III.

8:1CompareNansen(page 48 and following).9:1The Norwegians, as aforesaid, have generally looked upon Sweden’s maintaining its conception of the Union law as something very criminal; this has been Norway’s right alone.9:2CompareNansen(page 54). »The change in the Swedish Constitution in 1885 has therefore become the principal cause of the last twenty years’ strife in the union.»10:1On the Norwegian side, it has been said, that Sweden in 1885 adopted the same method, when, by changing the Swedish Constitution by themselves, they reorganized the Council for Foreign affairs. It must, however, be observed, that, in this, Sweden is supported by its own right, as acknowledged by the foremost Norwegian writers on state law and Norwegian Conservatives, to undertake the management of foreign policy. This legal stand-point had been adopted in 1835, when a resolution was passed in theSwedishCabinet to admit the Norwegian Minister of State to theMinisteralCouncil. The Norwegian claim to participate in the revision of the Swedish Constitution is, however, unwarrantable, as Norway, in the indisputably unionistic Stadtholder question in 1860 maintained that Sweden was not warranted in interfering when revisions or changes were made in the Norwegian Constitution.11:1CompareNansen(page 68 and following).12:1It is a singular coincidence, that Norway in these days, when it has brought the Consular question to a climax, has begun to carry out a general rise in the Fiscal rates; the mercantile interests of »the land of Free Trade» Norway evidently do not lie so very deep after all.14:1The question as to when a matter shall be discussed in a Joint Cabinet or not, has not been the smallest of the stumbling blocks in the thorny path of the Union negotiations. In Norway, to quote MrHagerup, there has been quite a »sickly» fear of having matters settled there. On the Norwegian Left Side they have defended the opinion, that only those matters which, being expressly mentioned in the Act of Union, as being distinctively Union-matters ought to be brought there. In Sweden it has been held, that the Act of Union has no power to give an exhaustive account as to what matters belong to the Union and which do not. Whether it can be considered a matter which concerns both the Kingdoms depends entirely on the exact nature of the matter itself.This latter conception has been adopted of old.15:1Compare No. I §§ 5, 15, 30, 31.18:1The Swedish majority had contemplated a provision in the Act of Union,wherevyit became incumbent for both Kingdoms to place a fixed minimum of fighting forces to the disposition of the Union.18:2Nansensays (page 71) »Divisions arose partly over the resistance from the Swedish side to the unanimous demand of the Norwegian delegates for a separate Consular Service.» This is, as plainly apparent, an extremely modified version of the truth.

8:1CompareNansen(page 48 and following).

9:1The Norwegians, as aforesaid, have generally looked upon Sweden’s maintaining its conception of the Union law as something very criminal; this has been Norway’s right alone.

9:2CompareNansen(page 54). »The change in the Swedish Constitution in 1885 has therefore become the principal cause of the last twenty years’ strife in the union.»

10:1On the Norwegian side, it has been said, that Sweden in 1885 adopted the same method, when, by changing the Swedish Constitution by themselves, they reorganized the Council for Foreign affairs. It must, however, be observed, that, in this, Sweden is supported by its own right, as acknowledged by the foremost Norwegian writers on state law and Norwegian Conservatives, to undertake the management of foreign policy. This legal stand-point had been adopted in 1835, when a resolution was passed in theSwedishCabinet to admit the Norwegian Minister of State to theMinisteralCouncil. The Norwegian claim to participate in the revision of the Swedish Constitution is, however, unwarrantable, as Norway, in the indisputably unionistic Stadtholder question in 1860 maintained that Sweden was not warranted in interfering when revisions or changes were made in the Norwegian Constitution.

11:1CompareNansen(page 68 and following).

12:1It is a singular coincidence, that Norway in these days, when it has brought the Consular question to a climax, has begun to carry out a general rise in the Fiscal rates; the mercantile interests of »the land of Free Trade» Norway evidently do not lie so very deep after all.

14:1The question as to when a matter shall be discussed in a Joint Cabinet or not, has not been the smallest of the stumbling blocks in the thorny path of the Union negotiations. In Norway, to quote MrHagerup, there has been quite a »sickly» fear of having matters settled there. On the Norwegian Left Side they have defended the opinion, that only those matters which, being expressly mentioned in the Act of Union, as being distinctively Union-matters ought to be brought there. In Sweden it has been held, that the Act of Union has no power to give an exhaustive account as to what matters belong to the Union and which do not. Whether it can be considered a matter which concerns both the Kingdoms depends entirely on the exact nature of the matter itself.This latter conception has been adopted of old.

15:1Compare No. I §§ 5, 15, 30, 31.

