colonel Wood. The men paraded without lights, bugles, or the slightest sound, and moved off silently into the bush, without even the jingle of a sabre or the clank of a chain. Their march was accompanied by one gun, the wheels of which were, however, carefully wrapped with cloth and bound with raw hide. This was not only a protection against sound, but a preventive to injury to spokes and axles from the sharp boulders and rocks in the bed of the drift. The column left the camp by moonlight, crossing the usual ford, and were fortunate enough to gain the shelter of the bush without being seen or heard in the neighbouring villages. After a couple of hours' marching they reached a wide plain, where there was a broad watercourse, but sufficiently shallow to be easily forded. Here the gun, as the early grey of the morning came on in the sky, was brought into position, and here the final instructions were given to the men. As the daylight grew more marked there could be seen in front a long unbroken rangeof mountains, varying in height from 900 to 1000 feet. This range ran along the valley leading to the smaller kraals in the distance. Half the cavalry were now sent away by Colonel Buller to the left, with instructions to gain the bush, and wait dismounted until the shells were heard. They were then to dash forward at a swinging canter and cut off the cattle to be seen feeding on the slopes, which manœuvre would, if carried out, drive them into the hands of Piet Uys and his men posted on the right. Just as the sun began to appear above the horizon the gunners managed to hit off the range to a nicety, and the second shell crashed and burst right into the centre of the interior circle where the cattle were placed at night, and which is usually surrounded by the beehive-shaped huts where the Zulus live. It was at once perceived that this shot had caused the wildest commotion, as it was immediately followed by smoke and flame, figures rushing about through the village, the bellowing of oxen, and the shouts of men. As the horsemen advanced at a gallop towards the kraal, the enemy, firing a random and hasty volley, fled up the sides of the mountain, where cavalry could not follow. All the huts and stores along the base of the mountain were now destroyed without much resistance, although as soon as the Zulus got a little vantage-ground on the cliffs, they turned, and replied to the English fire. Four hundred head of cattle and a quantity of sheep and goats were brought off by Buller's men, who behaved with the most admirable coolness and steadiness. The fight had lasted about half an hour, when indications of reinforcements to the Zulus were observed. Seeing that nothingmore was to be gained, and that he might lose the cattle, Colonel Buller gave the order to make good the retreat, covered by skirmishers and a rear-guard. This movement was skilfully effected without loss, and the column reached the camp early in the afternoon, having been about eight or nine hours in the saddle.
Meanwhile, to strengthen Wood's hands, the Commander-in-chief had ordered Colonel Rowlands to join that general. Rowlands at this time had with him, at his entrenched camp at New Derby, only a wing of the 80th, a couple of guns, and 200 Swazis. Raaf's Horse and Weatherly's Borderers were, however, expected daily to reinforce him. In the meantime, Rowlands was not allowing the grass to grow under the feet of his men, for, on the same day that Wood destroyed the Manyanyoba Kraal he left his camp at Derby and marched on to the Talako range, where he knew the enemy were in the numerous caves hidden by dense bush. The operations were entirely successful. Five large kraals, some of them of great natural strength, were burnt to the ground, 197 cattle, seventy goats, and forty-five sheep were captured. Magalini, the chief, was killed, with ten of his men, while defending one of the caves. One Zulu prisoner was taken, and forty women and a number of children came in and claimed protection. Six of the Swazi allies, under Fairlie, were wounded, and one horse killed.
