University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.Michigan Agricultural College, East Lansing.State Normal College, Ypsilanti.Central Michigan Normal School, Mt. Pleasant.Northern State Normal School, Marquette.Western State Normal School, Kalamazoo.Michigan College of Mines, Houghton.Michigan School for the Deaf, Flint.Michigan School for the Blind, Lansing.Michigan Employment Institution for the Blind, Saginaw.State Public School, Coldwater.Industrial School for Boys, Lansing.Industrial Home for Girls, Adrian.Michigan Soldiers' Home, Grand Rapids.State Psychopathic Hospital, Ann Arbor.Kalamazoo State Hospital.Pontiac State Hospital.Traverse City State Hospital.Newberry State Hospital.Michigan Home and Training School, Lapeer.Michigan Farm Colony for Epileptics, Wahjamega.Ionia State Hospital.Michigan State Prison, Jackson.State House of Correction, Marquette.Michigan Reformatory, Ionia.Detroit House of Correction.State Sanitorium, Howell.
The United States Army consists of officers, non-commissioned officers and privates. Officers hold commissions. Non-commissioned officers hold warrants. Officers in the regular army engage to serve the United States for life and may leave the service only on the acceptance of their resignations, on retirement or on dismissal imposed by sentence of a general court martial. Enlisted men in time of peace engage to serve for a definite term of years and at the expiration of this term, return to civil life or re-enlist as they may elect. Non-commissioned officers are enlisted men and the duration of their service is governed by the same rules that apply to privates.
The grades of commissioned officers, given in accordance with their relative rank are: General, lieutenant-general, major-general, brigadier-general, colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, captain, first lieutenant, second lieutenant. The grades of enlisted men are sergeant, corporal and private. There are numerous special grades in each of these general classes. Master sergeants, master electricians, etc., are the highest paid enlisted men and rank all others. Every commissioned officer ranks every enlisted man regardless of the length of their respective services. All officers are of equal social rank. Officers and enlisted men are forbidden to associate socially.
Cadets at the United States Military Academy are neither enlisted nor commissioned but have a status of their own. Socially they rank with officers. They are required to salute all officers but are not entitled to the salutes of enlisted men. Flying cadets in the Signal Corps, who are candidates for commissions as aviators or aeronauts, also have a status of their own. They are required to salute officers but do not receive the salutes of enlisted men. Officers salute one another, the juniors saluting the seniors, who acknowledge the courtesy.
The infantry organization is based on the company. Under war conditions, the company consists of 250 men. Four companies form a battalion, and three battalions a regiment. A headquarters company, a supply company and a machine gun company also are attached to each regiment. These three are smaller than the other companies. The band is part of the headquarters company.
The cavalry organization includes the troop, squadron of four troops, and regiment of three squadrons, with headquarters, machine gun and supply organizations. The field artillery regiment is made up of six batteries, divided into two battalions. It also has headquarters and supply companies.
The infantry company is divided into platoons and the platoons into squads of eight men each. The field artillery battery is divided into platoons and sections. The coast artillery until the war had no regimental organization but consisted of several separate companies. All the companies stationed in acoast defense district were under the command of the ranking officer in that district. For service abroad with heavy mobile artillery, several coast artillery regiments were organized on the infantry model.
The United States Navy consists of commissioned officers, warrant officers, petty officers and enlisted men without ratings. The officers' grades are: Admiral of the Navy, vice-admiral, rear-admiral, captain, commander, lieutenant-commander, lieutenant, lieutenant junior grade, ensign. The warrant officers rank below commissioned officers and above enlisted men. Gunners, boatswains, machinists, etc., are warrant officers. They wear a uniform similar to that of commissioned officers but with different insignia. Chief petty officers and petty officers are enlisted men. Chief petty officers wear a double-breasted blouse and a cap similar to that won by officers but with a different ornament. Petty officers and unrated enlisted men wear the sailor shirt and either the flat hat or the watch cap. Petty officers are rated first, second and third class, the first the highest. Men aboard ship are organized in divisions. The commander of a ship is called captain by courtesy regardless of his real grade.