18:1The Swedish majority had contemplated a provision in the Act of Union,wherevyit became incumbent for both Kingdoms to place a fixed minimum of fighting forces to the disposition of the Union.

18:2Nansensays (page 71) »Divisions arose partly over the resistance from the Swedish side to the unanimous demand of the Norwegian delegates for a separate Consular Service.» This is, as plainly apparent, an extremely modified version of the truth.

His Excellency Mr. Lagerheim’s Proposal.His Excellency Mr.Lagerheim’sproposal implied an attempt to settle the Consular Question itself, by retaining the existing Foreign Administration and dissolving the joint Consular Service. By doing this, he plainly foresaw that the Consular Question would inevitably be raised afresh on the part of Norway. It was necessary therefore to lead the work of reform in the quiet paths of Union negotiations, in order to prevent the old attempts on Norway’s side »to take matters into her own hands», to the detriment of the harmony in the Union. If results in that way could be gained, negotiative operations might win more confidence from distrustful Norwegian politicians. The Swedish government seems also to have taken into account the contingency that, by making this offer, they would get Norway to meet them half way, and agree sooner or later to a definite solution of the Union conflict, by a reorganisation, on the grounds of having a joint Minister for Foreign affairs.

In one respect, it was undeniably a good opportunity for such an attempt. The violent Russianizing of Finland, and the undefined plots it concealed, could not fail to open the eyes of many in Norway. Even Norwegian Radicals were obliged to acknowledge that the integrity of the Kingdoms of Scandinavia formed a necessary guarantee for their freedom and independence19:1. It was certainly on that account that their courage was not so fully shared by all, when the Norwegian Radicals prepared to renew their old efforts to break the Union. An honourable compromise with Sweden, on that occasion, would probably have been acceptable.

But MrLagerheim’sexperiment had, on all hands, almost insurmountable difficulties through which to pilot its way.

The difficulties attending the satisfactory settlement of the Consular Question.In Sweden it had always been feared that separate Consuls for Norway without the reorganization of the Foreign administration, would act as a wedge to rupture the Union, especially as leading Norwegian politicians took no pains to hide their ulterior motives. Therefore, the Swedish Diet in 1893 expressed a decided wish that the Consular question should not be discussed except in connection with the question of Foreign administration, and from this decision the Swedish Diet has not since deviated in any way.

In order, therefore, that there might be some prospect of the Swedish government gaining the approval of the Swedish Diet, of the result of the negotiations, it was necessary that it contained safe guarantees that the Consular reform would not react to the advantage of a Union programme to which Sweden could never agree: i. e. a purely personal Union.

But on the other hand, it was expected that the efforts to get these guarantees fixed on a firm basis would meet with opposition from the Norwegian side. The old Norwegian traditions of the Radical party were as deeply rooted as ever in the political life of Norway. It was hard for the Norwegian Radicals to lose sight of the original political aims in carrying out the reform of the Consular service. D:rIbsen’saforesaid inquiry plainly hinted that Norwegian opposition would be raised against the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs having direct control over the Norwegian Consuls, a stipulation that was absolutely necessary both from a Swedish and a Union point of view. And Norwegian policy had generally with its sickly distrust and susceptibility an instinctive disinclination to bind Norway to anything referring to the burning question of the day. »As to one’s rights, no one negotiates». This has become well nigh the axiom for Norwegian politics. And Norway now considers she has a right to one and all of her demands. —

The Consular Committee of 1902.In a joint Cabinet Council held on January21et1902, it was resolved to convene a Union Consular Committee consisting of two Swedish and two Norwegian authorities,21:1who were to institute an examination as to how far a new arrangement with separate Consuls for each of the United Kingdoms would practically work under the administration of the present joint diplomatic representatives.

The Committee accepted its task in a purely administrative spirit. It declared distinctly that it considered it was not compulsory for them to give an opinion as to the suitability or desirability21:2of the arrangement, or of the political importance that might be assigned to the same. This limitation of the duty of the Committee is of importance in order to understand the terms of its conclusions; it was meant simply to describe the effect of the aforesaid arrangement under certain circumstances and nothing more.

The Committee gave two alternatives; Norway should either have its own consuls, subordinate, to a certain extent, to the Minister of Foreign affairs, or a separate Consular Service, in which case, the consuls would be entirely under Norwegian authority. As to the first of these alternatives, the Norwegian members explain, that whichever way we look at the arrangement, it would be at the outset in conflict with the spirit of the Norwegian Constitution; a corps acting for the most part under authority out of Norway, would, from an administrative point of view, be an »anomaly». The Swedish members evidently ought not to confute the Norwegian interpretation of the Constitution; they do not approve of it, nor do they agree to it, though they declare that they see plainly the advantages to be obtained, froman disciplinarypoint of view, by continuing to allow theseparate consuls to act under the administration of the Minister for Foreign affairs.