On a still more recent occasion Colonel Rowlands had shown even greater activity. On the 20th February intelligence was brought to his camp that a small force of Zulus had been left in charge of supplies at Makatees Kop, a naturalfortress close to Elozo, and intended as a depôt for future operations. The place was by no means easy of access, and apparently innumerable difficulties were mentioned to dissuade the colonel from any hostile attempt. On the date just named (20th) the detachment sent forward as a sort of advanced guard by Colonel Rowlands reached one of the mission-stations still left on the border. There was a laager consisting of a simple stone enclosure, bastioned, however, and loopholed, and situated on the bank of a running stream of bright and clearly sparkling water. In the dead of night the sentries were heard to challenge, and the sergeant on guard at once called his men to arms. This alarm, however, proved to be merely the return of some mounted Boers who had been sent on to reconnoitre on the previous day, and the information they brought in was important. The kraal which they had been seeking was about twenty miles off and supposed to be only held by about fifty Zulus, belonging to the regiment of Nkobamakosi, and part of the Undi or Royal corps. A large number of cattle were not supposed to be yet there, but some were coming in daily, and it was considered advisable to break this link in the enemy's communications. In the early morning, preceded by a few horsemen (many were coming in as volunteers to both Rowlands' and Wood's column), and marching with only their haversacks full of rations for two days, the little expedition started for a duty uncertain and believed to be full of risk. Eight European officers, 275 natives, partly Swazi allies, and some volunteer horse, the whole under command of Captain Harvey, staff officer, formed the reconnaissance; but, as itturns out, a smaller force would have sufficed. From the post or laager at the mission-station the road lay up a narrow valley, from which, after an ascent of about 200 feet, it stretched out on to a wide grassy plain ten miles in length. On the left of this could be plainly seen a number of Zulus tending sheep and cattle on the hills. Crossing part of the Iwangovini district, and fording a drift on the Inpongo river, the Iembe mountain could be seen always to the right; while the Eloso, a rocky height, loomed in front. At the bottom of a steep, rocky, and heavily bush-grown gorge, fourteen miles from the laager, a halt and short off-saddle were made, and every precaution taken against surprise. From this point to the stronghold the pathway was most difficult, and the men had to proceed with the greatest caution, in case of an ambush, which was half suspected. Two columns of smoke, one from a steep krantz on the left and another lower down on the right, were noticed, but these were afterwards found to be abandoned camping-grounds of the enemy, who fancied the British force was much stronger than it really was. On nearing the kraal, and on turning an angle of the gully, the column came in sight of the first village, which was as usual fortified in the Zulu fashion. As the foremost files dashed on, a couple of shots rang out and some assegais were thrown, causing a couple of casualties amongst the Swazis, who, however, showed a bold front, and, gallantly led by the European officers, carried the kraal by a rush. The results of this skirmish may not appear of great importance, but, taken in conjunction with Wood's recent successes, they had a most useful effect uponboth the minds of the regular soldiers and those of the colonial volunteers.
The junction of Rowlands' column with Wood's was the next eventful incident in the history of the latter force. It was found, of course, impossible for Wood with so small a column and with so few cavalry to keep an efficient and reliable watch over the lengthy border he had to defend, and the result was that a Zulu force managed to effect a raid in the German settlements over the Pongolo. Commandant Schermbrucker had hitherto done remarkably well in keeping his line of defence intact, but his want of mounted men seriously hampered him, and enabled the Zulus to elude his vigilance. A serious raid happened on the 11th February; but Schermbrucker came up with the marauders as they were retiring with their booty, recaptured some of the cattle taken, and killed about a dozen of the enemy. On the 13th a large Zulu force managed to cross the Pongolo, and steal past the fort and laager of Luneberg. This was in the dead of night, and by daybreak they had burnt a number of huts belonging to natives friendly to or in the employment of the Dutch. The savages rushed in thousands upon the kraals and single huts, setting the roofs on fire and massacring old people, women, and children who could not escape. They deliberately tortured to death about a score of old men, killed in the most brutal manner at least fifty women and an equal number of children, while they left several young women fearfully stabbed with assegais. All this took place within five miles of the fort; and as fire-arms were not employed, the attention of the sentries was not aroused. Early in the morningone of the wounded managed to effect his escape, and brought this terrible news to the laager, and measures were immediately taken to follow and punish the band. Patrols were ordered out, and the utmost diligence exerted to overtake the enemy, who, it was known, was overladen with spoil. Before the Tombe river was reached, the leading patrol came up with a portion of the enemy's rear-guard, and a very pretty fight took place. The Zulus numbered about 450, but they were embarrassed by the cattle they had charge of, and this did not allow them to make a good stand. The consequence was that the Boer patrol killed twenty of their foes, put the remainder to flight, and won back a number of the stolen cattle. The rest, however, managed to escape over the Tombe, and the patrol were wisely ordered not to pursue. These raids were principally due to the activity of both Umbelini and Manyanyoba, and were the immediate cause of the expedition to attack and burn the kraals of the chiefs on the Intombe river. It should be mentioned that Umbelini was a Swazi refugee, and not even a legitimate chieftain of that tribe, but was regarded by the real headmen as a mere adventurer and pretender. Manyanyoba's people, again, were not Zulus, but thedébrisor remnants of various tribes conquered by Chaka and Dingaan. They wandered about in a starving condition, landless, and without flocks or wealth of any kind, until Cetywayo, from compassion, allowed them to settle north of the Pongolo, and on the banks of the Tombe river. This very land was mentioned in the ultimatum sent by Sir Bartle Frere to the king, who had no right whatever to cede any portion of it.