The marine corps is under the control of the Navy Department but has an organization separate from the Navy proper. It has the same grades of officers and non-commissioned officers (with some exceptions among the latter) as the army. The corps is commanded by a major-general, which is the highest grade to which marine corps officers are eligible.
Here is a classic bit of advice given by Flaubert to de Maupassant:
"Whatever one wishes to say, there is only one noun to express it, only one verb to give it life, only one adjective toqualifyit. Search, then, till that noun, that verb, that adjective are discovered; never be content with 'very nearly,' never have recourse to tricks, however happy; or to buffooneries of language; to avoid a difficulty. This is the way to become original."
UPBUILDER OF THE HOME . . . NOURISHER OF THE COMMUNITY SPIRIT . . . ART LETTERS AND SCIENCE OF THE COMMON PEOPLE.
The following general statement of some of the fundamental principles governing the law of libel is intended to enable the newspaper writer to guard against the publication of indefensible libelous matter.
The intention is to state the rules and principles, as far as possible, without legal technicalities, and to include only such portions of the law on the subject as may be necessary or essential for the accomplishment of the double object desired.
For the purposes of the newspaper writer, libel may be defined as malicious defamation, either written or printed, charging on or imputing to another that which renders him liable to imprisonment, or tends to injure his reputation in the common estimation of mankind, or to hold him up as an object of hatred, scorn, ridicule or contempt.
Slander is malicious defamation by speech or oral language; hence the newspaper writer has no especial concern for the law relating to it, further than to remember one general principle—that the law of libel is much stricter than the law of slander. Thus, one may apply to anotherorallywords of personal vituperation and abuse that would not render him liable in a suit for slander, but which if published of another in a newspaper would be libelous and actionable.
The definition of libel here given is broad enough to cover all the experiences of the newspaper office. But the character of defamatory publication that is brought within its scope is best shown by the language of the courts in individual instances.
Language in writing has been held to be actionableper sewhich "denies to a man the possession of some such worthy quality as every man isa priorito be taken to possess"; "whichtendsto bring a party into public hatred or disgrace"; which "tends to degrade him in society"; which "tends to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule"; which "reflects on his character"; which "imputes something disgraceful to him"; which "throws contumely and odium on him"; which "tends to vilify him"; which "tends to injure his character or diminish his reputation"; which is "injurious to his social character"; which "shows him to be immoral or ridiculous"; which "induces an ill opinion of him"; which "detracts from his character as a man of good morals"; which "imputes to him a bad reputation" or "degradation of character" or "ingratitude," and "all defamatory words injurious in their nature."
Each of the following terms charged on one personally in writing or in print has been adjudged in one or more reported cases to be libelous and actionable, namely:
That he was a "villain"; "liar"; "rogue"; "rascal"; "swindler"; "drunkard"; "informer"; that he was the author or the publisher of a libel or slander; that he was a "libelous journalist"; "a hypocrite, and using the cloak of religion for unworthy purposes"; "an imp of the devil"; "a miserable fellow it is impossible for a newspaper article to injure to the extent of six cents"; and "that the community can hardly despise him worse than they do now"; that he had paid money to procure an appointment to an office; that he had received money for offices; that he had been "deprived of the ordinances of the church"; that he was "thought no more of than a horsethief and a counterfeiter"; that he had infringed a patent; that he had been guilty of falsehood; of "dishonesty"; or "moral obliquity"; of "smuggling"; of "blasphemy"; of "false swearing"; that he was "insane"; that he was "fit for a lunatic asylum and unsafe to go at large"; that he had been guilty of gross misconduct in insulting females, etc. Where quotation marks are used, they indicate the exact language used in the respective publications complained of on which the suit was brought.
The following published charges have been held to be objectionable, namely:
Want of chastity (as applied to women, at all events) or adultery (charged on either man or woman); the publication of the obituary of a person known to the writer to be living; a charge that a member of Congress was a "misrepresentative" and a groveling office-seeker; that a juror agreed with another juror to rest the determination of the damages in a case upon a game of checkers; characterizing a verdict of a jury as "infamous" and charging the jurors with having done injustice to their oaths; stating in the criticism of a book that the motives of the author are dishonorable or disreputable.