The formal way in which the Committee acted naturally brought about very imperfect results. The logical consequences of the issue being, for instance, that the Minister for Foreign affairs was debarred from giving instructions directly to the different consuls; his ’wishes’ were first to be communicated to the Norwegian Consular administration, on whom rested the decision as to whether or not, the wishes of the Minister of Foreign affairs should be complied with(!). And the Minister of Foreign affairs, would not, of course, have any power to interfere disciplinary when a consul compromised the relations of the United Kingdoms with Foreign powers etc. etc. The Swedish members express their extreme doubts on the critical points all through, and point out the necessity of an extremely amicable co-operation between the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Norwegian Consular Service, as the only guarantee against the total disorganization of the administration for Foreign affairs; the Norwegians tried to soothe their doubts by declaring that the Norwegian Consular Service would »duly value the importance of a loyal co-operation.»

It was evident that these statements from the Swedish side could not be considered as contributing to the solution of the problem, so much the more so, as the Swedish members had strong doubts. Neither could any reference to them be made on Norway’s part without further notice, the Committee itself having shirked the most salient points, namely those of a practical and political nature. And yet in Norway the committee’s conclusions were considered to be an acknowledged method from the Swedish side for the solution of the question22:1.

Negotiations 1902-1903 between Swedish and Norwegian delegates.Mr.Boströmbecame Prime Minister in the summer of 1902, and in the autumn of that year, negotiations on the Consular question were commenced between the delegates of the Swedish and Norwegian Cabinets. The conclusions of the Consular Committee were then preliminarily examined and discussed. In February and March the negotiations were continued in Christiania, and touched especially upon the political side of the matter, particularly the nature and binding power of an eventual agreement. In the middle of March negotiations were abruptly broken off on the grounds of divergencies of opinion, but were resumed again by the Norwegian side, the result being published on March 24th in the well known so-called Communiqué23:1.

The Communiqué.This much-dismissed Act must be regarded as a summary compendium of the preliminary results of the negotiations in the Consular question, though it must be especially observed that it is not issued by the governments themselves23:2, but only by different members in each, and that the Swedish members, at any rate, had no official authority in the matter.

Its contents inform us that the Swedish negotiators prefer to have the Consular question solved in conjunction with the entire question of Foreign administration, in other words,they plainly offered a general agreement to separate Consular services under a joint Minister of Foreign affairs, but that the Norwegian negotiatorsrefusedthis offer. On the Norwegian Radical Side it was considered that the time was not yet ripe for such a solution, and a resolution in the Storthing affirmed this in January 1903, with the consent of the government; the Radicals were evidently determined not to give up their claim — so unreasonable from a Union point of view — to a separate Minister for Foreign affairs.

With respect to the Consular Question, the Swedish negotiators declare that a dissolution of the joint Consular Office, appears to them, in itself, undesirable, but as an opposite opinion has long been prevalent in Norway, and as during the preliminary negotiations, it was shown to be »not impossible» that under certain circumstances a system with different Consuls for each Kingdom could be established, in order to obtain the most important advantage of the political agreement between the two countries, they have found it expedient to advise a settlement of the question on the following basis:

1. Separate Consular Services for Sweden and for Norway shall be established. The Consuls of each kingdom shall be subordinate to the authority of their own country which the latter shall have to determine.

2. The relations of the separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to the Embassies shall be regulated by laws of the same wording which cannot be altered nor abolished without the consent of the authorities of both Kingdoms.

It is furthermore stipulated that the Status quo with reference to the position of the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors should remain intact. Each Kingdom is to have its right to decide on the establishment of its own Consular service; the identical laws are only to regulate the relations between the Consuls on the one side, and the Minister for Foreign affairs and diplomatic representatives on the other. The laws are especially designed to give a guarantee that the consuls do not outstep the boundaries of their occupation and at the same time secure the necessary cooperation between the Foreign Administration and the Consular Services of the two Kingdoms24:1.

When the Communiqué was issued, it was received with very great diversity of feelings on both sides of the State boundaries. The lively discussions which immediately sprung up concerning the actual contents of the agreement, on whichconsiderable divergence of opinion was held, contributed in no small degree to the former. The debates were especially concentrated on the contents of what was called the identical laws, and as the different conceptions on this subject were without doubt of great importance in the final issue of the negotiations, it is as well to give some enlightenment on the point.