Wood next moved his camp to the Kambula Kop, and there entrenched himself in a position of great natural strength. There now occurred an event of considerable importance. Oham, brother of Cetywayo, had always declared himself opposed to war, had openly stated his opinion in Zulu's councils, and had ever since the outbreak of hostilities been making overtures of friendship to the British. These, however, had been but lightly treated, as suspicions of their honesty were entertained by the powers that were. How groundless were these suspicions the event proved. On the 2nd inst. Oham came into the camp of Captain M'Leod, the political agent on the border of Swaziland, arrived at Derby on the 4th, and came on thence to Wood at Kambula a couple of days back, and declared his complete submission to her Majesty's Government. Immediately before leaving his kraal in Zululand the chief took the precaution to try and save some of his best cattle, and he subsequently sent a thousand head of his finest herds into the Swazi county; but they fell into Dutch hands, and some of the Boers, obtaining possession of them, had the audacity to brand them as their property before M'Leod could arrive to claim them. Oham had with him between 300 and 400 of his people, and was accompanied by his eldest son, an intelligent lad of fifteen, who soon made himself an object of great interest in Wood's camp, and a favourite with the soldiers. Immediately on his arrival he had an interview with, and was received with great respect by Colonel Wood, who was informed by him that he would have surrendered some time back but for two reasons. In the first place, he was under a systemof espionage by the orders of the king, with whom he had never been on good terms since he openly, before the Indunas, spoke against the warlike attitude and aggressive tone of his brother; and, secondly, when he did make his first overtures for submission, he was told that he was not believed by the English, and would be cast into prison, and sent to Robbin Island as a convict.
Oham was a black ikehla (head-ringed man), resembling both his father, the late Mpanda, or Panda, and his brother Cetywayo, and although a large man, his body and muscles were firm, not flabby like those of so many other big Zulus. After the usual salutations he thus opened his interview with Wood:—
"Sir, chief, and great warrior, whom I respect, because you fight against men, and do not kill women or children, I came here to your camp from a desire to see you, and to ask you to intercede for me and my people, who have never wished to make war upon you, but to live in peace and goodwill, and hunt the wild deer together. I have left more than two thousand of my people ready and most anxious to come in and submit to you, surrendering their arms and cattle, and giving their sons as hostages, if you will guarantee their safety."
The chief, who had a dignified manner and an honest expression of countenance, was then informed that he and his people should receive every consideration, and as much protection as was consistent with the safe advance of the English troops into Zululand. He then assured Wood that the Zulu army was considerably demoralized, and that, the people having gone back to their kraals, Cetywayo found it no easy task to collect a really effectivefighting force. With some difficulty, indeed, the king had managed to get together a strong impi, composed of the Udhlambedhlu, or "Ill-tempered" Regiment, whose kraal was at Udhlambedhlweni, about six miles east of the Usixepe, to exercise a surveillance over Oham and his people. This corps, however, was formed originally from a clan, or tribe, which were Dingaan's chief and favourite regiment, and although in a measure loyal to their then ruler, they were somewhat indignant at the duty imposed upon them, when they would infinitely prefer the chances of raiding and plunder, which the present unsettled state of the border presented. Now, when Wood was at Utrecht the previous autumn, a letter was sent by the Landdrost Rudolph to the Secretary for Native Affairs, in which he mentioned the arrival of Gwegwana, the favourite messenger of Uhamo or Oham, with letters from that chief to the following effect, which Oham now repeated to Colonel Wood:—"I am sent back by Uhamo to hear what answer his father, Somtseu (Sir Theophilus Shepstone), has sent to his message brought by me on the 10th October last. Uhamo is very anxious to know what is going to take place in the land now that Cetywayo has called the whole of Zululand together, and Uhamo has refused liberty to his people to assemble at 'Ondi,' and will openly tell Cetywayo that if he (Cetywayo) makes war upon the English, he (Uhamo) will not join him, because Cetywayo's people, Sirayo and Umbelini, have, by their overt acts, brought the country into its present state of trouble and disgrace. Moreover, the building by Cetywayo's orders of a military kraal on the Pongolo, and the claims made by him of a portionof the Transvaal beyond the Blood River, which had been, as Uhamo repeatedly told Cetywayo, ceded many years ago to the Transvaal people, and other acts, had never received any countenance from Uhamo, who now asks, Why does Cetywayo want to quarrel with the English, who have ever been his friends, and who, indeed, placed him on his present throne?"