The illustrations of this character might be multiplied indefinitely, but these cover the general range of libelous expressions when personally applied to an individual.
Imputations on character in allegory or irony may amount to a libel.
Imputing to a person the qualities of a frozen snake in the fable;headingan article in regard to a lawyer's sharp practices, "An Honest Lawyer."
The general rule is that it is libelousper seto impute to a person in his official capacity, profession, trade or business any kind of fraud, dishonesty, misconduct, incapacity or unfitness—any imputation, in fact, which wouldtendto prevent him deriving that pecuniary reward from alegitimatebusiness which otherwise he would have obtained.
It has been held actionable to publish of abutcherthat he used false weights; of ajewelerthat he was a "cozening knave" who sold a sapphire for a diamond; of abrewerthat he makes and sells unwholesome beer or uses filthy water in the malting of grain for brewing; of atradesmanthat he adulterates the article he sells; of aschoolmasterthat he is an "ignoramus" on the subject he pretendsto teach; of aclergymanthat he is immoral, or "preaches lies" or is a "drunkard" or "perjurer"; of anattorneythat he offered himself as a witness in order to divulge the secrets of his client, or that he "betrayed his client," or "would take a fee from both sides," or that he "deserves to be struck off the roll"; of aphysicianthat he is an "empiric," or "mountebank," or "quack," or "vends quack medicines"; of amechanicthat he is ignorant of his trade; of ajudgethat he lacks capacity and has abandoned the common principles of truth; and of anyonein public officeof a charge of malfeasance or want of capacity to fulfill its duties.
So also personal criticism of anauthormight go so far as to injure him in his business as an author and come within the rule. And so of any other occupation from which the injured person derives pecuniary benefit.
It is hardly necessary, except for completeness, to add that to charge a person withany crimebrings the publication within the definition of libel.
If matter libelousper seis published falsely concerning a person he ispresumedto have suffered loss without proving the specific amount or the manner of loss, the amount of damages being found by the jury in accordance with the circumstances of the case and various legal rules.
If the language complained of does not come within the foregoing definitions and limitations, and is not therefore libelousper se, still, if untrue, it may furnish the basis for a libel suitwhere it has resulted in pecuniary loss or the loss of other material advantage.
"Any false words are actionable," say the courts, "by which the party has sustainedspecial damage."
But special damages have to be proved. That is to say, in such case, excluding general damages arising from aper selibel, the character and manner of the loss and the amount in dollars and cents must be proved, and the verdict should not exceed such amount.
A single illustration will be sufficient for this class.
A newspaperfalselypublishes that a man has died of the smallpox at a certain hotel. The proprietor brings a libel suit, claiming loss of custom by way of special damage. His recovery would be limited to such special damages as he could fairly show.
Libel has been defined above as "maliciousdefamation," etc. But it is not generally necessary that the injured complainant should prove actual malice. If the defamatory matter complained of isfalse, the lawpresumesthat the publication was malicious, unless it can be shown either that it was "privileged" by statute or otherwise, or the presumption of malice is overcome by actual proof. That is to say, if the publisher claims that, although false and not privileged, the defamatory publication was not malicious, he must prove it.
Of course, if it was not false, it would not be legally malicious.
The defense to libel suits, therefore, are three, namely:
(1) To prove the published charge is true. This is called a "justification."
(2) To show that the publication was "privileged."
(3) To prove circumstances connected with the publication tending to show that it was not malicious, or was provoked and excused by the conduct of the complainant. This is called a defense "in mitigation of damages."
To prove that the defamatory publication complained of istrueis an absolute and complete defense.
The old maxim of the English criminal law, "The greater the truth the greater the libel," frequently quoted erroneously in this connection, has no application to actions in the civil courts, and at the present time would scarcely be invoked even in any of the criminal courts of this country, except under the most extraordinary circumstances.