In the first part of the Communiqué, whichdecribesthe offer of the Swedish negotiators, it is mentioned, as aforesaid, that the relations of the Separate Consuls to the Minister for Foreign affairs and Diplomatic representatives should be regulated by identical laws, which could not bealteredorabolishedwithout the consent of the Government powers of both Kingdoms. In the mutual resolution reference is made to laws »which cannot be altered by one of the parties», the word ’abolish’ does not occur. This already caused astonishment. It was asked if this omission had any important significance. It was observed that MrBoström, in the Swedish Diet, made use of the first form of expression, MrBlehrin the Norwegian Diet of the second.25:1In reality, the difference depended on some oversight in the final revision which was made in Christiania under great excitement in political circles there; this seems to have given a prominent place to the preliminary solution, before the full contents were grasped. MrHagerupacknowledged later that the expressions in reality meant the same, as the conception of the word ’alter’, must necessarily include the conception of the word ’abolish’. It was afterwards frequently proposed in debates, that the intended laws should be terminable only by mutual agreement, and this question has been significant only through the connection which may be found to exist between it and the chief point of this discussion itself, as to the extent to which the laws were to be changeable.

The divergencies referred especially to the conception of Union Law by the Norwegian Radicals, according to which Norway had the right to have her own Minister for Foreign affairs, and consequently was entitled to appoint one without agreeing with Sweden. As the proposed laws were based upon the presupposition that the Swedish Minister for Foreign affairs would continue the administration of the Foreign affairs of the Union, the question now arose as to whether a Norwegian Minister of Foreign affairs could be appointed unless Sweden consented to the suspension of the Consular Laws, or whether the Consular Laws would become extinct of themselves, if Norway made use of her assumed rights in the matter.

In other words, was it the intention of the Communiqué to force Norway to a solution of the question of the foreign administration only through negotiations with Sweden, or had the Norwegian Radicals the liberty to continue to urge Norway to take matters into her own hands?

In Norway much anxiety was expressed lest the negotiations should prove too binding, — Norwegian politicians hate, as previously mentioned, to be bound in any way —His ExcellencyBlehrmeanwhile imagined that he might be able to explain in the Storthing, in May 1903, thatthe laws will not include any restrictions for either of the two Kingdoms, in the matter of their authority, in future, to decide on questions relating to the regulation of foreign administration; or be reckoned as a proof that they had confirmed the existing terms, or bound themselves to carry them out. This explanation produced a calming effect, and it was confirmed in the following debate with satisfaction that the character of these laws could not be referred to, as showing, that Norway was bound in any way whatever. This interpretation was afterwards approved of by MrHagerup, and may be said to form the Norwegian official standpoint in all negotiations.

Now, was this also the Swedish interpretation of the Communiqué? It is evident that the Swedish standpoint in this respect must be of especial importance, considering it plainly referred to a guarantee demanded by Sweden26:1, touching the nature of which the Swedish interpretation ofthe Communiqué must, of necessity, in an especial degree be one of authority.

On the part of the Swedish government, no opinion on the question has yet been published.Buthit may nevertheless, with great certainty, be assumedthat the Swedish negotiators for the identical laws really, among other matters, intended to bind Norway not to take the question of foreign administration »into her own hands.» The great fear of such a contingency, shown by the Norwegian Radicals, is sufficient proof of this, for, as a rule, Norwegian politicians keep themselves pretty well informed on matters of negotiation, even when they are of a more confidential nature. Also, more or less direct references have been made by the Norwegian government, that the interpretation of the Communiqué by the Swedish government differed from its own27:1. This supposition is vindicated by the political situation throughout. It is plain that to the Swedish government the compensation demanded for concessions in the Consular question, was the guarantee that the consequences of having a Norwegian Consular Service would not pave the way for a Norwegian Foreign Office. It was therefore first necessary to demand of Norway implicit loyalty with reference to the future solving of the Foreign Minister question. The Swedish delegates have therefore evidently tried to exact from Norway, as an expression of implicit loyalty, a contract not to seek to alter the Status quo with respect to the Foreign administration27:2, without an agreement with Sweden.

How is it possible then, that the Norwegian government in the Storthing could interpret the Communiqué as it did?

As long as the details in the protocol of negotiations are not known, it is impossible to make any definite assertions.

The Norwegian government may possibly have felt assured that the Communiqué did not intend a direct refusal to Norway of its assumed legal right to its own Minister for Foreign affairs — that demand could scarcely be expected to emanate from Sweden — and passed over the Swedish delegates’ plain intention to bind Norway to theexecutionof that right. But as this question has manifestly been an object of protracted debates, the Norwegian government cannot possibly have remained in ignorance of the Swedish delegates’ intentions with regard to the wording of the Communiqué on that point, and the Norwegian governments attitude in the matter, is, to say the least, rather strange, especially in the light of the apparently somewhat undiplomatic War MinisterStang’sopen declaration in the Storthing, that according to his idea of the matter,the decisions in respect to the identical laws were scarcely in accordance with MrBlehr’sinterpretation of the Communiqué.