In his second interview with Colonel Wood, Oham was still more explicit and demonstrative. He expressed himself with much indignation at his brother's countenancing such a despicable character as Umbelini, who, neither a pure Zulu nor a Swazi, had all the vices and none of the good qualities of either; and he added that the degradation which his brother had brought upon the race of Chaka by such an unworthy alliance has caused him to lose much of his former popularity. Oham also added that, in case of the continuance of the war, rather than be compelled to fight against his old friends the English he would at all hazards bring his people bodily over to that Government, and under these circumstances claim their protection. "Uhamo loves peace as his father Panda did," said the chief in conclusion, and his open and honest-looking eyes seemed to corroborate this expression.
We now come to another sad event, which though less in magnitude, is in many points similar to the Isandhlwana disaster. Major Tucker, the chief officer at Luneberg, gives this account of the affair:—Captain Moriarty, with a company of the 80th, was ordered to march from Luneberg on the 7th March, for the purpose of bringing in twenty waggons from Derby, variously loaded, which hadarrived at the Intombi Drift. Earlier in the month Major Tucker sent down to the Drift, which was not more than four miles off, a small escort to await the arrival of these waggons. Believing, however, the position a perilous one, owing to the proximity to Umbelini's kraal, on the 5th he ordered it to return. On the 7th, however, the waggons, which had all but been captured on the way down, did arrive at the Drift, and Moriarty was again sent with seventy men of his company to act as escort and assist in getting the convoy across the stream, which was considerably swollen by the continued rains. The Drift was only four miles from the stronghold of the renegade Swazi freebooter, Umbelini, who had of late given so much trouble, and Moriarty had orders to neglect no precaution, and above all to laager his waggons and keep an incessant and vigilant look-out. It was ascertained from survivors that the waggons were actually parked, but in a somewhat loose and careless fashion, and that no earthworks were thrown up around the camp. For several days the river continued in strong flood, and consequently no crossing could be effected. On the 11th it was reported by the native waggon-drivers that Umbelini's people were gathering in the neighbourhood. The camp was pitched in a most dangerous position, with its face towards some high ground, covered here and there with dense bush, while its rear was resting upon the swollen river, across which Lieutenant Harward and thirty-four men were posted. No particular precautions appear to have been taken, with the exception of a sentry being posted about fifteen paces from the front of the camp, on the Derby side. When first warnedby the drivers, Moriarty ordered the men to stand to their arms, but only for a short time. On the morning of the 12th, at four o'clock, a shot was heard from the unfortunate sentry, who had barely time to call "Guard, turn out!" when dense masses of the savages were seen not more than two hundred yards from the camp. Their front extended for several miles, and they could not, by the lowest estimate, have been less than 4000 or 5000 strong. Lieutenant Harward, who had been on thequi-vive, and who had carefully placed his thirty-five men under cover of his solitary waggon, at once called his detachment to arms, and made what dispositions he could to open fire upon the enemy's flank. In less than ten minutes, however, the whole valley was swarming with the savages, who at once proceeded in their usual manner to surround and overlap the camp and waggons. In less time than it takes to tell, the camp was in their hands, and the majority of the soldiers were assegaied, many of them before they could leave their tents. The fight, or rather butchery, which ensued was soon over, and, in spite of a well-directed and well-sustained fire from the Luneberg bank of the river, the enemy followed up the men, and assegaied them as they endeavoured to swim the river. Harward, seeing the enemy crossing the river in large numbers, gave the order to his men to retire slowly. Then, jumping on the back of his horse, he galloped away at full speed to Luneberg, where he reported what had happened. The savages continued to cross the stream, and coming on in dense masses, for a short time a hand-to-hand fight took place, ending however in the little band being broken up.