But it is not enough that the writer of defamatory articles himself knows that they are true, unless he is able to produce, when required,competent legal proof of their truth. What he himself has witnessed is, of course, competent evidence as far as it goes; when such proof can be strengthened by official records or other documentary proof, and by the evidence of other persons who can testify of their personal knowledge to the truth of the publications, a defense of the strongest character is presented.
But one distinction should be observed carefully, a misconception in regard to which has given rise to many libel suits that have been difficult to defend. When it is said that "the truth is a complete defense," the literal truth of the published statement is not meant;but the truth of the defamatory charge.
To illustrate: A prominent official, say a judge, during the progress of a political campaign, either in the course of an interview or of a public speech, makes the charge against a candidate for an important office that he (the candidate) obtained his naturalization papers either through perjury or subornation of perjury. A newspaper publishes the interview or the speech, giving the speaker's name and the exact language he used. If the candidate referred to should sue the newspaper for libel because of this publication, it would be no defense for the publishers to show that it wastruethat the speaker had said just exactly what the newspaper represented him to have said. To justify they would have to show that the defamatory charge was true, that the candidate had been guilty of perjury or subornation of perjury in obtaining his naturalization papers.
In other words, no publishers or writers can escape responsibility for defaming a man's character by showing that it was on the authority of some other individual.
The same principle applies to defamatory accusations republished from anothernewspaper, whether the name of the newspaper from which they are copied is given or not.
There is a certain class of publications concerning official proceedings which, although they be defamatory in character, public policy demands that publishers should be protected in making, entirely regardless of the question whether the defamatory matter be true or false. These are termed "privileged publications" and are defined by law.
The mere fact that a paper isentitledas being in a certain suit or thatits contents are sworn todoes not necessarily make it a part of any "judicial, legislative or other public and official proceedings." Such proceedings must actually and legally have been instituted before it becomes entitled to the privilege.
An instancewould be the publication of libelous statements taken from a complaint or affidavit that had been sworn to in a suit but beforethe paper had been actually introduced in the trial of the case. Here there would be no privilege.
The same would be true of an affidavit charging crime on a person which had not before the publication of it been presented to and judicially recognized by the committing or police magistrate.
Criticism is also privileged in a limited degree. Nowhere else in the world, not even in England, is so great freedom of legitimate criticism allowed and protected by law as in the United States.
The Constitution of the United States provides: "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press."
The Constitution of Michigan provides: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, accused shall be acquitted."
But the right to criticise is general, and belongs quite as much to any other individual as to the newspaper writer, editor or publisher.
Theactionsof individuals are always legitimate subjects of discussion and criticism.
"In this country," says Judge Smith, of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, "every citizen has the right to call the attention of his fellow-citizens to the maladministration of public affairs or the misconduct of public servants, if his real motive in so doing is to bring about a reform of abuses or to defeat the re-election or reappointment of an incompetent officer."
"No one can doubt the importance," is the language of Judge Story, "in a free government of the right to canvass theactsof public men and the tendency of public measures—to censure boldly the conduct of rulers and to scrutinize the policy and plans of government."
The language of the English courts is nearly as broad.
"God forbid that you should not be allowed to comment on theconductof all mankind, providing you do it justly and honorably," says Baron Alderson.
Chief Justice Cockburn said: "It is of vast importance that criticism, so long as it is fair, reasonable and just, should be allowed the utmost latitude, and that the most unsparing censure of works which are fairly subject to it should not be held libelous."
But the privilege of criticism extends only to theactionsorworksof an individual; it does not extend to theperson. In the case of an author, hisworksmay be criticised as severely as the occasion demands. "Every man who publishes a book commits himself to the judgment of the public," says an eminent English judge; but this can not be made the excuse for personal abuse of the author himself.
The author, the artist, the architect, who produces a book, a painting or a building, is in this respect in the same position as the maker or producer of a watch, a piano or a carving-knife.
The thing produced in either case may be "criticised." But if thepersonwho produces it is defamed, this must be defended, if at all, upon some other ground than that it iscriticism.
Moreover, to justify such comment on men's actions or on the products of their hands or brainsas criticism, it is essential that the acts or things so criticised should have actual existence.