Now, however matters may have been in detail, one indisputable fact remains clear,that the guarantee the Swedish delegates sought to effect by means of the identical laws, has been refused on the grounds of the Norwegian interpretation of the Communiqué. This must be kept strictly in view, if any correct idea of the ensuing development of events is to be obtained.

19:1It is undoubtedly Russia’s proceedings in Finland which have especially influenced the recent unionist-political views ofBjörnson.21:1The most effective power in the Committee was D:rSigurd Ibsen, who is credited with having drawn up the drafts of the result of the Committee’s debates. The rest of the members were the Swedish AmbassadorBildtat the Court of St James, the Consul GeneralAméenin Barcelona, and the Consul GeneralChristophersenin Antwerp.21:2The Swedish members of the Committee indicate, incidentally, that they do not consider it to be altogether desirable.22:1Nansenevidently looks upon the matter in this light (page 64): »No change in the Consular regulations was made, and it therefore, follows that even theSwedish Commissionersdid not think it incompatible with the terms of the Union, for Norway to have separate Consuls». And, of course, he mentions, »theunanimous conclusionof the committee of experts frombothcountries» (p. 72).23:1N:o 3.23:2The Swedish members were, the Premier,Boström, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr.Lagerheim, and State SecretaryHusberg. The Norwegian members were, Prime MinistersBlehrandQvam, and State SecretariesKnudsenandIbsen24:1N:o 3These latter decisions in the Communiqué, which are conclusive in explaining the later standpoint taken by the Swedish government, are, of course, omitted byNansen.25:1The same difference also occurs in the drafts of laws which have been proposed at more recent dates.26:1It is manifest that it is on the part of Sweden that the idea of identical laws has arisen. In Norway they afterwards complained, especially the Radicals, of that »Massive instrument.»27:1In the debate in the Storthing on April 27:th 1904 MrCarl Bernersaid he had heard that MrBlehr’sexplanation in the Storthing respecting; the Communiqué before its publication was made known to the Swedish government: that the latter, neither previously, nor later on, had made any objections to it. To this State SecretaryMichelsensharply replied, that »MrBlehr’sexplanation was only the explanation of the Norwegian government on the subject of the Communiqué.»27:2Further affirmation is given by MrIbsen’sdeclaration in the Storthing, that the negotiations fell through in consequence of MrBoström’sopposition to the request of the Norwegian delegates that in the Communiqué it should be mentioned that the identical laws were to be valid only »so long as the present system of foreign administration existed.» When, finally, the Norwegians consented to omit this condition, it could only have been their intention that the laws should only be valid until by mutual consent they were rescinded. Other explanations in the Storthing of the divergencies of opinions on this point are to all intents unacceptable.

19:1It is undoubtedly Russia’s proceedings in Finland which have especially influenced the recent unionist-political views ofBjörnson.

21:1The most effective power in the Committee was D:rSigurd Ibsen, who is credited with having drawn up the drafts of the result of the Committee’s debates. The rest of the members were the Swedish AmbassadorBildtat the Court of St James, the Consul GeneralAméenin Barcelona, and the Consul GeneralChristophersenin Antwerp.

21:2The Swedish members of the Committee indicate, incidentally, that they do not consider it to be altogether desirable.

22:1Nansenevidently looks upon the matter in this light (page 64): »No change in the Consular regulations was made, and it therefore, follows that even theSwedish Commissionersdid not think it incompatible with the terms of the Union, for Norway to have separate Consuls». And, of course, he mentions, »theunanimous conclusionof the committee of experts frombothcountries» (p. 72).

23:1N:o 3.

23:2The Swedish members were, the Premier,Boström, the Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr.Lagerheim, and State SecretaryHusberg. The Norwegian members were, Prime MinistersBlehrandQvam, and State SecretariesKnudsenandIbsen

24:1N:o 3These latter decisions in the Communiqué, which are conclusive in explaining the later standpoint taken by the Swedish government, are, of course, omitted byNansen.

25:1The same difference also occurs in the drafts of laws which have been proposed at more recent dates.

26:1It is manifest that it is on the part of Sweden that the idea of identical laws has arisen. In Norway they afterwards complained, especially the Radicals, of that »Massive instrument.»

27:1In the debate in the Storthing on April 27:th 1904 MrCarl Bernersaid he had heard that MrBlehr’sexplanation in the Storthing respecting; the Communiqué before its publication was made known to the Swedish government: that the latter, neither previously, nor later on, had made any objections to it. To this State SecretaryMichelsensharply replied, that »MrBlehr’sexplanation was only the explanation of the Norwegian government on the subject of the Communiqué.»