Eight men, and the sergeant of Harward's detachment, by taking advantage of shelter afforded by an old and dismantled kraal wall at some little distance from the stream, and by their cool and determined shooting, succeeded in saving their lives and getting to Luneberg. Ten men only were saved from Moriarty's party, while he, with a civilian, Surgeon Cobbin, was slain.
The camp was evidently wrongly placed, and was clearly taken by surprise. Major Tucker went out from Luneberg in person, with a small party of horsemen, followed by 150 of the 80th, to see what could be recovered, and the bodies of the dead were brought over the river and buried, while twenty-five of the enemy's dead were discovered, and a couple of wounded taken prisoners. From these men it was ascertained that Umbelini himself was in command, having with him some men belonging to our old antagonist Manyanyoba. Mcame, a powerful induna, had been asked to join in the foray, but refused. When Tucker and his handful of horsemen arrived on the banks of the river, the enemy were seen to be retreating, but they could not be followed until the infantry came up. Curious to remark, the waggons were not taken, and many of them were only half plundered by the savages, who seemed most anxious to decamp with what spoil they had secured.
For his conduct in this affair Lieutenant Harward was subsequently tried by court-martial. The ground of complaint was his having galloped off on his horse—the only one present on the scene—leaving his men engaged in a desperate engagement. The loss of the camp, or anything of asimilar nature, was in no way charged against him. His defence was that he had ridden off to obtain assistance from the nearest point—that this was his duty—and that he could not send a soldier in his place, as none of them could ride. In the event the Court acquitted him. But in May of the ensuing year (1880), the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief issued the following special general order relative to a court-martial recently held on an officer in South Africa:—
"At a general court-martial recently held, an officer was arraigned upon the following charges,—First. Having misbehaved before the enemy, in shamefully abandoning a party of the regiment under his command when attacked by the enemy, and in riding off at speed from his men. Second. Conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline in having at the time and place mentioned in the first charge, neglected to take proper precautions for the safety of a party of the regiment under his command when attacked. The Court recorded a verdict of 'Not Guilty' on both charges. The main facts of the case were not in dispute. The officer rode away from his men to a station distant four and a half miles, at a moment of extreme danger, when to all appearance the small party under his command were being surrounded and overwhelmed by the enemy. The charge alleged misbehaviour—that is, cowardice in so doing; the defence averred that it was to procure reinforcements, and either by their actual arrival, or by the imminence of their arrival, to ward off destruction. In acquitting the prisoner, they have found that he was not guilty of cowardice. The proceedingsof the Court were submitted to the General commanding, who recorded the following minute:—'Disapproved and not confirmed. Lieutenant ... to be released from arrest, and to return to his duty.' The confirming officer has further recorded his reasons for withholding his approval and confirmation in the following terms:—'Had I released this officer without making any remarks upon the verdict in question, it would have been a tacit acknowledgment that I concurred in what appears to me a monstrous theory, viz., that a regimental officer who is the only officer present with a party of soldiers actually and seriously engaged with the enemy can, under any pretext whatever, be justified in deserting them, and by so doing abandoning them to their fate. The more helpless the position in which an officer finds his men, the more it is his bounden duty to stay and share their fortune, whether for good or ill. It is because the British officer has always done so that he occupies the position in which he is held in the estimation of the world, that he possesses the influence he does in the ranks of our army. The soldier has learnt to feel that, come what may, he can, in the direst moment of danger, look with implicit faith to his officer, knowing that he will never desert him under any possible circumstances. It is to this faith of the British soldier in his officers that we owe most of the gallant deeds recorded in our military annals; and it is because the verdict of this court-martial strikes at the root of this faith that I feel it necessary to mark officially my emphatic dissent from the theory upon which the verdict has been founded.' In communicating to the army the result of thiscourt-martial, the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-Chief desires to signify his entire approval of the views expressed by the confirming officer in respect of the principles of duty which have always actuated British officers in the field, and by which his Royal Highness feels assured they will continue to be guided. This general order will, by his Highness's command, be read at the head of every regiment in her Majesty's service.—By Command,H. Ellice, A.-G."