For instance, a newspaper comments with great severity on certain occurrences which it publishes as the official acts of a mayor of its city. Before these strictures can be defended ascriticism, it must appear that such official acts really occurred.
Again, newspaper proprietors might well be held liable for publishing a ridiculing criticism of language pretended to be quoted from the book which the critic is reviewing, but which language the author of the book had not actually used.
If the publishers who are defendants in a libel suit are unable to show that the defamatory publication istrueor that it isprivileged, then the injured plaintiff is entitled to a verdictin some amount. How small this sum shall be will depend upon how good a case the defendants can make outin mitigation of damages. The range of defenses that may be interposed for this purpose is very broad. The following may be enumerated as the most important:
(1) That the general conduct of the plaintiff gave the defendant "probable cause" for believing the charges to be true.
(2) That the complainant's general character is bad.
(3) That the publication was made in heat and passion, provoked by the acts of the plaintiff.
(4) That the charge published had been made orally in the presence of the plaintiff before publication, and he had not denied it.
(5) That the publication was made of a political antagonist in the heat of a political campaign.
(6) That as soon as the defendant discovered that he was in error he published a retraction, correction or apology.
(7) That the defamatory publication had reference not to the plaintiff, but to another person of a similar name, concerning whom the charges were true, and that readers understood this other individual to be meant.
The principle underlying all the above defenses is that they tend to show an absence ofactual malice. Many other circumstances, too numerous and varied to be classified, and which properly could be used in the same manner and for the same reason to reduce damages, will readily suggest themselves to every one.
The successful defense of libel suits depends largely on having clear and trustworthy proof of the facts sought to be sustained promptly at hand as soon as the suit is brought.
Any metropolitan newspaper that deserves the name finds itself compelled every day to publish matter that is defamatory in character. Otherwise there would be no journalistic records of crimes or of a large portion of the other occurrences in which the public is interested. The publisher's concern in that particular is a double one—that whatever of that nature is published in his newspaper should betrueorprivilegedand that there should be clearproofof the truth or privilege.
Every newspaper writer frequently finds himself called upon to deal with such matter. If it is the report of a trial in court, he need have regard, so far as his report is concerned, to four points: (1) that the judicial or official proceedings have been already begun in open court; (2) that his report of the testimony, etc., or synopsis of the sworn papers is fair and impartial; (3) that he knows where he can put his hands on the official records to sustain the privilege at any time; and (4) that both sides are similarly published.
If the matter is defamatory and not privileged in any way, then the utmost care before publication with regard to the proof of its truth will be the only safeguard against libel suits.
The publication of such matter on the authority of any person's mere word,however truthful, trustworthy and careful that person may be believed to be, will always be attended with danger. The statements may be entirely true, and yet the giver of the information when called upon may not be able to furnish the proof. If he is, probably he could furnish it as well before as after publication.
The only absolutely certain way for any newspaper writer to avoid all risk of this sort is for him to furnish for publication such defamatory matter only as he can sustain by his own testimony as an eye-witness, or such as he has seen the proofs of before writing the article.
The almost certain result will be to prevent the bringing of a libel suit—the first consideration in this connection. If, on the other hand, a libel suit should be brought, the writer would be able to furnish the publishers with the best means of defense, namely, proof of the truth of the publication—which is of next importance.
Adams Sherman Hill, professor of rhetoric at Harvard University for nearly 30 years, gives these three rules for good writing:
Precision: Of two forms of expression which may be used in the same sense, that one should be chosen which is susceptible of only one interpretation. Observance of this rule tends to give each word a meaning of its own.
Simplicity: Of two forms of expression which may be used in the same sense, the simpler should be chosen. The simpler a word or phrase, the more likely it is to be understood, and simplicity in language, like simplicity in dress or manners, belongs to the best society.
Euphony: Of two forms of expression which may be used in the same sense, that one should be chosen which is the more agreeable to the ear. It is of course wrong to give undue weight to considerations of euphony, but when no sacrifice is involved it is desirable to avoid an expression that is unusually difficult to pronounce or to substitute for an extremely disagreeable word one that is agreeable to the ear.