27:2Further affirmation is given by MrIbsen’sdeclaration in the Storthing, that the negotiations fell through in consequence of MrBoström’sopposition to the request of the Norwegian delegates that in the Communiqué it should be mentioned that the identical laws were to be valid only »so long as the present system of foreign administration existed.» When, finally, the Norwegians consented to omit this condition, it could only have been their intention that the laws should only be valid until by mutual consent they were rescinded. Other explanations in the Storthing of the divergencies of opinions on this point are to all intents unacceptable.

The reception of the Communiqué in Sweden and Norway.Even without taking into consideration the indistinctness that was supposed to characterise the Communiqué, its general contents roused no unanimous approbation. In the Swedish Diet in May 1903, during a debate, serious doubts were rife, and it was emphatically declared that the Consular Question must be solved simultaneously with the Foreign Minister Question as resolved by the Diet in 1893. The Second Chamber (lower Home) was more leniently inclined towards the negotiations, but it nevertheless referred to the resolution of 1893.

Nor did it get a promising reception in Norway at first. It was known there that one of the chief stipulations of the negotiations had been the cessation of the agitation for a separate Minister of Foreign affairs. Meanwhile after the publication of the Communiqué, the Norwegian Radicals immediately expressed their opinions at their large meeting by again solemnly entering this old claim on their party programme.

However when the agitation for a new election for the Storthing was started later on in the year, there was a strong inclination towards negotiating, and evenBjörnson, among others, warmly advocated the cause of the negotiation programme, and that too, in opposition to the Radical MinisterBlehr, who, though having introduced the negotiations, was suspected of being but a lukewarm partisan to the cause. The party for negotiation conquered, and was in the majority in the Storthing, though not in great numbers. The issue could scarcely be attributed to the Swedish proposal alone, but also in no slight degree to the miserable, impoverished condition to which the country had been brought by the old Radical government. MrBlehrresigned in the autumn 1903, after the elections. ProfessorHagerup, the leader of the Conservatives, then became Prime Minister at Christiania in companionship with D:rIbsenas Prime Minister at Stockholm. The old Radical party retired from the leadership, but exercised, by its criticising, suspiciousattitude, a powerful influence on the progress of the negotiations, and that too, in no favourable direction.

Negotiations on the basis of the Communiqué.In a joint Council held on 11th Dec. 1903, the Cabinets of both Kingdoms were commissioned to resume negotiations on the Consular question, on the basis of the Communiqué. They were carried on slowly during the Spring 1904, but it was not till May that the first official break in the proceedings was made by Mr.Hageruppresenting to the Swedish government the Norwegiangouvernmentproposal for identical laws.

The problem of the relations of the Minister of Foreign affairs to the Consular service.It was clear that the chief point of the question should concern the real authority to be exercised by the Minister for Foreign affairs over the Consuls in diplomatic matters. It must necessarily be the chief interest of the Swedish government to insure a guarantee for this. It was partly a purely practical matter, that the Minister for Foreign affairs, who was responsible for the relations of both Kingdoms to Foreign powers, should be able to exercise an efficient control over all matters in any way connected with the Diplomatic service. And it was also necessary to hinder the Norwegian Consular service, in its progressive development, from acting in the direction of a division of the Foreign administration within the Union.

The practical necessity of strict co-operation between the Foreign Service and the Consular Service had previously been acknowledged in Norway on certain sides. It may thus be of interest to recall the strong efforts that were made by the Norwegian majority in the latest Union Committee, to emphasize the importance of having the consuls under the direct control of the Minister for Foreign affairs and Envoys in all matters which are likely to assume a diplomatic character. The same conclusions may also be drawn from the plan of some Norwegians to solve the Consular question, by arranging for the separation of the mercantile part of the joint Consular service, while the diplomatic part remained intact30:1.

But the problem now presented a somewhat different aspect from the one it had for the Norwegian Majority of the last Union Committee, for it had postulated a Union Minister of Foreign affairs. And, undoubtedly, a deeper penetration into questions it included, had made clearly manifest the impossibility of drawing a distinct line between the diplomatic and mercantile functions of the Consuls. The question, for instance, now arose, as to whether a Norwegian civil official, in certain cases, would be subordinate to a Swedish Minister. In the face of this problem, the Norwegians on their part lost sight of the real points at issue in a most remarkable way. In the Consular Committee’s deliberations, Norwegian opinion on the question of subordination, that it would be an »anomaly», in conflict with the spirit of the Norwegian Constitution etc. etc. made it evident that the Swedish claim would come into collision, on the part of Norway, with the formal respect to which the abstract demand of State Sovereignty, viewed logically, is entitled.

From this conflict, the Swedish government had no duty, nor even the right to withdraw without protest. Facts are of more importance than mere forms. The evasive talk of the »spirit» of constitutional law, and the administrative anomalies could not be decisive. Many events both in public annals and administrative legislature are very illogical, and very great anomalies. The main fact which the Swedish government had to hold in view, was this,that the responsibility of the Swedish Minister of Foreign affairs, for the joint Foreign policy of the two Kingdoms, must presuppose a fully effective administration of the same in all its branches.

The Norwegian proposal. May 1904.The Norwegian proposal of the 28th May 1904 showed that the views of the Swedishgovernementcould not entirely be ignored. According to this proposal31:1the Consular administrationin Christiania should regularly inform the Minister of Foreign affairs of nominations, orders issued etc., etc. which it would be of importance for him to know.

Furthermore, when an affair seemed likely to assume a Diplomatic character and required immediate treatment, the Consul should send the report directly to the Minister for Foreign affairs, and the latter, under similar conditions, would give direct instructions to the Consul. Ambassadors were also empowered to give orders to the Consuls, but on no account to exceed the instructions given by the Norwegian Authorities.

This was undoubtedly something, but manifestly not much. The connection between the Diplomatic Service and the Norwegian Consular administration was very unsatisfactorily provided for. There was no guarantee whatever that the orders of the Norwegian Consular administration would not come into conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, a deficiency so much the more serious as the Act § 1—c allowed the Norwegian Consular administration rather extensive powers of more or less diplomatic significance, for instance, that of giving instructions to Consuls respecting the regulations of International Law.

Furthermore it was deficient of any provisions that would entitle the Minister of Foreign affairs and the Ambassadors to the authority to secure a guarantee, by strict control, that the Consuls would not compromise the Foreign administration, and, in fact, there was good cause for declaring from the Swedish side, »that the proposition includes scarcely any rules calculated to secure the guarantee referred to in the Communiqué, that the Consuls would not exceed the proper limits of their office», andwas therefore in that respect not in accordance with the acknowledged principles of the Communiqué.

MrBostrom’sConditions.From what has been already stated, it seems that in the Swedish Cabinet there were divided opinions. But the Government was unanimous in not accepting the Norwegian proposal, and even in the summer of 1904 it must have been evident to the Norwegian Council, that the Swedish Cabinetcilwould not in any essentials comply with the Norwegian proposal. But the question was not thoroughly discussed by the Swedish Cabinet in pleno, till the autumn.

During the autumn MrLagerheimresigned on the grounds of difference of opinion with the Prime Minister, though the real cause of his resignation was said to have no direct connection with the Union negotiations. In November His Excellency MrBoströmwent to Christiania and presented his conditions, as to which the Swedish Cabinet had declared its approval if the Norwegian government would approve of them33:1. These conditions stipulated among other matters, that no orders should be issued from the Consular Office that would come into conflict with the commands of the Minister of Foreign affairs; that, if a Consul acted in any way likely to disturb the relations between the United Kingdoms and the Foreign Powers, the Minister of Foreign affairs could send in an appeal to the King, recommending his dismissal; that the Ambassadors, in certain cases, should also be empowered to suspend the Consul from his Office33:2.

After personal consultations in Christiania His Excellency MrHagerupmade a written statement of his objections.

Mr Hagerups Reply.In this, and the ensuing interpolations on the Norwegian side, the Norwegian system of conducting negotiations appears in its typical manner. Of real facts and reasons there is not a trace. For instance, though the Norwegian majorityitself, in the last Union Committee, emphasized the danger of separating the Consular Service from the Diplomatic administration, MrHagerupdoes not make the slightest acknowledgement that interminable practical difficulties would be the results of acceding to the Norwegian proposition. Neither is there a single proposal, which, from a Norwegian point of view, would be acceptable, to make decisions that might in any possible degree remedy thedeficiences. On the contrary, MrHagerupmentions that such decisions would be calculated to stamp Norway as a dependency, according to international and common law principles, and declared that from a national point of view, it indicates a very great retrogression on the present arrangement of the Consular Service34:1. In this, he forgets that MrBoström’sconditions refer to exceptional decisions and do not touch the Norwegian Consul’s normal position as being a Norwegian civil Official, and he omits to observe that the interference of the Diplomatic Officials with Consular affairs, as proposed by MrBoström, would very seldom occur.

The Swedish Government’s proposal.It is, meanwhile, easy to understand that MrBoström’sdemand, that the King, on the Swedish Minister’s representations, should be empowered to dismiss a Norwegian civil official, would deeply injure the Norwegian susceptibilities, and that it was therefore quite possible to be blind to the fact that the Swedish Minister was also responsible for Norway’s Foreign politics. When therefore His Excellency MrHagerupwent to Stockholm for further discussions, all the rest of the Swedish Ministers, as will be seen, were ready to present a Swedish proposal34:2for identical laws modified especially to meet the sensitive point.

The demand that the Consular Office should not issue orders in conflict with those given by the Minister of Foreign affairs, remained, but it naturally did not necessarily imply a formal subordination, as the Minister could not giveorders directly to the Consular Office. Further, the decision remained, that the Ambassadors could, on especial occasions, suspend the Consuls from their office, but this decision need not necessarily offend the Norwegian susceptibility, as the Ambassadors, though more directly under the influence of the Minister for Foreign affairs, are nevertheless, according to the Norwegian legal point of view, not only Swedish Officials, but Officials of the Union35:1. On the other hand, the form for the interference of the Minister for Foreign affairs with the Consuls was modified in a way which showed great consideration for Norway; thus when a Consul had compromised the United Kingdoms, the Minister of Foreign affairs was to bring the matter before the joint or the Ministerial Council, after which it was laid before the King for decision at a State Council especially dealing with the affairs of that State.

The Norwegian government’s Ultimatum.What reply now does the Norwegian government give to these apparently perfectly fair and moderate demands?35:2

It declares that it »stands to reason» that the Norwegian Consular Office would not issue orders in conflict with those of the Minister for Foreign affairs, and remarks that it is not very appropriate in a form of law, to presuppose want of loyalty in a Public Office35:3. If the Swedish proposals had been accepted, the Norwegian Consular service would have been very largely placed under the control of the Foreign Minister, who is constitutionally a Swedish Minister. It claims for other more important points the unsuitability of a »hierarchal» relation between Swedish and Norwegian officials, and several times cites the decisions of the Consular Committee, the one-sided formal views of which the Norwegiangovernment itself had abandoned. But when the Norwegian government intends offering other guarantees of cooperation between the Minister for Foreign affairs and the Norwegian Consular Office, and that the Consuls shall not exceed the limits of their duties, it has only to refer to the loyalty of the Norwegian Consular Office, and its interest in keeping Norway from being compromised abroad, guarantees, which, of course, have their significance, when reliable, but manifestly are not of the legislative binding nature intended by the Communiqué. Finally the Norwegian government declares these and sundry other Swedish conditions unacceptable, and adds, that »if they should be adhered to further discussion the Swedish draft about would be useless»36:1. Really a formal ultimatum!

The Swedish government’s reply.Before the Swedish government replied to the Norwegian government’s Ultimatum, the critical attitude of the Consular negotiations became the subject of debate in the Lower Chamber of the Swedish Diet, and from the liberal party’s side, a strong appeal was made to the government to try, if possible, to avoid any interruption of the negotiations. The reply of the Swedish Cabinet is dated Jan. 30th 190536:2. Its tone is oneafdecision tempered with undoubted moderation and good-will. The Cabinet firmly maintains the real grounds of the disputed claims. It especially emphasizes the importance of the Minister for Foreign affairs having the power in exceptional cases to interfere in Consular matters, as the limits between the Diplomatic and Consular operations are exceedingly indistinct and, on both sides, there is a natural tendency to extend operations into departments that had previously been considered as belonging to the other party. The reference, made by the Norwegian Cabinet, to the Consular Committee’s resolution that the Norwegian Consuls should be entirely under the control of Norwegian authority, was met by the Norwegian Cabinet’s own admissions, that the Minister for Foreign affairs should be authorised to give the separate Consuls instructions, and, herewith the claimthat, in the Diplomatic branch of affairs, the Norwegian Consuls should be solely under the control of Norwegian authority may be considered void. Furthermore it points out the unsatisfactory attitude of the Norwegian proposal with reference to the guarantees presupposed by the Communiqué that the Consuls shall not exceed the proper limits of their duty, and the objection made only on Norway’s side, that the best guarantee would be the control exercised by the Norwegian Consular Office, is met on the grounds that a guarantee of that kind was not intended in the Communiqué, as it had nothing to do with the internal relations between Norwegian Consuls and the Norwegian Consular Office.

On the whole the Swedish Cabinet maintains its claims, but it offers to modify them, if they can be proved to be in conflict with the provisions of the Communiqué. Furthermore the possibility is not excluded, of making on other accounts changes and modifications in the proposed resolutions, but their essential items must »be adhered to». The Cabinet does not consider itself entitled, in the interests of the Union, unconditionally to refuse the points designated by the Norwegian Cabinet.

The Norwegian government breaks off negotiations.To this document from the Swedish Cabinet, is immediately despatched the reply, »that the Norwegian Cabinet finds no grounds for further communication on the matter.»

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